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2008

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EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES

Major General Ferenc Kovacsics
Military Security Office

KOSOVO

It is well worth to study the current situation of Kosovo, as there are two Hungarian military units serving in peacekeeping role at this theatre of operations (in KFOR at Pristina and Pec). They are protected by our Office through deployed security officers.

Historical review

In Hungary's South-Eastern neighbour, following the wars erupting on the remains of Tito's Yugoslavia: the Balkans- and the Kosovo war of the '90s, the situation seems to be consolidating.

However, there are several events indicating that this is not yet the time to be relieved, and this region divided by nationalism still deserves increased attention.

Between 1945 and 1989 in the Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia, Kosovo used to be an autonomous region (just like Voivodina). In 1989 its status was cancelled, its Parliament dissolved. The „Little-Yugoslavia” formed in 1992 did not restore the previous status of these two regions. The Kosovar Albanians founded their parliament against the prohibition of Belgrade. Since then Kosovo has been the region of permanent riots and fights, the repeated demonstrations, and clashes became every day events. As a consequence of the Serbian countermeasures, masses of Albanians started to migrate, mainly to Albania.

In 1992 the Liberation Army of Kosovo (UCK) was formed and it began a war for establishing Great-Albania. Until 1995, the Albans had been kept out of the establishment.

After the WW II. 700.000 Albanian and 300.000 Serb lived in the area, but the end of '90 years the number of Albanians increased approximately to 2 millions and the number of Serbs decreased 150.000. After the war in Kosovo

and the entry of KFOR peacekeeping forces the above-mentioned rate shifted further towards the Albanians. Nowadays, according to the unofficial data – the number of Serbs, who live in permanent fear decreased to 30-35.000.

The majority of Serbs could not submit to the idea that the southern province had been practically detached from the homeland, and the Serbs living in Kosovo forced to get minority status. In this new situation and fleeing from revenge of the Albanians approximately 200.000 Serbs left their home. The hostile feelings against Albanians do not block the economic, especially trading relationships.

Today it is expected that Kosovo will not stay with Serbia. Sooner or later the Serbs have to accept the detachment of Kosovo. It is clear, that the Serbs want to protect the Serb minority in Kosovo. The loss of the province would mean significant defeat and would create an increase of nationalism in Serbia. Union of Kosovo and Albania is unthinkable in the short term; for reasons discussed later.

Autonomy of Kosovo is hard to execute, but the Serbs have to accept this situation if Kosovo grant the minority rights and the protection of Serb historical monuments. According to Kosovar Serbs, the UN public services failed and for this reason they asked presence of Serb armed forces. It is possible, that the conflict will escalate and expand to Serbia or Macedonia where Albanians live. Moreover, it is possible, that other nationalities will follow the example of Kosovo, if the present status of Kosovo changes. Therefore, it seems, that no permanent historical resolution has been achieved in the Balkans, and the critical balance could overturn easily.

If we are focusing on the particular circumstances of the separation of Kosovo, we need to underline, that it would mean the immediate redrawing of present borders. This would create a destabilizing precedent in the Balkans at other parts of Serbia and in Macedonia and in Bosnia. Moreover, we may think of other regions as well, because China and Russia refuse such similar situations, since it could suggest that if minorities take up arms and call the attention of the international community, they could establish a new, ethnically homogeneous small state, with the support of the international community.

For example, when the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia, and Czechoslovakia collapsed the internationally recognised inner and outer borders of the republics remained. In case of Kosovo, both the inner and the outer border will change as well. If someone believes that the Serb minority could live in Kosovo in peace for a long time has not the foggiest idea about reality.

It is very interesting to mention the example of Belgium, where the Walloons and Flemish have been forced into a federal state for 125 years now, and which, despite the high living standard, democracy and federalism, they still cannot fully accept. In spite of this, without the EU centre there, and Brussels was not in the Flemish territory they would have already separated from each other for a long time. So far, they could manage to accomplish this, because of – among other reasons – the EU centre.

Actual status of Kosovo

Mr. Matte Ahtisaari, the special representative of UN Secretary General, in his March 2007 report to the Security Council, suggested the Kosovo province of Serbia to become independent with international control.

According to the main points of report the independence would be the only way which could promise stability and a politically and economically manageable Kosovo, because the re-enstatement of Serbian authority would be unacceptable for the majority of inhabitants and it would set off vigorous opposition. On the other hand, the autonomy of Kosovo inside the Serbian borders could not be maintained.

Kosovo cannot remain under international administration without end, but during initial period the independence of Kosovo „has to support and control with international civil and military presence”. The international control would be authorised with significant rights regarding specific key areas, focusing on such as the rights of communities living in Kosovo, decentralisation, protection of the Serbian Orthodox Church of and the constitutionality. These functions would counter any measures opposing the spirit and text of the resolution plan. The control of international authorities would end when Kosovo completes its responsibilities set in the resolution plan.

After the resolution plan takes effect, a 120 days transitional period will begin, and during this time UN administration (UNMIK) – which has worked since 1999 – perform duties.

During the transitional period, the Kosovo national assembly in consultation with the representative of international community approves the new constitution, and other laws, which are necessary to accomplish the resolution and create establishments. At the end of the transitional period the mandate of UNMIK will finish and authority is handed over to Kosovar administration. In nine months from the resolution plan taking effect, general and local authority elections must be held in Kosovo.

After the report came out, Frantisek Kasicky, the Defence Minister of the Slovak Republic, announced that without Serbian agreement, the Slovakian government would not support any kind of autonomy of Kosovo. According to the Slovakian point of view they could not support any process, which led to a final situation in which a national minority of a motherland makes a claim to set up another state.

In June 2007, the Russian government expressed doubts about the Kosovo recommendation to the Security Council by the western countries, which would internationally assure the independence of Kosovo. This step was not unexpected, because the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs had notified that Russia will take stand for the interests of Serbia. Belgium, United Kingdom, France, Germany, Italy, Slovakia, and the US prepared this document in consideration of the declared worry of Russia. This time, London gave in the draft of the document, which included several compromises to win the support of Moscow. Serbia would like to extend at least a partial sovereignty to the province in any case; therefore, Serbia pressed the start of new negotiations assisted by UN. Russia is backing this Serb demand.

In June 2007, while the above mentioned six states attempted to find a solution to the situation of Kosovo through diplomatic channels, the Serb separatists threatened to start a new civil war. One of their main reasons is that, if Kosovo, with Albanian majority became independent, the Serb minority would fight for their independence. For example, in the town of Kosovska Mitrovica, the Serb inhabitants are majority. The streets are decorated with flags of Serbia, and the portraits of Vojislav Seselj, charged with war crimes by the court of The Hague, could be seen all over the town.

In the northern part of the province, a mass of approximately 20,000 Serbs live. Earlier this territory had belonged under the UN administration, but the supervising troops of NATO left this land. For the Albanian minority of 1500-2000 living here it is like the for Serbs living in Southern part of Albania, they live in ghettos and in everyday fear. The Serb officials already declared if the province wins independence, the northern part of Kosovo separate from the province. In that moment, the 60,000 Serbs living in the South will go to North and probably they will run into an Albanian resistance. According to the Albanians if the northern part of Kosovo separates, it may even start the war against Serbia.

On 17 of September the Serbian Government decided that the elections of local authority should be conducted at same time in Serbia and in the parts of Kosovo inhabited by Serbs. As the point of view for Serbia and the Belgrade leadership, only those elections are legal which are held at the same time in the territories of Serb majority and other parts of Serbia.

It is a problematic question, when it will happen, just one thing is sure: it must be proclaimed until 31 of December. However, the commissioner of the Secretary General of the UN supervising Kosovo announced the parliamentary and local elections to 17 November. Last week, the Serbian government recommended to the 100-200.000 Serbs, still living in their old homeland, not to participate on the parliamentary elections. From the opposition parties there was more criticism to the recommendation in Belgrade, because the parties argued that the Serbs in Kosovo deprive themselves from the last chance to vindicate their democratic rights if they do not send any representative to parliament in Pristina.

It deserves an expressive attention, that the Serbian Prime Minister Vojislav Kostunica said in an interview it 22,09,07, that if Kosovo wins independence, the world should face „devastating consequences”. The Prime Minister sees this decision as a violation of international laws. P.M. Kostunica said that the negotiations were the best way, whilst accuse Albans that they are just waiting for the time limit of 120 days to end, and then to declare their independence right away. On 10 September 2007 Secretary of State Vuk Jeremic said that, if any solution coming from abroad or which is enforced upon the situation threatens the stability of the whole Western–Balkans region.

On 31 August 2007 Tomislav Nikolic, deputy chairman of Radical Party Of Serbia, said: „There exists a danger, that if territory is thaken from a country, that country will start a war.” His party – the most powerful opposition power – will adjure the government to break diplomatic relationships with every state, who may acknowledge the independence of Kosovo. (In more subtle words Prime Minister Kostunica also forecast the same a fey weeks ago.) Belgrade is using dual rethorics, as the Serb foreign minister said: even if Kosovo declares its independence, Belgrade won’t use military force. (The Kosovar Albanians have already mentioned, that after the November elections they are ready to declare their independence.)

At the same time, he referred to UN article 1244 stating Kosovo as a province of Serbia. According to the Serb politician if the Serbia and the other parts of the region are seriously destabilized, it will cause serious problems in the fulfillment of Serbian reforms concerning EU integration.

On 10 September 2007 Dusan Prokovic assistant-secretary of Kosovo–affairs said: „there is a right of Serbia to send back its troops into the province, and cancel the agreement with NATO, which prescribe the withdrawal of Serb military units”. He also said, that Belgrade is ready to apply total economic embargo against the Albanian-inhabited province.

Currently the Serbs and Kosovar Albans are trying to solve the more and more burning question of the peaceful arrangement around a conference table in New York. In case the talks fail, Brussels and Washington seem to be ready to recognise the independence of the province. It was leaked out, that in case of their independence Kosovo will offer to Belgrade to sign a mutual friendship pact.

The other side will present the concept of partial autonomy inside the country, which would give the 95% of affairs of the province into hands of Albanians. This 95% was interpreted by the minister of Kosovo affairs of Serb Government that only a “weak and minimal” connection would remain to the mother country.

For Belgrade the integrity of the country is the red line which they do not want to cross during present negotiations, and that may be guessed the Albanians will refuse. The UN set a deadline at 10 December this year, for the parties to make an agreement. Earlier this failed; Martti Ahtisaari was not able to make advances in the point of view of the two parties. The Kosovar Albanians do not make it a secret that when the time for the negotiations runs out, they will proclaim independence whether the UN agree or not.

There is a matter which complicates the situation, as the Kosovar Serb National Assembly in August 2007 officially asked the Serb Government, according 1244 UN-SC. Decision, to send 1000 Serb soldiers and policemen into Kosovo on be half of defence of Serb historical an religions memorial places and Serb citizens. The KFOR announced immediately that they do not allow the deployment of Serbian soldiers and policemen into Kosovo.

According to analysis the Serb forces deploying into Kosovo could not move the Albanians towards compromise. The aim of the Serbian suggestion could have been to encourage the Albanian extremist for action against Serbs, to improve Serb positions during negotiations.

Another information that could be connected to the Kosovo situation that the Supreme Defence Council of Albania held a meeting led by Bamir Topi President of the Republic. The Prime Minister, and Minister of Defence Home Secretary, Foreign Secretary, minister of Justice and the Chief of staff of Albanian Armed Forces took part in the meeting. The main subject of the meeting was the evaluation of the Kosovo situation. At the meeting The President of the Republic confirmed the official point of view of Albania, i.e. they regard the Ahtisaari-plan to be the only acceptable solution to settle the issue of Kosovo. The President asked the participants of council (in case the decision on the status of Kosovo is delayed) to be ready to handle the security risks regarding the safety of Albania.

After the meeting of Supreme Defence Council news appeared in the Serbian press, that the Albanian Armed Forces, Boarder guard and Police were put to higher readiness because of Kosovian situation. However, these news were not confirmed so far, and it is possible that the Serbian press twisted the news in order increase the tension.

Summary

In order to protect the soldiers serving in the missions, we have to take into consideration the words of the Serbian Prime Minister about „devastating results” in case of separation.

However, he may define his words as a warning for the International Community namely he called attention to avoid a dangerous precedent. This must be emphasized, as several states worry about their own integrity from the attempts of minorities’ to gain autonomy.

It complicates the situation, that because of the considerations describes above, Brussels may not recognise the independent Kosovo, because such a precedent in the international law would mean problem for several mamber states, as some countries, e.g. Slovakia, Romania, already expressed dislike just as Cyprus and Greece as well.

It is questionable whether the pressure of Washington would be enough to convince hesitating countries. Washington called EU to support the Kosovo independence, because „this is the only solution, which potentially could stabilise the situation in the Balkans”.

* * *

According to previously discussed points, it can be expected that whatever the result will be of the talks on Kosovo in December, to one of the sides it will not be fully acceptable. Therefore the possibility of escalation of turmoil or armed conflict cannot be excluded, which are affect the security of the KFOR and the Hungarian Missions is the theatre.

With this knowledge the MSO in the next period, during the mission in Balkan, will strengthen the cooperation with the members of partner services in order to provide early-warning of the conflicts that will come. During this cooperation - in consideration of the priority of Hungarian interest - we will turn significant attention on information that can influence the security status of contingents on their area of responsibility.

As I mentioned in the introductory remarks, in both Hungarian military Missions MSO have deployed security officers. So, in the next period we can daily evaluate, actualise the security status of the personnel, the camp, the critical infrastructure and facilities. We make proposals to the unit commanders in order to take the necessary measures against potential security risks..

Designated sections of our Office are ready to give operational support to the contingents and KFOR based on collected and analysed intelligence.

At home base we cooperate – because of the Kosovo situation – with the partner services, the Police, the Border Guards and the liaison-officer of CIA. In order to enhance effective counter-measures against terrorism we make closer cooperation with NATO partner organisations: AC CI, NOS and the partner services of allied countries in KFOR.

In the interest of handling the future situation we suggested to the Hungarian military leadership to task the Commanders of Hungarian military contingents in Kosovo to actualise crisis situation plans and tasks.

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21st SECURITY CHALLENGES

In the second half of the 20th and at the beginning of the 21st century Europe and our country had to meet several security challenges. At the beginning of the 90s, by the end of the cold war new challenges appeared in the security environment of Europe, which required new answers and reactions. The 9/11 terror attack in against the USA revealed a more developed form of terrorism, connected to the Islamic radicalism.

The terror threat of Hungary is relatively of low level. At the same time, our Membership in the NATO and the European Union is bears such risks, which require preparedness on behalf of our national security services.

Security risks

At the beginning of the 21st century many basic changes have happened concerning national security challenges both in Europe and all around the world. The break-up of the bipolar world order has brought up new priorities; most of them are of political, economical and social origin. Among the new security challenges, terrorism should be mentioned, which took organized shape at the end of the 1960s and has grown into a global threat by the end of the 20th century. There is a new phenomenon, the appearance of multinational terrorist groups and their cooperation regardless of the geographical distances.

It is hard to characterize terrorist actions, as their motivations and implementations might significantly differ. Their common feature is that the actions are committed in the name of mainly political or religious causes, unknown and insignificant to randomly chosen victims. The purpose of such terror actions is always raising fear, dread, so that the attention of the society is drawn to questions important to terrorists.

Nowadays a new generation of terrorists has appeared, applying the most modern inventions of science and informatics, communicating through the Internet when preparing and executing an action. Terror threat has also grown by illegal weapon and drug trade, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, the illegal shipping of hazardous materials and human smuggling. The freedom

and liberalism of western democracies as well as the easy passing of frontiers help terrorists.

Poverty, blank future, the lack of religious rights for ethnicities, all increase aptitude for terrorism. It causes a dilemma in democracies that proposes the defense of civil security at any price.

The fight against terrorism has relations to foreign affairs, military, economy, finance, security, environment protection and human rights. The aversion of terrorism is a governmental issue, belonging to organizations responsible for national security. Terrorism means a global threat to all democratic states; therefore governments need to cooperate on wider terms.

Features of terrorist actions and prevention

The common characteristic of terrorist movements is that they are committed for mostly religious and political causes, unknown and not important for victims randomly chosen. The fundamental function of terrorist actions is creating fear because it calls the attention of the political leaders and society of the given country to issues relevant to terrorist groups. Well-developed telecommunication, the natural freedom of press in western countries assures the desired dread to increase fear into mass panic.

In the era following the Millennium a new generation of terrorists appeared, similarly to organized crime. They utilize the most modern inventions of science and informatics, use communication through the Internet for preparing and executing actions. International terrorism, a new manifestation of violence is a complexity of ideological, political and geopolitical elements. It came into existence in a historical progression. It started in France, followed by the Euro-terrorism in the 1980s, and was finally created as a result of Middle Eastern confrontation.

At the beginning of the 1990s, the communist world system collapsed, bringing up new possibilities for creating tension. Terrorism has adapted itself to the new situation quite fast, grew stronger and by the appearance of radical Islam, it expanded all over the globe.

The expansion of Islamic fundamentalism in its most radical form is a new phenomenon, a severe intimidation, as it is not just a cultural threat of civilization, but a gigantic ideology spreading fast and lacking nationality.

As this threat is increased by illegal weapon trade and the expansion (proliferation) of weapons of mass destruction (atomic, biological and chemical), terrorists can easily obtain modern, at times mass destructive or chemical

arms. Freedoms in western democracies, the penetrability of border-lines favor these groups.

Another great problem is poverty, being present in most part of the world, as mentioned above, hopeless local situations, the absence of rights of religious ethnicities. They might help terrorism to find followers in these areas as they set western welfare states as the cause of misfortune. The problem of the leaders of well-developed democratic states is how to provide civil security without violating freedom rights. It is a central topic of debates on regulating operations of national security organizations in law.

From the parliamentary suggestions of Hungary's security politics it becomes obvious that the definition of national security is much wider than the activities of intelligence services. The Constitution also stipulates duties of national security to be fulfilled by the Parliament, the President of the Republic, the government, military services and the police, judicial organizations and the prosecution.

Moreover, the fight against terrorism is connected to political, military, economical, financial, public-security, environmental, human rights, etc. issues. Partial tasks of averting terrorist actions are build in the profile of certain state bodies. Steps against terrorism are extremely important for national security topics, because the system of means to avoid such actions is insufficient in most cases.

Services, along information retrieval described in their terms of reference, collect information both openly and using secret methods. However, exposition and interception occur using intelligence tools.

Summary

Terrorist actions, as manifestations of political aggression and terror threats are important means of demoralizing democracies. The phenomenon has been already proved, geopolitically speaking, however, terrorist actions contain significant criminal elements as well.

Terrorist menace has newly gained political significance in its nature and expression and qualifies itself as one type of warfare.

Terrorism develops in a special form and returns to a strategy consisting of three basic principles:

- hidden;
- international solidarity;
- initiation.

Characteristics of international terrorism

Characteristics of international terrorism can be summarized by the followings:

- stronger ethnical or religious ties (Islamic radicalism);
- limited targets and unlimited target areas;
- operation within one sector against western interests and forces;
- becoming even more anti-American;
- growing strategic dimensions;
- taking the form of vehement aggression.

The only way to stop spreading international terrorism is to step up against it globally.

Answers to terror attacks might have crucial influence on international terrorism.

Well-organized terror strikes show that the genuine origins of international terrorism are not to be found in poor Islamic countries. Al-Kaida has proven to originate from the wealthiest and culturally most well developed Islamic countries in the Middle East, having members belonging to the upper-middle classes or the elite layer of the society, getting degrees at western universities.

Today the most modern form of international terrorism has been born, the so-called supra-national terrorism, which is not controlled by any state. Practically speaking, its first action was the terror attack on America.

In the 21st century Hungary's security tasks are eased by NATO and EU memberships as well as joining an information system which provides reports from American, British, French and German intelligence services supported by modern technical, personal and financial conditions.

Stipulated by law, Hungary has set up the Coordinating Centre against Organized Crime in April 2001. It is permitted to request for or provide information to intelligence services and other organizations entitled to collecting data. The expectation in connection with the planned change of structure and intelligence tasks is the emphasis on prognosis.

If no data based upon analysis imply that certain people staying in Hungary or objects are threatened by terror strikes, though several institutions or banks have actually been warned by unknown callers, Hungary can be judged not as primary target for a terrorist attack.

At the same time, Hungary's NATO and EU membership might draw international terrorist groups' attention to our country. The threat might increase if some terrorists wish to attack interests (councils, companies, and cultural institutions) of EU and leading NATO countries, judging Hungary's tools of exposition and aversion rather weak.

Hungary's becoming a receptive country after the political transformation might be another issue, basically thousands of strangers living in Hungary have residency certificates, and many of them have already obtained Hungarian citizenship. Most of them have already integrated into the society but some represent radical political views and react quite sensitively to problems of their native country.

Of course it is incorrect to classify foreign communities or religious groups living in Hungary as dangerous as mentioned above simply because of their religious, cultural or educational practice. However, international experiences show that terrorists tend to use business interests, cultural institutes and foundations belonging to religious or ethnical communities as a cover organisation.

Another insecurity factor in Hungary is illegal migration and the intensification of human-trafficking. Although Hungary is not a primary target, she is rather a part of the transit traffic towards the EU; it cannot be disregarded that some routes might be used to transport terrorists to target-countries.

Security challenges of the NATO in the 21st century

After the cold war, in the 1990s, Europe's security has greatly changed. At the same time, new challenges appeared that required fresh reactions from the NATO. It had to build tight partnership with Central and Eastern-European countries and integrate the qualified ones into the organization.

The first example of this new attitude was Kosovo and Bosnia. The next one was the Middle East bearing strategic importance both for Europe and the United States. Because of the proximity to Europe, the conflict in Iraq has already started to show influence, since both European and American countries rely on Middle Eastern energy resources.

One of the fundamental issues of the NATO in that area is to eliminate terrorism and to stop the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.

In the 20th - but also in the beginning of the 21st - century, we could face the fast development of technologies. As a result, despite the limitations and regulations, many countries will soon be able to produce chemical and biologi-

cal weapons and the missiles to carry them. The increasing export of traditional arms might give a reason to worry as well; the gun makers pay only attention to big foreign demands and don't see whom they are selling the products to.

Information warfare hides the biggest danger. Opponents of the NATO have already tried to use such preparedness against the Alliance's civil and military infrastructure. (During the Kosovo war Serbian IT experts (Information Technology) have disabled the websites of the White House and the NATO). Thus it can happen in the future that the information systems of NATO members get either paralyzed or receive false data to destroy them.

The civil and military intelligence services of NATO-countries depend strongly on these information systems, therefore they become more and more vulnerable to such warfare. It is dangerous that some well-trained IT experts paid by poorer countries might incapacitate a country's computer system which can lead to the collapse of information and intelligence systems within some days.

Conclusion

1./ The European geopolitical reorganization influenced crucially and perceptibly the continent's security situation. At the same time, some areas are still in crisis the treatment of which imposes hard tasks to the European security-policy systems. For Hungary it means that she is directly concerned in solving the region's security problems, dealing with crisis, since the Southern-Slavic turmoil has hardly settled, so that the threats could reappear.

2./ International terrorism is already able to use information warfare to reach its targets, and some well-trained, or well-paid IT experts hired by poorer countries can damage a country's computer systems, which can lead to the collapse of applied information and intelligence systems in a couple of days. The result might be the given country's full political and economical breakdown.

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Dr. Habil Judit Balázs

CHANGES AND DANGERS AT THE DAWN OF THE 21ST CENTURY

Traditionalists generally agree that numerology indicates fundamental changes in mankind's history around the year 2000. Whether or not one believes in that, it seems factual that the 20th century world-order has perished and the outlines of a new one are beginning to show themselves.

Paradoxically, the new economical-political-military order stems from the complex security system which was shaped soon after World War II. The new one was manifest by the US intervention in the Kosovo crisis,¹ the first time a non-European power played the leading role in a series of events on an European scene. That makes us wonder whether such a war – labelled as 'local' – is just the next milestone on the road of mankind's history or the first challenge of the 21st century.

Substantial analyses bear out the claim that the Yugoslav crisis was subsequent of the pacification in and after 1945, the economical, military, social and moral tension caused by the 'Cold War' and the realigning (restructuring) that followed the disappearance of the bipolar system. *All these served as a prelude to a non-European power's intervention on the Balkans and the reappraisal of the complex institutionalised system of security.*

Three pedestals of the institutionalised world order and security

As it is shown on the following flow-sheet, the world-order – shaped after World War II. – used to be based on economy, politics and military power. The post-war economical recovery was granted by The World Bank, while the stability of courses of exchange was guarded by the IMF. It was left for GATT to bring dynamism to trade relations, and several other international organisations were created to improve and enhance the safety and effectiveness of world-economy.²


The United Nations guarded the global political security, and the terms *international peace* and *security* – worded in its Charter – seemed to be valid world-wide. Built on the Security Council's right of veto, the policy of inaction was aimed to avoid any global confrontation. In fact, the international peace was not based on global security, but on the great (nuclear) powers capability to retaliate.

¹ In an interview military experts were asked whether the NATO's intervention in Kosovo was a prelude to or a rehearsal of a new world order. They replied that *it was the beginning of the drama itself.*

² Here the term *world-order* means a political system and refers to that of the West, from which the so called 'socialist block countries' were excluded after World War II.

In the period of the Cold War the balance of power between NATO and the Warsaw Pact provided for military security which had institutionalised conditions. In that period alliances secured international peace; national security materialised through those (see Flow-sheet No. 1).

Flow-sheet No. 1



The Process of Disuniting

Placed on the three pedestals, the institutionalised system of security lived almost three decades before it suffered its first crack: the oil-crises in the seventies. On the surface it seemed to be of economical origin, while – in fact – it was politically motivated.³ The Bretton-Woods-System came to an end, the stability of courses of exchange was replaced by ‘flotation’, the institutionalised stabilisation – provided by The World Bank and the IMF – suffered changes, and Keynes’ theory on influencing business-cycles was questioned. That marked an end to an age which has since been labelled as ‘the golden age of capitalism’. Differentiation showed among the third world countries themselves. The oil-importing countries got indebted. The role of the so called ‘petro-dollars’ has become more and more important in the world-economy; all these have led to the restructuring of the world-economy.

It took not longer than two decades for the second crack to come: the bipolar system – the factor, which proved to be decisive even though a number of hubs of economy had formed in third countries – disappeared. Together with that system the world-order – the order that used to be based on hemispheres of military influence – also perished. The myth on the USSR’s economic power has gone, giving a good example of the failure of the military-stimulated economies.

As early as in the eighties it became obvious that security could not be granted by large stocks of weaponry and military strength. After a political stagnation (typical of the ‘Cold War’), the orthodox Marxists’ rigid political and social attitude unhardened in the Soviet-block countries, and thus let the non-military factors of security gain strength. Those factors could not be treated by force. Nuclear deterrent made sense no more (some people say it has never made sense at all). So some potential (those of economy, of business-relations and of safety elements of trade) appreciated. At the same time, and it is something of a paradox, currents of destabilisation caused depression in the global economy within the complex system of security. With the crisis deepening, it has become more and more obvious that new – scientifically based – methods⁴ should be used to handle the destructive tendencies worldwide.

In the last third of the 20th century the world economy rested on three large pedestals: North America, The European Union and Japan (plus the Far Eastern countries). Within these regions semi-centres gained a greater scope of authority to make policies of their own and safeguard regional interests right

³ Here we cannot give a detailed explanation on who and how triggered and manipulated the crisis which resulted in a new order of economical capabilities and potentials.

⁴ While in the ‘70s monetarism-influenced policies of economy conducted to some results, such policies proved virtually insufficient in the ‘90s.

after the bipolar system had come to an end. However, the issue of security is far too complex to be given in such a simplified model.

For a comparatively short period of time it seemed as if global co-operation would replace global confrontation. Theoreticians made several efforts to prove that trade connections used to be determined by ideologies. They suggested that the elimination of ideological obstacles would unite mankind and help mankind to prosperity. A number of studies envisioned a *complex* system of security replacing the former one based on military reasons. They also hoped for the economical aspects of security gaining priority.

However, it was left out of consideration that the politically still regions used to be the key factor of security; those sectors happened to be East of the Cold War's east-west 'demarcation line'. East of that line social tranquillity was preferred to 'development' and 'reshaping' and 'being constantly on the move'; ideas which have long had magic strength west of that line. It is also interesting to know that the end of the bipolar system weakened the cohesion which the so called 'Soviet threat' used to create in the West.

Once oppressed for reasons of balance of power, the problems of economy began showing themselves in the 1990s. At the same time new conflicts came about through some destabilising currents which had been present in the global economy for decades. Paradox that (within the complex system of security) the world *economy was developing contradictions* and growth-hindering currents *in the very period when economical capability was supposed to be of first rate importance*. Among these circumstances the trends of globalisation made their way and overwhelmed the nation-states' endeavours to carry out their own points. The gap between Centre-countries and Periphery-countries has further widened and undermined security (be it national or international).

One may hardly go wrong by saying that the interests and counter-interests in security are so much interwoven with the economical, political and cultural endeavours that no (economically-based) concept of pure national security might be put to practice. Towards the end of the Cold War it was more and more difficult to mark the difference between national and international security. The system to link international, global security to national interests is to be worked out ever since.

Due to such circumstances the third crack was resulted; it weakened the political pedestal by lessening the weigh of the Security Council's decisions. NATO's action in Kosovo – the first military operation in Europe since the end of World War II. – was ordered without the approval by the Council. Theoretically speaking, this step was a milestone on our road to dissolving the previous, institutionalised system of complex security.

It was the *economy* that suffered the first crack (through the collapse of the Bretton-Woods' System). The end of the bipolar *military* system marks the second crack. And the third crack came when the *political* system of international peace and security (institutionalised by the United Nations) dissolved; the United States played a stabilising role no more. The first of the three cracks came thirty years after World War II., the second twenty years after the first, and the third ten years after the second – rather like the rising tone of the whistle of a coming locomotive. That roaring engine may symbolise the third millennium; it is to be seen whether that is pulling a new world-order (or the very lack of it) behind.

New World-Order?

Flow sheet No. 2 is aimed to show the predictable trends of world's economy in the decades to come. Obviously, after the dissolution of the institutionalised world-order, an un-institutionalised one might influence the trends of power-policy. By the end of the twentieth century, *competition and co-operation were present simultaneously* in the most complex system of world-economy. The global output around the year 2000 was about five times of that of fifty years ago. Admittedly: the economical growth seemed to be slowing down. The rapid growth right after World War II. has become less and less intensive; there was a 4.6% increase of gross output in the 1960s, it reduced to 3.6% in the 1970s, to 2.7% in the 1980s, to 2.4% in the 1990s.

These positive figures hide a grave disproportionateness in terms of distribution. The gap between the so-called 'North' and 'South' – or the 'Centre' and the 'Periphery' – has been growing more and more intensively. Social inequalities are also on the rise. Within every one of the nations – as well as within the nations' community – one fifth of the population seems to have secured its leading role over the rest of four-fifth. On the international level, competition is becoming more and more aggressive and co-operation less and less calculable. The first years of the new millennium have a heavy burden of an unfolding social crisis.

The world-economy could certainly do with some applicable theory; without that it is difficult to find answers to the new challenges; the so-called 'restrictive monetarism' is considered effective no more. Keynes' theory (aimed at interest-reducing and demand-aggregating) is also questioned.

With globalisation entering a higher stage of development, the role of multinational corporations is becoming more and more important.⁵ Their dominance is still increasing. In the world-economy there is a structural change going

⁵ It is in my understanding that at the end of the 1990s almost 60 thousand transnational corporations possessed more than half a million sister corporations in 173 countries the world over. As a result of the waves of fusion and acquisitions large and even larger corporations are formed frequently.

on, in which the sector of production and the sector of finance are getting apart. The latter is becoming independent from the former. Monetary sectors the world over are fast integrating and becoming more and more internationalised (including those of national concern). Development of the world-economy and sustenance of the economical growth – in each one of the countries – is getting more dependent on the international monetary sector (the multiply combination of a network formed by states, stock-exchanges, money-markets, national and international monetary institutes as well as regional and global councils and agreements).

This phenomenon – a strong de-stabiliser to all currents in the world-economy – represents a twofold danger. There is a monetary crisis creeping towards the money markets. Capital is directed not into production but to the more profitable stock jobbery; the ‘financial bubble’ is on the rise. Money-markets and stock-exchanges are unique in offering the quickest opportunities to gain or lose fabulous fortunes. All these account for the shortage as well as the abundance of capital; two phenomena that exist simultaneously, drive economies bankrupt, overthrow political regimes and – all in all – may lead to serious malfunctions in the world-economy.

These factors brought major changes and challenges to global security. At the dawn of the new millennium the ‘uncontrollable currents’ – shown on **Flow sheet No. 1** – seem to be getting stronger. The significant trend they follow fragment, first of all, the world-economy; one of the pedestals of the world-security is getting less stable. Obviously the dangerous non-economical (or not strictly economical) currents are gaining strength and are getting out of the national governments’ range of control. The more they are out of control the more dangerous they are; criminals seem to be most interested in some sectors of international concern: information technologies, traffic of drugs and terrorism. The world misses the means to handle these problems. What is more: the concept of security itself *is* insufficient for it has bogged down in surface details without ‘zooming out’. In other words: there are too many phenomena left without a unifying theory. A systematic classification of policies of security (and what we expect of them) could serve to develop the abstract framework we need – but where is it?

The endeavour to redefine ‘national security’ is aimed to figure out what sort of ‘defensive reactions’ might be expected, what nature the conflicts might have, what sort of strategies might be employed to solve future conflicts. The collapse of the bipolar system entailed revolutionary restructuring which influenced the issues of sovereignty and national interest.

As far as military-security is concerned, the first years of the 21st century may be labelled as ‘transient’. In terms of military strength, there is only one

superpower left on Earth: the United States. It was made clean-cut in the Kosovo conflict. Nevertheless, it was the military intervention that raised the question of what international security might mean, what system of security might be considered effective and what guarantees might support it in terms of international law and organisational network. The conflict on the Balkans has also raised the question of whether this new century inherited any 'classical political values' (and, if 'yes', how they should be interpreted). One must think over what categories like 'sovereignty' or 'autonomy' or 'human rights' may refer to.

Power Relations

The main characteristic of the past couple of decades was the US.-West Europe axis, even though at the very beginning – right after the end of World War II. – it happened to be under US predominance. That marked the end of Europe's five hundred year leading role. After the disunion of the USSR there is only one superpower left: the United States. In the past decade the US economy produced 40% of the total output of world-economy. On the eve of the new millennium the US were the only power on earth capable of military actions in space, in air, on land, on sea as well as on the field of information-technology; five dimensions altogether. US military forces are present on all the continents except the Antarctic.⁶

In terms of gross yearly production there is only one integration to be a match for the US. and for the NAFTA; it is the European Union. However, the EU's military power falls far behind that of the US; the former's capability does not include all the five dimensions mentioned above.⁷ There are plans to set up the European Union's own military forces the sooner is the better. However it is premature to say anything about them being an effective support of a sovereign security policy.

These days it is the inherited nuclear potential that marks Russia's once existed superpower status; it remains an open question whether his climacteric economy provides a basis sufficient to sustain the present strength of his armed forces. Russia's 1.2-1.3 million troops must be reckoned with in spite of their weak moral and outdated weaponry. Chances are that Russia is becoming a considerable military power in the region over 10 to 15 years.

⁶ In January 1999 then-president Clinton proposed an USD 100 billion increase of defence expenses between 2000 to 2006 in order to modernise the army and solve some tensions within the military sector. According to Lajos Harmat, Hungarian experts, that step in itself may not be considered as the prelude of a new spiral of arms-race.

⁷ On November 21st 2000 the EU formed its quick reaction force, which is to be ready for combat in (or after) 2003. Some one-quarter of a million soldiers are needed to provide for the shifts and the auxiliary units of the six thousand odd troops which are to make a bridgehead – within a scope of 4000 kms – in not more than sixty days after relevant command and hold on for at least one year.

There are a number of other regions in which such a characteristic leading role is likely to form; China is on the path to superpower status. Huntington highlighted the cultural (civilisation) fault-lines along which, first and most of all, the Muslim resistance is likely to rise.

What sort of actions might the US take is a question of first importance. These days the traditional American attitude of ‘leave me uninfluenced’ is showing itself in Washington’s unilateral decisions. Sometimes his top leaders air their intention to conduct a hard line policy towards either or both China and Russia.⁸

Flow sheet No. 2 is intended to show – among other things – the potential global conflicts which might stem from the (semi) local ones. Some of them make a serious threat. On the right side of the sheet, the term *potential conflict* refers to the names of the potential rivals (and what their clash of interest stem from).

One of the future conflicts might break out between the US and Russia, especially if they cannot come to terms about US military bases being pushed towards the Russian borders. A conflict around China is looming as a result of Beijing’s opposition to the US’s keeping the ‘two Chinas’ doctrine alive. It seems likely that Muslims interpret the Middle East crisis as a ‘threat created by Europeans’.⁹ The US’s ‘Desert Storm Operation’ against Iraq at the beginning of the 1990s¹⁰ may result in the spreading of the conflicts. And so does the Russians’ combat with Muslims on the South nowadays. All in all: the EU may get involved. Conflicts cannot be excluded between Russia and China, as these two giants – unlike other regional powers – have thousands of miles of common border.

Summing up

The first thing to say is that the institutionalised form of world-order – formed right after the end of World War II. – has undergone fundamental changes. Security used to be based on the three pillars shown on Flow-sheet No. 1. With the erosion of the pillars the system itself reached a point where a new world-order is to be formed. Its outlines are already visible while the new picture is yet to be seen; security is getting destabilised on a global scale and mankind faces increasing tension worldwide.

⁸ On the other hand – as it is obvious from the example of the bilateral trade agreement – economical ties between the US and China have been invigorating.

⁹ In this respect North Americans are counted as ‘Europeans’, due – perhaps – to the idea of ‘Judeo-Christianity against Islam’.

¹⁰ The US’s meantime intervention in Afghanistan also fits into the picture. (*The Editor*)

In terms of regional conflicts and their intensity the extents of security are constantly changing; they point towards the need for a complex system. It must include elements like new strategies, new challenges, new risks and new goals (with regard to the nations' political stability as well as their new geopolitical and geo-strategic positions). Priority is constantly shifting; in peaceful periods the political, diplomatic and economical aspects usually outshine those of the military. The latter gains ground at times of crises and wins priority only at times of wars.

It must be noted that a number of different paths and outcomes are possible, of which the following conclusions enumerate the most feasible ones, especially those that happen to fit in with the main trends of systems of security.

On the field of economy the role of multinational companies is becoming dominant.¹¹ Trans-national capital plays a more and more aggressive role, and it overwrites national interests according to the needs of the multinationals. After the end of World War II. the institutionalised form of world-order – based on the bipolar system – was aimed at bringing economical development for all. The collapse of that system is an obvious encouragement to diverging tendencies: the rich gets richer, the poor poorer.¹² Uncontrollable currents (see Flow-sheet No. 1 and 2) are getting more and more impossible, thus they are hard to influence. More and more countries suffer from the same problems worldwide.

Most probably the United States shall be able (or rather: go on) to influence the main political events on Earth. The European Union is likely to advance modest changes in terms of deepening integration and admitting new states to the community. In all probability the US - EU alliance shall be continuing even though there is a definite difference between the *Wilson-principles* (which reflect the Americans' view on collective security) and traditions of European real-politics (which are a combination of ethics and national interests). Recently a number of evidence seemed to highlight that difference; European countries have brought some decisions which indicate their independence from the US. Whether those form a new tendency is an open question as yet. Quite a lot depends on whether the American economy continues the boom. If it lessens, US policy-makers may decide to give a boost to their economy by a new spiral of arms race. And, in due course, that will have some political and military consequences.

¹¹ According to *The Fortune* (periodical): of the world's 500 biggest companies there were as many as 139 with an income larger than the gross national product of 120 countries on earth. In other words: one country out of every three – 60 ones of the world's 180 countries – produce as much as (or a bit more than) the first 139 multinationals.

¹² In terms of income the differences in America are larger than those in Europe. Also: those on the Northern Hemisphere are larger than those on the Southern. Senior officials of the first 150 US companies earned an income *sixty times bigger* (!) than that of the average US family's in 1996.

As it was mentioned above, at the dawn of the new millennium the US is the only superpower nowadays.¹³ What is more: the gap between the US and the military potential of the EU is constantly growing. Europe is unprepared for the new forms of combat encounters (see the right half of Flow-sheet No. 1) The EU has focused on the non-proliferation of weapons and decided to control both the legal and the illegal channels of weapon-trade; these efforts limit the military potentials of the rest of the countries, thus preserve and further enhance the US's vantage.

It is not without ground to assume that the Cold War – as we understand it – may not be resumed and the peril of nuclear confrontation has gone. However, through the newly created (groups of) countries (the ‘Cold War invokers’), the clouds of regional or local wars are still visible. Furthermore there is a chance of Russia's regaining his super-power status. The opposite may also happen: he may slide into the other extreme of gradually losing his political and military weigh. It may not be excluded that some powers in Asia – China, Russia, India, Iran and others – may concentrate and harmonise their efforts.

The ‘farewell to the arms’ seems realistic neither these days, nor in the future. Nevertheless there is hope that the amount (the ‘level’) of armaments may decrease. Decisive changes are expected on the technical side, especially in weapons' effectiveness. As the economically developed countries are capable of financing the costs of arms race, technical advantage is likely to remain with them. Besides traditional and nuclear weapons there will be new forms of warfare present on the battlefields such as ‘information- warfare’, ‘tectonic warfare’, ‘psychological warfare’. Future wars may be based on weapons constructed to disarm the enemy without taking his life.¹⁴


From the scientific point of view the most disturbing aspect of all these weapons is that there seems to be no mechanism to handle (or prevent) conflicts in case they show themselves in some strategic field or area. The post-war legal system is found rather inflexible. So are the old institutions which toil and moil at “governing the world's affairs” without an institutional background.

The eve of the new millennium is marked by a number of symptoms indicating crises in economy; global security seems to get fragmented, thus points forward to military actions. As there is no balance of power, it is highly probable how to guarantee national security, and what sort of institutions might give pause to military intervention.

¹³ Admittedly, some of the Hungarian experts have even worked out a table of those criteria. See for example Lajos Harmath's *Can the Cold War Return?* (An essay in *Biztonságpolitika*, 1999/3-4.)

¹⁴ Weapons like: ● nerve-chemicals, ● anti-vision laser, optical bomb, ● acoustic bomb, ● high-powered microwave, ● mobility-fixing glue (mud), ● tire-dissolver and the like, ● high-powered electronic impulse, etc.

NEW WORLD ORDER



ECONOMICS OF MIGRATION

Security and usefulness of migration

Migration as an important question can be discussed after the security issues are organized and the only focus is on the usefulness of migration. This means the first priority in the strategy of international migration is security. If this fails we cannot focus on the usefulness of migration. In a case of unexpected mass migration, humanitarian action, or any uncontrolled flow, the governance could not turn its interest towards the gain of movement.

Hungary, in the early 90's, was a new inexperienced country nevertheless, how to do deal with an active migration channel which was affected by the global flow, and not only with neighbouring countries. At that time, all efforts were concentrated on hosting the refugees and to operate an effective border control. Only in the second half of 90's, there opened a possibility to the take Hungary's first free breath, because at this period, the supervisor body of international migration could take some actions in consideration on the development of domestic demand based international migration.

Recently, old ideas of migration have changed to new ones. More and more host countries recognised the shifted situation, and agreed on the convergence of goals and common thinking could get more benefit to them, and can highly contribute to keep the security, and not to use more resources for national security. As we all know, the consequences of immigration will be effect and visible, after crossing the border.

All this underlines the roll of new residence and the integration into new home. Including more actors, actors like: in the early stages there were only the migrants and the host country. Nowadays, the migrants, the host country and above these, companies with international interests and regional actor are included in migration, the management flow need more permanent dialogue and to have a better understanding. Who governs the international migration flow? (Rédei 2007)

Migration is an increasingly central dimension of globalisation. The result is a new mobility system characterised by diverse forms of migration patterns. Policy makers and citizens look upon the links between this emerging mobility system and the economic and social outcomes within migrants-sending and migrant receiving countries with growing interest and sometimes with alarm. Can international migration contribute to economic progress? With appropriate

policies and programmes addressing all sectors of societies affected by migration, it can. At present, however, the prospects for economic and other gains from migration are beset by variety of institutional obstacles.

The economics of migration focusing not only on the theme of national rules, but on the local interest as well. I believe, in the near future not only national rules, but regional and urban governance rules will be powerfully formulated and take in force for the reason of manifest its interest. The PR of migration like basic element of trust, will mediate the demand and will supply. It is not the interest of the host country, but even more of the sending countries.

Red card or red carpet?

In mobility literature, the economics of migration can be found in past analysis, or in trade union as a kind of protection reasons, or can be found in order reports about the impact of international migration.¹⁵ One of the basic scientific approaches originates from Gy. Borjas 1994.¹⁶ His article means a milestone in the interpretation of economics of migration. He mentioned the following:

„These questions follow the main stream of policy. According this, the migrant is a person, whose success depends on, how is he able to integrate in a more effectively in the host country labour market. And by his activity is able to contribute to the surplus of the economy.

At the same time of immigration the host region will shoulder several social and catch-up costs. Societies will make better choice if they consider the evidence and social economic realities. Any selection and orientation policy is essential not to raise the social cost of arrivals, to take a similar chosen to the host country population or even more better. This cost can be reduced by a right selection. If the migrant fills a market demand, not only create national gain, but also has impact for the local labour market. E.g. income level, professional preference. In the case of multicultural society it can be diversified.”

All of these things are underline the urgency and significance of multi angle consensus. With the help of a better-explored and mapped situation, the creators of the strategy are able to produce gain. (Rédei 2006)

It is visible how Borjas describes the situation of choice from „best of the worst” to the „worst of the best”.

¹⁵ This October, media announced an ordered analisis requested by the trade union that is about the foreign workers in the frameworker of against black work.

¹⁶ Journal of Economic Literature <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~GBorjas/Papers/JEL94.pdf>




Figure 3. The Self-selection of Return Migrants

Sources: <http://ksghome.harvard.edu/~GBorjas/Papers/JEL94.pdf>

The national selection is based on graduation, which is too general. In practice, the domestic labour force admission system is not able to reflect back the demand in details, like ability, experience, skill and adaptively integration. In most cases, the ISED (International Standard of Education system) on regional level does not combine ISCO (International Standard of Classification on Occupation). So human resources are not used in a proper way. The TNCs could push their labour market interest, because of keeping or even growing their expedite trade. This is the case with a highly qualified people. What is the case with an unskilled one? On their level, there is a stop and/or a strong limit when try to entering a host country. The preference takes in force at the high skill level. On the bottom, there is a „red card” level, refusing the applicants mass and on the top is a „red carpet” to preference and assist, support them.

One fifth of the migrant populations are unskilled or even semi skilled persons on the world. Only 20% are highly skilled, who have more choices and are welcomed by host countries. While the mass is looking for the entering gaps, highly skilled mates are able to bargain about their movement. During the actual bargain, they are evaluated by international expectation, how to “sell” their ability. Both patterns cannot be compared in the awareness of migration decision.

Concerning this problem, Prof. Salt¹⁷ evaluated the domestic system of international workers admission. He queries to mediate settlement and individual companies interest. It looks like a leaky net, where those who want to enter and unskilled, they can enter, and on the other hand, the TNCs are able to get a mastery over the national rules in order to make their chosen and needed employee enter.

¹⁷ J. Salt 2007. Population, Space and Place. vol. 13. issue 1. In whose interests? IT migration is an interconnected world Economy, pp. 41-58.

His results are based on UK cases, but several other countries could share similar patterns. He ensures the readers that multinationals have more experience to put their interest as quick as it is possible to go through. And push them behind the local or even the national interest.

Almost all European countries will experience rapid ageing of their populations and declining workforces in the coming up decades. Projections indicate that the size of the native-born work force in Europe will decline by over 16 million by 2025, and by 2050 nearly 44 million are expected to decline. The Hungarian population estimations are saying: by 2050, nearly 40% population will be over 62 years! (Hablicsek 2006.) It is a new period of ageing. During these decades, we are expecting economic growth. This means that large cohort of potential workforce will seek for work opportunities in Europe and elsewhere. As well, unemployed workers will seek for work opportunities from the less advanced economies mainly east of the European Union. Many with skills and education will continue to seek employment opportunities in the EU for foreseeable future.

The reality of an ageing European population is: declining workforce combined with neighbouring countries suggests an obvious conclusion: the EU and its member states need a rational system of orderly, safe and well-regulated labour mobility.

Spatial distribution of foreigners in Hungary - Hypothesis to a research plan

In the next we would like to say some words about the domestic spatial distribution of foreigners and to test some hypothesis. How they have different impact for the economical and social life, than the local people. In 2006 the stock of foreigner was nearly 150 thousands permit holders, which is 1,5 % of the Hungarian population. See the list of our questions.


We established the following hypothesis for our research:

- A hypothesis the stock of foreigners has more impact on economical disparities as it originates from their number.
- B hypothesis, with or without the present international migration is not only about the causes and consequences questions, even more a multiplicative process. In this process, the internal migration plays determining roll.
- C hypothesis, the unemployment has impact on settlement process. We suppose that the foreigners moved not on to lagging area. They look for the emerging units, where there are more opportunities for them.

By this, we underline the fact that the international migration is not causing local unemployment. As it can be even more shifted by the case of internal flow.

- D hypothesis foreigners are more sensible for the economical situation than the local people. That is the reason why the foreigners are concentrating on the new development area.

Chart 1: The stock of foreign citizens by small territorial units on 01. 01. 2006. (Persons) Source: CSO




The chart 1. shows the regularities of temporary settlement is concentrated to Budapest region and geographically near to the main potential migration sources.

The capital attracts the better skilled people and employed them in international decision branches.

The low skilled people are pulled by services and agriculture.


Especially this spatial distribution was characterised by the membership of Romania. Several new companies were established in South Hungary and benefited for the interregional connection.

Chart 2: The stock of EU 16 citizen by small territorial units on 01.0.1 2006.
(Persons)



In the case of EU15 citizens see the chart 2. that reflects not only the accessibility to the European market, but the graduation structure of foreign citizens. The EU15 citizens have higher ratio of highly skilled people, than among the new member countries.

Chart 3: The centre of settled foreign population by citizenship in 1995–2006.



edited by Aron Kincses

The chart 3. shows that while Hungarian population has practically no shift, the settlement of foreigners pull the weight towards their native country.

Old and New ways of thinking

The new system should not be thought as an immigration system at all: instead, it should be conceptualised as an emerging system of international migration labour mobility. Those who govern the new mobility system should be willing to shape it. Specially, they need to:

- make it clear to the migrants what is expected of them and what they can expect from the host country,
- be willing to explain the logic and rationale of migration policies to the electorate and defend the new system against its oppositional,
- engage with migrants and their countries of origin as genuine partners in governing the mobility system, and
- be willing to adjust immigration postures to reflect on both changing circumstances and the results from ongoing evaluations.

When crafting a new mobility system, governments faces to three principal challenges: 1.) how to foster public confidence in governments' capacity to manage migration in order to generate support for the new policies and institutions: 2.) how to allocate tasks across levels of government-local, regional and global – so-called migration subsidiarity, and 3.) how to ensure migrants' integration into host societies.

As it is the experience during the selection we make decision on the applicant, but most of the cases he her spouses, and children. In admission is important to examine the age structure of together arrivals. All these are issue on the social cost of arrivals. The social security cost paid to the central body, which will cover the health care and later their pension. A young age structure is able to contribute, they will be deposit, and in case of mid age arrivals it will be clearing. To sum up it is not enough to calculate the recent labour market demand, but by a cost benefit analysis to put in balance the social cost. What kind of cost can we get more immigrants? How it is hanging if they are coming form different part of the world? How it is effected the autochthon population living standards?

The spatial internal and international mobility has a strong relation by relocation of workplaces. By the rising comparability of regions and the better accessibility, the relocation mobility of production speeded, and the roll of transportation cost increasing. As Porter recommended it, instead of comparability became an issue the competitiveness.

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CURRENT ISSUES

Col Istvan Toth

NATO TRAINING MISSION – IRAQ



The Start

Based on a request (22 June 2004) from the Iraqi Prime Minister to assist the Iraqi Interim Government in organising and carrying out the training of the Iraqi Security Forces (ISF), the NATO decided (Istanbul Conference) to set up a NATO Training Mission in Iraq (NTM-I) on 30 July 2004. All NATO Allies agreed to provide assistance in Iraq, outside of Iraq, through financial contributions or donations of equipment. The tasks of the mission were to identify training opportunities for the ISF; start training selected groups of headquarters and establish liaison arrangements with the Iraqi Interim Government and Multi National Coalition Forces.


It is important to emphasize that the NATO is involved in training, equipping, and technical assistance – not in combat activities. At an early stage the training mission involved both Allied Command Transformation (Norfolk) and Allied Command Operations (Mons). This mission demonstrated The Alliance`s new capabilities as a 21st Century global security tool, assisting in building and developing new security structure in Iraq.

The initial NATO Training Implementation Mission (officers and NCOs from the above mentioned two Allied Commands) arrived in Iraq on 7th and 14th August with the goal to collect information about the Iraqi military requests and real local circumstances, to create acceptable service and life conditions in order to deploy NATO military training personnel in Baghdad.

The NATO training mission initially focused on the following areas:

- Provision of training and advice to selected groups of HQ personnel, predominantly military;
- Setting up a military academy; a Training, Education and Doctrine Centre (TEDC);
- Coordinating national contributions on military equipment and training (TECC);
- Assisting in the establishment of an Iraqi Training Command.

Training started as early as 18th August. Originally NTM-I consisted of some 45 officers from 10 NATO nations (US, UK, NL, NO, TU, IT, DA, CA, RO, BU). Throughout September and October the mission grew to 60 officers and NCOs. In the first phase of operation the NTM-I personnel advised Iraqi personnel at the National Joint Operations Centre (NJOC), Ministry of Defense Joint HQ, Operations Centre and Ministry of Interior National Command Centre (NCC). Following the North Atlantic Council (NAC) meeting 8th October 2004, LTG David Petraeus was appointed Commander of NTM-I, in pursuit of a permanent command and control arrangement. LTG Petraeus was already in Iraq as the Commander of the Multi National Security Transition Command Iraq (MNSTCI; under the Multi National Force), training both Military and Police units. LTG Petraeus was the first „double-hatted” commander, commanding both MNSTCI and NTM-I. *NTM-I headquarter is located in the International Zone (Green Zone – Cultural Centre), Baghdad. There are also some small groups of trainers, serving in different parts of Baghdad (Figure 1):*



- Ar Rustamiyah (Baghdad SE): Iraqi Military Academy compound, where the TEDC personnel assists Iraqi Armed Forces in developing infrastructure and programs for the Iraq Military Academy, furthermore NATO officers and NCOs taking part in training of Iraqi cadets and young officers;

- Baghdad International Airport (BIAP – Baghdad SW) - Camp Victory): Group of trainers is responsible for the senior and staff officers` training of Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC) HQ - training has started on 15th May 2005; Ministry of Interior National Command Centre (NCC) – in the „Red Zone”

Training in progress

The next step of NTM-I's development was connected with the NATO „Activation Order”, signed on 16th December 2004 that set in motion the 2nd phase of training. Phase 2 was divided into 3 stages. During the 1st stage was continued the advising process and conducted „train the trainer” course which was completed with a graduation on 25th July 2005. During the 2nd stage the NATO training team focused on the establishment of an Iraqi-led Training, Education and Doctrine Centre in Baghdad. The 3rd stage was aimed at high level theoretical and practical training to increase the self-confidence and skills of the Iraqi officers, made them prepared for the independent decision-making and joint military activities (including combat efforts).

Over the last years NTM-I progressed (currently serving 200 persons from 19 countries) towards advising and recently to mentoring, helping the Iraqis establish well-run, self-sufficient institutions in-country. The projects which NTM-I has supported in this way can be divided into two categories: they are either educational institutions concerned with training of officers, all of which now fall under the **Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command (ITDC)**; or are part of the Iraqi Authorities' **Command and Control (C2)** structure.

The out-of-country training, as well as the equipment donations, are coordinated by NTM-I's **Training and Equipment Synchronization Cell (TESC)**, where NTM-I staff have developed a smooth and effective process to ensure that the equipment and training provided accurately meets the Iraqis' needs.

Other projects, which don't fall under either of these categories, include the Gendarmerie-type training for the Iraqi National Police, assisting the Iraqi Armed Forces in building up a strong and effective NCO Corps. In addition, NTM-I engages in various reach-back projects, where Specialist Training Teams are brought into theatre for a limited amount of time, for the purpose of teaching a certain skill-set.

Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command

The Iraqi Training and Doctrine Command (ITDC) controls all training of the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF). ITDC is divided into two main branches: the Tactical Training Command and the National Defence University. NTM-I

mentors the ITDC staff at different levels, from the leadership of the ITDC to the staff of individual institutions.

The **TACTICAL TRAINING COMMAND (TTC)** controls all the IAF branch and specialist schools as well as the main doctrine centres.

NTM-I provides the Tactical Training Command with advisors and mentors at all levels and within all its branches and institutions, including Army, Navy, Air Force, Combat Service Support and Combat School plans development.

Among the units of TTC, the Tactical Doctrine Centre is developing the new doctrine for the IAF and has already produced both a Soldiers' Manual and a Counter Insurgency Doctrine approved by the Iraqi Ministry of Defence.

The Lessons Learned Centre has provided valuable insight into the efficiency of the training and how soldiers are using their trained skills out in the field.

The **National Defence University (NDU)** has several Institutes and Colleges, all of which provided with NTM-I advisors or mentors. The NDU consists of the following units:

- The **National Defence College** offers a one year graduate program in National Security Studies, giving flag-level and strategic decision-makers a higher-level education in the field of leadership.
- The **Defence Language Institute** teaches foreign languages to personnel in the Iraqi Armed Forces and Iraqi government administration. It also trains English Language teachers who are then deployed to military bases throughout Iraq to enhance the English language skills of Iraqi military personnel.
- The **Defence Strategic Studies Institute** focuses on independent analysis at the strategic level in order to formulate policies and make recommendations to leaders.
- The **Centre for Military Values, Principles and Leadership** develops and assesses Training and Education programs. The Centre paves the way towards Iraqi Armed Forces that are ethically-based and competently led.
- The **Joint Staff College** at Ar Rustamiyah has courses for junior and senior officers. The Junior Course instructs Captains and Majors while the Senior Course is open to the ranks of Lieutenant Colonel up to Colonel. The Joint Staff College was re-established with NTM-I assistance in 2005 and has received NTM-I support ever since. It reached Full Operational Capability in July 2007.
- The four **Iraqi Military Academies** are located in Ar Rustamiyah, Qualachulon, Zakho and Tallil. NTM-I has supported the first Iraqi Military Academy at Ar Rustamiyah (IMAR) since 2006, helping it reach Full Operational Capability in July 2007. The academies' graduate cadre will provide the future leaders of the Iraqi Armed Forces. Since August 2007, NTM-I has dedicated a mentor for the Basic Officer

Commissioning Course, which is taught at the Military Academies, and an advisor dedicated to the establishment of a Senior Non-Commissioned Officer (SNCO) Academy and the development of training plans for Iraqi NCOs.

Command and Control

NTM-I supports the staff and leadership of Iraq's National Command and Control Centres, which gather, analyse and process information, to provide decision-makers with up-to-date situational awareness and prepare timely and accurate decisions, direction and guidance. In addition, NTM-I also supports the maturing of the Iraqi Ground Forces Command (IGFC). In 2005, an NTM-I Training Team was deployed to the IGFC, soon to be followed by another Training Team at the Joint Operations Center (JOC), an MoD facilities which monitors all military operations in the Iraqi theatre and provides intelligence for the Minister of Defence.

In early 2007, preparations began on a new Command and Control structure, the Prime Minister's National Operations Center (PM NOC), to coordinate all aspects related to the Nation's National Security. Also, NTM-I has moved forward in its activities and now focuses mainly on Advising and Mentoring through the deployment of Mobile Advising and Mentoring Teams (MAMT), while a Specialist Training Team (STT) on stand by to meet any ad-hoc training needs. An NTM-I MAMT has supported the training of the staff through advising the leadership at the PM NOC.

The latest addition to the NTM-I organisation is a MAMT at the National Command Center (NCC), positioned within the Ministry of the Interior (MoI) in September 2007. This team will help the NCC improve the command structure to successfully monitor all police operations in Iraq.

Training Equipment and Synchronisation Cell (TESC)

The Training Equipment and Synchronisation Cell (TESC) coordinates all out-of-country training, as well as equipment donations from donor nations to the Iraqi Armed Forces. TESC assists the Ministry of Defence in evaluating the equipment requirements for the following calendar year, and helps determine which of these requirements can be met through NATO donations. It has developed an effective process to coordinate equipment offers from NATO countries with the requests from the Iraqi Authorities, ensuring that everything is appropriate to Iraqi needs. TESC has assisted the Iraqi Armed Forces administration estimate the need for out-of-country training, and has then forwarded these requirements to the NATO headquarters. Training offers are also sent forward by member nations. TESC evaluates whether these offers are viable and then presents them to the Iraqi Authorities.

Over one thousand Iraqis, both military officers and civil administration staff, have received out-of-country training in NATO countries, either at NATO schools or at national establishments. Courses on offer have ranged from specialised civil and military administration subjects to handling EOD dogs. The NATO's goal is to annually train about 500 members of ISF outside of Iraq. Iraqi officers and NCOs have been sent to train in several NATO countries, for instance to Oberammergau in Germany, to Stavanger in Norway and to Italy for various trainings. NATO and nations providing uni-lateral training may also coordinate to use facility in the Middle East.

Other projects

One of the biggest projects that NTM-I has embarked upon is a two-year training program for the Iraqi National Police, starting in October 2007. This is a Gendarmerie-type training program focusing on key leadership skills and it is prepared and carried out by an Italian Carabinieri Training Unit.

NTM-I is also taking on the commitment of helping the Iraqi Armed Forces (IAF) build an effective NCO Corps. There has never been a strong tradition for an Non-Commissioned Officer (NCO) Corps in the Iraqi Armed Forces. Therefore, this assistance does not only involve training, but mentoring on how to build up and manage an NCO Corps as an integral part of the Armed Forces, based on a military model that has proved its effectiveness.

Hungarian contribution to NTM-I

In order to support the Multi National Forces` in Iraq (MNF-I) efforts the Hungarian parliament in summer 2003 decided to deploy a transport battalion in Iraq (Babilon, Al-Hillah) what finished its mission on 31. December 2004. The Hungarian government authorized by the Parliament decided to continue its contribution to a newly established NATO mission (NTM-I) in Baghdad. The first Hungarian trainers (18 officers and NCOs) arrived in March 2005 and after a short orientation program they were appointed for different positions (HQ, NCC, IMAR, IGFC, NJOC). Currently 20 Hungarian officers and NCOs serve (6-month rotation) at the NTM-I in Baghdad and lately the training contingent`s mandate was extended one more year until 30 September 2008.

Hungary has contributed to the Iraqi freedom and security not only with training of personnel but with military equipment what played a significant role in enhancing the defense and combat capabilities of the Iraqi Ground Forces. The Hungarian Republic donated to Iraq 77 refurbished T-72 tanks which were delivered to the Iraqi Ground Forces (9th Division, Taji) in August 2005 and helped to support the security efforts surrounding Iraq`s first independent elections in fifty years.

Conclusions

The NATO Training Mission in Iraq is a distinct mission, under the political control of NATO's North Atlantic Council. It is coordinated with the US-led MNF-I. NTM-I's existence with its results and success has testified the importance of this mission and the Iraqi side needs its special training.

Extract from the Riga Summit Declaration Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Riga on 29. November 2006:

„ 18. All Allies continue to contribute to the NATO mission in Iraq, consistent with United Nations Security Council Resolution No.1546, to support the Iraqi security forces through training, in or out of the country, equipping, or contributing to trust funds. Our training mission is a demonstration of our support for the Iraqi people and their government, and for the stability, democratic development, unity and territorial integrity of the Republic of Iraq, in accordance with the relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions. In response to a request from the Prime Minister of Iraq, we have asked the NATO Military Authorities to develop additional niche training options to support Iraqi security forces where military expertise is required, within the mandate of the NTM-I. This demonstrates our continued commitment to help Iraq build effective and sustainable multi-ethnic security forces.”



WE WERE PEACEKEEPERS?

Public Affairs in Iraq during OIF

"I hate newspapermen. They come into camp and pick up their camp rumors and print them as facts. I regard them as spies, which, in truth, they are. If I killed them all there would be news from Hell before breakfast."

General William Sherman

In March 2003 Hungary has decided to participate in the Global War on Terrorism – justified by various UN SC Resolutions – with military forces. The Hungarian Parliament approved sending additional Hungarian troops to support the coalition efforts in Iraq. Among twenty six countries (from Europe, Asia and South-America) contributed their contingents to built up the Multinational Division Central-South (MND CS) Hungary deployed one Transportation Battalion, (deployed in al Hillah) one general (DCG J3) served with CJTF-7 in Bagdad and seven staff officers worked for HQ MND CS in Babil. I have served as deputy chief of Public Information Office of MND CS. MND CS was lead by Poland as a lead nation. The structure of MND CS was co-ordinately and accurately planned by the HQ staff officers in May-July in Poland and finally created in August 2003.

The mission of the Hungarian Armed Forces in Iraq began in August 2003 with the deployment of TB and the first phase of deployment MND CS HQ. Under the umbrella of Operation Iraqi Freedom MND CS conducted purely stabilizing tasks – not an offensive. Honestly speaking, our main task was to carry out a stabilization mission.

That mission was “to establish secure environment in the AOR for future economic and social development”. Our area of responsibility consisted of Babil, Karbala, Wasit, An Najaf and Al Quadisiyah provinces, mainly inhabited (90%) with Shia Arabs.

As a part of our mission, soldiers from MND CS assisted in reorganization of local administration, security structures. They conducted reconstruction works and training activities for local troops, but most of all they were engaged in operational tasks connected with counterinsurgency and peacekeeping. Later on, main efforts of the Division focused on training of Iraqi

Army Divisions and security forces (Police and Border Police). Providing secure environment for peoples of Iraq required countless patrols, mine-clearing operations and disposals of unexploded ordnance.

MND CS among classical military tasks also has been actively engaged in improvement of living conditions for local society in the area of responsibility by building schools reconstructing roads, bridges and restoring electricity. Civil affairs personnel went into the area and worked with locals to better conditions in the five provinces. Coalition soldiers organized reconstruction of the whole civilian infrastructure and provided humanitarian relief for the citizens from organizing medical check in villages to transport wheeled chairs from Kuwait City. That time, an insurgency against the Coalitional Provisional Authority (CPA) and Coalition Forces was primarily concentrated in Baghdad and in areas west and north of the capital. The AOR of MND CS was considered as one of the most secure areas.

Our mission serving with PIO was complicated by the continuous presence of so called embedded Polish media representatives. I use this terminology “so called embedded” because they had no advanced training for that mission – conducted by us. They lived in our camps show everything what show. They faced everything what we were faced, but they did not always understand what we done – or missed to carry out. They reported back to Poland on their own interest, sometime avoiding rules or agreements.

Despite of the technically obsolete media environment the international and embedded media had advanced technology. All media representatives, all of which were located in our Camp, used satellite access, connectivity, global satellite phone systems, and live-capable devices. The MND CS headquarters accredited all journalists who wanted to cover our activities. Media from contributing nations were highly represented and remained neutral. Two Hungarian correspondent, were stationed in Bagdad and visited to Hungarian Transportation Battalion regularly and reported on their activities back home daily. They maintained excellent relationship with the Hungarian troops and remained correct in their correspondence. Local journalists were also accredited and regularly invited to participate on press conferences, press briefings or visiting the bases manned by subordinated units to report on a specific topic on short notice. Although MND CS soldiers took up peacekeeping duties, our troops took all necessary measures to maintain law and order in the region.

Local media together with the embedded journalists were privileged by PIO staff by giving special background briefings, media advisories or offering special media trips. We did our best to keep them informed – and to keep them busy to. The practical reason behind this attitude was very simple: we were responsible for our man patrolling our AOR day by day so the need to maintain

good relationship with locals were much more important than any other media coverage. Our aim was to create accurately informed audiences of interest and public. And the other one was a saying: If you don't provide access, you don't have PA.

In conclusion, press coverage – both international and local – was high and remained positive or neutral during our stay in Iraq. It was true in MND CS AOR and in the contributing countries. Last, but not list, I would like to mention things we missed to consider, like: Iraqi culture was not taken sufficiently into consideration; Arab media was patronized; rapid retraining of Iraqi indigenous capability for public communications was disregarded; lack of HUMINT impacted everything; lack of interpreters. Ad hoc nature of public communications apparatus lead us to loose the only weapons PIO brings to the fight: trust and access.

And finally, the answer for the question in the headlines of this article is: yes.

CONSULTATION

Colonel István Kobolka PhD

RESEARCH OF POLICE-COMMUNICATION IN THE FRAME OF PUBLIC JUDGEMENT AND MEDIA-PRESENTATION

Introduction

Today when people talk about police or police-measures in non-professional forums, it is usually combined with negative content and association of ideas. It might not be stretching things to state that the Hungarian police of today is in a moral and in some content professional crisis. Signs of the morale crisis are reflected by the great mistrust experienced from the public, by the loss of prestige as well as by the increasing deviancies in the society and within the organisation of the police.

The current situation is the result of a nearly twenty years process, which was influenced by external and internal factors. To understand and analyse this, we have to first clear the reasons and factors leading to the negative judgement and great loss of prestige and we have to examine the sections of the specifications of police-work, with special attention to the cooperation between society and media.

The aim of my study is principally not the examination of the professional functioning of the police but the analysis of the "service" image and communication of the police towards society. I want to alight the aspects of the effective police-communication, behaviour and role-culture from both the sides of the police and the society, including the different expectations and responsibilities and the aspects of successful cooperation.

Although the problem-raising is not new since many experts have dealt with or are dealing with the analysis of this topic, with the possible renewal of the image and strategy of the police, with the necessity of changes, but still it is worth to look at it again and again from different aspects.

In general we can say that experts represent different opinions and approach this question from different angles but they agree independent from each other that there is a need for a change of view, reforms at different levels for the police to be able to meet the democratic expectations of the XXI. century. I will try to show and discuss also these different expert-opinions.

I will pay special attention to the relation between police and media because the connection of these two powers, as well as the possibilities of their future cooperation could determine and influence how the police will be accepted by society and how they could indirectly promote the efforts to fight crime.

The "scandals" and failures of the past years generating great echos in the society and the criminal rate which is temporarily stagnating, but regarding statistical indicators still high, make self-critical examination necessary, especially the analysis of the possibility of renewal. At the same time it is worth mention the positive aspects of the judgement of the police, which mostly raise appreciative opinions from the side of the public, which means from the non-professional side.

I would also like to alight the positive effects of this or such communication, as well as the cooperation between police and media bringing positive effects, through which the prestige of the police could be increased.

The police as organisation

Before the political changes, the police, regarding its functions, had to serve the same aims as today but we can not leave out the fact that the given political and social situation had always determined the judgement. In my study I want to deal mainly with the police after the political changes, and I will only refer to the period before.

As introduction it would be worth to mention that the public judgement of the police had already changed in the times before the political changes, it even fluctuated on a wide scale in the XX. century. After the world wars when the power was strongly concentrated in Hungary, the police - with other authorities - many times was considered as attendant of the ruling power, and a changing level of fear from the side of the public also accompanied it.

By the beginning of the 70's the fear started to cease and a kind of state of confidence took over. At that time the criminal rate and public security was at an acceptable level and the police fulfilled its duties with bigger efficiency and public judgement. One of the acknowledged criminologists of this era, János Dobos called 1975 the last year of peace.

By the 80's the scale moved from positive judgement to the negative side. At that time the public started to be convinced that police officers were uneducated and untrained. It is no coincidence that this period meant the renaissance of the police-jokes. As György Moldova also wrote in his book "Life is a crime": in this period a country can be proud that it is cleverer than its

own policemen. But we have to note that in 1980 criminality began to increase drastically and by the time of the political changes, compared with the rate of the 1970's, it was twice so high. According to experts, the explosion-like growth of the middle of the 80's lasted with growing intensity until 1995.

Dr. Antal Kacziba points out in his study *Criminal situation in Hungary at the end of the century* that the public opinion of the society is greatly influenced by the personal experiences or by the experience you obtain from the direct surrounding, through mass-communication. Within the personal experiences the most important opinion-formulating factors are the criminal acts, which are committed frequently and disturb public peace.

Naturally it is not only in this aspect that we can pull a line between the periods of before and after the political changes but also between differences in the economical, public and social situation.

The political changes for the police meant big changes in every aspect, together with new challenges and the effects of which are still experienced today. The sudden political, economical and social changes induced new types of criminal acts and although from that independently, but with that parallel the citizens' rights were more definitely emphasized, which in many respects changed the relationship between police and society. The economical-political reforms brought more benefit for the society than for the state institutions which were in a monopol-situation until then, and which at the same time had lost their "reputation". Opening the borders meant that foreign criminal groups had bigger space for movements and Hungary in many respects became a transit-country. With this the profile of local criminality had also changed. We could then say openly what competent police officers had indicated years before, that organised crime was present in the Hungarian underworld. The "maffias" of the East-block appeared on the scene and claimed space in the area of the local criminal groups. For this reason other typical and new criminality-types of the 90's were the murders committed with bombings and weapons, which are related to the criminal circles mentioned above. With the settling of the division of areas, from 1998 the number of such crimes had decreased.

According to statistics, in Hungary the rate of killings and self-murders was always higher than the average of the European countries. Among the motivation for killings, family conflicts, jealousy, violence and alcohol played a leading role. But after the political changes, because of the sudden economical changes, the number of murders for greed increased.

But not only the number of murders for greed increased after the political changes, but also the number of crimes against property or crimes in connection

with that. This was partially because of privatization and the changes in ownership.

The changes of the public and social relationships also show negative tendencies. The number of unemployed, homeless people living under minimum existence standard has increased, what increased the rate of the so called existence-crimes. It is also a tendency of Hungarian characteristics the increase of the criminal acts committed by children and juveniles, where in the background you can often find social and family problems. Beside all that, alcohol- and drug consumption is also increasing, the latter results in appearance of more and worse crimes.

In order that the police would be able to keep up with the changing situation, there was and is a need of reorganisations and changes. Although a little hyperbolic, but almost every year there is an internal "reform", but by today the "final" organisational structure of the police has been built out. The police of the Republic of Hungary is carrying out its duties with national authority, its operations and functions are regulated by Act No. XXXIV of 1994, which gives detailed instructions about the duties, rights, authority and way of procedure for the police.

But it is not only the organisation that had changed, but taking the requirements regarding police-work also into consideration, the admission and educational system has also been changed - I will talk about it in more details later.

It is also a fact that among the state organisations the police opened the most towards the public, not only ensuring a wider range of oversight on its operations but also allowing more space for critics regarding its effectiveness. This oversight means on the one side the forums operated by the police - TV-programs and police reviews, weekly -, on the other side the media with its public communication. This kind of openness proved to be a "two-edged weapon", as it became clear afterwards, because often it did not give the results the police wanted.

Police and society

The balance between police and society changed in the last decades, looking at the judgement of the police. The police is one of the institutions for the control of the public and for that reason they are in tight symbiosis with each other. One means of control is the internalization, that means making it internal, when during the process of socialisation and training members of the society are trying to make the generally accepted norms routine. When this is functioning

successfully, the citizens show self-control. Among others, family and schools belong to the institutional forms of internalization.

The other way of the control of the society is based on sanctions. Regarding its aims it is the same as of internalization, but it is different in its means, because it is based on the principals of rewards and penalty. The system of sanctions is established through the social institutions, executors are the institutions of law, law enforcement and penal authorities.

According to the changes of social problems, changes the role of the police also. But the implementation of solving social problems greatly depends on its social role.

Ferenc Krémer in his study *Sociological basic information for law enforcement students*, beside the above statements, outlines also the three order-conceptions, which will help us to look into the current situation and social role of the police.

The first model is the "fight against crime" which draws a clear border between "honest" citizens and deviant persons. Its aim is to isolate the unwanted groups and persons from the rest of the society, its means are violence and force as the only possible solution. Here we have the "zero tolerance", according to which the smallest offence should be sanctioned. In this case communication to the society is only about sanctioning and is strictly one-sided, without any real conversation.

The second model is the policing which has the aim of enforcing law and maintaining order, and not the separation of social groups. In the middle you find the democratic value and norm-system. Its task is to handle social conflicts and to not only fight crime but also to prevent it. So policemen deal not only with crimes but also with other human problems. A policeman can not be isolated, he must be present in the society and that means another type of relationship. Compared with the first model - where practically only force is needed - the training and continuative training of policemen play a greater role, because they are not only executors but during their measures, they have to bring independent decisions. Prejudice is driven in the background because it hinders work, objective decisions. The character of organisational communication must also change because it is not the order dominating but the independent decision brought by the police officer taking action in that given situation. The communication between society and police is also getting looser. It is not one-sided any more, but the conversation based on coequality and trust is not full yet.

The third model is the "servicing", which focuses on the tight connection with the society. Duty of the police in this model is to establish and maintain public security in cooperation with society. For this reason the relationship between police and society changes more than before, since the model assumes mutual interdependence. Policemen become part of the local community, they are not isolated any more and the equal and two-sided communication and personal contacts come forward.

In Hungary the police follows mainly the order-maintaining model, but there are signs of the servicing model as well. The institution of the local police is in many aspects suitable for a servicing model in case it is functioning ideally.

According to a study of 1999 (Krémer and Molnár) most of the Hungarian police officers prefer the order-maintaining model and think that the police should first of all deal with crimes and offences. Fortunately only a few supported the fight against crime model, but only so few thought the servicing model should be followed.

A lot of officers thought that it is not necessary to follow only one kind of a model, they thought that a synthesis of order-maintaining and servicing model could be established.

But we have to study not only what police officers think about their own organisation and profession but also the demands the public sets towards the police.

From different studies, public opinion polls we can see that the larger part of the society wants a kind, community police, that means, they would choose the "servicing" model. For many years now, in many Western European countries a police organised on such basis and working with this mentality is functioning well, but we must add that in these countries both parties are trying to meet the necessary conditions.

According to Robert R. Friedman: "The model of public order means such a philosophy and practice which has the aim of a more effective and successful law enforcement and which relies on public sources in a proactive way. The current conditional system has to be changed, which strengthens the isolation of the public, communicational crisis, fear from criminals and lack of trust towards the police."

László Ipacs, in his article *Change of attitude in the training of police officers* in 2000/2 of Internal Affairs Review points out that a new demand of the public is, that during action the police officer should be able to make a difference between a citizen making a mistake and a criminal. This is important

also because without this capability the police could lose the support to establish the public model. The society is not critical about the measures of the police against the criminals but rather watching how the police treat the determining, accepting majority during routine-controls and measures.

To know all this is important also, because the image of the police and its cooperation with the society is greatly determined by the model followed and a consent is needed for that. The model used also determines the means and methods, including communication as well.

Beside the above it is also an important question to decide whether criminal investigation or crime-prevention should get more emphasis in the work of the police because there is a slight difference in their means and methods. Naturally many think that both are tasks of the police but in practice an organisational correction and a change of attitude would be needed. While criminal investigation is purely a law-enforcement task, crime prevention includes other areas - as sociology, psychology - as well. According to current experiences there are three police officers to one colleague dealing with crime prevention, though most of the experts think a 50-50 % rate would be more appropriate.

By introducing the models the question of stereotypia has already been mentioned which is experienced not only from the side of the police, but also from the side of the public as well. The more isolated the civilian and the police worlds are from each other, the more characteristic is the prejudice against each other. Stereotypia is dangerous because it hinders objective decision-making and makes communication between the two parties impossible.

As frequent public stereotypias, the aggressive and corrupt police-patterns can also be mentioned, which are formed upon the personal or indirect experiences of the citizens. Such and similar prejudices are extremely damaging for the whole of the police because it threatens not only the individual police officer, but also indirectly the judgement of the organisation as a whole.

Police mission

Regarding the work of the police, the question often comes up, whether it is an occupation or a mission. Under occupation we mean working, having knowledge, skills, experiences, while mission means vocation to a given carrier, upon which a person later chooses employment. This is an important question because the behaviour, attitude of a police officer could be greatly influenced by looking at their chosen employment as an occupation or as a mission. Experts and law-enforcement officers agree that police-work should be regarded as a mission.

Every job has its own qualification-criterias, which determine whether the person has the characteristics and capabilities needed to be effective and successful in that given job. The qualification criterias are mainly determined by the specialities of the job. The qualification conditions include physical and also mental criterias.

In the case of a law-enforcement officer for example an important criteria would be the physical and health condition, while in the case of a civil servant these are not priorities. Beside that the knowledge, capabilities, experiences and special social conditions needed for the job have to be determined. In case of a police officer, beside the already mentioned physical conditions, capabilities and experiences could also be priorities, which in case of a person working in the civil area could only be extras. Among others, high driving skills, mastering use of weapons and self-defence. Special social requirements could be a clean - no criminal record - and morale background.

But by the qualification-criterias of a police officer, not only the above mentioned special criterias have to be paid attention to, but also the necessary personal features are needed to be able to effectively and successfully fulfill the tasks.

While the physical qualifications are easier to measure, screening personal features is a more complex job. To be able to set up an appropriate admission-system, one has to determine the personal characteristics needed for a police officer.

Ferenc RÁCZ in his study talks about 10 expectations, which show the result of a research of many years. The list was formed upon opinions of many hundreds of police academy students and professional police officers, but this does not mean that it is compulsory for everyone. This is not a strict order, does not mean a stiff, closed category. Each concept, feature receives content and means real value compared to a given person.

According to this study, expectations regarding police officers are the following:

1. Constructive way of life
2. Special knowledge
3. Discipline
4. Education
5. Determination
6. Communicational capabilities
7. Tolerance
8. Partnership, empathy

9. Creative capabilities
10. Healthy way of life

Constructive and healthy way of life, special knowledge, discipline, determination speak for themselves, so next I would rather talk about the other features in more detail.

The fourth position of education is good because as I have already mentioned - the public still has the picture of the untrained police officer, although it is not so strong as it was in the 80's or 90's. As Rácz also mentions, education has a content which is expressed through communication and has an effect on the forms and functionings of communication, but can also be experienced in every other appearance and activity of a person. The organisational communication-culture of the police is also included here, that means how and through what means does the police represent itself in the society. So education of both the police officer and the police organisation is "amplifying", meaning generalizational processes are working just as in other cases.

Tolerance according to Rácz is patience and self-control, which appears in the consciousness of the activities.

It is a fact that during police-measures a policeman experiences many reactions, attitudes, and looking at the current Hungarian situation, he can only hope for a neutral attitude. Even if he has the best intention and acts according to his best knowledge, he can still face the prejudice already mentioned. This prejudice is usually against the uniform and not against the person wearing it. Already before any measures are taken, preconceptions are formed in one or the other party, or maybe in both. How a uniform influences our behaviour, is well shown through the reaction of a driver when he sees a parking police-car or a policeman checking documents.

A police officer has to tolerate verbal insults or antipathy - just as exhaustion or physical overstrain - without influencing his official activities.

At the same time I think it is important that within tolerance, tolerance of stress should get more emphasis, which should be a priority among the capabilities of all law-enforcement officers. Stress not only appears during work - operations - but also in apparently everyday situations when its mental and health damaging effect is unseen.

The fact that partnership and empathy is among the 10 most important features points in the direction of a collective, servicing law-enforcement model. In Rácz's study this means mainly prejudice, including discrimination against

gypsies and other ethnic groups, which is really a question and problem to be solved.

I mention creative capabilities separately because the fact that it is included in the list means a kind of change in the attitude at a certain level. The greatest virtue of a policeman is not the executive role any more but the capability to bring independent decisions.

Beside the already mentioned features, a police officer needs to have the following characteristics as well: respect, sense of duty, good manners, discipline, empathy, readiness to help, open-mindedness. These features appear through communication and behaviour. All this has an effect on the judgement of not only the police officer, but indirectly on the police as a whole as well.

So, that is why I think that from the above-mentioned features, capabilities, the high professional knowledge is the most important one. But just as important are the communicational capabilities.

Police role

According to psychological determination, role(playing) means a special way of reaction, a habitual, used, automatic chain of behaviour. Everyone has congenital and learned role-repertoire, their combination changes from person to person. Role-playing is influenced by the social status we are in or by the social group we belong to.

In general everyone plays at least 5 roles:

- given (sex, age)
- achieved (profession)
- spontaneous (in connection with situations)
- social (within family)
- community

The police role is a special role, which operates within certain mentality and characteristics. Every role has its requirements, which are needed for the so-called facade. In the case of a policeman it is the uniform, which has an effect not only on his behaviour, but also on the behaviour of his surrounding. The role demands an appropriate behaviour and his appearance as well as his manifestation should adjust to that.

The problem starts when the police-role gets into conflict with his other roles, which could - in a serious case - lead to a distortion of his personality. In order to avoid this, it became general practice that a surgent cannot operate his relative or a teacher cannot teach his own child.

The police role includes among others honesty and law-abidingness, the expression of which is the uniform the police officer has on. When he is wearing the uniform, his surrounding will automatically identify him with the role and features mediated by the uniform. That is why everything what he does in a uniform will respond to his role and can increase or damage its credibility. So that is why the adequate communication and behaviour gets special emphasis in maintaining the credibility of the role.

But it is only an illusion that one can take off the police role with the uniform. Professional roles are special, they mean a kind of expected, given quality for the surrounding even when the person is "outside" his role and plays other - eg. family - roles. When the professional role of somebody became publicly known in his own small community, he will be expected to act accordingly in every situation. When the person behaves in a way that is not identifiable with his role, it loses its credibility. If a person does not remain true to his role in every circumstance, he is endangering the importance of that role.

All this is important because a police officer is considered as a promoted occupational category and that means the role connected to him has also special attention. When a policeman makes his police role uncredible, the consequences will not only affect him but indirectly will influence disappointed persons' confidence in the organisation. It is even truer when a policeman, during work, wearing uniform, loses credibility. Here we can mention the case of corruption when the police officer asks for or accepts money in order not to take measures. Apparently both parties are satisfied but the damage caused will only have its effect on the long term. The citizen escaping a heavy penalty this way will not think with gratitude on the policeman letting him go, but with scorn. He would then project this scorn subconsciously on every person wearing a uniform he meets in his life.

Police communication

I have already mentioned how an important role communication plays in the work of the police. But under police communication I mean not only the discussed sections but also both the internal and external communication of the police as well as the special communication connected to certain police positions, areas. For better understanding I will separate the discussion on police communication according to these aspects.

But as a preliminary I will deal with communication in general. Because this topic has been already much researched, discussed, analysed, I will only talk about some principles.

Communication runs on many channels, with two basic ones: verbal and non-verbal. It has at the same time many levels which means that the nature of communication determines the relation between the parties, how we interpret the received information.

You always have to keep in mind the fact that we communicate in every minute of our lives, consciously or not. Every second we are giving information to our surrounding. Even if we do not want to communicate, we still give different non-verbal signs, which tell about our mood and intentions. You do not have to speak in order for others to know what we think about them or what our mood is. If one can read non-verbal signs well, will be able to "decode" even what we did not want to say anything.

From these general facts it is clear that one should pay attention to the communicational processes, situations because a good understanding could help our work or aims, while an unsuitable communicational strategy could bring damages for longer or shorter periods, in the worst case it could even make it impossible for us to succeed in that area. In general that is true for everyday or private communicational situations, but is especially important by official communicational processes.

In the case of the police, the communicational processes run on many levels, which could be separated according to 2-3 aspects.

Within the police there are many special areas - homicide, property-protection, youth-protection, protection of the public order -, which demand in some respect, unified behaviour from police officers. In other respect, regarding their means and methods, they greatly differ from each other.

In general we can state that the experts of the four areas I am researching meet many dozens of interactions daily, in which they have to actively participate. The process of social contact begins with noticing the other, having first impression and establishing contact. That is why the people working in these areas need to know and to correctly use these three interactional functions. Naturally, basic requirement is the precise and good professional experties, credibility, capability to be aware of the situation and knowledge of the human character.

Public order-protection and traffic police

A police officer serving in the areas of public order-protection and traffic police is whom an average citizen meets the most. Among others they are the ones wearing uniforms and checking papers. A great part of the civilian public identifies police through them and forms opinion upon personal or indirect experiences. These policemen in uniform are the ones who have to face social dis-

satisfaction and mistrust. They are the ones an average citizen wants to meet the least - especially by traffic control - and they become priority targets of stereotyping. And regarding corruption they serve in the most endangered areas.

According to experiences the opinion regarding policemen in uniform is unfavourable in general even if there is no personal negative experience connected. So out of communicational aspect, more emphasis should be put on them because as colleagues "on the front line" they can indirectly improve or damage the image of the police.

For police officers working in this area two communicational sections are the most important: speech and behaviour-style, and first impression.

Establishing the appropriate police-picture is not only their task but still they will be the ones who represent this picture, image most directly in the society. Taking the social and organisational expectations into consideration, the image of a policeman with perfect appearance and physical capabilities, polite but determined, ready to help but alert, would be acceptable for both sides.

All this is part of the picture, judgement made about the police, so with conscious direction, correction, the communication directed on the public could also be improved or modified.

Detectives

Detectives are considered a kind of non-official "elit" within the police and that is especially true for the ones working at homicide. An average citizen, if he is lucky, never meets a detective in his life, or when still, then his situation in some way differs from normal.

The three most common ways of meeting a detective: suspect, witness or offended. The three cases require different communicational styles from the detective, that topic should be discussed within professional communication.

The social judgement of detectives is more favourable because compared with their colleagues mentioned already, they rarely wear uniforms, they have "civil" clothing on during work, so they do not face the negative attitude connected to uniforms.

But we have to mention the group of detectives who are not dealing with priority cases, but they investigate usual crimes against properties, which occur often but promise relative less success. Much more citizens meet them especially as offended, eg. by break-ins or thefts. The positive attitude from the side of the public is not so obvious here and the reason is, that the number of

successful investigations is much lower and that such offences have a direct or indirect impact on nearly everyone. The detectives dealing with crimes against property "have to" listen to offended persons daily, make a report and give information regarding the measures taken.

In general we can say that in case of a detective, besides having good capabilities to realise the situation or to evaluate and analyse, there is also a need for the presence and use of communicational capabilities as argumentation- and question-technics, and establishing contact. And in certain situations, eg. during interrogation, there could be a need to use manipulating strategies as drawing attention, initiation, role-playing and operation. At the end it also influences public image, which is part of the communication of the police.

Local police officers

Local police officers are in a special situation because the people living there know him not only from name and face, but personally as well, because they have daily contact. The activity of a local police officer is connected closely to the every-day life of the people living there and he has many different duties at the same time, like public-order protection, traffic-police, criminal investigation or police-administration.

The local police officer is judged by many aspects, among others it depends on his results or on his relation with the people living there. These two are in connection also with each other because his relation with the locals can influence his results and vice versa.

A local police officer would be judged not only as a policeman but also as a person by the locals, so he has to fulfill double standards. People have different expectations regarding a policeman or regarding a local living among them. It is very difficult to fulfill both expectations, so the ideal local police officer has not only to have professional competence but must have also a balanced personality. From researches and personal interviews it became clear that in this area, the police officer is not only a colleague responsible for law and order, but in that given area directly influences the judgement of the police. I think it is necessary for the responsible police leaders to recognize the concern of this communication and the responsibility arising from the speciality of this area, so that they lay more emphasis on it in the future.

Crime prevention

In Hungary the different authorities still lay the emphasis mainly on crime-investigation and public expectation is following that. Within the organisation of the police it is estimated that there is one colleague dealing with crime

prevention to 3 police officers dealing with investigation. According to experts, this needs to be changed in the future so that the community model could work better and could be more effective, and that prevention would get more emphasis as the repressive solutions.

Crime prevention belongs naturally not only in the responsibility-area of the law-enforcement organisations but is in close relationship with activities of teachers, social workers, local authorities, and different civil organisations. People working in the area of crime-prevention are in contact with persons from different social areas and so could face different communicational situations. They have to be able to talk with representatives of every social group, with intellectuals and also with socially disadvantaged. In their work, beside social sensitivity, empathy and emotional intelligence and tolerance, verbal communication plays an outstanding role, since they address the target-groups not only through written educational materials, but also directly. This interaction is the communication of the special area, which should be handled as part of the whole police communication.

Internal communication

By internal communication I mean the contact between people working within the police, or contact between different organs of the police. Because of its special features only the people involved have deeper knowledge of this, so I will only touch it.

Even civilians know that within law-enforcement organisations, there is a hierarchical system, the officers work in a system of a chain of command and the different police units - police stations, district police offices - also function in a similar way.

A special feature of the hierarchical system is that the superior gives out the job for the subordinate in an official way - order, command, etc. - who has to then fulfill that. He may only have consideration so far if he gets an order to carry out an illegal activity, he can then refuse it, but in every other case he has to act according to that order. This kind of relationship needs self-control, sense of duty and loyalty at the same time.

One of the features of the military-type relations is that the communication within the unit is often one-way and even in the most ideal circumstances it is not equal. The subordinate can react only in an official way, eg. in the form of an application or proposal. Naturally this does not mean that police officers have contact with each other only through formalities, but this regulated relationship is more binding for them.

Naturally police officers voluntarily accept the restrictions and regulations with their ranks and positions, and with that in mind they take an oath on their chosen profession. But we must notice that with the hierarchical system in mind, within the police organisations it would be worth to allow more space for the two-way communication using different forms - tenders, meetings, consulting - through which one could learn not only about the problems the personnel is facing but also valuable new ideas.

Organisational communication

I think every manifestation of the police should come under organisational communication directed towards the society. This includes, among others, information, statements, press release, reports and all efforts about topics they want to inform the public.

Organisational or external communication is what the society meets through the different media-channels. This informs the society not only about the successes or failures the police had, but also mediates the image of the police.

The expression "image" is used in two contents, on the one side it means picture, but self-portrait as well. Self-portrait is practically as an organisation describes itself and how that is shown towards the public. Picture is how the organisation is seen from the outside. Actually image means the subjective and objective side of the same thing.

Naturally you can not prevent within an organisation of hundreds or even thousands that anomalies never would occur, or that a colleague would not commit discreditable activities. But in such cases the organisation has to clearly distance itself from the persons or the activities, which could undermine public trust. Beside that it should convey the message to the public that the given case is an isolated one, not a general practice and one should not draw long-term consequences about the organisation as a whole or about its members.

Strengthening the positive picture is the task of the so-called Public Relations, which does not consist only of statements. The main task of the PR is to organise communicational activity, inform the public, analyse communicational contacts and transmit the reaction and opinion of the public towards the organisation.

The most known and widespread form of police information is the spokesman-statement. Every police station has a spokesman or a media-section, but for its size and central role it is the Hungarian Police publicly appearing the most in such a form.

In the case of an organisation as the police, spokesmen often have to talk about sensitive issues, eg. about a case receiving great publicity but unsolved, or to "explain" unpleasant things. The public receives the first information about an issue through the spokesman, and its judgement will be greatly influenced by the fact whether it considers the spokesman credible, trustworthy. So beside the job-competence, by the selection of a spokesman, personality should also be considered. It is practice to choose a person who is accepted by the public.

Two major mistakes of police communication could be "over-informing" and "under-informing". By the first one there could be difficulties, that means could endanger the success of a case if information goes out that would inform also the committers where the case stands. Insufficient information could have the result that the police would be seen by the public as incompetent or inspire the feeling that the police has an interest in concealing something.

In a certain case it is often not only the spokesman giving a statement, but also different police leaders, or people involved. Often the information does not correspond with each other, or they are even inconsistent. We could see that in the case of the massacre in Mór in 2002, when not only the policemen, but also the representatives of the media reported inconsistently about the case.

The relation between police and media

The relation between police and media is often contradictory, but at the same time, at a certain level they have to rely on each other. This doubleness determines their cooperation. Their interests do not always meet, and from this "power" fight it is often the police coming out as loser. The different media-players, especially daily papers and sensation-press can acquire information regarding a case without asking for approval or assistance from the police, but at the same time the police needs the media to pass on information.

Within the relation between police and press we also discern two categories, one includes the professional papers, the other includes daily papers and especially sensation-press.

As I have already mentioned, after the political changes, the internal political, economical and social situation had changed and as a result new types of crimes appeared. The underworld changed, drugs appeared on the market and expressions like homosexuality, pedofilia, prostitution, porno-industry and other sexual crimes infiltrated into public consciousness. Among the crimes against property, break-ins and bank-robberies were "developing" most dynamically, with using brutal methods. Within organised crime the reckonings were new, and in the 90's many bombings were committed.

The political changes brought not only changes in the criminal activities, but also resulted in great changes regarding mass-communication. In the market-oriented democracy big competition developed between different media-organs, which was accompanied by unscrupulous information-demand and sensation-hunting. The representatives of the constantly growing bulvar-press emphasize saleability instead of credibility and objectivity, and accordingly, within leading news, beside the different star-gossips you can find police news as well. This guarantees that they will sell a lot of copies, and the more details they have about a shocking or "bloody" crime, the more papers they are able to sell. This can be explained also with the fact that a lot of people like to "shudder" and subconsciously state with a good feeling that such horrible things do not happen with them.

In such cases the police can not do much because of the imperfect legislation regarding the media, at most it can give out statements, in which it denies what has been published. But that occurs very rarely, partly because there is no capacity, partly because "explanation" would bring more damage than benefit. At the same time, the police can not be relieved from responsibility totally, because it not only has to endure and tolerate such reports but also should try to establish official contact based on mutual understanding, that could be satisfactory for both sides. The press is often "right" that based on an often too short police statement one can hardly put together even an objective report.

But there is a professional paper in Hungary which writes really with credibility and scientific exigent about law-enforcement organisations. The Internal Affairs Review offers possibility since 1953 to publish articles about public security, police, criminology, criminal law and other professional topics. Although according to changed demands it opened towards other scientific and public topics, still saved this exigent. The only disadvantage from the aspect of the police is that here we are talking about a professional paper and so it can only draw the interest of a quite narrow scientific and expert circle. An average citizen probably does not even know that such a publication exists so the articles published here will not change his picture about the police.

For the police it would be really profitable to establish a forum with the synthesis of the two "extremism" - bulvar-press and professional paper - as supplement of a known and read daily paper, which could serve its aims. It could deal not only with criminal investigation, but also with crime-prevention and other topics of public interest, so it could address the society more directly and according to its own needs.

By examining the relation between police and media it is worth to pay special attention to the programs broadcasted on TV and on the whole picture of the police coming through in these programs. Here we must make a difference between programs made by the police, and other news and other programs about them.

The most known TV-program, which deals with the police, is the *Bluelight*. The program with already decades of history is steadily bringing the standard the viewers expect. Certain elements of the program show signs of getting sensational and make much the feeling that they came into the program to win more viewers. But leaving that out, it offers more than a TV-bulvar-magazin, because it gives place for interviews, professional reports, details about warrents and other police information of public interest. It tries to give objective information, but out of its character it has the same disadvantage as the professional paper, that is, it can only address a closed circle. This is partially because this is broadcasted on M1 and M2 and Budapest TV, and these public service channels have fewer viewers as the entertaining channels.

As a whole we can state that the appearance of the police in the media does not always have a favourable effect on the organisational image. But it is not only the media responsible for changing it, the police also has to be an active partner to bring positive changes.

Conclusions

In my publication I tried to look at the different sections of the communication and judgement of the police, examining the positive and negative effects, analysing the mistakes and sometimes have a proposal to solve one or two problems.

In the following I summerize what the police has to change in order to have larger public satisfaction regarding its professional functions:

- strengthen social functions besides maintaining public order and control functions
- lay more emphasis on crime-prevention
- establish the model of community police officer and police organisation
- change the picture and image of the police with well planned and consequently executed external and internal PR activity.

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Koltai Zoltán PhD

EVALUATION OF SETTLEMENT ATTRACTIVENESS IN HUNGARY

It is always important to find what makes a certain city different from all other cities of similar size and function. In the competition of cities there are many participants with similar conditions therefore there must be something, a certain characteristic that makes them unique or stand out.

If we accept the fact that the aim of the regional competition is to increase the standard of living in the region through high employment rate, and increasing income, it can be declared that the means for successful participation in the competition is special and can be flexibly modified, and in fact is an economic developmental program coordinated by local governments and dynamic company networks, and the program is known and supported by households and companies.

Results of individual research

The most effective quality aspects of city competitiveness, such as the general condition of the inhabitants and the entrepreneur sector, or the ideas of city policy can become widely known through interviews and questionnaire surveys. This can be supported by several examples from international studies, such as the surveys performed by the International Institute for Management

Development (IMD), and the World Economic Forum or the competitiveness analysis of the World Bank.

The personal opinion of the involved individuals offered such up-to-date information which are inevitable for making successful decisions in the field of regional development. Along with this my study strived to assure comparativeness with researches performed in the field primarily based on statistical data.

The survey was launched at the beginning of 2004 and attempted to find answers to the following questions:

- What conditions are primarily considered by the Hungarian population when choosing their place of living or their company seat?
- Which Hungarian settlements and why particularly those are considered to be competitive according to private individuals or company leaders?
- Which are those central settlements that are seen as real centers of gravity?

The results of the fact finding investigation provide stable basis for a successful practical involvement, as it is obvious that regions with different potentials cannot be developed based on the same economic action plan. In order to prepare an appropriate plan every city and region needs to investigate those key factors which could assure their prospective resources for a long distance economic, social and environmental development, and at the same time cities need to be familiar with and also need to understand their present deficiencies. The achieved results can be used for the quality based classification of cities providing a basis for the development of new, market oriented regional policies. (Based on the statistical data a certain potential analysis can be performed which results can be compared to the so-called impression-value of the survey.¹⁸)

The interpretation of competitiveness during the research was not limited to a strictly economic approach of the concept, but it was interpreted more widely, in a more complex way. It incorporates both social and environmental aspects, and also what would in general be called the quality of life.

The stratified questionnaire survey involved 1300 private individuals, and a further 1600 entrepreneurs and company leaders as respondents. The five parameters for the survey involving private individuals were: the distribution of the Hungarian population considering the various regions and within the regions considering the size of settlements, the population's breakdown by sex, age and

¹⁸ Asworth, G. J. – Voogd, H. (1997)


highest education. The parameters for the survey targeted at Hungarian businesses were: their distribution based on region and company size. The multistep research was gradually limited to the potentially competitive settlements. It means that in the first phase of the study emphasis was put on approaching the inhabitants and company leaders of the potentially competitive cities in order to involve them in highest numbers. Considering the first findings of the survey the research was made complete by a necessary number of new participants in the later phase of the project.

The first question of the survey targeted at which the most important aspects were from among the collected twelve, from the perspective of judging the attraction of a certain settlement. On the one hand one of the bottle-necks was to determine the aspects most acceptable for evaluating regions and on the other hand it was necessary to weigh them.

Participants were asked to evaluate the listed factors (see below 1-12) on a scale of one through five according to their significance.

1. healthcare services (e.g.: doctors, hospital beds, number of pharmacies),
2. educational conditions (e.g.: number of basic, secondary and higher educational institutions),
3. infrastructure of the settlement (e.g.: gas services, sewage, road conditions, street-lighting, local public transportation, parking),
4. number of roles in the city (pl.: number of public institutions, commercial network),
5. condition of residential areas (e.g.: vastness of green areas),
6. natural conditions of the settlement (e.g.: climate, mountainous region, rivers),
7. history of the settlement, traditions,
8. demographic conditions (e.g.: age of inhabitants),
9. connections through transportation (e.g.: connection to national road and railway network, accessibility of Budapest),
10. employment opportunities (e.g.: unemployment, wage level, number of qualified positions),
11. opportunities to spend leisure time (e.g.: education, culture, sport, number of restaurants),
12. characteristics of homes (e.g.: age, type, quantity of living quarters).

Figure1.: Order of importance of factors making a place of living attractive to Hungarian inhabitants, based on the survey performed in 2004-2005



Source: questionnaire survey

Based on the opinion of the participants the findings showed (figure 1.) that among the most important factors the infrastructural conditions of both the settlement and transportation as well as employment conditions, healthcare services and the conditions of the residential environment are all inseparable background requirements and they were eventually listed in the above order. A somewhat lower level of significance was associated with the educational opportunities, the number of roles offered to the city, the opportunities to spend leisure time, natural conditions of the settlement, and the number of homes. The two least valuable factors were represented by the demographics of the settlement and its history and traditions

Apart from the above mentioned categories there were three other often mentioned parameters that affected the attractiveness of a settlement such as human relations (family and friends), the existence of a community, the standard of public safety and last but not least the ethnic composition of the inhabitants. In the future these parameters can be separately investigated and can tinge the precision of judgement of cities in a new survey, maybe by having them incorporated into the so far accumulated data.

The aim of the second and third open-ended questions of the questionnaire survey was to receive opinion about the competitiveness of Hungarian cities as places of living. Besides setting an order the reasons were also searched for, therefore the participants were asked to use the previously mentioned twelve indicators. So apart from getting information concerning the

frequency of appearance of certain responses it was possible to receive feedback about the national and regional public opinion, regarding a certain city. This provided useful information for making regional developmental decisions considering the real needs of inhabitants.

Based on a 1000 participant sample the following order could be determined considering the frequency of responses: (In Chart 1. those settlements are indicated which on the one hand had been mentioned by more than 5% of the respondents, and on the other hand they had been weighted considering how frequently these settlements were mentioned. As it can be seen the ranking of the cities was not changed by this at all). The number of answers given about Budapest is outstandingly high, the capital city is generally followed by regional county seats in the ranking order. As it can be seen in Chart 1. the 5% threshold level of being mentioned in the survey was exceeded only by one non-county-seat (Sopron has the precious third position), but among the first twenty settlements there are only five such cities (besides Sopron there are Siófok, Kőszeg, Hévíz and Szentendre).

Chart 1.: Ranking order of Hungarian cities as places of living based on the answers of Hungarian inhabitants, 2004-2005

	Settlement	mentioned	weighted
1.	Budapest	575	2523
2.	Pécs	258	830
3.	Sopron	238	766
4.	Győr	197	644
5.	Szeged	182	551
6.	Debrecen	164	511
7.	Székesfehérvár	125	414
8.	Eger	120	396
9.	Kecskemét	72	263
10.	Veszprém	65	205
11.	Miskolc	60	205
12.	Szombathely	54	189

Source: questionnaire survey

So it can be declared about present day Hungary – aligning with the category-types created based on the statistical data–, that mostly the relatively large cities are able to offer such conditions and services which make them attractive places of living.

The next question of the questionnaire was meant to discover which settlements fulfill the function of being a center in the life of a small or a larger environment. Naturally Budapest is considered to be a center not only by respondents from central Hungary, but all other respondents who represent other regions of the country. They also list Budapest into the category of centers. Within its own region Budapest is sought for its employment opportunities, wide range of city roles, its leisure opportunities, city roles and educational opportunities. To a smaller extent it is visited for its educational and healthcare services due to its geographic location. In all other regions of the country Budapest is seen as a frequently visited attractive destination.

In the Southern Plain region Szeged and Kecskemét, in the Southern Transdanubian region Pécs, in the Northern Plain region Szolnok, Debrecen and Nyíregyháza, in Northern Hungary Miskolc, in the Central Transdanubian region Székesfehérvár and Veszprém, and in the Western Transdanubian region Szombathely and Zalaegerszeg are considered and most frequently mentioned to be centers for one reason or another.

Conclusions

Those European regions could become successful which were able to define and implement a developmental strategy based on individual endogenic conditions. On the contrary the regions which were unable to independently develop programs, and where the declining of the leading industries was not followed by a diversified development but political organizations and companies supported the keeping up of the existing economic structure, could only temporarily stabilize their positions. The competition is related to increasing the well-being of the given region's inhabitants through high employment rate, through steady development, and the aim is to achieve this by only using mostly governmental support. The developmental potential, the competitiveness and the joining of the international regional division of labor of such regions is quite accidental, and hard to plan.¹⁹

As the economic strategy of a successful region strongly relies on the competitive advantages of the companies operating there it is worth discovering which industries participate in the global competition, and then collect the factors their advantage could possibly derive from. Based on all the above it can be stated that there is a so-called initiated from below, knowledge based, decentralized, and relied on endogenic resources type of economic strategy.

„Competitiveness depends on the combination of various factors, but there is no guarantee for success. It should be discovered in each and every city

¹⁹ Horváth Gy. (1998)

what brings success and implements a developmental strategy while competing with other cities in a similar situation.²⁰

The aim of the research was to provide information for a strategy that was developed considering closely examined, existing local needs. These received pieces of information perfectly indicate that the various regions of the country bear not only various conditions and in relative terms very different position, but also represent quite distinctive needs and experiences of the inhabitants.

I could draw the following conclusions in connection with my hypothesis:

- Based on responses of both inhabitants and business representatives the supposition that large cities are presently considered the most competitive in Hungary was proved to be true. Cities in lower positions of the hierarchy can be lifted up into the category of competitive cities based on their attractive regional location.
- My statement that the results of the two researches (involving the inhabitants and the business sphere) would show significant differences but also some similarities was only partially proved to be true. Budapest represents a separate group not only from an economic perspective but also as a place of living. It dominantly separates from other members of the Hungarian city-network from both aspects.
- Considering the competitiveness factors seen as most important by the inhabitants, the top of the list includes the institutional system of the settlement, the infrastructure of transportation and the employment opportunities, and much less importance was attached to social traditions, which was the opposite of what the hypothesis stated.
- The research supported the supposition, that along the aspects providing representation (that is agegroups, level of education, size of the home, size of the company, the geographic location of the settlement's operation) significant relations can be recognized considering the competitiveness factors.

As a significant part of a future research I plan to investigate those cities in more details, which seem to be more competitive. This could add a new dimension to the so far performed national and regional analysis.

Last of all the study of city competitiveness should not be restricted to cities within the borders, as the competition is becoming more global. Therefore it is considered to extend the research to settlements located outside the Hungarian border, and this way adds an international dimension to the study.

²⁰ Lengyel I. (2003, p. 273.)

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JANOS BÉRES

**DEMOCRACY PROMOTION AS PART OF THE GLOBAL WAR ON
TERROR**

(Nominal or substantive form of democracy should be followed?)

The term democracy is, despite its prevailing popularity and social acceptance, somehow ambiguous and complicated; its definition varies depending on the ages, the observer's perspective or political commitment and many other factors. However, despite its “one thousand and one meanings” democracy boils down to what the two words comprising it mean – *demos* (people) and *kratos* (rule of). Democracy therefore means rule of the people.²¹

Beside that basic clarification of term in case of our contemporary democracy there are two main approaches of definitions which are currently accepted and unquestioned by international relations scholars: the nominal and the substantive democracy definitions.²²

The nominal or traditional democracy is defined as a political system characterised by translation of the people's general will into government actions; it is a polity in which the formal and actual leaders are chosen through regular elections based on multiple candidacies and secret balloting, with the right of all adult citizens to vote (free elections).

According to the substantive or institutional democracy approach, besides free elections a lasting democracy requires certain conditions like a robust civil society; the rule of law and an independent judiciary; open and competitive economic structures; respect for human rights, including the right to political dissent; freedom of religion and belief; an independent media capable of engaging an informed citizenry; mechanisms to safeguard minorities from oppressive rule by the majority; full respect for women's and workers' rights; and civilian control of the military.

²¹ Meaning of Democracy; <http://www.aceproject.org/main/english/ve/vek05b01.htm>

²² Narciso L. Abaya, Democracy, National Security and Foreign Policy: A Philippine Perspective <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/Pacific2005/abaya.pdf>

These two types of articulation of democracy are essentially different in a sense that while the traditional democracy sets the goal of it in the actualisation of the general will through the empowerment of the people, the substantive democracy aims the institutionalisation of the participation of the people in decision making processes in which empowerment of the citizens becomes possible.

In my paper, through the post-communist countries' example, I will argue that in our age of a worldwide democratization process in which more and more nations are embracing democracy as a system of government the leading developed nations – especially the USA – should focus on the substantive democracy promotion. The paper intends to prove that the primacy of traditional type of democracy promotion (free and fair elections first) should not be used unconditionally in every countries (“one size fits all”). The paper will argue that this kind of approach could cause serious delays in the transition to democracy and disturbances in the society unless a large number of prior conditions are set, like the rule of law, the existence of civil society or a minimal level of democratic political culture.

My thesis statement is that holding of free elections alone cannot guarantee the establishment of stable democracy and, though in the complex process of democratization every country differs and requires case-specific assessment, the general method for assisting emerging democracies should primarily focus on the substantive type of democracy approach including first of all the building of a rule-governed, stable and strongly institutionalized system.

The Central European case

In the past decades the movement of nations away from repressive governance and toward democratic and publicly accountable institutions has been extraordinary.²³ The Western democracies with the leadership of the United States worked to strengthen democratic and free market institutions and norms in all countries, particularly those making the transition from closed to open societies. This commitment to see freedom and respect for human rights take hold is not only just, but pragmatic. The West realized that its people's security depends upon the protection and expansion of democracy worldwide, without which repression, corruption and instability could engulf a number of countries and threaten the stability of entire regions.

The Western European democracies together with the United States made enormous efforts to consolidate democratic and market economy reforms in the Central and Eastern European countries and the newly independent states of the former Soviet Union. The two dozen post-communist countries however have

²³A National Security Strategy For a New Century; <http://clinton3.nara.gov/WH/EOP/NSC/Strategy/>

had very different experiences in the transition to democracy. While many of these countries have successfully established stable multi-party democracies, a great number of them have elected governments that have been fragile at best, while several have experienced political breakdowns.

The successes and failures have clearly showed the necessity of the country-specific approach in the process of the democracy promotion. The sometimes-difficult road for new democracies in the 1990's demonstrated that free elections were not enough; what is more, good elections in bad conditions could hinder the transition to democracy.²⁴

The success-story of the worldwide democratization process is the example of the Central European countries. In these cases where features of developed democracies like civil society, the rule of law or market-oriented economy at some extent have already been present free elections served only as the hub holding multifaceted spokes together in a wheel. In these countries the conditions of a democracy did not operate as preconditions but as co-conditions and the progress was achieved simultaneously in a number of sectors, each mutually supported the other in the transition process. In no other democratic country had transition taken place so quickly and along so many fronts simultaneously. It has occurred in Central Europe where the transition has been largely successful and the free elections have helped to promote, deepen, and regulate democratic patterns. These countries have made sufficient overall progress toward a full and self-sustaining democratic transition to justify later inclusion in the first rounds of NATO and EU expansions. Integrating these new democracies into European political, economic and security organizations, such as NATO, European Union, OSCE and the Council of Europe, was not only the acknowledgment of the impressive progress these nations have made in instituting democratic and market-economic reforms but was also the peak of the post-soviet era's democratization process and served as a great example for the rest of the transforming post-communist countries.²⁵

Case of the post-soviet countries

The Central European post-communist countries' example however did not work in many other cases including the majority of the former Soviet Union countries. In these countries where free elections have taken place against a bleaker and starker backdrop, the carrying capacity of elections in entrenching the habits, rhythms, and norms of democracy was insufficient. The free and fair elections have not been able to substitute for, or stimulate the production of

²⁴ Free Thoughts On Iran, http://freethoughts.org/archives/2005_06.php

²⁵ Peter S. Adam, Integrating Europe's Periphery; <http://www.cipe.org/publications/fs/ert/e09/ eurpt1-3.htm>

democratic conditions that were otherwise absent. In these countries the democracy has been so fragile at one point or another in the last ten years as to speak of a total breakdown of the transition. Indeed, in some of these states, violence has not decreased, trust has not increased, and elections are considered by the population as an insufficient instrument for achieving the dramatic break with the past.

With the difficulties and failures of some post-communist countries the Question emerges: does free and fair election that elects criminals, anti-Semites, anti-democratic communists and extremist Muslim fundamentalists really help democracy? Would not it be better to avoid constructing systems that provide high degrees of representation at the expense of strong government? Would not it be better in the process of the democracy promotion to focus on the elements of the substantive democracy, first of all on good governance and on a strongly institutionalized system?

The case of USA

The Answer and the key to the post-communist countries' transition problem could be found or at least better understood if we overlook the development of suffrage and the electoral system in the developed Western societies first of all in the United States and elsewhere in the West.

In the USA, democracy was developed by narrow elite that established the rules of the game by which an equally narrow electorate would choose its representatives. The elite were generally divided along a single socio-economic axis, and the electorate was also highly under-represented by the general population. A stable two-party system emerged fully capable of orchestrating the development of the American democracy at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Thus, in 1824, in the first election where the popular vote was officially recorded, J. Quincy Adams won election as president with a total vote of a mere 114,023; and this in a country that by the time of the 1830 census would have a total population of 12.3 million.²⁶ The franchise was regulated state by state, but certain similarities existed among the states. However, lacking the franchise were all women; all slaves; most freed blacks; Indians; citizens below the age of 21; most non-property owning white males; indentured servants; recent immigrants (including all Asians, non-white, and non-English-speaking immigrants and non-Protestants - efforts were made to deny Catholics the vote on the grounds their vote would be controlled by the Pope); felons; illiterates; most non-income tax paying white males; and those unable or unwilling to pay a poll tax where levied. The actual rather than the purported principle behind the

²⁶ John Quincy Adams, From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia; http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Quincy_Adams

franchise until the end of the century appear, therefore, to have been the minimization, and not the maximization, of participation in suffrage. Not until the twentieth century was there success in realizing the communal aims set out in the Declaration of Independence: direct election to the Senate was introduced; women were given suffrage in 1920; and the rights of blacks to vote without encumbrance (through the 1965 Civil Rights Voting Act) were given full recognition.²⁷

This is to suggest that the interests of the founding fathers in establishing strong governance were at odds with the principle of universal suffrage: in other words, it was their commitment to governance more than their interest in the principle of universal suffrage that explains the ability of American democracy to emerge as a rule-governed, stable, and strongly institutionalized system.²⁸ Taking into consideration this end it is interesting to speculate why the export of democracy and not the export of good governance has been the watchword of American policy toward post-communist states.

As with the United States, so with the West in general, the received wisdom exported to the East has been that a democratic shock therapy could deliver the same big bang for democratic transition as shock therapy was designed to deliver for economic transition. However, that notion was based on a revision of the rich history of democratic development throughout the West. More precisely that history has been reduced to the simplistic notion that democratic development was an unbroken chain of accomplishment in which a country's founding fathers reflected the general will of the entire population and established the rules of the game by which the electorate would choose them. Yet this history of "for the people, by the people" overlooks the fact that both the electorate and the elite overwhelmingly were white, Christian, affluent males throughout Europe and the United States until well into the second half of the twentieth century.²⁹ Divisions within the elite along a socio-economic line produced a narrow, but stable, two-party system over time. One naturally wonders how the institutions of American democracy would have emerged had all those groups denied suffrage in the nineteenth century had the vote from the beginning.³⁰

The narrow basis of both the elite and the electorate in most western democracies did allow, however, the conflict between the needs of governance and the desire for representation to be kept in balance by the mutual observance of rules, including the rules and rhythms of elections. The desire for expanded

²⁷ The Voting Rights Act of 1965; http://www.usdoj.gov/crt/voting/intro/intro_b.htm

²⁸ Proceedings of the Sixth Conference of The Samuel Griffith Society; <http://samuelgriffith.org.au/papers/pdf/Vol6.pdf>

²⁹ For The People By The People, U.S. History Beginning to Present; <http://peoplespublishing.com/socialstudies/ss001.html>

³⁰ Michael Lind, Why There Will Be No Revolution In The US; <http://www.newamerica.net/index.cfm?pg=article&DocID=1013>

representation certainly produced protests and demonstrations, but not of an anti-regime or revolutionary nature. The expansion both of suffrage and of representation of non-traditional elites and interests at the top, when it did finally occur, did not destabilize any of these systems because of the mediating influence of electoral rules that by and large were regarded as neutral and nonpartisan. The systems were seen as functioning to provide proportional representation of societal groups within the elite and to aggregate rather than suppress the upward flow of demands. The fact that no Western democracy operates an electoral system of pure proportionality means that the regimes were able to legitimize themselves even without pure proportional representation so long as the society trusted the state to operate on the dual principles of the rule of the majority and the non-coercion of minorities.³¹

This historical overview could be a useful guide to avoiding pitfalls in the same process of the emerging democratic states and consequently a kind of background that could help to rethink the priorities of the ongoing worldwide democratization process.

Substantive democracy as essence of the process of democracy promotion

The optimal solution could be derived from the original thesis statement about the importance of the elements of the substantive democracy. The key factor on the way towards a strong democratic society is to secure those conditions that provide the essence of a functioning democracy. Though free and fair elections have a very high symbolic importance in the once oppressed post-communist (post-colonial Arabic, Asian, south-American etc.) countries the real interest of the West – and also these emerging democracies – is a stable, functioning democracy that requires a great many of preconditions like civil society, rule of law, independent media, market economy, etc. In the absence of these conditions the demands on the electoral system are excessive because the carrying capacity of free elections is not sufficient: they can assist in building democracy, but not substitute for it. What is more, there is a great danger as it is more likely that a free and fair election would give dictators a smooth ride to electorate authoritarianism.³² The 1992 ballot in Serbia that elected Slobodan Milosevic as president was declared largely free and fair by the international community. In the moderate Arabic countries there is a great concern about the repetend Western requests to hold free democratic elections. They usually remind their critics about the European example when the German fascism gained political power through free parliamentary elections. They argue that

³¹ The Systems And Their Consequences; [http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/ upload/ The_Systems_and_their_Consequences.pdf](http://www.idea.int/publications/esd/upload/The_Systems_and_their_Consequences.pdf)

³² Karen Dawisha, The Unintended Consequences of Electoral Reforms; [http://www.sais-jhu.edu/ programs/res/papers/dawisha.pdf](http://www.sais-jhu.edu/programs/res/papers/dawisha.pdf)

hastily introduced democratic mechanism could easily place extreme religious anti-democratic Muslim parties to power all over the Islamic world.

The final question, therefore, is why do we believe that free elections would succeed in building democracy if other aspects of the democratic transition fail?

As an essence, democracy promotion in the future should focus primarily on helping to building the elements of the substantive democracy. The US led West's strategy must be based on strengthening the commitment and capacity of nations to build good governance, implement democratic reforms, protect human rights, fight corruption and increase transparency in government. Instead of insisting on immediate general elections in the emerging democracies the focus should be on strengthening the pillars of civil society, supporting administration of justice and rule of law programs, promoting the principle of civilian control of the military, training foreign police and security forces to solve crimes and maintain order without violating the basic rights of their citizens, improving the market institutions, fighting against corruption, encouraging good governance practices and supporting a free and independent local media that promotes these principles. Though every elements of the institutional democracy is important there are some conditions that could be considered as inevitable from the democracy-building point of view.

First of all the democratization process should encourage the foundation of stable, clean, non-corrupt, rules-based, responsive, and transparent institutions. When those institutions are established, good governance will follow. The presence of good governance, which involves government, civil society, and the private sector, is essential for sustained economic growth. When the national economy is in a good and stable shape, it is highly hoped that people will do well and they uphold harmony instead of being at odds.³³

From the point of view of the domestic milieu, another important element of the democracy establishment is the emergence of a strong civil society. It should include among others, NGO's, community groups, professional organizations, faith-based organizations, business associations, self-help groups, and social movements. When governments lack resources, the contribution of civil society groups is very much needed. This complementary role is indispensable when states are on the verge of great political and socio-economic changes. Those civil society groups could play a pivotal role in democratic settlement of disputes or democratic resolutions of inter-communal conflicts during the transition.

³³ Agus Vidjojo, Democracy, National Security and Foreign Policy; <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/Pacific2005/widjojo.pdf>

The importance of rule of law can not be underestimated. By the same token, responsibilities of law enforcement agencies and internal security forces are also very important. These forces have to be politically accountable as democratic principles should drive security policies, rather than security interests undermining democratic principles, as has been the practice in the past.

Democracy in a more substantive level means seeing that the well-being and welfare of the people improve over time.³⁴ Promoting the creation of a prosperous market economy is one of the most essential key factors on the road towards a stable democracy. When the Central and Eastern European countries joined to the euro-atlantic organization their intention was to be in one of those clubs that are essential to their aspirations to become developed, democratic, European states. To be in a group that is tied to the West in all its dimensions, rather than to the East and what they identify as a past of backwardness, underdevelopment, authoritarianism, and oppression. Hence, the reason for wanting in the NATO or EU right after the political considerations was also strongly economic.

Finally, during the democratization process the emerging democracies have to understand that democracy could serve as a strategy to foster their national security. From the perspective of an external milieu, such a milieu must be peaceful and stable in order to sustain national processes, including development. When a state is democratic and also its neighbors, those states share common values and principles, and they would promote cooperation instead of instigating conflicts. Democracies rarely go to war with each other.³⁵

The supporting methods for promoting democracies should be as varied as the nations involved. Sometimes considerable political or economic assist to achieve the goal is sufficient. This is the Central European example where countries like Hungary, Poland or the Czech Republic had enough and proper internal resources to be the vanguard of the emerging new democracies. Some-times concerted economic and political pressure, combined with diplomacy, is a better answer. In other cases even a collective military action is appropriate but it should be carried out only in conjunction with multinational forces supported fully (and not merely cosmetically) by the majority of the democratic countries. The policy of the democracy promotion of the Western countries should be carried out along clear principles. Unilateralism or inconsistent political practice could discredit and compromise the noble intention of the developed democratic countries to make the world better and more secure. The West must enhance its ability to make effective use of different country-specific methods. Besides,

³⁴ Narciso L. Abaya, Democracy, National Security and Foreign Policy: A Philippine Perspective <http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/Pacific2005/abaya.pdf>

³⁵ James Ostrowski, Does Democracy Promote Peace? <http://www.mises.org/story/665>

under the aim of democracy promotion the US led forces must develop their communications and information capabilities to counter misinformation and incitement, mitigate ethnic conflict, promote independent media organizations and the free flow of information, and support democratic participation.

As a conclusion, democracy promotion requires a concerted, pragmatic, long-term effort focused on cooperation, values and institutions.

Conclusion

The US led Western democracies must sustain their commitment to promote democracy worldwide. Every dollar they devote to preventing conflicts, promoting good governance, opening markets, creating financial stability, raising living standards, deterring aggression and terrorism, protecting the environment, a sure return in security and long-term savings.

Thus, there is no question about the importance of worldwide democracy promotion. What not quite clear is the content of the “starting democracy package” and the sequence of steps the emerging democracies are supposed to adapt.

Though the primary criterion for democracy to exist is the “equitable and open competition for votes for political parties without government harassment or restriction of opposing groups” and at the very heart of democracy is considered to be regular and free elections³⁶, however, democracy could not be reduced to the conduct of regular elections whereby the people choose their leaders. For a society to be considered substantively democratic and therefore the rule of people a great many other conditions has to be met.

These conditions, elements of the substantive democracy are not only provide a wider understanding about the essence of democracy but also represent inevitable preconditions for free democratic elections. In case of elections are held in the absence of these preconditions the democratic transition could be hindered and the formation of a rule-governed, stable and strongly institutionalized system could be delayed.

Consequently the leading countries of the democratization process should focus on strengthening the commitment and capability of nations to build good governance and other essential elements of a substantial democracy. This is the way to build a kind of functioning democracy that is comprehended with the notion of the people's control over their own lives.

³⁶ Narciso L. Abaya, Democracy, National Security and Foreign Policy: A Philippine Perspective
<http://www.ndu.edu/inss/symposia/Pacific2005/abaya.pdf>

THE APPLICATION OF STATISTICAL FORECASTING MODELS TO REVEAL THE MAIN RISK FACTORS IN THE FUTURE OF THE SOUTHERN-TRANS-DANUBIAN REGION

Introduction

The paper aims to analyze and forecast the sources of main risk factors in the Southern-Trans-Danubian region regarding the primary economical and demographical indices. The aim is to draw attention to the regions unfavorable forecasts using statistical means.

The mathematical background of the used forecasting methodology

The spectrum of the mathematical methods aiming forecasting is exceedingly wide. Based on the area to be modeled it spreads from statistical methods to partial differential equations describing dynamic processes, through the tools of operations research. For economical geography, social and cultural forecasts, the classical statistical approach is applied the most successfully.

The forecasts regarding given geographical regions are typically based on so called time-series, since the predictions are typically derived from measurements taken in the past in more or less regular intervals, thus each individual data point has an associated time stamp as well.

Let the time stamps of the measurements be given by $T = \{1, \dots, n\}$.
The set of measurements $X_t, t \in T$ are called a time series.

The analysis of time series may be considered as a special regression like methodology, aiming to approximate a given process minimizing the deviation from the measurements points, i.e. after filtering the input data (e.g. with exponential or moving average methods to decrease the number and magnitude of the peaks in the data) to determine an approximating function well describing the process.

The $AR(p)$ auto regression model may be written as follows:

$$X_t = c + \sum_{i=1}^p \varphi_i X_{t-i} + \varepsilon_t,$$

where $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_p$ are the parameters of the model to be determined, c is a constant and ε_t is the error term. The error term is sometimes referred to as white noise, and is assumed to have an expected value of zero.

Because the data points used are ordered by the time stamps, the methodology of time series features several differences when compared to the classical statistical approach. Several properties, like correlation for e.g. has to be defined specially. While in the case of classical statistical data sets, the measurements are usually aimed to be as independent as possible, in the case of time series this cannot be expected due to the dependence on time. Instead, the methodology models the memory of the process, i.e. measurements taken further back in time has less effect on future measurements than measurements taken close to the examined time period. The so-called auto correlation thus describes the level of effect the measurements of previous time stamps have on the future of the process.

We use the classical formulas to estimate the expected value and the standard deviation of a times series of length n : let

$$\bar{X} = \frac{1}{n}(X_1 + \dots + X_n)$$

The auto regression values are approximated with

Note, that this approximation is biased (i.e. it's expected value is different from the expected value of the original process). However, this formula yields better approximation than the unbiased versions [1].

The trends of time series are used for longer period forecasting. The methodology includes the handling of seasonal effects (events repeating themselves in short time intervals like floods during the spring) as well as the handling of events diverging more significantly from the trends (events happening occasionally with large uneventful time periods, like the swarming of pests).

We use regression based on minimizing the quadratic deviation for determining the values of parameters $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_p$ of model (the equations are sometimes referred to as the Yale-Walker system):

where $\varphi_1, \dots, \varphi_p$ the auto regression coefficients defined before, σ_w is the standard deviation of the white noise associated with the process, and $\delta_{m,i}$ is the Kronecker delta:

$$\delta_{m,i} = \begin{cases} 1 & \text{if } i = 0 \\ 0 & \text{if } i \neq 0 \end{cases}$$

This linear equation system has n unknowns and n equations, yielding a

unique solution for the parameters $\theta_1, \dots, \theta_p$.

After determining the approximating function of the process, the forecast in its simplest form is the evaluation of the function in the future time in question. Because of the high-expected deviation associated with such evaluations, in several cases the efforts are concentrated to determine the trends, i.e. the direction and magnitude of the expected changes regarding the examined area.

The South-Trans-Danubian region

In this paper, while analyzing the sources of risk factors of the region, we concrete on the status of the region inside Hungary, thus or primal interest are in trends that threaten the region with significant falling behind compared to the other regions.

The region was so far unable exploit the favorable geographical properties of the South-Danubia to such an extent, that would have made the region economically attractive. This has several hard to remove reasons, based on the characteristics of the region. Such are the unfavorable location, the proximity of the southern border and the instability of the south-Slavic regions, the low level of urbanization, the high ratio of commuters (above 30%) , the aging and the decline of the number of the population in the already sparsely populated area, as well as the diverse nationality pattern of the region.

However, the risks of the region may be brought back to factors due to the lack of general developments, the former buffer zone character of the region. Such are the unfavorable qualification factors, the high level of unemployment and high ratio of economically inactive population or the low level of R+D spending. The undeveloped infrastructure further worsens the problems associated with the unfavorable location of the region. The region falls far from the main economical centers of the wider area Vienna and Budapest, which are economically even further than the geographical distance would justify (the regions features no significant amount of motorways, even Pécs that can be considered as the center of region is hard to be reached from Budapest). The region still lacks significant airports, and the extension of the M6 motorway still awaits.

During the last years, the region tried to improve it's cultural influence and tourism. The process is slowed by the sparsely spread catering industry, the insignificant number of hotels, restaurants and retail networks. Pécs has been awarded the title of Europe's cultural capital for the year 2010, giving some boos to the region, though the hoped dynamical developments have few spectacular effect so far.

In the next section, to emphasize some main economical hazard factors, we statistically analyze the risk factors that threaten the South-Trans-Danubian region.

Risk factors forecasts in the South-Trans-Danubian region

It's a nationwide tendency, and even true for the whole of Europe, that the demographical tree is getting deformed, i.e. the population is aging. The reasons of the process is not only natural like that families has less children, but also fastened by migration. The economically active population, first of all the younger segment is more willing for economical migration. Thus the active population moves towards economically more advanced regions, further deepening differences. Although the European unification process further accelerated the process, the effect is more nationwide, not affecting significantly the differences between the regions. On the average, since the millennium, the population in the 0-14 age-group decreased 1.67%, while in the economically active 15-65 it decreased by 0.08%, and the population in the age group above 65 increase by 0.64% on the average.

	0-14	15-65	65-
Budapest	-	-	-
Pest	1.18%	0.61%	0.19%
Central-Hungary	0.93%	1.64%	2.03%
Middle-Trans-Danubia	-	-	-
West-Trans-Danubia	0.19%	0.27%	0.52%
South-Trans-Danubia	2.22%	0.04%	1.31%
North-Hungary	-	-	-
The North-Plains	1.82%	0.12%	0.79%
The South-Plains	-	-	-
National average	2.26%	0.38%	0.69%
	-	-	-
	2.22%	0.54%	0.51%
	-	-	-
	2.13%	0.15%	0.53%
	-	-	-
	2.32%	0.26%	0.48%
	-	-	-
	1.67%	0.08%	0.64%

Table 1. The average changes in the population in the last 7 years.

0-14	15-65	65-
0.82%	0.04%	0.89%
0.84%	1.43%	2.63%
0.87%	0.62%	1.49%
-2.13%	-0.06%	1.58%
-1.60%	-0.14%	1.19%
-2.55%	-0.45%	0.92%
-	-	-
2.64%	0.72%	0.25%
-2.47%	-0.30%	0.33%
-2.49%	-0.25%	0.75%
-1.51%	-0.05%	0.99%

Table 2. Forecast for year 2008, based on linear approximation minimizing the quadratic deviation.

Although the figures are not the worst in neither category for the South-Trans-Danubian region, both compared to the national average or viewing the general picture, it is one of the most hazardous regions. This is well presented by Table 1, where (apart from the centrally position Pest, which is special region) all the figures are the second worse. The demographical situation is further endangered by the fact that the average incomes are below the national average, and the worst apart from the Northern and Southern Plains.

	Average changes in industrial value	Trend
Budapest	7.08%	+
Pest	9.64%	+
Central-Hungary	7.85%	+
Middle-Trans-Danubia	12.24%	+
West-Trans-Danubia	6.37%	+
South-Trans-Danubia	3.10%	-
North-Hungary	14.20%	+
The North-Plains	9.10%	+
The South-Plains	6.64%	+
National average	9.06%	+

Table 3. The average of the changes in the industrial output values based on the site of operations in the last 7 years.

The deformation of the demographical tree and the economical performance of the region are mutually dependent process. The changes in the industrial values of the last 7 years forecast the South-Trans-Danubian region the be falling continuously behind.

Not only the average of the growth is the smallest, but this is the only region where the trend calculated minimizing the quadratic error is negative, thus forecasting a decrease (though the volumetric indices based on the previous periods do not forecast the region the be such unambiguously the most hazardous, but still, compared to the national average, the falling behind remains significant).

	Number of foreign owned firms	Foreign capital of the foreign owned firms
Budapest	0.87%	14.15%
Pest	2.12%	26.76%
Central-Hungary	1.01%	15.82%
Middle-Trans- Danubia	-1.66%	25.49%
West-Trans- Danubia	-1.95%	16.80%
South-Trans- Danubia	-3.32%	10.67%
North-Hungary	-3.44%	15.03%
The North-Plains	6.52%	18.18%
The South-Plains	-7.63%	4.35%
National average	-0.46%	16.15%

Table 4. The average of the changes in the number and capital of foreign owned firms in the last 7 years.

Foreign owned firms and the foreign capital brought to the economy by foreign owned companies play a significant role in the Hungarian economy. Though the number and capital of such firms are not free from drastic changes (e.g. the number of foreign firms between 2004 and 2005 dropped to its one half in the North-Plains region), the average of the changes in their number and capital is the smallest in the South-Trans-Danubian region, apart from the South-Plains region.

	Number of employees	Forecast of employment levels for 2008 (LNM)	Average change in the numbers of economical active populace
Budapest	0.09%	-0.24%	0.02%
Pest	2.37%	2.61%	2.45%
Central-Hungary	0.95%	0.88%	0.93%
Middle-Trans-Danubia	0.77%	0.02%	0.98%
West-Trans-Danubia	-0.12%	0.15%	0.15%
South-Trans-Danubia	-0.32%	0.25%	-0.10%
North-Hungary	-0.25%	-0.95%	-0.07%
The North-Plains	0.69%	0.40%	1.01%
The South-Plains	-0.58%	0.60%	-0.11%
National average	0.32%	0.33%	0.51%

Table 5. The averages of the changes in employment levels and the economically active ratio of the populace, and forecast using linear approximation minimizing the quadratic deviation.

In the light of the previous factors, it is not surprising that the employment indices and the ratio of economically inactive population is worse than the national average, and region is one of the most endangered in the country.

4. Summary

The most threatening factor for the South-Trans-Danubian region is the further deformation of the demographical tree, the increase of ration of economical inactivity and the general risk of falling back behind the other regions of the country.

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MANAGED CARE IN HUNGARY

Introduction

Ever since its introduction into the health care system 'Managed Care' has sparked hot debates - not only among those involved directly in providing health care services but also in the rest of the society. It was launched as a model experiment (Hungarian abbreviation: IBM) to test the government's health reform initiatives aiming at the improvement of health care – to provide care of a higher standard with more effective use of available resources -. However, this pilot programme has since then lost some of its original popularity. Despite the facts that the goals to raise the quality of health care services been actually fulfilled and the objectives to improve the health status of the population have been met, the results of Managed Care have been largely overlooked as attention focused on critics constantly objecting to the gaps and shortcomings of the relevant regulations.

However, the success of its preventive strategies, its results achieved in the field of organisation and management and the effectiveness of the tools implemented in this model experiment can not be debated. With its further development and further improvement of its legislative background Managed Care can serve as a base for the introduction of the long-planned multi-insurance health care system.

Furthermore, as Hungary is now a member of the European Union a well developed Managed Care System can facilitate the co-ordination of cross-border health care services and the provision of higher standard care with more effective use of available resources.

Preceding events

The model experiment started in 1999 - on the basis of a Parliamentary decision adopted at the end of 1998 – playing an important role in developing and shaping relations and interests in the health care sector. Its objectives included the co-ordination of the roles and tasks between the 3 levels of the health care delivery system as well as of all health care providers; the prevention of diseases; the improvement of the general health status and quality of life of the population.

In the year of 1999 11 health care providers submitted their tenders to the the health care minister's invitation to tender for the implementation of Mana-

ged Care. Finally, the National Health Insurance Fund Administration entered into financing contracts with 9 health care providers which agreed to organize and provide the full range of health services to the population concerned and, to organise services that are not provided by them. The model experiment was based on 104 family practitioners' practices that covered a population of 161 076.

Since 1 September 2004, 18 service organisers, 1240 family practitioners and a population of nearly 2 million (1 885 045 people) has been participating in the model experiment.

International Experiences

The Hungarian Managed Care was designed based on the American type of Managed Care HMOs (Health Maintenance Organisations) – that are widely known from relevant international publications – and the British Fund Holding systems.

John Ingelhart, the editor of Health Affairs, defines managed care as "a system that, in varying degrees, integrates the financing and the delivery of medical care through contracts with selected physicians and hospitals that provide comprehensive health care services to enrolled members for a predetermined monthly premium. All forms of managed care represent attempts to control costs by modifying the behavior of doctors, although they do this in different ways." (*Iglehart; 1994*)³⁷

The Hungarian model takes the tools (patient path ways, protocol guidelines) it implements from the American Managed Care System, while its structure and logics follows the British example.

Features of the Hungarian model

The model does not promote competition between insurance providers but the pilot programmes are operated in the framework of the National Health Insurance Fund Administration. General practitioners, outpatient care providers, hospitals, local governments (municipalities are owners of district and county hospitals) submitted their tenders and participated in the pilot on their own will. Care organisers are health care providers at the same time. Care organisers have limited decision making authority. Under the pilot, providers are allocated a virtual budget; it is based on capitation payment and adjusted according to the size and composition of the local population. If a provider spends less than allocated by the virtual budget, the surplus is given to the provider; if a provider spends more than allocated, the National Health Insurance Fund Administration

³⁷ Adapted from Tamás Evetovits's lecture, 2005.

covers its overspending, provided there had been a surplus in other participating institutions.

Goals and Objectives of Managed Care

The objectives of the Managed Care System can be concluded as follows:

- To rationalise the management of health care delivery for the population (divided to given geographical units) and to provide services that meet and satisfy real needs to avoid overprovision or occasional duplication of services and oversupply of resources; to separate medical necessities from consumers preferences.
- To improve primary care (provided by family practitioners) as well as secondary care (outpatient services, specialists) preferably close to the patients' place of residence in order to reduce the overprovision of tertiary care (hospitals).
- To implement primary, secondary and tertiary preventive measures and special screening programmes for conditions and diseases and in areas of health care that are not in the family practitioners' control.
- To manage, follow up and analyse patients' pathways through the different levels of health care provision; to monitor and control providers' performance; to elaborate guidelines for the more rational management of health care delivery based on the experience gained through these processes.
- To facilitate collaboration and professional relations between health care providers of the primary, secondary and tertiary levels of provision in order to insure progressive patient care.
- To improve the health status of the population as well as the quality of the services.
- To allocate surplus resulting from applying Managed Care practices - rational management and, the avoidance of overuse or duplication of services and the oversupply of resources – rationally.
- To generally improve efficiency in health care.

Tasks of Service Providers in Managed Care

Service providers are obliged to provide the respective health care authorities (the National Health Insurance Fund Administration) with regular reports and the required data in order to prove the quality and the propriety of services delivered by them.

Improving Health Care. Increasing the population's Health Consciousness

Comparing morbidity and mortality statistics with other countries' respective data, it is obvious that the health status of the Hungarian population has been extremely unfavourable for many years.

The average life expectancy at birth was 68.6 years for men and 76.9 for women in 2004. In the morbidity pattern, the diseases of the circulatory system have the highest share. The occurrence of tumours is the second most dominant factor of mortality in Hungary. (Figure 1)




Figure 1 *The break-down of mortality figures according to the main causes, 2004 Source: Healthcare Statistical Yearbook, 2004 (Editor: E. KAJTOR)*

Preventive Care Programmes

The employment of preventive strategies is one of the key features of Managed Care.

Prevention: Primary prevention aims at avoiding the development of a disease. Most population-based health promotion activities are primary preventative measures. Secondary prevention activities serve early disease detection, thereby increasing opportunities for interventions to prevent progression of the disease and emergence of symptoms. Tertiary prevention

reduces the negative impact of an already established disease by restoring function and reducing disease-related complications.³⁸

Preventive strategy: A programme office called 'The Decade of Health' was established and commissioned for the design, the governmental management and the implementation of preventive programmes and sub-programmes.

Examplpes for the major preventive programmes:

- 'The prevention and decrease of the burden of most frequent chronic diseases' programmes. E.g.: The prevention of diseases of the circulatory system' programmes.
- 'Promotion of healthy lifestyle and healthy nutrition within educational institutions' programmes (School health and youth health promotion).
- Risk factor reducing programmes – that are expected to affect the lifestyle of the population positively.

Emphasising prevention, preventive strategies is mandatory for all health care providers. The health maintenance of the population and the early diagnosis of possible diseases is in providers' interests too.

Ensuring appropriate Information Tecnological Background (Appropriate upgrade of IT Background)

The implementation of an up-to-date IT background is essential to ensure proper follow-up and analyzation of patients' path ways. As a result of the data processing system, each medical practice has access to its own patients. A considerable advancement is, that the system supports the provision of feedback for patients' family practitioners (they recieve feedback in an electronic way – in which way they are informed about their patients conditions regardless a patient informs them or not).

Health care providers participating in the model have experienced vast advancement in the field of IT in their institutions and practices.

Quality Insurance, Quality Policy

Service providers determine their objectives in the field of Quality Policy. The strategies - to meet those objectives - is concluded in their Quality Policy Plans.

Their commitment to raising standards and to improve health care provision has been confirmed in the Declaration of Quality Policy.

³ Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia .

Managed Care is

- to help maintain and improve the health status of the population and the prevention of diseases with more effective use of available resources;
- to insure health care services of a higher standard to the patients' greater satisfaction;
- to improve equal opportunities in access to health care services;
- to use of available resources of the 3 levels of the health care system effectively and - with rational management -; to promote the creation of surplus where possible; to insure long-term financing for the system;
- to support the co-operation of health care providers of the system in the field of efficient institutional operation and medical-technological development.

Health care providers carry out surveys to monitor patients' satisfaction. Patients' opinions, complaints are always handled confidentially and taken into careful consideration.

Specialist Protocols, Practice Guidelines

Without proper specialist protocols and practice guidelines, patient care can not be regarded as transparent. Care providers insure that uniform specialist protocols and practice guidelines aid not only the consistent work of health care employees but the institutions' smooth operation as well. Specialist protocols are in harmony with the Quality Insurance System and they promote fair treatment of patients, while at the same time are responsible for economic considerations regarding the avoidance of overprovision.

Specialist protocols are guidelines to be observed by specialists regarding the speciality's different procedures and they must be applied consistently in the given health care institutions.

Methods for Spotting Errors in the System - Patients' Follow-up-Analising Patients' Path Ways

Following patients' path ways in Managed Care is of outmost importance. *Patient's path way*: includes all the treatments and services a patient has been given (in a health care system). *The main guidelines to analyse patients' path ways*:

- continuous data procession of screening events, primary, secondary or tertiary care services and medications prescribed according to medical fields and according sub-regions
- analysing cases involving high-cost treatments

- screening for medical care received by patients outside their geographic unit/district; finding the causes behind patients' decisions to find for care outside their geographic unit; the possible elimination of such choices
- improving the efficiency of co-operation between the family practitioner and the outpatient facility
- improving the flow of information between the primary, secondary and the tertiary care
- CT/MRI diagnostics – the justification of the use of services outside of the health care provider's facilities, possible elimination of such incidents
- Screening for overprovision; analysis and possible elimination of such incidents
- Analysing pharmaceutical expenditure

Education and Training

Education and training of participants in Managed Care is organised according to the Education and Training Programme of the health care provider - only accredited education and training programmes are included.

Participation in the educational programmes and trainings is motivated and special incentives are employed to encourage fruitful, quality participation.

The results of Managed Care

The Managed Care model experiment is considered to be successful - with regards to the work of general practitioners, outpatient specialist institutions, hospital, care organizers/providers and last but not least the population involved – for the following reasons.

Improvement in the Health Status of the population

The population appreciates quality preventive programmes. The objective of such programmes is to exert a positive influence on the population's approach to health maintenance, health improvement, a healthy lifestyle and to develop healthconsciousness.

Preventive Cardiovascular programmes

By introducing evidence based, a modern therapeutic protocol, patients' life expectancy improves, while they seem to have less side effects or they only occur later in life. Managed Care conducts surveys on a regular basis to screen and find patients with potential risk factors and to prevent the development of disea-

ses or to diagnose conditions early enough to start treating patients in time for full recovery. The first medical examination of patients with more than one risk factors is done by the primary care provider according to set protocol guidelines.

Bearing in mind the extremely unfavourable morbidity and mortality rates of the Hungarian population, the importance of preventive programmes can not be debated.

Patient pathways. The 'Gate-keeper' role of Family Practitioners

Analyzation of patients' path ways as well as the rationality of treatments (and their outcomes) has considerable potentials for cost-savings, as a result, the number of patients recieving hospital treatment has been already reduced by as much as 20%.

Furthermore, the effectiveness of family practitioners in the Managed Care System has greatly improved as an obvious result of their participation in the regular lectures and trainings organised for them. The screenig programmes for cardiovascular risk factors have already proved to be successful.

Fundamental Change in Approach to Health

Participants of the Managed Care System have abandoned their former 'disease centred' approach and adopted a 'health centred' way of thinking; prevention has become the primary focus of attention.

The efficiency of the system is ensured by the re-allocation of available resouces, the rationalization and the co-ordination of operations and the more rational utalization of services.

The development and expansion in the field of Information Technology and the newly developed cost-conscious thinking also exerted a positive impact on the system.

A need arose - from both parties - to co-ordinate and harmonizes the roles and interests of family practitioners (primary care providers) and hospitals – their co-ordination had not always been acceptable in the past. This new approach, new way of thinking strengthens the base of a successful collaboration and co-operation.

Communication

An unquestionable achievement in Managed Care is the success of its Internal and External Communication.

Meaningful dialogues have been developed between health care managers, family practitioners (primary care), outpatient institutions and the hospitals.

Excellent working relations have been established with civil organisations, the media, the local councils (municipalities), educational institutions and the population.

Reinvesting Savings into the Health Care System

The more efficient operation of primary, secondary and tertiary care institutions results not only in a healthier population but also realizes savings that can be reinvested into health care to insure a continuous quality improvement in the Managed Care System - which process further strengthens effectiveness and guarantees the higher quality of health care delivery.

Summary

The goals and objectives established by Managed Care are realistic.

The Employment of management techniques to re-allocate of available resources, to rationalize the utilization of services, to match needs-based treatment choices with more rational equipment structures, to implement preventive measures and the primarily focus on prevention promotes the delivery of cost-effective health care and improves the general health status of the population.

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EDUCATIO

Tamás Vámosi PhD

SPECIAL DISADVANTAGES ON THE HUNGARIAN LABEL MARKET – ADULT EDUCATION AS A KIND OF SOLUTION

The paper focusing on some macro level progressions that have influences on Hungarian labour-market and developed important target groups of adult education. Since the early 90s unemployment is decreasing, but the average duration of being in this status has increased. A massive group of long-term unemployed has set, and adult education - especially vocational training – is the most effective resort of re-integration. The economic activity of population aged 50-64 is very low in Hungary, without marketable knowledge they application is hardly possible, and that compromises the objectives of Lisbon, too. Nearly one million people couldn't or could finish only elementary school, so the lack of specialized knowledge is a straight way to unemployment status or illegal labour relations.

Introduction

The quality of life and employment categories are showing strong relation on the level of society and the individual as well. The rules of the market affect the manpower in the market economy the same way as they affect the other factors of production. Competition dominates the labour market, and in this competition countless factors can mean an advantage or a disadvantage. The social cohesion as an aim includes improving conditions necessary for equality for prospects and decreasing the social polarization. Certain fields of social politics, employment politics, educational politics, different segments of social expenditures, financial aids for the labour market, money spent on education and training in the system of redistribution take aim at reducing disadvantages.

The aim of the publication is to give a picture of the position of strata or focus groups of disadvantageous status with a low school qualification on the labour market and to treat them as an focus group of andragogy from the perspective of lifelong learning strategy. The presence of the highly qualified manpower can be an obstacle for economical improvement, in their case they are

to face an even more serious problem. Improvement stabilizes the segmentation of people with an undervalued knowledge or even without any qualifications on the labour market. On the Hungarian labour market a steady stratum of permanently unemployed has evolved, whose reintegrating into the labour market is almost impossible, and in this stratum the main „source” are employees beyond 50 years of age in addition to the Roma minority.

I. The equality of prospects in domestic and in EU documents

Aims of the full employment, the equality of prospects, the social cohesion appears in each and every comprehensive documents, especially they show a stressed importance in documents relating to employment.

According to the Lisbon Aims, employment politics of the member-states should concentrate on three comprehensive and closely related aims:

- full employment,
- first-class and productive work,
- social cohesion and reception.

In the course of forming the employment politics the member states take these goals into consideration, giving equal prospects and providing equality for sexes is of vital importance from the perspective of accomplishing the three comprehensive goals.

In Hungary these principles appear in the National Employment Action Plan (above all in means of services, training possibilities, establishing enterprises, getting or keeping an job), in the strategy of lifelong learning (finance relating questions, forming trainings of modular structure, adapting competencies fitting to EUROPASS system, training action plan concentrating on focus groups, elaborating and providing learning materials), and in transformation of the support system on the labour market and emphasizing the use of active implements, respectively.

It is important to mention, with a respect to our topic, that the support system of the adult education has been transformed, as a result of which the training institutes receiving adult educational norm must provide training for people older than 50 years of age, and a central fund can be obtained for receiving a second qualification as well, respectively. In addition, the opportunity to get a cost-free access to marketable knowledge is also provided for young and elder adults as a part of the „Take A Step Forward” programme.

Characteristics of the focus group of people with low level or missing school qualifications

The school qualification structure of primer groups from the perspective of the population and the labour market must be taken as important makings from the point of view of the labour market and of planning the educational and training system. The national census in 2001 reported that 11.2% of the population group of those above 15 years of age (952 000 persons) have not finished even the primary school. In population of those above 18 years of age 38.2% (3 097 000 persons) were granted at secondary school certification, in population of those above 25 years of age 12.6% (888 ,000 persons) completed their college or university studies. In population of those above 15 year of age 18.6% (1 581 ,000 persons) do not have a secondary school certificate but hold a professional qualification, meaning that they are skilled workers in the traditional meaning.

It is vital to compare these data with trends in employment. In 1990 38 % of employee completed primary school, 30% completed industrial secondary school (and became skilled workers), 20% graduated from high school and 12% was granted a college or university diploma, in 2005 these rates are 13, 40, 23 and 19 %, respectively, which gives us a clear picture showing that the development of processes in production also caused the revaluation of knowledge on the labour market.

It describes the transformation of economy and so the structures of employment as well that in the more developed EU countries are ahead of Hungary within the process of structural change, at the same time they have followed a path that started well earlier and which is also longer and more well balanced (SZÉP Zs. – VÁMOSI T. 2007). A characteristic of the changing in the employment structure is that the market demand for more highly qualified manpower is increases, which is mirrored in the fact that the school qualification of employees are getting higher and higher, and also that there is an enormous difference between the qualification structure of employees, unemployed and inactive. This shows a correlation with the fact that the service sphere rapidly widening within the whole economy by all means requires qualified manpower at a greater rate than the industry or the agricultural sectors do. In general, it is a characteristic that parallely with the increase in GDP per person, the proportion of those employed in agriculture decreases permanently, the proportion of those employed in industry and in construction industry decreases, while the importance of the service sphere increases at the same time. Within each of the sectors the proportion of branches requiring manpower with lower level qualification decreases on the contrary to those requiring workforce with better qualifications. By degrading jobs in agriculture and those requiring more simple physical work it

is definitely the field falls back where those with a lower qualification could have been employed. This raises the rate of unemployed within the focus group on one hand, providing a smaller chance for reintegration in the labour market, and has a stronger effect on elder people and on the Roma ethnic group. In 1990 15% of the Hungarian employee worked in the agricultural, 38 % in industrial and 47% in the tertiary sector. Today this rate is 5, 32 and 63 %, respectively, in addition the structure of the industry has been entirely changed, heavy industry has lost its importance, and production processes based on advanced technologies are came into the limelight.

Unemployment characteristics within the focus group

In the last two years the Hungarian unemployment rate varied between 7-8%. As for school qualification, 41% of unemployed have no higher than basic level qualification, 32% hold a skilled worker's qualification, 21% have secondary school certificate and only 4% graduated from higher education. Other characteristics took part in forming this status as well, but the relation between holding a marketable school qualification and succeeding on the labour market is clear and evident enough.

The training can serve as a solution in most of the cases. However, the trend is frightening that from the view of the previous years the proportion of unemployed person holding maximum a basic level qualification has increased (an 8% increase in 2 years).

The other negative process – which is even more worse of higher importance-, is that the average period of time spent in unemployed status is increasing. Presently 19% of unemployed have not been able not find a job for 25 months, and an additional 22% have already exceeded 12 months. For these people getting back to the labour market is almost impossible, in their case even the training cannot be taken as an effective solution.

The presence of the permanently unemployment is the strongest in depressive regions, which contributes to the regional segmentation of the labour market. In case of the four regions dropped behind the rate of permanently unemployed is 27 to 30% (in addition to a unemployment rate much higher than the national average!), in the three prospering regions this rate is around 18-20%.

It is a unique correlation that by aging the chance of repeatedly getting a job is getting harder and harder. It can be observed that 30% of the age group of 40-49 years being unemployed, 40% of those of 50-59 years of age, and 80% of those beyond 60 years of age have been seeking for a job for at least 12 months.

The adult education as an active tool on the labour market in the case of the focus group

When choosing the methods of training we must take the previous experiences into consideration. Permanently unemployed cannot be necessarily taken as a consistent group in terms of previous learning experiences, since from the low educated strata to the strata of those who has taken a diploma in an unmarketable major this group can be really heterogenic, with very different previous learning experiences. For permanently unemployed with low qualification, having only a little and usually negative learning experiences the most important task would be to lead them back to study. Total or partly lack of fundamental skills in the case of traditional, at-school type learning processes can definitely be an obstacle for efficient learning. For those with an unfavourable learning past and therefore with low school qualification studying in adulthood experiencing success is almost the most important compensating factor (VÁMOSI T. 2005). Since these people faced failures in school in the majority of cases, usually their self-confidence is not proper. One possible way of making self-confidence stronger in this stratum is using the existing knowledge (not scholar knowledge) and life experiences of the student.

An important principle in pedagogy, of which andragogy can draw sources as well, is the principle of leaning on positive things (BENKE M. 2006). Positive elements can be found at each and every individual, but recognizing them needs time and an andragogist with adequate grounding. From this point of view completing team exercises or individual practice works indicating or offering solvable problems can be useful. Elder adults are socialized rather to traditional learning-teaching methods, many of them have not used computers before at all, they prefer the teacher's direction dominating in their learning processes. For them methods focusing on the teacher can be more advantageous, but it is very important for this age-group to have teaching processes based on their own experiences organized for them.

In general, the following facts can be told about adult education programmes offered for the focus group:

- Among trainings offered for individuals with low level qualification programmes orientating for attaining basic competencies (writing, reading, counting) play a central role. We must take it absolutely clear that without these competencies succeeding in society and on the labour market will be basically uncertain. Trends show that the minimally „acknowledged” school qualification more and more becomes the high school leaving certificate, which is indicated by the fact that an increasing number of professions are allocated with the high school leaving certificate. Just for this reason the adult education market needs to be prepared for making more and more

available getting the high school leaving certificate for underprivileged groups.

- According to the present law regulations no one can be accepted for vocational training or study at professional training programmes without basic level qualification – disregarding some very simple professions.
- The programmes are almost exclusively based on physical activities, only a few professions belong to the field of classic service. Intellectual work is limited to only one or two professions. This strongly relates to the fact that among the unprivileged, above all among those with a low level qualification there are many with Roma origin, and for them professions with physical activities are the most attractive.
- The programmes above all strive to attain strictly profession-related competencies, and the lack of modules raising general intellectuals can be observed. During the vocational examinations first of all they concentrate on questioning/examining practical knowledge, theoretical knowledge in most of the cases are examined restrictedly to the general knowledge.
- Vocational practices are prevailed over theoretical training in every professions. In average this rate is 70-30 %, respectively.
- In case of labour market trainings the proper establishment of training period is especially important, because the results of surveys justifies that one of the important decision making factor of taking part in training is the length of a programme. Attaining the professions at school typical of the focus groups usually takes 2 years, in the form of a labour market training it takes 6 to 8 months.
- The efficiency of the training activity and the rate of participation increases to a high degree when the training is fully financed by the state, or in addition an allowance or other form of support is given for the applicant.

Results of the survey focusing training demands

The author has accomplished a deep interview survey among the members of the focus group, which gave the following results. Quite different system of values can be found behind those decision-making factors that determined choosing of the **content/topics** and the nature **of the training**.

In case of the members of the focus group all of the respondents have stated that „it is important to get a job with it”. This statement may seem to be much too simple, but from their point of view this one is the relevant. They are looking for the trainings – and in overwhelming majority of these cases it is about physical professions – which will give them the opportunity to get employed, whether

legally or at the black market, sometimes only temporarily. For men it is mainly silviculture or construction work, for women it is a profession of a dressmaker, a cleaning woman, an administrator or a nurse. The length of the training can be a relatively important point of view, because the time spent in school benches is considered as time lost only taking away the opportunity for making money (supposing the person is not given an allowance in addition to the training). So in their cases social circumstances are considered as important factors when choosing training by all means. *Ab ovo* they experience practical training as a chance, as many are given a job at the company providing place for the practical training and success of given people can serve as an example.

Motivations behind participating in a training show an even more mixed/complex picture. On one hand people want to study profession with which they can get a job, on the other hand they definitely look for such trainings which give them an allowance in addition to participating in the training. For them receiving the allowance (and maybe monthly ticket for transport for free and other support) is a decisive point of view. The training itself is not a motivating factor, but the opportunity to make money. During the deep interviews we considered as a basic case that a person tries to reach the highest level of school system that is available within his/her social and financial circumstances, so the questions were directed towards trainings of out of the school system: first of all courses and labour market trainings. It does matter how the person gets in touch with the training opportunity, since “at the beginning” they show a lack of confidence / act with distrustfully towards them, and then after the second or third course they start directly looking for them. Most of these people can be *influenced* easily; in almost all cases they take encouragement and urge of friends and most of all of social helpers and mentors... This kind of system of relations will be decisive mainly during recruiting. They are proud if they succeed in overcoming difficulties, complete a given training, so this is something we can build on during recruitment.

We consider the question very important **how people get to know of training possibilities**. Both these possibilities and this activity show dispersion. Throughout the interviews a picture has been drawn that the greatest activity is shown by those with low level qualification, who are especially looking for trainings, they visit job offices, training centres, and they often ask for advices from social helpers and non-profit organisations (foundations, associations). That is exactly what we can build on, and what is actually already works, since the civil organisations visited reported that they get information from trainer companies on a regular basis. These people only need an impulse and encouragement. The chances of those living with some kind of deficiency are the narrowest, calling them is the hardest. As it turned out, the Internet is not the most suitable medium, their mobility is not efficient, so according to their *opinion in the field of flow of information and recruitment we need to rely on social participants and civil organisations*.

Summary

The rate of Hungarian employment at an European level is very low (57-59 %), but all this happens at a low rate of unemployment. At the moment partly the high level of inactivity is the main problem, partly the forming of the situation of unemployment, and its structural character, and its permanence, respectively. Disadvantages are added up, and we witness the reproducing and inheritance of the drawbacks; second and third generations are raising up not getting into touch with the world of work through their parents (TÉSITS R. 2004). Keeping the development of economy, the social integration and decreasing the significant differences among regions requires the effort what we can do on behalf of the success these focus group at the labour market.

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Major Eng. Vartman György

THE SHORT HISTORY OF THE COURSE ON „FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF MILITARY SERVICE”

Introduction

Article 70/H of the Constitution of the Hungarian Republic states the following principle: „(1) All citizens of the Republic of Hungary have the obligation to defend their country.”, an obligation that is precisely defined by Act CV. of 2004. on National Defence and the Hungarian Army. Passing the new Act on National Defence has meant that from that time on, in times of

peace, citizens become exempt from the obligation of military service. On the other hand, the security of the country as well as fulfilling Hungary's other international military obligations must be guaranteed in another way, by the newly formed professional army.

Setting up the Hungarian professional army ended the possibility for the young generation to gather some basic knowledge on defence in an institutionalized way, through basic military training and compulsory military service. Therefore, today's youth does not have the accumulated knowledge necessary for defending the country in case of an armed conflict neither the basic skills needed to fulfil citizens' obligation of defence as stated in the Constitution. Naturally, nowadays the risk of armed conflicts is rather low, and just as most of our Central-Eastern European neighbours, Hungary too, seeks to fulfil its defence obligations as a member of NATO. Hungary, together with the Czech Republic and Poland, signed the NATO Act of Accession on 12 March 1999. in the city of Independence of the State of Missouri, USA.

However, setting up a professional Hungarian Army should not mean losing touch with the Hungarian population. In voluntary military service there are contracted and professional soldiers who join the army as a result of their own decision and from free-will. A continuous manpower supply can only be guaranteed from civil society, therefore, recruitment and providing continuous information to civilians is of outmost importance. The younger generation is the most important target group for the Hungarian Army, not only because of their openness towards a positive patriotism through education, but also because it is with their human power that Hungary can fulfil its obligations in NATO and other international missions.

By and large, these were the most important external circumstances – apart from other reasons of course – that the Hungarian Ministry of Defence started actively seeking ways of contacting the younger generation. We have originally targeted all levels of education – primary, secondary and tertiary education – as possible places of military training and patriotic education. However, we have managed to outreach only in the secondary education sector where we have implemented our ideas. Preparation has started long before the shift towards a professional army and, as a result, we can proudly say that once voluntary military service had been introduced, with Government Regulation no. 338/2004. (XII. 18.) a new subject called „The Fundamental principles of military service” has been incorporated in the agenda as one of the possible subjects of choice at final exam at the end of secondary schooling. In the school year of 2005/2006 those schools that have incorporated this subject in their pedagogical programmes and had it approved by their maintainer could start teaching.

Structure and publication of the subject

Both the structure and the learning material have been a result of a long development process taking into account the needs of the Hungarian Army and the possible interests of young students. During the 4-year training, 8 subject areas are taught in 280 hours. According to the suggested curricula subjects are taught in the following suggested frame: in the 9th and 10th grade one hour per week, while in the 11th and 12th grade two hours per week.

„The Fundamental principles of military service” was a thoroughly worked out pedagogical programme when the last institution of its kind, the Military School named Béni Balogh Ádám, with the support of the Department of Education and Scientific Major of the Ministry of Defense and the necessary accompanying expert opinions, handed in the accreditation application of the subject early in 2003. to the National Public Education Evaluation and Examination Centre. As a result of this successful accreditation procedure the subject of „The Fundamental principles of military service” is incorporated in Government Regulation 100/1997. (VI. 13.) on the Instruction of the Secondary School Leaving Examination.




Diagram 1.: subject areas of „The Fundamental principles of military service” and their distribution

It is the above mentioned Regulation that includes those general requirements that may be expected after finishing the course. It also defines the goals of the training and the principles of examination. The examination itself has both a written and a practical part.

- a.) Goals of the final exam of the course on „The Fundamental principles of military service”: The examinee should demonstrate his or her
- Knowledge of the subject elements defined in the curricula and the capacity for self-instruction,
 - Knowledge as defined by the curricula, critical thinking skills, the skill to systematize the gained knowledge and to put it into practice,
 - Ability to further his/ her knowledge in upper educational institutions.
- b.) Form of examination: school leaving examination, after secondary education. The examination itself has both a written and a practical part.
- c.) Content:

Table no. 1. illustrates the contents of the examination and shows the division between the written and the practical parts.

	Subject areas	Examination form	
		written	practical
1.	Procedures and Regulations	X	
2.	Close order drill		X
3.	Hungarian Army and NATO	X	
4.	Military topography	X	X
5.	Employment Protection and Safety Regulations	X	
6.	Medical training	X	
7.	Legal knowledge	X	
8.	Musketry training		X

Table 1.: Subject areas of the school leaving examination: „The Fundamental principles of military service”

Introducing the subject of „The Fundamental principles of military service” and its Learning material

Our aim was to introduce the course on „The Fundamental principles of military service” to as many civilian schools as possible. As a first step, we have asked to make a presentation at the school opening conference of the schools providing vocational training (in the towns of Tata and Szolnok), then we have organized a conference for all potentially interested schools at the Cultural and Recreational Centre of the Ministry of Defence on 10 December 2003. to introduce the subject. This conference was organized and managed by the

Department of Education and Scientific Majors of the Ministry of Defence with the participation of 50 civilian secondary schools.

It was around this time, when preparations have started for developing the supporting learning material. In order to facilitate textbook development the Military School Béri Balogh Ádám maintained by the Ministry of Defence and OKKER Education, Publishing and Trade Ltd. Signed a contract to prepare the first exemplar of the textbook for „The Fundamental principles of military service”. After a number of readings and further development the textbook, the Ministry assigned the OKKER Corp. to manage the process of textbook recognition at the National Public Education Evaluation and Examination Centre. Finally, the textbook was approved until 31 August 2010 without further need for change.

The topic of military education is a specialized field both in terms of its subject and structure. Therefore, it was inevitable for the Ministry of Defence to aid this textbook development process for civilian schools. Such learning material has not been available for civilian schools before accordingly, civilian school had no access to learning material in this field.

Developing learning kits has also been an integral and important part of the process right from the beginning. The Head of department of the Department of Education and Scientific Majors of the Ministry of Defence met the Chief of Staff of the Ministry 23 February 2005. which meeting actually laid the foundations for future developments. As a result, the idea of preparing 10 learning kits has been accepted with the active help of the Military School Béri Balogh Ádám and which shall then be distributed to the schools using the curricula for their course.

This demonstration kit was not available at that time. The development process was slightly hindered by the reorganisation of the Ministry of Defence where the actual department leading the development process became integrated in Human Resources Department of the Ministry. Developing the demonstration kit was overtaken by the colleagues dealing with secondary education at Department of Education and Training. The kit itself helps training in the fields more military specific in nature.

The development process was accelerated by the statement of the Minister for Defence who committed himself to organising a conference with the title “Youth, Patriotism and Education” in the building of the Institute and Museum of Military History 28 November 2005. The goals of the conference were to provide on overlook on the actual state of military education, to enumerate steps that have been taken in this matter, to identify the relationship between patriotism and national defence and finally, to demonstrate to necessity of national defence identity. The conference gave space for the directors of those interested

secondary schools to get acquainted with the learning materials developed for the course on „The Fundamental principles of military service”.



Diagram 2.: A picture taken at the conference (source: <http://hon.zmne.hu/ifjusag.doc> 15 September 2007.)

Colleagues at the Department of Education and Training have contacted teachers, instructors at the Military School Béri Balogh Ádám in order to gather their opinion on the instructional kit and to prepare for the conference. This was to basically locate the needs. The final list that seemed to be feasible was developed with the help of experts from the Logistics and Support Unit after looking at the needs and the stock-material. Finally, after another round of discussions, all necessary licenses were signed by the Minister and the State Secretary and the list of items were prepared for show during the conference.

Items on display are all part of the registry of the Hungarian Army therefore, gaining access to them was difficult. It was already clear at the time of preparation that access to these items is limited, only 10 of each were made available and so, it seemed logical to think of developing a CD-Rom as an educational tool for the subject. With the development of the CD-Rom, only irreplaceable items (as maps, compasses) should have been made physically available which would have been a lot easier to arrange.

It has been clear that the free learning material cannot solve the supply problem and so the idea of developing a teachers' manual arose as early as August 2005.

During the accreditation process, the subject material was developed for four years of education. Subject areas do not follow one another as can be seen from the course structure. Certain subjects are taken out from the subject areas and those form the actual learning material of the semester. The subject areas of “Procedures and Regulation” and the “Hungarian Army and NATO” are taught

during four semesters, while “Military topography” and “Musketry Training” are instructed for two semesters only. By and large, the course book not only needs to be taught during the four years of the course, but it needs to be taught according to the suggested curricula. The course itself is not a homogenous material, but a compilation of those subject that really aim for teaching the fundamental principles needed for military life and service.

The aim of the manual was to develop some sort of help for teachers in order to support the successful learning process, to help identify the goals of this type of education, to demonstrate its relationship with other subjects and to show its fit in the education system as a whole.

The teachers’ manual also included the CD-Rom, providing illustrations, demonstration material, pictures, videos, graphs, charts and technical profiles.

The Ministry of Defence wanted to help teachers with the developed learning material, the CD-Rom, the teachers’ manual. The goal of military education can only be achieved by continuous development and update of the study material which the Hungarian Army wants to do.

The latest event organised was on the 27 April 2006. – as a part of the Spring Pedagogical Days – with the cooperation of the Department of Human Resources and the OKKER Institute for Pedagogical Services in the main building of the institute. The conference focused on the professional educational questions of teaching the course on “The Fundamental principles of military service” with the participation of secondary school leaders and teachers. During these discussions a new dimension started to form. It seemed that the fundamentals of the course could be taught together with another course called “Principles of Internal Security” and only in the 11th and 12th grade would students specialize. This solution would allow for a better pool both for the army as well as the police and, at the same time, would rationalize costs. Unfortunately, this idea was never followed-up, partly perhaps because of the reorganisation following the elections of 2006. the responsibility for the course has been moved to the Department of Communication and Recruitment of the Ministry of Defence.

As a result of our efforts in the school year 2006/2007 a total of nine schools meaning approximately 250 students including the Military School Béni Balogh Ádám have incorporated the course on „The Fundamental principles of military service” into their curricula.

Conclusion

Unfortunately, budgetary restrictions needed to be applied also at the Ministry of Defence which inevitably resulted in changing some of the portfolio of the Ministry. This basically meant closing the Military School that was previously maintained by the Ministry at the end of the school year in 2006/2007. This is rather unfortunate with regard to the future of the course, and could well mean the end of military education. A rapid solution is needed. The lack of expertise could soon make the subject discredited by civilian educational institutions and, as a result, they may discontinue offering the course in „The Fundamental principles of military service” as part of their curricula.

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