

# *TRADECRAFT*

# *REVIEW*

PERIODICAL OF THE  
MILITARY NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE

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**Seat:** Budapest

**ISSN:** 1785-1181

**Postal address:** Military National Security Service  
1502 Budapest, POB.: 117  
Telephone: 0036 1 236-5111 / 24-301, 24-304  
E-mail:msoscience@kbh.gov.hu

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## ***CONTENTS***

	Page
<b><i>EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES</i></b>	
<b>Gréta Czene – Prof. Dr. György Szternák CSc</b> Impact of the NATO's new strategic concept on the armed forces development .....	5
<b>Peter MORENTH, Africa researcher – István TARRÓSY PhD, Africa researcher, assistant professor, University of Pécs</b> Strategic Recommendations for Hungary's prospective African Development Strategy - <i>A policy paper</i> .....	24
<b>Dr. Péter Marton PhD</b> “DEWEY” GOES transnational: Trans-nationalization in the Field of Counterterrorism .....	55
<b>Peter Gergo Juhasz PhD aspirant – Prof. Dr. Endre Kanizsay Szent István University</b> The agriculture and the globalization in Africa .....	72
<b>Erik Molnár, Jr.</b> Namibia Migration Food and Health Security .....	86
<b><i>CURRENT ISSUES</i></b>	
<b>Dr. Daniel Sogor PhD, historian ELTE</b> The Iranian situation War in words, or in the near future .....	101
<b>András Hettyei university lecturers, Andrásy University</b> Clever or paranoid? - The drivers of Eritrean foreign policy towards Somalia .....	116
<b><i>CONSULTATION</i></b>	
<b>Dr. Major János Besenyő PhD</b> Peacekeeping mission in Maghreb: The MINURSO .....	125
<b>Dr. Zoltán Koltai PhD</b> Success or a not fully utilised opportunity? - Opinions about the European Capital of Culture – Pécs 2010 programme .....	144

***FORUM of PhD CANDIDATES*****Peter A. Kiss PhD aspirant ZMNE**

Strategic Communications in asymmetric conflicts. .... 153

**Zsolt Mészáros PhD aspirant, ELTE**

How to give back Stolen Dignity - Assessing John Howard's Aboriginal Policies in Australia..... 174

**Major András Füleký PhD aspirant**

Militarism in Japan I-II ..... 193

**István Sabjanics PhD aspirant**

Review on some actual legal issues regarding anti-terrorism legislation ..... 212

**Dóra Dévai PhD aspirant, university lecturers, Corvinus Uni.**

Cybersecurity Agenda of the Evolving US Regulatory Framework ..... 220

# ***EVALUATION S, ANALYSES, STUDIES***

**Gréta CZENE – Prof. Dr. György SZTERNÁK CSc**

## **IMPACT OF THE NATO'S NEW STRATEGIC CONCEPT ON THE ARMED FORCES DEVELOPMENT**

### ***Abstract***

Before the Lisbon Summit Meeting, an expert team headed by Madeline Albright processed the lessons learned from the previous operations and missions of the Alliance and explored the relationship between military capacities and the possibilities of overcoming new challenges. Concerning capacities *deployability, flexibility, versatility and the lack of national limitations* (armed forces participating in operations should not be restricted by national laws) were suggested as possible requirements towards the armed forces of the member states in next decade.

**Key words:** strategic concept, challenges, dangers, crises

### ***1. Introduction***

The report examined all the elements of security with special emphasis on their influences on the future of the Alliance. *“Conventional military aggression against the Alliance or its members is unlikely but the possibility cannot be ignored. The most probable threats to Allies in the next decade are unconventional. Three in particular stand out: 1) an attack by ballistic missile (whether or not nuclear-armed); 2) strikes by international terrorist groups; and 3) cyber assaults of varying degrees of severity.”* The report also mentions *“disruptions to energy and maritime supply lines, the harmful consequences of global climate change, and financial crisis.”*<sup>1</sup>

At the same time the experts also posed the question whether the Alliance should have a permanent civil capability and how this organization possessing civil capabilities should participate in the planning, organization and execution of military operations. *“Achieving peace and security is primarily a military*

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<sup>1</sup> NATO-2020 Assured Security, Dynamic Engagement Analysis and Recommendations of the Group of Experts presents report on NATO's new Strategic Concept Brussels, NATO HQ, 17 May 2010 <http://www.nato.int/strategic-concept/expertsreport.pdf> 2010. 09. 06.

*task; however, the state of stability considerably depends on civil support provided to the general strategy of the certain military operation.”<sup>2</sup>*

According to the conclusion of the mentioned report, the lessons learned from the military operation in Afghanistan is that the Alliance should cooperate with international organizations, institutions, and states which provide help with civil reconstruction, thus the role of NATO in civil initiatives should also be defined in the following years.

The expert team advised that if necessary or if the UN requests, the Alliance should apply its complete crisis management capacities in order to create a safer environment anywhere around the globe. In our opinion this means that in the future, for the sake of increasing military capacities of crisis management, NATO should cooperate with states and organizations supporting the military operation, regardless of whether the states are members of the Alliance.

According to NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen: *“If we are to accomplish a military mission or prevent a conflict, we must engage with the relevant major actors and stakeholders. NATO should become a place where our global partners can come and discuss security issues of common concern.[...] Afghanistan is a case in this point. There are two overarching political lessons learnt: the need for a comprehensive approach to peace operations, and the importance of developing our partnerships.”<sup>3</sup>*

In the following let us examine the contents of another study. In 2009, after the Strasbourg-Kehl summit a study was published by former director of NATO Defence College Klaus Wittmann in which he justified in details the need for the development and approval of a new strategic concept on behalf of the member states’ Heads of States and Governments. Klaus Wittmann had already participated in the development of the strategic concepts of 1991 and 1999, therefore neither his expertise nor advice can be disputed or only on sufficiently expert grounds.

In his study he writes the following on the capacities of the member states’ armed forces: *in the future capabilities that are essential to both defence and expeditionary (deployed abroad) forces should be developed.* (The author means deployability, the protection of capabilities and flexibility.) *The tasks enacted in the Treaty cannot be replaced, rather they should be broadened, with emphasis on the broadening content of military operations. Thus the re-established ambition levels (levels of pursuit, prevalence) cannot be avoided*

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<sup>2</sup> Di Paola, Giampaolo. A NATO új stratégiai koncepcióján innen és túl. [NATO’s New Strategic Concept] In. Honvédségi Szemle. Issue 5./2010. p.5.

<sup>3</sup> "Afghanistan and the Future of Peace Operations" Speech by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen at the University of Chicago  
[http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-3AA14427-CF021B4F/natolive/opinions\\_62510.htm?selectedLocale=en](http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-3AA14427-CF021B4F/natolive/opinions_62510.htm?selectedLocale=en) 21 November 2010.

*before developing a new strategy.*<sup>4</sup> The suggestions of Klaus Wittmann can be found in the NATO Lisbon Summit Declaration as well, almost without alteration.

In our opinion the examination of the operational and combat features of future's operational environment; the development of an approach and mentality that supports joint operation; the issue of the establishment, training, deploying and commanding of small units, task forces and battle groups have become the focus of scientific research. Furthermore the research of the possibility of capability development for the sake of securing operation and cooperation in the allied system and of the execution of determined missions and tasks. The military scientific research and exploration of the questions mentioned above are important in the higher political and military echelons of the Alliance.

The wide-range analysis of the requirements enumerated in the two documents and the new strategic concept and their incorporation into the national military strategies and operational doctrines will be the task of military experts after the summit. We will also make a humble attempt at it in the present paper.

## ***2. Challenges, dangers, crises that threaten security***

*The new strategic concept defined current and possible future threats in the following way:*<sup>5</sup>

The new strategic concept has taken into consideration the geopolitical and geostrategic changes that have occurred in the world and in the continent of Europe and which affect or may affect the future of NATO. Conventional threats cannot be overlooked in the future. Numerous regions and states of the world lack significant and modern military capabilities that may affect both international stability and the Euro-Atlantic security. It is hard to predict these impacts. These include the uncontrollable proliferation of ballistic missiles which poses a real and increasing threat to the Euro-Atlantic region.

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<sup>4</sup> Wittmann, Klaus: Towards a New Strategic Concept for NATO. NATO Defence College, Research Division (NDC Forum Paper 10) Rome, September 2009. pp. 83-95.  
<http://www.isn.ethz.ch/isn/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?ots591=0C54E3B3-1E9C-BE1E-2C24-A6A8C7060233&lng=en&id=108701> 20 October 2010.

<sup>5</sup> We would like to add that similar statements about challenges, dangers and crises threatening security can be read in other strategies as well, for example in the national security strategy of the Russian Federation until 2020  
Deák, János. Oroszország katonai stratégiája a második világháború befejezésétől napjainkig. [Russia's Military Strategy from the End of WW II until Today] University handbook. Budapest 2010. pp. 204-231.  
Президент России официальный сайт Военная доктрина Российской Федерации, 5 февраля 2010 года *Утверждена Указом Президента Российской Федерации*  
<http://www.rian.ru> 5 April 2010. <http://www.nato.int/lisbon2010/strategic-concept-2010-eng.pdf> 3 January 2011.

Changed global economic processes accentuated the conflicts of interests between states whose underlying agenda is primarily the possible promotion of economic interests. Furthermore, different developmental patterns can be found in different regions of the world which provide almost identical options to states in the aspect of resources of energy and economy.

The uncontrolled proliferation of nuclear weapons, other weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems pose an unpredictable threat to global stability and welfare. In the next decade such proliferation and trade will be the greatest threat in several of the most dangerous regions. It is highly probable that the number of states possessing nuclear weapons will increase in the following decades.

Terrorism means direct threat to NATO member states, international stability and in a wider sense to secure welfare as well. The influence of extremist groups is still spreading towards and within regions that are strategically important for the Alliance. The opportunity to access modern technology increases the threat and impact of terrorist attacks, especially in case the terrorists acquire nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological capacities.

The intensification of nationalist sentiments, xenophobia and violent extremist movements remains to be a threat. Apart from this, an epidemic can break out in any part of the world caused by a currently unknown virus.

Instability or conflicts outside the borders of NATO can have a direct influence on the security of the Alliance's member states through extremist movements, terrorism and the support of various international illegal activities such as clandestine arms and drug trade as well as human trafficking. The Middle East, Afghanistan and the Korean Peninsula will continue to have long-term influence on the security of the world and the Alliance.

Cyber assaults are becoming more frequent and organized, and they inflict greater and greater damages to states, businesses, economies and potentially to transport and logistics networks, as well as critical infrastructures. Cyber attacks can reach an extent which presents a threat to the continuous national and Euro-Atlantic operation, security and stability. Foreign military forces and secret services, organized crime, and terrorist and/or extremist groups can all be the perpetrators of such assaults.

The welfare of every state increasingly depends on fundamental communication, transport and transit routes connected to international trade and energy security. A greater international effort is required to secure their uninterrupted functioning against all attacks or disruptions of supplies. The significance of resource possession has also increased, thus certain regions of the world became more important.



To meet their energy demands, certain NATO member states will become increasingly dependent on foreign energy suppliers in the future and in some cases even on foreign energy supply and supplier networks as well. As greater and greater part of the world's energy consumption gets transported globally, energy supply becomes increasingly vulnerable.

Several technological processes – including the advancement of laser weapons, electronic warfare and technologies blocking access to space – can be capable of having a world-wide impact that will influence NATO's military planning and operations. Apart from this the development of new weapons systems based on new physical principles will influence military organizations and principles of leadership.

Key environmental limitations and those of resources including health risks, climate change, lack of water and growing demand for energy will continue security environment also in areas of high importance for NATO and they will have a chance to have a significant impact on NATO planning and its operations.

### ***3. Possible military tasks and capabilities***

The military operations and operations other than war of the recent years were conducted within unconventional frameworks and circumstances of theatre. There was a growth in the number of operations where armed forces conducted crisis management or executed certain types of peace operations among diverse social and natural circumstances that are fundamentally different from the European conditions. Although according to lessons learned the number of military operations has been increasing in recent decades, there are fewer and fewer wars waged by states with conventional forces. In the decades after the Second World War more than two-thirds of the military operations were conducted by national liberation movements and involved struggles between opposing ethnic or religious groups.<sup>6</sup>

In both the operations in Iraq and Afghanistan the weapons and weapons systems which are applied have a destructive capability almost identical to that of nuclear weapons. The efficiency of target destruction further increased. In order to acquire strategic superiority the attacking party utilized the capabilities of all services as well as the potentials of their assets in outer space. In addition, non-military forces and devices gained greater significance in the mentioned operations.

The lessons learned from unconventional theatre circumstances and the new features and characteristics of military operations required the research and

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<sup>6</sup> Kiss, Álmos Péter: Generációk a hadviselésben – a negyedik generáció. [Generations in Warfare – The Fourth Generation] In: Hadtudományi Szemle. Issue 2./2009. Budapest. Electronic edition pp. 10-19. <http://www.hadtudomanyiszemle.zmne.hu> 17 May 2010.

development of new forms of armed struggle from the cultivators of military science. Similar tasks can be discerned from the part of the new strategic concept dealing with military tasks and capabilities.

At the summit meeting of Heads of States and Governments the principle of collective defence gained confirmation. At the same time during crisis management operations the Alliance placed emphasis on the cooperation with the United Nations, the European Union and the Organization of Security and Cooperation in Europe. *The commitment of the member states to collective defence remains firm and compulsory.*

The capability-based nuclear and conventional forces of the Alliance remain the basis of collective defence, which is primarily intended to deter potential aggressors.

At the same time the strategy did not assert what response NATO member states would give to possible attacks. In other words, the Alliance retained the principles of collective defence and strategic deterrence including nuclear capabilities. The strategic concept did not alter the previously accepted theory and practice concerning types, forms and methods of strategic operation, military operation and combat.

*At the Lisbon Summit Meeting the following decisions were made in order to maintain and develop the complete capability-based forces:*

The Alliance should be capable of executing both large- and small-scale military operations. For the sake of the initial success of military operations all capacities of the NATO Response Force (NRF) should be developed.

Special emphasis should be placed on the preparation and training of armed forces, on the updating of plans required by military operations, and on the communication between member states. For this reason member states will continue participating in the entire process of defence planning. The Alliance cooperates with the Russian Federation in developing the European missile defence. At the same time for the sake of cooperation negotiations are needed to solve further professional and military technical problems. At the meetings of the NATO-Russia Council only the necessity of further negotiations was decided without any technical details.

The member states' capabilities of defence against weapons of mass destruction and of detecting perpetrators of cyber attacks should be further developed. In order to detect threats of terrorism and prevent terrorist acts capacities should be increased in cooperation with states and organizations subscribing to the same principles.

On the basis of its capacities the Alliance should support energy security, the safe transport of energy, and effectively protect systems and facilities connected to the member states' energy security.<sup>7</sup>

At the Summit Meeting the Heads of States and Governments agreed *that the member states should provide the logistic, technical and financial means and resources required for the further development of capacities.*<sup>8</sup>

*For the sake of efficient execution of crisis management the Alliance stated the following in the new strategic concept:*

- a) A comprehensive approach taking into account political, social and military aspects equally should be applied during crisis management.
- b) In order to prevent crises the events of possible crises areas are continuously surveyed, analyzed and processed. In other words the efficiency of the work in the Situation Center should be improved.
- c) In order to improve crisis management the application of military force should be expected and considered if necessary. Furthermore, preparations should be made for a prolonged crisis management in cooperation with other forces for the sake of stabilization and successful reconstruction.
- d) Reconnaissance, intelligence and information exchange should be improved in order to predict crises more precisely.
- e) New operational doctrines should be developed in order to improve counter-insurgency operations and the efficiency of reconstruction.
- f) The civil capabilities of the Alliance should be improved by more efficient planning, the preparation, training of civilians and the better organization of cooperation with partners.

These decisions at political level require further professional-level analysis in the various headquarters and staffs of the Alliance. In other words, society accepts the existence and necessity of armed forces and thus provides the required financial means. Huntington described the features of this relationship

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<sup>7</sup> Further information about the background of the realization of these aims can be found in the following article: The world in figures, defence. The World in 2011. in. The Economist p. 111.

<sup>8</sup> There are two remarks concerning the success of the summit contradicting this agreement which appeared in *Heti Világgazdaság* [Weekly Global Economy]: firstly, the statement of United States Secretary of Defence Robert Gates declaring that the European member states lack the sufficient financial means and quickly deployable units due to cultural differences (they do not understand the significance of armed forces today) and the financial crisis. This has become an obstacle of security. Secondly, the extent of the member states' defence expenditure is merely 1.7 percent compared to the previous 3.1 percent in a European average. The military-defence expenditures of ten of the member states don't even reach the mentioned average, like Hungary where this number was 1.1 percent in 2009. NATO-csúcs Lisszabonban. Alulteljesítők klubja. [NATO summit in Lisbon. The club of under-performers] In. HVG. 20<sup>th</sup> of November, 2010. pp. 24-25.

in his well-known book, from which a quotation about soldiers follows. *“Upon the soldiers, the defenders of order, rests a heavy responsibility. The greatest service they can render is to remain true to themselves, to serve with silence and courage in the military way. If they abjure the military spirit, they destroy themselves first and their nation ultimately.”*<sup>9</sup>

Concerning the development of civil capabilities the new strategic concept declares that NATO is to strive for the development of only the necessary capabilities, and it would create and provide devices required by crisis management operations in cooperation with the European Union. In other words, the Alliance needs the acceptance of a more defined security approach, which enables the joint and comprehensive use of various military combat units and the further development of theoretical and practical cooperation between member states, partner states, international organizations and non-governmental organizations.

In order to ensure the development of capabilities NATO previously devised three transformational objectives, which are essential for the successful execution of future military operations: *Decision Superiority, Coherent Effects, and Joint Deployment and Sustainment*. The new strategic concept also emphasized these objectives but formulated them with different terms.

In the new strategic concept the listed aims of capability development for member states clearly define the main requirements for the preparation and training of staffs, units, small units, and individual soldiers, which can be the following: joint integrated preparation, capability of deployability in multinational environment, transportability of forces and assets, capability of readiness, cohesion of personnel and small units, and leadership capability of commanders.

In the Alliance the final objective for the future based on the new strategic concept is the following: *presumably the establishment of interdependent armed forces in member states, with cooperative capabilities. In another approach, the required capabilities are summated in one point of theatre at a defined time and this can create a new capability level in military operations.*

The early detection of cyber attacks, the identification of the perpetrators and preventing their attack appeared as a new element among the tasks of capability development. The creation of the capability for the recognition and efficient management of this threat is especially important for the member states, because by using such opportunities an attacker can significantly harm and limit the operation of social organizations connected in networks (military systems).

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<sup>9</sup> Huntington, Samuel P. *The Soldier and the State*. Harvard University Press, 1981. p. 466.

Any developed society and its defence system comprise a cluster of networked systems interwoven with computer networks where the secure functioning of one system depends on the functioning of the other systems.

Consequently, a cyber attack or the protection of any major part of the system is a matter of national security which affects the whole of society from a defence point of view and has a direct or indirect influence on the Alliance.

It is enough to neutralize or constrain the operation of one carefully selected infrastructure important for society's economy or transport with a cyber attack, due to the networks it will have a negative influence on the functioning of other important elements as well. The Alliance wishes to eliminate this threat in the future both in headquarters and in member states.<sup>10</sup>

According to Colonel General Boris Fedorovich Cheltsov the essence of such a military operation is the wide spectrum broadening of information processing, access to intelligence by allied forces, and a complete supervision over the execution of the task. In other words, political and military supervision during the entire time of the execution of the operation. The "network" created this way opens a new dimension in modern military operations. *Namely, in this network apart from strategic elements of politics, intelligence, diplomacy, economy, technology and media also appear. In this network military operations are present as merely "an element of the network process". Both military and civil (political, economical, etc.) elements of the modern military operation are integrated in one system (network), according to Colonel General Cheltsov.*

According to experts the 21<sup>st</sup> century will be the century of ultramodern and advanced technology which will provide assets, weapons, and military technology to soldiers, which were unknown previously. The commissioning of limited numbers of weapons of especially efficient precision is predetermined to require the transformation of forces in the fields of leadership, size of personnel, and quantity of military devices. In the following decades due to the rapid development of military technology the conventional methods of operations and armed struggles may change in future wars. All this change can be brought about by the utilization of military technology of new types and systems and the mass application of military robots.

#### ***4. Development of the capabilities of the Hungarian armed forces***

At the Lisbon summit the document "*Ministerial Principles of Defence Planning (2012-2021)*" issued by the Hungarian minister of defence was released about the same time as the new strategic concept was released. Among

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<sup>10</sup> Experts of other member states have also explored questions of the defence of computer systems and information and the efficient operation of communication systems. The author is a doctor of military sciences, and currently the first deputy director of the institution of automated engineering researching the science of leadership in Moscow.

other things the principles formulate the requirements of the development and capabilities of armed forces. Without an aim at completeness let us quote a few requirements which are in harmony with the objective of the new strategic concept.

*“The Hungarian Defence Forces need a balanced and well proportioned combat, combat support and combat service support structures. In our understanding leadership structures also belong here. Granting military contribution proportional with the country’s size and capacity is an important responsibility of Alliance and EU membership. In the case of operations and readiness services (NATO Response Force, EU Battle-group) task forces composed of the right modular, organization-like small units suitable for the task should be utilized. In the period of planning the foundations of defence and warfare against cyber attacks should be laid down.*

*Proposals should be devised concerning fields of the following capability development [...] in order to make the development processes dominant in the period between 2012 and 2021: infantry fighting vehicle and main battle tank capability, field artillery for fire support capability, anti-tank missile capability, bridge building capability, surface-to-air missile capability, medium transport and combat helicopter capability, fixed-wing aerial transport capability and mobile airspace control.*

*The future of tactical aircraft capability must be examined urgently as well as the possibility of creating an air mobile capability.”*<sup>11</sup> We do not argue with the mentioned requirements and aims, we just want add a few remarks concerning the capabilities.

Capability in special literature means that the armed forces are ready to execute their combat or task while the elements of the capability may continuously vary depending on the task.<sup>12</sup>

The capability and combat capability of armed forces include the competence to successfully execute military operations and non-military operations, the cooperation of services which have theoretical and practical elements.<sup>13</sup> It is reasonable to add certain remarks to these concepts: firstly, the

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<sup>11</sup> Document 503-34/2010. Deputy State Secretary of Defence Policy and Defence Planning, Ministry of Defence. pp. 1-9.

<sup>12</sup> Soldier’s Handbook by the Science Organization Department of the Defence Staff . Budapest, 2000. p. 49.

<sup>13</sup> Knowledge: the sum of experiences, concepts of reality or its certain fields. The knowledge of something: being informed about something. Knowledge gained through learning.  
Knowledge: a state of consciousness indicating the facts and abstractions (emphasis and generalization of the most important features) of the objective reality (the world) on various levels the emerged through an activity of cognition.  
Skill: knowing something well, being experienced, practiced in something. Being proficient, informed in something.

concepts of knowledge and knowing are bound which include the complete mastering of a system based on the logical context of knowledge. Secondly, at the level of skills soldiers (small unit) can relatively easily apply their knowledge during new tasks. Thirdly, skills and readiness are usually in a complicated relationship, they are built on each other in several layers. Fourthly, skill and readiness “expire” relatively early due to the lack of practice (training), while capability is permanent once it is developed. Therefore skill and readiness can be taught, learned while capability is developed.

The feature contents of the concepts presume that a capability can be mastered through learning and practicing realistic situations. Today capability has been expanded by the demand that armed forces should cooperate with civil, non-governmental and other organizations in operations other than war.

*Parts of the theory are the following:* social acceptance, national military strategy, joint services, services and doctrines of arms, expert teams, field manuals, operational instructions and the quality of leadership. *Parts of the practical element include:* organizations required for conducting armed struggle, technical devices, logistic support, stages of readiness, the content and preparedness of the reserve personnel, training and preparation of the personnel, and preparation of the defence sector.

In another approach combat capability also includes *theoretical, moral and physical components*. From the aspect of capability-based armed forces theoretical concepts such as joint service, service doctrines, the theory of the development of forces and activities conducted in a multinational framework will have a dominant role.

Concerning the development of the capability of armed forces the following cannot be ignored: according to the views of Hungarian and foreign (both western and eastern) authors, armed struggle can be characterized by the following: *firstly*, the use of long range and high precision weapons can present a serious risk to the mobilization and concentration of troops. This activity is conducted by missile or fire strike with the involvement of all services. *Secondly*, the relationship between strategy, operation and tactics develops and improves from the aspect of the execution of operational tasks. Based on the

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Skill: creative, combinative use of the mastered skills, their application in absolutely new situations.

Readiness: the willingness, inclination to do something. A capability, skill that can be developed by practicing. Mental functions are aimed at the goal, essence of the activity.

Readiness: automatized component of the conscious act, which develops during the multiple repetition and practice of the activity.

Capability: aptitude, competency, talent for a certain physical-spiritual activity, performance. A mental function and system of functions that enables the execution of a certain activity.

Capability: the sum of those personal characteristics that create the possibilities, requirements of conducting certain activity.

Hungarian Larousse Encyclopedia 2. Akadémia Kiadó. Budapest 1992.

cohesive, coherent connection strategic success of armed struggle depends on operational, tactical successes in both military operations and operations other than war. *Thirdly*, armed conflicts will be conducted in absolute space with the inclusion of all services, arms, and civil factors' expert teams with the application of the most modern devices. *Fourthly*, due to the increasingly accurate and efficient mission and fire strikes the importance of the fragmentation, protection and defence of forces and devices has increased. *Fifthly*, the range, precision, and destructive power of missile and fire strikes will further increase, allowing the uninterrupted continuation of strategic level offensive operations. *Sixthly*, missile and fire strikes will destroy the enemy's political, economic, administrative, infrastructural and military installations at the same time. *Seventhly*, based on the previous features the efficient, protected missile and air defence will be – or already is – crucially important, which is capable of fighting against all of the enemy's destructive powers. *Eighthly*, the role of reconnaissance, intelligence and prevention of disinformation will become increasingly important in the detection of the enemy's aims and objectives. *Ninthly*, the struggle for air space superiority and the execution of successful missile and fire strikes will have a crucial influence on the outcome of the armed struggle, but the importance and necessity of surface operations will persist.<sup>14</sup>

If we accept this assessment, it turns clear that it is reasonable to explore possible tasks, organization, equipment and education, preparation and training of the personnel of armed forces accordingly.

For the realization of the listed research tasks the confrontation of various views and theories is required since this is the way how professional-theoretical fundamentals based on results of military science can be obtained to underpin defence-related political decisions. In other words it is reasonable to compare the findings and conclusions of research on armed struggle with geopolitical and geostrategic analyses of scientific rigor. Furthermore, with the country's interests, allied obligations and its expected capability developments. A few thoughts follow about the development of soldiers' capabilities, and about soldiers as a system.

In order to protect individual soldiers engaging in armed struggle the member states of the Alliance have been conducting research for years which are aimed at examining and equipping combat soldiers as a system. As a result

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<sup>14</sup> Pirityi, Sándor. Barangolás a „sebezhetőség” fogalma körül. [Exploring the Concept of „Vulnerability”] In. Új Honvédségi Szemle. Volume LIX. Issue 12/2005. pp. 45-61.  
Hajma, Lajos A háborúval kapcsolatos elméletek változásai. [Changes in Theories of War] In. Hadtudomány Issue 2./2005.  
Rinaldo, Richard J. Warfighting and Peace Ops: Do Real Soldiers Do MOOTW? In. Joint Force Quarterly 14./1997. pp. 111-116.  
AJP 3.4 Non-Article 5 Crisis Response Operations.MC 237/2 NATO Military Policy for Crisis Response Operations.



of the research even today but especially in the future they will be equipped and provided with light and efficient weapon, clothing, and protective gears, networked communication devices and modern energy sources thus enhancing their human performance.<sup>15</sup> In the studies of the referred article authors of various member states present their findings and plans in their “*soldier as a system*” research.

In the following we would like to discuss the essence of this, if it relates to the topic undertaken in the title of the present study paper. According to lessons learned in the future the majority of armed combat will be conducted in populated areas where the use of main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers and fighting vehicles is restricted. Soldiers and small units participating in the operations need to get off their vehicles or transport helicopters in order to be able to perform their task. According to experts in such cases the soldier and the sub-unit should be regarded as a “*basic combat unit*” and system – the subsystem of modern fighting vehicles.

*For the development of the system’s capability improvement and/or modernization should be carried out in five areas: mobility, destructive power, survivability, command and control. In another approach: clothing, equipment, communication and information, armament and energy supply. In practice, these are the five areas of development accepted by the member states conducting the research.*

In modern military operations and operations other than war such systems and subsystems are connected to the elements of *Network Centric Warfare* (NCW) thus soldiers act accordingly and carry out their tasks. Research linked to „*soldier systems*” is conducted in nearly every member state and the equipping of armed forces with the necessary assets and materiel can be expected within 5-10 years, experts claim<sup>16</sup>.

*Countries involved in development set an objective: the development of a modern, easy to operate, highly efficient, fully integrated individual system, including armaments, equipment, clothing, protective gears, networked communication, and the necessary energy sources. A requirement for command and control is the interchangeability of elements of the system, in accordance with the assignments of individuals, section and platoon leaders.*

In the opinions of Research and Development experts the application of such a system will comprehensively increase operational efficiency in combat,

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<sup>15</sup> Future Soldier Systems. NATO's Nations and Partners for Peace. Issue IV.-V.2004.pp.122-154.,76-95.

<sup>16</sup> Further information of the development process and the achievements can be found in: Gácsér, Zoltán: A katona harci képességét növelő korszerű, hálózatba integrált egyéni felszerelésrendszerének kialakítási lehetőségei a Magyar Honvédségben. [On the Opportunities of Building a Networked Integrated Personal Equipment-system to Enhance Soldiers’ Combat Capabilities] PhD thesis 2008. Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University, University Library.

crisis response, and peace support operations: destructive power, defence and protection, transportation, force protection, reliability, and fast medical service. These aspects may prove important in built up areas, where close quarter combat, already mentioned above, will be unavoidable.

In the countries involved in the experiments 7-10-strong sections are considered as “*basic units*” in which there is a very close cooperation between soldiers nevertheless each member has their own well-defined and practiced task. *On such basis the soldier comprises an element of the mentioned system. The most important requirement is that the soldier or small unit armed and equipped this way should be able to carry out their missions both in combat operations and operations other than war, in any weather and on any terrain.*

*Such a requirement and capability can be achieved through ensuring the following preconditions:* the soldier is provided with a multipurpose, integrated weapon. Such a weapon is capable of acquisition, engaging, and destroying of targets at an optimum use of ammunition and in extreme conditions. The clothing of the soldiers will protect the most sensitive parts of their bodies and will provide protection from the impacts of weapons of mass destruction for the longest possible time. It is relatively comfortable even in extreme weather and terrain conditions. Another requirement is that the basic equipment of a soldier should be easy to complement in accordance with the particular mission to accomplish. The equipment should meet the soldiers’ requirements linked to catering, rest, and accomplishing their mission. The provision of food, water, and basic medicine is of particular significance during the entire duration of the mission. Part of this equipment is carried by soldiers, another part is in the combat vehicle. Similar precondition applies to all sources of electric power which operate the equipment of soldiers. Finally, the deactivation of the system should also be ensured in case of necessity (taken prisoner), in order to protect data and other systems. According to experts there are several electronic options for this.

The average overhead will be approximately 32-35 thousand Euros at the accomplishment of the program. In certain countries – due to the relatively high costs – it is the soldiers and units of special operations forces that will get such new equipment.

A few ideas on specialisation. In NATO Member States with characteristics similar to Hungary experts increasingly consider the establishment and maintenance of small but easy-to-mobilise special units capable of conducting special (instead of conventional) tasks and missions.

Recently the issue of specialisation has grown even more important but that should not involve the negligence of “conventional” capabilities. When conducting military operations beyond the borders the deployment of special operations forces will remain a necessary requirement in the future too.

Accordingly, the establishment and shaping of special operations forces is in the focus of efforts in the armed forces of several Member States similarly to their preparation in close connection with the requirements of the Alliance.

Modern warfare requests modern warriors to be open to information under pressure too, to be able to correctly evaluate it, then to carry out their decision in a series of complex actions therefore it is particularly important to make them resistant to exhausting psychological impacts stemming from such activities<sup>17</sup>.

In our opinion military can only meet altered requirements if new training systems get introduced which fully match the structure of the Alliance. The new training and education system should ensure the acquiring of all skills necessary for the successful conduct and accomplishment of crisis response operations. The introduction of the Bologna Process and the entering into force of the Act on Higher Education allow the revision of the structure of military higher education and its adjustment to changed circumstances. Such a revision seems particularly reasonable at the military leadership specialisations because changes in the techniques and structures of conducting crisis response operations require the change and updating of teaching materials, including their structures, in order to increase the quality of the preparation of young commissioned officers and non-commissioned officers.

In the early 21<sup>st</sup> century it is armoured infantry sections and their personnel that remain the decisive factors of warfare and their capabilities will continuously develop in dependence on technical and technological opportunities. Network centred characteristics allow continuous command, control, and communications between the commander of the battle group, the combat vehicle, the section and its members, with regard to reconnaissance, target acquisition, and destruction. At such a level of leadership in network centred military operations it is the combat vehicle that comprises the centre of information and communication from which the personal computers of personnel, linked separately, are updated.

In the future warfare commanders demand their soldiers that they should continuously evaluate their situation, make decisions; in short, they should be independent and initiative during the entire period of combat.

Next, a few thoughts follow on the structure and capability to establish. It is the job of experts and researchers to analyse the link and relation between a brigade or battalion, or a battalion size force and the prospective strength of the armed forces, the procurement of military technology, and the expected defence expenditure, outlined in “*Ministerial Guidelines to Defence Planning (2012-*

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<sup>17</sup> Stephen E. Ambrose: *Az elit alakulat.* [Band of Brothers, E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne: From Normandy to Hitler's Eagle's Nest] GABO Publishing House 2001. p. 192.

2021)»<sup>18</sup>. Another question is what structure a *battalion battle-group*, which comprises the “*basic tactical unit*” of the Hungarian Defence Force will have from qualitative and quantitative aspects.

In our opinion, taking into account the capacity-development plans of technology it can be presumed that a battalion battle group will be equipped and armed with main battle tanks, armoured personnel carriers or infantry combat vehicles, field and antitank artillery guns, and engineer assets in the given period of time. The commissioning of such technology cannot take place without command and control, reconnaissance, and fire control capacities deployable in any conditions. The structure also requires combat support and combat service support elements for its timely and efficient actions, particularly if a mission is to carry out in remote theatre.

The examination of transportation capacities, of the quality and quantity of transport vehicles in the above mentioned structure can comprise an issue of theoretical research. On the basis of the statements above a proposal can be formulated: the setup of a research group seems to be necessary, which could be tasked with conducting cost and asset analysis concerning the organisation, strength, and technological backup, within a certain time limit. Another option can be the research group previously established at the Joint Force Command to be tasked with continuing its activities in accordance with the guidelines.

During the analysis it is reasonable to take into consideration the fact that the capabilities of a brigade (battalion) include the capability of the assigned air force assets too. The presence of the transportation, fire-support, and antitank capabilities of the Air Force may prove to be of particular significance in military operations of the Ground Forces. Before its deployment the assigned unit is evaluated by the Alliance in accordance with the usual methodology.<sup>19</sup> During the evaluation the commission evaluates the combined capabilities of Command and Control, combat, combat support, and combat service support capacities. In other words, the commission conducts a combined combat readiness evaluation of the command organs, combat, combat support, and combat service support capacities at the units or small units before their deployment. This means no military unit with partial capabilities can be committed to the Alliance in the future.

On the basis of the lessons learned from military operations of the near past it can be stated that the personal, material, logistic, training, and preparation requirements towards commanders, units, and the personnel. Military personnel in the area of operations, smaller in strength but possessing the above listed capabilities, will remain the key element of conducting warfare. At the same

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<sup>18</sup> Document 503-34/2010. Deputy State Secretary of Defence Policy and Defence Planning, Ministry of Defence. pp. 1-9.

<sup>19</sup> CREVAL – Combat Readiness Evaluation.

time it is a necessary requirement to have the combat support, and combat service support branches prepared during the entire military operation.

On the basis of the lessons learned from previous military operations it can be claimed that stabilisation operations (peacekeeping, peace building operations) closing a military conflict will have increasing significance. In such operations combat support capabilities (field artillery, antitank artillery, etc.) can be deployed only in a limited way.

Another lesson learned is that during the execution of a military operation in the future beside multinational joint forces international aid organisations, and non-governmental organisations also take part and their capabilities complement the lacks in NATO capabilities. On this basis the use of civil-military cooperation and other stabilisation enhancing capabilities become increasingly important.

After all this the requirements to and the necessary capacities of the committed (small) units (platoon, company, battalion, or brigade) of armed forces should be examined.<sup>20</sup> Because of the theme of the present study paper our focus is on the small units as Hungary is highly likely to be involved in prospective military operations and operations other than war with such military forces.

*Requirements towards a small unit can be identified through the content of deployment readiness and capability:*

- a) The small unit has its up-to-date readiness plan, deployment orders and directions. The personnel in various assignments know both the theory and practice of deployment; they have the capacities necessary for command and control;
- b) The small unit has carried out the mandatory training and preparation tasks, live firing exercises, and has appropriate plans for wartime deployment;
- c) The small unit has the appropriate plans for personnel and materiel augmentation which includes the order of preparation of the augmentees, and the preconditions of the rapid acquirement of knowledge necessary for their appointments;
- d) The execution of the readiness-increase plan ensures the timely readiness level for the small unit with its capabilities in the requested location;
- e) The small unit has its plans for movement, embarkation, debarkation, and transportation. The personnel is familiar with and practiced the tasks outlined in the plans;

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<sup>20</sup> For the analysis the most important conclusions in the study paper written by Colonel József Kovács in 2004. Colonel Kovács incorporated his lessons learned from foreign study tours and military missions therefore his proposals and recommendations are correct. The study paper can be found in the University Library of the Zrínyi Miklós National Defence University,.

- f) The small unit has intelligence on the crisis zone, the conflicting parties, the population, the social and cultural circumstances, and the intelligence and CIMIC capabilities necessary for intelligence gathering;
- g) The small unit has means of communication for cooperation and for maintaining links with home base, the personnel knows the rules and regulations of operating this equipment.

*On the basis of the lessons learned from military operations of the near past it can be stated that the identification of requirements for deployment has specific significance:*

- a) During the training the personnel practiced its tasks related to increasing readiness level, movement, transportation, and taking up positions;
- b) The unit has a plan with all the necessary rules and regulations for maintaining combat readiness, and its execution is well-practiced. The readiness to repel direct attacks is of particular significance for the protection of personnel and military technology;
- c) The unit is capable of minimising enemy intelligence through the application of camouflage means and techniques, and by observing communication rules and regulations;
- d) The units is familiar with the techniques and practical skills of preparation and use of technical means and installations of force protection;
- e) The command staff is familiar with the use of command tools, is capable of managing activities at command posts, dealing with documentation, has practiced the execution order of tasks;
- f) The personnel is familiar with the use of means of protection against weapons of mass destruction, they have practiced all the major techniques and skills;
- g) The personnel is prepared for the elimination of consequences of a strike with weapons of mass destruction and to provide help and assistance to other military units;
- h) The personnel – familiar with its mission – is ready to execute its tasks, is familiar with the theory and practice of combat, fire control, and cooperation of the unit. Tasks related to combat support are known and practiced. The listed requirements of readiness, capability and deployment can change, and in dependence on the particular task they can increase.<sup>21</sup>

## **5. Conclusion**

Analysing both eastern and western military special literature it can be claimed that the political objective of future military operations may be not to

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<sup>21</sup> Further information on the readiness, preparedness, and capabilities of the armed forces can be found in: Padányi, József: New challenges in the field of Engineer Support, ACADEMIC AND APPLIED RESEARCH IN MILITARY SCIENCE 1: pp. 43-50.

destroy enemy and its country but to put an end to crises, to preserve peace and security in the area of military operations. Furthermore, old – conventional – and new ways of warfare will be combined in military operations. The likelihood of asymmetric operations is increasing in any region of the world.<sup>22</sup>

In the future the geopolitical and geostrategic significance of NATO Member States' armed forces will remain. However, further development is required in the field of *deployability, flexibility, versatility* as qualitative indicators. In foreign special literature the notion of strategic non-nuclear forces has appeared, which means strategic intelligence and strike systems.<sup>23</sup> These systems are capable of providing efficient protection and defence to the country and its armed forces and of preventing attacks from the outer space.

In our opinion new proportions of quality and quantity are developing in all fields of conducting a military operation. In other words, the occasional quantitative approach, still present in military thinking, will be replaced by qualitative approach at each and every commander and soldier.

The shaping of fully capacity-based armed forces in every Member States remains dependent on political decisions and economic opportunities in the future. There cannot be a precise schedule outlined for the development of the capabilities of the Hungarian Defence Forces, only versions and development trends can be formulated. At the same time, it is clear that it is reasonable to change the current proportions of the two services in favour of transport and combat helicopters, and air defence troops. In the future it cannot be fully excluded that some elements of services or branches will be combined or a new branch develops for the sake of capability development. At strategic level further battle groups will have to be developed in order to meet the requirements of *flexibility and versatility*.

In our opinion after the Summit meeting the political and military leaders of the Member States got answers to their questions how collective defence can and should be interpreted and executed in the years to come. In other words, whether the points of Washington Treaty are still in force, and if so how to apply them, how to prepare armed forces for them.

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<sup>22</sup> Szenes, Zoltán: Katonai kihívások a 21. század elején. [Military Challenges in the Early 21st Century] In: *Hadtudomány*, Issue 4 / 2005. pp. 25-30.

<sup>23</sup> This is not a brand new idea as a number of study papers were written in the late 1980s on „high-precision weapons and weapon systems” both in eastern and western military special literature. Piller, Tibor – Vitai, Ferenc: A felderítő csapásmérő komplexumok értékelése és az ellenük való harc lehetőségei. [The Evaluation of Reconnaissance Strike Complexes and the Opportunities of Fighting Them] Kilián György Air Force College, 1989

**Peter MORENTH, Africa researcher – István TARRÓSY PhD,  
Africa researcher, assistant professor, University of Pécs<sup>1</sup>**

## **STRATEGIC RECOMMENDATIONS FOR HUNGARY'S PROSPECTIVE AFRICAN DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY<sup>2</sup> - *A POLICY PAPER***

### ***Introduction***

The aim of the present “recommendations” is to prompt reflections, constructive critic on behalf of all those who work with Africa, for Africa, for the Hungarian-African relations, in whichever sector they may be. In addition, this document is intended to keep developing continually from its official publication onwards, therefore, the authors and the organizations driving the cause encourage anybody reflecting upon it, and responding to it.<sup>3</sup>

It is rather well known that the six months of the EU presidencies offer countless possibilities to everyone, and the happenings, events realized during the EU half year do not only contribute to build the given country and its image, but at the same time offer excellent opportunities and platform for civil organizations to showcase and develop their initiatives, increase their presence in general terms. This means that for every country holding the position of the incumbent presidency the possibilities are ensured that during the designated six months, parallel to the governmental and diplomatic events, civil society at large and its actors can present to their country, to the European Union as well as to the wider international community, what they are capable of now and what other capabilities they might have in the future.

It was behind all this background that the umbrella organization called HAND and its member organizations set to work in 2010 to shape the series of events of the presidency period financed by the Europe Aid programme of the European Union, whose organic part is the present strategic recommendations.

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<sup>1</sup> Further contributors were Zoltán Frank, Bogát Marton, Ildikó Hermina Szilasi and special thanks for the professional contribution of Anita Kárai.

<sup>2</sup> The present material was jointly commissioned by the Africa Working Group of the HAND Association Hungary, being at the same time the members of the Steering Group - African Hungarian Union, Foundation for Africa and the Anthropolis Association and made within the Africa-application and realized within the HAND Association's general project “New Voices in International Development”, coordinated by the Steering Group and supported by EuropeAid. The original Hungarian policy paper was translated into English by Szilvia Kotlan, and that provided the initial text for the present paper.

<sup>3</sup> As a next step of this open process, another Africa-symposium could take place with the participation of all the actors concerned, which then could be followed by another finely tuned work that could be published in the fifth half of 2012 on the basis of the opinions expected to reach the authors.



The objective of the Africa-related part of the programme package within the scope of HAND Association's general application "New Voices in International Development" was to formulate African strategic recommendations for the Hungarian Government, from civil perspectives, focusing on development.

**The Africa Working Group of the HAND Association, being at the same time members of the Steering Committee - African Hungarian Union, Foundation for Africa and the Anthropolis Association, together with the Hungarian Africa Platform** have envisaged no less than to make the Hungarian African civil organizations popular through an all-encompassing series of programmes, showcasing their activities and thus contributing to form a more conscious social attitude and approach.

A particularly important element of the project was to formulate recommendations for strategic development focused on Africa, whose non-concealed intention is to help and support the work of Hungarian decision-makers, thus promoting the possibilities to create an overall governmental Africa strategy.

On the basis of the results of the meeting the Steering Group decided the following activities to be realized:

- Prepare an experts' survey;
- Meeting of different focus groups;
- Organize symposia;
- Prepare the recommendations' document.

The group also defined the actors to be relied upon as follows:

- Heads and officials of Hungarian civil and trade organizations dealing with Africa;
- Africa experts skilled in development and aid issues;
- Diplomats (*African members of the Honorary Consular Corps, residing African Embassies, African Ex-Ambassadors*);
- Political decision-makers and institutions (*Ministry of Foreign Affairs, especially MFA Strategic Planning Department, MFA Hungarian Development Department, Ministry of National Economy, Ministry of National Resources*), actors of the academic and scientific sector dealing with Africa (*especially the Africa Research Centre of the University of Pécs, the African Studies Journal (Afrika Tanulmányok), lecturers of ELTE African Studies' MA programme*).

### ***About the recommendations***

#### **Summary of the objectives of the recommendations**

Although the strategic recommendations were collected through a multisectoral consultancy process, they emphasize the points of view of the civil sector in the first place.

They have the following objectives:

- For the civil actors dealing with Africa to reach better results regarding humanitarian aid, activities concerning international development, education, science and business;
- Take stock of the requests, objectives, expected results of the actors through multisectoral consultations, to express the helping and hindering factors, the weak and take off points;
- Support the Government's work with realistic objectives, practical and feasible recommendations, thus contributing to Hungary's Africa strategy to become coherent, effective and successful;
- Improve the communication of the Hungarian stakeholders dealing with Africa, promote their cooperation and increase their effectiveness;
- Establish a long-lasting joint consultation platform between the Government and representatives of the civil and other sectors;
- Through the above, to strengthen African-Hungarian relations, making the Hungarian society more committed towards African issues, endorse, support and corroborate the activities of the Hungarian actors regarding humanitarian aid, international development, scientific, educational and business matters.

### ***Results of the experts' survey<sup>4</sup>***

#### **Breakdown of those replying**

On the basis of the answers to the survey there are actually two bigger groups which can be outlined in Hungary regarding African issues: on one hand, there are institutions which have been dealing with Africa for decades, since well before the political (regime) transformation, (*approximately one third of all the persons/organizations*), parallel to which, on the other hand, a newer, 'fresher' generation has begun to establish itself, which has started to deal with this matter around the turn of the millennium or after Hungary joined the EU in 2004.

From the professional point of view, one third of those replying are affected by African matters thanks to dynamic scientific activities in the last couple of years, one quarter in relation with civil organizational activities, while it concerns a lower number of people in economic terms, or on governmental level (*20 and 15 per cent*). The ecclesiastical and cultural line is marginal.

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<sup>4</sup> In the experts' survey covering more than 80 experts in various fields we find answers from organizations and persons who deal with Africa in the governmental, economic, scientific, cultural, NGO, ecclesiastical and other areas. The survey mirrors the opinion and perceptions of those replying, and cannot be considered representative, because it is extremely hard to reach certain groups with this kind of survey. So e.g. groups - whose opinion is the most important - like the Government, NGO-s, underrepresented persons among those replying.

Which sectors are affected by your activities regarding Africa?	Breakdown of those replying
Governmental	15.4 %
Ecclesiastical	3.9 %
Economic	19.2 %
Scientific	30.8 %
Cultural	3.8 %
NGO	26.9 %


From the point of view of the activities it is a most heterogeneous company. Speaking of Africa in Hungary the most accentuated areas concerning the activities of those replying are: development, education, attitude-forming, and not far from these human rights, research, diplomacy and foreign economic relations. To a lesser extent: activities like healthcare or even security policy. Internationally important areas such as food safety, environmental protection, agriculture, global education and development-education occupy a marginal role in Hungary today.

What is the character of your activity?	Breakdown of those replying
Human rights	8.3 %
Attitude-forming	10.4 %
Global education	4.2 %
General cultural knowledge	6.2 %
Research	8.3 %
Agriculture	2.1 %
Food safety	2.1 %
Environmental protection	4.2 %
Development	10.4 %
Education	10.4 %
Development education	4.2 %
Healthcare	6.3 %
Security policy	6.3 %
Diplomacy	8.3 %
Foreign economic relations - trade	8.3 %

### **What would make an African development strategy successful?**


Nearly all those replying are aware of Hungary's development policy, and while everyone can do something with Africa, astonishingly few persons know what the development policy of the African continent is all about.

*Do you know Hungary's Africa development policy?*



The great majority of those replying think that the “Africa-issue” is underestimated today in Hungary, a minority thinks that the field is handled appropriately/on an average level. None of those replying used the adjective ‘overestimated’. Bearing this in mind it is not surprising that according to the majority, Hungary needs an African development policy. All those replying request for a national Africa strategy, and find that establishing this is indispensable.

*According to you in Hungary the African issue is ...*



Among the main hindering factors of a successful African development policy those replying mention the lack of the political will and support, coupled with the lack of harmonization and co-ordination. Many think that the co-operation and sharing of information between the sectors is lacking. Against this background we can unanimously formulate the demand for a certain central co-ordination, establishing a centre for communication and information, thus promoting the unification of the much differentiated and often insufficient knowledge of the different sectors, actors, stakeholders.


As for the territorial importance, the result is more diverse. According to those replying it is useful to give Africa high priorities in the following areas: economy, culture and science. One of those replying has responded in a more concrete way, and this more or less mirrors and sums up the opinion of those

asked: “It is well worth dealing with all the areas, where Hungary’s government, the civil or business world have gathered experience, where a transfer of experience is possible. On a long-term basis it might be important, whether Hungary would focus on one or two countries, where we could join in the development on several sectoral levels. It would be important to separate humanitarian, development co-operation from the business activities. From the business point of view we should primarily focus on those points, where a Hungarian actor can join a European Union project.”

Another expert has formulated another aspect of the matter: “Naturally, developing the bilateral relations and establishing economic co-operation can be a priority. After establishing the political framework we have to concentrate on outlining viable trade policies.”

This last approach is all the more interesting because most of those replying have agreed that on the governmental decision-maker level the African issue is passed over or tolerated.

*According to you on the governmental decision-maker level the African issue is ...*



Regarding relations between Hungary and Africa those replying consider that the present and the next 20 years will bring scarce co-operation between the two parties. At the same time it is clearly visible that those asked do see – short- and long-term – business opportunities in bilateral co-operation between African and Hungarian entities. NGO, ecclesiastical, scientific and cultural possibilities fall in about under the same opinion.

### **Tasks regarding Africa - breakdown regarding the different actors**

The following answers mirror the most the opinion of the majority of those replying, what the *actors of the government* should deal with talking of Africa:

- “Each ministry/governmental institution has to evaluate the Hungarian interests and their openings in their own areas, as well as the possibilities of the Hungarian contribution to the predominance of global interests.”

- “The actors of the government should pay more attention to the matter of international development in general. We could do the most for Africa by passing a skeleton law of the National Development Ministry and making a pledge towards the poorest countries. A transparent background with clearly traceable regulatory enactments should be established.”
- “With the overall building and strengthening of the Hungarian-African relations, support is needed for the Hungarian businessmen, NGO-s and other actors so that their activities prove efficient and their interests enforced. This can be done with the strengthening of the Hungarian African diplomatic positions. Communication must be refined and extended.”
- “Presence, making sure that there is information, optimizes the existing political and diplomatic possibilities. Identifying and representing Hungarian political and economic interests are crucial. Establishing the necessary institutions and responsibility models is needed.”

Apart from the above-mentioned answers the following – already earlier emphasized – recommendations are clearly outlined for the government: the government needs to build and strengthen bilateral relations, communication and development, incorporating actors from the business world, scientific and educational institutions, civil organizations and the churches.

The following answers define well the two areas on which the actors of the *business world* should concentrate if they want to establish business contacts in/with Africa according to those replying:

- “They should realize that the business life is profit-oriented and would not follow the interests and possibilities of the Africans, but their own business interests. That is why it would be better to establish a generally acceptable ethic code for the business world. ... In order to develop their competitiveness, the Hungarian actors should participate in the tenders of EuropeAid and international organizations regarding several different technical co-operation, project management, and agricultural development, development of energy-related and other areas where they could join development projects.”
- “They should try to re-establish the good co-operation, economic collaboration which characterized the parties before the political transformation took place. It is desirable to contribute to the marketing of Hungarian products, technologies, know-how on the African markets. They should help the interested businessmen to find real possibilities, and guide, support and protect them so that they assert themselves on the African markets and have success.”

Regarding the role of the *civil organizations* it has become clear that:

- “The civil organizations should realize effective, well-structured microdevelopment projects based on good examples. The objective is to generate on the target area, once the project is finished, a sustainable ‘profit’ and production, which is independent from the outside factors.”

- “The current ‘role-disorder’ should be diverted into a normal direction. And it might be unavoidable to strengthen the role of civic control functions and humanitarian aid.”

In the answers regarding civil organizations concrete areas have come up such as humanitarian tasks, human rights, security missions, healthcare (healing), education (schooling), environmental protection, culture, aid, building human relationships, women’s rights, turning back the demographic boom of the population, lobbying, etc.


Regarding *churches* most people recommended to deal with humanitarian and health issues. Some were of the opinion that it would be necessary to study in depth and get to know more the African churches, while others were thinking that the activities of the churches have their hierarchy and centralized system and therefore it would not be necessary to deal with them on the substance.

The main task for the actors of *science and education* would be to build up relationships and capacities, including the relaunch of African (area) studies at Hungarian universities, together with the development of exchange programmes or the widening of the institutional relations, with a heavy focus on scientific/research co-operation.

### Geographic focus of the development policy

From the geographic point of view the development policy to be tailored for Africa should be Sub-Saharan according to a third of those replying and on a continent-level according to a quarter of them. Much less people consider the necessity of a national, regional or eventually trans-regional focus.

*According to you, which geographic focus the development policy to be tailored for Africa should have?*



Those asked even made concrete suggestions in this regard. Several people considered focusing on East Africa (*Ethiopia, Kenya, Tanzania, and Rwanda*), but there were people who suggested another approach: they would focus on the countries supported by the ex-socialist countries (*DRC, Rwanda, Angola and Mozambique*). There are others who consider dealing separately with the more developed countries, like the South African Republic and Nigeria.

## *Territorial contexts of the strategic recommendations*

### **The global context of the revaluation of Africa and the new dynamics of the global system**

In the 21<sup>st</sup> century Africa is certainly to be revaluated in the economic, political and social sense at the same time. Contrary to the mostly negative stereotype the global media have mainly been transmitting up to now, the continent offers several opportunities for the partners ready to co-operate with her (*among others, the Africa-strategy of the European Union is about partnership as well*). Naturally, reality emphasizes the image, according to which the migration flows influencing Europe and thus Hungary from the continent, face us with up to now unknown challenges. It is quite natural that these challenges are on the one part excluding the solution offered by one state only, which means that a close co-operation between states and the different types of actors is needed in the social, health and cultural field as well as in economic and political aspects. On the other hand, this can only have success, if it enables harmony and co-operation between the different scientific areas and disciplines; therefore, *it is highly recommended that an interdisciplinary and multi-sectoral approach is developed.*

All this only makes sense, if we try to map global correlations. The typology of the world system theory of Immanuel Wallerstein, according to which apart from states clearly situated in the centre and on the peripheries and whose relation can be considered as rather simple, there is an “in-between” reality, the semi-periphery, which is in a position to make us turn our attention to the new dynamisms of the system imbued with global processes. In the correlations between centre and periphery this latter plays an essential role. The hierarchy of the world order according to the Realists’ interpretation can be reshaped due to the always more intensive relations of the actors moving along the periphery and even more so along the semi-periphery, and, although the existence, the activity and the status of the central states is unquestionable (or at least seems to be so), the controversial activities of the actors which can mostly be found on the semi-periphery will indeed change the entire system. “The characteristics of the semi-periphery will manifest themselves in the zones, regions or states, in which they are ‘exploiters’ of the periphery and at the same time mean a passive party to the exploitation by the centre. This group is characterized by a bigger dynamism and its members expect, beyond the economic analyses, to be part of the processes affecting them and want to actively form politics at large.” (*drawing upon Jaime, 2010: 125*)

It is exactly in the spirit of this thought that the emerging economies of the global world’s semi-peripheries, which are becoming stronger and stronger, want to change the existing relation between the different actors, and naturally they want to occupy new positions in the arena, similarly to the economically



and technologically developed actors of the centre. The supranational dimensions of the transnational network world lead to the “rearrangement and reorganization of international relations, since they reshape the central power block’s attitude to the periphery, resulting in steps, which will change the nature of the global system.” (*Ibid*)

In the global arena imbued by mutually interdependent relations – according to the unanimity of the historic development – there is a complex system of intercommunication between the small and big nations. Naturally, the steadily relevant role of the central states in the capitalist world indicates points of reference for other actors and in their frame of reference it is these big nations who determine the manoeuvring possibilities of other states and national economies, the possibilities of forming economic and political coalitions (*Lévai, 2003: 146*). Based upon the work of *Burton (1975)*, in the interdependent global sphere the sub-national and supranational formulae and actors are being upgraded. And *Paul Kennedy’s (1997)* opinion in this respect signals that although the supranational tendencies have been weakening the sovereignty and the role of the state, there was no corresponding substitute, which could have replaced it as fundamental unit responding to the changes which are about to take shape in the world. It is indisputable that the traditional means of the state are weakening, nevertheless it makes sense to stick to the reciprocity of the national level and its other corresponding levels, as well as the place and role the state occupies in the global networks’ cob-web as compared to the position and place of the other actors. Especially, when the “new” challenges are of a global nature. None of the actors of this system – not even the states themselves – can confront and meet these challenges on their own, alone, finding an appropriate solution, as these can only be properly answered on a global scale (*Ibid*). In this respect, joining forces and collaboration gain crucial importance, on a national level between the states, and on several other levels between the different stakeholders.

The processes of the first decade of the 21<sup>st</sup> century make us turn the attention of the global society to a great extent to the semi-peripheries and sub-centres, as well as to the dynamic transformations between these regions and the peripheries. In other words, studying South–South dynamics in the global world today is exceptionally exciting, because on the long run considerable implications are to be expected in this century concerning the entire system. At the same time these South–South relations reveal interdependences – and it is doubtful if the world has been paying appropriate attention to them in the last decade.

In our global network society one of the main geopolitical cleavages is, among other things – also according to *Wallerstein (2003)* – the North–South dichotomy. Although it is true that while *Rostoványi (2002)* says that “one of the deepest fault lines of the millennium keeps being” the North–South relation,

Wallerstein already stresses that this will be one of the most relevant gulfs (and tearing tests also) of the “chaotic” future of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. The new type of dynamisms is linked with the big states of the South which are becoming stronger and stronger, from Latin-America to East Asia. Today the Southern „triangular” co-operations are developing in rather unknown regions which had been underestimated, exploited, even depleted, for a long time for their raw materials only. Today, these triangles have much more in store. Last, but not least, they might result in numerous votes in the UN General Assembly...

Due to the mutual interdependences of the global world, it is important for Hungary to get to know well the processes underway (also) around her, and, at the same time, to be even better aware of the actors generating the processes and their relationships to each other, together with to correctly situate the countries of the global South and the eventual co-operation with them in her strategic considerations.

### **The European context – EU–Africa relations: international directives, agreements and efforts**

The context of relations between the EU and Africa goes back to a past of several decades in the field of aid and development co-operation. Nevertheless, in the present case, the most important thing is to focus on the following aspects:

- Directives and commitments of the EU development policy – linked to international commitments.
- Obligations and commitments of Hungary – as EU Member State – regarding international development and aid.
- International and Hungarian civic experience on the basis of the development and aid projects directed to Africa.

It is generally known that the European Union is the world’s biggest donor organization. The following, strategically relevant international documents, like the Millennium Development Goals approved by the UN, the Monterrey Consensus, the Paris Declaration and the ensuing Accra-Agenda, and within the European Union the Lomé Agreements which have replaced the Yaoundé Convention emerging by now from historic perspectives, and then the Cotonou Agreement, based on the ACP–EU co-operation, are serving as guiding directives for the Member States, signalling the European Union’s commitment regarding the international development issue.

Above all this, it is important to mention the Lisbon Agreement also, which – although changing and regulating the internal functioning of the European Union – has been having a great impact on the foreign and development policy of the Union.

In the course of the Cotonou Agreement coming into force in 2003 the EU established the 9<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund to finance the commitments

announced herein, and every Member State pays its contribution fee. Since Hungary, which by joining the EU in 2004 has adhered to the Cotonou Agreement, but did not adhere to the 9<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund, was not a payer into this fund, thus, it was not possible for her to obtain support for civil organizations and economic actors from this source in the past few years. At present, Hungary already contributes to the 10<sup>th</sup> European Development Fund, nevertheless, the possibilities to obtain money from this source are still not entirely clear.

A newer form of co-operation is the Joint Africa EU Strategy (JAES) approved in December 2007 at the EU–Africa Summit in Lisbon, in which both parties jointly agreed on their short- and long-term projects. After surveying the plan for 2007 a 2<sup>nd</sup> Action Plan was drawn up for 2011–2013, which points out eight items of high importance:

First, they mention the civil voices regarding the EU, while at the end they shortly hint at the efforts of the “new Member States”. The “Sound of Africa – Vienna Declaration, NGO-response to the EU–Africa Strategy”, was made in 2006, approved during the “Sound of Africa” conference in Vienna where 40 countries were represented at the conference with 290 participants. Among the organizers we find CONCORD and the platform of the Austrian development policy NGO-s. The declaration deals with the EU–Africa relations with regard to several items and approaches. It makes recommendations for the EU, its Member States, as well as the African and European governments and at the same time invites the civil sector to actively and consciously participate.

As most important items they name the following:

- Active participation to outline, carry out and monitor the EU–Africa strategy;
- Participation in the “programming” of the 10<sup>th</sup> EDF;
- PCD (*Policy Coherence in Development*);
- Increase in capacity;
- Integrated approach – resulting from the realization of the diversity of the civil society;
- Intensify co-operation and create alliances.

The document further draws up a thematic approach of the recommendations, going into detail. Passage from the document, which favours development based on human rights and promoting community involvement, stressing the importance to realize the Millennium Development Goals when working out whatever strategies regarding Africa: ”*recommend within the area of Key Development Issues to*

- use a rights-based approach with a specific focus on community involvement to put the MDGs at the core of any strategy, and work in the context of already agreed African strategies and commitments;
- introduce mechanisms for ensuring the participation of civil society organizations and communities at all stages of development policies and

- programs, and prioritize monitoring of impact on communities, with a specific focus on marginalized people such as women, children, people living with HIV and AIDS and persons with disabilities and the elderly;
- ensure all EU financing mechanisms, in particular the 10th EDF and Member States bilateral assistance prioritize human and social development and aim to provide 0.7 % of GNI now. In doing this, the EU as a donor must avoid using misleading figures of aid quantity;
  - create systems and capacities in the EU and Africa in order to be able to cope with the increasing ODA to African countries to achieve the MDGs in line with African national and regional poverty reduction strategies and action plans, ensuring that by no means resources originally allocated to development financing are siphoned off for migration and /or other purposes;
  - ensure that the European Commission and African decision-makers reaffirm the importance of universal primary education;
  - raise public awareness among policy makers and the broad public on all key development issues, including migration, and accordingly make development education an important element of the strategy”.

From the strategic point of view we cannot forget about the “Joint Africa–EU Strategy” either, approved for 2011–2013. The two-year plan details comprehensively and thoroughly the commitment of the parties towards each other, their projects and expected results.

In light of all these, taking the efforts of the new Member States at a glance, we can state the following:

- Several of the countries which joined the EU in 2004 had already had relations during the years of socialism with countries of the third world, but these were interrupted at the moment of the political transformations, so after joining the EU it is a challenge for every country to build, renovate, and modernize its own development policy. Equally, it is the new responsibility of each Member State to meet the EU requirements as donor countries, as well: the administrative infrastructure, the adequate legal and political environment, increased budgetary contribution to support development and humanitarian aid: these are the three determinants, every NMS country has to have in sight in the course of strategic planning. Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland are those new Member States who have an Africa strategy or African relations worth mentioning.

***A closer regional outlook – African presence of the Visegrád Group, regional promotion of co-operation***

In order to establish any Hungarian strategy, apart from the national, European and global contexts it is worth looking around in the direct region of Hungary, thus letting a certain territorial attitude prevail – giving publicity to the African presence, African development ideas and Africa-linked aspirations of the Visegrád Four (Slovakia, Czech Republic, Poland and Hungary).

It is not new for the Visegrád Group to play a role in African development because during communism they used to give substantial support to African states, under the cloak of solidarity and ideology. In the course of political transformations these relationships were immediately curtailed, it often came to precipitated setbacks which have even caused long-term disadvantages to the former “friendly supporters” in every Visegrád country. What we see today is the reduction of the diplomatic presence and the lack to promote other kinds of presence. There is a perceptibly increasing rhetorical tendency speaking of the commitment of the countries of the region aiming at realizing the MDGs of the United Nations and reducing poverty in general terms across Africa (also).

Nevertheless, examining the “Africa-content” of certain aid and development policies, we see a completely different picture: the question of Africa remains marginal, and there does not seem to be a serious chance for it to come into another priority circle in future (see also: Kopinski, 2011). To realize effective Africa-policies, aid and development projects, it is indispensable to channel the knowledge which can be interpreted in site: it is important to invigorate on the one hand the activities of the experts, researchers and organizations of the corresponding domains, on the other hand to assert the governmental and non-governmental presence on the African terrain. For example, Poland maintains 5 (Angola, Ethiopia, Kenya, Nigeria, the Republic of South Africa), the Czech Republic 7 (Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Nigeria, the Republic of South Africa, Zimbabwe), and Hungary only 2 (Kenya, the Republic of South Africa) embassies in Sub-Saharan Africa.

It would be worthwhile – and this thought can be interpreted as another clear-cut recommendation – to get to know better the Africa-policy of each other, and strengthen the Visegrád co-operation by well-orchestrated and harmonized actions focusing on Africa. A new network is about to be formed in the academic–researcher sector, trying to unite the African studies’ research centres of the region.

At their last meeting during the European Conference on African Studies (ECAS) in June 2011 in Uppsala the centres have outlined concrete co-operation areas for the next period:

- Launch a new scientific e-journal called Central-European Africa Studies Review (CESAR) – with a joint Visegrád editorial board, to be published by the African Research Centre of Pécs;
- Joint regional and EU applications, under the direction of the Visegrád group;
- Starting a joint university course about the history of the Visegrád Group’s Africa policies, the circumstances and possibilities of their development policies.

Regarding joint research one of the special areas is to chart the African immigrants living in the countries of the region, and setting up a database of the Africans who earned their university degree in one of the countries of the region. During the course of 2011 the Pécs-based think tank IDRResearch has realized a project entitled “Black and white – Here we are!”, supported by the European Integration Fund, making a survey about the legal African communities in Hungary (more from this site: [www.ittvagyunk.eu](http://www.ittvagyunk.eu)).

According to the latest data of the Central Statistics Authority the number of the African immigrants to Hungary has considerably increased in the last two years. The number of African citizens having a permission to stay or establish themselves in Hungary reached 2,513 persons on January 1st, 2010, showing an increase of c. 26 % compared to 2009 (*with 1998 persons according to the then-statistics*). 1,080 persons, that are 43 % of the African migrants, came to Hungary from North-African countries. As to the regions South of the Sahara only from Nigeria 739 persons migrated to Hungary – this is more than half (51.6 %) of the entire Sub-Saharan migrants’ community. No one has made a survey up to now regarding the personal motivations of the migrants – the above-mentioned project serves this purpose also, among others, and as a result we might see more clearly in this respect from 2012 on.

Tendencies show that the majority of the immigrants come to Hungary with the purpose of studying. This kind of mobility is “a very important part of migration as a whole, which does not mean settling down definitively, but results in a stay for a long time, which also supposes getting to know one’s environment, eventually for the person to learn the language and/or feel comfortable in other domains, compare the possibilities of his actual and earlier domicile, it increases the intention to definitively migrate and he might settle down.” (*Rédei, 2009: 11*) From this point of view a clear governmental concept, intention and strategy is even more necessary, concerning the question how one “could make the most of” the person about to settle, along with the interests of the receptive nation. These days one of the most heated debates in the European institutions is the issue of migrant communities, the diasporas and their active contributions to economic development of the receptive countries, in particular, when migrant entrepreneurs are concerned.

It is indispensable to establish as early as possible the governmental intention and create an immigration policy, which reflects the European expectations and has a separate Hungarian Africa-programme, as well.

### ***National aspects – Hungary–Africa relations: tasks, obligations, possibilities***

After the democratic transformation in 1989–1990 Hungary practically left Sub-Saharan Africa, and nowadays it is mostly the civil organizations that

give substance to the relation instead of (or rather in addition to) the official presence of the state. The civil organizations working in the African area (e.g. African Hungarian Union, Foundation for Africa, Taita, etc.) try to fill the void left over by Hungarian foreign policy.

Hungary's integration into the European Union meant a turning point in her international relations as well. While playing the game of the European Union the country has to try to enforce her interests in the most effective way possible. As a Member State of the European Union the possible Africa-policy of Hungary (or better the one which has yet to be established) has gained, due to the joined Africa-EU strategy, a new scope (see *item II.2*), and after one and a half decades the African continent itself "has come back to the political and economic map of Hungary".

*As part of this we should give special attention to the reshaping of Hungary's international – in this case pointedly African – relationships.* Hungary has to participate more intensively than up to now in the communal development policy, because our African economic presence is minimal. This justifies, among other things, that since 1 January, 2010 Hungary also has access to the European Union's Development Fund (EDF) that means that Hungary can play an active role in its programmes. This is an alternative possibility for the Hungarian enterprises to break free from the always more restricted European markets.

In this context it is evident that, for example, the Sub-Saharan region can be a take-off point to boost the Hungarian ideas regarding the development of the economy. The region could become a new market, investment target for the Hungarian big-, small- and medium-sized enterprises. Parallel to developing foreign markets and increasing Hungarian export, the *sub-Saharan co-operation can signify multilateral political successes for the Government of the Republic of Hungary*, and bids several new economic possibilities which would not be feasible on the Asian or European market. A good example for this could be the Economic Co-operation Agreement with the Republic of South Africa, signed on 26 November, 2009, although the details of the contract are not known and we do not have information to the merit of its realization for the time being.

As György Suha (2007) stresses: "Presently, Hungary's Sub-Saharan presence in Africa is still confined to passively support or even contemplate from a distance the Africa-policy defined by the colonialist states of Africa. [...] At the same time the political and economic relations with the North African states show an explicitly developing tendency." (Suha, 2007: 8)

In the course of 2010 the governmental ideas regarding Africa have slightly shifted towards a positive direction, and several events, exchange of ideas furnished the necessary background. This can be explained with the fact that Africa has become a central target for the EU's joint foreign policy,

especially concerning the EU–ACP partnership and international development co-operation. Hungary has to/should also take her share of this as an EU Member State. The country has direct serious security policy and geopolitical concerns and interests, e.g. with reference to migration, peacekeeping and NATO commitments.

Regarding foreign economic tendencies Hungary is not present in the African continent, and above all not in the Sub-Saharan region to the extent as seen before, in the decades preceding the political transformation. With the lack of active governmental activity at the moment it is often so that the Hungarian-African relationship is divided between alleged or real representants of particular individual, economic and civil interests.

The country's African activities are considerably reduced by now in every sense foreign missions were closed, especially in the Sub-Saharan region. From the former eight embassies seven were closed in the last decades (*Guinea, Tanzania, Ghana, Mozambique, Angola, Ethiopia and Nigeria*). Today we have only two diplomatic missions left south of the Sahara: in South Africa and Kenya. At the same time, there are Hungarian embassies in all five states (*Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, Libya, and Egypt*) of North Africa, on the Mediterranean coast.

Presently, Hungary has altogether seven embassies in Africa, while we maintain twenty- seven in Asia, thirteen in America and sixty-one in Europe, including the missions of the international organizations ranking as embassies.

Thus, it is evident that the humanitarian aid of the Hungarian State is “limited” in Black Africa. One of the biggest items recently has been that Hungary cancelled 96.75 per cent of Mozambique's debt amounting to MEuro 17.3.

The African market could be opened for the Hungarian companies, becoming some kind of take-off point supposing that they can successfully apply for international funds (*EDF, World Bank, specialized agencies of the UN, etc*) and/or local tenders) to foster bi- and multilateral co-operation and development.

Hungary as a donor country gives money to international organizations as well for humanitarian purposes. The European Union and the OECD will then distribute this money between the states in need in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean. For example, between 2008 and 2013 Hungary has been giving to the 10<sup>th</sup> Development Programme of the European Development Fund c. MEuro 125, that is about BnHUF 35, and it is to expect that a considerable part of this amount will go to Africa. All this is not only important from the aid point of view: thanks to this programme Hungarian associations will have opportunities to realize European Union projects planned in countries of Africa, the Caribbean and Pacific region, but *our contribution is only “rewarding”, if the Hungarian*



*economic, trade and civil organizations actually apply for ACP European Union programmes which have become accessible to them with Hungary's joining the EU.*

Hungarian associations would also very much need to intensify economic relations, since it is well-known that Africa is one of the world's biggest and most important regions of natural resources, therefore, participating in industry-related developments can also become an option. After the political transformation Hungarian missions in Angola and Mozambique were closed, and the intensity of bilateral relations has decreased accordingly. Nevertheless, today it is well worth to pay attention to the fact that, for instance, Angola is one of the most dynamically developing countries of Africa and the world, and they have discovered considerable energy resources, and their GDP increase is also one of the highest of the world.

In September 2008, on the Africa Forum, one day before the opening of the 63<sup>rd</sup> Meeting of the UN General Assembly the former Hungarian foreign minister, Kinga Göncz outlined Hungary's intentions in detail, saying that within the international development co-operation Hungary wants to focus its African efforts on the countries of the south of the Sahara. She also indicated that the (then) Hungarian Government wished to improve the 'quality' of support so as to promote better than before the development of the countries in question. She also stressed that in the future bigger emphasis would be given to tied aid. Unfortunately, all this has remained plan only up to now.

International aid programmes are being uniformly handled in the Department for International Development Co-operation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, established in November 2002. According to the Ministry the OECD- and EU-conform donor activities of the Republic of Hungary were started in 2003. Quite independently, there were international development and support programmes earlier, which were not handled uniformly, and for which Hungary spent Bn HUF 4.1 in 2001 (or Bn HUF 5.7 according to other estimations). At the same time in 2010 Hungary's entire available development funds of Hungary, including Asia, South-America and Africa, amounted to a total of MHUF 90 only.

Despite all these, it is a fact that in Hungary, thanks to active civil organizations and individual initiatives, Africa is on the way of being (positively) revalued (*see above II.1. global context*), which is predicted to increase wider attention in the following years.

In addition to all these, a new type of "race for Africa" needs to be mentioned, i.e. the latest worldwide trend, according to which the leading Asian powers (China, Japan, India, Malaysia, Indonesia), as well as Russia and Brazil, and other emerging economies have become the most serious challengers of the EU, first of all in the race for the natural resources, the places of occurrence and

the exploitation rights of raw materials. Comparing the investment portfolios it leaps to the eye that while e.g. China participates in African developments/investments in a much diversified way and in several different regions, Europe keeps speculating on investments in connection with the natural resources of the continent.

By today, Africa has become a continent with more than one billion people, which means an enormous market and enormous possibilities at the same time. It is also true that up to now coups d'état, ethnic clashes, epidemics, increasing water shortage and crushing poverty make the chances of keeping alive difficult nearly in its every corner, which, unfortunately, is also a challenge for any potential Hungarian aspiration.

Parallely, Hungary's former leading role in the competition on the market is completely finished, as Hungary almost disappeared from the economic map of Africa. Before the political transformation Hungary used to take a considerable share in the development co-operation, providing technical-professional support e.g. through the Hungarian TESCO company. The number of the African students studying and taking a degree at Hungarian universities was also very considerable, many occupying a leading position in their country by now.

Hungarian SMEs are also trying their wings on the Continent, but up to now few companies were successful. The biggest challenge to survive as a company is connected with the informal society and corruption at large, although if one is familiar enough with the place and understands the particularities of the administration, these difficulties can be easily bridged over. With appropriate co-ordination the existing relationships of the civil organizations can be used in this sector, as well as the "love for Hungary" and the extensive relationships of the thousands of African students who graduated in Hungary in the previous decades...

Furthermore, it would be important to speak more sensible and with unbiased words about Africa (*like in the volume "Africa today" (Afrika ma) published by Publikon, Pécs in 2009 and in the Hungarian Africa-journal called African Studies*). Apart from this it would be important that Hungarian experts speak about Africa in a sensible way, who "travel about in Africa" and have come to know Africa through field work, research and other economic, diplomatic and civil activities, have come to know today's African cultures and who steadily keep coming closer to the Africans. They can authentically share Africa's past, present and future with the decision-makers. And the future is not all about problems and difficulties, but about innumerable economic, political and cultural co-operation opportunities!

According to the international market developments we can witness across the continent, together with the recent surveys published, the 21<sup>st</sup> century

can/will probably be Africa's century: through the different development possibilities and, of course, having to meet and answer the several challenges of the transformation. In this respect it is worth shooting a glance at the recent studies of the McKinsey Global Institute about African growth and economic perspectives (see: [www.mckinsey.com](http://www.mckinsey.com) – *Lions on the Move*).

Hungary, as member of the European Union and also as a country giving the world several outstanding Africa-researchers (*László Magyar, László Almásy, Emil Torday, Sámuel Teleki, Flóra Sass*) and internationally renowned hunters (*Zsigmond Széchenyi, Kálmán Kittenberger, Antal Rácz*), should take her share of this process, but of course in an adequate way, along with well-founded strategies.

We are aware that Africa has not been the Hungarian foreign policy's high priority until recently, but the continent could (and should) become much more important for our country through our well-considered foreign economic efforts.

“Educating” should therefore help enable Hungarian society “to the reception and better understanding of Africa”. We hope that these recommendations will contribute to reconsider and reshape the Hungarian foreign political and economic strategy and development policy, to lay the foundation of an effective and proactive Hungarian contribution to the EU Development Policy. We are convinced that the future brings much more possibilities for the civil organizations, educational-research institutions and the actors of the economy than at present, to co-operate as intensively as possible with the African countries and realize joint development projects for everybody's benefit.

Bearing the economic interests in mind the Hungarian Government should pay more attention to the fact that the mutually beneficial intensification of its African presence gives new impetus to the Hungarian-African relations.

The African issue is not merely a foreign relations' or foreign economic question, but a complex government mission. *We propose that the Government should consider setting up a Government Commissioner Office for Africa* for the effectiveness of the steps to be taken towards Africa as alternative market take-off point.

In the last few years – among others at the Africa Conference held in 2004 in the Four Seasons Hotel in Budapest – the idea originally formulated by former State Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, László Várkonyi, has been repeated several times: ***“The time has come to reconsider our objectives and interests concerning the African continent and give new perspectives to our endeavours. We have to situate Africa in our foreign relations' system rationally and with the future in mind. As a matter of fact, we should point out***

***why a relatively small Central European country with practically no colonial background needs an Africa-policy.***

Developing the relations is our own interest in the first place. Africa is a potentially rich continent: the important actors of the international arena – such as China, India, Brazil, the USA, Japan, Russia and last but not least the European Union – have long been fully aware of the importance of the continent’s immense raw material reserves (*e.g. mineral oil, natural gas, gold, diamond, copper, cobalt, timber, etc*). The import of certain tropical agricultural products means an excellent business opportunity (*tropical fruits, coffee, tea, cut flowers, and fish*). The African market is immense, although still with a low purchasing power.

At the same time Hungary cannot isolate herself from the problems of the Sub-Saharan region. For the economic and political refugees streaming from this region, Hungary is about to gradually become target-country from transit-country. The region in question has been in continued crisis for several years and is the hotbed of problems with international impact. Organized crime, international terrorism, AIDS, etc all reach Hungary, too. *To reduce poverty and create political stability is our best interest and moral obligation.*

Neither can we pass over the influence our EU membership exercises over Hungarian foreign policy. What is important for the European Union, Hungarian foreign policy has to deal with also. And Africa is a high priority for the European Union. The Union considers Africa as her strategic partner.”

In a material of the former African research unit of the Geopolitical Council, published in 2007 the following four areas were highlighted as important items to be considered when drawing up a national Africa-policy:

- Aid programmes linked to economic activities (investment);
- Close working relationship with the scientific-professional network of the country;
- Maintaining constant contact with voluntary and civil organizations;
- Launching social awareness programmes.

All these ideas have been further reinforced by János Hóvári Deputy State Secretary for Global Affairs of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs – passage from the protocol of the Africa symposium held in Pécs in September 2010: *“Helping Africa, the Hungarian presence in Africa and national politics are not fighting, but much more supporting one another!”* The State Secretary summarizing the meeting stressed that it had no precedent on governmental level up to now to appoint such a high-ranking position for “global affairs” in the foreign affairs’ management of the country. As main objective he specified the necessity to lay down the global concept of Hungary’s foreign policy, and Africa has to have a natural place in that.

*Apart from all this we have to accept it as a fact: there is a competition between the different actors of the world for African partnerships – first of all regarding Africa’s “treasures” (as we have been referring to it several times in this policy paper), but in general for the African markets and the mutually beneficial partnerships. In order to make sure that Hungary has a presence in Africa which is mutually beneficial for all parties concerned in the co-operation, we have to see our possibilities and objectives very realistically.*

Between 2009 and 2011 there were three different initiatives regarding the formulation of a potential Hungarian Africa-strategy:

1. The HAND Africa Team was set up under the title “Suggestions to Hungary’s actions plan for 2009–2010 and the Hungarian Africa-strategy, based on the joint strategy of the European Union, shortly called “*Alternative Africa Development Strategy*”, upon request of the Department of International Development of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (antecedents: Suggestions to Hungary’s actions plan for 2009–2010 and the Hungarian Africa-strategy, based on the joint strategy of the European Union)
2. Upon request of the Ministry of National Economy the company Africa Holding, and the African Trade and Development Office have drawn up the document “*Development of Hungary’s Economic Relations in Africa*”, which was later forwarded to the Ministry of Regional Development and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, with corresponding trade revisions.
3. “*Consultancy meetings’ series promoting Hungary’s long-term Africa-policy*” (September–November 2010, Pécs–Budapest) organized by the African Research Centre at the Faculty of Humanities, University of Pécs, the Strategic Planning Department of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Hungarian Institute of International Affairs also took place resulting in some fundamental discussions over the potential strategy.

***Foreign economic and agricultural strategic recommendations –  
“Developing Hungary’s Economic Relations in Africa”***

The idea to create a Hungarian African Economic Strategy came up at the moment of the change of government, in May 2010, upon the initiative of Africa researcher and CEO of ATDO (African Trade and Development Office) Peter Morenth, Foreign Economy State Secretary Zsolt Becsey and others.

The first version of the document was presented to the Ministry of National Economy in June 2010, and then in November in its modified version. The author sent the recommendations to the Prime Minister’s Office, to Péter Gottfried, the Prime Minister’s foreign policy adviser. The document, with its corresponding trade amendments made by Zoltán Lakner, was forwarded in December 2010 to the Ministry of Regional Development, and later on, in February 2011, to the Department of International Development of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

The following passages of the document concern the areas of international development and can further illustrate the efforts that are recommended to be carried out:

“In the past few months the Hungarian governmental concept has shown a positive shift regarding Africa. This is due to the fact that Africa has become main target of the joint EU foreign policy, particularly regarding the field of EU–ACP partnership and the international development co-operation, and we being an EU Member State, have to/should take our share in this.

*The support for African projects should have to be ensured with state help and by means of economic diplomacy – using the relationships of civil companies, particularly regarding the planning and risk-management period of the projects. Without such projects the EU-funds created to this effect would not be accessible to us.*

*Information channels should have to be created for the follow-up of the international aid grant possibilities – it is important to help realize the applications, and thus customer service, B2B information site, green and/or blue line should have to be operating.”*

### ***Some “soft power” and public diplomacy considerations***

Those former university students from Africa who took their university degree in Hungary and many of whom are in leading political or business positions could mean considerable social capital for Hungary. Developing the Hungarian “soft power” via this network has considerable relevance.

The civic consortium drawing up the present recommendations found the expression “soft power” adequate, because its use might help Hungary to become (more) attractive and (more) important to the outside world, the international community. Thus it is essential to consider factors such as the idea echoed by France Mutombo, i.e. the development of the educational-cultural relations, the scientific-technological co-operation, the enlargement of the institutional network into a position to represent Hungary – first of all by “additional” items. Good examples for these last items are the Germans’ Goethe Institute, the French Alliance Française (AF) network or the Chinese Confucius Institutes worldwide. This means that the network of the Hungarian cultural institutes should be enlarged, and could be widened by incorporating the civil actors on the model of AF.

For Hungary, developing similar items could mean long-term development possibilities. Should these factors be of great(er) importance in a prospective Africa-strategy, Hungary will certainly be able to bring other, more specific areas – e.g. those of the economy, trade, security policy, etc and their Hungarian actors – in a more favourable position, thus really reinforcing and further developing its “smart power” (see more on this from Joseph Nye).

Although there are perceptibly more and more young Africans (better still their parents and family) who are able to follow studies at European universities as “tuition fee-paying students”, we emphatically recommend drawing up and offering a new Hungarian State scholarship programme focusing on the African region. The emerging economies of our global world annually offer an increasing number of state grants to African young people. With the help of this kind of support Africans can gain professional training and knowledge, in possession of which – and this is supported by the most recent research and surveys – they establish contacts to the state which provided the grant for them, and the business and other sectors’ actors, which means that they join intensively in the long-term development of bilateral co-operation – since they have the necessary qualifications and speak correctly the language of the state providing the grant, which has crucial importance in the development of relations in general terms. Consequently, Hungary should have a new, overall Hungarian state scholarship programme explicitly for Africans. It is imperative to suitably enlarge the existing possibilities (if necessary, the frameworks handled by the Hungarian Scholarship Board MÖB and the Balassi Institute).

### ***Strategic recommendations and suggestions by sectors***

*In the final part of this policy paper, it is intended to summarize some of the potentials in three different sectors, i.e. the civil, the economic and the scientific sectors.*

#### **Civil sector**

##### *Communication*

- We suggest establishing a regular bilateral communication forum between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the civil organizations dealing with Africa.
- We encourage to outline as soon as possible a communications plan (*sharing information, newsletters, selecting contact persons, quarter yearly meetings*), to ensure the future exchange of information between the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the civil organizations.
- We consider it important to share the information of public interest about the security and political situation and the grant application possibilities, coming from the embassies and honorary consulates and concerning civil organizations.
- We insist on the communications plan to be extended to the media-communications channels of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the civil organizations, so as to jointly inform the public at large about the successes and results of each other on the different news sites, in newsletters, on websites, and in the media.

### *Support for administrative resources, grant application possibilities and micro-projects*

- We suggest that the invitation of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to support the Hungarian International Development Policies (NEFE) of the civil organizations include in the future also the Sub-Saharan countries of Africa, and not only those countries with a Hungarian embassy or foreign mission.
- We suggest a joint financing system for civil organizations which do have an approved development project and will bring further financing from other sources. In this case the necessary budget should be completed by the International Development Department of MFA so that the project becomes a success.
- We suggest the International Development Department of MFA to support within its long-term Africa-strategy the African activities of the civil organizations which have a permanent agency and permanent project in one of the Sub-Saharan African countries. This would make the Hungarian civil organizations' African competitiveness easier at the local applications.
- We suggest increasing the allocation available for the Sub-Saharan region's countries, which amounted to MHUF 15 in 2010. We request to ensure appropriate information for the applying organization about the decisions regarding the applications, to provide the applying organization positive or negative critic to contribute to the future success of their future applications.
- We suggest the annual invitation for the microproject applications initiated with the embassies, as well as to increase the available funds and ensure better visibility of the invitations to applications.

### *More effective use of know-how and expertise*

- We suggest setting up a database for the organizations and experts dealing with international development and Africa. Following Western examples this could be realized in the form of a public electronic surface on the official site of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs or other corresponding institution. The experts' database would help more intensively incorporating and using the know-how and expertise of the actors of the civil sector.
- We suggest to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to deal with the civil experts as partners at conferences, lectures, as well as when requesting a standpoint or an opinion and to give them more opportunities in future to contribute to the issue in the respected African countries.

### *Moral support*

Official reference letter, supporting letters, recommendations, main sponsorships and presence at events on the part of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs can considerably help the civil organizations to be authentically judged and to be successful in Africa (*aid programmes, development*) and in Hungary (*charity events, promotion of general knowledge, forming the attitude, the*



*approach, etc*). We request that the civil organizations can turn with similar requests to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the future also and that it keeps supporting the activities of the civil organizations with these roles and documents.

### **Economic sector**

- It is/would be essential to outline the long-term Africa-policy of the Hungarian Government, or at least it's "Africa-vision" at a recommendation level.
- The appointment of a separate African Trade Commissioner should have to be seriously considered, who would cater for the far-reaching activities of the exploitation of the African market and the renewal of 'old' relations. Who would also encourage the social actors of the civil organizations with local contacts and the Hungarians living in Africa, and would draw up Hungary's African economic relations to be able to build a Hungarian trade network in Africa.
- It would be necessary to establish the foundation of an institutional system for consultancy regarding trade development and investment, based on information, reuniting the activities of NKH (HITA = Hungarian International Trade Association), Tourism Zrt., AMC, African Development Department of the Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Afrika Holding Zrt., etc.
- The intensified attention given to Africa should be continuously communicated on governmental level towards the Hungarian entrepreneurial sphere. Within this framework an African economic website should be set up and edited, trainings should be provided for entrepreneurs about the system of the international development supports and applications.
- It would be essential to tune Hungary's existing bilateral development programmes and aid policy to the expectations of the European Union. We should contribute with programmes on a smaller scale, being more in line with Hungary's possibilities (*e.g. communicating on a state level the current programmes of the civil organizations, local governments, educational institutions, their moral, "free" support*) to realize the common ideas and thus meeting the expectations of the European Union in this regard.
- It would be essential to establish the GVB-s with the more important African countries and the existing South African GEM (Global Entrepreneurship Monitor) should have to be substantiated as soon as possible.
- To take part in trade development applications, African local and international tenders together with the organizations and societies of the older EU Member States as "sub-contractors", to get as many references as possible.
- We initiate organizing a professional round-table discussion to incorporate the Hungarian entrepreneurs, such as NKH (HITA), AMC, Joint Venture

Association JVSZ, Hungarian Industrialists' National Association MGYOSZ, Entrepreneurs' National Association VOSZ, Budapest Chamber of Commerce and Industry and Africa Holding Zrt., ATDO, with the participation of the European KGSZ, representatives of the big associations, as well as experts as intensively as possible into the international development co-operation projects.

- Our aim is for the Hungarian companies to become consolidated in their international activities and be able to actively participate in the development co-operation projects “as sub-contractors”, thus obtaining the actual experience and the unavoidable and inevitable references. They should see clearly the Millennium Development Goals and be active partners in using as effectively as possible the European Development Fund and other international financial funds.
- There are at least three groups within the Africa–EU strategy, in which Hungary should actively participate (and in which Hungary has not participated to the merit up to now): Trade and Regional Integration Partnership, Energy Partnership, as well as Science and Information Society Partnership. We should actively participate in the Africa–EU Partnership programmes in co-operation with experts, the prospective Honorary Trade Adviser Network, with the “moral” support of the civil organizations.
- The Hungarian local governments should share the possibilities of the Development Co-operation Initiatives (DCI). The sister city system should eventually be converted into a “three-sided” (EU–Hungarian–African) system in Africa also, and by using this, we should first obtain the “sub-contractor” role in the African programmes and later on, armed with the necessary references, gain direct access to EU funds.
- To establish the Honorary Trade Advisers Network in Africa and later on other continents also under the leadership of the current governmental head of the foreign economy.
- Invigorating the bilateral political and related economic relations through high-level (presidential, national assembly president's) and delegations' visits.
- Hungary should take a more efficient part in the activities of the African Union.
- Hungary should have to be made more attractive for the African investors, since, by today, they exist in an increasing number.

### **Contribution and eventual participation of the scientific-academic field**

The objective setting up at the end of 2009 the African Research Centre in Pécs (the sole such academic institution in the country) was, from the professional point of view, to enable Hungary to have and strengthen a research

potential and, parallelly, professional training, which is in a position to educate persons who understand and know Africa's problems and capacities as well. Consequently, they could enrich Hungarian scientific life in many respects, and potentially promote the effective and long-term activities of the Hungarian economic actors in Africa's economic growth (which will accordingly have positive aspects for Hungary also).

A researcher database and professional training formulating these objectives is socially necessary and reasonable, particularly through the fact that since the beginning of our EU membership in 2004 Hungary has (only) been net payer of the Union's development policy.

It is important that the Hungarian contributions turn to good account, particularly so that as much Hungarian activities and performances gains terrain and are given free play concerning African development issues.

In the national researcher-academic network approximately 40 persons have an academic qualification with a PhD degree as a minimum, and when writing the present recommendations preparatory measures were taken to create an academic sub-division within the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. All this in order that Hungary can benefit from the power of the country's scientific potential – first of all to draw up synergic effects, that is to support the multisectoral, interdisciplinary co-operation outlined in the present recommendations.

The prospective all-governmental strategy should contain a separate chapter regarding the scientific-academic developments, detailing how to best exploit the know-how of these areas.

Under the coordination of the existing African Research Centre the researcher network can support a Hungarian strategy promoting the promotion of the most recent research results to the greater Central European region, in order to be incorporated into the corresponding foreign affairs', economic and security policy process. It links university education to the job market, always keeping an eye on the best utilisation of results. It makes the most of new sources from the university education side, first of all by obtaining international research sources.

It is the prospective strategy which brings those active in these areas in a more advantageous position, for obvious mutual interests and benefits. It should be possible for the members of the research network to:

- Organize and share field exercises;
- Organize Hungarian and international conferences, publish studies, trade journals (these activities are presently under way) in matters and in areas considered important by the Government as well;
- Support education promotion to reach a wider public.

With this scientific potential in hand the researchers are able to support the Hungarian African development ideas by:

- Drawing up studies and development concepts, among others upon request of the Hungarian Government and other governmental background institutions;
- Developing instruction material for the professional training, human resources development programmes, and realizing training services;
- Promoting Hungarian and international scientific, professional co-operation and those with PPP construction;
- Carrying out analyses and assessments on various topics/themes supporting any investment idea;
- Drawing up and managing students', teachers' and researchers' exchange programmes.

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**“DEWEY” GOES TRANSNATIONAL:  
TRANS-NATIONALIZATION IN THE FIELD OF  
COUNTERTERRORISM**

*“Terrorism never fits one particular real estate. It is effective precisely because it spreads all over the map. The government is not organized as a whole to really deal with transnational problems.”*

Duane “Dewey” R. Clarridge, the first director of the Central Intelligence Agency’s Counterterrorist Center (CTC), writing in a memo to Director of Central Intelligence William Casey, in early 1986 (the CTC started functioning on 1 February 1986)<sup>1</sup>

*“The enemy is today represented by a highly diffused, extremely dangerous evil: an evil which is hard to capture or even understand. Therefore, at this stage we should be aware that for the Alliance to fulfill its everyday mission, it must change fast and ostensibly”*

Vaclav Havel, President of the Czech Republic, speaking at the NATO Summit in Prague, on 20 November 2002<sup>2</sup>

*“In order to defeat this [terrorism], we have to collaborate and to cooperate as an international community”*

Queen Rania, wife of Jordanian monarch Abdullah, born in Kuwait of Palestinian refugee parents, speaking to ABC, 13 November 2005<sup>3</sup>

***Introduction***

In a widely cited book, fifteen years after Duane “Dewey” Clarridge wrote his memo (in 2001), Arquilla and Ronfeldt, as well as some of their co-authors, warned of the threat posed by acephalous or polycentric, all-channel or relatively flat, network-like terrorist and criminal organizations in the age of the internet, in a globalized context characterized by accelerated and intensifying flows, including that of information. As a result, Arquilla and Ronfeldt claimed, power would be “migrating to non-state actors,” in the face of which hierarchical structures may be disadvantaged competitors, and it would take networks to fight networks (2001: 1, 15). In the same book, Zanini and Edwards

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<sup>1</sup> As quoted by Coll (2004: 140).

<sup>2</sup> As quoted by Fraga (2003)

<sup>3</sup> As quoted by Reveron (2006: 463).

put forward even more alarming predictions. Quoting from the abstract of their chapter,<sup>4</sup> “The Networking of Terror in the Information Age” (2001: 29):

“Middle East Arab terrorists are on the cutting edge of organizational networking and stand to gain significantly from the information revolution. They can harness information technology to enable less hierarchical, more networked designs – enhancing their flexibility, responsiveness, and resilience.”

While concerns about the destructive potential of networks of super-empowered individuals remained (Robb 2005), criticism was raised concerning whether networks really automatically have an advantage, or if the kind of “mitigating factors” that Arquilla and Ronfeldt reckoned with, may, perhaps in tandem with other, hitherto unconsidered factors, even constitute disadvantages for them, at least under certain conditions (Eilstrup-Sangiovanni and Jones 2008). Having lost its sanctuary in Afghanistan, and replaced it with a less perfect one in Pakistan, al Qaida clearly utilizes the “strength of weak ties” for its survival, so important in a number of ways for networked actors in the age of the internet (Kennedy and Weimann 2011). The latter seems to be one decisive factor as to how, as Hoffman points out, “(Terrorist groups today show a degree of resiliency and capacity for survival that has increased their average life span some five to ten times that of their Cold War counterparts” (Hoffman, 2009: 360). Yet, at the same time al-Qaida today is clearly weaker than it was in the period 1999-2001.

Meanwhile, it has been overlooked that just as some of Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s networks were in fact networks of organizations, with hierarchies, and not only individuals, occupying these networks’ nodes, states and their bureaucracies can similarly form their own networks.<sup>5</sup> With thousands of NGOs active in Afghanistan, even some of the same activist circles that Arquilla and Ronfeldt considered, are in fact present in one of the key theatres where global terrorist networks are being fought.

The question, asked in this article, is what role network-like structures play in counterterrorism? Could anything approaching all-channel communication be observed on the side of the counter-terrorists, threatened to be “out-networked” in Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s view? Would this much trust be possible between, and by, bureaucracies, especially in the field of security? And do network-like structures involved in counterterrorism make an overall positive or an overall negative contribution to it? What kind of picture can one draw on the basis of experience from Afghanistan and Pakistan?

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<sup>4</sup> It should be noted that the abstracts were prepared by the editors of the volume, and not the authors of the chapter themselves.

<sup>5</sup> See the section on activism in Denning’s chapter, in Arquilla and Ronfeldt’s book (2001: 242-263).



## *The structure of the discussion*

Who is doing counterterrorism? Who is a CT actor? One would be wrong to adopt a nominal-output-oriented definition of this: actions deemed belonging to “counterterrorism” often happen not to reduce the terrorist threat, while the production of actual counterterrorism has aspects far removed from the central thrust of nominal CT endeavors. Many participate in both nominal and real counterterrorism who are not necessarily considered as CT actors, and many of these predominantly non-transnational actors experience trans-nationalization as a feature of the contemporary setting, as affecting their work, or as a set of phenomena that ought to be affected by their work — clearly, this all pertains to an understanding of trans-nationalization in the field of CT, and thus forms part of the agenda of this discussion.

For these reasons the first section of the article briefly looks at how “CT actor” and “transnational” may best be conceptualized, arguing for a sufficiently broad interpretation of the former, and a sufficiently narrow interpretation of the latter, to maximize the scope of the subject material covered here: casting the net wide, but with the kind of fish one wants in mind, to arrive at a “catch-most” sample of issues.

The brief list that follows below provides an overview of the different links between CT actors, arguing that the following categories may be particularly relevant in an investigation of the trans-nationalization of counterterrorism, offering four distinct perspectives on the phenomenon which are discussed extensively in the remaining sections of the article.

1) Both the absence and the presence of transnational CT cooperation in an increasingly trans-nationalized/trans-nationalizing world, and the corrective measures undertaken by various CT actors on the macro level, with a view to compensating for existing deficiencies or proactively acting to reduce the threat of terrorism. *This is a “structural” view of transnational CT.*

2) Transnational governmental networks: cross-border governmental cooperation, in hegemonic as well as non-hegemonic forms. These networks may include liaison officers, advisors seconded to governments other than their own, joint policy-planning, the employment of other-country nationals in CT-related tasks — and further, similar roles and activities. *This is a “(governmental) actor-focused” view of transnational CT.*

3) The role of epistemic communities, and other media involved in the transfer of ideas, such as intelligence-sharing or the proliferation of CT best practices. *This is an “ideas-focused” view of transnational CT, and at the same time it is a key link between structural and actor-focused views of transnational CT.*

4) Finally, the privatization of security roles and the “incorporated” public-security mechanisms of the increasingly transnational and global private sector.

*This is a complementary, and again a largely actor-focused, perspective, one that at the same time refines the structural view of transnational CT.*

Regarding these categories, numerous examples will be put forward to consider counterterrorism in a somewhat unusual light, in the remaining sections of the article. All-throughout, a case study of the counterterrorism-related aspects of policies vis-à-vis Afghanistan and Pakistan is incorporated into the discussion. To these will most of what is outlined here pertain. Following this overview, further peculiar examples of trans-nationalization are considered in more detail, ones particularly relevant to understanding important downsides of trans-nationalization, to arrive at a comprehensive normative assessment of the phenomenon.

### ***Conceptual issues***

**Terrorism and counterterrorism.** As indicated in the previous section, when answering the question of who is involved in counterterrorism, the first instinct may be to follow a nominal output-oriented approach by focusing on all that people may call counterterrorism and the very people directly contributing to it. This, however, requires foregoing the known and extensive debates about what may constitute terrorism: for example, the issue of whether “state terrorism” ought to be considered if any actors may wish to so define the terrorism that needs to be “countered”. Especially in the West, support is generally lacking for taking this direction, but in this rejection a history of the incoherent Western use of the term is also overlooked. The label “state terrorism” is not only a resort of those who want to argue that “one man’s terrorist is another man’s freedom fighter.” Old concerns about the “state sponsorship of terrorism” ought to be remembered at this point. This would not, in and of itself, be concerning analytically, given that the concept of state-sponsorship focuses primarily on non-state actors, and not states, actually committing the terrorist acts – were it not for the past and present questionable practices in attaching the “state sponsor” label to other countries.

Under Ronald Reagan’s presidency, for example, anti-communism and anti-terrorism were often conflated. This was informed by a Central American context of dirty wars which the United States readily entered in defense of its influence in the Americas. The wish to globally counter real and perceived Soviet advances also dictated engaging in (direct or indirect) support to a number of dubious allies, who did in fact employ terrorist tactics, such as Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s Hizb-i-Islami (supported largely indirectly, through Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence) and Jalaluddin Haqqani’s group (a faction of Hizb-i-Islami’s Younis Khalis-led rival wing; supported eventually – reportedly – also as a so-called “unilateral” contact by the CIA.<sup>6</sup>). As to the

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<sup>6</sup> Coll (2004: 167)

present, the U.S. State Department's list of state sponsors of terrorism reads as follows: "Cuba, Iran, Sudan, Syria";<sup>7</sup> at the start, in 1979, when the list was first published, it read "Libya, Iraq, South Yemen, Syria." Arguably this is neither an all-inclusive, nor a fully justified list, and it never has been one. Moreover, in numerous cases the binary logic of talking about sponsors and non-sponsors is not practical, given countries where some factions may be giving tacit support to terrorist organizations, with tacit acceptance by other factions, while facing opposition to this from yet other factions; the possible scenarios abound.

An alternative to focusing on nominal involvement in counterterrorism may be to adopt some of the usual definitional elements of terrorism as a working definition, to support a more (reasonably) narrowed-down inquiry. Indeed, this is the path the paper will tread: focusing on terrorist organizations that are non-state and employ intentional violence against civilians, aiming at second-order (e.g. psychological) effects from their operations; regardless of what else they do besides this. Moreover, the focus in the context of this paper is mostly al-Qaida.

Even with this clarification, however, it needs to be borne in mind that while an actor may believe it is acting in furtherance of counterterrorism against al-Qaida, by doing what it considers directly or indirectly relevant to this goal, it may be that it is not in reality making a positive contribution to this effort. Its role may even be counterproductive in certain respects.

**CT actors.** It follows from the previous section that all of those who participate in the activities studied in the remaining sections of this paper may qualify as CT actors. No limitations are set: it would not be practical. The perceived or real stakes of state-building in Afghanistan as one of the West's means or stratagems in the broader counterterrorist struggle, indirectly define a function for everyone involved in it, in relation to counterterrorism.

**Transnational.** Without a fully comprehensive overview, one can demonstrate that transnational means different things from different points of view. Structuralist authors may focus on the trans-nationalization of value chains, and the emergence of an increasingly transnational "capitalist class" (TCC), made up of capital-owners as well as managers. Sociologists may be interested in studying the emergence of a borderless elite whose members are often double/multiple citizens or people of mixed origin, schooled in multiple countries. Economists may be interested in how these people take advantage of offshore investments and tax exemptions, sensitive to changes and cross-country differences in regulations, being mobile, global nomads who really make the economic policy that dictates states' economic policies, as captured in the term

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<sup>7</sup> „Chapter 3: State Sponsors of Terrorism.” *Country Reports on Terrorism 2009*, Office of the Coordinator for Counterterrorism, State Department, <http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/crt/2009/140889.htm>, accessed on 4 April 2011.

“policy dictates politics.” Constructivist authors may focus on how boundaries dissolve in heads partly on the above outlined social bases, partly as a result of further processes enhancing this shift, e.g. a mediatized global neighborhood, a globalizing economy fostering regional integration processes, and a generally freer flow of capital, goods, services and natural persons. Pluralist/socio-liberal IR Theorists may wish to highlight in particular the emergence of transnational interest groups leading to further dislocation of power from central governments, as well as point to the emergence of a transnational civil society influencing policy through its transnational activist and advocacy networks. Yet others may emphasize the role of trans-governmental networks and epistemic communities directly involved in governance and policy-making, embedded within state and inter-governmental structures.

To provide but one example, Bruszt and Holzhaecker (2009: 1-22) imply, by the study of trans-nationalization, interest in the rise of international cross-ownership networks, the transnational embedding of domestic rule- and policy-making, interest group influence in multi-level governance structures, and differences of shallower or deeper levels of trans-nationalization across regions.

Considering all of these aspects would leave us with a bewildering diversity, of questionable use in the analysis here. As indicated before, narrowing down the scope of the inquiry in this dimension is necessary, with a view to the context-specific relevance of trans-nationalization.

Afghanistan – the context – is part of a transnational battle-space, where a vast number of foreign as well as trans-local or migrating fighters join the ranks of a multi-factional insurgency which is fighting against a large, multinational military coalition. The country’s central government is deeply embedded in (some would say: with its strings attached to) a transnational institutional setting given its financial and security dependencies, with Western and other advisors, trust funds as well as intense external media scrutiny overseeing its activities. Present is an IGO/NGO community so closely intertwined that a high degree of cross-mobility exists between them (and “multi-“ and “transnational” become indistinguishable concepts in their midst). Alongside them one finds a host of private, corporate as well as non-corporate, structures fulfilling security-, governance-, and development-related as well as economic functions on a for-profit basis. In the meantime, Afghanistan’s rural population has to rely on illicit/illegalized transnational value chains as well as on labor mobility for sustaining itself, and migrant workers who are key trans-local linkage actors to the Afghan diaspora (in the Gulf region and beyond). The latter transfer home a significant amount of money largely through informal mechanisms (*hawaladar* networks). It is *this* Afghanistan that is also landlocked territory from which transnational terrorism can be waged effectively, unless there is the possibility of counterterrorist force projection locally.

The study of the “transnational” in CT efforts in Afghanistan has to take place with this extra-ordinarily sophisticated context in mind. The need for tailoring the research object’s working definition to the context, along the lines of the four perspectives outlined prior to this, is not merely an arbitrary or convenience-seeking arrangement. Afghanistan is outside the “security envelopes” of globalization,<sup>8</sup> and it means a threat to these security envelopes. In its space inevitably different rules and concepts apply than elsewhere, and consequently “transnational” takes on a different meaning and empirical form. The literature on the trans-nationalization of security has, to a great extent, been influenced by, and biased towards, investigating the operation of governance in just the security envelopes, in places where globalization was working “so far so good.” Traces of this can be observed in Bruszt and Holzhacker’s non-security-related inquiry: they study transnational regimes, norm transfers, and the trans-nationalization of processes of governance largely in relation to formal rules, licit economies, and state-based multi-level governance and integration structures. In Afghanistan, one faces informality, illicit economies and non-state-based structures of governance (with strongmen fiefdoms, Islamic *tanzeems*, self-sustaining communities, warlord militias, narco-militias, parallel overlapping patronage networks, transnational migration networks and others) playing a role more important than that of formal structures and activities or of actors acting within a legal framework.

***Transnational counterterrorism in Afghanistan: an overview from four perspectives***

**The structural perspective.** Securing Afghanistan, that is, securing the security envelopes of globalization from the insecurity there, and negative externalities of it, has been taking place in dynamically evolving ways, with temporary successes, and with questionable sustainability. The security aims of the Afghanistan mission have always been transnational. In the ideal case, security there should provide security here, that is, in the security envelopes, where the threat of mass-casualty attacks by al-Qaida affects the lives of a multinational set of individuals, at the same time as it threatens to cause economic ripple effects, ones that can impose significant costs on interdependent economies around the world as fallout from any attack.

Telling the story of the trans-nationalization of security and counterterrorism with regards to Afghanistan, and from a structural perspective, requires an understanding of globalization, with both its intended and unintended (dark) consequences, as well as an account of efforts in Afghanistan. The latter is a tale no less complex to tell than that of globalization, with the security aspects of the Afghanistan mission having evolved from a strategy of

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<sup>8</sup> Borrowing this term from Taipale 2005, who in turn quotes it from former U.S. Secretary of Homeland Security Michael Chertoff.

light-footprint presence and warlord cooptation to a massive counterinsurgency campaign envisioned as transitioning to an Afghan Security Forces-led effort in the end – and all of this has taken place parallel to global and regional efforts at rolling back al-Qaida’s network and infrastructure, including by drone strikes in Pakistani territory.

**The (governmental) actor-focused perspective.** With regards to the Afghan theatre, an actor-focused perspective first has to take note of ISAF operations’ integrated command structure, the joint planning on various levels accompanying these operations (on levels of policy, military strategy, framework operations, operations, and even doctrine development), the extensive role of Western advisors working with the Afghan government as well as the Western military and police trainers working with Afghanistan’s security forces (the Afghan National Army and the Afghan National Police). The integrated command structure does not really mean a fully streamlined chain of command, without complications, and the resulting arrangements and troubles, subsequently, are but the more pertinent to the topic of trans-nationalization. Battle-space ownership is allocated to various different countries in different parts of the Afghan theatre, but there never is really fully autonomous ownership as such, and cooperation and coordination has to take place with a large number of actors in anyone’s “own” area of operations. For example, this is necessary given a need to adjust to national “caveats” which make assigning different roles in operations, as well as working out a generally functioning division of labor, a complex exercise. One also needs to rely on on-call close air support (CAS), whichever nation happens to provide it, just as one has to inevitably liaise with Afghan Security Forces as well as their embedded operational trainers/mentors. There often is a need to work with proxy forces on the ground, e.g. with local militias and *arbakai*.<sup>9</sup> The countries present in ISAF also feed into coalition intelligence through integrated structures. And many more examples could be cited. This complex, whole-of-government, multinational (or joint and mixed) structure has to successfully work even with actors outside it, namely, for example, networks of covertly handled local Afghan informants, or private security as well as other contractors from a large number of countries around the globe.

Beyond this being an imperfectly integrated military structure, it is also an intricately interwoven, and thus transnational, military structure, and it has to constructively contribute to the whole-of-government efforts of a large coalition

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<sup>9</sup> In some corners of eastern Afghanistan, mostly in the so-called Loya Paktia (Greater Paktia) area, this is a traditional tribal security institution, created to enforce order within, and defend a community from the outside at the same time, when the need arises. An attempt to franchise this model, to contain the infiltration of certain areas, has to some extent been utilized, as part of counter-insurgency (COIN) efforts.

simultaneously struggling to achieve gains in the fields of development and governance.

**The ideas-focused perspective.** The role of epistemic communities in the case of Afghanistan may be plausibly demonstrated, even if not directly and unambiguously evidenced, in that there is extensive intelligence-sharing (process-based evidence), and a proliferation of best practices in operations involving both militaries and other government agencies (outcome-based evidence). The diffuse effects of information operations may also be mentioned – an increasingly important part of these in the field of CT is Western and Arab facilitation of an emerging critical, “post-jihad” discourse of those renouncing their past involvement with terrorist organizations.

In intelligence-sharing, the walls within countries may be more important and impeding of sharing than the firewalls protecting national security. Even within agencies one finds compartmentalization and the omnipresent circles of inclusion/exclusion based on need-to-know practices. This is true even in the U.S. case where the attacks of September 11 and the lessons drawn gave a clear warning as to the importance of timely sharing. A compartmentalized and (nationally) fenced-off approach to all issues involving sensitive intelligence is certainly set to remain part of the nature of these activities. A recent trend in trying to mitigate this challenge is the creation of fusion centers, or national clearing houses for intelligence. Some argue that thanks to these enough may have been done already. Quoting Aldrich, “intelligence officers claim that the current approach, resembling a distributed network, is more effective than creating central clearing houses or general ‘pooling’” (2008: 130; see also Richard and Lebl 2009), although others add that what one may have is rather “a few key nodes (...) with not a little duplication” (Aldrich 2008: 128).

Various different forms exist for the purposes of sharing (see e.g. Walsh 2009). There is the Club of Berne CT Group, Europol’s CT Unit, or for example NATO’s interim information cell, besides some more peculiar structures such as the so-called CT Intelligence Cells, or CTICs, two of which have reportedly been set up in Europe, at U.S. initiative, one in Romania and one in France, the latter being the most important in Europe. The Paris CTIC is reportedly dubbed “Alliance Base,” and is operating since 2002. Among its advantages, it is claimed that France as its location offers “a freedom of action that is not possible elsewhere in Europe” (Aldrich 2008: 130-131). Freedom of action in fact sounds very relevant to the issue of control which Arquilla and Ronfeldt feared bureaucracies would not readily give up to become more efficient. At the same time, it can also be a source of concern, and thus belong to a normative assessment of these issues which the paper is interested in.

Besides sharing fore, there exists an extensive network of liaison networks. In the U.S. case, various government agencies are involved in this, for

example the FBI with its *legates* or legal attachés (Aldrich 2008: 130). Even sub-national actors join the come-together: the New York Police Department is running its own CT intelligence liaison operations across Europe, the Middle East and Africa. At their disposal are resources enviable from some smaller-country national intelligence services' point of view: a \$100-million budget, and about 70 Arabic speakers on their staff.

Moreover, even without personal interaction, some sharing occurs based on jointly maintained or shared platforms/infrastructure. In the field of signals intelligence, or SIGINT, a major piece of infrastructure is PLATFORM, serving the operation of the ECHELON system. In fact, trans-nationalization in this field started in the 1940s, its roots being the special U.S.-UK relationship, and its incubator the equally deep relationship of the U.S. with other close partners (including Australia, New Zealand and also Canada), and their cooperation, under the Five Eyes system, from the early phase of the Cold War against the Soviet Union (Davis 2009: 1-3).

To quantify the overall effect of joint CT efforts, one U.S. official noted at a Congress hearing that of over 3,000 people associated with al-Qaida, killed or captured since 2001, the majority were located, tracked, and neutralized with help by other countries (quoted in Aldrich 2008: 130). Germany has also benefited from timely information from Turkey, about the activities of the so-called Sauerland Cell, to mention another example.<sup>10</sup>

Less visibly, but probably equally importantly, as part of an ideas-focused perspective, one has to note the role of an increasingly transnational strategic discourse, with a lot of roving memes or creative talking points, behind which trans-governmental networks, in-the-loop think tanks, contracted consultancies, as well as the global conference circuit play a role; to point to but a few of the nodes and platforms of these cross-border discursive structures.

In this context, invoking the notion of epistemic communities seems useful (Haas 1992; Horváth 2010: 19-26). These may be defined as knowledge-based networks with established rules for valid reasoning, crowding out voices deemed invalid, taking intellectual ownership of problems or issues (as long as those remain accepted as existent by external audiences). In other words these are the influential circles of technocracy, with their peculiar, policy-based relation to politics. They clearly pertain to the fields of state-building, COIN, or humanitarian and development aid. As Horváth writes, epistemic communities may narrow down choice, but of course this does not imply fully transnational policy coordination as domestic and international constraints and leader

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<sup>10</sup> For example, persons associated with al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) have recently been detained by Spain, the United Kingdom, Germany, Italy, Portugal and the Netherlands, highlighting how along with the responsibility to act, risks are also spread out across all of the countries involved, and how Europe itself may face a significant threat as Besenyő points out (Besenyő 2011).



attributes still mediate what policies are chosen. What one sees rather is the transnational governance of policy preferences.

Besides seeing an advantage in the sharing of ideas among large communities, which certainly can foster innovation and creativity as well, some problematize various aspects of epistemic communities' impact. They may gain influence that is impropportionate to their wisdom, because in their distinct fields, almost regardless of record, they may offer policy predictability. Leaders may attempt to evade responsibility by calling on them for solutions, in effect leaving ownership of those solutions, and their side-effects and possible counter-productivity, to others (see also Chandler 2007 related to this).<sup>11</sup> A peculiar aspect of the evolution, and hybridization, of epistemic communities in the field of CT is their trans-professionalization. Political advisors, military officers, and lawyers may be present in the same room in some cases, for instance when decisions regarding the use of lethal force in drone strikes are made, or when strategic policy assessments are carried out.

**The (private) actor-focused, complementary perspective.** Global anti-as well as counterterrorism efforts increasingly rely on actors in the private sphere. Cooperation plays a vital role from the part of private banks, e-mail providers, telecommunications companies and many others – a remarkable example is that of companies cooperating with the World Customs Union Standard Framework, or the SAFE system, in providing transnational supply-chain security. All of this help is utilized by intelligence agencies in prevention, protection, pursuit as well as response, and by law enforcement agencies in Intelligence-Led Policing and in more traditional investigative work. Meanwhile, private security firms play a major role in the service of governments, IGOs, and for even NGO and corporate clients, involved in a wide range of tasks from logistical support through training to personal protection. Consultancies, non-national think tanks, as well as cross-national think tank networks, and yet others, facilitate innovation in the field of counterterrorism by providing strategic assessments and forecasts, and working out policy recommendations. A peculiar example of this is the London-based consulting firm PA Consulting that produced the famous “spaghetti slide.”<sup>12</sup> The transnational media coverage of CT efforts may also be mentioned, with an uncertain overall role in the outcome, that depends on multiple factors. To cite but one example, working with a broad definition of the media: expert/observer

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<sup>11</sup> Presenting the „surge” of U.S. forces in Afghanistan, after end-2009, as „General David Petraeus’ population-centric counterinsurgency strategy,” by many on the part of the Obama administration may constitute just this kind of evasion of direct responsibility or ownership.

<sup>12</sup> This was the most widely cited page of a leaked PowerPoint presentation prepared by the company, outlining a jungle of links between a multitude of concepts, to uncover possible lines of operation for their clients, namely the Pentagon and the U.S. government. See at *Talking Points Memo*, date not indicated, at [http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/2009/12/the\\_militarys\\_plan\\_for\\_the\\_afghan\\_war\\_surge\\_in\\_one.php](http://talkingpointsmemo.com/news/2009/12/the_militarys_plan_for_the_afghan_war_surge_in_one.php) (accessed on 19 May 2011).

blogger networks sustain a lively secondary debate on strategy where useful ideas are pooled together for anyone paying attention (of course, insurgents and terrorists can also benefit from this: they are no exceptions in this respect).

**In conclusion of the overview.** Structural factors strongly affect all of the above aspects of trans-nationalization, including privatization-related aspects. Growing levels of interconnection, and security as well as economic interdependence dictate increased coordination and deepened cooperation. Sharing ideas and intelligence is a part of the latter two, in an environment characterized by an intense demand for information. Moreover, privatization, often benefitting or involving transnational economic actors, stems from the general trend of state downsizing under current crisis-induced budgetary constraints as well as the more persistent drive of neoliberal economic policies.

More than this, however, has to be told as part of the story in the special environment of Afghanistan and its region, where engagement with a networked enemy (multiple insurgent factions, and their foreign supporters and allies, including non-state and rogue state actors) is taking place in a very direct form, requiring fast adaptation, vigilance, and innovative and clandestine solutions, including a vast number of covert operations.

The most peculiar and most controversial examples of this can be highlighted in the field of (counterterrorist and counterinsurgent) intelligence-gathering. This is not merely an idiosyncratic phenomenon in the midst of generally more formally organized counterterrorism efforts.

As Reveron points out (2006: 3), “In contrast to the Cold War, where intelligence-to-force ratio was low, the war on terror requires high levels of intelligence.” Given that both the field of intelligence and the area of Afghanistan are key to the current conflict, even strategic calculations and structural conditions lead to controversial cases and practices such as the ones that are presented in the following section (three such cases altogether). What is observed thereby is therefore not merely accidental, but inevitable; it happens rather by rule than by chance, and this also ought to inform a normative assessment of the phenomenon of trans-nationalization in the field of CT.

***Case briefs: Transnational grey-zone (public/private) networks  
in para-governmental intelligence and security roles***

**The strategically significant.** In 2001, the U.S. went into Afghanistan with only a small number of special operations forces. With close air support, and working with local proxies, they were able to topple the Taliban’s regime. Importantly, however, they were not in a position to impose anything resembling dominance over Afghan politics. Strongmen had to be co-opted, including some involved in the drugs trade or other illicit activities. These included Haji Bashar Noorzai, a close ally of the Taliban, and reportedly one of

the strongest druglords in Afghanistan in 2002, able to mobilize a few thousand men in arms (Corcoran 2002). The Pentagon was pragmatic about making a deal with him, but to handle him, it was a convenient arrangement to bring in private or quasi-private actors. Rosetta Research and Consulting, well-networked in Washington and with U.S. intelligence and military circles in particular, became involved in this (Corcoran 2009). They also handled other contacts, referring to the people they were collecting information from as the Key Informant List (also known, informally, as the “Kill”) [Weiser 2008].

The relationship with Haji Bashar Noorzai worked quite well up until 2004–2005, by which time in Washington an interagency counter-narcotics coalition began calling for Haji Bashar Noorzai’s inclusion on Washington’s list of most wanted narcotics traffickers, and thus for his arrest. Rosetta Research cooperated with the Drug Enforcement Administration in luring Haji Bashar Noorzai for a series of meetings to New York in 2005. He was arrested there, and put on trial in the U.S. (Risen 2007; TIME 2007).

The case is of notable strategic significance, as there does indeed seem to have been fallout from this arrest, in the form of the deterioration of the security situation in southern Afghanistan (which can, at the same time, be attributed to other, relatively more important factors as well).

**The surreal.** Perhaps one of the greatest embarrassments during the years of Western-led state-building in Afghanistan thus far has been Jonathan Keith Idema’s case (see Sullivan 2005). Idema was a former U.S. Army special forces soldier who went to Afghanistan after October 2001, and made acquaintances there introducing himself alternately as speaking on behalf of various companies, as a security consultant, or as doing humanitarian work, or as someone associated with the CIA or otherwise involved in covert operations in the service of the U.S. government. Companies he was associated with included one with the peculiar name of Northern Alliance Assistance. This seems have contributed to his reputation, as an element of his background suggesting that he may have been intricately involved in sensitive operations connected to the toppling of the Taliban. Hereafter Idema, who once sued Steven Spielberg for allegedly modeling the central character of the movie “Peacemaker,” played by George Clooney, after him, occasionally passed on “intelligence” to his military contacts and the Pentagon. It is difficult to tell what happened with, or as a result of, this information, but by 2004 Idema built something akin to a small personal fiefdom in Afghanistan, largely based in Kabul. He ran a private jail there where “terrorism suspects” were held (Richburg 2004). Eventually this was revealed by the media, and Idema spent three years in an Afghan prison, before he was released and sent back to the United States in 2007. As one reporter summed up the case: “With Kabul awash with armed men in and out of uniform both Nato and the US military were duped by Idema” (Meo 2004). A *Washington Post* article adds: “Idema was able to function relatively openly for so long because

there are so many mysterious armed Westerners in Afghanistan and few people dare question them” (Richburg 2004).

**The subversive.** In 2010, the activities of the so-called Eclipse Group were revealed. The ageing mastermind behind this formation was Duane “Dewey” Clarridge himself. By 2010, he was 78, and no longer working with the CIA but on his own. He was hired by the *New York Times* to try and help in securing the release of one of their journalists, David Rohde, who eventually escaped from captivity in Pakistan on his own (he had been taken to the Federally Administered Tribal Areas from Afghan territory by his captors). Clarridge could nevertheless claim some credit for his role in efforts to free Rohde, and he won a contract from the U.S. military to report on the Haqqani Network. Out of this, he started an extensive operation which eventually saw the employment of over 200 local staff and many former CIA and special forces operatives. Clarridge was “put in charge of a £15m (\$22m) budget” (Farmer 2010), but besides this it is also reported that “like-minded private donors” helped his operations as well. Control rested with him personally. He oversaw the production of intelligence working from his San Diego, California home according to the NYT. Some of this information and analysis may or may not have been used by the U.S. military later on for targeting purposes, i.e. in order to neutralize insurgents or terrorist associates identified by Clarridge’s group (Mazzetti 2011a; Mazzetti 2011b).

Clarridge, once referred to as someone “always on the edge of his skis” (as quoted in Mazzetti 2011a), seems to have been experimenting with freestyle here. To promote himself, he mobilized many old contacts of his, including Oliver North, the key man behind the Iran-Contra deals in the U.S. National Security Council staff in the 1980s, now working with Fox News. Reminiscent of those times, soon enough Clarridge developed his own private policy towards Afghanistan. He was keen on finding decisive evidence against Ahmed Wali Karzai, Hamed Karzai’s Kandahar-based half brother, either of his involvement in the drugs trade or of his being a drug addict. Eventually, he reportedly even started a smear campaign against Hamed Karzai, setting up a fake Afghan organization, “Voice of Afghan Youth,” to this end. Over this, he may have come into direct confrontation with his old employer, the CIA, which reportedly had had Ahmed Wali Karzai on its payroll (Filkins – Mazzetti – Risen 2009). This may be part of the explanation regarding why it was the CIA’s station chief in Kabul who appears to have blown the whistle to the media over this.

That is the story of how “Dewey,” the former CIA officer concerned with the threat of terrorism, disassociated from particular “real estates,” went transnational himself, and how his operations came to an end after he was eventually forced to shut them down.

## ***Conclusion***

As shown in this paper from four distinct perspectives and through three case briefs, trans-nationalization in the field of CT takes a large variety of forms in the broader context of operations and state-building in Afghanistan. This overview likely has not been exhaustive: some of the potentially relevant issues may have not been discussed. What does clearly transpire from even this overview, however, is that while trans-nationalization brings major benefits in the fight against terrorist organizations that operate across borders, it is impossible to have a “unicolor” normative assessment of it. A further example illustrative of this may be the practice of “extraordinary rendition,” i.e., the capture of terrorism suspects abroad. Former Vice-President Al Gore reportedly once referred to the latter as a “no-brainer” (i.e. absolutely necessary) [Clarke 2004: 143-144], but it is probably right to be concerned with even those practices seen as absolutely necessary *under the aggressive pressure of terrorist groups*. Two of the case briefs presented in the previous section of the paper, those of Jonathan Keith Idema and Duane Clarridge, may also well demonstrate this. Importantly, Al Gore made his remark prior to 11 September 2001, in a context in which al-Qaida was already a major concern, but not on the level that one was to see eventually. The risks and the potentially counterproductive nature of control-evading counterterrorism practices in response to the terrorist threat may not have become entirely obvious before the machine of counterterrorism was switched into top gear. By now they should be self-evident.

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**Péter Gergő JUHÁSZ PhD aspirant –  
Prof. Dr. Endre KANIZSAY Szent István University**

## **THE AGRICULTURE AND THE GLOBALIZATION IN AFRICA**

On the basis of research in 18 African countries we can establish that malnutrition, starvation and death from starvation is still unsolved in spite of work lasting decade. There is no positive effect of globalization in those countries we examine.

If we would like to achieve the feeding. jubilee goal that UN set for 2015, we have to rationalize the present development work.

The condition of successful operation is extensive international co-operation between international and economical-political organizations, regional institutions, governmental and non-governmental organizations of certain countries.

It's necessary to give possibility for those African countries which are in possession of ecological and economical conditions to work.

The modernization of these countries' institutional network and providing of good qualified specialists is one of the most important tasks.

The prominent role of human factor requires development of training, researching and consultation. Activity of developed countries are needed during the provisional terms in Africa because formation of „good” governments takes a long time in developing countries. Considering that „starvation isn't waiting” and there are plenty of starving people in 23 sub-Saharan countries (in agreement with other experts), the reformation of global economy became urgent.

It would be practical if development of global economy were not for serve globalization, but helped to get rid of negative effect of this and helped co-operation which is advantageous for all countries and organizations.

Considering that international development is a prominent task in EU, developing work of our country is basic. Activity of Hungary – in our opinion – can help co-operation work which is based on mutual advantageous.

### ***Why does Africa starve?***

The globalization proceeds unstoppably whilst at one side of the World dollar billions and huge stocks of food is cumulatively up, at the other part undernourishment ,starving, death, lack of appropriate quality drinking water and lack of the minimum medical assistance is typical. This way notwith-



standing all sorts of attempts, for hundreds of millions present day purveyance at appropriate level is irresolvable.

Acquainted, that the jubilee goals of the United Nations Organisation is primarily the effort for the continued correction of the provision supplies for the developing countries , to cut the number of undernourished people, the number of people without available medical assistance and the number of people with less than 1 US dollar/month earnings no later than 2015 . For more than fifty years it's an acknowledged fact that different aid programs can not solve the problem. The people involved in this subject totally agree as well, that the food production require different strategy and at least the fundamental purveyance has to be generated by the developing countries. This activity is emphasized by the by United Nations Organisation and affiliate structures (FAO, UNESCO, UNIDO, UNICEF, WFO, WHO), other international structures (OECD, EU), non-governmental and humanitarian structures and different interstate aid organizations as well.

Especially the poverty in Africa is a daily topic in the electronic and written press. Beside the campaign of rock-stars ,the quarter million participants social demonstration organized near the G8 Summit held in Edinburgh ,the thousand civilian organizations, the clerical and also communist leaders composed Jubilee 2000 ,the reconsideration of the debt cases, the NEPAD (New Partnership for Africa's Development ) , the IMF and World Bank's Debt Setoff Programs ,the increased subsidy decision at United Nations Organisation summit held at Monterrey in 2002 (12 Mrd compared to 50 Mrd) and the lobbying groups of the 20 supremely indebted African countries together failed to solve the problem. Looking at the above mentioned monetary part of the supports, it is immediately visible, that reducing the debt of the countries involved, in principle, takes 7-10 % of their GDP, which most of them are not able to satisfy. Lately The Black Continent was loaded with approximately 11 Mrd dollars redemption.

Even getting rid of their debt, which would be an estimated 1.5 Mrd dollars decrease annually, because the value of the export products decreased by 50% since the 70's, the Continent lost approximately 100 Mrd dollars. What would it mean 1.5 Mrd dollars let-up? Unfortunately more than half of the Continent's GDP is realized by raw material extractive multinational companies, that way little goes to the African people especially not to the poor population.

*Structure of developmental activity:*

1. United Nations Organisation specialized structures (FAO, WF, UNICEF, UNESCO, UNIDO)
2. Economical ,political structures (EU, OECD, NC)
3. Non-governmental and aid organizations
4. Independent countries (USA, France, Germany, Japan, China)

### *The role of FAO:*

FAO is the permanent specialised agency of the United Nations Organisation that has been in operation for the longest period. FAO was established immediately after the Second World War, in order to reduce famine, to improve food production and distribution. The organisation covers forestry and fishery activities as well, and in addition to production it also finances significant scientific research, education and consulting activities. It prepares statistics on production, consumption, trade, it co-ordinates – together with several organisations jointly – the delivery of the food aids. Our country, Hungary has been participating in the work of the organisation since 1946.<sup>1</sup> In the beginning we received support in the framework of the 2nd irrigation program of Tisza mostly, and subsequently we provided assistance mainly to the work of education projects and consulting. The organisation operates with a headquarters in Rome, and with offices of different decision levels that are located at several points of the world. The Sub-regional Office of FAO for Central and Eastern Europe has been in operation in our country for a couple of years, which shall be expanded into the European Regional Office on the basis of the decision of the 33rd conference of FAO organised in the framework of its General Assembly of 2005. This decision clearly acknowledges the activity of the Hungarian trainers, researchers and consultants done in FAO. The activity of FAO is outstanding in the area of improving on famine from among the specialised agencies of UN, as regards achieving the jubilee objectives. In view of the experiences gained so far, the efficiency of the development work can be significantly improved by the acceptance of the proposal made for decentralisation, which serves the more rational distribution of both the costs and the decisions.

This new development element may exponentially increase the success of the development programs supported by FAO. Since in agriculture the knowledge of the condition system of production is an indispensable prerequisite of bringing rational decisions. It is known that all the three factors of the production condition system<sup>2</sup> can induce a positive result only if there is a synchrony. This means that learning, systematising, evaluating the basic data related to the three factors, their transformation into accessible information, with special regard to the possibility of replacing the frequently changing data, are prerequisites of successful operation.

The twin strategy of FAO was published in the worldwide food situation reflecting publication of the organisation of year 2004<sup>3</sup>, and it is demonstrated in

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<sup>1</sup> Although Hungary was not active between the beginning of the 50ies and 1968, as a result of Russian pressure.

<sup>2</sup> Agroecological, societal, economic.

<sup>3</sup> The State of Food Insecurity in the World, FAO, 2004


table 1. The strategy contains all those factors which dominantly contribute to the achievement of the jubilee objectives.

*(Table 1) The simplified twin strategy of FAO:*

<b>Productivity, income increase</b>	<b>Co-operation connections</b>	<b>Direct food supply</b>
Cheap, simple technology	Alliances against famine	Mother and infant nutrition
Rural infrastructure	Local food supply	School feeding
Irrigation development, increasing soil productivity	Supporting rural organisations	Supply for unemployed people and pensioners
Natural resource management	Primary health protection	Food provided for work, learning
Development of the market and private sectors	Asset and land redistribution	Directed financial support
Food safety and quality	Training the rural population, especially the women	People's kitchen, canteen
Agricultural consulting, research, and training	Clean potable water	Food banks
	Legal reforms (right to food)	Food emergency reserve

If we look only at the first aspect of the first point, then it can be concluded that one of the most important tasks is the development of a production technology that is cheap, simple and appropriate for the given endowments. The rough draft of technology-planning is demonstrated by Diagram 1.

*(Diagram 1) Relationship of the production condition system and technology development:*



On the basis of the diagram it can be concluded that it is practical to establish the species, types of the plant cultures that are to be grown on the basis of the agro-ecological, societal, economic endowments (elements of the production condition system), as the first step. Their selection is justified by nutrition traditions, improvement of the nutrition structure, employment of local workforce, utilisation of the domestic processing capacity, role played in export (export-market), and in most of the cases the settlement of the nomads or the establishment of the fodder base of animal breeding. It is practical to elaborate the basic norms of the production technology of the selected plants, to merge them in a system, and to prepare several technological versions<sup>4</sup>, both in the cases of non irrigated and irrigated (supplementary irrigation) cultivation methods. A good technological plan – depending on the factors that influence development – contains the expenditure and cost indices of the individual operations as well. The technologies that are elaborated in decade level details show the different machine (power machines and work machines), transportation vehicle, material (seed, chemical fertilizer), skilled and manual worker requirements as well. These parameters may significantly facilitate the activities of both the leaders of the ministries, and the top, medium level, and workplace leaders of the given operation, and the activities of the farmers.

Successful production (technological plan execution) requires synchrony between the production factors. From among the factors that influence development – especially in Africa – a significant role is played by the human factor. Implementing appropriate expert and skilled worker training is also an essential condition of starting development. Unfortunately there are very many

<sup>4</sup> Basic version, partially machine-based version, etc.

good plans, concepts that have been wrecked in the lack of knowing the production condition system, and because of neglecting the synchronisation of the production factors.

The Lome Treaty was signed in 1975 by the relatively rich countries of the European Economic Community and 46 developing African, Caribbean and Pacific Region countries. Later on 78 developing (A.C.P.) countries participated in the treaty. Beyond the core contract financial, economic and technical assistance was also included in its agenda. However, the result of this exemplary co-operation is the fact that a decreasing tendency of the share of the A.C.P. countries in the union market could be observed since a relatively longer time, and their world trade role is ever more insignificant, while famine - as one of the core problems - is unchanged, it has hardly improved.

On the basis of the information published by the World Food Summit of 2002 it can be concluded that under-nutrition involved 840 million people in 1996, while the number of dead is 25 thousand persons each day. At the summit an unanimous agreement was reached as regards the unacceptability of these data, and the fact that it is unacceptable for the future that the world is unable to solve this problem. Already in year 2002 the secretariat of FAO presented an anti-famine strategic program<sup>5</sup>, which presented a way for ensuring a higher "food availability" with cost efficient agriculture and rural development. According to the estimate of document „World Agriculture: towards 2010" of year 1993, we have to calculate with about 600 million underfed people in the developing countries during the period of 2015-2030. The target of the World Food Summit is 400 million persons, the cost of which is at least 120 billion USD each year, while its yield is several hundred million more healthy, more capable of working people living longer. Achieving the target assumes the joint activity of the governments, international communities, civil associations, the non governmental organisations, and the private sphere. In this activity education (further training), research and consulting play an outstanding role. Several experts do see the basic key to success, as one of the corner stones of the new developments, in the development of biological research.<sup>6</sup>

There is an obvious question, that is, which are those countries, continents, possibly regions in the case of which it can be shown that famine decreased as a result of biotechnological development? We do not have data related to this issue, for this reason we present for the purpose of providing information only the under-nutrition indices of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa.

In the fight against famine about 20 African countries adapted the experiences of Brazilian project "Fome Zero" /Zero Famine/. Several countries

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<sup>5</sup> Anti-Hunger Program

<sup>6</sup> Agriculture: towards 2010, Conference, FAO, Rome, November, 1993

wish to terminate famine within their own borders independently<sup>7</sup>. According to our information, on the basis of the Brazilian example, attention worthy results were achieved in several African countries<sup>8</sup>.

Fight against famine is a continuous activity in the case of FAO. It is very difficult to forecast success, since it is a resultant that depends on a number of different components, and forecasting is made even more difficult by unexpected events (e.g. natural disasters). In summary, one may find that the primarily financed, supported areas of the fight against famine are the following:

- increasing the productivity of agricultural production in the poor rural areas,
- preserving and developing the natural resources,
- improving rural infrastructure, assisting market entry,
- developing the level of education and its wide application,
- ensuring food for those in need.

### ***The role undertaken by the European Union:***

The lack of decentralised decision has become a key issue of agrarian politics in the European Union as well. In the middle of the 90ies several theoretical and practical experts<sup>9</sup> suggested - according to them with reason – a concept covering this issue, which they also published in a book under the title of „Re-nationalisation in the agriculture of the EU”. The essence of the idea – which the Finnish people joined with a one year membership experience – that it is impossible to bring a professionally well founded decision in Brussels, primarily because of the several thousand kilometres of agro-ecological distance.

On the basis of the above, it may be concluded that - primarily in the case of the developing countries, thus in the case of the African countries - the project level knowledge of the basic data in respect of all the three development factors is of essential importance, and it decisively influences the success of a development program.

In the case of the European Union, the issue of the development policy involves more than people drinking clean water and getting an appropriate level of food supply and medical care. According to authentic sources close to half of the money that is spent on supporting the poor countries originates from the European Union and its member states. The EU engages trade as well for the success of the developments, it has opened its financial taps for the export goods of the poor countries. It has reduced or eliminated customs duty (as of 1971),

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<sup>7</sup> e.g.: Sierra Leone

<sup>8</sup> Chad, Guinea, Namibia

<sup>9</sup> in the United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Netherlands

and it terminated the quantity limitations.<sup>10</sup> If one examines the foreign trade policy systems of the EU, then it can be seen that trade with most of the Mediterranean countries belongs under the General System of Preferences (GSP). Approximately 150 countries have been the beneficiaries of GSP since 1971, including the Asian and Latin-American countries, which embraces 40,000 items. Sensitive and non sensitive products do equally belong under this category, with the exception of the products that are covered by the common agrarian policy. Naturally the contract is amended, modified on continuous basis. The co-operation of the EU and the Mediterranean countries is regulated by the so-called EUROMED (Euro-Mediterranean Partnership). The European Union announced its global Mediterranean policy already in 1972, at the Lisbon Summit, which it had declared under the title of "New Mediterranean policy" at the conference that was held in 1995 in Barcelona. In the framework of this policy - in addition to technical, financial, and economic co-operation – there are political dialogues that determine the details of the areas of cultural co-operation and widely applied free-trade. Naturally, in the case of the agricultural products this activity is carried on within certain limits.

Trade between the EU (EEC) and the former colonial countries is regulated by the Yaoundé convention that was signed at the same time as the "Treaty of Rome". On the basis of this convention, the former colonies won an associated membership, and they were included in the group that carried on free trade. However, only partial liberalisation is characteristic of the co-operation – due to the fact that only a relatively small group of the agricultural products are exempted from customs duty. The co-operation - in addition to free trade – consists of different subsidies and the loans provided with the co-operation of the European Development Fund, mostly for infrastructural and agricultural investments. An additional advantage is the possibility of entering the markets of all the member states beyond the "parent country", and there is also a wider opportunity for engaging professional consultants.

Subsequently, in 1975-1976, "Lome Convention I" regulated the trade carried on with 46 African, Caribbean and Pacific Ocean Region countries (APEC), which was followed by „Lome Convention II" (1980), then III (1985), and IV (1990). The conventions contain different rules, regulators for the different products, and their final result is the following

*„It is possible that the Lome Convention prevented the further decrease of the share of the ACP countries in the markets of the EEC. However, as a positive step in the direction of prosperity and development it was practically useless so far for us."*

*(Labour Research, July, 1979).*

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<sup>10</sup> The related program started in 2001 ensures complete exemption from under customs duty for the products of the 49 least developed countries.

In the framework of searching the solution, the EU introduced complete exemption from customs duty in the case of the 49 least developed countries in year 2001, and in 2004 it started a negotiation series with the 10 new member states for the purpose of rationalising production and structure transformation.

EU is interested in the development of a so-called "new agreement". For this purpose the EU had a meeting with the APEC countries, the purpose of which was merging the assistance providing and trading activities in a new way. The essence of this solution is that the Union is to assist its partners in being regionally integrated as a first step of the global process, to allow them to establish their appropriate institution systems and responsible governing<sup>11</sup>. One of the known forms of regional integration is COMESA that unites 21 countries in Africa. The developing countries receive each year 30 billion EUR from the European Union and from its member states. This corresponds to 0.34 % of the gross national products of the 25 member states at present, which is more than the value per capita subsidy provided by the USA or Japan. In line with the practice of the developed countries, all the member states of the EU accepted the 0.70 % support target, however, this has been met only by Denmark, Luxemburg, Netherlands, and Sweden so far<sup>12</sup>. The rest of the member states plan for year 2010 a subsidy of 0.56 % of their gross national products, while for year 2015 they plan with a subsidy rate of 0.70 % . The EU subsidies in most of the cases do not have to be refunded, while loans are provided by European Investment Bank with a limited allowance (3.5 billion EUR in year 2004). From among the several thousand EU subsidized projects it is worthwhile to mention as regards Africa the Namibian agriculture development project, the business venture project in Senegal and the agricultural plant protection project of Egypt.

EU provides the subsidies in the cheapest and most efficient manner in the following areas:

- connection points between trade and development,
- regional integration and co-operation,
- supporting efficient and successful macro-economic politics,
- transportation, forwarding,
- rural development in the area of food safety and subsistence,
- institutional development (governing, constitutional state).

In the case of the EU, humanitarian activity is implemented by ECHO, as the "European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office". In the case of Africa, one of the most supported regions is the so-called Horn of Africa region, however, significant activities were implemented in the Republic of Congo and

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<sup>11</sup> The Union supports on global level the decision of the world trade negotiations known as the "Development Schedule of Doha", which improves the steering capability of the developing countries, in the interest of making trade negotiations more effective.

<sup>12</sup> The developed Danish agriculture plays an outstanding role in this.



in the Central African Republic as well. The 23 countries of the sub-Saharan region needs practically continuous assistance as well.

***The role undertaken by the OECD:***

OECD regularly examines and evaluates the processes of the development of the world economy, and it publishes the results. The conclusions, questions of year 2005 are the following:

- One of the most significant question is whether the donating countries will reach the planned annual 130 billion USD by 2010?
- If the donating countries wish to achieve the target set for year 2010, then the subsidies have to be increased between 2004 and 2010 with 60 %.
- Whether it is practical to fund the consulting activities of experts in the developing countries, in spite of the fact that it is difficult to measure their result<sup>13</sup>.
- In the short term a jump may be expected in the increase of subsidies, however, a significant part of this means the writing off of debts that have been accumulated in the past.

In summary it may be concluded from the 2005 report of the OECD that "significant changes are needed for improving the situation of the poor people, the magnitude of which should at least approach the rate that is determined in the millenary development targets". However, it can be also concluded that in 2005 it became obvious for the world that it has to accelerate as soon as possible the steps made for preventing the lack of food, inequality, neediness and earlier experienced impoverishment. It is necessary to avoid "dependency on subsidies" that may evolve as a result of increased subsidies, and - primarily in the case of the smaller African countries - it is also necessary to take into consideration the governmental risks as well. The solution of the problem is significantly facilitated by the fact that the development issues were in the highlight at the Canadian summit of the G8.

A program called "New Partnership for Africa's Development" suggested by the heads of five African states<sup>14</sup>, covering the way development should be implemented belongs here as well. The "natives" phrased their objectives, expectations, according to which the "tap of subsidies" have to be given only into the hands of wise local governments.<sup>15</sup> Accordingly the heads of the local and developed countries are to sign a contract for Ne-PAD – as the newest African Marshall subsidy – with indicating the most significant areas of subsidies (infrastructure, education, debt reduction, market entry). In exchange

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<sup>13</sup> Most of the developing countries demand the presence of external experts, and consider it essential as well.

<sup>14</sup> Presidents of Ghana, Nigeria, Republic of South-Africa, Senegal and Egypt.

<sup>15</sup> It is a question whether can a better solution be expected than the earlier political solutions that have failed.

for the subsidy, the local leaders have to observe the rules of the world order, the principles of "good governance"<sup>16</sup>. Some of the African leaders do know that there is no place for anti-West hostility any more, this has to be surpassed, and they have to sit down as equal partners with the heads of the developed states. These leaders also know that moving ahead assumes the analysis, evaluation of the earlier failures, since without this, they may be only the viewers, subjects, and not the participants of the economic policy decisions. Nevertheless, they maintain that the West has a historic responsibility as regards the evolution of the current situation (e.g.: slave-trade, colonial system, setting the borders), and they know that the West is interested in the poverty of Africa only from its own aspect. This conclusion is fully in harmony with our own on site experiences and investigations as well.<sup>17</sup> It is essential to implement Ne-PAD, since the failures of small regional, regional, national initiatives could be seen in the last decades South of the Sahara everywhere. The following was written by Bhimal Ghos, former UN expert, in the July issue of International Herald Tribune last year:

*“the **Lagos** action plan in the 80ies together with the UN Africa conferences that followed it were like village funerals – only the front of the line sang”.*

However, unfortunately, due to the way the African heads of states reacted to the president election of Zimbabwe, the realisation of Ne-PAD that has a cost demand of 64 billion USD is doubtful.

### ***The role undertaken by the NGOs:***

The activity of the non governmental and charity organisations is a very significant segment of reducing, terminating African starvation. They do participate in practically all the elements of the work (transportation of aid, distribution of aid, training, treatment). Their co-operation and future role is significant. If they carry on their activities free of politics, then they may often act as a connecting link between countries that have antagonistic views.<sup>18</sup> However, making their gap bridging work more efficient assumes closer co-operation with the other development programs (UN, EU, OECD, etc.). The lack of appropriate professional knowledge in many cases represented an obstacle in the way of more successful execution of work. In addition to the above, it is also essential to clarify the task division between the large number of international and national non governmental organisations, in order to reduce the overlapping of activities.

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<sup>16</sup> "Clean hands, accountability, transparency, human rights, democracy, constitutional state, opening the market, etc.

<sup>17</sup> Algeria, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Malawi, Tanzania, Sudan.

<sup>18</sup> EU support to the African Union mission in Darfur, p. 31-45

### ***Development activities of the individual countries:***

On the basis of the experiences of the last decades it can be concluded that several countries do play a significant role in the subsidizing, development activities. Based on our investigation, in addition to the already indicated development and subsidy forms, briefly we will introduce the direct subsidies provided by the countries in the area of direct food aids (mostly urgent aids). In the area of providing direct food aid, the activities of the USA, United Kingdom, Denmark, France, Netherlands and Finland is apparent<sup>19</sup>. If we examine the role of USA, which provides the largest volume of aid according to several sources, then the change of known aids developed since September 11, 2001 as follows:

*“Washington views everything in all the areas of international life through the glass of the fight against terrorism. And following this approach black Africa may be easily pushed back to the garbage field of geopolitics”*  
(Copyright The World Today, magazine of the Royal Institute of International Affairs of Chatman House.)

Tony Blair was the only one, who tried to merge in Washington the steps against terrorism with the worldwide efforts that are made for liquidating poverty. It is known that the Minister of Finance of the United Kingdom, Mr. Brown, on the occasion of his African tour made in 2005 wrote off the debts of the indebted countries. Persuading USA was made more difficult by the fact that President Bush took over without any criticism the scepticism of the Clinton Administration concerning the subsidies:

*„world trade nets, not aid-fishes!”*

Later on Bush had also acknowledged the direct connection between economic bankruptcy and terrorism, and at the Monterrey Summit of the UN he promised a 5 billion USD (15 %) aid increase, given for the next three years. Of course the decision was also driven by the fact that it is less and less possible to disregard the African natural oil reserves.

If we examine inter-country co-operation in the life of Africa, then China plays an outstanding role since the Bandung Conference of 1955. China revived again the Chinese-African Co-operation Forum in year 2000, which opens opportunities between China and the African countries in the form of uncountable projects implemented for the purpose of "equal negotiation conditions, better understanding of each other, making efforts for consensus, reinforcing friendship and promoting wide ranging co-operation", with keeping in mind at all times the new world economic order generated by globalisation, this also involves the area of fighting starvation. Co-operation is advantageous

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<sup>19</sup> The financial situation of the countries and the extent of subsidies provided were not included in the subject of the study.

for both parties, since one of the most dynamically developing countries of the world gets an increasing quantity of raw materials (ores, oils), while several of the poorest (starving) states of the world located in Africa get wide ranging subsidies in its framework. Moreover, China – contrary to IMF and World Bank – does not dictate the investments, it does not tie the given subsidy to the realisation of a structural adaptation program. Reducing or writing off debts offered by China involves 31 African countries. In the area of training the number of fellowships is more than 2000 in total.<sup>20</sup> On the basis of the experiences of the Addis Ababa action plan of 2004-2006 a further South-South co-operation extension is expectable, which – according to most of the experts – may significantly influence the global scale development of the 21st century.

Co-operation was rather extensive between Hungary and the African countries previously. Naturally in the development of the relationships – as everywhere in the world – politics played a significant role. Independently of this, the highly appreciated Hungarian agricultural experts and results of the Hungarian agriculture lead to work relationships that were advantageous for Hungary as well. Hungary did not have any colonial past, therefore we started our activity in this area without any real experience. As regards co-operation in the area of training, the activity of the Tropical and Subtropical Agricultural Department of the University of Agricultural Sciences of Gödöllő was outstanding. This activity - in addition to different levels of graduate training - covered in the case of domestic and foreign students the organisation, leading and keeping of post-graduate training courses as well. The role of the department was also significant in executing, co-ordinating similar type of activities that were implemented at other high education institutes. The Advanced Training Institute of the University (MÉM – Engineer, Manager, and Advanced Training Institute) organised jointly with the department the preparation of the experts that were sent abroad (who were sent abroad mostly by company TESCO).

The Hungarian National Committee of FAO contributed to the training activity on continuous basis, among others it provided assistance for grounding a multi-year training project at Gödöllő.

In the area of research our internationally renowned (irrigation, plant growing, animal breeding, economics) researchers worked in the research network of MTA and the Ministry of Agriculture and Food. There was a close co-operation between the universities and the research institutes, they mutually helped each other's activities (researchers kept training events, and the other way around). Our experts working in the area of agriculture were delegated to several African countries primarily by TESCO – but also by FAO. In many cases "intellectual export" was the forerunner of economic and commercial co-

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<sup>20</sup> Knowledge and know-how transfer.

operation. Company Agroinvest that was established in the middle of the 70ies also relied on its earlier contacts, and it carried on profitable activities in the life of several countries of Africa. The major co-operating countries – without trying to list all of them – are the following ones: *Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Sudan, Ethiopia, Tanzania, Mozambique, Benin, Nigeria, Ghana, Angola*. As regards the current situation – in our opinion - it can be concluded that our relations have been practically completely liquidated in this area. Our decision makers - contrary to the rest of the EU countries - are incapable of escaping from their relatively narrow minded economic-trading concept and they are not signing mutually advantageous contracts in the frameworks of African development programs. We are convinced that activity in Africa - carried out within appropriate frameworks - would significantly contribute to the future development of Hungary and its complex agricultural sector.

### ***Summary***

As a summary it can be concluded that the issues of famine, starvation level nutrition, death from starvation - as a problem - have remained unsolved till today, in spite of the activities of several decades. We are convinced that the jubilee targets, the World Food Program can be realised only with very wide international co-operation. This has to involve the co-operation of international organisations, regional economic-political organisations, the governmental and non governmental organisations of the individual countries. However, achieving the ultimate target assumes the modernisation of the institution system of the country to be developed, the provision of experts of appropriate education. Establishing the "good governments" of the developing countries will still take a long time, therefore –to our mind – the success of the interim period assumes the engagement of the experts of the developed countries. Since "famine does not wait", and the inhabitants of 23 sub-Saharan countries are starving even now, the economic order of the world has to be reformed as soon as possible. The complete failure of the neo-liberal model is evident. Therefore it would be wise if the development of the world economy would not only mean the serving of globalisation, but it would cover the methods available for preventing the negative effects of globalisation. and those opportunities of joining this process, which are for the advantage of all.

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**Erik MOLNÁR, Jr.**

## **NAMIBIA MIGRATION FOOD AND HEALTH SECURITY**

Security is often wrongly treated as a solely military issue; it deserves more careful attention than it usually receives. In this paper we will examine the way everyday concerns can be related to human security. We will underline the interrelated nature of (internal) migration, health, and food security. The case of Namibia, a democratic state in sub-Saharan Africa, and the Windhoek area in particular, will serve to illustrate the argument.

Namibia is a southern African country situated on the Atlantic coast. Its inland neighbours are Angola and Zambia to the north, Botswana to the east and South Africa in the south. The country covers an area of 824292 square kilometres of desert and has little arable land. The Namibian population is estimated to be 2.1 million.

For well over a century Namibians were subjected to repressive foreign occupation both by Germany and South Africa. There was armed resistance to German colonial occupation by the Herero and Nama people in the early 1900s,

and armed resistance to South African occupation by the South West African People's Organisation (SWAPO) from 1966 to 1989. Namibia became independent in 1990. There is a link between Namibia and Hungary, because between April of 1989 and March of 1990 around 22 Hungarian peacekeepers served in the United Nations Transition Assistance Group.<sup>1</sup> The Hungarians made excellent job in Namibia and some people still remember them.

### ***(Internal) Migration***

Windhoek, as the primary and capital city of Namibia, has been the most attractive urban area for migrants looking for job opportunities. Migration to Windhoek started when Windhoek was founded in 1890. In 1912, during the German colonial period, the Town Council of Windhoek established two locations for the black inhabitants, namely Old Location in the present day Pioneers Park, and another location in the present day Klein Windhoek. In 1959, during the South African apartheid government, the municipality of Windhoek established a peri-urban settlement, Katutura<sup>2</sup>, for blacks outside of Windhoek. Compound and single quarters were built in the new settlement to accommodate contract migrant workers. After the abolition of contract law, migrant workers moved into Katutura. Currently, about 60 % of the city's population lives in Katutura. Migration in Namibia is influenced by a combination of the following macro factors<sup>3</sup>:

- Migration as a disaster mitigation strategy
- Migration as an economic strategy
- Migration due to poor rural productivity
- Migration due to population issues
- Migration as social and economic strategy
- Migration as a lifestyle

The urban populations of sub-Saharan Africa have increased by 600% in the last 40 years. It was an expansion of previously unknown scale in human history. This resulted in the emergence of informal settlements, and in 2003 sub-Saharan Africa had the highest rate of informal settlers, with 72 % of the urban population living in these areas.<sup>4</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Besenyő János: Az ENSZ nyugat-szaharai békemissziójának tapasztalatai, p. 140

<sup>2</sup> Katutura is a settlement similar to Soweto in Johannesburg in South Africa. "Katutura" is an Otjiherero word which means "a place where we do not want to settle." It is a large area to the northwest of the city. Black residents refused to move to this new location. They were forcefully moved there.

<sup>3</sup> Frayne, B and Pendleton, W. 2001. Migration in Namibia: Combining Macro and Micro Approaches to Research Design and Analysis. International Migration Review Volume 35 Number 4 (Winter 2001). <http://www.jstor.org/page/info/about/policies/terms.jsp>

<sup>4</sup> Caraël, M. & Glynn, J.R.R. 2008. HIV Infection in Young Adults in Africa: Context, Risks, and Opportunities for Prevention. <http://0-www.springerlink.com.wagtail.uovs.ac.za/content/171v54607671825t/fulltext.pdf>

### ***Rural-urban migration***

Namibia has a very mobile population migrating within the country, but also to neighbouring countries. In Namibia the two most common forms of migration are cross-border cyclical migration and internal cyclical migration. Internal migration takes place primarily from the northern regions to the major urban centres, mostly in an attempt to find work.

The high migratory rate into Windhoek increased when the Municipality started to accommodate squatters, due to political pressure. The latter meant that existing squatter laws were deliberately not being enforced by the Windhoek Municipality.<sup>5</sup> The population of Windhoek has been growing at an annual rate of 15 % to 20 %. In 2001, the population of Windhoek was about 224 000, which represented almost half of all urban residents in Namibia<sup>6</sup>. No other country in southern Africa has such a large proportion of its urban population living in the capital. It is estimated that the population of Windhoek will double between 2000 and 2015<sup>7</sup>.

Of the total migration to the city of Windhoek between 1990 and 2000, more than two-thirds targeted Katutura<sup>8</sup>. The traditional philosophy of humanism and the availability of space for squatters led to the rapid growth of Katutura. Since 1990, new informal and formal settlements in Windhoek were established on the periphery around the old core of Katutura, such as Okuryangava, Ombili, Goreangab, Okahandja Park, Greenwell Matongo, Havana, Hakahana, Babilon and Otjomuise. These areas have a substantial percentage of semi- and informal settlers, who have linkages to their home regions.

Urban centres have not been able to accommodate the large numbers of migrants as industrial growth has been limited. Windhoek experienced the closing down of a textile factory in 2008, which originally promised to employ 15,000 workers. Informal economic activities have expanded, but cannot provide for the increasing number of new arrivals.

### ***Rural-urban food and remittance transfers***

Increased population growth in Windhoek has resulted in hardship for many migrants, who try to eke out a living. Widespread unemployment among migrants has led to a high crime rate in Katutura. Sources of income for residents include wage employment, trade activities, old age pension and agriculture. Still, 68 % of households in Katutura had incomes below the

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<sup>5</sup> Dima, S.J., Ogunmokin, A.A. & Nantanga, T. 2002. The status of urban and periurban agriculture, Windhoek and Oshakati, Namibia. [ftp://ftp.fao.org/sd/sdw/sdww/nam\\_periurban\\_02.pdf](ftp://ftp.fao.org/sd/sdw/sdww/nam_periurban_02.pdf)

<sup>6</sup> Frayne, B. March 2007. Migration and the changing social economy of Windhoek, Namibia. *Development Southern Africa*, Volume 24, Issue 1.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid

<sup>8</sup> Ibid



poverty line, according to a study from 1995, and female-headed households could be the worst affected.<sup>9</sup>

Household data collected from Katutura between 1991 and 1996 reported a decrease from 70 % to 30 % in the proportion of households that considered obtaining food to be a “serious problem”<sup>10</sup>. The contradiction between high unemployment and a lower level of food insecurity can be explained in terms of transfers of food from rural areas especially the north central regions (former Owamboland) to Windhoek. In the households sampled, 62 % received food from relatives in rural areas and another 4 % did so from friends.<sup>11</sup> These food transfers were crucial in ensuring some food security in urban areas.

Another urban-rural linkage is money transfer. In 2000, about 50% of Windhoek households sampled remitted money to rural relatives every month or at least every two or three months, compared to 63 % in 1991.<sup>12</sup> This decrease in percentage of households sending money has been thought to be a result of decreased earning potential for migrants, in turn due to the low growth in the Windhoek economy. Nevertheless, as a result of the rapid increase in population numbers in urban areas, the total value of remitted amounts has increased. Most of the remittances (85 %) were sent to parents and/or children living in the rural areas, which indicate the importance of the social and economic ties between the various segments of an extended family.

### ***Food security and HIV/AIDS***

Food security in Africa has been a decade-long problem, exacerbated by the prevalence of HIV/AIDS, whose impact on agricultural production and food availability is felt in terms of both quantity and quality of food<sup>13</sup>. Future determinants of food security in southern Africa lie primarily outside the domain of agricultural production, which means that a “focus on improving crop yields would neglect those economic (e.g. poverty, lack of employment, inflation and market failures) and socio-political factors (e.g. conflict, property rights, education and HIV/AIDS) that are undermining the coherence of the family unit and creating increasingly vulnerable and socially unstable communities.”<sup>14</sup> In Africa, rural women provide most of the work in the small-scale agricultural

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<sup>9</sup> Poverty line is defined by van Rooy et al. (1994) as N\$ 116.63 per adult male for four weeks, equivalent to approximately N\$ 1, 500 per annum.

<sup>10</sup> Frayne 2007

<sup>11</sup> Ibid

<sup>12</sup> Ibid

<sup>13</sup> Villarreal, M. 2006. HIV/AIDS: a threat to the viability of the societies it attacks. <http://emeraldinsight.com.wagtail.uovs.ac.za/Insight/viewContentItem.do;jsessionid=8AD865FB34FD9D293248143BCDF7B8B9?contentType=Article&hdAction=lnkpdf&contentId=1546077&history=true>

<sup>14</sup> Misselhorn, A.A. 2005. What drives food insecurity in southern Africa? A metaanalysis of household economy studies. <http://www.popline.org/docs/1641/291900.html> - 4k -

sector, and the proportion of woman-headed households reaches almost one third in some countries. Another problem emerges when children lose their parents before learning basic agricultural skills or obtaining nutrition- and health-related knowledge.

The World Food Summit in 1996 asserted that “Food security exists when all people, at all times, have physical and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food that meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life.”<sup>15</sup> The documents pointed out the following dimensions of food security:

- Food availability: The availability of sufficient quantities of food of appropriate quality, supplied through domestic production or imports (including food aid).
- Food access: Access by individuals to adequate resources (entitlements) for acquiring appropriate food for a nutritious diet. Entitlements are defined as the set of all commodity bundles over which a person can establish command given the legal, political, economic and social arrangements of the community in which they live (including traditional rights such as access to common resources).
- Utilization: Utilization of food through adequate diet, clean water, sanitation and health care to reach a state of nutritional well-being where all physiological needs are met. This brings out the importance of non-food inputs in food security.
- Stability: To be food secure, a population, household or individual must have access to adequate food at all times. They should not risk losing access to food as a consequence of sudden shocks (e.g. an economic or climatic crisis) or cyclical events (e.g. seasonal food insecurity). The concept of stability can therefore refer to both the availability and access dimensions of food security.

As emphasised above, food security is only one dimension of a wider livelihood crisis. The United Nations, charged with overseeing the unprecedented food aid response in southern Africa between 2001 and 2006, defined the prevailing situation as the “Triple Threat”: the combination of HIV and AIDS, food insecurity and a weakened capacity for governments to deliver basic social services has led to the region experiencing an acute phase of long-term emergency<sup>16</sup>. HIV/AIDS exacerbates the impacts of other stressors and intensifies the insecurity of many communities affected by the disease in southern Africa. The epidemic contributes to the crisis by reducing production and income, as labour and capital are lost to disease and death<sup>17</sup>; undercutting

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<sup>15</sup> Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2006

<sup>16</sup> Maunder, N & Wiggins, S. 2006. Food Security in Southern Africa: Changing the Trend? Review of lessons learnt on recent responses to chronic and transitory hunger and vulnerability. Oxfam-GB, World Vision International, CARE, RHVP and OCHA.

<sup>17</sup> Maunder and Wiggins 2006

the ability of households to cope with shocks; and contributing to losses in scarce skilled staff in the public service and private enterprises. Another possible consequence of the AIDS epidemic is increasing inequality, even where average incomes remain constant, through the ‘impoverishing’ nature of the disease affecting some families, and not others.

Food relief programs, social and financial support, food-for-work programs, and gardening projects are unlikely to be the most appropriate and sustainable solution for the majority of African families. These programs “usually have a narrow focus on food and food production, without addressing the factors that drive the HIV epidemic and its impact.”<sup>18</sup> Furthermore “Nutrition and food security must be addressed not simply by giving food packages but thinking of long-term solutions such as individual or communal vegetable gardens.”<sup>19</sup> In other words: by moving beyond relief, and over to longer-term programmes that might underpin sustainable food security. This remains a serious challenge in a region facing a series of intertwined stressors that are undermining livelihoods, including failure to reduce the underlying risks of, and vulnerability to HIV. Hunger is a chronic condition that cannot be alleviated by simply increasing access to food. It calls for women’s education and empowerment, and a heavier focus on health as an essential component.<sup>20</sup>

In Africa, HIV/AIDS is commonly referred to as the slim disease, because as the disease progresses, food intake and metabolism are altered, leading to visible weight loss.<sup>21</sup> A poor diet may accelerate the onset of AIDS after HIV infection, creating a vicious cycle in which malnutrition, HIV infection, and additional opportunistic infections destroy the immune system, and death can occur more swiftly.

Another point where nutrition and the disease are connected is that food is essential for those who receive treatment. Many people living with HIV and AIDS who are on anti-retroviral treatment receive it without a sufficient food intake. Food and nutrition is therefore considered very important in their case. Not only individuals living with the disease, but also their households and communities are affected. As the Joint United Nations Program on HIV and AIDS<sup>22</sup> states:

“Lack of food security and poor nutritional status may hasten progression to AIDS related illnesses, undermine adherence and response to antiretroviral

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<sup>18</sup> Swaans, K., Broerse, J., Meincke, M., Mudhara, M. & Bunders, J. 2008. Promoting Food Security, Well-Being Among Poor And HIV/Aids Affected Households: Lessons From An Interactive And Integrated Approach.

<sup>19</sup> Singh, G. 2008. Patterns of Migration, Settlement and Dynamics of HIV/AIDS in South Africa. [http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001729/Migration\\_HIV\\_Singh2005.pdf](http://www.sarpn.org.za/documents/d0001729/Migration_HIV_Singh2005.pdf)

<sup>20</sup> Ibid

<sup>21</sup> Piwoz, E.G., & Preble, E.A. 2001. HIV/AIDS and Nutrition: A review of the literature and recommendations for nutrition care in Sub-Saharan Africa. Washington, DC: AED Publications.

<sup>22</sup> UNAIDS 2008

therapy, and exacerbate socioeconomic impacts of the virus. ... HIV impairs nutritional status by undermining the immune system, as well as nutrient intake, absorption and use.”

An important fact is that adults living with HIV have 10–30 % higher energy requirements than a healthy adult without HIV, whereas children living with HIV have 50–100 % higher requirements than healthy ones<sup>23</sup>. Malnutrition increases fatigue and decreases physical activity in people living with HIV. Food production can be impaired as a result of deaths in a family, as the loss of workers at the crucial periods of planting and harvesting can significantly reduce the size of the harvest<sup>24</sup>. Additionally, farmers may switch from export crops to less-labour-intensive food crops. One example is the change from mahangu<sup>25</sup> to maize. The rationale for this is that maize requires less work, particularly in terms of weeding, and it has a better market value<sup>26</sup>. This practice is more of a Devil’s trade-off, as maize is a heavy feeder depleting the soil, it is not as drought tolerant as millet (mahangu), and as a nutrient, it has fewer amino acids than mahangu. AIDS could, therefore, affect the production of cash crops as well as food crops.

Mahangu remains popular. In a study mahangu consumers were asked what other staple foods they eat instead of mahangu. Only three major products are mentioned regularly: rice, pasta (wheat), and vegetables (bean and potatoes). Maize is used as a supplement to mahangu. Most mahangu consumers (80% in Windhoek) mix mahangu with maize for different reasons, but rarely consume maize alone. One reason is that mixing mahangu with maize helps to save mahangu, a practice attributed to years of poor harvest and to the memory of famine years. A variety of meals and drinks are made out of mahangu and the most popular meal for 83% of consumers in is Windhoek the traditional oshifima porridge made from fermented or unfermented flour. The most common drink prepared is oshikundu, a fermented but non-alcoholic drink made from mahangu flour and malted sorghum.<sup>27</sup>

Water is a major problem in an arid country, in particular when exotic crops are planted. These require substantial amounts of water, as opposed to indigenous crops such as mahangu. The Khomas Region and the capital city rely heavily upon water resources generated in other regions. Shortages of water

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<sup>23</sup> UNAIDS 2008

<sup>24</sup> Bollinger, L. & Stover, J. 1999. The Economic Impact of AIDS in Namibia.  
<http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/SEImpact/namibia.pdf>

<sup>25</sup> Pearl millet (*Pennisetum glaucum*) which is grown in Africa. Is the most widely grown type of millet.

<sup>26</sup> Fuller, B. 2005. Silently Starving? The HIV Epidemic and Communal Farmers.  
[http://www.nepu.org.na/index.php?id=281&no\\_cache=1&file=1104&uid=475](http://www.nepu.org.na/index.php?id=281&no_cache=1&file=1104&uid=475)

<sup>27</sup> Leporrier, S., Leveau, A., Dury, S. & Bricas, N. 2002. Mahangu Urban Consumption Survey.  
<http://wwwwww.cirad.fr/presentation/programms/sea/Pages/Publis/FinalReportNamibia.PDF>

were reported as a constraint by 46% of all respondents in Windhoek.<sup>28</sup> The regular droughts in Namibia have an adverse effect on the price consumers must pay for water. The Municipality instituted a block tariff after a drought in the beginning of the 1990s, which means that the cost for water increases drastically after a certain amount is exceeded. Due to aridness access to rainwater is also limited, and storage facilities are very expensive. “This has great potential in the settled middle to high income areas, but would require some intervention in the form of provision of plastic storage tanks in the poorer areas”.<sup>29</sup> The use of domestic greywater in Windhoek is not encouraged by the Municipality in areas with an installed sewer network, as it could reduce the flow required to keep the system operational.

The contribution of rural–urban food transfers to the provisioning of poor urban migrants appears to be workable only when there are rural food surpluses, and when transportation is both available and affordable. In countries where these latter conditions have deteriorated, urban agriculture has become an attractive substitute.<sup>30</sup>

### ***Urban agriculture***

There is much room for development in agricultural production. Currently, most of the food sold in Namibia is imported from South Africa. Being the driest country in sub-Saharan Africa, the agriculture of Namibia is very weak<sup>31</sup>. Urban agriculture is also quite limited in Windhoek. About 5% of respondents were involved in some form of agriculture. This saved households an average of N\$60 per month on food costs in 2000.<sup>32</sup> Livestock did not feature high in this survey, as there are limits imposed by the municipality on livestock within municipal boundaries. Urban and peri-urban agriculture producers in Windhoek faced numerous problems, such as shortage of water (41 %), pest attacks (40 %) and theft of the produce (31 %)<sup>33</sup>. Other issues identified include the lack of information regarding the type of crops to grow, on which chemicals to use, and the prices producers would receive for their products. This is partly because of the absence of Extension Services to the producers. Farmers rely on trial and error, and have to learn from their experiences. More men (79 %) than women (56 %) in Windhoek receive no advice on how to produce from anyone. Those who receive help and advice rely on neighbours and friends and not on

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<sup>28</sup> Dima et al., 2002

<sup>29</sup> Ibid

<sup>30</sup> Mougeot, L.J.A. (ed). 2005. AGROPOLIS. The Social, Political and Environmental Dimensions of Urban Agriculture. <http://www.idrc.ca/openebooks/186-8/>

<sup>31</sup> Dima et al., 2002

<sup>32</sup> Frayne 2007

<sup>33</sup> Dima et al., 2002

elders or relatives, who are traditionally the source of advice in the African society.<sup>34</sup>

A policy should be formulated to encourage the production of high-value fruits and vegetables for the market. In addition, micro loans should be considered as a means to enable producers to purchase inputs, including appropriate technology. The policy should also mark out the responsibilities of authorities with respect to legal recognition, guidelines on advisable husbandry practices, and the protection of the environment to ensure sustainable production.<sup>35</sup>

The Economic Commission for Africa evaluated mitigation interventions with respect to improving smallholder agricultural production and nutrition. The report notes that vegetable gardens can help vulnerable and affected households get access to vegetables, and so ensure food and nutrition security; either as individually owned, or community-owned gardens. A range of vegetables can be grown to provide the household and chronically ill people with vegetables and herbs to improve their nutrition throughout the year. Gardening can also be a source of income generation. These gardens should be close to homesteads or houses, to ease the burden of women and other members of a household. The World Health Organization and FAO support the “production of specific medicinal plants that have a role in treating HIV related symptoms; improving digestion and stimulating appetite are also being promoted in conjunction with the vegetable gardens.”

### *HIV and food security in Namibia*

In Namibia, the impact of HIV and AIDS on agricultural production could be wide-spread.

- 50 % of Namibians obtain their income through subsistence farming, which accounts for 3% of the GDP. Studies have shown that “...there is evidence that surviving children, who may have lost both parents to HIV-related illnesses, often have problems in retaining family land and other assets”.<sup>36</sup>
- Commercial agriculture accounts for 9 % of the Namibian Gross Domestic Production (GDP) and employs approximately 36,000 workers. Productivity will be affected as skilled, supervisory and unskilled workers experience HIV related morbidity and mortality.<sup>37</sup>

HIV/AIDS in Namibia “will exacerbate the present decline in farming output and/or per capita food production, widening income disparities, increased

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<sup>34</sup> Dima et al., 2002

<sup>35</sup> Ibid

<sup>36</sup> Bollinger, L. & Stover, J. 1999. The Economic Impact of AIDS in Namibia.

<http://www.policyproject.com/pubs/SEImpact/namibia.pdf>

<sup>37</sup> Ibid

food prices and exodus to cities already crowded with unemployment”.<sup>38</sup> The situation in rural areas and the impacts of AIDS on agriculture were investigated by the FAO in 2000 and were identified as:

- smallholder farming (livestock, arable, mixed)
- commercial and commercialised agriculture
- irrigated agriculture
- specialised crop production for export markets
- the supply of services by government and other agencies

As the epidemic has negative effects on labour availability, labour substitution of younger children may occur, which is the case in the northern parts of the country. The FAO study mentioned this deficiency already in 1999. Another problem pinpointed by the FAO is that:

“Over 50 % of the communities reported sale of livestock as the means of covering direct costs caused by sickness and death. This diverts critical crop production resources (draft animals and manure), essential animal food products (meat and milk) and the returns in cash or kind from the mobile bank away from the household’s normal use ...”

Many communal farmers in northern Namibia (Kavango, Oshana and Oshikoto) are not coping. Over half of those surveyed own livestock, but do not have enough for regular offtake for either consumption or sale.

“Given the very low levels of production, hunger is a constant feature of life. ... With them a hard question must be asked whether or not it is best to support them with assistance to agriculture, or to provide them with direct support via disability pay outs, pensions, support for orphans or a basic grant. Food for work programs may not be successful with these households because there may not be enough healthy adults able to work.”<sup>39</sup>

When discussing security one has to take into account that:

“Namibia is the driest country in sub-Saharan Africa. It is largely semi-arid, with the rainfall being not only low but also erratic with a high level of inter- and intra-seasonal variability. The acute scarcity of water means that most of the country is a marginal, high-risk cropping environment, with livestock representing the predominant source of agricultural income” (FAO 2000).

The Food, Agriculture, Natural Resources Policy Analysis Network conducted an impact study in 2005 on the effects of HIV and AIDS on agriculture in Namibia. This study conducted in three Northern regions of Namibia (Kavango, Oshana, Oshikoto) found that HIV and AIDS are affecting the social and community frameworks in rural areas, and that there was an increase in malnutrition due to food shortages and poor nutrition mostly in HIV affected households. Crop yields have declined as a result of less cultivation;

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<sup>38</sup> Ibid

<sup>39</sup> Fuller 2005

and poor livestock management has occurred due to illness and loss of labour. Assets, such as livestock and farm animals, are being sold to pay for funeral expenses, and lack of secure land tenure leaves widows vulnerable to ‘property grabbing’ which further impacts the vulnerability of HIV/AIDS affected households.

One possibility to save labour inputs would be to investigate labour saving technologies. This should be done with local participation to ensure their relevance and appropriateness while adaptation is facilitated. For example, with respect to livestock the identification could include the improvement and promotion of livestock species that require little labour, e.g. scavenging chickens, pigs and bees, and efficient use of farm organic wastes, e.g. use of mobile livestock enclosures, toilets and homesteads within the arable land. In urban areas, the promotion of urban agriculture could contribute to a higher level of food security.

In Namibia, the ministries of health and of agriculture are collaborating on activities to build extension and home-based care workers capacity to support the food security needs of households affected by HIV/AIDS. Furthermore, the manual *Living Well with HIV/AIDS* by the FAO and WHO, and local recipe books are being adapted to the local context. They also provide the basis for inter-active training and guidelines.

There are numerous challenges that arise when addressing the HIV/AIDS epidemic.

“The advent of AIDS in particular underscores the fact that ‘business as usual’ is no longer applicable, as this ‘creeping disaster’ has steadily eroded the livelihood base of millions of people. Increasingly, the challenge becomes to respond with development taking centre stage instead of mere rehabilitation. Development should be at the core of projects. This raises an imperative for agencies to seriously consider their medium and long-term assistance priorities as ‘silo-oriented’, fragmented development support.”

A four-pronged approach was recommended to mitigate the HIV and AIDS epidemic’s effects on agriculture and food security. The approach consists of:

- initiatives to protect and improve the livelihoods of rural households (through both farm and non-farm avenues);
- social protection policies to provide financial and nutritional assistance where appropriate;
- focused nutrition programs for key populations at higher risk (e.g. girls and women);
- improvements in the development, implementation, and accountability of policy-making in the agricultural sector.



### ***The prevalence of HIV in Namibia***

Namibia has one of the highest rates for HIV infection in the world. According to the 2006 HIV sentinel serological survey, HIV prevalence in Namibia varied by region from 9 % to 43 %, with an overall estimated 20 % “crude prevalence rate for sexually active adults.” In other words, one out of five Namibians aged 15–49 is HIV positive, making Namibia one of the top five HIV-affected countries in the world. Namibia’s epidemic is generalized, meaning that the high prevalence rate occurs throughout the country and not just within certain high-risk groups, and infection rates have not yet peaked. According to the United Nations General Assembly Special Session Country Report for Namibia (2008), “...it should be noted that HIV prevalence is still on the increase in some regions and in some age groups, meaning continued high levels of prevention, care and support services are needed.”

### ***Migration and HIV/AIDS***

HIV/AIDS is often characterized as an urban problem, with urban areas generally having higher prevalence rates than rural areas. Studies state that when urban dwellers become symptomatic, they often return to the rural areas, where they will eventually die. Migrants are involved in spreading HIV to rural areas, and also caring for those infected. They periodically visit their home regions and may infect rural dwellers with HIV that was acquired in urban areas. At the same time, migrants may make money available for the care of the infected in rural areas.<sup>40</sup> This state of affairs may lead to the decline in food production in rural areas, a situation that affects both rural and urban dwellers.

An increasingly connected world offers innumerable opportunities for a pathogen to travel vast distances. In case of HIV/AIDS, the infection can only take place through the exchange of certain bodily fluids (sperm, blood, breast milk). In addition, the HIV/AIDS virus mutates constantly in replication from RNA to DNA, with the consequence being an increasing variety of different strains.

The first decade of the HIV epidemic in Africa was characterized primarily by the urban spread of the virus. The movement of migrants between urban and rural areas introduced the virus in non-urban localities. A demographic imbalance was created, because most migrants were young rural men, who contributed considerably to the rapid urban growth, which limited the choice of partners in urban areas.<sup>41</sup> The system of migrant labour, which

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<sup>40</sup> Frayne and Pendleton 2001

<sup>41</sup> Decosas, J. & Pedneault, V. 1992. Women and AIDS in Africa: demographic implications for health promotion.

separates individuals from their families and prolongs absence of the regular partner for economic reasons, is widespread in Africa.<sup>42</sup> Therefore several relationships could be established in urban areas, many of them commercialized. This created an ideal environment for the rapid spread of HIV.<sup>43</sup>

## ***Conclusions***

### **Migration**

Migration is a continuous process. The majority of migrants are from the Northern regions. Young, single and educated migrants are coming to Windhoek for employment and are keeping their rural linkages alive through monetary remittance to the North.

### **Food Security**

There would be a high degree of food insecurity among migrants; however there is a difference in food security between residents of informal settlements, and those of formal houses in the townships. Furthermore, although there are very strong linkages to rural areas, particularly in Northern Namibia (defined as the seven political regions Omusati, Oshana, Kunene, Oshikoto, Kavango and Caprivi), where the majority of the population lives, reciprocity of remittances is unequal.

### **Urban Agriculture**

Urban agriculture does not appear to provide a considerable food resource, and it is not a significant activity due to a variety of environmental constraints in Windhoek.

### **Health**

Potentially, HIV positive migrants going back home would cause the spread of the disease. This theory was not necessarily supported by findings, for the reason that when people are sick they want to be with their families, thus going back home only applies if that is where the family is.

### **Final**

Migration, food security, employment and to some extent HIV/AIDS, are all interwoven in households in the North western townships of Windhoek, regardless of whether the households are in formal or informal settlements. Food is available and accessible, presupposing that people can afford to buy it. In order to be able to access food, one must first be able to access the money

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<http://0heapol.oxfordjournals.org.wagtail.uovs.ac.za/cgi/reprint/7/3/227maxtoshow=&HITS=10&hits=10&RESULTFORMAT=&fulltext=hiv+sprea+migration&searchid=1&FIRSTINDEX=0&resourcetype=HWCIT>

<sup>42</sup> Caraël and Glynn 2008

<sup>43</sup> Decosas and Pedneault 1992

necessary, either through employment (formal or informal) or government grants. Therefore, food insecurity must be viewed in a larger context as a problem related to poverty. Thus, it is not a stand-alone issue; on the contrary, it is embedded in the entire socio-economic fabric of Namibia. Urban agriculture could be a component in increasing food security (albeit presently minor due to some inherent problems of urban agriculture in Windhoek), but formal and informal employment and income are even larger factors. Any discussion of food security cannot take place in the absence of understanding land affordability and densification issues and the municipal policies that promote densification. These municipal policies are land policies which favour zero agriculture, and have developed in the context of widespread poverty.

It becomes clear that local and national policies on migration, HIV/AIDS and food security are not coordinated to form the integrated policy and programming interventions required to address urban development needs. There is a growing recognition that these three areas require integration, but there is not enough information available to ensure the development of such an integrated policy with an effective implementation strategy.

There is a pressing need to develop and integrate policies in these areas of the Triple Threat.

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## ***CURRENT ISSUES***

**Dr. Daniel SOGOR PhD, historian ELTE**

### **THE IRANIAN SITUATION WAR IN WORDS, OR IN THE NEAR FUTURE**

The current situation of the Middle East – which is indeed quite complex - has many issues that can rightfully interest the public opinion. The Palestinian peace process is in abyss, which not something out of ordinary, however once again at the top of the agenda after the Palestinian leadership plans to gain full membership in the UN, and its organizations. The later even has certain progress, as it is about to be accepted into the UNESCO.<sup>1</sup>

The phenomenon called “Arab Spring” – which was regarded by many, especially by the elites, which seized leadership by it, as a wave revolution, however in the cases of numerous countries effected by it such a claim is more then brave – is seemingly at exhaustion.<sup>2</sup> In Yemen, even though after thirty years ‘Alī ‘Abd Allah aṣ-Ṣālih is about to quit after a period of instability, and at the eve of civil war, yet the outcome of the transition is dubious more than anywhere else in the region.<sup>3</sup> In Syria, the situation is far from solved, and the current events show little sign to an end – to either way – crisis. It would be a great mistake by any, to assume that the solution of the Syrian crisis lays in the hand of the Syrian people marching and protesting on the streets – both against and for the president. One could argue that the ongoing pro-government protests, the substantial Chinese and Russian, and the search parties of the security forces, and the army will overcome the opposition sooner or later, however such a calculation can only be incomplete if we think about the ongoing protests against the regime - which fail to fall in number – and the economical sanctions imposed recently by the Arab League. It is true that the effectiveness of these protest are seriously undermined since Syria’s Arab neighbours, namely Lebanon, Iraq, and Jordan expressed their unwillingness to commit themselves to them, and so did – eventhough expressed very recently willingness to support a military action – Turkey, but the ceased assets of the Syrian economy in the Gulf countries can cripple it in the short run in such a

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<sup>1</sup> [http://arabic.cnn.com/2011/middle\\_east/9/24/UNGA.Palestinians/index.html](http://arabic.cnn.com/2011/middle_east/9/24/UNGA.Palestinians/index.html)  
<http://www.ahram.org.eg/Arab-world/News/110087.aspx>

<sup>2</sup> <http://afriport.hu/elemzes/10696-forradalom-vagy-vezetcerek-tanulmany-az-arab-tavas-rol.html>

<sup>3</sup> <http://ara.reuters.com/article/topNews/idARACAE7980AS20111009>

level, that can eventually lead to the fall the current regime.<sup>4</sup> The protests of Bahrain by the intervention of the Saudi army, and the by the skillful techniques of the al-Arabiyya – Saudi – and the al-Jazeera – Qatari – Tv stations, disappeared completely by now from the daily news stream. Not counting these, and the countries which in it brought changes in the leadership about the “Arab Spring” steadily loses pace, and slowly disappears even from the Arabic media headlines, as it only deals by now with Libya, Syria, and Egypt. However, even in the countries where the “Arab Spring” deposed the previous president, the current events don’t point to the direction the western media anticipated. Instead of modern elites with western orientation, the conservative and religious – sometime slightly fundamentalist – forces gain support. Such is the case in Tunisia, Libya<sup>5</sup>, and Egypt<sup>6</sup>, where the situation is far from stabilizing but yet a new wave of protests, and revolution is about to commence. This time, against the army leadership.<sup>7</sup>

But next to these issues, new-old story claimed attention sometime in September, early October. The case of the Iranian nuclear plan, and institutions – eventhought it is forgotten many times – is ongoing issue since 1979, and always gains the attention of the media, as there is and unsolvable stalemate in the region, or when the relations between Iran and the Western powers suddenly turn to freezing cold. The current period completely fits to the pattern. As the “Arab Spring” loses velocity but as its last chain, Syria’s case is not about to be over, connected to Damascus, and in a way as a continuation of the wave of revolutions, Iran fell to the spotlight. It is not something unusual that certain western countries impose economical sanctions upon Iran, or the criticize the country for its nuclear program, and express concerns about it, yet since September there are more and more speculations about a possible war against Iran in the near future. Not by coincidence. It has rarely happened before that the actual Israeli Prime Minister and the Minister of Defense not only did not confute media speculations about a possible conflict, but yet they even support them, and the American administration even support such harsh statements with Britain express its willingness to support a possible American or Israeli action. While we can attribute these statements to a possible propaganda war between the sides only to be fought in the press right after a NATO action in Libya and a possible one against Syria – as more and more speculations arouse about that as well<sup>8</sup> – such statements shall not be taken lightly.

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<sup>4</sup> Syrian Television news reports;

[http://tishreen.info/\\_mota.asp?FileName=77155833920111130215252](http://tishreen.info/_mota.asp?FileName=77155833920111130215252) ; <http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/home/?u=556aeef60722f6e5811ea2519&id=ee6a1a7b7c>

<sup>5</sup> [http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/11/111122\\_libya\\_government.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/11/111122_libya_government.shtml)

<sup>6</sup> <http://www.aljazeera.net/NR/exeres/B8636349-141D-4FC7-A955-4146AFF65570.htm>

<sup>7</sup> <http://www.elfagr.org/Detail.aspx?nwsId=88416&secid=1&vid=2>

<sup>8</sup> <http://us2.campaign-archive2.com/home/?u=556aeef60722f6e5811ea2519&id=ee6a1a7b7c>

In this article I will try to evaluate how much possibility a war has, or will it take place only in diplomatic fields. How much likely it is, that a possible Israeli military action against the Iranian nuclear institutions will flare up the region, and will bring about a large scale war. For that, first of all, I will try to sum up the Iranian nuclear case, and current inner state of Iran. That is essential if wants to see clearly, how much Teheran seeks peaceful way out of the current treat, or how likely it is that Iran would respond to any Israeli military action with deadly force. Only after that I wish to go into the statements, and events of the last couple months, so to see what is the current condition, which gives special ground to topic now. At the end, I will seek to provide scenarios for a possible conflict if indeed there is a chance for a new war in the Middle East.

### *Iran internally*

First of all, we need to see the internal state of Iran, to able to truly judge, how much is Iran ready to go bear the risk of war with its current foreign policy towards the conflicts of Syria, and Bahrain. One the other way of seeing the issue, how much can take the pressure of the West.

From a certain way of looking the situation in the region right now, the first country to witness mass protests against the current leadership – and being highly amplified by foreign mass media coverage – was Iran after its presidential elections in 2009. With great controversies over the election results, Mahmūd Ahmadinežād won his second term which brought about mass protests but was overcame by the security services within weeks. Its is true that the leadership showed power, and kept his grasp on the control, however two important viewpoints should be noticed about that. First of all, eventhough the protests were great in numbers in favour of Mir Hosseyn Musavī, and Mehdī Karrūbī<sup>9</sup>, main opposition figures, they did not aim to alter the political system itself, only wished to change to policies which it implemented, but even so, within the given frames. On the other hand, eventhough Ahmadinežād has considerable popular support himself, and managed to overcome the crisis, and eventually put the opposition figureheads to the side, his reputation became seriously tarnished, and started his second presidential term with such a handicap that it made quite questionable how long can he hold on to power. In that light one could ask, how much the current president seeks confrontation with such an unstable inner support for himself.<sup>10</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Both of them were sentenced to house arrest after the elections, and later on in 2011 to prison, for security reasons. Karrūbī was even attack by armed, and yet unidentified people in his house arrest for his criticism toward the actions of the government.

<http://edition.cnn.com/2010/WORLD/meast/09/02/iran.karoubi/index.html#fbid=bWTYV6M6pLq&wom=false>, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-12599837>

<sup>10</sup> [http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2009/06/090620\\_nh\\_iran\\_protest.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2009/06/090620_nh_iran_protest.shtml) ;

On that point two important features the Iranian politics should be noted. First of all the president of Iran is not the head of the state. He is more than a simple implementer of policies, but far from being so independent to determine the foreign policy on his own. He can have his ways but only under the careful supervision of the Supreme Leader – currently ‘Alī Hāmene’i – and only to the point where he does not contradict substantially with him, and the higher levels of the political elite.<sup>11</sup> We could see, the so far the president was much less active on the international scale than in his first term, which support the theory of fallen trust in him by the elite, the Supreme Leader<sup>12</sup>, and fallen support from the people. The other important characteristic of Iran is that Teheran always seeks the ways compromise. The way out of direct confrontation. Can his ways be regarded as pushy many times, but rarely aggressive outspokenly and not at all in favour of open conflict. In that sense Ahmadinežād was a rare exception who was quite vehement in his first term. However this nature of Iranian policies only true until it feels threatened. While Tehran seeks all ways the escape open confrontation, never bows to pressure, and once feels blackmailed, than retaliates instantly. First of all, expresses willingness to use full force. In the current events on of the most curious steps of Iran can be understood by that feature. On 2 November the Head of Revolutionary Guard’s aerospace division, General ‘Alī Amīr Hāğīzāde announced, that Iran strike back right away, to NATO bases in Turkey, if feels in immediate danger.<sup>13</sup> The immediate message is about the American radar stations about which Turkey only recently agreed with Washington.<sup>14</sup> Such stations would provide great tactical advantage for the Americans for a possible invasion, or for the Israelis in a case of a military action, given, that the Americans share intelligence information. Eventhought Tehran objected such stations so close to its borders, the recent message is a clear sign that if Israel hits, or serious steps are to be made for a possible military invasion, Iran is ready hit back, and even go to war.

Currently, what can be noticed from various Iranian steps and statements, that Iran is more and more concern, that the shockwave which was ignited in Tunis is about to reach, but embraced with the treat of an Israeli strike, and an American invasion. In Tehran, they are quite used to live in such a threat, but the situation is now somewhat different. The pressure is not only on its own, but it is about to reshape the region in a way not favourable to Iran. If falls Syria, so falls the Hizb Allah in Lebanon, and the region would be dominated by the influential GCC member, namely Saudi and Qatar most of all. So Iran has to be active in shifts of power and step in to defend its interest in one hand, and to stop the shockwave even before its doorstep. That is why Iran is vocal to defend Syria,

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<sup>11</sup> <http://www.iranonline.com/iran/iran-info/government/constitution-9-1.html>

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.asharq-e.com/news.asp?section=2&id=25600>

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.mehrnews.com/en/NewsDetail.aspx?pr=s&query=turkey%20&NewsID=1470172>

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.todayszaman.com/news-256744-turkey-us-sign-agreement-on-nato-radar-deployment.html>



and questions the policies implemented in Bahrain.<sup>15</sup> While such a policy is understandable, and quite logical in a sense however it can just as well pull Tehran into war in the case of Syria. It is therefore imperative to act always in a cool-headed manner, and not to make rash actions, which was not always the characteristic of Ahmadinežād. Such was the issue of Bahrain in which the Iranian president was very outspoken, and was very trying to show force, and oust the Saudi intervention, but at the end, at the could not take the risk of starting a war with the US as the island state is the base of the 3<sup>rd</sup> US fleet.<sup>16</sup> The result was a quite big diplomatic defeat, which made Iran seem weak, and unreliable for its other friends as a source of useful help. So as he slowly steps back – or being stepped back – from the first line of foreign policy, western sources suggest break within the Iranian political circles. While the break can be very real, and given it exists it is certainly not a new one, that does not mean that the leadership is not committed.<sup>17</sup>

In short, it is for sure that Iran is not seeking confrontation as it is alien of its very nature, but needs to defend its interest, and now more than ever feels pressured. That makes it take active role, which again not a tradition of Iranian foreign policy. Nonetheless, as Tehran would be happy to escape confrontation, and exactly that is why tries to intimidate its opponents, it is ready to strike back to Israel, given being hit, or defend itself from the US.

### ***The Iranian Nuclear issue***

Since the nuclear program is the most important pretext of confrontation with Iran, we have to see into the issue a bit, eventhough I find it a little futile. Futile since the nuclear case is simply a pretext, and not much more. That claim of mine I will try to explain more with the support of a little historical sum up.

The Iranian nuclear case is confusing – as most nuclear stories are – one, but definitely not a new one. Ironically the state which did the most to start the implementation of nuclear technology in Iran was the one which does now the most to stop that from happening, namely the US. Iran started its route for the delicate technology in the '50-s, after the Shah was reinstated with much help from the CIA. The Shah wanted to modernize its country, and was interested in anything for that goal. While a nuclear energy program would prove to be very useful, a military implementation of the technology would have made Iran the strongest power in the region. At the time the US had its program, called Atoms for Peace, in which provided nuclear technology to countries in alliance with it,

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<sup>15</sup> [http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-03-14/politics/29987588\\_1\\_bahrain-saudi-arabia-iran](http://articles.businessinsider.com/2011-03-14/politics/29987588_1_bahrain-saudi-arabia-iran) ;  
<http://www.payvand.com/news/11/may/1029.html>

<sup>16</sup> <http://abna.ir/data.asp?lang=3&Id=245863>; <http://www.newstimeafrica.com/archives/18871>

<sup>17</sup> [http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/05/110502\\_iran\\_row.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/arabic/middleeast/2011/05/110502_iran_row.shtml)

so to be able to halt Soviet political penetration, and spread of influence.<sup>18</sup> Giving such a fearful thing to a country which is regarded as reliable, can intimidate others in the region.

In 1967 the Tehran Nuclear Research Center was founded, along with the Atom Energy Organization of Iran, it started its work in a small scale nuclear research reactor, which was completed by the Americans, and so was provided fuel for it by them. In 1970 Tehran ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty.<sup>19</sup> By this a country vows to refrain from nuclear weapons research, and to make its institutions transparent for the International Atomic Energy Agency. In exchange such a country enjoys the right for civilian nuclear program, and usage as long as it is transparent, and even can get access to help to achieve that from the IAEA. After that Iran agreed with the US, and with certain European states – namely the UK, France, and West-Germany – and companies, so these would build facilities there. Most of the sites which are under dispute now, are build in that era, in the ‘70s. The most advanced was the reactor I. in Bushehr about to be built by Germans.<sup>20</sup>

The Islamic Revolution in 1979 brought a big change. Suddenly from a reliable ally for the US, Iran became an enemy; therefore Washington halted all shipments of fuel and substances to Iran and started to pressure other countries as well to do so. As soon after the Revolution Iran was dragged into a long war with Iraq, the case of the nuclear program was dropped. Especially the Bushehr reactor was hit numerous times by Iraqi warplanes.<sup>21</sup> However at the end of the war Tehran expressed its wish to carry on and complete its program. By that time all previous states which provided aid, bowed before American pressure. Argentina was ready to help to transform the Tehran research reactor, and provided fuel for it from 1987-88, but the deal was cancelled by American pressure in 1992.<sup>22</sup> The most frustrating for Iran was not simply that mostly all access was denied, but even the money invested in the program was not about to be refunded, eventhough Iran never broke the agreements. That is a crucial point to mention, since Iran was offered many times to be supplied to by fuel to its nuclear reactors, and even get help to finish their construction given they stop the uranium enrichment. However Iran always claimed and claims even now, that such offers are not creditable since all the previous agreements were cancelled as well, with no refund. Furthermore that this is one of the biggest reasons of ill sentiment towards the US.<sup>23</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> [http://alsos.wlu.edu/adv\\_rst.aspx?keyword=atoms+for+peace&creator=&title=&media=all&genre=all&disc=all&level=all&sortby=relevance&results=10&period=15](http://alsos.wlu.edu/adv_rst.aspx?keyword=atoms+for+peace&creator=&title=&media=all&genre=all&disc=all&level=all&sortby=relevance&results=10&period=15)

<sup>19</sup> <http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Infcircs/Others/infcirc214.pdf>

<sup>20</sup> [http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record\\_id=12477&page=37](http://books.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12477&page=37)

<sup>21</sup> Goodrazi, Jubin M.: Syrian and Iran, London, 2009, I. B.Tauris & Co Ltd, pp. 115-124

<sup>22</sup> <http://cns.miis.edu/wmdme/flow/iran/reactor.htm>

<sup>23</sup> Such was the case in an interview with Rafsanjānī – president of Iran at the time – by Mike Wallace, which is a very famous example. [http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-ojq-O\\_Ecc](http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=P-ojq-O_Ecc)

On that point we must go to details a bit. The controversy is not about the nuclear power plans. That is not disputed. The issue is the fuel, the nuclear rods, for the power plans. Iran wish to produce that on its own, recycle the used rods to achieve the so called full nuclear circle, being completely independent. To produce the rods, one has to run the uranium ore through centrifuges to enrich them. For civilian use up to 5%. But such is the way to gain uranium for bombs, only in a much bigger concentration. That is why it is relatively hard to determine in the beginning from a nuclear program whether is peaceful or not.

Most of the enrichment facilities, and reactors were reported to the IAEA by Iran, and even monitored, and for that, the IAEA provided certain amount of technical help. In 1995 Russia agreed to help to finish the Bushehr reactor, and provided limited technological help.<sup>24</sup> Even so Iran was regularly accused of pursuing a secret nuclear weapon program such a claim was never proved. The situation changed a bit in 2002 when an Iranian political exile provided information that Iran has further two installations – namely in Natanz, and Arak – which were not reported and were serving the purpose of a military plan. The IAEA demanded access to these facilities, however by the agreement of the time Iran was not obliged to do so.<sup>25</sup> In 2003 Iran signed to Additional Protocol for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, which allows monitoring not only in facilities approved by the host state, but anywhere within.<sup>26</sup> That happened shortly after that the IAEA in a report condemned the break of safeguard measures by Iran. After that an EU mediation started, ending with a the Paris Agreement – in which Iran would temporarily halt its enrichment, in exchange for fuel supply- but eventually the agreement broke down. It should be noted that at that time, between 1997-2005 as the Iranian president was Mojmammad Hātāmī the relations were amicable with Iran by the West, even in times of controversies, and it always aimed agreement, and not sanctions. That was not the case prior, the time of ‘Alī Akbar Rafsanġānī – between 1989-1997 – when Iran was accused of trying to get a hold of a nuclear bomb, so it happens nowadays.<sup>27</sup>

That atmosphere changed once again in 2005, when the current president, Mahmūd Ahmadinežād was elected. Iran stepped back from the Paris Agreement, and removed the seals in the enrichment facility of Isfahan. In 2006 the IAEA report suggested a step against Iran, which ended up in UNSC Resolution 1696 which demanded a halt on every uranium enrichment activity.<sup>28</sup> Since than, the Iranian program is ongoing, with more and more American initiated sanctions against the Persian state. The IAEA reports being issued every six months mostly claimed that cooperation by the Iranian side is

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<sup>24</sup> <http://www.nti.org/db/nisprofs/russia/exports/rusiran/react.htm>

<sup>25</sup> <http://www.alirezajafarzadeh.org/>

<sup>26</sup> [http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg\\_overview.html](http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Factsheets/English/sg_overview.html)

<sup>27</sup> See 23, the interview by Mike Wallace

<sup>28</sup> [http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1696%282006%29/page\\_2/rect\\_184,543\\_829,610](http://www.undemocracy.com/S-RES-1696%282006%29/page_2/rect_184,543_829,610)

satisfactory, and there is no evidence for a nuclear weapon plan, or that the facilities are being used for such a purpose. That was the case until 2011 November, when the IAEA accused Iran of such a possibility. Iran denied such an accusation, stating that the report was formed by American pressure.<sup>29</sup>

Nonetheless, in 2010 August the Bushehr reactor was completed, and its fueling started.<sup>30</sup> The enrichment capability was announced long before. But to go to the bottom of all that, why I say it is a pretext? First of all, either Iran has or has not a nuclear weapon plan in progress, it definitely cannot produce a bomb on its own now, and not for a while. Let us simply think about the pace with which the reactors are building! Iran was ready many times to show willingness for cooperation, but once it is pressured it did not bow. It is clear by now, that Iran will not stop can it by sanctioned in whichever way. Such measures will never be successful anyways, since the Persian state has great oil reserved, much needed for China, and geopolitical importance, much can be put to the help of a possible Russian penetration into the region. If there was a real treat about of Iranian atomic bomb production capability it is much more likely that either Israel or the US demolish the site, such was the case in 2003 in Syria<sup>31</sup>, or 1981 in Ūsīrāk, Iraq<sup>32</sup>. Furthermore, if there was any serious evidence for that, Washington would present it. It is true that simply the absence of evidence does not prove the contrary either, but one had seen how the US accused Iraq with possession of WMDs, yet after invasion proved nothing, the creditability of such accusations without solid proof is quite weak.

But once we are at the Iranian nuclear case, one cannot skip to mention the suggestion, that Iran even without production capability indeed posses limited amount of nuclear warheads for its ballistic missiles.<sup>33</sup> Rumor - of course officially denied by Tehran - exist about that, claiming that in the '90s Iran bought unclear warheads from Belorussia. If that is true, much of the debate is futile. Plans to produce bombs or not, and the aim of an Israeli or American intervention is to prevent this or not, the main claim, that Iran would use nuclear weapons in the region is groundless is it possess for some time already.

But from another point of view, the whole case seems even more just as a pretext. Let's we look the economical and political conditions of both Israel, and the US! The government of Netanyahu formed in 2009 failed to solve the problems inherited by the last administrations. The economy is in such a bad

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<sup>29</sup> <http://iaea.org/newscenter/focus/iaeaairan/bog112011-65.pdf>;  
[http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2011/11/111109\\_103\\_ahmadinejad\\_iaea.shtml](http://www.bbc.co.uk/persian/iran/2011/11/111109_103_ahmadinejad_iaea.shtml)

<sup>30</sup> <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.php?nn=9006020115>;  
<http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newsvideo/7213618/Iran-President-Mahmoud-Ahmadinejad-announces-uranium-enrichment-at-rally-in-Tehran.html>

<sup>31</sup> <http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2003/sc7887.doc.htm>

<sup>32</sup> [http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/7/newsid\\_3014000/3014623.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/onthisday/hi/dates/stories/june/7/newsid_3014000/3014623.stm)

<sup>33</sup> [http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/071119\\_iran.is&nuclearwar.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/071119_iran.is&nuclearwar.pdf);  
<http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2011/05/31/iran-nuclear-warheads/>

condition, that - possibly in connection with the "Arab Spring" - massive protests broke out in 2011 in the main cities in Israel against the government, demanding better salaries, and work conditions.<sup>34</sup> The American economy is in bad shape as well, as the debt is rising, and the economical crisis since 2008 still hits the economy. The same is the case of the EU which faces problems of coherence within the member states, and a crisis about the euro. In such conditions a war is always on the horizon, since that is a proven "solution" for stagnating economy, and high unemployment. In Israel, furthermore a war can take attention away from an economically unsuccessful government, and create a sentiment of national coherence against the common enemy.

To stay a little more at Iran, we have to assess its capabilities to retaliate. To any Israeli strike it can strike back, as it is suggested in the study Cordesman.<sup>35</sup> With or without nuclear warheads, Iran can inflict considerable damage, especially if old allies, the Hizb Allah, and Syria would join in the action. The chances of Syrian and Hizb Allah intervention shall be discussed later when I will talk about the possible scenarios. If America strikes the capability to strike back is negligible directly, but as suggested in the statement before, can hit the NATO bases in Turkey, and the American fleet in Bahrain. In case America would try to invade Iran, no doubt, that would be able to overcome the Iranian defence eventually, but that would need massive military build-up, what we don't see yet. But the pros and contras shall be discussed later, along with the possible scenarios.

It is obvious that Iran is capable to hit back, and even to defend itself from an American invasion for a limited time, but are we approaching to that? For the judgment, we have to look into the events of the last couple months.

### ***The current events***

The events possibly suggesting an Israeli air strike vary on two levels. The level of the statements of top Israeli politicians and not highly discussed bombings within Iran. In November Israeli newspapers accounted that Netanyahu aims to strike Iran, and such an action is about to happen soon.<sup>36</sup> It was suggested, that the Prime Minister is only trying to gain government support. Washington defended the possibility initially and soon the UK announced as well, that it is ready to provide help if America is indeed about to strike.<sup>37</sup> Massive media started Iran stated that would hit back with deadly force for any hit by Israel. More and more Israeli announcements rose, and even Simon Peres had a word in it, but the intensity of such a war in words eased by December. Even the previous head of the Mossad, Meir Dagan criticized a

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<sup>34</sup> <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/03/us-israel-economy-protests-idustre7821os20110903>

<sup>35</sup> [http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/071119\\_iran.is&nuclearwar.pdf](http://csis.org/files/media/isis/pubs/071119_iran.is&nuclearwar.pdf)

<sup>36</sup> <http://news.sky.com/home/world-news/article/16101552>

<sup>37</sup> <http://www.elfagr.org/Detail.aspx?nwsId=78578&secid=24&vid=2>

possible strike on Iran.<sup>38</sup> America tried to cool tension, and tried to hold back Israel, even calling such an action imprudent and dangerous. Even the previous Israeli Iran vocally defended itself even threatening Turkey as mentioned before. One can argue that such statements are nothing more than bluff and means of pressure, since it is unlikely that a state would announce a strike in the media which needs to be fast and decisive. For such, secrecy is a big asset, and would be foolish to announce it long before, giving time to the opponent to be ready. Even more, that is not something new, since this possibility is discussed for some time now. The same way, leading British newspapers stated the possibility of was unrealistic, and even a dangerous move such as the Guardian.<sup>39</sup> However the other layer of the debate, the recent events within Iran raises questions.

The first in the recent chain was in mid October, when the American secret services foiled a claim plot by the Iranians to assassinate the Saudi ambassador in Washington. The case and the claim was quite a complex one, with many unrealistic details, yet Hilary Clinton presented the case as proven and promised punishment. The issue is likely aimed – if one accepts the theory of a sending war on the way – to gain support by Iran's Arab neighbours. Most importantly from Saudi-Arabia, which has great difficulties with the Persian state now since the Saudi sent its army to Bahrain, but the leading opposition groups, mostly siis themselves sought help from Tehran. Help what Iran was happy to provide on political level, as the island state is a long important priority for Tehran.<sup>40</sup>

In November 5 a Pasdarān<sup>41</sup> ammunition storage compound blow up near Tehran. The loss was not great in numbers, or material, eventhough that was a missile compound, but in the "accident" died Brigadier Hasan Tehrānī Moqaddam who was a leading figure in the Iranian missile project, and probably provided great help to Hizb Allah in 2006 and the Palestinians in 2009. After a week Iran pointed the finger on the Mossad. Israel denounced the claim untrue, but expressed its happiness for the blow. The event was seen in Iran as step further for was, and raised the vehemence of the leadership.<sup>42</sup>

Recently news came up in November 27 that major blows were headed in Esfahan, a major Iranian city in which's vicinity there is nuclear facility as well. The news were denied by Iranian news agencies but much of the event stays in the dark.<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> <http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/former-mossad-chief-asked-to-return-diplomatic-passport-1.368584>

<sup>39</sup> <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/03/attack-iran-us-nuclear>

<sup>40</sup> <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2047939/US-foils-Iran-terror-plot-kill-Saudi-ambassador-Washington-D-C.html>

<sup>41</sup> Iranian Republican Guards

<sup>42</sup> <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/211592.html>

<sup>43</sup> <http://www.worldnewstribune.com/2011/12/01/bombing-squad-penetrated-security-at-irans-isfahan-explosion-wrecked-nuke-site/>

The Western attempt to put more pressure on Iran through the IAEA was intensified based on its last report shadowing Tehran's nuclear intentions. As a result, in November 28 a group of protesters broke to the embassy of the UK in Tehran. The protestors burned American, Israeli and British flag, and inflicted serious damage on the embassy building.<sup>44</sup> The Iranian government naturally denied any involvement however the sincerity such a denial is quite questionable, since the break-in is unlikely could have been successful without the security forces turning a blind eye to it. Any ways, as a gesture for diplomatics most of the protestors were arrested. Britain renounced such action as a clear violation of international treaties and recalled its ambassador temporarily.<sup>45</sup> So did France and Germany. That bought the relations between Iran and the West to a long not seen abyss, and with the disappearance of intimidating statements from America or Israel, the chance of war came close once again.

The last of the chain of events, is very fresh, only dating to December 4. IRNA announced, that Iranian forces managed to take control of a US unmanned drone in Iranian airspace.<sup>46</sup> Such a claim was even somewhat proven, when American sources verified the claim stating, that the drone was on mission in Afghanistan, when contact was lost, and it disappeared.<sup>47</sup> Then again, the validity of these claims from both sides is hard to determine. While it is useful for Iran to take a hold of an American drone, and test its computer capabilities in a possible eve of war, it seems foolish to provoke the US into open confrontation. On the other hand, while it seem would seem credible, that the Americans used the drone to monitor Afghan territories only to a certain point. But why is America using spy applications so close to the border? Why is it monitoring the part of Afghanistan now, when it relatively calm, compared to other parts of the country? Is Iranian computer technology that advanced, that can “steal” American drones? Fair questions, but as later on at the scenarios I will suggest, can be a useful tool for provocation, much needed for Washington.

### *The scenarios*

So after all these let us see what are the possible scenarios for war, and what are the realities for each. As I see now, there are three possible course of action now, as I would deem an Iranian first, or pre-emptive strike unlikely. Not simply since it is out of the nature of Tehran, but it is most unwise as well, both militarily, and diplomatically. As far as diplomatics, Iran can claim that it is simply acting under pressure, but such a claim would be groundless making a first move. That would further alienate Iran's Arab neighbours, and the interna-

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<sup>44</sup> <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/30/world/middleeast/tehran-protesters-storm-british-embassy.html>

<sup>45</sup> <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203833104577069892514327020.html>

<sup>46</sup> <http://www.irna.ir/ENNewsShow.aspx?NID=30697771>

<sup>47</sup> <http://news.yahoo.com/blogs/envoy/isaf-u-spy-drone-iran-claims-brought-down-195224233.html>

tional community. Militarily it is unwise, since Iran has good defence capabilities, but using weapons to a doubtful first strike would be a waste.

The first possible scenario is an Israeli air-strike against the main Iranian nuclear facilities, as suggested in previous statements. Given they can get American approval – since the Israeli planes have to cross American controlled airspace, and would need Washington's backing in a very likely retaliation – such a strike can be successful. But there are risks to consider nonetheless. First of all, no one really knows how much could Iran hit back with missiles, but could inflict considerable damage for sure. There are suggestions, that that would bring Israel into war with Hizb Allah in Lebanon as it would shell Israel with missiles of its own on a large scale; and with Syria as Baššar al-Asad would might go into war. By doing so, could boost popular support, and in the case of war could deal with the internal descent he faces since March much more easily. That I deem very unlikely since Baššar al-Asad has doubts about the military support he enjoys within the ranks of the generals. He would most likely lose such a war, and would only provide pretext for an open American, or NATO intervention in support of the Syrian National Council – the most important opposition factor in connection with Western states – and the Free Syrian Army which agreed to cooperation just recently.<sup>48</sup> However retaliation from the Hizb Allah is likely, as it should not fear Israel. On the ground defeated Israel in 2006 and could halt Israel once again. It would give more popular support for the movement, which claims itself as the only real opposition against the Jewish state.

But I see a much bigger argument against an Israeli strike. The case of Egypt. Since the fall of Mubarak, and the army's gain of control, the people demanded more firm stance against Israel. The popular sentiment is anti-Israeli for long, but now outspokenly. The people attacked the Israeli embassy in Cairo, and many border clashes happened between the two countries. The army, while for sure tries to secure its relations with Israel, to hold on to American favour, the army leadership, which is currently still controls the government had to bow to the popular sentiment to a certain scale, to prevent further internal problems, and reopening of protests. That happened anyways, but about inner political issues. The growing conservative sentiment is well proven by the early results of the recently started elections, as the party sponsored by the Muslim Brotherhood, gains ground. Now if Israel strikes before the end of the Egyptian elections, the anti-Israeli feeling would rise to such a level, that would simply hand over the country to the Muslim Brotherhood. In that case either it forms a government which would be happy to prove itself committed to opposition against the hated Jewish state, or the army would keep the control, but would have to take steps to prevent a full scale uprising.

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<sup>48</sup> <http://us2.campaign-archive1.com/?u=556aeef60722f6e5811ea2519&id=424edc4a9a&e=f28d89494b>



Now let say, Tel-Aviv strikes. Iran will strike back beyond doubt. If so, the reactions cannot be calculated for sure, but it is likely that Hizb Allah joins. If so, Israel will have to hit Lebanon resulting heavy civilian losses, and that will raise hateful sentiment. That will push Egypt. If Egypt steps up, the Syrian reaction cannot be calculated, but the government will likely not miss the chance to do something to prove itself committed in the pan-Arab issues which is the long claim of the Ba'at Party. Now does Tel-Aviv want to wage a war in all frontiers, with possibly heavy civilian losses, and deteriorated relations in the region? Will America let the whole region flare up in an unfavourable way ending up in a chaos, right when still has high hopes to bring down Syria, and the Hizb Allah with it? All that so close to presidential elections? Will a president walk down such a shadowy way before elections, who won by promising a peaceful foreign policy, and bringing the American troops back home? I do think that it is unlikely.

The second option is a bigger hit against Iran. An American lead coalition including the UK and possibly Gulf Arab states, most importantly Saudi, and possibly Turkey. Probably with Israel at the back, giving assistance. First of that needs a massive build up, more than just the third fleet in Bahrain, and massive diplomatic rallying. That needs time. Time Obama simply doesn't have since he would not only had to hit Iran, but even win, form a new government, and bring the troops home. Without serious losses. All that before the elections next year. Unrealistic now, but possible for the next administration. But is that possible for the next administration? First of all Turkey. Turkey can be vocal against Iran to win American favour, but would gain nothing from a war. The current relations are quite lucrative, such are the positions in Northern Iraq. But going to war would be a heavy task even for Turkey, and would have to count in the Kurdish card. In a war, Iran could turn to the great Kurdish population in Turkey, ethnically close to itself, and it proved itself skillful in that already in the Iraq-Irani war. Erdoğan is still quite popular, partially because of his policies towards the Kurds, but would lose that, and even his Islamic support would be tarnished attacking the Islamic Republic.

Now the case of Arab states in a coalition. The main question is Saudi, since the GCC Defense Shield doesn't step without it. Saudi for long had serious problems with Iran, and would certainly be happy to see it going under. It had to keep the Persians out of the GCC, and even it's own *shī* opposition always turns to Tehran for support. With Iran going down, such a support would be cut. Now there is even the case of Bahrain, which is crucial for both. Riyadh knows, that eventhough Iran can make its position in Bahrain very bad, but as long as the American fleet is there – and that is not about to leave at all – cannot oust it. Going into war now along with the Americans is only favourable for Saudi with two conditions. First, if the current regime in Tehran is toppled for sure, otherwise doesn't worthy it. The second is a short war, in which Iran cannot

inflict serious damage to the kingdom, and to its economy. But such a thing, knowing the missile arsenal of Iran, and only suspecting the scale of Iranian secret services built in within Saudi cannot be guaranteed. Now one can argue, that when the US invaded Iraq in 1991 at the lead of a coalition, such states joined as Syria, and many more Arabs, which could not be thought before. But there is a great difference between now and then. Then, Iraq had no international backing, a ruined economy, and difference between the Iraqi and the American capabilities left no doubt about the result. So they joined only to win American support. In the case of Syria for example, to turn Washington away from itself, and it had problems with Bagdad for long anyways. Those who joined then did not have to fear Iraqi retaliation. But now, Iran has a running economy, which can support a standing army. It has Russian and Chinese support making any UNSC resolution impossible, and without the international community the GCC will not rush to aid America. Russia even defended Syria by sending it's fleet to Latakia, and with statements of a possible nuclear war. Now let us just imagine how Russia would step up to defend Iran if needed, which is much more important for Moscow than Syria. So in short, I don't think that Washington could fetch up a coalition, and would not attack alone or with only British support. Especially not before the elections on the way.

The third possibility is to wait. Put pressure more on Iran through the IAEA and the UN, wait for a the new administration to take place. Let Israel threaten Iran, maybe even pushing it into mistake to such a level that would be a pretext for war. But it worth much more to wait for the elections in Iran. Ahmadinežād cannot run for a new turn, and even the last elections brought about great protest and discontent. The "Arab Spring" especially in Libya proved that the internal discontent which can be built upon in the right time, and can bring down even a standing regime. As the case of Syria, such policy can shake a standing regime completely. So it worth much more now for Washington, and especially to Obama to corner Iran. Make it feel under siege, and keep it in bay for now. Obama can then impose himself fulfilling his promises to a level bringing American troops back from Iraq, and not going into a complicated conflict. The new administration can carry on that policy, pushing for more sanctions, which might prove themselves useful to cripple the Iranian economy to a level, and limit its defense capability. Try to win support within GCC members, and make them vow for a war, but for that it is wiser to wait for the outcome in the "Arab Spring" hit countries. Better to build up the intelligence services within Iran, so the next elections can be put for good use in 2013. If Iran commits a foolish mistake in the meantime, still good for Washington. Maybe at the meantime Iran can be provoked into war, with a foolish act. For such a thing the recent issue of the American UAV taken down in Iran can be very useful. Then the international, and inter-Arab favour will be against Iran. The GCC would line up in fear of the war spreading to them, Turkey would oppose nothing, Russian or China

would lose argument for defense, and than Israel can hit with ease, as no one would question such a move.

### *Conclusion*

So to sum it up, the picture can look grim, and the possibility of war close, the time is just not right. America cannot afford to step now. I do think that Iran knows that, and whatever Ahmadinežād says, like sending Iranian warships into the vicinity the American shores<sup>49</sup>, Hamene'ī would not let anything foolish to happen. Right now the Arab world is to much in turmoil for a coalition taken for granted.

So what is all the rhetorics, and bombings about? As I see, it is the great interest to provoke Iran to say, and especially to do something foolish. To provoke it to a strike, or to a step that would force Western states to step up. If one believes that the Mossad is really behind the recent bombings and assassinations in Iran, than it fits. If that can be achieved, the internal political problems of Netanyahu can be put to the side, and he can prove his leadership strong as he promised in the elections. But making the first direct hit is more than risky now.

I doubt the possibility of a war in the very close future now, however three things cannot be lost sight, and not mentioned in a sum up like this. First of all, we don't see everything, the real scale of preparations if there are. The leaders in Tel-Aviv, Washington and most importantly in Tehran know what Iran is capable of, but we don't. Second, that foreign policy is not just logics. All make careful judgment, measure the pros and contras, but even if those argue against the action, that doesn't mean, that Israel, the US or even Iran would not take chance.

The third most important one is however, that America is undoubtedly losing control in the world. Quits Iraq now, it's economy is failing back, as Russia, but much more China is coming up. The GCC's greatest economical partner is China even now. China makes great inroads to Africa. The "Arab Spring" can however create such a shockwave that brings down regimes enemies of the US, and secure its position in the region. If the wave can be brought further, that can bring down Iran, securing America's biggest ally, Israel in the region. The biggest race of all however, if the sentiment, of popular revolutions asking for human rights, and freedom – at least seemingly – can be delivered all the way to Moscow and Beijing than these future opponents can be crippled if not toppled prolonging the US's global influence.

*So Iran, just like Libya was and Syria is, a ring in the chain, but there is much at stake overall, in the long run.*

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<sup>49</sup> <http://www.ibtimes.com/articles/221457/20110928/iran-navy-ships.htm>

## CLEVER OR PARANOID? - THE DRIVERS OF ERITREAN FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS SOMALIA

During the last couple of years, Eritrea has shown an active foreign policy attitude towards Somalia. This mostly took shape in financial and material support for various militant groups and warlords inside Somalia. The overriding aim of Asmara has been to strengthen anti-Ethiopian Somali movements in order to weaken its archenemy, Ethiopia. In this paper, we try to assess the Eritrean foreign policy towards Somalia and to present its reasons and goals. In order to understand that, however, we first have to take a look at the drivers of Eritrean foreign policy *in general*. This is what we do in the first part of the paper. The second part then goes on to examine the Eritrean engagement in Somali affairs.

### *1) The drivers of Eritrean foreign policy*

Eritrea's engagement in Somalia (in fact, its whole foreign policy) can not be understood without its history. In her masterful book about Eritrea, the English journalist Michela Wrong describes a short conversation she had with an Eritrean scholar: "My country has a lot of history," an Eritrean academic once told me. "In fact," he added, with lugubrious humour, "that's all it has."<sup>50</sup> History shapes and defines the country like few places on earth.

The "official" history of the current Eritrean regime has it, that the country was dominated throughout its history by foreign powers. To take a quick look of the history of the country, it is useful to divide the territory of what is present-day Eritrea. The arid coastal part of the country (the ports Massawa and Assab included) was conquered in 1557 by the Ottoman Empire under Suleiman I (1520-1566). The Ottoman state maintained control over much of the northern coastal areas for nearly three hundred years, leaving their possessions to their Egyptian heirs in 1865 before being given to the Italians in 1885.

The highlands of Eritrea, around the capital Asmara, preserved their Orthodox Christian heritage, but were not ruled by Ethiopia. Rather, the area of the highlands was controlled between the 13<sup>th</sup> and 17<sup>th</sup> centuries by a vassal of the Ethiopian emperor. The vassal did pay tribute to the Emperor, but "there was no sense of the peoples of Eritrea being a constituent part of a territorial state

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<sup>50</sup> Wrong, Michela: *I didn't do it for you*, 2005, London: Harper Perennial: xii.

with clear boundaries.”<sup>51</sup> This tenuous link was anyway destroyed in the 17<sup>th</sup> century, when infighting robbed the Ethiopian king of much of his power. It would therefore be both wrong to argue, that (1) Eritrea was always an integral part of Ethiopia (as the Ethiopians justified their annexation of and control over Eritrea), and (2) present-day Eritrea was constantly suppressed throughout its history (as the official Eritrean history has it).

Present-day Eritrea was united in a single administrative unit for the first time by the Italians in 1890, when the Italian king Umberto declared the establishment of the colony of Eritrea, with the capital of Massawa. In the Second World War, British forces defeated the Italians, and Eritrea was put under British administration from 1941 until 1952. In the absence of an Allied agreement as to what should happen to the former colony, in February 1950 a United Nations (UN) commission was dispatched to Eritrea to determine the fate of the territory. Under heavy American pressure, the commission proposed the establishment of some form of association with Ethiopia, and the UN General Assembly adopted that proposal along with a provision terminating British administration of Eritrea no later than September 15, 1952. In 1952 the United Nations resolution to federate Eritrea with Ethiopia went into effect.

Although Ethiopia guaranteed the Eritreans democratic rights and a degree of autonomy, these rights quickly began to be abridged or violated. The Ethiopian Emperor Haile Selassie pressured Eritrea’s elected chief executive to resign, made Amharic the official language in place of Arabic and Tigrinya, terminated the use of the Eritrean flag, imposed censorship, and moved many businesses out of Eritrea. Finally, in 1962 Haile Selassie pressured the Eritrean Assembly to abolish the federation and join Ethiopia. Eritrea soon became a part of Ethiopia.

Shortly before the incorporation of Eritrea into Ethiopia, however, militant opposition to the Ethiopian rule had begun. Fighting a guerilla war for 30 years, first against the Ethiopia of Emperor Haile Selassie, then against the *Derg*-regime led by Haile Mengistu Mariam,<sup>52</sup> the Eritrean guerillas received only limited outside help. The fight was first led by the Eritrean Liberation Front (ELF), and then, from the mid-1970s, by the Eritrean People’s Liberation Front (EPLF), under the leadership of Isaias Afewerki, the current president of Eritrea. At the same time, Ethiopian rebels under the name of the Tigrayan People's Liberation Front (TPLF) were also fighting against Mengistu. They were led by current Ethiopian Prime Minister Meles Zenawi. The EPLF and TPLF cooperated often during the course of the civil war, and, in 1991, finally succeeded to oust President Mengistu. In accordance with Ethiopia, Eritreans voted about their independence between 23 and 25 April 1993 in an UN-monitored referen-

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<sup>51</sup> Wrong 2005: 114.

<sup>52</sup> For a first-hand account of this struggle, see: Connell, Dan: Against all odds. A Chronicle of the Eritrean Revolution, 1997, Lawrenceville – Asmara: The Red Sea Press

dum. The result of the referendum was 99.83 % for Eritrea's independence. After centuries of foreign – Ottoman, Egyptian, Ethiopian, Italian, British – domination and/or control, Eritrea and the Eritreans became finally independent.

Their history left the Eritreans with a deep sense of distrust for foreigners. According to their historiography, Eritrea was constantly controlled, determined and influenced by outsiders, who had little or no interest in the wishes of the Eritrean people. According to the foundation myth of the current PFDJ-regime (the former EPLF), in order to become independent, Eritreans could only rely on themselves. The regime “understood their success in the independence struggle not as a constellation of events or a historical moment and opportunity but as a single-handed military victory achieved ‘against all odds’. This allowed it to ignore the host of regional and external enabling factors that had contributed to Eritrea’s success.”<sup>53</sup> This foundation myth constantly omitted the fact, that external factors (the alliance with the EPRDF, the collapse of Soviet support for Ethiopia, military and diplomatic support from Arab states) were crucial for the success of the EPLF. Instead, the regime credited only its indeed heroic and well-organized fight for toppling Mengistu.

Taken together, this perception led to one of the most important internal drivers of Eritrean foreign policy: *enormous confidence and a sense of invincibility*.<sup>54</sup> Needless to say, this greatly distorted the calculations of political risk. This was most evident in 1998, when Eritrea captured the disputed border town of Badme, which led to a two year, devastating war with Ethiopia, a country with incomparably bigger military capabilities. After the defeat, arguably, this sense of invincibility became weaker (although it did not disappear completely), but another, equally important driver of Eritrean foreign policy came to the fore: the *sense of us against the world*, or, in other words, a culture of everybody-hates-us.<sup>55</sup>

This was already evident before the war with Ethiopia. As we have seen, the regime portrayed its struggle for independence as a single-handed affair, in which Eritreans could only rely on themselves. After the independence, President Isaias Afewerki dismissed the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) as an “utter failure” in his first address to the organization, because the OAU insisted on the principle of territorial integrity, and therefore regarded the Eritrean rebels with suspicion.<sup>56</sup> This prickly speech did not endear Eritrea and set the tone for its relations with other African states, which were, and are, mostly difficult. Although Eritrea initially managed to build good relations with

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<sup>53</sup> Healy, Sally: Hard and soft power: some thoughts on the practice of Eritrean foreign policy, In: Reid, Richard (Ed.): Eritrea’s External Relations, 2009, London: Chatham House: 152.

<sup>54</sup> Healy 2009: 152.

<sup>55</sup> Reid, Richard: Eritrea’s role and foreign policy: past and present perspectives, In: Reid, Richard (Ed.): Eritrea’s External Relations, 2009, London: Chatham House: 22.

<sup>56</sup> Clapham, Christopher: The Foreign Policies of Ethiopia and Eritrea, In: Wright, Stephen (Ed.): African Foreign Policies, 1999, Colorado: Westview Press: 94.

the USA and Israel, this quickly waned after the war with Ethiopia, Washington's key ally.<sup>57</sup> A short border conflict with Yemen over the Hanish archipelago in the Red Sea in 1995 and its meddling in Somalia and Sudan sealed the isolation of the country. After 2000, the "us-against-the-world" narrative became a self-fulfilling prophecy.

Stemming from the aforementioned internal drivers of Eritrean foreign policy is another important factor. If Eritrea could win its liberation solely through its own efforts, and continues to survive without good relations with other countries, why would it need a network of friends?<sup>58</sup> This *who-needs-friends theory* is underlined by the fact, that Eritrea does not really know how to make friends."...in further marked contrast to others involved in anti-colonial struggles, Eritrea's leaders had little or no exposure to international institutions and no experience of achieving any results through solidarity or diplomacy."<sup>59</sup> This confidence combined with self-arrogance was well illustrated in Afewerki's lecturing speech to the OAU in 1993. Compared to its neighbor Ethiopia, which always excelled in skillful diplomacy, Eritrea's diplomacy is amateurish. Driven by the obsession of self-reliance and a sense of mission, Eritrea greatly neglected conventional diplomacy. "Contempt for [international] institutions, or for dealing with foreigners in general, has the effect of eroding rather than enhancing Eritrea's statehood."<sup>60</sup>

Moreover, in the perception of the current regime, the international community has constantly let Eritrea down and preferred its archenemy Ethiopia. This sense of injustice is felt especially strongly in the way the international community deals with the still festering border conflict. After the 1998-2000 war, both governments pledged to accept the findings of the Boundary and Claims Commissions as binding. In the event, only Eritrea did so. When Ethiopia lost Badme in the ruling, it equivocated, and then demanded renegotiation. Asmara refused - and, from a legal standpoint, they were right.<sup>61</sup> Ever since, Eritrea is deeply - and somehow understandably - hurt by the fact, that the international community does not put pressure on Ethiopia to adhere by the ruling. In this sense, the Security Council Resolution 1907 was just yet another unjust ruling singling out Eritrea, writes Nicole Hirt: "Die eritreische Regierung interpretiert die Sanktionen als ein neues Glied in einer Kette historischer Ungerechtigkeiten der internationalen Gemeinschaft zugunsten

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<sup>57</sup> About the relations between Eritrea and African states and the West, see: International Crisis Group: Eritrea: The Siege State, 21 September 2010, Nairobi – Brussels: International Crisis Group: 23-25.

<sup>58</sup> Reid 2009: 18.

<sup>59</sup> Healy 2009: 153.

<sup>60</sup> Healy 2009: 154.

<sup>61</sup> Healy, Sally – Plaut, Martin: Ethiopia and Eritrea: Allergic to persuasion, January 2007, London: Chatham House

Äthiopiens und zu lasten Eritreas.”<sup>62</sup> In short, in the view of the current regime, there is an international conspiracy going on to weaken Eritrea. To some extent, this is understandable: Eritrea usually gets all the bad press “in a region where no state’s external dealings are beyond reproach.”<sup>63</sup>

Yet another important driver is the fact, that the current PFDJ regime evolved from a military organization, and only knows military solutions. In a region, where the use of hard power is the norm, Eritrea only seems to know military answers to whatever foreign policy problem. The war with Yemen in 1995, the war with Ethiopia in 1998-2000, the border conflict with Djibouti in 2008-2010, its meddling in Darfur and East Sudan, in Somalia, and even in the Democratic Republic of the Congo all point to one direction: “readiness to respond disproportionately to perceived threats and a willingness to abandon diplomacy for military adventurism.”<sup>64</sup>

It would be, however, wrong to think, that Eritrea’s foreign policy consists of conspiracy theories, aggressive sulkiness and isolation. There is a method in the apparent madness, because, as Dan Connell writes, Eritrea has clear goals and a clear, if questionable strategy to achieve them: “Eritrea’s regional strategy is driven by two overlapping concerns. First, there is the long-range view that as a small, vulnerable state with extremely limited resources but a vision of itself as a major player in the region, Eritrea needs to keep its larger neighbours either in its thrall or internally divided in order to compromise their ability to govern and therefore to project power in the Horn. The most effective vehicle for this is insurgent forces that challenge them from within, support for whom will yield leverage over those regimes and over other powers with interests in the region. Secondly, the short- and medium-term view is that the best defence of Eritrea’s own borders against hostile acts by neighbouring states or by opposition groups based in them is the creation and support of effective insurgent forces that will, as a quid pro quo, assist Eritrea in patrolling its borders as well as levers.”<sup>65</sup>

Eritrea’s behavior is, therefore, absolutely rational. To achieve its goals, the country has to weaken the neighboring countries and support insurgents there. The ultimate goal of Asmara is clear: it wants *to be indispensable in the region*, a country, without which it is impossible to make peace in the Horn. Eritrea’s grand strategy is therefore “to be a player in regional politics that local and global powers ignore at their peril.”<sup>66</sup>

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<sup>62</sup> Hirt, Nicole: Sanktionen gegen Eritrea: Anstoß für Reformen oder “Akt der Verschwörung?”, 2010, GIGA Focus: 6.

<sup>63</sup> ICG 2010: 20.

<sup>64</sup> ICG 2010: 20.

<sup>65</sup> Connell, Dan: Eritrea and the United States: towards a new US policy, In: Reid, Ricgard (Ed.): Eritrea’s External Relations, 2009, London: Chatham House: 37.

<sup>66</sup> Connell 2009: 43.



Another important factor is that the regime is obviously interested in keeping the external threat (especially from Ethiopia) alive. As one of the world's most oppressive state, the ruling regime around President Afewerki instrumentalized the Ethiopian threat to its own advantage. The continuing hostilities clearly benefit the regime, as it provides a rationale for indefinitely suspending the move towards democratization. It is also used to justify the silencing of dissenting views.<sup>67</sup> Moreover, the Ethiopian threat also makes it necessary to maintain a huge army, and it might be argued that the conscription and subsequent training of young males keeps the youth busy and prevents them from challenging the regime.

## ***2) Eritrea's foreign policy towards Somalia***

Let us now turn to Eritrea's foreign policy towards Somalia. The most important goal of the Eritrean engagement in Somalia is to weaken Ethiopia. As long as the country had peaceful relations with Ethiopia, i.e. up until 1998, it did not support any faction in Somalia (more precisely, there is no information suggesting otherwise), although the civil war there was already going on for years. First information about Eritrean arms shipment coincides almost precisely with the outbreak of the war against Ethiopia.<sup>68</sup>

This suggests that Somalia became interesting for Eritrea only after the breaking down of its relations with Ethiopia. From 1999 to 2009, we see a steady pattern of Eritrean arms shipments to Somali factions opposed to Ethiopia.<sup>69</sup> According to Kidane Mengisteab, the long-term interest of Eritrea is similar to Somalia's: "to hinder Ethiopia's hegemonic aspirations in the region. Eritrea's support of the UIC [the Islamic Courts Union], is often viewed as a proxy war intended to bleed Ethiopia. But it is not merely a proxy war. It can be viewed as strategic cooperation with Somali opponents of Ethiopian hegemony in that both countries are seeking to check Ethiopia's apparently expansionist tendencies."<sup>70</sup> To this end, the regime in Asmara has provided weapons and ammunition to anti-Ethiopian groups (be they the ICI, al-Shabaab, Hizbul Islam or other groups). Moreover, as we have seen, Eritrea organized a training camp for the rebels, and hosted and helped to organize the anti-Ethiopian Alliance for the Liberation of Somalia (ARS). On the diplomatic front, it never recognized the TFG 1,0 and 2.0, and regarded Somalia as a state being without government.

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<sup>67</sup> Connell 2009: 35.

<sup>68</sup> United Nations: Report of the team of experts submitted in accordance with resolution 1407 (2002), 3 July 2002: 20-21.

<sup>69</sup> See for example: Besenyő, János - Kis-Álmos, Péter -Resperger, István: Országismertető-Szomália, 2010, Sereg Szemle kiadvány, az MH Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság tudományos kiadványa, Székesfehérvár: 52.

<sup>70</sup> Mengisteab, Kidane: What has gone wrong with Eritrea's foreign relations?, In: Reid, Richard (Ed.): Eritrea's External Relations, 2009, London: Chatham House: 65.

Apart from its goal to weaken Ethiopia, Eritrea has another goal in Somalia: to make itself indispensable for any future, possible “solution” of the Somali conflict. Without Eritrea on board, the regime hopes, it should be impossible to negotiate effectively about Somalia. The support for al-Shabaab is, in this sense, a bargaining chip, and presumably, Eritrea would only cease its support for al-Shabaab if it gets something else in return. As we have already mentioned, Eritrea wants to be a player in regional politics which can not be ignored. With the support for the Islamists, this goal is clearly achieved.

Yet another important factor in the Eritrean engagement in Somalia is the fact, that Eritrea is basically unaffected by the negative effects of the conflict. It has no border with Somalia, therefore, it has no Somali refugees to host and support. Its rudimentary economy is mostly unaffected by the conflict in Somalia, as it had no significant economic relations with, or interests in, Somalia. Although it primarily supported its rival, Hizbul Islam, it is highly unlikely, that al-Shabaab would stage a terrorist attack in Eritrea, especially since Eritrea supplied arms and ammunition to al-Shabaab as well. There is, as of yet, no sign, that Somali Islamist movements would inspire similar movements in Eritrea. This is, of course, not to say, that this can be ruled out. About half of Eritrea’s population is Sunni Muslim, and in the past, there has been radical Islamist groups trying to topple the regime.

More recently, the RSADO (Red Sea Afar Democratic Organization) rebels have shown activity. In late 2009 and early 2010 the group has carried out several attacks against Eritrean government soldiers and installations,<sup>71</sup> but there is no sign that the group would fight for Islamist reasons. In fact, it seems that the reason for their activity is the government's 'suppression' of the Afar minority.<sup>72</sup> In short, it is unlikely that Eritrea, as a sponsor of Islamist, would be engulfed by terrorist/Islamist activity emanating from Somalia.

All this points to the fact that Eritrea is, for one reason or another, mostly sheltered by negative effects emanating from Somalia: no refugees, negligible economic costs and a low probability of terrorism spilling over. The costs for supporting al-Shabaab are, therefore, not too big: the money needed to finance the weapons, ammunition and their transport to Somalia is the only immediate tangible cost. Eritrea is, therefore in a very advantageous position: it can support any Somali faction with relatively few costs and huge benefits.

This is, however, not to say, that there are no costs for Eritrea whatsoever. For supporting al-Shabaab, Asmara had to pay with growing isolation. By 2009, the country was an international *pariah* state, having bad relations with basically all its neighbors, the USA and the EU and withdrawing from the AU as well as the IGAD. Its isolation was underlined by the Security Council Resolution 1907

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<sup>71</sup> See for example: AFP: „Eritrea rebels say killed 17 government troops”, 16 February 2010

<sup>72</sup> Press TV: „Rebels kill ‘25 Eritrean soldiers’”, 3 January 2010

in December 2009, which punished the country for supporting al-Shabaab and its border conflict with Djibouti.

Lately, however, there seems to be a slight recalibration of Eritrean foreign policy going on. Recently Eritrea has taken a slightly more constructive approach since 2009. The reasons for this are not clear. One reason, according to several interviewed diplomats and analysts, might be that the isolation is apparently taking a toll on the country.<sup>73</sup> With almost no friends left and increasingly pressurized by the international community (exemplified by the Resolution 1907), the Afewerki regime might have concluded, that it is no longer beneficial to be isolated in such a way, and that it might gain more if it behaved more positive.

Another school of thought, also heard often in interviews, traces the apparent opening to the situation of the Eritrean economy, which is, in short, catastrophic. Precise data is hard to come by, but available information paints a very bleak picture. Between 1998-2008 GDP grew on an annual average by 0.4 per cent from 1998-2008, and per capita GDP declined by 3.3 per cent during the same period. According to more recent data from the Germany Trade and Investment, the Eritrean economy is currently still in a very difficult situation:

<b>Indikatoren</b>	<b>2008</b>	<b>2009</b>	<b>2010</b>
BIP-Wachstum (%)	2,0	3,5	6,0
Budgetsaldo (% von BIP)	-25,0	-14,5	-13,7
Leistungsbilanz ((% von BIP)	-10,9	-10,3	-9,8
Inflationsrate	19,9	20,0	18,0 <sup>74</sup>

**Table 5: Selected indicators of the Eritrean economy 2008-2010**  
(Source: GTAI 2010: 2)

Bad relations with neighboring states, almost no foreign investments, red tape, massive militarization, weak infrastructure, low levels of industrialization, recurring droughts and few natural resources (apart from gold) all contribute to this situation. Some analysts went so far as to say, that the private sector has collapsed and that there are no jobs and no spare land at all.<sup>75</sup> Homegrown industry is unable to produce even basic products like Coca-Cola or tomato puree.<sup>76</sup> Black market rates seem to be about 50 %.<sup>77</sup> Large parts of the

<sup>73</sup> Personal interviews and email communications, Nairobi, Kampala and London November-December 2010.

<sup>74</sup> Germany Trade and Invest: Wirtschaftstrends kompakt - Eritrea Jahresmitte 2010, July 2010, Köln: Germany Trade and Invest: 2.

<sup>75</sup> Chatham House: Eritrea's Economic Survival, Summary record of a conference held on 20 April 2007, London: Chatham House: 8.

<sup>76</sup> Hirt 2010: 4.

<sup>77</sup> Chatham House 2007: 10.

population live, by all accounts, in dire poverty: “Nach UN-Schätzung lebt etwa 1 Mio. Menschen und damit ein Fünftel der Einwohner unterhalb der Armutsgrenze.”<sup>78</sup>

It might be argued, that, for the Eritrean economy to recover fully, it would be of paramount importance to reestablish good relations with Ethiopia. It is hard to overstate the importance of Ethiopia for the Eritrean economy: before the war, “Ethiopia constituted about two thirds of Eritrea’s export market; the closure of that market has been devastating, and factories and labour have been idle as a result.”<sup>79</sup>

Yet another theory holds that Eritrea ceased to support al-Shabaab and opened up because Ethiopia was no longer in Somalia, and that therefore the importance and usefulness of al-Shabaab diminished in the eyes of Asmara.<sup>80</sup> As Ethiopia was officially not in Somalia anymore, it could not be harmed by supporting al-Shabaab. This theory is supported by the fact, that we have no information about Eritrean arms shipment at all since May 2009. Since Ethiopian troops left Somalia in January 2009, there was apparently only one arms shipment from Eritrea, in May 2009.<sup>81</sup>

Linked to this theory is another opinion voiced by analysts: that Eritrea also ceased to support al-Shabaab, because the Ethiopian rebel groups OLF and ONLF fighting against the government in Addis Ababa, who used to cooperate with the Islamists, greatly reduced their activity in Somalia. (There is currently no sign of cooperation between Eritrea and either OLF or ONLF). Consequently, the usefulness of al-Shabaab as a *liaison* to them diminished. Yet another experts say that with the demise of Hizbul Islam, Asmara’s closest ally in Somalia, there was nobody left to support, because Eritrea never really trusted al-Shabaab.<sup>82</sup>

As all these competing theories show us, it is extremely hard to fathom the foreign policy of the Afewerki regime. With a highly regulated press and strict limitations on travelling, it is extremely hard to gather information about the country. It is perhaps Eritrea which is the most opaque country in the region, so this section trying to explain its foreign policy vis-à-vis Somalia is inherently prone to errors and misinterpretations. Still, we believe that the basic assumptions underlying our analysis are, by and large, correct. Only the future knows which direction the Eritrean foreign policy takes from here.

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<sup>78</sup> GTAI 2010: 4.

<sup>79</sup> International Crisis Group 2010: 14.

<sup>80</sup> Personal interview, Nairobi, October 2010

<sup>81</sup> Garowe Online: „Eritrea govt rejects allegations of importing weapons to Somalia”, 4 May 2009

<sup>82</sup> Personal interview, Nairobi, October 2010.

## ***CONSULTATION***

**Dr. Major János BESENYŐ PhD**

### **PEACEKEEPING MISSION IN MAGHREB\* : THE MINURSO**

In 1975 Morocco invaded Western Sahara, and after a long war between Morocco, Mauritania and the inhabitants (sahrawis), in 1985 the Secretary General of the UN and the Organisation of African Unity decided to set up a mission aimed at the final settlement of the disputed territory. Both the Kingdom of Morocco and the Polisario agreed on the purpose of the mission but the agreement was achieved as late as 30th August 1988.<sup>1</sup> In 1990 the Secretary General of the UN submitted a report (S/21360) to the Security Council, which comprised a finalised plan offering a peaceful resolution for the armed conflict having been escalated for numerous years. The draft was approved by the Security Council on 29th

April 1991 as ‘Resolution 690’ and thus a UN mission (United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara) tasked with resolving the future of and the rule over a territory was established.<sup>2</sup> This plan provided a transition period during which the Special Representative of the Secretary General, SRSG, had the responsibilities to prepare and implement all decisions and resolutions linked with a prospective referendum on the future of the area. The question was how the local inhabitants decide - would they wish to support the idea of an independent state or would prefer to live in an area integrated into Morocco. The SRSG was also tasked with directing civil employees, military personnel and police officers of the mission, and with the establishment and operation of the office of The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR).

Originally, the MINURSO was planned to have 800–1,000 civil employees, 1,700 military observers and a 300-strong police unit.<sup>3</sup> *The mission was tasked with the following:*

- Controlling the ceasefire and verifying the decrease of strength of Moroccan troops in Western Sahara;
- Observing Moroccan and Polisario forces in certain regions with special regard to troops concentrations or other military build-up;

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\* In this article I am writing about the UN peacekeeping mission in Western Sahara, where I served 12 months, between 2003 and 2004

<sup>1</sup> Dunbar: Saharan Stasis: Status and Future Prospects of the Western Sahara Conflict. p. 527.

<sup>2</sup> Norrie Macqueen: United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960. p. 242.

<sup>3</sup> Jocelyn Coulon–Phyllis Aronoff–Howard Scott: Soldiers of Diplomacy: The United Nations, Peacekeeping, and the New World Order. p. 61.

- Taking measures for releasing political prisoners from Moroccan prisons;
- Supervising the exchange of prisoners of war (POW);
- Accomplishment of repatriation encouraged by the UN. In the framework of the action refugees would be freely returning to their previous homes;
- Identifying and registering those entitled to participate in the referendum to be held on the future of the area;
- Organising and ensuring free and fair elections then declaring its official outcome.<sup>4</sup>

On 24th May 1991 an official proposal was submitted by the UN Secretary General regarding the starting day of the ceasefire between the warring parties (6th September). All involved parties agreed upon the date nevertheless it seemed that no ceasefire agreement could be achieved due to the conflict situations. In the region of Bir-Lahlou and Tifariti a general anti-Polisario offensive was launched by the Moroccan High Command in the month before the ceasefire was due. After initial success Moroccan troops withdrew behind the Berm.<sup>5</sup> The map below shows the post-offensive situation and the military districts and sectors established by the opposing parties:



Source: <http://www.esisc.org/documents/pdf/en/the-polisario-front.pdf>

<sup>4</sup> Yearbook of the United Nations 1991. pp. 793-796.

<sup>5</sup> Raymond W. Copson: Africa's Wars and Prospects for Peace. p. 63. and Jarat Chopra: Peacemaintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority. p. 165.

The diplomatic efforts of the UN proved successful and the official ceasefire between Morocco and the Polisario was declared. After the agreement 100 military observers were deployed to the region in order to control the compliance with ceasefire and soon this number increased to 228 and some administrative and logistic elements.<sup>6</sup>

That time the MINURSO was tasked with observing the ceasefire agreement and prevention of potential clashes. The mission HQ was set up in the town of Laayoun and two sector commands were established in the controlled Sahara areas with their HQs in Dakhla (Sector South) and Smara (Sector North). Moreover, a Liaison Office was also established in Tinduf,

Algeria, in order to ease the co-operation with Algerian authorities and the Polisario.<sup>7</sup> The next step was taken in 1993 in the form of the establishment of an office for processing the data of people entitled to participate in the referendum and responsible for preparing the balloting lists. The preparation phase was accomplished in August 1994, which was followed by the collection and processing of the data of potential voters.<sup>8</sup> This activity was significantly impeded by the fact that the opposing parties often complicated the work of the office workers and challenged the voters delegated by the other side.<sup>9</sup>

Organisation work was in progress not only in Morocco but also in Mauritania, and on 23. October 1995 UNSG Representative Erik Jensen met with Mauritanian President Maaouya Ould Sidi Ahmed Taya. The purpose of the meeting was to set up an office in Mauritania, too, for the registration of Saharawian descendants dwelling in the country. As a result of the negotiations, the UN was allowed to open its office in the town of Nouadhibou, and the collection of data of potential voters' belonging to ethnic Saharawians could be started. However, due to the multitude of problems the registration of potential voters was halted by the UNSG in May 1996. Then, the number of office workers and police officers was reduced by 20% (28th May 1996).<sup>10</sup>

The work in the office was re-started as late as December 1997 and was finally accomplished on 3. September 1998. Then, mainly military aspects of the mission got in the focus, such as enforcement of the ceasefire, patrolling, inspection of military units, and demonstrating the presence of the UN. In accordance with the latest resolution on 31st October 2003 the entire

Office and Police Section was "temporarily" disbanded and the material they collected and processed was transferred to the UN HQ in Geneva.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> Yearbook of the United Nations 1991. p. 796.

<sup>7</sup> Besenyő János: Magyar Logisztikusként az ENSZ nyugat-szaharai missziójában. p. 210.

<sup>8</sup> Dunbar: Saharan Stasis: Status and Future Prospects of the Western Sahara Conflict. p. 529.

<sup>9</sup> Jarat Chopra: Breaking the Stalemate in Western Sahara. pp. 307-311.

<sup>10</sup> Dunbar: Saharan Stasis: Status and Future Prospects of the Western Sahara Conflict. p. 530.


<sup>11</sup> Besenyő János: Magyar Logisztikusként az ENSZ nyugat-szaharai missziójában. p. 211.

## *The structure of MINURSO*

MINURSO is subordinated to the United Nations Secretary General but the leadership rights are exercised by the Special Representative of the Secretary General (SRSG), who is the Head of Mission at the same time. Today, the Special Representative is Mr. Hany Abdel-Aziz from Egypt.<sup>12</sup> The military commander of the mission is the Force Commander (FC), who is invited by the UN Secretary General and consented by the Security Council. The military counsellor supervises his job in the UN Headquarters, New York, and informs the Special Representative of the Secretary General at the same time.

The MINURSO HQ is located in Laayoune, in the centre of the territories occupied by Morocco. 231 military personnel serve in the mission, including the commanding General (currently, Major General Abdul Hafiz from Bangladesh).<sup>13</sup> There are 203 military observers, while 27 personnel serve in jobs connected to leadership, service and the security the mission (there is a medical group from Bangladesh and an administrative group of 7 Ghanian non-commissioned officers) and other 6 police officers.<sup>14</sup> The following states have delegated military observers to the mission: Argentina, Austria, Bangladesh, the Republic of Guinea, South Korea, Egypt, Salvador, France, Ghana, Greece, Honduras, Croatia, Ireland, Kenya, China, Poland, Hungary, Malaysia, Mongolia, Nigeria, Italy, Russian Federation, Pakistan, Sri Lanka and Uruguay.

Apart from them, 99 personnel from various countries all over the world and 162 local employees and 18 United Nations Volunteers contribute to the work of the mission.<sup>15</sup> The Department of Identification of the mission are closed down temporarily. The Civilian Police office was closed as well, but later it was opened and nowadays 6 police officers are working in the mission. The organisation chart of the mission:



Source: MINURSO

<sup>12</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/leadership.shtml> (downloaded: 23.11.2011)

<sup>13</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/leadership.shtml> (downloaded: 23.11.2011)

<sup>14</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/facts.shtml> (downloaded: 23.11.2011)

<sup>15</sup> <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minurso/facts.shtml> (downloaded: 23.11.2011)



The operating area of MINURSO earlier had been divided into two sectors: the centre of the Northern sector was located in Smara city while the centre of the Southern sector was in Dakhla on the shore of the Atlantic Ocean. Later the missions leaders terminate the sectors system and every peacekeeper under the direction of Layoune Headquarter. *The mission area:*



Source: MINURSO

Team sites were established at the appropriate places of the sectors, where they were able to control a certain area due to their location. The officers selected for the military observer position and trained either by the UN or the delegating states serve in these team sites. MINURSO has an unwritten law, which states that two military observers from the same nation should not serve in one team site, if possible, unless in special situations. Naturally, this can only be applied effectively to soldiers from countries with small contingents. The same principle is to be applied to soldiers serving in the headquarters.

In general, the staff serving at the headquarter are divided according to the current NATO organisational structure. The tasks of the Staff Officers is regulated by the **Standard Operating Procedure for Peacekeeping Operations** (SOP).

- The main duties and obligations of the Staff Officers serving at the headquarters include:
- To prepare suggestions in professional matters for the Commander and the Chief of Staff (COS).
- To co-operate with civilian organisations, to co-ordinate and manage their professional work.
- To co-operate with other military departments (G1-Personnel, G3-Operations, G4-Logistics service, etc).
- To prepare and check personnel serving in team sites and are subordinated to them professionally.
- To prepare different documents for MINURSO and New York HQ.
- To provide up-to-date information on professional matters to the Chief of Staff (COS).

***The personnel serving in the Staff Command:***

**Chief of Staff (COS)**

Based on the agreement between the Malaysian government and the UN, the position (Colonel) can be filled by Malaysia. In case of the absence of the military commander, he controls the work of the military observers, monitors everyday affairs, organises and supervises the professional and military work done at the HQ.

**Senior Liaison Officer (SLO)**

Based on the agreement between the Russian government and the UN, the national position (Colonel) can be filled by the Russian Federation. His tasks include the management of the military liaison office in Tinduf, controlling the work of the military observers serving here, maintaining contact with the Polisario leaders and the Algerian government.

**Chief Operations Officer (COPO)**

Based on the agreement signed by the government of Ghana and the UN, the national position (Lieutenant Colonel) can be filled by Ghana. From the beginning of the mission until January 2003, the United States of America appointed the officer for the position and only after they had left the mission the position was transferred to Ghana.

His primary tasks include the control of the operational level of the mission, the organisation and supervision of the military and patrolling tasks. As

the advisor of the Chief of Staff is responsible for working out and applying different operational and service instructions of operational matters, and also for preparing and classifying mission reports (OPORDS, etc) and informing the control centre in New York. He is responsible for organising and holding training courses and meetings organised at the headquarters, preparing and controlling the services. He deals with the security matters of the headquarters, by involving the civilian security service (Service) and the Moroccan security and law enforcement agencies.

### **Chief Military Personnel Officer (CMPO)**

The position can be applied for by officers of any nation, and generally officers from African countries are selected. His primary tasks include the organisation and control of personnel tasks (arranging leaves, reports, personal descriptions, preparing identification cards, orders, etc). He evaluates the reports of the military observers and prepares them for review by the commander. He represents the commander in disciplinary and other matters (accident, death, etc) concerning the military observers and organises and supervises the work of the Investigation Commission. He acts as the advisor in personal matters and prepares the roster for both duty officers and patrols at the headquarters. He maintains contact with the Chief Medical officer, coordinates the round-trips of the military observers arriving for medical check-ups or treatment between the camps and the headquarters.

### **Chief Logistics Officer (CLO)**

The position can be applied for by senior officers of any nation. His tasks are to provide full logistic service (food, petrol oil and lubricant, drinking water, furniture, other equipment, etc.) to the mission and supply the military observations posts. He carries out his tasks in co-operation with the General Service Section-Integrated Support Services. He is responsible for the preparation and application of the logistics regulations and orders. He is to visit the team sites regularly in order to personally check the sectors and the logistic services there.

### **Senior Co-ordination Officer (SCO)**

Based on the implicit agreement within the mission, the position can be filled by South American (Salvador, Honduras, Chile, Uruguay) senior officers on a rotational basis. His main task is to supply goods to the staff canteen, organising and co-ordinating freetime activities. He is responsible for providing accommodation to military observers going on leave, or arriving to the headquarters for duty and to organise and co-ordinate various military holidays (national days, official events). Military protocol and maintaining contact with the representatives of electronic and printed media are also his responsibilities.

### **Force Training Officer (FTO)**

Senior officers of any nationality can apply for the position. All training matters belong to him (professional courses, organising Arabic, French and Spanish language courses, publishing journals and regulations). He prepares weekly and monthly reports, updates the military training programmes of the mission and checks the execution of the trainings (UNMO Mission Training Programme – MTP). He checks the training, the expertise of the personnel serving in the sectors and organises lectures and training courses for them if necessary. Besides his training tasks, he also fulfills the positions of the Sports Officer of the mission.

### **Force Medical Officer (FMO)**

Based on the agreement between the Bangladeshi government and the UN, Bangladesh can fill the national position (Lieutenant Colonel). His task is to co-ordinate the job of the Bangladeshi medical team and to manage and control the organisation of all health, medical and hygienical tasks related to the mission.

### **Commander of the Bangladeshi Medical Unit (CBMU)**

In accordance with the current international agreements, the medical supply of the mission is provided by the military medical team of 20 members delegated by the Bangladeshi Armed Forces under their own command. The commander of the unit is responsible for the work of the team and the providing medical care for the mission, in cooperation with the Moroccan military hospital (Casablanca) and the navy hospital of the Spanish Armed Forces (Las Palmas).

### **Aide-De-Camp (ADC)**

Due to the implicit agreement of the mission and the special requirements accompanying the agreement (command of the French language and contact with the Moroccan military organisations), the position is filled by the captain of the French contingent. He organises the trips, meetings of the commander within Morocco, maintains contact with the leaders of the local organisations, participates at official meetings and takes the minutes there. He organises the correspondence at Commander's Office, participates in organising and coordinating the administrative work and executes the commanders commands.

### *Military Assistant of Force Commander*

Generally, the position is filled by a captain from the same country as the commander. His tasks include organising the commander's meetings, taking minutes at the meetings, doing the correspondence of the commander, going through and classifying the incoming daily mail, preparing the draft of the commander's official speeches, copying it if necessary. He takes photos at official events, records and archives the events for later use (internal

publications, press, etc). In case of the absence of the ADC, he takes over his tasks, but he in command.

#### *Military Assistant to the Chief of Staff*

The position is filled by a captain selected by the Chief of Staff, who is of the nationality of the commander. He fulfills administrative tasks for the Chief of Staff. He prepares and organises the programmes of the Chief of Staff, maintains contact with the different military organisations and sectors. Basically, his job description is identical to that of the Military Assistant.

#### **Force Sergeant Major (FS M)**

In accordance with the current agreement, the position can be filled by a non-commissioned officer, sergeant-major or warrant officer from Ghana. He has significant role in organising various military events; he is responsible for observing the dress-code of military observers, and acts as the advisor to the commander of the mission in disciplinary matters. The FSM organises, controls and checks the work of non-commissioned officers subordinated to the office of the commander. He escorts the Commander on his official trips and helps the military assistants organise the programmes.

#### *The following departments function at the Mission Command:*

##### **Personnel Department**

The tasks of the Personnel Department include all the personnel tasks (travelling, service trips, unexpected death, accidents, medical checkups or treatment, etc) related to military observers at the MINURSO Staff, including the preparation of identification cards, of various reports, reviews, providing help in religious and conscience matters, setting up and operating disciplinary committees. Besides the commander, two commissioned officers and two non-commissioned officers work for the department. The non-commissioned officers do registration, and administrative work under the DCMPO's control but their superior is the Force Sergeant Major.

##### **Planning and Operations Department**

Reconnaissance (G2) and operations-planning department are integrated mainly due to the shortage of human resources. The work of the department is led by the Chief Operations Officer (COPO). Their tasks include all types of military planning, information gathering, the processing and evaluation of information within the mission and the coordination of the work of military observers (patrolling and other service duties).

Five officers serve in the department (the deputy of the Chief Operations Officer, the Air Liaison Officer and three other Staff officers).

### *Deputy Chief Operations Officer (DCOO)*

He is responsible for organising the work of the officers working in the department, maintaining contact with the operational and intelligence officers of the sectors and the camps, checks the gathering, evaluation of information, and sending the reports to the Operations Centre in New York.

### *Air Liaison Officer (ALO)*

He is responsible for organising and coordinating the air transport, air reconnaissance, trainings and rescue activities of the mission. His task is to ensure that military observers apply and do not violate air safety regulations. He prepares flight manifests and organises special flights in co-operation with the local military and civilian air traffic services.

### *Staff Operations Officers (SOO)*


Their tasks include checking the daily operation of the team sites and preparing, controlling and checking the services, processing and evaluating the incoming intelligence (ORBAT) for the mission commander. They take part in working out different orders, controlling the observance of military and ceasefire agreements, and in case of violation start investigating the case. They prepare the daily, weekly, monthly and other periodical reports (SITREP, etc) for the leaders of the mission and the UN. Deputy of Chief Operational Officers, Air Liaison Officers and Staff Officers must be senior officers.

## **Logistics Department**

Like anywhere else, this department has the most responsibilities and work load, as there is always need for fuel, food, drinking water and other logistic supply. The transport of the supply is done by three helicopters (MI-8) and three Antonov transport planes due to the large distances. This requires daily contact and continuous coordination with the other departments involved. The planes are rented together with their crew from the Ukraine and Russia, generally for six-month time periods.

The logistic supply of the mission is primarily done by the civilian part of the mission not the military. This is obvious as the military observers spend 4-6 months in a position in the headquarters on average. Due to the special situation prevailing in team sites and sector commands, only the military observers do logistics work, while the civilian logistics service is based on the HQ (Laayoune). The civilian experts (in cooperation with the military personnel) provide the following services in the mission: repair and maintenance of the vehicles, transport, signals, finance and other administrative tasks.

## The logistic - transportation system of MINURSO:



Source: MINURSO

The Logistics Department is headed by the Chief Logistics Officer and the following positions can be found within the department:

### *Deputy Chief Logistics Officer*

He is responsible for the maintenance and operational tasks. He receives the supply necessary for running the team sites, he is responsible for executing fire-protection tasks, the repair and if necessary replacement of electric generators and other technical equipment used in the team sites. He is entitled to assign any kind of task to the garages on behalf of the military organisation and he organises the temporary deployment of technicians to the team sites.

### *Transport and Plans Officer*

He is responsible for the repair and maintenance of all vehicles used by the military observers, for fuel, lubricants and airplane fuel supply. His tasks also include finalising the reports of the Logistics Department and sending them to the consignees.

### *Supply Officer*

He receives the requests for supplies from the team sites (except for food and fuel), which is provided dependent on the current needs and the stock available. He maintains daily contact with the Procurement department, civilian logistic personnel, the ones responsible for the store-houses and Receiving and Inspection.

### *Food Officer*

All tasks connected to the food supply of military observers belong to him. He monitors the food supply tasks in the team site, the results of the weekly and daily reports, checks and approves requests for food supply. He controls the quality of food together with the Hygienic officer, co-operates with the civilian logistic and supply companies. His tasks include checking of the invoices received and only he is entitled to authorise any payment to the companies supplying food for the mission. The positions of the Logistics Department can be filled by senior officers, however, if a candidate is suitable for the job, the military commander of the mission can authorize a captain to be selected for the position, as a professional position.

### **Welfare and Co-ordination**

This is the smallest department of the mission and it is responsible for supplying the canteen with goods (cigarettes, alcohol, confectionery, etc) organising and co-ordinating freetime activities all over the area of the mission. Apart from the mission commander, there are two other officers serving at the headquarters.

#### *Welfare Officer*

He runs the shops of the mission, purchases goods, calculates the prices of the products and it is his duty and responsibility to transport the goods to the team sites. He is in charge of the money of the welfare fund of the military observers and if necessary purchases cultural items (DVDs, CDs, videos, cassettes, board games, etc) and sports equipment from the fund. He organises the sports and cultural programmes in co-operation with other departments.

#### *Co-ordination Officer*

He is responsible for providing accommodation to the military observers arriving from the team sites to Laayoune, receiving the newcomers, organising and coordinating various military and official events (National days, awarding medals, etc). He maintains contact with Moroccan and Spanish hotels, travel agents and other tourist organisations to provide discount air tickets for officers travelling home for holiday.

### **Communication Department**

Due to the fact that the mission is located in three countries and the insufficient infrastructure of the area, the communications experts developed their own communication system independent of the host nations the mission. The personnel serving in the communication department, in cooperation with the civilian experts (UN employees) operate the radio (long and short waves, VHF and HF) and telephone system, operate, maintain, repair the IT and telecommunication (facsimiles, computers, photocopy machines, etc) equipment.



## *Two senior officers serve in the department*

### **Force Communication Officer (FCO)**

He co-operates with the leaders of the civilian communication department. They plan the purchase of the equipment together, co-ordinate the work of the military, civilian and repair departments. He receives the communication daily reports from the team sites and sectors, which he sends to the Chief Staff Officer after processing and evaluating them.

### **Assistant Force Communication Officer (AFCO)**

His primary task is to help the work of the Force Communication Officer, and to observe the deadline of the planning tasks. He supervises the operation of the communication systems between the headquarters, sectors and team sites and to troubleshoot (computer security, daily maintenance, etc) in cooperation with the civilian departments, if necessary. He maintains daily contact with the Force Communications Officers of the sectors and team sites and is also responsible for their professional training and control.

Below you can read about the organisations co-operating with other military parts of the mission. I do not have an insight into the work of the administrative department as this is not a very important area for military observers, however, I have written about the police department, the identification and the refugee offices in detail, as their work influenced the events of the mission for years. Presently, the identification office have been suspended temporarily in the mission but can re-open anytime following a decision in the future.

## ***CIVPOL***

When the UN in its Resolution 690 decided to establish MINURSO (29 April 1991), it was clear that certain tasks cannot be accomplished by the military observers due to the lack of appropriate training, so the UN Secretary General recommended delegating police forces to the mission. In his report (S22464-46. paragraph – 19 April 1991), the Secretary General proposed to employ 100 police officers immediately to aid the work of the staff preparing the census. They would have increased the number of staff by 200 in order to secure the repatriation of refugees to the territories occupied by Morocco.

The police force worked hand-in-hand with the staff of the Identification Commission and Registration Centres from the very beginning. The work started in July 1993 under the command of Police Colonel Jürgen Friedrich Reinman.<sup>16</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Nassrine Azimi: The Role and Functions of the Civilian Police in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. pp. 107-111.

The first police unit was composed of 19 personnel (4 Germans, 5 Belgians, 5 Malaysians and 5 Togans), who also carried out the security tasks of the mission but their primary task was to escort and protect the employees of the Identification Centre during the preparation period for the census.<sup>17</sup>

The moment the identification of eligible voters started the number of police officers increased proportionally with their tasks, thus the UN Secretary-General authorised the employment of as many as 26 police officers in his report (S/1991/819 – 12 July 1994), and by the end of the year 55 police officers had been in service (S/1994/1257 – 5. November 1994). Resolution (973/1995) of the Security Council authorised the increase of police staff to 160 but it never manifested. There was a downsizing again followed by an increase in the number of staff. The highest number of the police staff was 91 in January 1996.<sup>18</sup> At that time, there were 19 Identification Centres established in Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, where police officers served together with the civilian staff. The task of the police officers included maintaining law and order in the identification centres and providing the possibility of uninterrupted work for the civilian employees.<sup>19</sup>

The UN established identification centres in Laayoune, Dakhla, Boujdour, Smara, Tan-Tan, Goulimine, Assa, Rabat, Casablanca, Marrakesh, Sidi Kacem, Zagora, Taroudant, Tata, Zourat, Nouadhibou, Elkela, Meknes and Tinduf.

The primary tasks of the police force during the identification period were the following:

- To provide registration and the opportunity to vote for anybody who would like to participate at the referendum deciding about the future of the territory, after presenting their legal documents.
- To take a photograph and fingerprints of the eligible voters in order to simplify their identification later.
- To escort tribal leaders and all people who supported the work of the UN, preparing the referendum.
- To protect personnel and facilities.
- To collect the documents processed during the identification process and to transport them to Tinduf and Laayoun and finally to the UN centre in Geneva (346,000 documents were transported to Geneva by the end of December 2003).
- To provide escort for the finance officers transporting the salary of the UN employees and the military observers and the security of the venues of payment.

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<sup>17</sup> Roxane D. V. Sismanidis: Police Funktionen in Peace Operation, Report from Workshop organised by the United States Institute of Peace. p. 3.

<sup>18</sup> Martin Ira Glassner: The United Nations at Work. p. 270.

<sup>19</sup> Nassrine Azimi: The Role and Functions of the Civilian Police in the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. p. 108-110.

- To organise joint patrols together with the military observers in the region of Laayoune and Tinduf.
- To participate in military observer training (driving in the desert, navigation- and GPS-training).
- To plan the establishment of the police forces of Western Sahara having received autonomy, their training and checking they comply with the democratic norms.
- To assist the work of the security service and to accomplish other tasks requiring security technological experience and police expertise.
- To give advice in police and security policy issues for both the military and civilian leadership of the mission.
- To participate in the repatriation programme.
- To conduct investigation of disciplinary and criminal cases in MINURSO in co-operation with the local authorities.
- To co-operate with the UNHCR in refugee matters.

81 police officers (including Hungarians) served in Western Sahara and the neighbouring countries in the time period after the census. There were only 26 police officers in the mission in June 2003.<sup>20</sup> The police unit was dismissed after the identification process and due to the suspension of the identification centre for an indefinite time period. But as written previously, later 6 police officers arrived in the mission again, and today they are working in the Headquarters.

The police unit had an excellent disciplinary conduct, nevertheless, two police officers had to be sent home before completing their service due to causing road accidents and their poor command of English.

### *Identification Centre*

The Identification Centre or Census Preparation Office was established by Security Council Resolution 690 (April 1991), as one of the organisations of MINURSO. The employees of the office started the preparatory work immediately after the office was opened. They requested the Spanish government to issue the documents containing the data of the 1974 census (Spanish Census) and started the data-processing. The result of the census then was 74,343 people, although some Saharawians had been registered more than once as a member of different tribes.<sup>21</sup> This could occur as the staff of the census were often confused about the fact that one person can be a member of several tribes and sub-tribes due to kinship. After processing all data of the Spanish Census, a database was ready for future activities.

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<sup>20</sup> Yearbook of the United Nations 1999. p. 178.

<sup>21</sup> Statement of Frank Rudy before the Subcommittee on the Departments of Commerce, Justice, State and the Judiciary and Related Agencies. <http://www.arso.org/06-3-1.htm> (downloaded: 21.11.2011.)

The staff of the office started registering the eligible voters for the referendum about the future of the territory on 20 June 1993 on the basis of the data of the previous census. The first two identification centres were established in Laayoune (Western-Sahara) and Tindouf (Algeria). Due to the insufficient personnel and financial background the registration work could only start on 3. November 1993. The Head of Office sent the registration documents together with the filling instructions to both the Moroccan and the Algerian governments. Due to political reasons, the work in the Mauritanian office could only start in late February 1994, despite the fact that the UN officially published the data of the Spanish census overviewed and corrected by its staff. There were only 72,370 people registered. This document was especially important as this provided the base of the census carried out in the future. According to the original plans, people or their descendants living in then Spanish Sahara in 1974 could vote about the future of the territory.

Due to the pressure of the opposing parties, however, the UN changed its original plan concerning the requirements of eligible voters. Five preconditions had to be met in order to be registered on the list:<sup>22</sup>

- Being registered on the list prepared by the Spanish authorities in 1972.
- Living in Spanish Sahara during the 1974 census but not being registered for some reason (this was very likely due to the migration periods of the nomadic tribes).<sup>23</sup>
- The immediate kins were registered but the potential voter was not registered for some reason.
- If the potential voter's father was born and lived in Spanish Sahara.
- If the potential voter lived in this area for six years continuously from 1. December 1974 or for 12 years with some interruptions.

The official list was published on 29. November in both Laayoune and Tindouf cities (including the refugee camps). The representatives of both parties (Morocco and Algeria) handed over the registration documents (sent to them before hand) and their recommendations to the UN staff on 16 May 1994. The office staff started data-processing the incoming material and the identification process immediately. This meant that a person whose personal data was registered on the computer had to appear in the identification centre where their identification was confirmed and photographs and fingerprints were taken. This was necessary to prevent forging of votes or multiple registration of one person. The representatives of both opposing parties - the Moroccans and the Polisario - intended to manipulate the office staff.<sup>24</sup>

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<sup>22</sup> Dunbar: *Saharan Stasis: Status and Future Prospects of the Western Sahara Conflict*. p.528.

<sup>23</sup> Norrie Macqueen: *United Nations Peacekeeping in Africa Since 1960*. p. 241.

<sup>24</sup> Anna Theofilopoulou: *The United Nations and Western Sahara – S Never-ending Affair*. <http://www.usip.org/pubs/specialreports/sr166.pdf> (downloaded: 10.11.2011.)

On 28 August 1994, in Tinduf, the confirmation of data and the checking of voters registering to vote started in the refugee camps.<sup>25</sup> However, due to the lack of data-processing staff, the work was very slow. The number of office staff reached its maximum capacity only in 1998, which speeded up the process. By that time, the office had established 19 Identification Centres in Morocco, Mauritania and Algeria, four of which were located in Western Sahara, four in refugee camps, two in Mauritania and nine in Morocco. The first phase of the identification process started on 28 August 1994 and finished on 23. December 1995. The gathered data could only be processed completely by 3 September 1998.<sup>26</sup>

Out of the 179,497 potential voters only 84,262 met the UN requirements, so they all were entitled to participate in elections to be held in the future.<sup>27</sup> The non-contested tribes appearing in the first phase and the 1st Provisional List of Voters of Saharawians was published on 15 July 1999 and were made accessible for the Algerian, Moroccan and Mauritanian governments.<sup>28</sup> In the second phase, the contested tribal groupings, 51,220 applicants were registered as potential voters in the identification centres but only 2,163 met the requirements and were put on the 2nd Provisional List of Voters. The second list was made public on 15 June 1999 and similarly to the first list this was also sent to the governments of the three countries and the Polisario leaders.<sup>29</sup>

The work of the Office is well illustrated by the following:

- 244,643 registration sheets were processed;
- 243,625 invitations were sent out for the registrations in the identification centres (179,437 in the first phase and 64,188 in the second phase);
- 198,469 people completed the identification process (i.e. after registration, went to the identification centres, had their photographs taken, confirmed their personal details with their fingerprints and signature);
- 86,425 people met the requirements of the UN and the Office organised to inform them.

Then, in February 2000 the situation between the Moroccan government and the Polisario had become so tense that working in the identification centres became impossible and they were closed down. Afterwards the employees of the UN processed the results of the data-gathering phases and corrected the forms stored on the computer. As the opposing parties were not able to reach an agreement, on 15. January 2002 the UN decreased the number of employees in

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<sup>25</sup> Jarat Chopra: *Peace-maintenance: The Evolution of International Political Authority*. p. 173.

<sup>26</sup> *Yearbook of the United Nations* 1998. p. 194.

<sup>27</sup> Por Martin Zirlingen: *Western Sahara: The United Nations Will determine for You*. <http://www.gees.org/articulo/1314/> (downloaded: 23.11.2011.)

<sup>28</sup> Andreu Solá-Martín: *Lessons from MINURSO*. p. 373.

<sup>29</sup> *Yearbook of the United Nations* 2001. p. 214.

the office to 40. Due to the lack of other tasks, the UN workers continued to archive the materials, while other colleagues did research and conducted the analysis of the information gathered during long years and prepared studies for the UN. The final decision about the office was made in July 2003, when the leadership of MINURSO was informed that all ongoing tasks must be completed by the end of October and the documents must be sent to the UN centre in Geneva. The transport of the processed documents started on 8 September and finished on 6 October. The staff left the territory of the mission at the end of the month.<sup>30</sup>

### ***Refugee Office (UNHCR – United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees)***

The organisation started working in 1975-76 among the Saharawians fled from Western Sahara and living in the refugee camps established in Algeria. Although the office is not part of the structure of MINURSO and follows orders received from New York independently, there has been good and close co-operation between the organisations since the very beginning. One of the major tasks of the office would have been to organise the return of the Sahrawi refugees to Western Sahara—so far, this has not been achieved.<sup>31</sup>

The organisation had established and maintained good relationship with the opposing parties and very often acted as a mediator organisation to solve problems.<sup>32</sup> The office staff forwards the food offered by the non-governmental aid organisations to the camps where they hand it over to the local authorities supervising its distribution. Despite this fact, the food received as aid does not always reach the needy but ends up on the black market. I have personally seen food items (sugar, flour, etc) carrying the logo of the UN, originally from international aid being sold in shops in villages. This may be why the leader of the World Food Programme warned the UN representatives in the summer 2003 about the serious food shortage in the camps. Basic food items (sugar, flour, rice, semolina and canned fish) were already scarce at the beginning of spring and there were not enough vegetables and fruits for the refugees.

According to the UN, in such a situation there is a great risk of an epidemic, so, on 16 October 2003, the Security Council in its Resolution S/2003/1016 demanded that the international organisations get involved in the solution of the problems and help feed the refugees in the camps with every possible means.<sup>33</sup> The organisation helped several times to maintain contact

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<sup>30</sup> Yearbook of the United Nations 2003. p. 262.

<sup>31</sup> Toby Shelley: Endgame in the Western Sahara. What Future for Africa's Last Colony? p. 144.

<sup>32</sup> Reinoud Leenders: Western Sahara: Africa's last colony, Searching for Peace in Africa, 2000. <http://www.conflict-prevention.net/page.php?id=40&formid=73&action=show&surveyid=16> (downloaded: 23.11.2011.)

<sup>33</sup> Yearbook of the United Nations 2003. p. 262.

between the refugees in the camps and their relatives living on the territories occupied by Morocco. They organised and co-ordinated meetings between the relatives occasionally.<sup>34</sup>

Negotiations were initiated between the government of Morocco and the representatives of the Polisario to establish a regular postal service and telephone connection (confidence-building measures) between the refugee camps and the occupied territories.<sup>35</sup> This was not so simple as the Moroccans demanded the right that the letters arriving from the refugee camps should be forwarded to the addressees by the Moroccan postal service, but this would not guarantee the intactness of the letters. Naturally, the UNCHR did not accept the proposal so the UN would continue to guarantee the intactness of the letters and their safe delivery. In March 2003, an agreement was reached, which guaranteed the uninterrupted operation of the postal service, and not tapping the telephone conversations between the refugee camps and the relatives from the Sahara. On 15 April, the UNHCR announced that there were limited postal service and personal telephone calls available between the refugees in the camps and the occupied territories.<sup>36</sup> The telephone line was shut down by Morocco after one day. It re-started only on 11 January 2004. Until 2006, according to the report of the office, 60,000 calls were made between refugee camps and the occupied territories.<sup>37</sup>

The third important element of the programme was to provide constant contact and meeting opportunities between refugees in the camps and their relatives left behind in Western Sahara.<sup>38</sup> This may be an even more delicate issue than the postal service and its operation. The first suggestion of the Polisario was that only people who were registered in the Spanish Census, or met the requirements of the UN to vote about the future of the territory should be allowed to attend family get-togethers.

Morocco would provide opportunity to meet other family members to anybody with a relative living in Western Sahara. In 2004 the UNHCR organised the first encounters between relatives. In the first round 1,200 people attended these meetings, mainly coming from refugee camps. In 2005 19,000 people registered for the programme, and with the mediation of the office 1,476 people could meet up with their relatives.<sup>39</sup> The action had to be halted for a while as the required financial means were missing. Later on it was re-launched, and ever since it has been smoothly running.

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<sup>34</sup> Dunbar: *Saharan Stasis: Status and Future Prospects of the Western Sahara Conflict*. pp. 540-542.

<sup>35</sup> Hakim Darbouche, Zoubir, Yahia H: *Conflicting International Policies and the Western Sahara Stalemate*. p. 94.

<sup>36</sup> *Yearbook of the United Nations* 2003. p. 260.

<sup>37</sup> <http://www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/4666d2520.pdf> (downloaded: 23.11.2011.)

<sup>38</sup> Toby Shelley: *Endgame in the Western Sahara. What Future for Africa's Last Colony?* p. 117.

<sup>39</sup> *Yearbook of United Nations* 2005. p. 366.

**SUCCESS OR A NOT FULLY UTILISED OPPORTUNITY? -  
OPINIONS ABOUT THE EUROPEAN CAPITAL  
OF CULTURE – PÉCS 2010 PROGRAMME**

*Research preliminaries, hypotheses*

Pécs won the European Capital of Culture title in 2006, competing with ten other Hungarian cities. The city of Pécs is the first holder of this title in Hungary. We can clearly say that the award of the title filled the – understandably proud – citizens of Pécs with optimistic expectations and hopes for the development of the city.

This is also why the following chaotic years resulted in so much disappointment; the chaos was primarily due to the personal conflicts within the organisation responsible for the management of the event, the continuous fluctuation of the staff, communication problems, belated tendering and implementation activities. The initial phase of euphoria was replaced by disillusionment. How did the citizens of Pécs feel about this situation?

In this place I am referring to some of the findings of a research started in 2008 and still going on. The research is made jointly with the students of the Faculty of Adult Education and Human Resources Development, University of Pécs. In the representative questionnaire survey conducted in 2008 and 2009 (the breakdown of the respondents by gender and school education reflected the composition of the inhabitants in the cities with county rank and the capital city) a total of 2.000 persons were asked in Pécs and Budapest about the European Capital of Culture – Pécs 2010 programme. We sought answers to the following questions:

- Do the respondents know that for the year 2010 a Hungarian city was awarded the European Capital of Culture title? If so, do they know which city it is?
- Which key projects are they familiar with?
- What benefit they think the city will have from the series of programmes?
- What measures are indispensable for the successful implementation of the event?
- How actively are they willing to participate in the programmes?
- How much do they think the organising city is able to implement the series of programmes with success?

As the first part of the research is still going on, in the spring of 2008, we asked Pécs and Budapest citizens, then the questionnaire survey was repeated in



the spring of 2009. The respondents were different in the two surveys, but both samples were representative as regards the breakdown of the population by gender and school education.

The following hypotheses were made prior to the processing of the questionnaires:

1. The larger part of the citizens of Pécs and Budapest know about the award of the title and the location of the event. We expected a slightly higher level of information among the respondents in Pécs. We expected a further improvement in information level by 2009.

2. The expected benefits of the series of programmes, mentioned by the respondents, should primarily be the boom of tourism, the development of infrastructure, the expansion of international relations and the improvement of the acknowledgement of Pécs both in Hungary and abroad. According to our prognosis those who have positive expectations are the majority.

3. Among the measures indispensable the most important are the development of the roads and transport, the renovation of monuments and the expansion of the capacity of commercial accommodations.

4. The majority of the citizens of Pécs will surely participate in the would-be programmes; we expected a somewhat lower activity among the respondents in Budapest.


5. Due to the rather contradictory events of the former years, the opinion of the majority will probably be that the programme will be implemented but not become a success story. The clearly optimistic or pessimistic views will be the minority.

6. In general, the assessment of the programme will slightly improve by 2009 compared to 2008.

### ***Research findings***


Of all those questioned in 2008, 94.4 per cent had already heard that a city of Hungary had won the European Capital of Culture title, and 92.4 per cent knew it was Pécs. It was not surprising at all that among the citizens of Pécs the share of those who knew that their place of residence possessed this title was higher (97.8%), of the Budapest citizens a slightly smaller proportion (85.6%) of respondents knew that Pécs was the holder of the title. Our first hypothesis was only partially justified, as the questionnaire survey repeated one year after, in 2009 showed by and large the same level of information among the Pécs citizens, and even a decline was experienced in the circle of the Budapest respondents (83.6 %).

Of the five key projects featured in the “Borderless City” programme, the Zsolnay Cultural Quarter was the best known, as shown by the survey of 2008: 81.1 per cent of the respondents in Pécs and 51.6 per cent of them in Budapest said they had already heard about this project. The second and third best known projects were the Music and Conference Centre (with 56.8 per cent of the local respondents and 42.7 per cent of the Budapest respondents knowing about it), and the Revival of public spaces and parks (54.5 % and 43 %, respectively). Much less people had information about the plans of the Regional Library (32.5 % and 18.7 %, respectively), and as regards the Great Exhibition Space, the project with the least certain future, just over one quarter of the Pécs respondents (26.6 %), and less than one-fifth of those living in Budapest (19.6 %) knew anything of it at all. The temporal order of the implementation of the investments was well reflected by the findings of the survey in 2009. This year the project best known by the Pécs citizens was the Revival of public spaces and parks, but the proportion of the local citizens knowing the Regional Library grew by 15 per cent and those with information on the Music and Conference Centre also increased by over 20 per cent. On the other hand, the proportion of those knowing about the other two investments with less spectacular development decreased a little. (Figure 1: Change of the level of information on the key projects in Pécs, 2008-2009)



As regards the expected impacts of having the European Capital of Culture title, the proportion of those was the highest by far who said “many tourists will visit us”. No less than 74.9 % of the respondents expected this. Our hypothesis was justified inasmuch as the second most frequently mentioned benefit was the answer “infrastructure will develop”, indicated by every second respondent (49.6 %), the third most frequent answer was “the acknowledgement and image of Pécs will improve both in Hungary and abroad”, with a value of 49.2 per cent. The high value of the positive external evaluation is made even more interesting


by the fact that Budapest citizens mentioned this more frequently (in 58.2 % of the responses). Also the Budapest citizens answered in larger numbers that “the city will become a regional cultural centre also at international level” and “international cooperations and relations will be born”. (See Figure 2: Expectations about the series of events in 2008) We must not forget, however, that the frequency of just these answers related to the better international recognition decreased to a considerable extent (3-8 per cent) by 2009. The proportion of those who did not expect any positive impact at all was relatively low, but the 10.5 % rate of reply by Pécs citizens is worth the attention, especially if we consider that the proportion of definitely pessimistic answers slightly increased by 2009 (to 11.7 %). Among the other possible answers we found both positive and negative expectations, including the growing indebtedness of the city, the rising of corruption, negative international propaganda, the construction of the motorway, and the fact that “by the programme series the city will become more open and receptive, which will promote the spread of multiculturalism and the tolerance of others”.



1=“many tourists will visit us”, 2=“infrastructure will develop”, 3=“the acknowledgement and image of Pécs will improve both in Hungary and abroad”, 4=“international cooperations and relations will be born”, 5=“the city will become a regional cultural centre also at international level”, 6=“the economy will boom, new jobs will be created”, 7=“the city will become more liveable”, 8=“the economic potential of the city increases, multinational corporations will locate in Pécs”, 9=“I do not expect any positive impact”, 10=“other”

The most frequently mentioned measure indispensable for the successful implementation of the event, not surprisingly, is “development of roads and transport”: no less than 82.9 % of the respondents thought it was closely related to a successful series of programmes. As regards the respondents in Pécs, the proportion of this reply was even higher (87.5 % of all respondents). (See Figure 3: Measures necessary for the successful implementation of the event, 2009)



Also, many thought it would be worthwhile to renew buildings (59.8 %) and monuments (55.9 %), and make green parks in the public spaces (52 %). On the other hand, respondents both in Pécs and Budapest believed that Pécs already had enough restaurants and cafés (26.8 %). It is not surprising that considerable differences could also often be seen in the replies, depending on the place of residence. While the local citizens emphasised the necessity of “renovation of buildings” and “green parks”, the Budapest respondents preferred the answer “expansion of the capacity of commercial accommodation” in a somewhat higher proportion. The “other” replies frequently included the necessary expansion of the car parking facilities, making the flow of information more effective, finding solution for the issue of the homeless, the cleanliness of the public spaces and the improvement of public safety.



1=“development of roads and transport”, 2=“renovation of buildings”, 3=“renovation of monuments”, 4=“green parks”, 5=“expansion of the capacity of commercial accommodation”, 6=“expansion of the capacity of restaurants, and number of cafés”, 7 = “other”

Of course the European Capital of Culture events are worth nothing without the interest and active cooperation of the Hungarian and foreign tourists visiting Pécs. In the next part of the questionnaire we wanted to find out how much the respondents are willing to participate. We can clearly say that the largest group was that of the “uncertain”. Every second respondent (48.7 % in 2008 and 52.5 % in 2009) thought that either s/he did not know or would only probably take part in one of the would-be programmes. It is sad that the group of those refusing participation is also high: in 2009 35 % thought that s/he would definitely not participate in any event or at least his/her participation was very much unlikely. It is thought-provoking that the proportion of those who would certainly participate is not only low but decreasing (16 % in 2008 and 12.4 % in 2009). The only thing that can make us optimistic is that the largest group in


both years was made by those who thought they were likely to participate in programmes. (See Figure 4: Willingness of participation in the would-be programmes, 2008 and 2009). As opposed to our hypothesis, respondents with definite participation willingness were not a majority even among the Pécs respondents. Although the number of those refusing participation decreased by 2009 to some extent (from 26.2 % to 20.5 %), this only slightly increased the number of the uncertain.



Knowing the mostly negative events of the previous years it is not at all surprising that the idea which most people associated with the title European Capital of Culture – Pécs 2010 was “uncertainty” (48.8 %), the word “success” came to the minds of less respondents (37.1 %), while “failure” was mentioned by 14.1 % of the respondents. (See Figure 5: Associations related to the expression European Capital of Culture – Pécs 2010, in Pécs, Budapest and total, 2009). The respondents in Pécs were especially critical; in their group the proportion of optimists was hardly more than those who had definitely negative expectations (24.3 % and 21.3 %, respectively). It is interesting that in Budapest the majority was made by those who expected success, both in 2008 and 2009 –

it is true, on the other hand, that their proportion decreased by more than 10 per cent in a year (59 % and 48 %, respectively).

The above-written is well supported by the opinion of the respondents about whether the city of Pécs would be able at all to implement the programme. The majority opinion was that “the programme will be implemented but not become a success story”, thought by over a half of the respondents in 2009 (51.7 %). Less and less respondents expected a successful implementation (36.6 %), while more and more considered the cancellation of the programme as a realistic threat (11.7 %). (See Figure 6: The ability of Pécs for the organisation of the programme event, in 2008 and 2009). It is worrying that the number of those local citizens who supposed the cancellation of the programme almost doubled in one year (9.3 % and 17.9 %, respectively).



In order to define the correlation between the gender and schooling of the respondents, and the judgement of the ECC programme, we made an optimism index. In the value of the index, the participation willingness was rated with scores 1 to 3 (1 point to those who rejected participation; possible participants were given 2; and those who were sure of their participation scored 3 points), and the same system was used for associations related to the programme (failure: 1 point; uncertainty: 2 points; success: 3 points) and the opinions about the organisation of the programme (the programme will not be realised: 1 point; the programme will be realised but will not be a success story: 2 points; successful organisation of the programme: 3 points). Accordingly, the possible values ranged from 3 to 9. The value of the index revealed no correlation between the level of optimism and schooling. It is interesting, though that the average value of 2008 (6.52) dropped a little, to 6.25 by the year 2009; least optimistic about the programme were males living in Pécs (6.26), while the most optimistic respondents were women in Budapest (6.83).

On the basis of the responses given we made an attempt to classify the questioned persons into homogeneous groups. By the typifying we wanted to get an insight into the percentage breakdown of the respondents, the change in their number in the two years in question, bearing in mind that the addressing of the respective groups requires very much different methods.

### ***1. Dedicated optimists***

Those respondents were put into this category who will definitely participate in the programmes, they think of success when they hear the title ‘Pécs – European Capital of Culture’ and are also sure that Pécs will successfully implement the events. The value of optimism index is 9.

### ***2. Passive supporters (fans staying at home)***

They are the ones who will probably not participate in any of the programmes, despite their belief in the successful organisation of the event. The value of optimism index is 7.


### ***3. The uncertain***

They will probably participate in the ECC programmes, but the title ‘Pécs – European Capital of Culture’ raises uncertainty in them. They think the programme will be implemented but it will not become a success story. The value of optimism index is 6.

### ***4. Pessimists***

The group of pessimist involves those who will participate in the ECC programmes, think of “uncertainty” or “failure” when they hear the expression ‘Pécs – European Capital of Culture’, and think that even if the programme is implemented at all it will not be a success story. The value of optimism index is 3-5.

As one can see in Figure 7 (Types of responses in Pécs, 2008), the share of the first two groups with positive attitude is the smallest, in addition, their proportion decreased from 2008 by 2009 (15 % and 8.4 %, respectively). The problem is increased by the fact that the group of the uncertain stagnates in the two years, as regards their number, but the proportion of the passive respondents increased over the two years (54 % and 60.4 %, respectively). We saw similar tendencies in Budapest, with the non-negligible difference that due to the large number of “passive supporters”, more than one-quarter of the respondents were still among the group of optimists in 2009. It would be very important to make the larger part of the uncertain move to the group of the dedicated ones, and also to persuade the largest possible number of the presently passive supporters to join in the programmes. Our last hypothesis was not justified; the programme was not evaluated more positively in 2009.



### ***Summary***

The specification we used in the title of this paper may not be an exaggeration, i.e. that the previous years were defined as the years of expectancy and uncertainty. The questionnaire survey clearly supported out hypothesis that the title and its location were known both in Pécs and Budapest. The stakeholders expressed serious expectations related to the programme, they considered certain measures indispensable (some of which have already been partly realised since then). In our survey the really spectacular, positive results are still yet to come. As for the key projects, some have already been finished since then, some will be implemented in the near future, others will be finalised in the coming years. The implementation of the series of events is now a certainty, the continuous offer of programmes contributes to the increase of the number of participants day after day. The question whether the programme will be experienced by the people as success or as a not fully utilised opportunity will be answered adequately by our ongoing researches.

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## ***FORUM of PhD CANDIDATES***

**Péter Á. KISS PhD aspirant ZMNE**

### **STRATEGIC COMMUNICATION IN ASYMMETRIC CONFLICTS**

**Abstract:** Influencing the information environment is important in all wars, but it is crucial in an asymmetric conflict, which is more violent and competitive theater than war: the belligerents play for the support of the population, and their messages have greater importance than combat operations. The non-state belligerent generally understands this better than the state's security forces. Through several case studies the author shows some of the difficulties and some of the possibilities of Strategic Communications and Information Operations in asymmetric conflicts.

**Key phrases:** asymmetric conflict, societal Stockholm syndrome, propaganda, strategic communications, information operations

#### ***Propaganda, information operations, strategic communications***

As a part of every armed conflict, the world – both the society of the affected state(s) and the international community – passes moral judgment on the belligerents and takes the side of one or the other. Every belligerent tries to influence this opinion-forming process in his own favor, in order to mobilize society's resources on his own behalf, persuade citizens that his fight is vitally important, convince allies that it is in their interest to continue to support him, convince the enemy that further fighting will lead to failure, and convince the neutrals to take the "right" – i.e. his – side.

In the past influencing public opinion was called "propaganda," a term without any particularly negative or shameful connotations. Today propaganda is shorthand for "an endless torrent of manipulative lies." However, propaganda is so important in both war and peace, that every state and every non-state actor (as well as every political party, every politician, and every business enterprise) engages in it – albeit they use different terminology. The most common term today is "Strategic Communications" at the highest levels, and "Information Operations" – or its abbreviation, IO – at the tactical and operational level.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The first doctrinal publication the author managed to identify with this title is the 1996. edition of the US Army's FM 100-6 *Information Operations*.

Doctrinal publications and scholarship<sup>2</sup> draw a sharp distinction between propaganda and Strategic Communications. To simplify the explanations, propaganda is carried out by the enemy, while the own side engages in Strategic Communications and Information Operations. Propaganda knows no restraint, rejects all limitations and rules, uses half-truths and outright lies and attempts to influence the full information spectrum: enemies, own society, allies and outsiders. In contrast, Strategic Communications and Information Operations follow rules, do not contain untruth, and are intended to influence the enemy forces and enemy society, but is not directed against own forces, own society or allies. NATO doctrine defines Strategic Communications as *"the coordinated and appropriate use of NATO communications activities and capabilities – Public Diplomacy, Public Affairs (PA), Military Public Affairs, Information Operations (Info Ops) and Psychological Operations (PsyOps), as appropriate – in support of Alliance policies, operations and activities, and in order to advance NATO's aims."*<sup>3</sup> According to the same doctrinal publication, Information Operations is *"a military function to provide advice and coordination of military information activities in order to create desired effects on the will, understanding and capability of adversaries, potential adversaries and other NAC approved parties in support of Alliance mission objectives."*<sup>4</sup>

These doctrinal definitions provide excellent guidance in an international conflict. However, asymmetric conflicts are generally not international in nature. Instead of enemies, the security forces face *adversaries*: fellow citizens – voters and taxpayers, acquaintances, friends, brothers. This immediately raises some big legal and ethical obstacles, in addition to the special professional challenges. For example psychological operations and deception operations directed against the population and military forces of an enemy state are perfectly acceptable – but how far are they acceptable, when combat operations are carried out on own territory, among own citizens?

### ***Asymmetric warfare and Strategic Communications***

An asymmetric conflict is violent, competitive theatric performance, rather than war. The belligerents play for the support of domestic and international audiences, and in order to succeed they try to shape the information environment in their own favor. Combat is a media event, whose goal is to support and prove the "messages" of the belligerents. The non-state belligerent understands this better and deeper than the security forces, the duly constituted

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<sup>2</sup> WARD, Brad M.: *Strategic Influence Operations - The Information Connection*, Carlisle Barracks PA, War College, 2003. is just one example of many.

<sup>3</sup> *Public Affairs Handbook*, Allied Command Operations - Allied Command Transformation, 2010. [http://www.au.af.mil/pace/handbooks/pa\\_handbook\\_nato.pdf](http://www.au.af.mil/pace/handbooks/pa_handbook_nato.pdf), p. 314.

<sup>4</sup> *Public Affairs Handbook*, p. 342.

government or the affected society.<sup>5</sup> He integrates his combat actions with his political activities and his strategic communications operations to such an extent, that they become virtually indistinguishable. His final goal is to create a "societal Stockholm syndrome,"<sup>6</sup> and thereby break society's resistance and force a significant number of citizens to support him.




Figure 1. The non-state belligerent's goal: generate societal Stockholm syndrome, thereby acquire increased popular support, and force society to bend to his will.<sup>7</sup>

The non-state actor has an advantage over the state: the revolutionary is a romantic figure – Robin Hood, Robespierre, Garibaldi, Che Guevara gazing into the socialist future. His noble goals (liberty, national self-determination, just

<sup>5</sup> CORDESMAN, Anthony H.: *The "Gaza War:" A Strategic Analysis*, Washington DC, Center For Strategic and International Studies, 2009.pp. 1-4.

<sup>6</sup> In the course of an unsuccessful bank robbery in 1973. in Stockholm the perpetrators took several hostages. During the following several days the hostages were subject to abuse, death threats, but also experienced attention, care and some superficial kindness on the part of the perpetrators. In a short time the hostages became attracted to the hostage takers, identified with them and viewed the police (that was trying to free them) as the common enemy. This is one possible psychological defensive mechanism of the seriously threatened and helpless person. (interview with Livia Mohás, psychologist, Budapest, 2010.) The originator of the expression "societal Stockholm syndrome" is K. P. S. Gill, Director General of the Punjab Police. MAHADEVAN, Prem: *The Gill Doctrine – A Model for 21st Century Counter-terrorism?* New Delhi, Faultlines: Volume 19, 2008. april, <http://satp.org/satporgtp/publication/faultlines/volume19/Article1.htm>

<sup>7</sup> Based on Figure 5-1 in *Counterinsurgency - FM 3-24/MCWP 3-33.5*, Washington DC, Department of the Army, 2006. p. 5-3.

distribution of wealth) allow him to resort to unspeakable atrocities, manipulate the information environment, make use of the most ignoble methods – public opinion will still remain sympathetic and forgiving.<sup>8</sup> By exaggerating real and imagined grievances, emphasizing discrimination and suffering, and promising a better future, the non-state belligerent creates a narrative of victimhood. His task is not very difficult: injustice and grievances exist even in the most just, most democratic, most law-abiding societies, which can serve as the raw material to create religious, ethnic or economic crisis (or, in an ideal case, all three). Through overstated numbers and skillful camera-work it is easy to exaggerate the real damage and suffering caused by security forces operations, and based on real and imaginary stories, manipulated video-footage and unverifiable eyewitness accounts it is easy to create a legend of oppression and suffering.<sup>9</sup>

On the other hand, the activities of the security forces are subject to suspicion, the statements of the state's political leaders and official spokesmen are subject to doubt. In most cases this doubting attitude is not unfounded: both in the conflicts analyzed in this paper, and in others the state's institutions (especially the security forces) have committed grave breaches of the law, and there have been official statements that later proved to be unfounded. Perhaps even the attitude of the international community is justified when it sets a much higher ethical, legal and political standard for the state than for the non-state belligerent. One of the pillars of the government's legitimacy is that it guarantees safety and security, and enforces and obeys the laws. Unlawful or biased behavior of state institutions threatens this legitimacy. At the same time, modern digital technology and the internet publicize even the smallest breach of the law, and cause grave damage even if the atrocities turn out to be nothing but propaganda-bubbles. So, it is not enough for the state's institutions to be law-abiding – they must also be seen as such.

There is no point in grumbling about such double standards – we must simply accept that we fight in the real world, and the real world is seldom fair or just. We must accept that we face an intelligent and adaptive enemy, who uses every tool in the interest of success – and he is a master of propaganda.

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<sup>8</sup> This attitude is often true even of the opinion-shaping elite of the affected society.

<sup>9</sup> Such modern legends are the "Srebrenica Genocide," that was exploited to impose collective guilt on the Serbs, and the "Racak Massacre," that served as the justification of NATO's attack on Yugoslavia. Both are based on more-or-less factual events, but as a result of the legends, falsified data and distorting propaganda, they have become the foundation stones of unquestionable dogma.




Figure 2. Task of the security forces: mitigate the effect of the societal Stockholm syndrome and increase popular support for the government.<sup>10</sup>

The state has no choice: it must set aside significant resources to influence the information environment; it must identify the tools and procedures which can neutralize the non-state belligerent's propaganda and it must persuade the world that justice is on its side. Rather than suppressing debate and criticism, or engaging in institutional lies, the goal should be to persuade public opinion that the state's counterinsurgency actions are justified. For this to be successful the target audiences and the best media to address them must be identified; the best ways to isolate the insurgents from public media must be found. A situation must be created, in which the domestic and international audiences evaluate the conflict on the government terms, not on the insurgents' – the government must become the primary source of reliable information. Further, the tools must be found with which irresponsible reporters and news-services that publish false information can be identified and shut out without generating a backlash of accusations of censorship, limiting press freedom and abuse of power.

### ***CASE STUDIES***

There is a fundamental difference between conventional and asymmetric conflicts. In interstate wars operations are largely independent of the political

<sup>10</sup> Based on Figure 5-1 in *Counterinsurgency*, p. 5-3.

and social conditions that led to the conflict and sustain it. Experience gained in one theater can be put to use in another theater – but often even in another war. This not the case in asymmetric conflicts: the social, political and economic conditions that lead to one conflict and sustain it also determine the tactics and operations, and are so unique, that experience gained in one conflict can very seldom be translated into useful skills in another.<sup>11</sup> This is particularly true for strategic communication: in addition to the social, economic and political conditions, the local cultural environment is an additional determining factor. Procedures that are successful in Iraq are not likely to work in Afghanistan; procedures that work in one region of Iraq may fail in another.

This does not mean that experiences of other states, gained either in distant theaters or in their own domestic environment are not useful. On the contrary: these experiences are very valuable raw materials – but only raw materials. From their experience we may distill general principles, which may then be adapted to the doctrines and training of own forces. The following case studies are such raw materials: they illuminate some peculiarities of information operations conducted in the course of counterinsurgency operations.

### ***Punjab 1980-1994***<sup>12</sup>

The Sikh insurgency in the Punjab had a number of root causes, from economic and social tensions through politicization of the Sikh religion and the manipulations of India's Prime Minister, to incitement by the Sikh diaspora. The goal of the insurgents was creation of Khalistan – a sovereign Sikh theocratic state. They thought to achieve their goal through anarchy: terrorist attacks, indiscriminate violence and mass mobilization actions would create and sustain the greatest possible chaos, until either Indian society and government tire of the fight and accept Khalistan's independence, or the international community tires of the daily bad news from the Punjab and force India to grant independence.

State and union governments were at a disadvantage in the information environment. It was not at all clear, whether the state's political elite wanted to suppress the insurgency, or wanted to exploit it for its own purposes. For the union government Punjab was just one of many urgent problems. Other parties dominated the state legislature and the union parliament – which led to the

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<sup>11</sup> KISS, Álmos Péter: *Átvihetők-e az aszimmetrikus hadviselés tapasztalatai?* Budapest, Hadtudomány, 2009. electronic edition, [http://mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2009/2009\\_elektronikus/2009\\_e\\_8.pdf](http://mhtt.eu/hadtudomany/2009/2009_elektronikus/2009_e_8.pdf)

<sup>12</sup> The two primary sources for this section are: SAHNI, Ajai (2000): *Free Speech in an Age of Violence - The Challenge of Non-governmental Suppression*, in Gill, K.P.S. and SAHNI, Ajay, editors: *Terror and Containment - Perspectives of India's Internal Security*, New Delhi, Gyan Publishing House Ltd, 2001. SBN:81-212-0712-6, pp 161-182 and GILL, Kanwar Pal Singh: *"Endgame In Punjab: 1988-1993*, South Asia Terrorism Portal, 2001, <http://www.satp.org/satporgrp/publication/faultlines/volume1/Fault1-kpstext.htm>

contradictions and complications. Thus, the messages of the governments were unclear, ambiguous, weak and contradictory.

In contrast, the insurgents had a single cause, a single goal, a single message – Khalistan's independence. The "spirit of the age" was also on the insurgents' side: since they were revolutionaries, they could not do anything wrong in the eyes of the opinion-makers. They could commit unspeakable atrocities, manipulate the media, intimidate the workers of aid agencies, mislead "independent observers" – their good faith was not questioned, and excuses were found for even for actions that breached the most fundamental human norms.

Khalistan's voice was somewhat muted by censorship – but censorship is a negative tool; it is no substitute for positive messages. Furthermore, censorship had to be suspended during those periods when the government was seeking compromise. The period of the V.P. Singh and Chandra Shekar governments (1988-1991) is particularly instructive: in tandem with increasing terrorism, the Khalistan movement initiated a masterful propaganda campaign. As a result of the campaign's success and the weakness of the state and union governments, by 1991 the insurgents were on the brink of success.

The insurgents issued the "Panth"<sup>13</sup> code of conduct" for the news media, and demanded full compliance from press, radio and TV forums. They enforced the code by murdering editors, journalist, TV announcers and even street vendors. The perpetrators were often captured or killed in encounters with police, but their spectacularly brutal violence did intimidate the media, and most outlets strictly obeyed the code for a while.<sup>14</sup>

Legal front institutions organized huge mass mobilization events, which became the building blocks in the victim-narrative and the mythology of sacrifice and martyrdom. Protest strikes that paralyzed the life of cities, demonstrations that disrupted rail and road traffic and prayer rallies in honor of fallen insurgents were daily events. After every police action or arrest groups of activists would harass police stations and high ranking officers<sup>15</sup> (and attempt to provoke arrest). The *gurudwaras* (Sikh temples) proved to be excellent

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<sup>13</sup> "Panth" is the worldwide Sikh community - similar to the *umma* of the Muslims. The most important demands of the code were the prohibition of certain words and expressions (e.g. *atankvadi* - terrorist in Punjabi); prohibition of all non-Punjabi language broadcasts; Khalistan press releases and propaganda had to be published without modification (and in the case of state media, without censorship); changes had to be made in personnel and in programming; female broadcasters had to cover their hair.

<sup>14</sup> Only one media group, the Hind Samachar Group refused to obey the code. The government mobilized significant forces (upt to two police battalions on some occasions) in its defense. In spite of this defense, the group paid a heavy price for its principled stand: it lost 62 people, among them the owner, editors, journalists, but also street vendors.

<sup>15</sup> *Gherao* is hindi for surround, encircle. It is a frequent form of street politics and protest in South Asia. The target of the *gherao* (generally a prominent public figure) is surrounded in a public place by a group of activists, who loudly demand his attention (in reality, it is the public's attention they want to attract). Obviously, the task is much easier, if the target is stationary, as e.g. a police station.

propaganda outlets in the religious events designed to instill and sustain community consciousness. The crowds necessary for making the events meaningful were mobilized by coercion: village councils were ordered to provide the necessary numbers; buses and trucks were requisitioned for transport; the loudspeakers of the *gurudwaras* announced the time and place of assembly, and warned about the consequences of disobedience. The message was clear – there was no disobedience.<sup>16</sup>

The mass mobilization program was supplemented by a human rights campaign, in which the committed activists of the front organizations were aided by opportunists who wanted to be on the winning side, and by those who are best described by Lenin's expression as "useful idiots." In this period the insurgents killed an average of 200 people per month, but the human rights activists found fault only with the police: every arrest was that of "innocent citizens;" every dead insurgent was murdered by police in "false encounters." The Indian and international press were soon full of reports of police abuse; in every case "it was widely known," that atrocities took place "in a nearby village" or in similar undefined location, and the "reliable witness" of the event was invariably someone other than the person making the allegations.

The number of policemen available for operations was seriously reduced, because the mass events required their presence. This reduced the intensity of police operations, which created opportunities for the armed insurgent organizations. Political violence (which in late 1988 had been a problem only in the districts along the Pakistan border) again engulfed the whole state. A particularly worrisome aspect of the violence was that some of it was directed against the families of the security forces.

The insurgents' message was clear: there is no alternative to Khalistan; neither the government, nor the security forces can prevent independence; anyone, who tries will perish. The integration of focused violence with information operations was far more effective in delivering the message, than either one or the other element would have been on its own.

The state and union governments could not create a narrative that could effectively counter the idea of Khalistan. Military operations carried out with overwhelming force, the detention of prominent Sikh leaders, special police powers, special courts with simplified rules of evidence, suspension of civil rights and censorship – all these may have been necessary. But this was communicated very poorly to the people. In the hands of the propagandists the measures served as proof that the union government was giving up democracy and turning towards tyranny and harbored hostile intentions toward the Sikhs. At

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<sup>16</sup> This does not mean, that the movement had no mass support. On the contrary: the predominantly rural Sikh population initially reacted positively to the conflation of religion and politics, and to the fiery speeches of the mass rallies.



the same tie, they made the position of moderate politicians untenable in the radicalized Sikh society.

But the Khalistan movement also had failures in the information environment, especially due to the violent bent of its activists. It was difficult to reconcile the movement's message that it was fighting for the Sikh religion and for every Sikh with actions that clearly violated the most fundamental tenets of religion: rape, unrestrained violence against non-combatants, abuse of those who provided shelter and sustenance. By 1992 the difference between message and reality alienated most supporters of the movement, and by the end of 1994 the security forces suppressed the insurgency.

### ***Israel-Hezbollah – Israel-Hamas***

For over 60 years one of the determining factors of international politics has been the continuous confrontation and occasional armed conflict between Israel and her neighbors. The last two conflicts (South Lebanon, 2006. July-August and Gaza, 2008-09 winter) offer several valuable lessons on strategic communications in asymmetric warfare.<sup>17</sup>

Israel fights her wars in accordance with her own world-view and her own values, and – perhaps not wisely – largely ignores those of other states, other cultures and other religions. This attitude was evident in 2006: Israel considered the Lebanon war just and her operations justified, but did very little to justify and explain her actions to the rest of the world. The primary goal of Israeli IO was favorably to influence Israeli public opinion, Israeli political parties and the closest international allies. Her media-operators considered the opinions of Arab, European and other hostile or neutral opinion makers unchangeable, and made no attempt to influence them.

Israel was unable to exploit the propaganda advantage of being the victim of an unjustified and unprovoked attack that also violated international norms; she was unable to communicate to the world the justification and lawfulness of her military operations, and proved unable to mount quick and effective preemptive information strikes when operations had unexpected results (civilian casualties, Israeli failures). Instead of emphasizing the suspicious circumstances that surrounded the Qana incident, she reacted with regret and the suspension of operations. To the Hezbollah propaganda that emphasized the destruction of infrastructure and the suffering of civilians she did not respond by showing that Hezbollah deployed its weapons in civilian areas (often within private residences), and thereby put in danger those in whose name it claimed to fight.

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<sup>17</sup> KIS-BENEDEK, József: *A libanoni háború biztonságpolitikai és katonai összefüggései*, Felderítő Szemle, 2006/3. pp. 12-23 and KIS-BENEDEK, József: *Az izrael-hamasz háború biztonságpolitikai és katonai összefüggései*, Felderítő Szemle, 2009/1., pp 12-35

Neither the armed forces, nor any other government institution made an attempt to gain control of the information space. Journalists and TV crew roamed freely in the operational areas and broadcast everything with hardly any restrictions – Hezbollah's missile crews often relied on real-time broadcasts on Israeli TV to adjust their fire. There was no clearly defined "Israeli government position," which every soldier and government official could adhere to (or if there was, this author did not recognize it). Statements were made by everyone asked, and everyone said what came to mind – often colossal inanities that were greatly harmful to Israel's interests. An early statement of the Chief of Staff may be considered the apex in this category: *"If we do not get back our captured soldiers, we turn back Lebanon's clock by 20 years."*<sup>18</sup> From a military point of view, there is nothing wrong with this – a soldier's task is precisely to keep turning back the enemy's clock, until his will is broken. But for anyone even marginally familiar with the Middle East it was clear, that Lebanon was as much a victim of Hezbollah as Israel – and she had much more limited options to change her situation.

The question of "proportionality" was especially harmful to Israel's cause. Arab diplomats emphasized on every possible forum, that Israel responded to Hezbollah's provocation with disproportionate force, her retaliatory strikes caused disproportionate damage compared to the scale of the original attack. The chorus was soon joined by "the usual suspects:" not only some western news media and non-government organizations, but also some UN officials (among them Kofi Annan, the General Secretary) and some prominent European politicians (e.g. Jacques Chirac, the president of France) – people who, due to their training in law and politics, should be familiar with the meaning of proportionality in international humanitarian law.<sup>19</sup> Israel reacted slowly and falteringly – the accusations were left mostly unaddressed, and months or years later nobody was interested in the suspicious circumstances of the Qana incident, the true meaning of "proportionality," or the story of the "missile attack" on ambulances.<sup>20</sup>

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<sup>18</sup> *Israel authorizes 'severe' response to abductions*, CNN 2006.06.12.

<http://web.archive.org/web/20070305101409/http://www.cnn.com/2006/WORLD/meast/07/12/mideast/index.html>

<sup>19</sup> Proportionality has nothing to do with adjusting the scale of the response to the enemy's weakness or strength, or to the nature and extent of the damage the original attack caused. It simply means that the commander must balance the likely civilian casualties and material damage against the military advantage he expects to gain from the operation. KEILER, Jonathan F.: *The End of Proportionality*, Carlisle Barracks PA, Parameters, 2009/1. pp. 53-64.

<sup>20</sup> SNYDER, Michael D: *Information Strategies Against A Hybrid Threat: What the Recent Experience of Israel versus Hezbollah/Hamas Tell The US Army* in FARQUHAR, Scott C., (ed.): *Back to Basics – A Study of the Second Lebanon War and Operation Cast Lead*, Fort Leavenworth KS, Combat Studies Institute Press, Combat Studies Institute Press, 2009. ISBN 978-0-9823283-3-0 <http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/farquhar.pdf>

In contrast, Hezbollah executed a truly masterful strategic communication campaign. It deployed most of its military equipment and facilities in the civilian residential areas of South Lebanon's cities and villages (often without the knowledge or consent of the local civilians – the people most likely to be affected). The Israeli response to the missile fire inevitably struck civilian homes and facilities – and this was a propaganda gold mine for Hezbollah's propaganda experts. For days on end the TV screens of the world – especially the Arab world – were filled with footage of fleeing civilians, wailing women in black headscarf, confused old men shuffling among the ruins, the collapsing Lebanese infrastructure, destroyed bridges, ruined buildings, a teddy bear among the rubble – and finally the dead of Qana. Where the visual effects were not sufficiently dramatic, they were "improved" by artistic arrangement of dead bodies or by Photoshopping images to multiply the destruction.<sup>21</sup>

Hezbollah established full control over the operational area, and through close supervision of the reporters' activities it could dominate the information environment. Only reporters that had been carefully vetted were allowed to visit the combat zone – and those only with escorts. These "minders" showed only what Hezbollah wanted shown – primarily ruins and the suffering of civilians. There was only time to listen to the minder's explanation and take some carefully pre-arranged photos, and they were rushed to the next location. Photos and video footage could be made only of approved subjects, and those that disobeyed were threatened with expulsion and worse. It was particularly forbidden to record fighters, equipment and rockets: one of the pillars of Hezbollah's narrative was that it was Lebanese civilians who were facing one of the strongest military machines of the world. The greatest star-reporters of the international media tolerated this manipulation with a word of protest.

Israel lost the media war, because she could not respond effectively to Hezbollah propaganda. She could not define and explain her national goals, could not make quick and coherent answers to unexpected situations and to the accusation of disproportionality. She could not balance the fear and suffering of South Lebanon's population with those of Northern Israel's Jews, who lived under the daily barrage of Hezbollah rockets. It did not matter, that Hezbollah's and its supporters' deceptive propaganda subsequently came to light – the political damage had already been done, and could not be undone.

The situation was fundamentally different during the winter of 2008-2009, during Operation Cast Lead. The author closely followed both conflicts and saw immense improvement in Israeli strategic communications.

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<sup>21</sup> Three egregious examples are the burning Koran at the site of an attack that had taken place several hours earlier; the retouched photos of the Reuters photographer Adnan Hadj, and the "rescue team" at Qana striking dramatic and poignant poses for the camera with children's corpses. One of their number, Salam Daher became notorious on the internet as "Green Helmet Guy."

Based on the experience gained in Lebanon, the Israeli government created a "National Information Directorate," which imposed such discipline and coordination in the communications of government institutions as is seldom achieved by democratic governments at war. Every ministry adhered to one message; there were frequent press briefings, and a lot of information was provided to reporters – but they were not allowed to enter Gaza; contact between soldiers and the media was regulated, and the soldiers were not allowed to use their mobile telephones, which greatly increased operational security. The international public could see a dramatic change in the appearance, behavior and message of Israeli spokesmen: determined, strong faces; quiet, firm gaze; good speaking skills, with a hint of exotic accent – and one narrative, which emphasized Hamas's responsibility, the role of Iran and the lawfulness of Israeli operations.

Exploitation of the internet was remarkable: the armed forces created an accelerated review process, which allowed video footage gathered by intelligence flights and the on-board cameras of strike aircraft to be cleared for publication on video portals in a very short time. This way they could neutralize the "gate-keeper" function of press and TV editors. Even if the world's TV channels did not want to publish the footage of a secondary explosion in a mosque (which is irrefutable evidence of explosives having been stored in the place), the footage was still available, and received publicity through the portals' viewers.

They kept Gaza's population informed mainly through the mobile phone network: prior to an attack the directly affected people were warned in SMS messages to leave the area. This did not always work as intended: on several occasions people who would climb onto roofs and serve as a sort of human shield to prevent an airstrike. In other cases the warning was not followed by a strike – so nobody took the next warning seriously.

Control over the activities of reporters was a leaf out of Hezbollah's book: show the media what you want to show, and broadcast your message to the world through your own channels. Reporters were provided with copious amounts of information, but they were not allowed into Gaza. The reporters tolerated their enforced idleness with difficulty, and Gaza's isolation did not prevent Hamas from broadcasting its own message to the world. On the contrary: al-Jazeera's reporter was on the scene, and if the news networks wanted to publish video or still images from the operational area, they had no choice: they had to rely on this one source – which was a partisan of Hamas. Thus Hamas's narrative of "civilian casualties" reached the world's TV screens practically without any countervailing opinion or information, and there was hardly any mention of the measures Israel was taking to reduce civilian casualties.

According to some opinions,<sup>22</sup> Israel turned the international media – and consequently international public opinion – against herself by isolating Gaza and excluding reporters. But international media and opinion have consistently been anti-Israel. The decisions of the Israeli authorities made the success of their strategic communications less effective not by annoying a few star reporters, but by also denying the opportunity to sympathetic or neutral reporters to cover events in the battle zone.

Although the new procedures introduced after 2006 had some negative effects, they also brought significant benefits to Israel in at least three areas: public confidence in the efficiency and competence and efficiency of the government and the armed forces was restored; as a result of plugging information leaks, limiting the movement of the media and creating a communications monopoly operational security improved greatly; by isolating Gaza, Israel gained time to complete operations before international pressure became intolerable.

***Baghdad, December 2007. to February 2009.***<sup>23</sup>

To turn around a rapidly deteriorating security and political situation in Iraq, President George W. Bush ordered a surge of forces in January 2007. With the deployment of the new forces (altogether five brigades) the security situation improved significantly by the fall of 2007, but in spite of the huge technological and financial resources of the Coalition, the insurgents<sup>24</sup> still dominated the information environment. They had the information initiative, because their increasingly deadly terror attacks were immediately broadcast to the world by the international media. Insurgent operations were paralleled by an aggressive propaganda campaign, whose goals were the following:

- discredit the Iraqi government and security forces;
- reduce public support to the Iraqi government, the coalition and the security forces;
- retain passive support of the Iraqi public;
- break the American people's will and support for the war effort.

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<sup>22</sup> For example Lorenzo Cremonesi, reporter of the Italian *Corriere Della Serra*. Cited by SNYDER, pp. 128-129.

<sup>23</sup> ZIMMERMAN, Frank H.: *Attack, Attack, Attack - Information Operations: Multi-national Division Baghdad (4th Infantry Division) December 2007 to February 2009*, and OBIDINSKI, Therese L.: *Operationalizing Information Engagement*, San Antonio TX, IO Sphere, 2010/4 pp. 10-25.

<sup>24</sup> The insurgents were divided into several categories. The two most dangerous were "Al Qaida in Iraq" (AQI) and the "Special Group Criminals" (SGC) – shiite insurgents, trained, financed and directed from Iran. All insurgent groups followed similar tactics: missile strikes, ambushes, suicide bombings, vehicle-based bombs.

One of the principal strike forces of the coalition in the capital was the Multi-National Division, Baghdad – MND-B).<sup>25</sup> The Division Commander (MAJ Gen Jeffrey Hamond) placed great emphasis on information operations; for example, in the course of the two daily targeting meetings the G-7 chief had to brief the IO support of every operation. In December 2007, the Division commenced an aggressive, offensive IO campaign, attrited the insurgents' superiority in information and propaganda, and broke their grip on the population as well.

The 12 positions allocated to the G-7 (IO) in the MND-B Headquarters table of organization soon proved to be insufficient, therefore the number was tripled (14 of the G-7's 36 personnel were civilian contractors). The number of IO specialists was increased by a similar ratio in the brigades and battalions as well. From the very first days close cooperation developed between G-7 and G-2 (Intelligence), which allowed the integration of IO into targeting. Cooperation of the two staff departments provided background material for psychological warfare operations (PSYOPS) and provided detailed information on target audiences. Intelligence reports highlighted the successes or shortcomings of particular information operations and identified the sensitivity of certain target groups to certain information, which could then be used in further information operations.

At first information operations were like floodlights in a theater: they covered the Division's entire area of operations (AO) – a huge area, with a very large and mixed target population. The results were not satisfactory: the limited IO resources were fragmented, the messages were diluted, and their intensity was limited in any particular location or situation. In order to achieve better focus, the floodlight approach was replaced with the "spotlight:"<sup>26</sup> for a certain period a well-defined area was "illuminated" by intensive information operations, then the spotlight was switched off, moved to another area and switched on there. At about the same time, information operations were centralized: planning and execution remained with the brigades, but allocation of resources and coordination of operations became Division HQ functions. The spotlight operations were carried out in designated Tactical Areas of Interest (TAI), where the division could dominate the information environment through continuous and concentrated operations – in effect, it "outshouted" the insurgents.

The MND-B's most important task was to create a secure environment for the Iraqi population; therefore one of the main IO functions was information on

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<sup>25</sup> In reality, the MND-B was an American division with attached (primarily American) forces and an American table of organization. During the events described here the MND-B was the Fourth Infantry Division.

<sup>26</sup> The source for this information (ZIMMERMAN) uses the term "flashlight" for the new approach, but the author feels that "spotlight" is the logical alternative to "floodlight."

potential dangers and threats. When intelligence reports identified an imminent threat, the population of the affected districts was warned by quick distributions of prepared information packages that also recommended actions to minimize risk. The most common media were leaflets dropped by helicopter and handbills. The latter proved to be the most effective: they were distributed by Iraqi soldiers and policemen, whose presence contributed to the credibility of the message, and also improved the population's opinion about the government and the security forces. These operations had a positive influence on the opinion of the population and contributed to establishing security.

The first "spotlight" IO was executed as part of Operation Loyal Strike – 2008.02.01-2008.02.21. The goal of this short operation was to destroy an Al-Qaeda cell. The IO messages were intended to drive a wedge between AQ and the population by demonizing the AQ leadership. The primary media were handbills, posters and loudspeaker messages that identified the targeted individuals and detailed their crimes. The operation's success validated the spotlight approach. The IO messages that flooded the selected TAI, in conjunction with strike and search operation made the TAI a no-go zone for the targeted individuals.

During the re-occupation of Thawra district (Sadr City) March-June 2008.) the MND-B concentrated all its IO resources in the district and achieved information dominance. The messages emphasized the legitimacy of the government and the security forces and demonized the AQI and SGC groups. Continuous information operations preceded operations on the ground. Leaflet drops, handbills, the "Baghdad Alan – Baghdad Now" (a freely distributed Arabic and English language daily), radio and loudspeaker broadcasts, as well as the involvement of key social, political, religious and business (Key Leader Engagement – KLE) informed the district's population well in advance about the government's intentions. During May and June, as the coalition forces penetrated into Thawra, 12 large billboards were set up. Feedback indicated, that the local population viewed these as signs of growing security and stability, therefore several more billboards were set up in the following months.

Early in the Thawra operation it was difficult to gauge the effects of IO. But by June it became clear that IO effectively supported operations on the ground, contributed to minimizing civilian casualties, and to the population's positive opinion of the coalition forces' presence. As the coalition forces gradually destroyed the AQI and SGC groups, the population was freed from the insurgents' impositions, and begun to perceive the messages of the coalition as more credible, than the "foreign occupation" rhetoric of the insurgents.

These operations validated the Division's IO procedures – primarily the spotlight approach and the flooding of the target area with IO materials. Handbills distributed in conjunction with leaflet drops proved to be particularly

effective. Their additional positive side-effect was that Iraqi security forces maintained continuous contact with the population. An important factor in the success of IO messages was the close correlation between messages and events. One day Thwart's inhabitants saw the posters and handbills seeking information on local AQI and SGC operatives – a few days later they saw the same individuals fall in firefights with the security forces or being taken to jail in handcuffs.

Operation Ironhorse Blizzard (August 25 to 30 November 2008.) targeted every enemy group, their support networks and their leadership cadres simultaneously throughout the MND-B's AO. The coordination of combat operations, non-lethal operations, IO, public information and intelligence was far above anything that happened before. IO concentrated on several enemy networks simultaneously – several floodlights illuminate several targets at the same time. The IO component of the operation used far more resources<sup>27</sup> than any time in the past: handbills, leaflet drops, posters, billboards, press, loudspeaker, TV and radio broadcasts, press conferences, the "Baghdad Alan – Bagdad Now" newspaper. The printed materials were distributed primarily by personnel of the Iraqi army, the police and the Sons of Iraq militia at the checkpoints and during patrols conducted in zones that were supporting the enemy. The messages emphasized the leaders' foreign affiliation, their criminal conduct and their behavior that was incompatible with Islam. Other messages called attention to discovered arms caches, captured criminals, humanitarian assistance, reconstruction and economic development. Involvement of key local leaders (KLE) opened further communication channels into the areas that were supporting the insurgents.

Synchronization of combat operations and IO led to significant degradation of the insurgents' operational capabilities. They lost much of their active and passive support, and became vulnerable. Opinions about the Iraqi government and security forces improved greatly. The MND-B's activities were successful: attacks in and around Baghdad were reduced by 80 percent; the capabilities of the Iraqi security forces improved significantly; provincial elections (January 31 2009) took place without incident.

## ***CONCLUSIONS***

The case studies allow us to draw some conclusions and formulate some basic principles that can serve as useful guides in an asymmetric conflict.

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<sup>27</sup> The order of magnitude of the resources concentrated for this operation is remarkable: 20 000 000 leaflets were dropped in three months, 2 000 000 handbills, 600 000 hotline cards és 2 500 000 newspapers were distributed, 170 000 wanted posters were posted and 66 billboards were set up. In addition, the radio, TV and loudspeaker broadcasts added up to several thousand hours.



Any strategic communications plan is better than no plan. In the Punjab the divergent goals of the state and union governments, as well as the frequent changes in government policies guaranteed, that the propaganda of the Khalistan movement will not be opposed by effective counterpropaganda of the government forces. Although Hezbollah had proven itself in the past to be a consummate master of propaganda, in 2006 Israel still engaged it in a major conflict without a discernible strategic communications plan. Lacking a plan, Israel was unable to convince the world, that Hezbollah was a real national security threat. Lacking a plan, she was unable to handle the charges of "disproportionality," and could not convince the world, that she had as much right to defend herself as any other state.

An indispensable condition of the success of strategic communications is the unity of messages: the political leadership, the security forces, the ministries must all follow one narrative both in the statements of their employees, and in their actions. This requires integration and central supervision of all communications activities – however, it does not mean that everyone must parrot the same text, word for word. The target audiences and the best media to address them must be identified, and the messages must be tailored to the situation, the audience and the transmitting medium.

Every line of operation, and within it every operation has an IO dimension. During the planning phase activities (combat actions, administrative actions, provision of basic services) and words (IO) must be coordinated, and during execution the messages must be closely timed to actions on the ground. If this correlation does not exist, IO will be counterproductive. This correlation contributed to the success of the MND-B's information operations. To achieve the necessary harmony between message and actions, IO must become the counterinsurgency's integrative line of operations. Every line of operation and the actual operations themselves must have their own, integrated IO component.

Coordination of information operations and actions on the ground is important in non-kinetic operations as well. The ideal end-state for the MND-B's operations was a return to normal, peaceful, everyday life, to the rule of law, to a functioning public administration. To that end, the functions and operations of the Mayor's office, city government, the Baghdad Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT-B), government ministries, and countless other institutions and individuals had to be coordinated, and effectively communicated to the citizens. Without such coordination, the omissions of the various institutions would have contradicted the IO messages. Without continuous communications, the citizens would not have noticed (or would have noticed only with considerable delay), that significant – albeit incremental – changes took place in their lives.

Even the most generously funded armed forces do not have unlimited resources – and this is especially true about information operations that often

have to take their place behind combat operations, ammunition supply and other, more traditional military considerations. Therefore, IO tasks must be prioritized, and the resources must be concentrated on the most important ones – otherwise the effectiveness of information operations will be at risk: the messages will be drowned in the general cacophony of counterinsurgency operations. The successful experiment of the MND-B has demonstrated, that just as artillery fire can be concentrated onto well-defined target areas, so can IO.

The effectiveness of IO must be constantly monitored, and the operations must be adjusted on the basis of feedback. This can be a difficult task: resources may not be available, the target audience may be out of reach, expertise may be lacking, or the results may be contradictory. Selecting the right metrics is of obvious importance.

The MND-B relied on intelligence reports and on the analyses of public opinion surveys conducted by contractors (Iraqi Advisor Task Force, Gallup Baghdad Survey). The "Baghdad Alan – Baghdad Now" newspaper was subject to a lot of criticism (open American propaganda, low quality). The criticism may be well-founded, but IO is not a literary essay competition: success or failure does not depend on elegant composition, but on the effect the publication has on the target audience – and the effect may often be gauge only through indirect metrics, for example through the increase or decrease in the quality and quantity of intelligence information flowing to the security forces from the population.

Opinion is divided on the effectiveness of flooding the target area with IO materials: in the opinion of some experts this only generates immunity in the target population.<sup>28</sup> Baghdad's citizens often complained about the quantities of leaflets, but their behavior closely resembled those of western consumers, who complain about advertisements, but do change their purchasing habits. In spite of the complaints, support for the Iraqi government and coalition security forces increased. So, one condition of IO success seems to be the widest possible publication of the message: if the message is credible, it will persuade the audience – even the enemy audience. MAJ Obdinski is correct, when she says that in order to reach the widest possible audience, every possible communications channel must be put to use: those who do not watch TV or do not listen to radio may still be reached by printed media.

Only the non-state belligerent may manipulate the news media with impunity: the reporters tolerated without complaint the restrictions imposed on them by Hezbollah in 2006; similar restrictions imposed by Israel in 2008 elicited their loud outrage.<sup>29</sup> In any case, isolating Gaza and excluding the

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<sup>28</sup> The two authors reporting on the MND-B's operations (LTC Frank H. Zimmerman and MAJ Therese L. Obidinski) served in the division at the same time, yet came to opposite conclusion on this question.

<sup>29</sup> To the best of this author's knowledge, there was only a single voice (Anderson Cooper of the CNN) raised against Hezbollah's policies. Since he brought up the subject only after the war had

international media proved to be counterproductive: al-Jazeera was left without competition and could manipulate its footage and broadcast its anti-Israeli opinion with no contradicting voice in the international media-space. International news-media would likely have shown Israel in a more favorable light both in southern Lebanon and in Gaza, if she had followed the American example of "embedding" reporters – even reporters who are hostile to Israel – with combat units in contact with the enemy. Regardless of political convictions, professional reporters are not likely to refuse the opportunity to send their reports from the very front. Their presence would have guaranteed some coverage of Israel's views.

News media are the most effective weapons of the non-state belligerent. "If you did not tape it, you did not fight" is the essence of Hezbollah's doctrine. Non-state belligerents plan their operations to achieve the greatest possible psychological effect, and to make maximum use of dramatic footage and images. Their most effective narrative emphasizes persecution and victimhood, and exaggerates both real and imagined grievances. Civilian victims serve this narrative very well; therefore non-state belligerents will not hesitate to use civilians – the weaker and more vulnerable, the better – as human shields. For the warriors of radical Islam, this is not just a tactical, but also an ideological decision. By provoking collateral damage and then broadcasting it to the world, they bring the faithful into the struggle on their own side. At the same time, they deny that neutrals, bystanders or outsiders have a right to exist. In their binary world everyone is obliged to participate in the holy struggle. Those, who participate and die, will be richly rewarded; those, who remain on the sidelines, are supporting the enemy by their very neutrality, and therefore deserve to die.

The state that ignores international public opinion takes an enormous risk. With her nuclear arsenal and million-man defense forces India could afford it without negative consequences – the world was not paying much attention to the Punjab, in any case. Israel, constantly in the crossfire of international news media, cannot afford it. In the interest of international legitimacy, she must convince her key allies and the international organizations, that her operations are legitimate according to the key target audiences' system of values. Israel was partly successful in this during both conflicts that were analyzed here: her most important strategic ally, the United States, supported her firmly and decisively. She was less successful in convincing other actors of the international community and the international organizations, and she failed to convince most non-governmental organizations.<sup>30</sup>

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already ended, it war really more of an acknowledgement of having been a willing subject of manipulation, than a protest against restrictions on the press.

<sup>30</sup> Although the latter have very limited official international standing, their non-profit status and the generally worthy goals they claim to pursue have given them quite an extraordinary influence in the international sphere.

One of the most important tasks of the security forces is to seize and retain (or, in a worse case, recover from the enemy) the "informational high ground." The Internet plays a particularly important role today, and it must not be allowed to become the non-state belligerent's exclusive maneuver-space, from which he can broadcast his messages and execute economy-of-force information operations.

Israel's example is a warning, that it is a grave mistake to underestimate the importance of information operations. However, the Punjab example is a warning, that it must not be overestimated either. The successful propaganda of the Khalistan movement (in of the uncertain state and federal policies) was more than balanced by the successful operations of the Indian security forces. Credible news of dead, captured or surrendered insurgents (many of whom switched to the government side) and offers of amnesty proved to be more persuasive, than Khalistan propaganda.

In asymmetric conflicts influencing the target audiences is far more, than just important – this is the key to success: *"... communication superiority is a prerequisite for success in irregular warfare, just as air superiority is a prerequisite for victory in conventional war. To date we have been ineffective in the strategic communication campaign to strengthen the will of our own people, to weaken the will of our enemies, and gain the support of people around the world. In the current battle of wills, strategic communication is the center of gravity. This conflict is not to be won through economic, diplomatic, and military means."*<sup>31</sup> For the time being the non-state belligerent – perhaps because as the weaker contestant, he must be more inventive, perhaps for other reasons – understand this better and deeper, than the society under attack. It is incumbent upon the security forces not only to catch up with him, but to make better, more effective use of the information environment.

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Zsolt MÉSZÁROS PhD aspirant, ELTE

## HOW TO GIVE BACK STOLEN DIGNITY – ASSESSING JOHN HOWARD’S ABORIGINAL POLICIES IN AUSTRALIA

*„I met a man in Darwin jail who had been stolen from his mother at the age of three, sat in the back of a truck and driven for three days through the tropical heat to an institution in Darwin... ...And yet so often I have only ever met with friendship, humour and respect from those same Aboriginal people from whom I might expect anger and hate.”*

Australian novelist Richard Flanagan<sup>1</sup>

### *Introduction*

John Howard, the second longest-serving Prime Minister in the history of Australia, was famous for his contradictory stance on immigration: "tough" on illegal immigration in order to win support from the working class, while simultaneously "soft" on legal immigration to win support from employers.<sup>2</sup> While hundreds of Europeans (including many Hungarian families<sup>3</sup>) were welcomed with open arms in the late 90s and the early years of the new millennium, illegal immigrants from Asia were placed in island camps off the coast of the Fifth Continent (a policy termed as the Pacific Solution).

John Howard’s fear of Asian immigrants can be traced back to the long-lasting distrust of anything alien to the European culture, that the white majority has been trying to implement since the colonization of Australia by the British in 1770. The aversion toward “other cultures” has not only affected the new waves of Asian immigrants, but also the remaining members one of the longest-standing civilizations of the world, the Aboriginal people of Australia. In Central and Eastern Europe, 2005-2015 has been declared the Decade of the Roma Inclusion Programme. In the last leg of the initiative, it is time to ponder upon its successes

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<sup>1</sup> Tony Abbott, “Howard government didn't say sorry but did a lot more,” *The Australian* 13 Feb. 2008.

<sup>2</sup> Gittens, Ross. “Honest John's migrant two-step,” *The Age*. 20 August 2003. Retrieved 29 November 2011 from <http://www.theage.com.au/articles/2003/08/19/1061261148920.html>.

<sup>3</sup> Between 1996-2000 about 1,000 Hungarian citizens arrived to Australia as immigrants. *Census 2006*. Australian Bureau of Statistics. Retrieved on 29 November 2011. <http://www.censusdata.abs.gov.au>

and failures by comparing minority management cases near and far. Albeit Gypsies are neither indigenous in the region (like the Aboriginals in Australia), nor newcomers (like the Asian immigrants), it is worth looking at the history of a highly developed nation's minority policies, so that we could adopt new ideas and discover that, contrary to popular belief, even rich countries face problems which they cannot simply solve with money.

Prime Minister John Howard has divided the public with his controversial handling of the Aboriginal problem. Critics accuse him of racism and the denial of the horrendous deeds of the past, while his supporters claim that Howard – instead of pondering on past mistakes – tried to mend the current problems facing the Indigenous population.

To be able to assess Howard's policies in this matter, it is worth taking a look at the history of the Aboriginal-European interactions. The first part of my paper will recapitulate the most important milestones in Indigenous issues in the past hundred years leading up to the Howard administration. The second part will list and analyze the Aboriginal policies and measures taken during the 12-year long Liberal-National Coalition government from 1996 to 2007. The third part will assess and evaluate the effects of Howard's policies on the standard of living of the Aborigines.

### ***History of Aboriginal-European Interactions***

#### **Native Populations at the turn of the 19th Century**

Hundred years ago Australian anthropologists held the following view of the Indigenous people of the Southern continent:

*“... aboriginals have furnished the largest number of ape-like characters. The more one investigates the truer does this statement prove to be... ... [they] belong to the group of anthropoid apes – the gorilla, orang, gibbon and chimpanzee.”<sup>4</sup>*

The local inhabitants of the fifth continent were no more than apes and they were being treated in a similar manner as well. Who would have imagined that a sudden ideological turn sixty years later will lead to the complete legal inclusion of Aborigines into the Australian society?

The end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century signaled the beginning of the so-called “White Awakening” over Aboriginal issues, i.e. a feeling of guilt over the handling of the local population and during the European colonization of the continent. Nevertheless, the Australian natives had to start out with a handicap compared to other non-white races of the colonized world, as their status was the lowest among

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<sup>4</sup> W. Ramsey Smith, “Aborigines and Apelike Creatures,” Evening News 12 Jan. 1907.

all human races. They were considered by many – as mentioned above – equal to a chimpanzee. It was not the opinion of a lunatic, but a widespread notion shared by the Australian intelligentsia. In his haste to collect rare specimens of the Aboriginal races ‘destined to extinction’, the curator of the Australian Museum, E.P. Ramsay wrote these lines in his correspondence to James Hector, curator of the Auckland Museum:

*“The shooting season is over in Queensland and the ‘Black Game’ is protected by more humane laws than formerly. So it is impossible to obtain reliable skulls and skeletons.”*<sup>5</sup>

This passage is an awkward paradox proving that awareness of the injustices was slowly beginning to surface among the white population. Digging up graves and body-snatching were declared illegal by the High Court of Australia in 1908. Nonetheless, this legislation did not prevent gravediggers from continuing to desecrate Indigenous tombs without punishment upon orders of museums and collectors up until the early 1920s.<sup>6</sup>

We could say in a sarcastic tone that the *Aborigines Welfare Act* passed in 1909 was a step up the ladder for Aborigines on their way to receiving equal human status with the rest of the population. From an animal class they were to be promoted to second-class people from 1909 onwards. The Act prohibited the selling of alcohol to Aborigines and punished anyone selling or buying alcohol to them. This paternalistically benevolent act was aimed at mending the problems of the past, i.e. the use of alcohol by the settlers as a tool of subjugation and annihilation of the Indigenous people. The Act was only withdrawn in 1965 as two widely publicized cases stirred public objection.

Albert Namatjira was an Indigenous artist who achieved international fame in the early 1950s and was regarded as a showcase example for a native talent meeting white expectations. In acknowledgment of his achievements, the Australian government granted him full citizenship, thus removing the ban on the purchase of alcohol. All the same, he was arrested and jailed for giving alcohol to his two adult sons and his friends. He died soon afterwards due to maltreatment and depression in prison. A similar fate befell Robert Tudawali, a well-known Aboriginal actor, who was also jailed for possession of alcoholic beverages.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>5</sup> E.P. Ramsay wrote these lines in his correspondence on 28 August 1882 to the curator of the Auckland Museum, James Hector.

<sup>6</sup> Paul Turnbull, „Science, National Identity and Aboriginal Body Snatching in Nineteenth Century Australia,” *Working Papers in Australian Studies*, (James Cook University, 1991) 12.

<sup>7</sup> Scott Bennett, *Aborigines and Political Power* (Sydney: Allen & Unwin Australia Pty Ltd., 1989) 7-9.



### ***The 1950s: the Era of Pro-Aboriginal Movements and Activists***

The Aboriginal issue was brought into the foreground starting only from the 1950s. This was due in large part to the efforts of activists such as William Ferguson, Jack Patten and Charles Perkins. Perkins's 'Freedom Rides' revealed the injustices suffered by the Indigenous population. In 1965 he rode his bus through several towns of New South Wales, drawing attention to apartheid-like discrimination, such as Aborigines-only sections of cinemas and separated swimming pools for white children. Another activist, Kath Walker embarked on a walking tour calling for equal wages for Aboriginal workers and compensation for lost lands. Several organizations, including the Aboriginal-Australian Fellowship (AAF) and the Federal Council for the Advancement of Aborigines (FCAA) worked hard to stir white consciences.

The pressure on the State administrations caused by the huge publicity and media coverage of these events finally achieved its objective in 1967. The Holt Liberal-Country Government held a referendum on the deletion of the two most discriminating sections of the Commonwealth Constitution:

1. Section 51: "The Parliament shall, subject to this Constitution have the power to make laws for the peace, order, and good government of the Commonwealth with respect to... ..the people of any race, other than the aboriginal people in any State, for whom it is necessary to make special laws."
2. In reckoning the numbers of the people of the Commonwealth, or of a State or other part of the Commonwealth, aboriginal shall not be counted.<sup>8</sup>

The referendum on constitutional amendment passed with a 90.77 % yes vote, the highest ever recorded, making it clear that the majority of the population wanted to find a solution to the Aboriginal problem. We could say that 1967 was the year when the Aborigines, at least on paper, became full citizens of their own country!

### ***Aboriginal Issues in the Pre-Howardian Politics***

The Australian political parties had very similar programs in their Indigenous policies in the pre-1970s era, that of 'assimilation' and integration of the half-castes into the mainstream white community. It was widespread belief that the full-blood Aborigines are doomed to die out and the half-castes needed to be 'saved'. Thus, the *General Child Welfare* legislation, a cognomen for the infamous child

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<sup>8</sup> *Ibid.* 9-11.

abductions performed by government servants, was introduced to place lighter-skinned Indigenous children in white foster homes or special institutions. According to researchers, one in three to one in ten Aboriginal children were seized and separated from their parents by the Protectors of Northern Territories and Western Australia during the years of the Stolen Generation.<sup>9</sup>

The *White Australia Policy* practiced by the federal government did not only pertain to immigrants, but to the local native population as well. Sterilization and separation from the parents were implemented to ‘breed out the color’. Scientists studying the genetics of mankind proved that Aboriginals originate from the Caucasian, not the Negroid stock, thus making possible the breeding out of the race without atavistic throwback.

The *Aboriginal Tent Embassy* was set up in front of the Parliament building on Australia Day in 1972, presenting a list of demands to the McMahon government. The demands included the compensation for lost land, titles to mining rights and control of the Northern Territory. The Tent Embassy was torn down several times by the government, just to be rebuilt weeks later. The Tent Embassy has become a symbol of Aboriginal resistance to the government’s policies.

The 1980s brought promising but unfulfilled election promises. The Australian Labor Party (ALP) promised the natives veto rights over mining, royalties, compensation and protection of sacred sites. Nevertheless, mining companies and rural farmers opposed the land rights grant and exerted pressure on both the ALP and the Liberal Party. As a result, ALP candidate Bob Hawke dropped the promise on veto over mining and phrased the land rights legislation as “to be implemented voluntarily by the States.”<sup>10</sup>

1988 was the bicentenary for white settlement in Australia, a year of glory for the Europeans and a year of mourning for the Indigenous inhabitants. The Australian government, in its attempt to show responsibility for the past, convened a consultative conference in Barunga, whose results were to pave the way for Aboriginal self-determination. In 1991, Prime Minister Hawke blocked the mining exploration of Coronation Hill, a sacred site for the Jawryn people, as a sign of goodwill towards the Aboriginal population. This historical decision favoring the Aboriginals against economic interests was acclaimed by the Greens and most of the society, but criticized heavily by the economic actors.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>9</sup> Data collected by Robert Manne, “The Stolen Generations,” <[http://www.tim-richardson.net/misc/stolen\\_generation.html](http://www.tim-richardson.net/misc/stolen_generation.html)>.

<sup>10</sup> Bennett, *op.cit.* 36.

<sup>11</sup> F.G. Clarke, *Australia: a Concise Political and Social History* (Sydney: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich Publishers, 1992) 378.

1992 was a landmark in Australian history as the *Mabo decision* made irrelevant the declaration of terra nullius, or "land belonging to no-one" which had been the official stance since the commencement of British colonization in 1788, and recognized a form of native title to the traditional lands.<sup>12</sup>

### ***The Reign of Prime Minister Honorable John Winston Howard***

The Honorable John Winston Howard's four terms in government from 1996 to 2007 followed 13 years of opposition battle in the Australian Parliament. Thus, John Winston Howard came to power well-trained in political slogans and riding on the back of his strong conservative platform: family values, small government, Christian morals, and the virtues of economic liberalism (free enterprise and self-reliance). His staunch proamericanism and views on slowing down Asian immigration and denial of responsibility for Aboriginal problems were often the causes of open controversies.<sup>13</sup>

With regards to Aboriginal relations, he himself apostrophized the policies of the Liberal-National Coalition government as a 'deeds-not-words approach' to solving some urgent issues. Nonetheless, critics like Bonnell and Crotty expressed different views on John Howard: "[He] and his conservative allies in government and the media have waged a long campaign to influence the representation and public understanding of Australian history. They have sought to play down the historical harm done to Indigenous Australians... ... [his policies were] motivated by neoconservative ideology imported from the United States, the political interests of the Coalition government, and the personal background and convictions of the prime minister."<sup>14</sup> It is true that John Howard's *One Australia* policy was considered racist by his critics<sup>15</sup>. On the other hand, it was cherished by many as a determined step towards halting illegal immigration. Although the prime minister worked hard to emphasize his concern for Indigenous affairs, his promises tended to be well timed around election years and wore a taint of strong assimilation policies, without much regard for the native cultures and traditions. In this section

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<sup>12</sup> Australia, High Court of Australia, *Mabo vs. Queensland (No 2)* 3 Jun. 1992.

<sup>13</sup> Gabrielle Meagher and Shaun Wilson, „After Howard's decade, is Australia more conservative?" *Australian Review of Public Affairs*, 23 Feb. 2006, 12 Apr. 2009  
<[http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2006/02/meagher\\_wilson.html](http://www.australianreview.net/digest/2006/02/meagher_wilson.html)>.

<sup>14</sup> A. Bonnell and M. Crotty, „Australia's history under Howard, 1996-2007," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 2008: 149-165.

<sup>15</sup> One Australia was an immigration and ethnic affairs policy of the Liberal-National opposition in Australia, released in 1988. The One Australia policy proclaimed a vision of "one nation and one future". It called for a reduction in Asian immigration and opposed a reconciliation treaty with Aboriginal Australians.

we will take a look at some of John Howard's most important steps regarding Aboriginal matters and will give an analysis of their results and consequences.

### ***Where is the Love for my People? The Infamous "History Wars"***

One of the first measures undertaken by the Coalition government in power was to emphasize the greatness and glory of Australian achievements. The administration intended to paint a more affirming story about the rise of a new, democratic nation, and sought to play down the historical harm done to Indigenous Australians. The most effective way to convey this message was by varnishing the national history curriculum in the education system, where the glorification of Down Under could be best portrayed.

This step immediately aroused criticism from the public and from many academic historians, as well as from institutions like the Australian Broadcasting Corporation and the National Museum of Australia.<sup>16</sup> Along with other worrying issues it was this attempt to taint history that fuelled the quixotic walk of former Australian Football League (AFL) footballer Michael Long to Canberra in 2004, which climaxed in a meeting with John Howard. "Where is the love for my people?" Long asked the Prime Minister but got no clear response.

### ***Bringing Them Home: Inquiry into the Stolen Generation***

The legacy of the Stolen Generation is one that will haunt Australian conscience for a very long time. Described by various historians as an act of genocide, it is sure one of the most blasphemed chapters in Australian history. Consequently, no government can avoid dealing with it.

The issue gained spotlight in 1997 when the report called *The Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from their Families* (more commonly known by its title *Bringing Them Home*) was made public. The study conducted by the Australian Human Rights and Equal Opportunities Commission brought to light the darkest side of Australian history, the decades of forced separation of Aboriginal children from their parents leading up to the 1960s. The paper lined out a set of recommendations, including an official acknowledgment and apology from the Australian Parliaments towards the Indigenous populations concerned.<sup>17</sup>

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<sup>16</sup> Bonnell and Crotty, *op.cit.*, 149-165.

<sup>17</sup> Australia, Human Rights and Equal Opportunity Commission, *Bringing them Home: Report of the National Inquiry into the Separation of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Children from Their Families* (Canberra: Apr. 1997.) Appendix 9, <[http://www.humanrights.gov.au/social\\_justice/bth\\_report/report/appendices\\_9.html](http://www.humanrights.gov.au/social_justice/bth_report/report/appendices_9.html)>.

The Howard administration assured that proper investigation will take place. The Prime Minister admitted that he had been made aware of the report and that “it will neither be uncritically accepted nor summarily swept aside.”<sup>18</sup> In 1999 he moved a *Motion of Reconciliation*, which included an expression of “deep and sincere regret that Indigenous Australians suffered injustices under the practices of past generations, and for the hurt and trauma that many Indigenous people continue to feel as a consequence of those practices.”<sup>19</sup> Nevertheless, it came short of an official apology, which only became reality under Kevin Rudd’s Labor government, which succeeded Howard in the 2007 elections<sup>20</sup>.

Supporters of Howard claim that his denial to offer a former apology to the Aboriginal population has as one of the principal reasons the risk of reinforcing the victim mindset. He tried to avoid legitimizing the Aborigines shedding of all responsibility for past events, which would allow them to blame the whites for everything. This would just increase their passivity about their own fate and lead to a loss of personal responsibility over their own lives.

As expat journalist John Pilger puts it, “the whole sorry thing is really to satisfy the white population, not the black population. The sorry is without much substance unless it is backed by an honest and massive rehabilitation campaign of all resources available to Aboriginal people. Tears will be shed and there will be much emotion, but it will be over by next week.”<sup>21</sup>

All the same, it is the same man who criticized Howard’s integrationist approach and rejection of self-determination for Indigenous people by saying that “until whites give back to black their nationhood, they can never claim their own, no matter how many flags they fly.”<sup>22</sup>

### ***The Native Title Amendment Act of 1998***

In 1996 two Indigenous tribes of Queensland were prohibited access from visiting sacred sites on private cattle grazing fields. Representatives of the Waanyi and Wik people took this issue to court and it reached the High Court of Australia in December 1996. In the *Waanyi People vs. Queensland* and the *Wik People vs. Queensland* cases (also known as the *Wik Decision*), the court decided that “the

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<sup>18</sup> John Howard, Opening Speech of the Australian Reconciliation Convention, Australasian Legal Information Institute, 26 May 2000: 4.

<sup>19</sup> Australia, House of Representatives, Motion of Reconciliation (Canberra: Official Hansard, 26 Aug. 1999) 9205.

<sup>20</sup> It is worth noting that John Howard was the only living ex-Prime Minister not to be present at the official apology offered by Kevin Rudd on 13 February 2008.

<sup>21</sup> Abbot, *op.cit.*

<sup>22</sup> *Ibid.*

rights of Indigenous people who can prove a connection to the land can coexist with the rights of the leaseholders (or pastoralists), but where there is any inconsistency between the two, the rights of the pastoralist will prevail.”<sup>23</sup> In other words, pastoral leases do not automatically give exclusive possession to the pastoralist, and therefore do not prevent natives from using the land as well.

It was a highly significant decision of the High Court with respect to the long-awaited land rights and compensation process promised to the Aborigines. The Howard government could not bypass this issue either and passed the *Native Title Amendment Act* in 1998 (also known as the *10 point plan*) in response to the Wik Decision.

*The ten points set out in the Act were as follows:*

1. The National Native Title Tribunal holds absolute authority over claims for Native Title
2. State governments are empowered to extinguish Native Title over crown lands for matters of 'national interest'
3. Lands providing public amenities exempt from Native Title claims
4. Mining and pastoral leases allowed to co-exist with Native Title
5. The National Native Title Tribunal can create access to traditional lands rather than granting full Native Title
6. A registration test imposed on all claimants
7. Removal of the right to claim Native Title in or around urban areas
8. Permits government to manage land, water and air issues in any site
9. Very strict time limits placed on all claims
10. Creation of Indigenous Land Use Agreements to promote co-existence<sup>24</sup>

Although the plan was a huge leap forward in land rights reforms, many of the ten points clearly indicated that the state governments retained absolute power over Indigenous lands that were to be ‘given back’. In addition, nobody could forget Howard’s *One Australia* policy that rejected the concept of Aboriginal land rights: "I abhor the notion of an Aboriginal treaty because it is repugnant to the ideals of One Australia."<sup>25</sup>

### ***26 May 2000: Australian Reconciliation Convention***

The millennium year celebrated the *Australian Reconciliation Convention*, which was convened to address the most urgent needs of the Aboriginal societies.

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<sup>23</sup> Australia, High Court of Australia, Waanyi People vs. Queensland and the Wik People vs. Queensland Feb. and Dec. 1996.

<sup>24</sup> Australia, High Court of Australia, Native Title Amendment Act 1998 2 Aug. 2002.

<sup>25</sup> Andrew Markus, Race: John Howard and the Remaking of Australia. (Sydney: Allen & Unwin Pty Ltd., 2001) 85-89.

The Prime Minister was expected by many again to express a national apology in his opening speech for the 200 years of atrocities committed against the original inhabitants of the continent. Nevertheless, Howard refrained from saying sorry (although all State and Territory Governments did so) and instead personally expressed "deep sorrow" while maintaining that "Australians of this generation should not be required to accept guilt and blame for past actions and policies."<sup>26</sup>

Critics stormed Howard for his words but the Prime Minister found console among politicians who opposed the national apology because it would mean an official acceptance of responsibility and guilt, thus making claims of land compensation legally viable. At the convention, Howard instead tried to focus on the cornerstone of his government's Aboriginal policy-making: a renewed national focus on the true causes of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander disadvantage. He emphasized three concrete measures taken by his administration:

1. The government committed itself to improved outcomes in the delivery of programmes and services for Indigenous people.
2. *Indigenous Business Incentive Programmes* were implemented to boost funding for Indigenous business development and assist economic independence in the Indigenous community.
3. Through a Commonwealth Government initiative, the Army, the inefficient *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission* (ATSIC) and the Department of Health and Family Services were brought together in a pilot program to address water supply and broader environmental health needs<sup>27</sup>.

### ***Indigenous Self-determination and the Abolishment of the ATSIC***

Self-determination for the Indigenous people was a cornerstone of the pre-Howardian politics. The Hawke and Keating administrations saw Indigenous self-determination as a key step in the reconciliation and the resolution of the Aboriginal question. For this end, the *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission* (ATSIC) was set up, along with the recognition of the Aboriginal flag.

Howard, on the contrary, regarded such aspirations as separatist threats within his "one nation, one future" policy. His views of assimilation and integration were completely opposing to the ideas of self-determination and indigeneity. He imposed budget cuts on ATSIC of approximately \$400 million and accused it of misuse of public money and lack of public accountability. In a final move, the Howard government abolished the ATSIC in 2004 and replaced it with a non-representative, government-appointed advisory board, the *National Indigenous*

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<sup>26</sup> Howard, *op.cit*, 4.

<sup>27</sup> Howard, *op.cit*, 5.

*Council*<sup>28</sup>. This move was acclaimed by the Liberals as the elimination of an inefficient and wasteful institution and at the same time meant the abolishment of the policy of self-determination for the Indigenous population.

At Howard's initiative more than 250 *Shared Responsibility Agreements* (SRA) were developed at a local level between government and Indigenous communities or families, spelling out what all partners will contribute to implement better social practices. Critics claim that it was another mere attempt of assimilative 'surface techniques' as Indigenous communities were required to show higher rates of school attendance and literacy in order to receive improved community infrastructure and health subventions. At the same time, the government rejected the previous Labor Government's substantive *Social Justice Package* and hailed its SRAs as exemplary measures to integrate Aboriginals into the mainstream society<sup>29</sup>.

### **Little Children Are Sacred**

The terrorist bombings of New York and Bali shifted the focus to Howard's foreign policy in the early years of the new millennium. Aboriginal affairs were pushed in the background as the country's national security became the top priority.

On June 16, 2007 the *Little Children Are Sacred*<sup>30</sup> report was released. It uncovered serious child abuse and alcohol problems of Aboriginal communities in the Northern Territory. In response to this, the government declared a 'national emergency' in the area and announced the controversial *Northern Territory National Emergency Response*, a package of welfare reform, law enforcement measures designed to address child abuse. Below is a short list of the most important measures taken by the Howard government in the largest governmental intervention in the last 40 years of Aboriginal affairs:

- widespread alcohol restrictions;
- welfare reforms to stem the flow of cash going toward substance abuse and to ensure that funds meant for children's welfare are used for that purpose;
- enforce school attendance by linking income support and family assistance payments to school attendance and providing meals for children at school at parents' cost;

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<sup>28</sup> Andrew Gunstone, "The Howard government's approach to the policy of indigenous self-determination," *MAI Review* 2006: 1.

<sup>29</sup> The website of the Liberal Party includes the abolishment of the ATSIC and the introduction of the SRAs as some of the greatest achievements of the Howard Government regarding Indigenous Australians. For more results, see the article "Doing what's right for Australia".

<sup>30</sup> "John Howard," 11 Apr. 2009 [Wikipedia](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Howard) <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John\\_Howard](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/John_Howard)>.



- introduce compulsory health checks for all Aboriginal children to identify and treat health problems and any effects of abuse;
- compulsorily acquire these townships, most of which are held under Aboriginal freehold title, for a leasehold period of five years, possibly without payment of just terms of compensation;
- increase policing levels, including requesting secondments from other jurisdictions to supplement Northern Territory resources;
- ban the possession of x-rated pornography and introduce audits of all publicly funded computers to identify illegal material;
- scrap the permit system (which had been introduced with the recognition of land rights to allow traditional owners to determine who could enter their lands) so that permits would no longer be required for common areas within townships, road corridors and airstrips for prescribed communities on Aboriginal land; and
- appoint managers for all government business in prescribed communities to override the decision-making powers of Aboriginal community based organizations and their elected Aboriginal Boards.<sup>31</sup>

The sheer scale of the policy declaration terrified the public. Many critics of the program, including the *Little Children Are Sacred* report's authors, pointed out that the intervention failed to follow any of the key recommendations of the report. Others argued that the intervention was a 'Trojan horse' for rolling back land rights and retaining Commonwealth control of the territory. The intervention involved an attempt to remove the permit system that allowed Aboriginal communities to control access to their land. It was in line with Howard's long-term goal of bringing an end to Indigenous self-determination (commenced with the abolishment of the ATSIC) and forcefully assimilating the natives into the mainstream culture and lifestyle.

In addition, the intervention painted a dysfunctional and pathological picture about *all* Aborigines, creating the illusion that all Indigenous parents are child-abusers and careless parents. It was evident that the government plan was about much more than tackling child sex abuse. Some believe the plan and its timing were sly tactics to win over hesitant voters (mostly middle-class white families concerned with child abuse) before the Federal election to be held in November of the same year. In this way, Howard could demonstrate that he really 'cares about those poor, wretched fellas in the North.'

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<sup>31</sup> Media release by Mal Brough, Minister for Indigenous Affairs, on 21 June 2007. Source: Melinda Hikson, "A 'National Emergency' in Australia: the Howard Government's Intervention in Northern Territory Aboriginal Affairs," *Indigenous Affairs* Apr. 2007: 38.

In his speech to the Sydney Institute in 2007, Prime Minister John Howard explained the need for intervention with the following statement:

*“There comes a point where the obligations of national governments take over. Action cannot be delayed by concerns that it’s not ‘culturally appropriate’. No culture – and certainly no Indigenous culture – believes child abuse is appropriate... I believe the Australian Government’s obligation to the vulnerable Indigenous children of the Northern Territory is clear, compelling and paramount. Where possible, it’s to give them the chance of a childhood and some hope for the future.”*<sup>32</sup>

Among Aboriginal activists, the intervention was welcomed with mixed feelings. Noel Pearson, one of the most prominent native personalities, gave his support for the intervention, as it showcased the first sign of the Howard government taking any significant interest in Aboriginal affairs. Pearson, a stern advocate of heavy-handed politics, favoured this move as a step forward in dragging Aborigines out of their self-consuming passivity. On the other hand, Long Jack Phillipus, native community Papunya-based local activist, lashed out at the government’s paternalistic policy and called it another superficial attempt at trying to soothe white consciousness of guilt instead of addressing the roots of the problem.<sup>33</sup> Other native activists affirm that the Emergency Plan is just an attempt to break the back of the locals and is meant to be a threat to the Indigenous people, saying: you will live like us or you will be punished! National Indigenous Television chief executive Patricia Turner said “she regarded the Northern Territory intervention as an invasion of Aboriginal communities.”<sup>34</sup>

### ***Numbers Not Words: Facts and Figures During Howard’s Terms***

Although the hardliner anti-apology stance of the Howard era makes it look like as if Indigenous affairs were totally neglected during this decade, the story is not as one-sided as it seems. It's rarely acknowledged but no government gave more practical help to Aboriginal people than John Howard's. Looking at some statistics we are confronted with substantial improvements in the economic indicators<sup>35</sup>:

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<sup>32</sup> “Doing what’s right for Australia,” Liberal Party of Australia 9 Apr. 2009

<<http://liberal.org.au/about/documents/RESULTSFORINDIGENOUSAUSTRALIANS.pdf>>.

<sup>33</sup> Tim Johnston, “Far-Reaching Policy for Aborigines Draws Their Fury,” Papunya Journal 24 Aug. 2007.

<sup>34</sup> Stuart Rintoul, “Dodson plea for new way – Demand for end to assimilation fed by fear,” The Australian 29 Oct. 2008.

<sup>35</sup> SCRGSP (Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service Provision) 2007, *Overcoming Indigenous Disadvantage: Key Indicators 2007*, Productivity Commission, Canberra.

- There was a substantial 67% real increase of money spent on Indigenous-specific programs (from \$1.7 billion in 1995/96 to \$4.0 billion in 2007/2008).
- The unemployment rate for Indigenous adults has fallen from 30.0 % in 1994 to 12.8 % in 2004/05. Over the same period, Indigenous long-term unemployment fell from 14.2 % to 5.1 %.
- Between 1998 and 2005, the percentage of Indigenous students progressing to year 12 has increased from 32 % to 40%. The percentage progressing to year 11 has increased from 52 % to 62 %.
- From 2002 to 2004/05, average incomes for Indigenous people rose 10 per cent.
- Spending on Aboriginal health programs quadrupled in the decade from 1996.

On the other hand, we see deterioration in the health and social aspects of Indigenous societies:

- Indigenous imprisonment rates increased by 32 per cent between 2000 and 2006.
- Indigenous rate for kidney disease was 5 times as high as the non-Indigenous rate in 2001 — in 2004/05 it was 10 times as high.
- Between 2001/02 and 2004/05, Indigenous people 65 years and over had increased hospitalization rates for diseases associated with poor environmental health.

In January 2009 the *Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research* (CAEPR) published a socioeconomic report comprising a comparative index that tries to give a thorough insight into the situation of Indigenous populations<sup>36</sup>. The report concludes that during the 15-year span since such indices were first calculated in 1991 and 2006, the overall situation of Indigenous communities did not change significantly, only the regional distribution of disadvantages – urban vs. remote areas – had been varying (see figure below).

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<sup>36</sup> The index was based on the following nine variables: (1) employed, (2) employed as a manager or professional, (3) employed full-time in the private sector, (4) completed Year 12 of high school, (5) completed a qualification, (6) 15 to 24 years olds attending an educational institution, (7) individual income above half the Australian median, (8) lives in a house that is owned or being purchased, (9) lives in a house with at least one bedroom per usual resident.




Fig.1. Change in Indigenous socioeconomic rank by Indigenous Region, 2001–06. Source: *Ranking Regions: Revisiting an Index of Relative Indigenous Socioeconomic Outcomes*, 2009.

The report points out that the changes in the outcome could be attributed to migration. The example of the Alice Springs area serves as a proof, displaying a worsening of the index and at the same time having a strong net inflow of Aboriginals from poorer regions. Taylor points out the caveats of socioeconomic indices created from census data: “they don’t capture all aspects of Indigenous well-being, such as participation in Indigenous cultural activities, access to traditional lands, use of Indigenous language, and observance of Indigenous protocols.”<sup>37</sup>

This most recent study concludes by saying that “if anything, the remote/non-remote disparity was more pronounced using this most recent Census.”<sup>38</sup> Another sad example of such a non-appearing statistic, says the author of the report, is the high positive correlation between socioeconomic disadvantage and the percentage of the population who speak an Indigenous language at home (see figure below).

<sup>37</sup> J. Taylor, “Indigenous Peoples and Indicators of Well-Being: An Australian Perspective on United Nations Global Frameworks,” *Social Indicators Research* 87 2008: 111–126.

<sup>38</sup> N. Biddle, “Ranking Regions: Revisiting an Index of Relative Indigenous Socioeconomic Outcomes,” *Centre for Aboriginal Economic Policy Research* 2009: 21.




Fig.2. Indigenous socioeconomic rank by per cent of Indigenous population who speak an Indigenous language at home, 2006. Source: *Ranking Regions: Revisiting an Index of Relative Indigenous Socioeconomic Outcomes, 2009*.

Nevertheless, the final balance at the end of the Howard administration remains as grim as it was at its beginning. The two recent data below need no comment as they capture the appalling situation in which the original inhabitants of Australia find themselves:

1. The life expectancy of Indigenous people is estimated to be around 17 years lower than that for the total Australian population (the life expectancy at birth is 59 years for Indigenous males compared with 77 years for males in the total population, and 65 years for Indigenous females compared with 82 years for females in the total population)
2. In 2005, death rates in all age groups were higher for Indigenous people than for non-Indigenous people. The greatest differences were for those aged between 35 and 54, where Indigenous death rates were five to six times those for non-Indigenous people.

### **Assessment of the Aboriginal Policies of the Howard Administration**

The shortest answer to the question of how John Howard's policies went down with the public would be: he was reelected three times! Notwithstanding, it would be a gross generalization to state that the citizens voted him to office for his Aboriginal policies. The economic boom and well-being were the probable causes of his successes, coupled with sympathy for his strict immigration policies and support for the referendum in East Timor.

Another method of checking public satisfaction is through the reaction of people affected by the policy measures. An article in the Financial Times warned of

a possible closure of Ayers Rock to tourists in response to the intervention by the Federal government to halt child abuse. The locals claim that it is just a pretext for “rolling back Indigenous land rights” The text also mentioned that local families are once again fearing that police deployed “under the government’s plan were coming to take their children away.”<sup>39</sup>

Nonetheless, there are those who support the Prime Minister’s down-to-the-point approach. Warren Mundine, Labor Party’s former national president and an Aborigine, burst out saying that the real challenge in Indigenous policy is to “get away from all this romantic bullshit about Aboriginal culture and to get rid of this PC crap and confront some very, very tough issues.”<sup>40</sup>

The New York Times published an article from the Papunya Journal detailing the reactions of the inhabitants of Papunya, a mostly Indigenous town 170 miles West of Alice Springs. Papunya’s overwhelming majority lives on government benefits, with no hopes of breaking out of this devilish situation. Their reaction to the newest government intervention was furious. The locals say that the government is trying to turn them into white people and treats them like little children. Sammy Butcher, founder of Aboriginal Australia’s most successful rock group, the Warumpi Band says that “John Howard’s trying to make us into white men.” Nevertheless, a local inhabitant points out that “even if some of the policies are misguided, having the government engaged is better than the neglect of recent years.”<sup>41</sup>

My personal view on the subject is that the Howard administration changed radically its approach to the Aboriginal issue from the previous governments. It went from ‘cooperation on equal terms’ politics to a paternalistic, assimilation-focused strategy. The first line on the website of the Labor Party of Australia states that “The Howard Government has moved on from the old approach of ‘separating’ Indigenous people and their problems and overturned political correctness to focus on results.”<sup>42</sup> In other words, the attempts to draw up self-determination for the Indigenous people were dismissed (i.e. the abolition of the ATSIC) and new integration-oriented policies (such as the SRAs and the Northern Territory National Emergency Response) were implemented.

John Howard, in formulating his policies, displayed his firm conviction that Aborigines should take on or at least adapt to the mainstream – better said ‘white, European, Christian’ – values and wrote off the former attempts at a unity in

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<sup>39</sup> “Aborigines hit back at Howard,” Financial Times 27 Jun. 2007.

<sup>40</sup> Abbott, *op.cit.*

<sup>41</sup> Johnston, *op.cit.*

<sup>42</sup> See article “Doing what’s right for Australia”.

diversity approach as fruitless and hypocritical. As we have seen above, the economic indicators back up Howard's decision, but income and employment do not tell the whole picture. During his 12 years as prime minister the health indicators deteriorated, as well as incarceration rates rose significantly among the native inhabitants. Substance abuse, alcoholism and child abuse did not improve either.

### ***Conclusion***

Overall, the social cohesion and gap in the living standard between the Indigenous and non-Indigenous population have widened since Howard took office in 1996. In addition, Howard continuously rejected to offer a national apology to the Aborigines, being fearful of its legal consequences of having to compensate them for not only stealing their land, children, culture, but also their human dignity. John Howard's intention on carving out a unique Australian identity has been based on the interrelations of European and Asian cultures, with strong ties to the USA. Unfortunately, the original inhabitants of the fifth continent were forgotten to be included in this list.

To conclude this paper, it is worth contemplating for a while an alternative scenario brought to our eyes by a man of the Murri tribe. As he was standing on the cliffs of Dover, England, he raised his hand and claimed the whole territory for the Aboriginal nation. Unimaginable, isn't it? But why? The native inhabitants of the British Isles have only been living there for a couple of thousand years, nothing compared to the "Indigenous peoples of [Australia], the oldest continuing cultures in human history."<sup>43</sup>

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<sup>43</sup> This fragment ends the first line of the National Apology of the Federal Government, made by Prime Minister Kevin Rudd on 13 February 2008. Source: "Bringing them home," Wikipedia 6 Apr. 2009 <[http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bringing\\_Them\\_Home#Government\\_apologies](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bringing_Them_Home#Government_apologies)>.

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**Major András FÜLEKY PhD aspirant**

## **MILITARISM IN JAPAN I. FOREWORD**

In the beginning of my article I would like to return the ideological background of warriors in Japan, and the process of development in the Japanese society, whose successfully nourished the Japanese people's belief in their emperor, their victory and their invincibility. Starting from this aspect, my present work will put light on the militaristic side of Japan striving for being a superpower.

Characteristically, militarism can be defined as the actual power's belief that a country led by them be a strong military power and it is necessary to be prepared for defending the national interests by force.

Militarism is an important ideology in those countries that lead imperialistic or expansion politics.

Similarly to the building of a militaristic country in Germany in the 20<sup>th</sup> century, there were several events in Japan that led to the military events in this island country and this fact basically changed the relationship of Japan with its neighbouring countries.

It is obvious that in the political life of the 15<sup>th</sup> century Japan (the era of *Sengoku*, period or age of Warring States) the key figures were the powerful samurai war barons or *shōguns*. This is the reason why militarism was already present in the traditions of samurai, centuries before Japan's modernization.

Despite the fact that militaristic philosophy was an important element of the *shōgun* times, the national character of militarism could be identified only after the *Meiji* restoration. This fact is proved in the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors, which was published in 1882 and it became the most important document of the organization of the Imperial Japanese Army and the Imperial Japanese Navy.

The Rescript was meant to be the official code of ethics for soldiers, and it was mentioned together with the Imperial Rescript of Education, which was the basis for the national ideology of the WW2 pre-war Japan.

The Rescript was given to *Yamagata Aritomo*, the minister of defence, by Emperor *Meiji* himself at a special ceremony held in the Emperor's Palace in Tokyo. The special circumstances of this presentation were a perfect example of

the strengthening relationship between the Emperor and the Army, and it conveyed the idea that the Army belonged personally to the Emperor.

Following the *Satsuma* riot the Rescript soon became the symbol of unconditioned loyalty to the Emperor for every soldier of the Army.

Based on the traditions of the *samurai*, the document set rules for the personal behaviour of the soldiers, such as moderation and, according to the European traditions of the knights, respectful and positive attitude towards citizens.

It is worth mentioning that in the process of editing the Rescript there was an article that stated that the civilian population is superior to the military, but it was excluded from the final version.

At the end of the war there was an ideological summary about the character of the war in the Pacific and the role of Japan:

*“The people of the Great Eastern Asia and their several-thousand-year traditions followed by the truthful leadership of the Emperor, fight here with the superpower ambitions of the European and American countries. There is a decisive battle between the Japanese empire that leads people of Eastern Asia and the leading force of Europe and America among Anglo–Saxons. This is the last battle to unify the civilisation of the world under the truthful leadership of the Emperor. This battle will not be finished in the next five or ten years, this will be a long battle between the two sides, with all their strength required, and it may last for hundreds of years. Nobody should get desperate because we lost a five-year war. Germany, which was destroyed in WWI, could be reborn in 20 years. Though it lost again, its strength shook the world. If we preserve the nature of the people of Yamato<sup>1</sup> the same way as we preserved loyalty to the Emperor, our calmness and spirit, it will not be difficult to revive the Japanese state power. We need to revive it as soon as possible and bring an end to the world power of Europe and America, and to save the humankind. We know that many people became desperate in Japan after the loss and they speak frankly about the need to end the emperorship. They want a republic, similar to the ones in Europe and America. If somebody wags their tails in front of a winner, he proves to be a despicable and low class person.”<sup>2</sup>*

## THE *MEIJI* RESTAURATION, THE BIG TURNING POINT AND ITS CONSEQUENCES

The *Meiji* restoration (1868) significantly modernised the country where the Middle ages had stayed for a long time, and it brought back the emperorship, which had been repressed for about a thousand years.

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<sup>1</sup> *Yamato* – the ancient name of Japan

<sup>2</sup> SHIMODA Seiji: *A japán katona*. Bp.: Kozmosz Könyvek, 1982. p.178.

Seemingly, for some time Japan became unfaithful to all the heritage left by the *Edo* era, and it turned back to an earlier tradition where the love of the emperor, the godhead, the love of the motherland and religion meant the same, as well as the idea of Japan being god's chosen nation. However, the European lifestyle embodied people's lives more and more.

An order of the Japanese Emperor prohibited wearing a sword (*Haitōrei*) for any Japanese citizen, except those who served in the military. It put an end, even formally, to a historic era, because with this step, after the abolishment of social classes in 1871, the separation of *bushi*, as a class, disappeared forever.

The sword of the *bushi* was not only an object, but an intellectual personal symbol of its possessor, it was not only a tool of attack and defence, but the possibility to finish life honourably.

The path of the sword, similarly to all old-time combat elements, nearly was forgotten. This was supplemented by the modernisation and westernisation of the *Meiji* era. *Budō* when it entered the *Meiji* era became the symbol of a once existing warrior class. It was a significant change in the light of the fact that 6 % of the population was the class of *bushi*. There was a feeling of belonging there, and they tried to pass this feeling to more and more society layers with the aim of teaching discipline.

The most important task at that time was the establishment of the military strength and economy in Japan, because this was the only hope for the country to be treated as an equal by the Western powers. The question for the leaders of that time was how to reach this goal as soon as possible.

The restauration of the monarchy happened at the same time with the abolition of old feudal provinces, and the division of the country into prefectures. Then the following slogan was taken by everyone: "Make the country reach and strengthen the military!" However, bringing in Western technology did not mean the acceptance of Western values, and it has stayed the same in Japan up to now. With the *Meiji* restauration a kind of mystical nationalism awoke, which saw Japan as a country, protected by a powerful godheads, and hence invincible.

From the beginning of 1880, following a serious riot and its expensive and bloody defeat (*Satsuma* riot<sup>3</sup>), with the official acceptance of the new constitution a new institutional political establishment was formed based on constitutional monarchy, which brought considerable changes in the leadership of the country.

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<sup>3</sup> *Satsuma* riot (1876-77) – the followers of the old regime rioted against the changes of the *Meiji* restauration

While in the *Edo* era the emperor led the country only indirectly, via the *shōgun*<sup>4</sup> and the military elite (aristocracy, landlords, high ranking soldiers), but it was the government of *shōgun* who were the actual leaders. At the time of the *Meiji* the emperor's power was reinforced and the Emperor himself was the governor of the council of the old, the secret state committee, the ministry, the emperor's army and the navy and the entire governmental administration. According to the constitution, the Japanese emperor, somehow as an institution, was the symbol of the source of the national body and its unity and the emperor was the state himself. The military was subdued to the emperor. From the 30's of the 20th century this was what made possible to have "uncontrolled" actions of the military.<sup>5</sup>

During discussions about Japanese militarism it was unavoidable to introduce the 124th emperor of Japan who both directly and indirectly played a significant role in the formation of the era.

It was obvious that *Hirohito*'s grandfather had the greatest influence and showed deepest respect, which was understandable, since Japan, under the ruling of Emperor *Meiji*, managed to get rid of its passivity and entered the stage of world politics. During the reign of *Hirohito*'s father, *Taishō* himself was under the influence of *Meiji*, too, and often drastically mimed it. It was strengthened by the sad fact that *Taishō*'s poorly mental state was obvious.

In the emperor's household, with the knowledge of *Taishō*'s state of mind, his first-born son *Hirohito* was being prepared to take the throne. The young regency prince was conducting strategic studies and received military education.<sup>6</sup>

His education was the responsibility of *Kido Takamasa* who was a *samurai*'s son and who spent 10 years in America, which had caused him to have a negative attitude against Western traditions for all his life. Probably it was *Kido* who based the idea of Japan's superiority into *Hirohito*'s mind.

In 1908 *Hirohito* met the past in the *Gakushin* school, the educational establishment for the noble. The director of the school, the frightening *Nogi Maresuke*, lived and died absolutely in the warrior spirit of the samurai. When he was 16 he became blind during fencing and in the riot of 1877 his arms and legs became disabled. *Nogi* also despised the opening to the West, which made a person weak. *Nogi*, due to his physical disability, encouraged *Hirohito* not only to learn, but to develop his physical stamina. But all in all, he did not consider him capable

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<sup>4</sup> *shōgun* – military rank in Japan of the Middle age actually, the leader of the military, consequently, the first person in administration

<sup>5</sup> FERBER Katalin: A japán gazdasági és társadalmi modernizáció kérdéséhez. Bp.: Japanológiai körkép, ELTE Eötvös Kiadó, 2007. pp.366-371.

<sup>6</sup> KIRCHMANN, Hans: Hirohito, a Tennō „Japán utolsó császára”. Bp.: Gondolat, 1990. pp.23-27.

to take the throne of “godlike-emperor”. General *Nogi*, following *Meiji*’s death, went home with his wife and finished his life with *seppuku*.<sup>7</sup>

*Hirohito*’s upbringing continued, his educators forced politics on him, quite often painting an unrealistic picture of Japan’s role in the world.

By 1921 Japan became a significant economic and military power and in spite of *Taishō*’s poor mental state, the majority of Japanese people believed in the emperorship and in the mission of the country.

In spite of his education, his knowledge of foreign languages and his long European tour in 1921 *Hirohito* was soon influenced by the chauvinistic views of his friends at home.

In 1920’s there were significant changes in the life of the country due the fact that in the administration of the country the role of the defence minister was considerably strengthened, although seemingly Japan remained a parliamentary state.

The way of thinking which was blinded by the delusion of grandeur could be properly characterised by articles from a picture magazine titled “The warrior’s cry” and by the *Taishō nichichi shinbun* article of the 21st December 1921:

*“Japanese people should be similar to a whirlwind, which frees the enemy. The Japanese society was chosen by the destiny to finish the world revolution. The realisation of this idea and the organisation of the Japanese military is the work of ghosts. We believe that our task will not end with the reform in Japan or with a revolution, but we need to start with the renewal of our people, because we believe that our mission is the freedom of the mankind.”*

*“Both people and the Gods have the aim of realising the biggest of all tasks: to unify the world under the reign of the emperor.”*

Political fanaticism was not the only factor that turned the attention of the island country to conquering the world. The power battle of different nobility and military groups, the desire for the neighbouring territories, and especially the exploitation of raw material resources of China was Japan’s attempt to infiltrate into the long divided economic spheres of the superpowers. All these actions were the warning signs of the pre-war years.

On the 1st September, 1923 there was a big earthquake in *Kantō* region, which burned two thirds of Tokyo. In an absurd manner the military leadership blamed Koreans and the socialists for it and as a result, they started bloody payoffs.<sup>8</sup>

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<sup>7</sup> *seppuku* – the ritual suicide of *bushi*, with the aim to become clean of shame

<sup>8</sup> KIRCHMANN, Hans: *Hirohito, a Tennō „Japán utolsó császára”*. Bp.: Gondolat, 1990. pp.35-45.

## DREAMS AND DEEDS OF THE EMPIRE

During his coronation ceremony on the 10th of November, 1928, *Hirohito* promised to encourage world peace and to enrich the well-being of the nation but the desire for power could be heard in his voice.

The first general election was held the same year according to the new election law passed in 1925, with the participation of only men. This specific event was not approved by the government, but the date was set, in spite of the fact that the minister of the interior, *Suzuki Kisaburo* seriously protested against this democratic establishment, stating that democracy is an opposition against all Japanese basic principles. But the election finished with the victory of the Conservatives. After that the government set serious regulations and made several arrests against the imaginary or real enemies of the state, that is against communists or pacifists.

A group consisting of military and navy officers tried to shake up Japan. In May of 1932 and with this crisis they wanted to cause a turning point in the history. In spite of murder of the prime minister and occupation of some important governmental centres, the rioters were soon caught and court-martialled. The desired effect was still there, because they were regarded as national heroes by the society, who dared to oppose the immoral parliamentary system.

The events of 1932 ripened by February 26, 1936 when at dawn two trucks and a saloon car entered *Nagata-cho*, the governmental quarter. Soldiers tried a coup d'état by occupying the residence of ministries, the parliament, the police HQs, and the prime minister, and by this action they wanted to change the Godsend mission of the Emperor and to punish those who oppose "the enlightened peace". The fact that the soldiers considered themselves "the executors of the clean teachings" was reinforced by different secret organisations. These organisations, for example the Party of the Heavenly Sword, the Brotherhood of Blood, the *Jinmu* organisation<sup>9</sup> or the Cherry organisation, they all were inspired by the desire to act contrary to the useless parliamentary speeches and the weakness of defence of national interests. The leaders of the mutiny wanted to punish everyone who, with their passivity, or their wrong politics contributed to the emperor's decreasing prestige. High ranking officers and state leaders became the victims and a civil war situation developed, because the loyal governmental groups also became uncertain.

It was the first time in *Hirohito's* life that he got involved in everyday politics. His orders were issued daily and he ordered the soldiers to return to their posts because any further opposition equalled challenging the "Commander in

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<sup>9</sup> *Jinmu* – the name refers to the name of first emperor of the *Jinmu* dynasty (660 B.C.)

Chief” and they would have no other choice but to become traitors and they would have to bear the shame all their lives. After that there was not a single shot(!) and the rebels surrendered.<sup>10</sup>

The spread of the militaristic policy started from this point and the propaganda machinery produced big amounts of ideological work. Even though Japan took a lot from the European culture since the Meiji restoration, such as technical civilisation, the way of life, traditions, or perception of the world, the militaristic Japan, on the other hand, was a return to the old traditions. As far as internal politics was concerned, there was a return to the state of authority, however, internal politics turned away from European politics and an establishment of an independent East Asian state system.<sup>11</sup>

In the rules of education titled “The basic character of Japan as an empire” of 31 May, 1937 issued by the Ministry of Tuition that the main task of Nippon<sup>12</sup> is a kind of expansion politics which is practised as the “beneficial sphere of the Great Eastern Asia” and its main principles were the following:

*“This work was published to introduce our country’s origin, to show the great spirit of our ancestors, the realisation of the essence of the basics of our state which is realised in our history. We want to spread this idea to awake our people’s consciousness and to strengthen their efforts.”*

In the process of axis powers strengthening there was a significant step on 27th of September, 1940 when the alliance was supplemented by a new ambitious Far Eastern empire, Japan.

In 1941 there was a study introduced at the headquarters of the German Army that expressed the importance of Japan as a military alliance for Germany:

*“Japanese people were brought up in military spirit. Bushidō, the path of the warrior, had been the main aim of the Japanese moral for centuries. Since the Meiji restoration Japanese wars were always victorious. In the newest times it proved its capabilities in the war against China. Japanese staff officers are characterised by burning national conscience and strong sense of sacrifice. This behaviour is strengthened by the strong sense of duty towards national politics, especially among staff officers, and which is considerably influenced on this side.”*

Friedrich Sieburg, in his book titled Die Stählerne Blumen (the Iron flower) writes the following about the Japanese soul:

*“This belief, originating from the belief in God can nowhere be transformed into action more than in the Japanese military. A Japanese officer is able for emotional*

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<sup>10</sup> KIRCHMANN, Hans: Hirohito, a Tennō „Japán utolsó császára”. Bp.: Gondolat, 1990. pp.58-60.

<sup>11</sup> MEZEY István: Az igazi Japán. Bp.: Magyar Nippon Társaság, 1939. p.51.

<sup>12</sup> Nippon, Nihon – the reading of Japanese symbols (*kanji*)

*outbursts unimaginable for us. Since his life is limited by strict, even inflexible rules where there is no place for personal emotional changeability, he creates explosions for himself where they can burst out: in the admiration of the emperor and in the belief of the Godsent mission of Japan.”*

What emotional outbursts were like in the battle were soon became known by the world when Japan started its combat with China.

On the 7th July, 1937 during an event known as the Marco Polo incident, the Japanese leadership considered starting the war against China legal. It is impossible not to mention those terrible acts that the Japanese troops committed after occupying the city of Nanking<sup>13</sup> with the Chinese prisoners, with the civilian population, with the old, children. They were of no consideration of the foreigners, diplomats, missionaries who lived within the city boundaries.<sup>14</sup>

After the war, the war criminals stated that the killing and indignity of the population of more than half million people trapped in the city and that of the plain clothes military in the *Sugamo* prison in Tokyo was the fact that they thought that the enemies of the emperor must be bad people, and consequently, the more brutally they treat the prisoners, the more loyal they are to the emperor.<sup>15</sup>

After these opening events the mission of conquer started for the imperial Japanese army, during which there was the annexation of the Philippines, Thailand, Indonesia and Singapore.

In retrospect, after the end of the WW1 the main principle in the Japanese politics also retuned, namely, that Asia is for the Asians and with the inside changes, almost unnoticeably, the European constitution shifts towards the old state of authority. The same Japan, which not so long ago took up European civilisation almost without any criticism, soon realised its drawbacks and mistakes, and the weakness of European people strengthened their sense of their national conscience. In the place of the China-centred world order the Japanese nationally superior, Asia-missioned role appeared and ambitions of modernisation were connected with colonisation within Asia. Soon burning nationalism started to govern, which was not of European character, but its foundation should be sought in the centuries-long traditions of respect, which has been characterised up to modern times by that of the Japanese children of their parents, the slave and the master or the employees to their superior.

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<sup>13</sup> Nanking – city in the southern part of China. Earlier it was the capital of China several times and it was considered as one of the four significant historical cities, its cultural and historical role is very important

<sup>14</sup> KIRCHMANN, Hans: Hirohito, a Tennó „Japán utolsó császára”. Bp.: Gondolat, 1990. pp.61-68.

<sup>15</sup> BURUMA, Ian: A modern Japán. Bp.: Európa Könyvkiadó, 2006. p.107.



By the beginning of the 19th century the leaders had already realised that to preserve national character together with the rapid acceptance of Western technologies, would lead to a specific Japanese path. However, even then, the two biggest questions in Japan were the overpopulation and the lack of national resources. Overpopulation hurried up the process of industrialisation, on the other hand, productivity was slowed by the difficulty of acquiring necessary resources. The solution of the problem seemed to be evident, i.e., to conquer new territories.<sup>16</sup>

Consequently, one of the basic tasks of the *Meiji* government was the establishment of the national consciousness because in the earlier centuries there was no geographical or economic integration between the territories of landlords. The most important element of the national consciousness was the imperial institution together with the notion of the national body (*kokutai*). At the same time traditions continued to exist, built into institutions, so Japan was very old and new at the same time.

The basic aim of Japan that, as the leader of Eastern Asia, to force out the United States and to establish influence over Asian countries. The lack of aggression of their expansion policy was explained by them that they actually want to be masters instead of the „whites” and at the same time they want to put under their influence certain countries, such as China, Burma, Malaysia, Dutch-India, and the Philippines, as they had already done with Manchuria.

They perceived that for a development and strengthening of a state it is necessary to colonize. So far the Anglo-Saxons mastered Asia and the entire world. Why would it be against the law to send them away from the region?

In spite this all, on the 6th of September, 1941, a talk held between *Hirohito* and *Sugiyama Hayime*, the chief of staff, proved that the emperor was not sure whether politically a war would be the only solution for Japan.

On the 8th of December, 1941 the Air Force launched a surprise attack against Pearl Harbour, an American navy base on the Hawaii Islands. With this act Japan joined WW2 on the side of fascist Germany, and started its earlier expansions to the Pacific and South East Asia. In a relatively short period of time the Japanese military empowered the entire Indo-China, Malaysia, the Philippines and Indonesia. By the end of 1942 it was threatening India, Australia, and New Zealand. These conquests of the unstoppable Japanese military power's desire to expand were under the slogan of “eight fireplaces under one roof” and aimed to unify all Asian people in the Japanese society, to establish the “prosperity territory of the great Eastern Asia”. Between 1895 and 1945 Japan had 37 conquering wars

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<sup>16</sup> MEZEY István: Az igazi Japán. Bp.: Magyar Nippon Társaság, 1939. pp.41-42.

causing senseless death of millions of people with the concept of being God's chosen nation and having the mission of delivering the power of *tennō* to other nations.

The determination of the Japanese soldiers who became prisoners of war in the Pacific is well-illustrated by the fact that thousands of POWs repatriated by the Americans who survived the vicious war, in the place of the happiness of returning home, their minds were frozen by the fear of how they would be treated at home, what would be the sentence of the Japanese society, the military and the military court. The common „illness” of the prisoners was the fear of being ashamed and dishonoured by the society. The leading slogan was – Death is better than the shame of imprisonment!

A Japanese soldier remembers his thoughts before becoming a prisoner:

*“I had never heard of the Geneva Convention before, but I knew that the list of POWs will be sent to the Japanese authorities. I did not want my name to be on this list. I have no right to live – I became a prisoner.”<sup>17</sup>*

This inner agony of the prisoners in the camp was intensified by the fact that they had access to newspapers. In those papers the happy returning of Australian prisoners was portrayed as being winners, having been met by their family members in ports. The Japanese POWs could not understand this.

## **MILITARISM IN JAPAN II. IN THE TRAP OF TRADITIONS**

The fears and anxieties of the Japanese POWs can only be understood through the specific ideas that were formed in the Middle age Japan, namely, the Confucian philosophy, the *shintō*, and the *bushidō*. These ideas led the minds of the Japanese people, in their unconditional obedience concerning actual power, in their acceptance of *tennō*, the honourable death, and in their belief of being superior to any other nation. This specific ideology was formed by several factors, which characterised the way of social thinking of that era, the way of life and the sense of duty. They regulated the political situation and its functioning.

During WW2 the soldiers were given so-called „reminder notes” which had to be read loudly at company or battalion roosters. POWs were supposed to practise them daily. The notes formulated the following thoughts:

*“We were lucky enough to be born in a country that is like no other. Nothing can be more honourable! There is no bigger luck! Our happiness is the deepest that*

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<sup>17</sup> SHIMODA Seiji: A japán katona. Bp.: Kozmosz Könyvek, 1982. p.97.

*we are able to enjoy as the honours of this enlightened government! The loyalty to tennō and the love of the motherland lives deeply in our hearts! We must fulfil our obligations, so that we can thank tennō for his generosity!”<sup>18</sup>*

The Japanese military did not allow its soldiers to have any individual thoughts and life had no value. The leadership was aggressive and vicious. The duties of Japanese officers were dogmatised. Only regulations and the sense of duty existed, and they were viciously demanded. Nobody knew anything about integrity.

In one sentence this is how a soldier’s proper behaviour could be characterised: “*The duty of a Japanese soldier is loyalty to tennō and total obedience of superiors.*”<sup>19</sup>

In the Imperial Rescript to Soldiers and Sailors it is stated that “*Duty is heavier than a mountain, death is lighter than a feather.*”

This saying clearly shows a warrior’s religion based on the concept that the soul of a soldier who died honourably on the battlefield, goes to Heaven immediately. The memory of the dead soldiers was religiously honoured, their names were listed in churches on specially placed boards. In a special ceremony they were included to those Japanese heroes protected by the Gods above. It is necessary to mention that death is not considered as the final end. In Eastern religion and perception of life death is not a sad, finite moment as it is in European culture. According to the teachings of *shintō*, the mission and the aim of life of a Japanese person is to serve in the military and to die as a hero for *tennō*. In other words, it was very difficult for thousands of Japanese POWs to morally accept the fact that the chance to finish their lives, serving *tennō*, was taken away from them.

The thesis or explanations of *shintō*, such as the Godsend origin of power, expansionism as an original mission, the cult of heroes, was an indication of the central role of the military in the Japanese society and its leading role in political life.

Preparation for the war already started in schools, the theories of education served this aim, even arts were subdued to that.

The militaristic spirit of the education in the Japanese society was ensured by *bushidō*, the moral code that formulated military virtues as a law. It originates deep in the history of Japan. With the arrival of *Edo*-period the concept of the warrior finally became clear in form, in the spirit of *bushidō*, the main theories of which are: unconditional loyalty, the spiritual approach to death and perfect morals. These

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<sup>18</sup> SISKIN J. V. – SZAPOZSNYIKOV V.G.: A távol-keleti győzelem. Bp.: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1978. p.25.

<sup>19</sup> SHIMODA Seiji: A japán katona. Bp.: Kozmosz Könyvek, 1982. p.142.

never written, never pronounced rules, maybe formulated only in thoughts and in tales were established by life itself, and they were collected in the unwritten moral regulations of the knights. *Bushi* had to follow these rules and regulations in their everyday lives and while performing their duties.

For the military leadership the values of *budō*, such as lifestyle and moral attitude, were a very successful tool of nationalism. The military leadership used the old traditions in its own interests, and demanded that the values of *budō* be followed again.

In 1716 *Yamamoto Tsunetomo*<sup>20</sup> wrote the first summary of *bushidō*. That was the *Hagakure*.<sup>21</sup>

There were many appraisals and there was a lot of criticism of that book. The book played a significant role in the encouragement of the Japanese youth who accepted death in this final, desperate part of the war with the following classic saying – “I realised that *bushidō*’s origin is in death.” It was called the “philosophy of craziness” and, for example, the legendary *Mishima Yukio* called it “the philosophy of the overflowing spirit.”<sup>22</sup> It is true that in 1970 he was the last person to commit *seppuku* in the history of Japan. For a real *samurai* the most natural thing is to die – as it was stated in the earlier times in Japan.

For *Hagakure* the most important issue is the acceptance of death and the person’s attitude to it.

The interpretation of the book changed from time to time, depending on the social conditions and other factors. It is without doubt that the thoughts about death, self-assurance, courage, strong actions, strong personality and willpower will stay in the reader’s mind even after the first reading.

*Hagakure* is still alive for many and it portrays endless life strength.<sup>23</sup>

How this idea was accepted in the strong Japan of the early 20th century was described by a Hungarian linguist, who summarised his experiences after paying a visit to the country:

*“The Japanese know very well that all the glory, with which they want to place their flag in the middle of the world, will demand sacrifice. It is not an empty slogan*

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<sup>20</sup> *Yamamoto Tsunetomo* (1659-1719) – a samurai, the author of *Hagakure* (1716) the first work to summarise the ideals of *bushidō*

<sup>21</sup> *Hagakure* – meaning hiding under trees

<sup>22</sup> *Mishima Yukio* (1925- 1970) – one of the most talented Japanese writers of the 20th century. With four soldiers of his private army he captured the Army General of the Japanese Defence Forces. After encouraging the army to riot that later proved to be unsuccessful, together with another person he committed *seppuku*.

<sup>23</sup> TSUNETOMO Yamamoto: *Hagakure, A szamurájok kódexe*. Bp.: Szenzár Kiadó, 2000. pp.11-30.

*that those who die for their country, will not die. Glory is achieved not by the ones alive, but by those who are dead. Consequently, the dead are happier than those who celebrate the end of the war. They never think about the truth of these statements, because they do not understand but feel them. Inherited emotions cannot be wiped out. This is the reason why Japanese people are in love with death and as an enemy, they are so dangerous today. If someone does not want to surrender, they need to learn from them.*"<sup>24</sup>

It was *Nitobe Inazo*<sup>25</sup> who summarised in written form the real teachings of *bushidō*. The book was published in English language in 1900, and strangely enough, it was published in Japanese language only in 1938, as a tool of ideological education.

The loyalty to the emperor and the religious respect, the respect of the ancestors got into people's minds through *shintō*. It does not convey morals, it is more about emphasizing the perception of the nation in an individual's mind, together with the two leading features of the Japanese mind, namely, love of the motherland and loyalty.

Japan's perception of the world was mainly based on *bushi*. Even though they closed themselves off from the world, they established moral norms for the masses and led them by personal examples and emphasized the value of practise. Japanese morals, directly or indirectly, are the result of *bushidō*, and they move the nation and its individuals unstoppably.<sup>26</sup>

The rules that regulated the extraordinary life and behaviour of the military and nobility layer, together with religion, constituted the solid basis of the main role was given to discipline and endless determination. This was the requirement of the imperial soldier, similarly to the *bushi* of the Middle ages. It demanded blind obedience, courage without the fear of death, life-long determination.

Becoming a prisoner was considered cowardliness and, consequently, the greatest possible shame. According to the laws of *bushidō*, those who became prisoners ashamed their names and their families. The person has no more right to live, it is his obligation to escape and wash off the shame with his blood.

As a summary, this fanaticism based on ideological, nationalistic and militaristic ideas infiltrated into Japanese minds for long generations. This made their combat methods so vicious and dangerous. Burning with fanaticism, they blindly followed any order, they were able to withstand any suffering and to fight till the end even in the most hopeless situations: "Fight till your last breath, it may

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<sup>24</sup> PRŐHLE Vilmos: Napkeletről. Bp.: Stádium Sajtóvállalat, 1922. pp.77-78.

<sup>25</sup> Nitobe Inazo (1862-1933) – agronomist, educator, writer, politician in the Meiji and Taisho-era

<sup>26</sup> NITOBÉ Inazō: Bushidō. Bp.: Budo Kiskönyvtár, 1998. pp.162-171.

happen that your last blow will kill your enemy!” And they acted so, even when the war took an irreversible turn for them.

The spirit of *bushidō* showed itself in its clearest form, in its awful reality in the case of the *kamikaze*<sup>27</sup> pilots when they had to fly into the enemy ships with their planes full of explosives. The old traditions appeared at *kamikaze* units again: there was a ceremony with drinking *sake* before death. Among pilots chosen to die honourably, there were some who had waited for more than 2 (!) years to get the permission to take off. Then they were asked if they were ready to sacrifice their lives for the emperor and the motherland. As an answer, they had to draw a cross or a circle. Their strong determination could be perfectly illustrated by the fact that out of 100 men only one or two disobeyed.

The military fascist dictatorship, embodied in the institution of the emperorship performed everything in the light of spirituality establishment and its strength. All progressive ideas and organisations were suppressed. To serve this aim different militaristic, fascist, secret and semi-legal groupings and organisations were established, which were legitimized by the government and they networked the entire country, and controlled the population.

The acceptance of the expansionism and the establishment of strict discipline made the task of the ideological education of the soldiers extremely important, which was the task of the officers. The effectiveness of ideological education of the Japanese military is perfectly characterised by the fact that even after Hitler’s suicide the defeat of the Wehrmacht and the capitulation of the fascist Germany the soldiers continued to fight. As a consequence, the Australian and American troops could move only step by step in the jungle covered Pacific islands. (see as Operation Leap Frog)

#### THE FINAL STAGE WHEN ONLY THE STRENGTH OF SPIRIT REMAINED

In spite of the fact that due to the uncertain outcome of the war there was a certain lax in the discipline in the Japanese military, the ideology planted into the soldiers’ minds gave strength to millions. The situation with the soldiers who fought on extremely difficult terrain, often having been isolated from the main forces, in the jungle, having been weak after months of “survival exercises”, having been ill, covered in blisters, their bodies full of scars, often in almost unconscious state. That was the state how they were captured by the enemy and became “shameful” POWs. The disciplinary situation varied in different prisoner camps.

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<sup>27</sup> *kamikaze* – usually translated as “divine wind”. The word *kamikaze* originated as the name of major typhoons in 1274 and 1281, which dispersed Mongolian invasion fleets.

There were camps where the highest ranking officer acted as a mini dictator, but there were camps where there was virtually no discipline at all, and the Australian or the American “hosts” kept the order.

In Australian prisoner camps the local soldiers were always surprised how strict were still the military rules with the Japanese soldiers. “They threw away their weapons but their souls had not changed.” – was said about them.<sup>28</sup>

Considering the situation at the fronts, by the autumn of 1944 it became clear that Japan was defeated, and that it was only a matter of time. According to the state of the war situation most Japanese soldiers agreed with the fact that it was only the strength of Japanese spirit that could be opposed to the huge resources of the enemy.

The navy was defeated in the battle near the Pacific islands, the Air Force was not able to defend Japan, cities were constantly carpet-bombed. The Allied Forces concentrated more and more in the territory. Because of the blockade the country could not satisfy its needs from the southern seas and was forced to diminish the military industry. By this time the Soviet troops had reached Berlin. On the islands the situation of the Japanese troops became hopeless.<sup>29</sup>

For Japan there was no way out, since all its natural resources were taken. The Allied Air Force and the Navy cut all supply routes. The American heavy bombers systematically destroyed the island’s industry and the cities, the surface navy was totally destroyed. It is quite probable that due to economic reasons Japan would have to surrender anyway, no matter whether the Allied Forces would have landed or continued the blockade and the bombing.<sup>30</sup>

A couple of weeks before the capitulation there was a talk between two Japanese soldiers that illustrates that how blind determination that was unaware of the real situation, could deform their thoughts:

*“The Land Forces have not been deployed yet, - Takano stated. – Our troops are stationed in Japan, China, in Manchuria, in other words, everywhere. If the Allies land in Japan, troops can be regrouped easily, they are not that far.*

*- Let’s imagine that the Land Forces will be able to stay for five years. Eventually, they will envelope the whole territory of Japan, and there will be lack of food and other supplies. What will be with us on the island then? What will happen? What do you think, Sarge?*

*- Then the Japanese will die honourably.*

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<sup>28</sup> SHIMODA Seiji: A japán katona. Bp.: Kozmosz Könyvek, 1982. p.32.

<sup>29</sup> SHIMODA Seiji: A japán katona. Bp.: Kozmosz Könyvek, 1982. p.136.

<sup>30</sup> www.mult-kor.hu

- *You mean the entire nation?*

- *Of course. Though there may be some who will surrender to the enemy. But there will not be many. The majority will die together with the soldiers.*

- *So it means that the Japanese nation, the nation of Yamato will disappear from the earth?*

- *I think that defeat for Japan equals with death.*”<sup>31</sup>

The Americans knew that in an offensive the Japanese will fight till the very end, and after having counted the loss of thousands of civilians and soldiers, they made a decision about the new form of deterrence, the nuclear bomb.

The realisation of the fact that defeat is inevitable was realised by the population and was voiced by the media. However, the state power seemed strong, and the force of the terror was so frightening that people did not dare to start antiwar protests even when on the 8th of August, 1945 the Soviets declared war against Japan. Though people should have realised that the strong power collapsed like a sand castle, even though they still believed in their hearts in the doctrines that praised the military strength of Japan. Consequently, the soldiers were still ready to follow General *Anami Korechika*, the Minister of Defence of the Japanese empire, who called them on the 9th of August, 1945 for the following:

*“We need to protect the land of the Gods till the end by our sacred war, we must fight even if we will have to bite the earth, to eat grass and to sleep on naked ground. Life is in death – this is what the great Nanko taught us.”*<sup>32</sup>

The decision of the question of war and peace was in the hands of one person, Emperor *Hirohito*. At the end of June he sent one of his relatives, prince *Konoe Fumimaro*, to the then neutral Moscow. The Japanese delegation had the following message:

*“We have only one condition: tennō must stay on the throne. I need to add that in Japan we do everything that the Americans want.”*

The American code specialists had already broken the Japanese codes in the beginning of the war, so the intelligence knew about the trip to Moscow and the message. For some reason, President Truman was not informed.

In the time of the war Japan was governed, besides *tennō*, who theoretically was almighty but could not be considered ambitious, by a cabinet of six. In the

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<sup>31</sup> SHIMODA Seiji: *A japán katona*. Bp.: Kozmosz Könyvek, 1982. p.107.

<sup>32</sup> SISKIN J. V. – SZAPOZSNYIKOV V.G.: *A távol-keleti győzelem*. Bp.: Zrínyi Katonai Kiadó, 1978. p.129.

*Nanko* – the deathless hero of the Japanese sagas. He died seven times and was always reborn to serve his country.



beginning of August three out of these six voted for unconditional surrender, and the remaining three for a combat to achieve better position. This rate was not changed even by the nuclear blow. The final word had to be said by Hirohito. His decision was quickened by the destruction of *Hiroshima* and *Nagasaki* but the fact that the war could only be finished because of the atomic bomb is doubtful.<sup>33</sup>

When *tennō* announced that he had accepted the Potsdam declaration and by the 14th of August the war had to be finished, a group of military officers prepared a coup. General *Anami* with some of his ministers, the military leadership in the name of *tennō* wanted to take the power as it was in his announcement of the 9th of August to continue the war till its final end. The coup was unsuccessful.

It was difficult for the Japanese army to accept the news of the capitulation because there were still considerable forces in the background and the army staff still remained. Japanese forces were stationed on the continent, there was no serious attack, the enemy had not landed on the Japanese islands yet.

The opinion of the Japanese army was illustrated well in a telegram written by a high ranking military leader. Marshal *Terauchi*, the Commander-in-Chief of the Southern army troops, who wrote the following:

*“I have the courage to express my opinion during the decisive autumn time for the military. The situation now is absolutely different of that in the beginning of the war. Our hopes concerning the victory of the sacred war do not exist anymore. And there is the question whether we should submit to the enemy. We are worried about not being able to defend our state and our territorial integrity. What is the guarantee that we can keep the territory of our state? The Commander-in-Chief of the Southern Forces considers it necessary to refuse the offers of the enemy. We need to continue the war by employing the strength of the entire nation.”*

This is the telegram written by the Chief of the expedition troops stationed in China:

*“It is difficult to come in terms with the political rule of the state and the danger threatening the integrity of Japan. We are convinced that in spite of the successful attack of the enemy and the inner difficulties of the country, the Japanese army is ready to die as heroes and it will not give up its aims. I am deeply loyal to my country, this is the reason for expressing my opinion and I hope it will be accepted.”<sup>34</sup>*

This fanaticism with consideration of the facts that caused so much suffering for the people of Asia in the above-mentioned half century and after the loss of millions led to the military defeat that destroyed Japan both physically and

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<sup>33</sup> [www.mult-kor.hu](http://www.mult-kor.hu)

<sup>34</sup> SHIMODA Seiji: *A japán katona*. Bp.: Kozmosz Könyvek, 1982. p.156.

ideologically, and brought death to the civilian population of *Hiroshima* and *Nagasaki*.

On the 10th of August, 1945 the Allied forces got the decision of Japan to accept the Potsdam declaration with the condition that the Emperor would remain on the throne. The ordered total ceasefire on the 14th of August. In spite of this, several military units continued the fight, because the order of ceasefire had not reached them yet. The Japanese forces stopped the fight against the Soviet troops on the territory of Manchuria and China on the 28th of August, in the south of Sakhalin and the Kuril islands on the 2nd of September. The Japanese unit of the strength of a million soldiers in China and Indo-China capitulated on the 9th September, in Nanking, to the national forces of Csang Kaj-sek.

After the bombing of Japanese cities and the two nuclear bombing, Japan accepted the ceasefire, and on the 2nd of September, on the board of Missouri ship, stationed in the Tokyo bay, the peace treaty was signed that ended the six-year world burning.

Since then there has been an ongoing discussions among historians and politicians whether there was a real need for the nuclear attack.

As a result of the actions of the Japanese soldiers the enormous number of the civilian population who lost their lives on the occupied territories was probably emphasized so much because of the aggressive nature of the theoretical ideology of the imperial army and the personal viciousness of the Japanese soldiers. But we need to consider the fact that due to the bombings by the Allied forces there were 80-120000 victims in Tokyo, and there were 130000 of them in Hiroshima, and 170000 civilian victims in Nagasaki.<sup>35</sup>

The Allied bombings that forced Japan to take the final step, even if impersonally, required civilian lives whose number could be compared to the number of victims of the vicious acts of Japanese soldiers in WW2.

Except for the fanatic military, at the end of war the Japanese population accepted the new political and social situation and realised the necessity for changes. It is interesting to notice that the discipline and obedience of orders required by the military regime, the superiority of the Japanese nation, its invincibility, and the ideal of the fight till the last breath, in the moment of *tenno*'s order of ceasefire had caused shocking inner conflicts among soldiers and the civilian population.

The prisoners of camps were probably the first among Japanese soldiers who were informed about the Potsdam agreement. The most shocking fact for them was

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<sup>35</sup> Ezek hozzávetőleges adatok, a tényleges áldozatok pontos számát nem lehet megállapítani.

probably, the decision to demilitarise Japan and that the soldiers returning to their families would do peaceful industrial work. These soldiers could not understand how the country could be rebuilt without a strong military.

As a matter of fact, the Japanese soldiers lost their strength when they were informed about the capitulation. They could not handle the fact of the unconditional surrender, they did not consider this possibility. The fact that the Japanese army no longer existed, and the *tennō*'s announcement of his own mortality, took away the last glimpse of hope. Most of them did not even bow as a respect of the Emperor during their morning rosters. They had to accept the terrible fact that according the ceasefire of the Potsdam agreement, the memory of the millions of soldiers who died as heroes in the Asian and Pacific regions, will not be honoured.

The moment when the people of Japan first heard the voice of the *Amaretasu*, the Goddess of the Sun's 124th offspring, who was one of the priests of the *shintō* state religion and the leader of the Japanese state, people became shocked. This was the second and the last time that the *tennō* directly interfered into the politics of Japan. In this situation nobody knew what to expect after the war.

### *CONCLUSION*

The influence of the ideology that had formed the thinking of Japanese people for generations still exists. Even though Japan has not taken part in any armed conflict so far, and according to its constitution, is not allowed to do so, the majority of people who are conservative in their hearts, have not finished the war yet. Those Japanese old men who survived the hell of the Pacific battles, still cry when they remember their dead comrades and the lost war. There is a story that in the jungle of the Philippines, in March of 1974, an imperial officer, *Hirō Onoda* was found and he was honoured a national hero. The old officer did not hear about the end of the war, and hence, he still considered himself a soldier of the imperial army. The only way to make him surrender was to take his former commander there who personally informed him about the end of the war.

The loyalty, strength and morals of the old soldier is a good illustration of what characterises the Japanese society today and explains the position of the country in the world, achieved by peaceful means.

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**Lt. István SABJANICS PhD aspirant<sup>1</sup>**

## **REVIEW ON SOME ACTUAL LEGAL ISSUES REGARDING ANTI-TERRORISM LEGISLATION**

A pattern appears nowadays, which has effect on every bit of our lives. Regardless of the nature of our current activity, it is present at work, during holidays and even when just surfing on the internet. It has two opposite sides, none of which exist without the other one, sometimes even initiating each other. On one hand, there are the technological developments, experienced by many and simultaneously the possibilities of the consumer-user had become much wider. It doesn't just imply the physical connection and access to the available technology, but also suggests the fitting legal environment for the possibility to occur. Without further analysis we can establish that one of the major needs of society in the XXI century is related to accessing the achievements of technological development, e.g. social websites, video and photo sharing sites, e-mailing, using webcams, writing blogs, shopping online and countless other more features. As we proceed with our discussion on the legal matter, the Janus-faced specifics emerge. The desires of the

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<sup>1</sup> PhD-researcher at Pázmány Péter Catholic University Faculty of Law and Political Sciences

consumer-user of accessing completely the achievements of technological developments consists also, that no one else should have the same amount of access in contradiction of his or her benefit, or at least he or she demands to have some control over the question. All in all, his or her precise desire is to be secured, but not in just the physical way, also in the legal meaning. Consequently, keeping order by the police is not enough any more. The citizen claims for legal guarantees<sup>2</sup> that will protect and preserve his or her personal privacy, alongside with the unrestrained opportunities, which the technical development can offer. The two sides of the matter are the possibilities becoming much wider, therefore the risk factors multiply, but then again, no time existed before with such an intense demand for personal and public security. So what is security after all?

Pragmatism shows us, that through the correlation between security and the absence of security, the subject of the matter can be defined easier. When security does not exist, it can be described as fear from the lack of social security, or perhaps from the difficulties accessing new technologies, but our subject is the specific fear triggered by terrorism, and in accordance, also the fear from the lack of due process of law. Legal actions by state or private party can be initiated by real and present danger, however, looking back on the last ten years' successful and failed terrorist attacks, just the hint of a provision should be appreciated equally as an attempt. The struggle against terrorism generates certain issues regarding the due process of law, particularly concerning the due interpretation of law by state actors (e.g. state officials, judges) or private parties acting on behalf of the state, or in case of challenging the actions of the previously mentioned. Discussing these matters the first thing to do, is to identify the parties in the legal relationship. State actors basically imply all state officials, from civil servants to police officers, from judges to the army, or in some exact situations even a solicitor representing a private company, which acted on behalf of the state, authorized by a contractual agreement between the two. So with one significant phrase all state actors could be addressed as government. Now, how can we label the international bodies and multinational companies, since they hardly have direct and obvious connection to the state governments? The answer lies in their actions and their position in the legal relationships. Identifying the private party as the third corner of a triangle, we can easily distinguish and separate the international legal entities from individuals and domestic contributors of certain relationships, as they are usually linked through external relations and primarily act as a state actor.

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<sup>2</sup> Balázs Gerencsér, "Nation and Constitutional Values", in: *Balázs Gerencsér, Péter Takács (ed.) Ratio legis - ratio iuris. Ünnepi tanulmányok Tamás András tiszteletére 70. születésnapja alkalmából = Liber amicorum. Studia A. Tamás septuagenario dedicata.*, Budapest: Szent István Társulat, 2011. (551-559.) (ISBN:978-963-277-257-8)

The fear from terrorism has affect not just on the individuals separately, but also on the entire political system of a country. Terrorists are once ordinary people radicalized by a fanatic group, acting on behalf of this group, but acting alone. One individuals lone act and the fear from the repeated attacks, organized by the group in the shadow, is able to radicalize the whole community.<sup>3</sup> Thus, slowly but surely change the political system, once designated to live and function under the rule of law, with most respect for Human Rights. Representatives of the legislature, executive and judiciary had this process foreseen, but unfortunately reacted at once, mostly without thinking through from different perspectives the whole problem, and therefore producing law incompatible to the standards of the rule of law. This essay's main goal is to locate and analyze the theoretical and practical boundaries of interpreting anti-terrorism legislation and practice on some recent issues by just scratching the surface.

For instance, there is the phenomenon of private military and security companies (later on referred to as PMCs), with clean legal background as PMCs are usually registered both in domestic and in international law. Although, these companies are most commonly used in minor armed conflicts or post conflict situations, they act without proper, or sometimes in absence of any kind of oversight, and above all this often with immunity. Therefore, PMCs are practically free of any kind of accountability, free from the sort of legal restraints which normally bind military personnel in such situations. Because of their non-governmental legal basis, PMCs can be used much more easily as they need no authorization from parliaments to operate abroad, in contrary of the Army. The state shares none of the responsibility regarding an indemnity judgment of the PMCs' employee, but then again in case of service relations political accountability occurs alongside the financial issues. So in much less time, with much less responsibility of the client for the PMCs actions, these companies are indeed the supposedly lost mercenaries of the XXI century. From the trading companies of the time of the colonization, throughout history, there were always individuals or groups dedicated to protect the clients interests for appropriate amount of money. Nowadays, capitalism turned up not just in the field of war and security, but also in peacekeeping, particularly with the mandate of the international community. These legal entities act independent from local governments, exist on the international level, provide services for the same governments and also for a wide selection of multinational corporations for the same reason, that each and every member of this

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<sup>3</sup> Even though the three dimensions of dignity can be separated and discussed exclusively, the transcendental 'are born', the individual 'human being' and the communitarian 'all' refers to the same person who is influenced by terrorism in either way. For further discussion on the matter see András Zs. Varga associate professor (PPKE JÁK), "Personal Dignity and Community", in: *Iustum Aequum Salutare VI. 2010/4*, Budapest (167-173.)

group has the fitting financial coverage. Nevertheless, the legal independence of the PMCs is essential, we cannot say that this apparently ‘no strings attached’ policy is also true for political schemes. Being a non-state establishment enables the PMCs, a subject of private law, to decide whom to make arrangements with, should or shouldn’t the company, and if so, on which side to interfere in a situation, even to choose to take the less profitable offer. Even though, the direct link from governments to PMCs is hardly to be proofed, the actions of these companies in general demonstrate some logic and not just for the purblind believers of conspiracy theories.

PMCs offer most commonly physical security (e.g. building, site, transportation and personal) separately and often combined with advisory, training, intelligence and even covert operations, which alone makes us wonder, since covert ops carried out by military units with proper mandate, oversight and accountability often have the reputation of rarely being doubtless. Regarding the elimination of the least accountability for actions taken abroad, PMCs add in as much contractual layers between the original assignment from the client and the bodyguard taking action as it is possible. The reason of the rapid extension of PMCs is that the clients legal accountability almost never can be recognized<sup>4</sup> solely on the base of contractual agreement. One of the specifics of multinational corporations like PMCs is that they are hardly transparent for national monitoring bodies, thus it is a promising investment opportunity. Since private corporations domestic or international, all profit-oriented, work for achieving the same goal, if it is initiated by the market, can be suspended or even a liquidation proceeding can be carried out as easily and fast as it was instituted and launched in the start. The personnel of the PMCs contains former members of armed forces, police and intelligence services. Training these experts costed the state a lot and instead of keeping them as official members of the armed forces or the police, the state releases them from duty just to employ the same individuals as private contractors. They will cost a lot more this way, but the state can avoid restraints of the binding international law and more importantly make effective foreign policy, free of any political accountability.<sup>5</sup>

In the field of data security and data protection the vocabulary gained some very interesting new phrases because of terrorism. Not necessarily the actual words

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<sup>4</sup> For further discussion on corporate liability see Sascha-Dominik Bachmann, Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Portsmouth, “Civil Liability of Corporate and Non-state Aiders and Abettors of International Terrorism as an Evolving Notion under International Law”, in: *Journal of International Commercial Law and Technology Vol. 6, Issue 1*. 2011 (1-11.)

<sup>5</sup> For a wide compilation of case-law on the matter see José L. Gómez del Prado, Chairperson, UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries, “Private Military and Security Companies and Challenges to the UN Working Group on the Use of Mercenaries”, United Nations, New York, 2008. (1-18.)

are brand new, but their meaning surely is. Like ‘fishing net’ (Rasterfahndung) in accordance with profiling occurred in the landmark judgement of the German Constitutional Court in 2006. In the process of identifying sleeper members of terrorist organizations, as the ruling stated, tracking individuals matching the characteristics defined in advance generally ordered by law is such a breach of the fundamental rights of informational self-determination, that it could be justified only in case of concrete danger to highly valued legal interests.<sup>6</sup> This does not mean that authorities couldn’t observe with the required interest, they should, but not with an inaccurate loose definition and highlight the general insubstantial marks of a person, like male, student, Muslim. This would result many misleads. In the race for catching terrorists, plotters etc. there are always the unfortunate, like in every war, innocent suffer too, as politicians would say, who happened to be at the wrong place, at the wrong time, entered accidentally the wrong website or just match precisely the characteristics of a known terrorist. These people are called ‘false positives’. Yet, no actual legal procedure is available for a false positive if the authorities cause damages during the further investigation carried out in favour of his or her clearing. All forms of processing of personal data<sup>7</sup> must be monitored and interfere the least possible way with right respect for private life, and most of all, it needs to be guaranteed, that none of the standards imposed by the European Convention of Human Rights is to be violated in any way.<sup>8</sup> Citing a legitimate interest<sup>9</sup> is not enough. An action of the executive must be in accordance with the law and necessary in a democratic society. The last ten years’ terrorist attacks gave the opportunity for politicians to produce extreme directives with over-ambitious timetables, justifying it all by the ‘politics of emergency’.<sup>10</sup> Even members of the academic community quoted<sup>11</sup> some issues approving the unjust regulation following terrorist attacks. However, one question still remains, which could be dealt with in accordance with the rule of law. In most western countries terrorists are convicted in general criminal procedure, in some other cases a specialized criminal court of the Army have jurisdiction. The author of the cited article makes

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<sup>6</sup> Decision of the German Constitutional Court, BVerfG, 1 BvR 518/02 of 4 April 2006, Absatz-Nr.1-184.

<sup>7</sup> See further discussion on the matter by Elspeth Guild, “Global Data Transfers: The Human Rights Implications”, in: *INEX Policy Brief No. 9 / May 2010*. (1-10.)

<sup>8</sup> For a detailed compilation of European Court of Human Rights case-law and proper practical discoveries see Gloria González Fuster, Serge Gutwirth and Erika Ellyne, “Profiling in the European Union: A high-risk practice”, in: *INEX Policy Brief No. 10/June 2010*. (1-11.)

<sup>9</sup> Such as national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, prevention of disorder or crime, protection of health or morals, or protection of the rights and freedoms of others.

<sup>10</sup> Still, some authors’ suggestions are a bit inaccurate too. See Joanna Parkin, “The Schengen Information System and the EU rule of Law”, in: *INEX Policy Brief, No. 13/June 2011*. Policy recommendations. (4-7.)

<sup>11</sup> See Ronald Dworkin, “The Threat to Patriotism”, in: *The New York Review of Books*. New York, February 28, 2002



an effort to convince us that terrorists who do not apply the general rules of armed conflicts, like the Geneva Conventions, shouldn't be allowed to appreciate the advantages of the accused in a normal criminal procedure. Terrorists must be convicted in a more strict procedure and instead of establishing a whole new system, for better or worse there are the criminal courts of the Army. Contrary to the US solution, in Europe the legislature stated that terrorism is a crime, thus only in criminal procedure could be dealt with. The legal consequences threatening a terrorist can be aggravated but the legal procedure shouldn't be separated from the jurisdiction of general criminal law.

Terrorism transformed<sup>12</sup> in the past decades and became a global phenomenon, thus only a global solution would be an appropriate answer to it. Unfortunately, also in this area, unity is rare and governments would co-operate in certain questions only when the threat is imminent. International law is based on the sovereign equality of States, therefore we shouldn't be surprised to experience the lack of harmony around the defining of terrorism. Several global, regional and multilateral conventions discussed the problem, yet not one could bring the parties to come together behind a general definition. Each regional convention evidently speaks about the successes and difficulties of the diplomatic negotiations, consequently resulting significant differences both in structure and content. From an exact and detailed definition<sup>13</sup> to just referring back to each state's national law that ratified the convention,<sup>14</sup> from special treatment of certain persons<sup>15</sup> to implying the fair process of alleged terrorists<sup>16</sup> numerous solutions are composed. Basically the definition core is likely equivalent, however the standards of process and the exceptions regarding selected persons or forms of action block the creation of a generally acceptable and working definition. The European crime approach of the definition allows the legislature a limited space to operate in and make the norms more up-to-date and more importantly up-to-task. Although, the specialized separate treatment of anti-terrorism legislation authorizes the legislature and

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<sup>12</sup> Péter Tálas, "Kelet-Közép Európa és az új típusú terrorizmus", in: *A terrorizmus anatómiája*. (ed. Péter Tálas). Zrínyi Kiadó. Budapest. 2006. ISBN 963 327 412 5

<sup>13</sup> "Human Rights, Terrorism and Counter-terrorism" from the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, Facts Sheet No. 32, Printed at United Nations, Geneva GE.08-41872-July 2008-7, 820. ISSN 1014-5567, however this document is not a Convention, thus it is not binding for any of the States.

<sup>14</sup> Convention of the Organization of the Islamic Conference on Combating International Terrorism, 1999.

<sup>15</sup> See the 'Treaty on Cooperation among the States Members of the Commonwealth of Independent States in Combating Terrorism', done at Minsk, 1999, for the special protection for statesmen and public figures, as well as the 'OAU Convention on the Prevention and Combating of Terrorism', Tunisia, 1994, for exceptional legal classification of certain acts of violence, which normally are considered as acts of terrorism.

<sup>16</sup> See the 'ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism', Cebu, The Philippines, 2007.

executive a wider selection<sup>17</sup> of choices, in the mean time, it represents a greater threat to the rule of law to prevail. A separate system of anti-terrorism laws just not necessarily results in the lack of the rule of law or the due process of law, nevertheless had no practice in contrary existed. In the hurry<sup>18</sup> of calming and satisfying the citizens in the short period of time between two elections, it was more impressing to show up information, no matter how we came to know it, or to detain individuals with certain characteristics, without proper legal process provided by the rule of law (e.g. defense. appeal, or just to be heard by a judge). Phrases such as cultural relativism and respect for national traditions<sup>19</sup> should not be allowed to excuse certain regulations that are absolute opposites of the rule of law. History shows us that no extreme circumstances could justify in-just in the followup. Taking action against the supporters of terrorism is an obligation for individuals, as reporting it or avoiding financing terrorism, for authorities, as to take action with all necessary provided by the law, and also States, as equal members of the international community with an obligation and potential for humanitarian intervention against the States supporting terrorism. On one hand there is the sovereign equality of States, with the interests of the States, and on the other hand there are the individuals directly protected by humanitarian law. Humanitarian intervention is a conflict of interests, and this way the resolution of this conflict should contain a hierarchy of the interests involved.<sup>20</sup>

As we can see, the issue regarding the struggle against terrorism is complex and has a various number of solutions. None of which is perfect, or immediate, still, there are better and worse. The most important initiative should be to act always on the ground of the rule of law. Law is not the answer to every question, but it is likely the most effective form of guidelines if it is just and serves the people, the very subject of it. This article is a compilation of several problems, regarding the democratic handling of terrorism. Although, this short paper does not imply the best practice on the matter, it hopes to have some topics to consider. In the efforts to repress terrorism, we mustn't forget, that moral and justice stands with those, who submit to the rule of law.

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<sup>17</sup> See János Frivaldszky, "From legal constraint to legal obligation", in: *L'Ircocervo*, Rivista elettronica italiana di metodologia giuridica, teoria generale del diritto e dottrina dello Stato. 2010/2. [http://www.lircocervo.it/index/pdf/2010\\_02/legislazione/2010\\_02\\_02.pdf](http://www.lircocervo.it/index/pdf/2010_02/legislazione/2010_02_02.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> The standard and basic pillar of democracy is the principle of checks and balances, therefore this is the first and most effective defense line to prevent the misuse of powers. For more over this issue, see András Zs. Varga, "Alternative Control Instruments over Administrative Procedures: Ombudsmen, Prosecutors, Civil Liability", in: Passau: Schenk Verlag GmbH, 2011. 64 p.(ISBN:978-3-939337-87-4)

<sup>19</sup> Péter Kovács, "Az emberi jogok egyetemes nyilatkozata kidolgozásának története és elfogadásának körülményei", in: *Iustum Aequum Salutare V. 2009/2.*, Budapest (55-66.)

<sup>20</sup> See Tamás Vince Ádány, "Humanitarian Intervention Against States Supporting Terrorism", in: *European Integration Studies*, Miskolc, 2002

**Dóra DÉVAI PhD aspirant, university lecturers, Corvinus University**

## **CYBERSECURITY AGENDA OF THE EVOLVING US REGULATORY FRAMEWORK**

### ***Introduction***

Cyber operations intended to disrupt, destroy or degrade the enemy's military functions has become increasingly integrated into modern military organizations over the past two decades, reinforcing the need for clear guidelines applying to cyberwarefare, both on the national and international scale. Ever since the end of the final years of the George W. Bush administration there have been a growing public debate in the US about the proper policies to address the nation's cyber security, as well as the rules governing the conduct of defensive and offensive military activities in cyberspace. This article seeks to give a broad overview of the polemics surrounding the delineating legal, institutional and strategic framework. One of the major frontlines runs between the Pentagon and the Justice Department coupled with other legal agencies within the Executive Branch. Another area of conflicting interests and turf wars is related to the authority over the protection of the privately owned critical infrastructure of the U.S.. Finally, a separate section is devoted to the stance and role of the White House in the national and international arena mainly through the identification of the goals set in the *Cyber Policy Review*, the *International Strategy for Cyberspace* and the legislative proposal put forward by the Obama-administration this autumn.

### ***Brief history of civilian information technology (IT) regulation in the United States since the early 1990s***

The timeline of the regulatory framework well illustrates the governmental and legislative efforts and approach towards cybersecurity, as well as the resulting overlaps and inconsistencies in the evolving federal system.<sup>1</sup> With the arrival of the World Wide Web<sup>2</sup> a number of legislative and institutional landmark measures have been taken in order to address technological advancement and the risks of cyberspace, and to harmonize federal department and agency duties along the process. In 1994 Congress codified the existing State Department authority over

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<sup>1</sup> For a complete timeline of US IT technology and legal development see: *Cyberspace Policy Review*. Appendix C. [http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace\\_Policy\\_Review\\_final.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf)

<sup>2</sup> The WWW consortium had its first meeting in 1994.

foreign policy related to communications and information policy. Presidential Decision Directive 63 (PDD-63), signed in May 1998, established a structure under White House leadership to coordinate the activities of chosen lead departments and agencies, in partnership with their counterparts from the private sector, to “eliminate any significant vulnerability to both physical and cyber attacks on our critical infrastructures, including especially our cyber systems.”<sup>3</sup>

Subsequent to 2001 9/11 terrorist attacks, cybersecurity gained a renewed relevance. White House policy was updated in 2003 with the notoriously feeble document titled *The National Strategy to Secure Cyberspace*. It was further improved later that year in Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7), which assigned the newly established Secretary of Homeland Security the responsibility for coordinating the nation’s overall critical infrastructure protection efforts, including cyber infrastructure, across all sectors in cooperation with relevant sector-specific agencies within the executive branch (“dot.gov” domain).<sup>4</sup> Both of these policies focused only on defensive strategies, and HSPD-7 did not cover protection of Federal government information systems.

In 2007, the more advanced *Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative*<sup>5</sup> (CNCI) took a different approach. It has been the first all-encompassing effort to integrate the previously separate cyber defensive missions with law enforcement, intelligence, counterintelligence, and military capabilities to address the entire spectrum of cyber threats from remote network intrusions and insider operations to supply chain vulnerabilities. It includes defensive, offensive, education, research and development, and counterintelligence elements. It has been made emphatic that the CNCI was developed with great care and attention to privacy and civil liberties concerns in close consultation with privacy experts across the government. The partially classified CNCI strategy was codified in January 2008, in NSPD-54/HSPD-23 and initiated programs which focused primarily on the security of executive branch networks.<sup>6</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> <sup>17</sup> Presidential Decision Directive 63, *Critical Infrastructure Protection*, May 22, 1998, at section II.

<sup>4</sup> Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7, *Critical Infrastructure Identification, Prioritization, and Protection* (December 17, 2003). HSPD-7 also designated DHS as the lead agency for the nation’s Information Technology and Communications sectors, to share threat information, help assess vulnerabilities, and encourage appropriate protective action and the development of contingency plans.

<sup>5</sup> *Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative*  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/cybersecurity.pdf>

<sup>6</sup> Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7 (HSPD-7) established U.S. policy for enhancing critical infrastructure protection by establishing a framework for the Department’s partners to identify, prioritize, and protect the critical infrastructure in their communities from terrorist attacks. The directive identified 17 critical infrastructure sectors and, for each sector, designated a federal Sector-Specific Agency (SSA) to lead protection and resilience-building programs and activities. HSPD-7 allows for the Department of Homeland Security to identify gaps in existing critical infrastructure sectors and establish

## *The White House and the Cyberspace Policy Review*

Recognizing the ever increasing global paradigm shift in technology brought on the Information Age, as well as the entailed proliferation of cyber incidents resulting in the surge of economic and strategic losses endured by the US. President Obama identified cybersecurity as one of the top priorities of his administration. He declared cyberspace a strategic national asset, and that “cyber threat is one of the most serious economic and national security challenges we face as a nation.” The President directed a 60-day, comprehensive review to assess U.S. policies and structures for cybersecurity. The review team of government cybersecurity experts inventoried relevant presidential policy directives, executive orders, national strategies, and studies from government advisory boards and private-sector entities. Melissa Hathaway<sup>7</sup> was named the Acting Senior Director for Cyberspace for the National Security and Homeland Security Councils in February 2009, and she was put in charge of the inter-agency review. The President determined that the CNCI and its associated activities should evolve to become key elements of a broader, updated national U.S. cybersecurity strategy that was finally released in May 2009 under the title *Cyberspace Policy Review*.<sup>8</sup>

Consequently, the new national policy seeks to deepen the earlier integrative approach, but this time in a more transparent way:

*„Cybersecurity policy includes strategy, policy, and standards regarding the security of and operations in cyberspace, and encompasses the full range of threat reduction, vulnerability reduction, deterrence, international engagement, incident response, resiliency, and recovery policies and activities, including computer network operations, information assurance, law enforcement, diplomacy, military, and intelligence missions as they relate to the security and stability of the global*

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new sectors to fill these gaps. Under this authority, the Department established an 18th sector, the Critical Manufacturing Sector, in March 2008.

<sup>7</sup> Melissa Hathaway is currently a private sector cybersecurity expert. From June 1993 to February 2007,<sup>[1]</sup> Hathaway worked for consulting firm Booz Allen Hamilton, focusing on information operations and long-range strategy and policy support business units. She is best known for her work as the Director of the Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force at the Office of the Director of National Intelligence during the George W. Bush administration and her six-month role at the National Security Council under the Barack Obama administration. Hathaway served as Senior Advisor to the Director of National Intelligence, Mike McConnell, and Cyber Coordination Executive. She chaired the National Cyber Study Group (NCSG). In her role at the NCSG, she contributed to the development of the Comprehensive National Cybersecurity Initiative (CNCI). Hathaway was appointed the Director of the Joint Interagency Cyber Task Force in January 2008. In August 2009, Ms. Hathaway would returned to the private sector.

<sup>8</sup> *Cyberspace Policy Review*

[http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace\\_Policy\\_Review\\_final.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/assets/documents/Cyberspace_Policy_Review_final.pdf)

*information and communications infrastructure. The scope does not include other information and communications policy unrelated to national security or securing the infrastructure.”*<sup>9</sup>

Based on the findings of the expert review, the report designated ten major short-term objectives.<sup>10</sup> The Policy Review strongly advocates a much better articulated, and legally and institutionally entrenched leading role for the White House both in the national and the international arena. According to the White House Fact Sheet, by May 2011 the Administration has delivered on every point of the Near-Term Action Plan.<sup>11</sup> An Information and Communications Infrastructure Interagency Policy Committee (ICI-IPC), chaired by the National Security Council (NSC) and Homeland Security Council (HSC), as the primary policy coordination body for issues related to achieving an assured, reliable, secure, and survivable global information and communications infrastructure and related capabilities, most importantly the latest White House legislative package. Howard A. Schmidt has been appointed as the Cybersecurity Coordinator. The Obama-administration put foreword its *International Strategy in Cyberspace* later in May 2011, which is discussed in detail in the penultimate chapter.

The document has been received well. To date, it has been the primary departure point for any local, state federal or international cybersecurity initiative. However, a large part of the ensuing public debate proves to be most fierce with regard to the public-private partnership. Government interference aiming to enhance the security of the so called critical national infrastructure – including global internet networks, vital national infrastructure such as electricity grid, or computer-based financial networks – owned and operated predominantly by the private sector is a sensitive area.<sup>12</sup> The key elements of the disagreement are:

- Both the government and the market had been satisfied earlier with the governmental “non-interference” policy. As the above cited cybersecurity legislation implies, both parties regarded their cybersecurity as exclusively within their own purview.
- However, the stunning extent of the damage caused in terms of GDP growth, competitiveness and market share has made it a national economic security issue on one hand.

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<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid.

<sup>11</sup> “FACT SHEET: The Administration’s Cybersecurity Accomplishments”  
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/12/fact-sheet-administrations-cybersecurity-accomplishments>

<sup>12</sup> For Hungarian parallels see: Dr. Zsolt, Haig - László Kovács - Dr. Imre, Makkay – Dr. Imre Seebauer – Dr. Sándor, Vass „Az infomációs társadalom veszélyforrásai. A kormányzat szerepe a védelem és ellentevékenység műszaki és szervezeti megoldásaiban. Tanulmány. MEH Infomatikai Kormánybiztosság 2002.

- On the other hand, the vulnerability of the national critical infrastructure incurs justified national security concerns.
- “Here are fundamental differences in these two unevenly yoked partners: government's fundamental role under the U.S. Constitution is to provide for the common defense; industry's role, backed by nearly a hundred years of case law, is to maximize shareholder value.
- Further differences are that government partners and industry players often assess risk differently, based on their differing missions and objectives.”<sup>13</sup>
- How should the financial burden of enhanced security be shared?
- Concerns about privacy also adds to companies reluctance.
- What role, if any, should the military play in the new cooperation?
- Breach laws and vulnerability liability.

At present, the U.S. government still lacks a coherent approach to protect vital infrastructure, and in most cases relies on the voluntary participation of private industry. The legislative proposal<sup>14</sup> presented by the White House in May coupled with that of the House of Representatives in October incorporate some 50 bills. Bipartisan committees have been negotiating potential language in a cyber bill for the past months, but those efforts haven't produced results.<sup>15</sup> Vote has been deferred till early 2012.

### ***The military domain***

To understand the stance of the armed forces it is crucial to consider that the American military has always had an intimate relationship with information technology due to the vanguard position of the Pentagon in research and development. As a result, since the 1990s a fundamental shift is underway in the American Armed Forces rendering computer network based operations and information operations<sup>16</sup> ever more central, which has been serving as the basis for the (Information) Revolution of the Military Affairs in industrialized nations. The resulting network-centric warfare (NCW) is a military doctrine or theory of war in the Information Age championed by the United States Department of Defense.<sup>17</sup> It

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<sup>13</sup> Larry Clinton: „A Relationship on the Rocks: Industry-Government Partnership for Cyber Defense” <http://scholarcommons.usf.edu/jss/vol4/iss2/7/>

<sup>14</sup> FACT SHEET: Cybersecurity Legislative Proposal <http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2011/05/12/fact-sheet-cybersecurity-legislative-proposal>

<sup>15</sup> For the list of bills see: Cyber Legislation. <http://csis.org/blog/cyber-legislation>

<sup>16</sup> For example, in 1998 the DOD publication JP3-13, ***Joint Doctrine for Information Operations***.

<sup>17</sup> Department of Defense. *The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare*. Washington, D.C., 2005, p. 4. As a distinct concept, network-centric warfare first appeared publicly in a 1998 US Naval Institute Proceedings article by Vice Admiral Arthur K. Cebrowski and John Garstka. The concepts were later given greater depth in the book, *Network Centric Warfare*

seeks to translate an information advantage, enabled in part by information technology, into a competitive advantage through the robust networking of well informed geographically dispersed forces. NCW generates increased combat power by networking sensors, decision makers, and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, high tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and a degree of self-synchronization.<sup>18</sup>

The process accelerated when in 2005 lieutenant John M. Curron the head of the Future Force Center announced that the American military forces undergo a transformation in order to become suitable for NCW.

This is well reflected in the 2006 *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations*. It says that “as a war-fighting domain ... cyberspace favors the offense ... an opportunity to gain and maintain the initiative.” It further defines cyberspace as a domain “characterized by the use of electronics and the electromagnetic spectrum to store, modify, and exchange data via networked systems and associated physical infrastructures.”<sup>19</sup>

Current doctrine (Joint Publication 3-13, **Joint Doctrine on Information Operations 1998**) regarding cyberattack identifies computer network attack as an element of computer network operations (CNO), the other two of which are computer network defense (CND) and related computer network exploitation (CNE) enabling operations. Computer network attack (CNA) refers to actions taken through the use of computer networks to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers and computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves. CND refers to actions taken through the use of computer networks to protect, monitor, analyze, detect, and respond to unauthorized activity against or within DOD information systems and computer networks. CNE refers to operations conducted through the use of computer networks to gather data from target or adversary automated information systems or networks, and the term “related CNE enabling operations” refers to operations undertaken to gather intelligence information for carrying out CNO or CND operations. The doctrine notes that all of these capabilities can be used for both offensive and defensive purposes.<sup>20</sup>

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co-authored by Gartska, David S. Alberts (Director of Research, OASD-NII), and Fred Stein of The MITRE Corporation.

<sup>18</sup> Ibid.

<sup>19</sup> „Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities” National Research Council of The National Academies. 2009. [http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record\\_id=12651&page=R1](http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12651&page=R1)

<sup>20</sup> Ibid.



Another common tenet in US military doctrines and strategies is the goal to retain American dominance in the cyber domain: “The NMS-CO is the US Armed Forces comprehensive strategic approach for using cyberspace operations to assure US military strategic superiority in the domain. The integration of offensive and defensive cyberspace operations, coupled with the skill and knowledge of our people, is fundamental to this approach.”<sup>21</sup>

To date the most wide-ranging study on the policy dimensions and legal/ethical implications of offensive information warfare was prepared by the National Research Council of **The National Academies 2009. It points out that the:** “The doctrinal perspective further implies that cyberweapons should be regarded as no different from any other kind of weapon available to U.S forces. That is, their use should be initiated on the basis of their suitability for conducting the attacks in question, and should not require any extraordinary analysis or authority to which the non-cyberspace military is not already accustomed.”<sup>22</sup>

### *Legal perspectives*

It is well known that the military has been stretching its cyber muscle and testing new capabilities since at least as early as the 1990/91 in the First Gulf War. The next seminal international conflict in this regard was when “analysts and decision makers considered using information operations, including computer network attack, as part of an integrated campaign against certain targets in Kosovo. However, in practice, options such as computer network attack proved harder to use than expected, in part because of the difficulties in obtaining the necessary approvals and authorizations to use them. In some cases, the approval process took so long that the utility of the operation had passed, at least in part because the execution of a particular option had many unknowns about likely effects. In other cases, it would have been relatively straightforward for the adversary to counter the use of such an option. The summary assessment of a senior military officer regarding information operations in Operation Allied Force –“a big wind-up to an underhand throw.”<sup>23</sup>

Then came on April 27, 2007, a series of distributed denial of service (DDOS) attacks began on a range of Estonian government websites, media sites, and online banking services. From a legal and policy standpoint, the attack raised questions about whether such an attack constituted an armed attack in the sense

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<sup>21</sup> *National Military Strategy for Cyberspace Operations 2006.* p. vii

<http://www.cyberloop.org/library/the-national-military-strategy-for-cyberspace-operations.html/>

<sup>22</sup> „Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities.” p.163.

<sup>23</sup> *Ibid.* p. 173

intended by the UN Charter and whether cyberattacks against a member nation ought to be included in the provisions of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty which provides for collective self-defense if any member is attacked.<sup>24</sup>

In August 2008, a military conflict involving land, air, and sea forces of Georgia and Russia occurred in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, provinces under the nominal control of Georgia. Russian military action in this conflict was immediately preceded by a number of cyberattacks against a variety of websites of the Georgian government. These attacks defaced these websites and also made it very difficult for the Georgian government to put out its side of the story.<sup>25</sup> The primary significance of the cyberattacks on Georgia is in their appearing to be the first instance of simultaneous actions involving cyberattack and kinetic attack, rather than in any of the particulars of the cyberattacks themselves.<sup>26</sup> The performance of U.S. forces in the successful conduct of Operations Enduring Freedom (OEF, Afghanistan, 2001–2002) and Iraqi Freedom (OIF, Iraq, 2003) has provided a glimpse of NCW potential.<sup>27</sup>

The latest well publicized attack was the Stuxnet malware discovered Iran in June 2010. It targeted Siemens industrial software and equipment, and this was the first discovered malware that spies on and subverts industrial systems, and the first to include a programmable logic controller (PLC) rootkit.<sup>28</sup>

### ***Doctrinal shift or turf war?***

Over the last decade a number of key federal institutions have become instrumental in cybersecurity. According to experts and officials the division of labor is still not clear between the major players in the executive branch, and on the other hand, the inter-agency co-operation still needs to develop much further. Nevertheless, the power and efficiency of the federal agencies also depends on the strategic vision and the commitment of the President and his closest advisers.

A significant event propelled the establishment of the U.S. Cyber Command: in November 2008, the classified military network of the Department of Defense

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<sup>24</sup> „Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities.” p.163.

<sup>25</sup> János, Besenyő “Újfajta háború? Internetes hadviselés Grúziában.” Sereg Szemle, (MH ÖHP szakmai tudományos folyóirat) VI. évfolyam, 3. szám, 2008. december, 61-63. oldal [http://www.hm.gov.hu/files/9/11022/seregszemle\\_200812.pdf](http://www.hm.gov.hu/files/9/11022/seregszemle_200812.pdf)

<sup>26</sup> “Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities.” p.166

<sup>27</sup> Department of Defense. *The Implementation of Network-Centric Warfare*. p. 18

<sup>28</sup> "Building a Cyber Secure Plant". Siemens. 30 September 2010. "Last-minute paper: An indepth look into Stuxnet". Virus Bulletin.

(DoD) was compromised, and the Operation Buckshot Yankee enabled the intruder to extract critical operational plans undetected. After this significant security breach the Pentagon declared cyberspace a fifth domain of warfare on par with sea, land, air and space. In May 2010 U.S. Cyber Command was installed in order to integrate cyberdefense operations across the military. CYBERCOM incorporates the National Security Agency and the Defense Advanced Research Project Agency, with the purview to protect all defense networks (“dot.mil” domain); constitutes a single chain of command up to the president; shares and manages threat information and coordinate responses.<sup>29</sup>

In September 2010, DHS and DoD signed a cybersecurity memorandum formalizing cooperation between the two departments and allowing DHS to capitalize on the advanced technical expertise of NSA the primary U.S. agency in charge of signal intelligence and cryptologic work. The agreement also allowed the co-location of personnel and a joint operational planning element.<sup>30</sup> The division of labor between the Department of Defense and the intelligence community is inherently fuzzy.<sup>31</sup> Moreover, the post-Cold War strategic environment demands in general further blur the lines between military and intelligence activity, let alone cyberspace. There is a key difference between military and intelligence operations in terms of oversight. “Covert action requires a written presidential finding in advance of the action that the action is necessary to support identifiable foreign policy objectives of the United States, submission of the finding to the chairmen of the congressional intelligence oversight committees, and notification of congressional leaders of the action. By contrast, no findings, special approval, or notification are needed for conducting any of the traditional military activities, although activities conducted by the uniformed military are subject to the guidance of and restrictions imposed by the law of armed conflict, and, in practice, many highly sensitive military operations—if conducted outside the framework of a general armed conflict—have been brought to the attention of congressional leadership.”<sup>32</sup>

The personnel changes in the DoD might indicate a balance tilting in favor of intelligence operations. Army Gen. Keith B. Alexander the leader of CYBERCOM, Central Security Service and the National Security Agency. Leon

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<sup>29</sup> “Confronting the cyberthreat” Council on Foreign Relations. 2011. <http://www.cfr.org/technology-and-foreign-policy/confronting-cyber-threat/p15577>

<sup>30</sup> Ibid.

<sup>31</sup> Ellen Nakashima “Dismantling of Saudi-CIA Web site illustrates need for clearer cyberwar policies” March 19, 2010. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/03/18/AR2010031805464.html>

<sup>32</sup> „Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding US. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities.” p. 256

Panetta before assuming the Defence Secretary role had been CIA director between 2009 and 2011. The leave of senior officials most active in cyber-related procedures might also be the result of the general disappointment in the Pentagon's new cyber strategy. Bill Lynn, Deputy Secretary of Defense submitted his resignation. He had a very strong hand in the development of the Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace, which could be seen as his document. General James Cartwright, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has also been an important proponent for cyber operations and offensive operations. Bob Butler, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Cyber Policy is at the end of his two-year stint at the Pentagon and will be returning to Texas and the private sector.<sup>33</sup>

### *Strategic vision?*

However the latest attacks leave no doubt that cyber technologies now exist that are capable of destroying critical networks, causing physical damage, or altering the performance of key systems.<sup>34</sup> In the senior military and national security community of the U.S. – and in fact, more so internationally too – it is a wildly held and disseminated view that Stuxnet was only a harbinger of things to come. The U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs marked the attack as the beginning of a new era: The Age of Stuxnet. In February 2011, the then CIA Director Leon Panetta said "The potential for the next Pearl Harbor could very well be a cyber-attack," as he testified on Capitol Hill before the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence. In November's Senate Homeland Security Committee meeting, National Cybersecurity and Communications Integration Center director Sean McGurk said that beyond Stuxnet, the Department was also concerned hackers could make their own copycat versions of the worm to attack whatever infrastructures they like – a task Greenbaum said would be "fairly trivial."<sup>35</sup> Security companies and members of the defense industry are particularly active in providing hard evidence about cyberattacks.

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<sup>33</sup> Jason Healey "Cyber Leadership Gap Looms at DoD" Atlantic Council. July 20, 2011.

<sup>34</sup> William J. Lynn III "The Pentagon's Cyberstrategy, One Year Later" Foreign Affairs, 2011 <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/68305/william-j-lynn-iii/the-pentagons-cyberstrategy-one-year-later>

A 2010 report by the Congressional Research Service found that "should the industrial control system of a critical infrastructure facility become affected by a Stuxnet worm (PDF) or similar malicious code, disruptions could hamper the government's ability to provide domestic and international security, safety, and essential services for lengthy periods of time."

<sup>35</sup> Lee Ferran "The Top Four Cyber Threats for 2011" Jan.7, 2011 <http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/cyber-threats-2011-age-stuxnet-hacktivists-social-spammers/story?Id=12555830>

Senior republican lawmakers on Capitol Hill are particularly hawkish on cyberdefence. At Congressional request the DoD laid out its new (“Cyber 0.3”) strategy titled *Department of Defence Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*.<sup>36</sup> Those in the security community conclude that the strategy “offers few specifics and little insight into DoD policies,” and “suggests that it is clearly an effort to downplay foreign countries’ perception that the U.S. is going to militarize cyberspace.”<sup>37</sup> In contrast to past strategies were seeking dominance of cyberspace and overemphasized the offensive side of cyber operations the document is entirely about defense. There is no mentioning of offensive operations or deterrence. The “productive” use of defense is achieved by active defense tactics. These focus on preemptive strikes, counteractivity and active deception implemented against the enemy’s informational infrastructure.

Expert opinions differ on how explicit a strategy or declaratory policy about the employment of a new weapon should be. The main analogy is based on nuclear weapons and deterrence: “A declaratory policy may be couched deliberately in somewhat ambiguous terms, leaving somewhat vague and uncertain the circumstances under which the declaring nation would use nuclear weapons. Such vagueness and uncertainty have historically been regarded by the United States as a strength rather than a weakness of such policies, on the grounds that uncertainty about a U.S. response is an essential part of deterring other nations from taking hostile action against its interests. By contrast, a declaratory policy that is highly explicit may be perceived as limiting a nation’s options in a crisis and telegraphing its intent to some extent, thus simplifying an adversary’s planning process.”<sup>38</sup> However, in this case DoD strategy is very far from this kind of declaratory policy as it almost completely avoids any mention of offensive operations.

### ***Legal perspectives***

It is well beyond the scope of this article to give a comprehensive normative analysis. The aim is rather to present the recent shift in the U.S. national debate about the evolving regulatory framework. Recently the strategic stance of the U.S. administration seems to have moved towards self restraint. Leading Pentagon and legislative figures have voiced their indignation over the increasing number of

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<sup>36</sup> *Department of Defence Strategy for Operating in Cyberspace*.  
<http://www.defense.gov/news/d20110714cyber.pdf>

<sup>37</sup> Adam Segal “Pentagon’s Cyberstrategy” CFR. July 2011.

<sup>38</sup> „Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities.” p. 289

doctrinal and legal constraints imposed upon military decision-making both domestically and by new international treaty obligations.<sup>39</sup>

According to the assessment of the National Research Council legal standpoints fall into three broad categories: there are those theorists who argue that cyberweapons are no different than any other weapons and thus that no new legal or ethical analysis is needed to understand their proper use.<sup>40</sup> “Others have taken the opposite view, arguing that cyberweapons are so different from kinetic weapons that new legal regimes are needed to govern their use.<sup>41</sup> Further, some argue that it is much easier to place substantive constraints on new military technologies before they have been integrated into the doctrine and structure of a nation’s armed forces. And still others have taken the view that although cyberweapons do raise some new issues, the basic principles underlying existing legal and ethical regimes continue to be valid even though analytical work is needed to understand how these principles do/should apply to cyberweapons.<sup>42</sup> ”... the notion of cyberattack spans an enormous range of scale, impact, and complexity. Some specification of a cyberattack’s range, scope, and purpose must be presented if analytical clarity is to be achieved.”<sup>43</sup>

The most public discussion is about what event amounts to an act of war. If it is truly “war,” then in domestic terms the response is regulated by the national-security legal regime; if it is not, the incident should be treated as a law enforcement issue.

The international obligations of the U.S. – and many western nations signatories to the same legal framework – derive from treaties (the Charter of the United Nations,<sup>44</sup> the Hague and Geneva Conventions with their associated

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<sup>39</sup> Stewart Baker “Lawyers are crippling America's ability to defend against cyberwar with arcane rules and regulations. But war waits for no man.” *Foreign Policy Magazine*. September 30, 2011. [http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/denial\\_of\\_service?page=0,1](http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/09/30/denial_of_service?page=0,1)

<sup>40</sup> This point of view was expressed in presentations to the committee by the USAF Cyberspace Task Force (briefing of LTC Forrest Hare, January 27, 2007).

<sup>41</sup> See, for example, Christopher C. Joyner and Catherine Lotrionte, “Information Warfare as International Coercion: Elements of a Legal Framework,” *European Journal of International Law* 12(5):825-865, 2001.

<sup>42</sup> See for example Charles J. Dunlap “Perspectives for Cyber Strategists on Law for Cyberwar” *Strategic Studies Quarterly*, Spring 2011. <http://www.au.af.mil/au/ssq/2011/spring/dunlap.pdf>

<sup>43</sup> National Research Council. p.242

<sup>44</sup> Article 2(4) of the UN Charter prohibits every nation from using “the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations.” The right of self-defense is governed by Article 51. An important aspect of the interpretation of Article 51 involves the question of imminent attack. It is widely accepted that a nation facing unambiguous imminent attack is also entitled to invoke its inherent right of self-defense without having to wait for the blow to

protocols, and the Cybercrime Convention) and customary international law. To understand the legal context surrounding cyberattack as an instrument that one nation might deploy and use against another, the existing law provides major guidance – that is, the international law of armed conflict (LOAC). LOAC addresses two separate questions. First, when is it legal for a nation to use force against another nation? This body of law is known as *jus ad bellum*. Second, what are the rules that govern the behaviour of combatants who are engaged in armed conflict? Known as *jus in bello*, this body of law is separate and distinct from *jus ad bellum*. For further analysis along these lines one should consult the report of the National Research Council study.<sup>45</sup>

### *U.S.'s international role*

One of the touchstones of the *Policy Review* emphasized the significance of U.S. leadership in international cooperation and cybersecurity governance. A study prepared by the Council on Foreign Relations also very fiercely argues that the status quo is unsustainable: the only international treaty governing cybercrime is the Cybercrime Convention with a limited number of signatories and weak or completely lacking enforcement mechanism.<sup>46</sup> It is also clearly stated that it is not in the interest of the U.S. to promote any UN-level universal agreement, such as the International Telecommunication Union's attempt. America should rather take the initiative and elaborate on an entirely new framework for international cooperation and self-restraint, and "recruit" signatories from among the willing nations. The document is also very explicit in saying that so far any formal international agreement has been hampered by the fact that all nations have benefitted from the lack of it. Nevertheless, by now the economic and strategic damage done by such extensive cyberespionage exceed the gains.

Over the last two years, some initial steps were taken by the U.S. towards key international counterparts: An EU-U.S. Working Group was established on cybersecurity in November 2010; A joint U.S.-Russia report on cyber conflict was released by the EastWest Institute in February 2011. It is the NATO where the U.S. is most active in the international arena, however progress on cyberdefence strategy appears to be incremental in NATO as well.

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fall. (Self-defense undertaken under threat of imminent attack is generally called "anticipatory self-defense.

<sup>45</sup> „Technology, Policy, Law, and Ethics Regarding U.S. Acquisition and Use of Cyberattack Capabilities.” p. 239-292. [http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record\\_id=12651&page=242](http://www.nap.edu/openbook.php?record_id=12651&page=242)

<sup>46</sup> Robert K. Knacke "Internet Governance in an Age of Cyber Insecurity" CFR. September, 2011. <http://www.cfr.org/terrorism-and-technology/internet-governance-age-cyber-insecurity/p22832>

Accordingly, in May 2011 the White House released its *International Strategy for Cyberspace* which is first of its kind.<sup>47</sup> The strategic goal of the U.S. is a cyberspace that is: „*Open to innovation; Interoperable the world over; Secure enough to earn people’s trust; Reliable enough to support their work.*” This is to be achieved by common international norms, such as:

- Upholding Fundamental Freedoms
- Respect for Property
- Valuing Privacy
- Protection from Crime
- Right of Self-Defense
- Global Interoperability
- Network Stability
- Reliable Access
- Multi-stakeholder Governance
- Cybersecurity Due Diligence

In terms of deterrence, this strategy is slightly more daring:

*“When warranted, the United States will respond to hostile acts in cyberspace as we would to any other threat to our country. We reserve the right to use all necessary means – diplomatic, informational, military, and economic – as appropriate and consistent with applicable international law, in order to defend our Nation, our allies, our partners, and our interests.”*

On the whole, the strategy contains very little concrete proposals or goals, it is tentative in scope. It transpires rather as an initiative or a point of departure for further sophistication.

### ***Conclusion***

The U.S. firmly possesses the leading role in Military Revolution which is a major driving force behind its technological and economic development as well, and has good prospects of keeping it for a long time. However, in other aspects that are inevitable to be able to translate this advantage into geopolitical or economic gains America is clearly lagging behind. The process of framing the comprehensive regulatory framework for the Information Society has just begun and it requires a renewed mindset all over the spectrum of decision-making.

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<sup>47</sup> *International Strategy for Cyberspace* [http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss\\_viewer/international\\_strategy\\_for\\_cyberspace.pdf](http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/international_strategy_for_cyberspace.pdf)



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