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THEORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

LIEUTENANT COLONEL DR. VIDA, CSABA

THE ANALYSIS AND ASSESSMENT APPROACH TO INTELLIGENCE DISCIPLINES

Abstract

In his study, the author gives an overview of the six main intelligence disciplines from the viewpoint of the analysts of intelligence information. The author examines the different disciplines according to several information-related aspects (such as veracity, reliability, costliness, etc.), and lists their advantages and disadvantages taking into consideration the requirements of analysis and assessment. The study concludes that every intelligence discipline is necessary, but their use has to be suited to the changing requirements of the analysts and the decision makers.

Keywords: intelligence disciplines, analysis and assessment, HUMINT, SIGINT, IMINT, OSINT, MASINT, CYBINT, veracity, accuracy, credibility, usefulness, importance, availability.

How do organizations of analysis and assessment use the information of intelligence disciplines?

The central factor of national security activities is information, since national security services can work effectively only if they have the necessary amount and quality of information. The different intelligence disciplines (data collecting organizations) collect the necessary information for the services, while the partial processing and usage of the information are the task of the analysts because they inform the state decision makers. Analysts can only do this in an adequate way if the necessary information is available to them. Without the adequate amount and quality of information, effective analysis and assessment do not exist. Therefore, it is in the interest of analysts that the data collectors be able to obtain all information that is needed for informing the decision makers. To this end, organizations of analysis and assessment have to support data obtaining operations and control the information gathering activities of data collecting organizations.

It can be told in connection with the importance of information that for the national security services (that is, for informing the decision makers, which is one of

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the main duties of the services), only such information and data exist that the data collectors hand over to the analysts. In other words, information that is withheld by data collectors cannot be used by the analysts to inform the decision makers. The quantity and the quality of information fundamentally influence analysis and assessment, and, thus, the successfulness of national security activities. Consequently, the information available to analysts needs to comply with several criterions. However, in today's information society, this poses a serious challenge to the data collector organizations, since the characteristics of information have changed as a result of the (economic, social, military and migration) crises of the last decade, the globalization accelerated by the Internet, and the information and propaganda operations.

In order to define the adequate information, it became necessary to accurately define the concept of information. Every science, academic field and branch of science has its own definition for information, sometimes even more than one. Within national security theory, one can find several definitions for information in the different studies. It can be stated that the definitions can be generally connected to certain researchers. In a national security glossary that is currently in the making, among the analysis and assessment definitions, information is defined as follows: "Generally, the entirety of the reflection of real facts. Data processed from the viewpoint of analysis and assessment." Therefore, the concept of data also has to be defined – also with the help of the glossary –, thus data is "the form of appearance of real facts".

From the viewpoint of national security analysis and assessment, only those data can be considered information, which have gone through data processing. Data processing can include procedures such as systematization, selection, decoding, interpretation, statistical processes, translation, etc. The given data collecting organizations/elements make the data interpretable for the analysts. Data processing continues under the analysis and assessment process, which basically manifests itself in documenting, archiving and systematizing.

During their work, analysts have to take into consideration all pieces of information from every intelligence discipline, which have to be examined first based on the following characteristics:

- veracity,
- accuracy,
- completeness,
- timeliness,
- importance,
- prognosis,
- credibility,
- authenticity,
- confidentiality,
- usefulness.

The requirement of **veracity** refers to the degree the information approaches the real processes and events, or, in other words, to the extent of its reality/truth content. During the examination of the veracity criterion, the analyst examines if the information fits into the already known – previously determined as real, verified – processes and systems, and how likely the given event or process is going to take place. If the information deviates from the expected, it does not mean that it has to be dismissed; but it has to be further examined, and one phase of this examination can be anomaly detection.

Accuracy is a characteristic referring to the data content of the information, namely, to the extent of concreteness and generality of the data included in the information. The accuracy of the data can appear in numerical data, and in detailed description of facts and processes. Accuracy has to be in harmony with veracity as well, since only real data can be accurate.

Completeness also refers to the data content of the information, that is, to what extent the data or the information covers the given topic (event or process). If it only provides partial information about a given topic, this criterion is not adequately fulfilled. This does not mean that analysts do not need partial information. Information can only be whole if it contains comprehensive and detailed data about the given topic.

Timeliness refers to the time factor of the information content, and indicates the time when the event or process took place. Two further factors of this characteristic are actuality and real-timeliness. Information is more valuable if it contains data about a point of time as close as possible. In case of expired information, there is a chance that it does not comply with other criteria, such as confidentiality. This also does not mean that analysts do not need data about an earlier point of time, but only to a limited extent. This requirement is also important because analysts can usually draw prognoses from timely information only.

Importance refers to the extent the given information is connected to the examined subject area. If the analyst has been in a great need of that information or, perhaps, the information is of key importance to understand the given process or event, then the information has a high degree of importance.

Prognosis is one of the most important characteristics, since one of the main tasks of national security services is to prognosticate the events to take place for the decision makers; therefore, that information, which contains data relating to the future, can be considered as highly valuable. The significance of prognosis is also proven by the fact that national security services should not track events that have already taken place, but they primarily have to inform the decision makers about events that are going to take place, or security problems that are going to occur in the future.

Credibility is not related to the content of information, but to the source of information. If earlier a source provided real information, then the chances are higher that this source will ensure useful information again. If a source provided untrue information earlier, then there are probably going to be problems with the veracity of its information.

Authenticity is also a requirement related to information content. It refers to the extent of the veracity of information, but not only to the individual data elements within the information, but to the information itself as a whole.

Confidentiality does not refer to the information content, but to its protection. If the owner of the information provides it with elevated protection, it is highly likely that the information is valuable. Besides providing the information with protection, its accessibility also determines its confidentiality, since the less people know the given information, the more valuable it might be.

Usefulness is a complex requirement determined in connection with the information. It shows to what extent the information helped the work of the analyst, or, to what extent it could help him in informing the decision makers.

The above criteria do not mean that analysts can use only that information collected by the data collectors that fully comply with all of the criteria above, because in this case, analysts would not have any information. Therefore, the requirement system examines only the extent to which the analysts can use the given information, and what deficiencies the information has, which definitely have to be taken into consideration during its usage. The problems related to the information help the analysts to handle the given information on an adequate level, that is, not to over- or underestimate it. Furthermore, the requirement system helps to reveal disinformation and anomalies (surprises).

During their work, analysts and assessors place the emphasis primarily on the information and not on its source; however, in order to collect the appropriate information, they have to deal with the sources as well, that is, with the different data collecting (intelligence) disciplines, so that these disciplines support analysis and assessment as efficiently as possible. The relationship with intelligence disciplines manifests itself in controlling the information collecting activities of data collectors. In today's information society, analysts do not use the information of only one intelligence discipline; rather, they use every available opportunity, in order to provide the decision makers with appropriate information. Based on this, analysts carry out an "all-source" analysis and assessment work.

The different intelligence disciplines provide the analysts with the necessary information. The separate intelligence disciplines collect information on the basis of different methods and procedures. We can group the different intelligence disciplines according to the time of their development, the tool of data collection, the method of data collection, etc. From the viewpoint of their development, we can distinguish classic, non-classic and new intelligence disciplines. The classic disciplines are intelligence from human resources and open-source intelligence; non-classic is data collection by technical tools, while data collection from the networks ensuring the operation of information societies is considered as a new intelligence discipline. Based on the tool of data collection, intelligence disciplines can be divided into two main groups: intelligence with human resources and intelligence with technical tools. Six intelligence disciplines can be listed, based on the method

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of data collection. Although countless intelligence disciplines can be distinguished, every one of these can be “channelled” into the following six main intelligence disciplines:¹

- Human Intelligence (HUMINT);
- Signal Intelligence (SIGINT);
- Imagery Intelligence (IMINT);
- Open Source Intelligence (OSINT);
- Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT);
- Cyber Intelligence (CYBINT).

Besides these six intelligence disciplines, Communications Intelligence (COMINT) and Electronic Signal Intelligence (ELINT) can also be found in professional literature, but they can be categorized under SIGINT. Geospatial Intelligence (GEOINT) forms a part of IMINT. Social Media Intelligence (SOCMINT) belongs to the overlapping area of OSINT and CYBINT.

Beyond the above lists, analysts also classify different intelligence disciplines from their own viewpoint², based primarily on the nature of the obtained information. The idea was originally elaborated by Michael Hermann³, according to whom, the analysts divide the intelligence disciplines – based on the information ensured by them – into two groups:

- Literal Intelligence (LITINT);
- Non-Literal Intelligence (NON-LITINT).

If the incoming information appears in the form of words or in a written text, and there is no need for a comprehensive data processing (except for translation, systematization, selection and filtering), then the source of information – the given intelligence discipline – belongs to LITINT. Information arriving from LITINT can be immediately analysed and assessed by the analysts. HUMINT, COMINT (a part of SIGINT), OSINT and a part of CYBINT can be considered as LITINT.⁴

¹ DR. VIDA, Csaba: A nemzetbiztonsági tevékenység szerepe a társadalomban. (Hadtudomány, 2015/E-szám.) p. 231.

² CLARK, Robert M.: Intelligence Analysis: A Target-Centric Approach. pp. 87-123.

³ CLARK, p. 91.

⁴ CLARK, p. 91.

Those data collection methods can be classified as NON-LITINT, where the incoming information has to go through a comprehensive data processing before analysis and assessment, or, in other words, it has to be made legible. A part of SIGINT, IMINT, MASINT and a part of CYBINT belong to NON-LITINT.⁵

The above division supports the analysis and assessment process and the effective use of resources, especially determining the veracity of raw information.

The intelligence disciplines have different capabilities and possibilities. The analysts have to know these, in order to effectively control the data collection activity.

Analysts examine the given intelligence disciplines based on the nature and value of information, what advantages and disadvantages they have in providing information. The interest of analysts is that the intelligence disciplines obtain the needed information and that the intelligence be as effective as possible, especially during the usage of resources.

Therefore, in order to achieve as successful intelligence as possible, the analysts have to take into consideration the following factors, when they determine what kind of information a given intelligence discipline should collect.

Human Intelligence (HUMINT)

HUMINT is primarily aimed at obtaining the information known by the people, the given source. This way, this intelligence discipline can only obtain that information which the source knows or can have access to it. The limits of this intelligence discipline are inherent in the fact that data collectors always have to find the person who has the necessary information. If the source has a limited access or a limited knowledge, the information will not completely meet the requirements. As a result, two possibilities can be experienced in connection with information coming from HUMINT sources: if there is a connection to the necessary source, the information can be relatively easily obtained, but if there is not, then a very long time is needed to find the suitable source/person, who has the information.⁶

The veracity of information significantly depends on the quality of its source, since it is possible that the source completely hands over the information known by

⁵ CLARK, p. 109.

⁶ JENSEN, Carl J. – MCELREATH, David H. – GRAVES, Melissa: Introduction to Intelligence Studies. pp. 88-89.

him/her and does not want to deceive the intelligence agent, but he/she has wrong or defective information about the given topic. Another problem can be if the source intentionally deceives the intelligence officer.

One advantage of human intelligence is that such information can be obtained through it that cannot be gained through other intelligence disciplines. It can obtain such plans, ideas, thoughts and opinions that have not been communicated (COMINT), written down (OSINT, CYBINT) or forwarded yet by any infocommunication tool (SIGINT, CYBINT).

Another characteristic of information from HUMINT is that there is an opportunity for feedback, since the information flow can be interactive, namely, the analysts can ask the source (or the data collecting network) providing the information, to explain it, to complete it, or to confirm it. This interaction can ensure exceptional opportunities to improve efficiency and veracity.

The information collecting activities of HUMINT basically consist of three parts:

- official contact (legal) information collection;
- covered agent (illegal) information collection;
- interrogations and reporting.⁷

Besides the aforementioned activities, a new intelligence branch has developed in the last decades within military intelligence, due to the participation of the armed forces in peace operations: the peace mission intelligence.⁸

Information arriving from any of the HUMINT branches has similar characteristics.

From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, the followings can be considered as **advantages** based on the characteristics of information from HUMINT:

- such information can be obtained by it that other intelligence branches cannot access;
- there is an opportunity for feedback in order to specify or complete the information;
- it is a rapid-reaction method if the adequate source is available;

⁷ CLARK, pp. 94-99.

⁸ KIS-BENEDEK, József: A válságkezelő műveletek és a felderítés. (Felderítő Szemle II/4., 2003.) pp. 39-56.

- reliable information can be collected through it;
- there is an opportunity to obtain original documents;
- it can provide basic information on a given subject area.

The following factors can be considered as the **disadvantages** of HUMINT:

- it is an exceptionally costly way of obtaining information, since the information can be generally accessed directly or indirectly for money;
- a long time is needed to get such information for which there is no available source yet;
- the attitude of the sources significantly determines the quality of the information;
- in some cases, it provides unreliable information, since it is based mainly on the knowledge of the source, which can be inaccurate or defective;
- disinformation and deception by the source is frequent.

As a consequence of the aforementioned, HUMINT is one of the most important intelligence disciplines, through which the analysts can receive data that can ensure adequate information for decision makers.

Signal Intelligence (SIGINT)

Signal Intelligence obtains information through detecting and recording the transmitted electromagnetic waves, that is, through tapping the communication of the target persons and by recording the signals transmitted by the radio technical and navigations systems operated by the targets. As a result, the capability of SIGINT is largely determined by the laws of physics, namely the characteristics of the radiation of electromagnetic waves, since only those waves can be accessed that reach the SIGINT systems.⁹

The sources of SIGINT are the communications systems, the active radio technical devices, the navigation devices and the data forwarding networks. Based on this, SIGINT can be divided into two: Communications Intelligence (COMINT)

⁹ MARTON, Csaba: A SIGINT feladatainak és vezetési rendszerének változása. (Felderítő Szemle, 2007. emlékszám.) p. 213.

and Electronic Signal Intelligence (ELINT). Besides these, it is possible to determine also the operational location of devices radiating electromagnetic waves.

One limitation of information gathering by SIGINT is that only that information can be recorded by it, which is transmitted through electromagnetic waves (or, in other words, through infocommunications systems). It is not interactive, since it cannot intervene the communication, SIGINT can only uncover and record it, thus it greatly depends on the communication channel. The recording of information cannot be repeated, since – generally – information is only forwarded once in the given communication channel, thus if SIGINT is unable to detect it on this occasion, the information is no longer available.

By recording communication, an extremely large quantity of raw data can be obtained, but their significant majority is irrelevant, thus data processing is definitely needed. Data processing basically manifests in selecting and making the data interpretable (readable) for the analyst. If analysts receive too much information, the process of analysis and assessment can slow down, since all incoming data have to go through the process of analysis and assessment.

SIGINT information is usually reliable, since it contains messages and signs with which the target person wants to tell something, or, in other words, conveys information in the direction of the persons chosen by him/her. The messages reach results if they convey real information through the communication channel, since if the information is false, it does not reach its aim. Obviously, there are attempts to deceive SIGINT, but their successfulness is very low, since the experts are usually able to filter out disinformation. This is supported by the fact that the operators and the users of infocommunications devices develop their own systems rather towards encoding and more and more difficult procedures. In terms of SIGINT, such reliability problems can also occur that may result from the fact that the owner of information conveys defective data during his/her messages.

From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, the followings can be considered as the **advantages** of SIGINT, based on the characteristics of information from signal intelligence:

- large quantity of information can be obtained by it;
- usually ensures reliable information;

- it ensures information continuously about a given topic, during which no physical contact is needed with the target person;
- information can be obtained not only from the hostile area, but also from the domestic or secured area;
- it is a safe and secure way of obtaining information.

The followings can be considered as the **disadvantages** of SIGINT:

- being a technical intelligence discipline, it is extremely costly, since more and more modern and developed encodings are used;
- it has limited capabilities due to the laws of physics;
- it is not interactive;
- the processing of raw data and information is needed.

From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, SIGINT can obtain reliable basic and partial information in given topics, which can be supplemented by other intelligence disciplines. It ensures information that is communicated by the target persons in the given topic, but due to its limited capabilities, the availability of the necessary information is not guaranteed. Although it continuously ensures information in some defined subject areas, but its reaction ability is weak concerning newer and other topics. In order to obtain valuable information, a vast quantity of recorded raw SIGINT data and an adequate quality of data processing capability are needed.

Imagery Intelligence (IMINT)

During IMINT, information can be obtained with the help of images taken about the surface of Earth and objects, using aerial devices or satellites. The image can be a high-resolution picture, but a video clip as well. It basically ensures aerial images about visible objects, but with modern imagery reconnaissance capabilities – which touch on the area of geospatial intelligence –, information can also be obtained about non-visible target objects situated under the surface. Based on this, the sources of IMINT are images, bursts, videos and 3D images made by aerial photography aircraft and reconnaissance satellites.¹⁰

¹⁰ DR. VIDA, Csaba: Egyéb hírszerzési ágak. (In: Nemzetbiztonsági alapismeretek. Edited by KOBOLKA, István.) pp. 153-158.

Reliable information can be obtained about the target object, since IMINT directly produces the images, they are not manipulated. (Obviously, not every IMINT organization or country with IMINT capabilities has its own reconnaissance satellite capacity, thus they purchase the needed images from the operators of commercial satellites. The given commercial service providers are not interested in manipulating the images, since if they do so, the customers will turn to other service providers on the market. Therefore, providing real data is also in the interest of the service provider.) During measures taken against IMINT, the target persons/organizations attempt at covering or hiding the target objects, but due to the efficiency and complexity of the IMINT systems, this does not always ensure a solution. IMINT processors are able to identify the deceptive objects. One great problem of IMINT is that in case of clouds or unfavourable weather conditions, the target objects to be observed cannot be seen. With regard to IMINT images, the quality and the resolution of images are extremely important, since much more information can be obtained from a more detailed image.

With regard to IMINT, data processing is a central factor because although everyone can recognize data from an image, an IMINT data processor can extract a much greater amount of information. (About a picture of a marching column, every soldier can tell that he sees combat tanks and armoured vehicles. However, an IMINT data processor may also be able to tell – for example – which organization the combat equipment on the picture belongs to.) For this purpose, IMINT data processors have their own imagery databases.

Imagery intelligence provides information basically about the past, since images can only be made about those objects that were there at the given moment. IMINT data processors are able to produce predictions from the movement of target objects; for instance, in what direction the target object is moving, and where it is expected to be in the future.

From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, the followings can be considered as the **advantages** of IMINT, based on the characteristics of information from imagery intelligence:

- it can obtain such information more easily that is difficult to obtain through other intelligence disciplines;

- for relatively low costs, it can access good images, while the usage of private image recording devices can be very costly;
- it can collect reliable information.

The followings can be considered as the **disadvantages** of IMINT:

- it ensures information only afterwards;
- basically, it only provides information about visible objects;
- raw data can only be interpreted after adequate data processing.

From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, imagery intelligence can relatively easily collect such information that other intelligence disciplines could only obtain through serious efforts. IMINT is able to forward not only the geographic situation of the target object, but also data related to its activity and characteristics; however, it can only provide partial information for analysts.

Open Source Intelligence (OSINT)

By OSINT, every legally accessible information can be collected, or, in other words, every information that has been made available for anyone by an organization or a person. Open information – that has been disseminated only in a restricted circle – can be obtained by legal tools as well. This is one of the most important information gathering methods nowadays, since open information is available in enormous quantities. However, the bulk quantity of data can also cause problems to analysts; therefore, within OSINT as well, data processing is needed: the filtering, the systematizing and the grading of information. In a given topic, basic information can be easily obtained from OSINT, and it can provide an addition to the information collected by other intelligence disciplines, especially about its background and the past events. It can be stated that the source of OSINT can be not only the Internet, but a much wider circle.

The main sources of OSINT:

- the traditional (printed and electronic) media;
- the Internet;
- the commercial online service providers;
- the “grey literature”;
- the open events (conferences, presentations);
- the personal experiences (experts, observers, etc.);

- the images made by commercial satellites;
- and the scientific and research organizations.¹¹

OSINT is an extremely cost-effective intelligence discipline compared to the other intelligence disciplines, since it accesses the necessary information relatively simply and easily. As a consequence, analysts turn more and more often to OSINT information, since it provides continuous background information to the examined – analysed and assessed – subject areas. Thus, OSINT has an increasingly significant role in analysis and assessment.

Although OSINT information is present in analysis and assessment in an increasing quantity, information is not always reliable, thus it has to be checked. In this, OSINT data processors have a great role: they should only forward documents from a source that has already been checked. From the viewpoint of reliability, it is extremely important that OSINT forward the original information to analysts, and not information from citations or reposts, especially in the case of information from the media and the Internet.

In many cases, OSINT cannot be considered as interactive, since there is no possibility for a direct feedback to the source. For instance, the analyst cannot directly ask back to the statements of state leaders or ask new questions in connection with an analysis published by a research institute.

Obviously, there are also sources within OSINT, where interactive information gathering is possible. The social elements of the Internet belong here, which is called WEB 2.0. The followings can be listed in this category: social networks, blogs, forums, databases (pictures, videos, documents), online games, etc.¹² On these places, people may share with each other the information available for them, while they do not take security awareness into consideration, thus – in reaction to potential questions or provocation – they share information that is sensitive.

From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, the followings can be considered as the **advantages** of OSINT, based on the characteristics of information from open source intelligence:

¹¹ DR. VIDA, Csaba: Nyílt forrású adatszerzés. (In: Nemzetbiztonsági alapismeretek. Edited by KOBOLKA, István.) pp. 115-124.

¹² ROLINGTON, Alfred: Strategic Intelligence for the 21st century. pp. 83-91.

- cost-effective: huge quantities of data can be obtained for relatively low costs;
- in some cases, it is available at the same time with the occurrence of an event;
- a large amount of information can be obtained quickly by it;
- in some cases, it is able to collect reliable information.

The followings can be considered as the **disadvantages** of OSINT:

- there are problems with its reliability;
- it has to be checked;
- a long time is needed to check the reliability of the sources;
- in some cases, it provides an unmanageable amount of information in a subject area, which slows down the analysis and assessment process.

From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, open source intelligence is one of the determining data gathering methods nowadays, which provides basic and complementary information in a given topic. Within OSINT, data processing has an increasing role, since real and valuable information has to be selected from the enormous, but not always reliable mass of information.

Measurement and Signature Intelligence (MASINT)

Measurement and Signature Intelligence is a technical intelligence discipline, which collects information about a given characteristic of the target object or the target area with the help of different sensors.

There exist electro-optical, acoustic, radiating, chemical, biological, magnetic and movement (vibration) sensors, and sensors examining material and reflection. According to professional literature, MASINT can be carried out on six different ways: with electro-optical, nuclear, geophysical, radar-, material- and radiofrequency sensors. Sensors can be active or passive. They have a direct connection to the target object or the target area; they are deployed by MASINT professionals, thus they can collect reliable and exact information with regard to the given characteristic. At the same time, this represents also a difficulty, since the sensor has to be taken to the target object or the target area, to which, in some cases, the opportunities provided by HUMINT have to be used as well. A limitation of MASINT is that it can only provide information about a given characteristic of the

target object or the target area. Moreover, it requires data processing, since the sensors can show only the changes that took place in the different data; for instance, the presence of radiating material or the changes in the degree of vibration. Based on these, the MASINT experts evaluate what kind of event could have taken place on the target area.¹³

The international professional literature¹⁴ considers the followings as parts of MASINT:

- Radar Intelligence (RADINT);
- Foreign Instrumentation Signals Intelligence (FISINT);
- Acoustic Intelligence (ACINT);
- Nuclear Intelligence (NUCINT);
- Radio Frequency/Electromagnetic Pulse Intelligence (RF/EMPINT);
- Electro-optical Intelligence (ELECTRO-OPTINT);
- Laser Intelligence (LASINT);
- Materials Intelligence;
- Unintentional Radiation Intelligence (RINT);
- Chemical and Biological Intelligence (CBINT);
- Directed Energy Weapons Intelligence (DEWINT);
- Infrared Intelligence (IRINT).

MASINT can also be considered as a cost-effective method because there is no need for continuously keeping an information gathering person on the target area, since the deployed sensor ensures the information. The characteristics of the sensor decide whether it forwards the data immediately, or only stores them, and the data is extracted from it later. Both types of sensors have their advantages and disadvantages, since, for instance, those sensors that provide data continuously, are easy to be uncovered. The sensors usually provide one-way data flow, thus they cannot be considered as interactive.

¹³ DR. CHIA ENG SENG, Aaron: MASINT: The Intelligence of the Future. https://www.dsta.gov.sg/docs/publications-documents/dh2007_chapter_10.pdf?sfvrsn=2. Accessed by the author 1 May 2016.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, the followings can be considered as the **advantages** of MASINT, based on the characteristics of information from measurement and signature intelligence:

- it ensures information directly about the target object, the target area or the target person;
- it continuously forwards data;
- it provides reliable information;
- it can obtain data that are difficult to obtain from other sources.

The followings can be considered as the **disadvantages** of MASINT:

- the difficulties of deploying and using the sensors;
- only the adequate experts (data processors) are able to interpret the data provided by MASINT;
- it can provide only partial information about a target, about a given characteristic of the target;
- it is a non-interactive way of gathering information.

From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, MASINT can provide additional information in a given topic and first warning data about changes that took place in the target object or the target area. It is definitely necessary to complement it with information from other intelligence disciplines.

Cyber Intelligence (CYBINT)

CYBINT can be considered as the newest intelligence discipline, which obtains such information from computer networks that has not been intended by its owner to be available for everyone, in other words, to be published. Therefore, the targets of CYBINT are the information stored in computers, on servers or data recorder devices, or information forwarded within networks. The value of CYBINT is also manifested in the fact that it is able to obtain information that its owner wanted to protect somehow. As a result, the obtained information can be reliable. Basically, CYBINT has three types: information collection from open computer networks, from closed computer networks, and from the signs emitted by computer networks.

The data obtained by CYBINT can be metadata and concrete files. Metadata contain the information that shows where the pieces of information related to different topics can be found. Concrete files contain concrete information about a

given subject area.¹⁵ It is extremely important to note that in the case of CYBINT, the owner of the data cannot learn about the fact that his/her data and information have been obtained, since their values would significantly decrease if data obtainment was discovered.

CYBINT is able to collect an enormous amount of information, but without adequate sorting, filtering and selection, this method can hinder analysis and assessment. It can obtain information that other disciplines are unable to collect. Basically, it is not interactive, since it can only obtain the data that have been placed in the given computer system by the owner of the data.

From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, the followings can be considered as the **advantages** of CYBINT, based on the characteristics of information from cyber intelligence:

- it can obtain a huge amount of data;
- it is cost-effective;
- it can obtain sensitive – and, thus, valuable – information.

The followings can be considered as the disadvantages of CYBINT:

- it can provide too much information about a given topic, which might impede analysis and assessment, thus a preliminary data processing is needed;
- uncovering is relatively easy, which can significantly decrease the value of the information;
- it is a new intelligence discipline; those procedures and theoretical bases are still lacking that could make the usability of the information more effective.

Since cyber intelligence is a relatively new intelligence discipline, all of its information is important for the analysts; the only problem is the high amount of unprocessed information.

¹⁵ CLARK, pp. 103-109.

Conclusion

When comparing the different intelligence disciplines from the analysis and assessment viewpoint – besides the requirements of valuable information – also such other factors have to be taken into consideration that support the success of analysis and assessment. The reliability, the uniqueness, the interactivity, the costliness, the quantity and the quickness of availability of the information, and the necessity of data processing all belong here. Reliability means the entirety of the veracity of the pieces of information arriving from the intelligence discipline. Uniqueness relates to the question of whether or not the information can be replaced with information from another intelligence discipline.

Interactivity concerns whether or not there is a possibility to specify, complement and confirm the obtained information. Costliness depends on the price-value ratio of obtaining the information. The quantity of information is determined by the amount of information that a given intelligence discipline is able to collect in relation to a topic. The prompt availability depends on the pace of collecting basic information about a subject area. The degree of data processing corresponds to the length of the process, during which the data can reach the analysts.

Intelligence discipline	HUMINT	SIGINT	IMINT	OSINT	MASINT	CYBINT
Reliability	average	high	high	low	high	high
Uniqueness	high	high	average	low	average	high
Interactivity	high	minimal	minimal	average	minimal	minimal
Costliness	high	high	average	low	average	low
Amount of information	average	high	low	high	low	high
Quickness of availability	high	average	average	high	average	high
Necessity of data processing	low	high	average	low	high	average

Figure 1.

Original table edited by DR. VIDA, Csaba.¹⁶

¹⁶ English-language version edited by the translator of this article.

While collecting the data and the information needed for a given topic, the analysts take into consideration the above capabilities, characteristics and attributes of the intelligence discipline, when they determine the method of obtaining the necessary information. When selecting intelligence disciplines, the analysts have to take into consideration the most effective utilization of the available capabilities, since they have to analyse and assess not only one subject area at a time, but more; therefore, that intelligence discipline has to obtain the given information, which can do it with the smallest possible efforts. From the viewpoint of analysis and assessment, a priority cannot be determined among the analyst and assessment branches because every intelligence discipline is important, if it can provide information to the analysts in order to enable them to carry out their basic task, that is, informing the decision makers.

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REDEFINING STRATEGY¹
EVALUATION OF THE WARSAW NATO SUMMIT

Abstract

In his article, the author summarizes the most important security measures taken during the 28th NATO Summit in Warsaw. He discusses the increased cooperation between NATO and the EU, the capability enhancement measures introduced in the course of the Summit, NATO's forward military presence, and the importance of projecting stability to the partner states of the Alliance. The author provides details about NATO's efforts to guarantee Europe's defence as well – especially in relation to hybrid threats –, discusses the attention that the Summit devoted to cyber space, and offers an insight into the recently introduced concept of enhancing resilience.

Keywords: collective defence, cyber threat, eastern threat, enhancing resilience, forward military presence, hybrid threat, NATO, NATO Summit, projection of stability, resilience, southern threat, Warsaw Summit

Evaluation of the NATO summit in Warsaw²

Even though only a few months have passed since the NATO summit in Warsaw, a number of security political events – such as the military coup and the transforming domestic policy in Turkey, the development of the Syrian conflict, the stalemate situation in Ukraine and the unresolved migration crisis in Europe – *have taken the edge* of some “groundbreaking”³ decisions of the 28th NATO Summit held between 8-9 June 2016, with the participation of the heads of state and prime ministers of the member states. In his speech at the Harvard University, even NATO's Secretary General said that “The world is changing, and NATO evolves”.⁴

¹ Translated by Réka Kacsáncsi.

² The study is based on the primary assessment of the Warsaw summit. (<http://www.biztonsagpolitika.hu>).

³ Landmark Summit in Warsaw draws to a close.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_133980.htm; Accessed on 19 July 2016.

⁴ STOLTENBERG: The Three Ages of NATO: An Evolving Alliance. Speech by NATO Secretary General Jens STOLTENBERG at the Harvard Kennedy School.

However, the effects of the above events shall not diminish the fact that *the Warsaw summit was held at a very important time*, and the rapidly transforming security political situation – together with the *threats coming from a southern and an eastern direction* – have decidedly “turned” the Transatlantic Alliance to a new direction.

Poland, which hosted the event for the first time⁵ proved to be an excellent host. At Friday evening, the representatives of the NATO member countries, the international organizations and the partner states dined at the historic site of the presidential palace’s ballroom – the exact place where the Soviet Union and the Eastern European communist countries (back then) signed the treaty about the formation of the Warsaw Pact in 1955. Almost every report around the world has emphasized that the leaders of NATO could “smell the history in the air” under the gigantic crystal chandelier, holding 80 light bulbs, and among tapestries with a surface of 185 square metres. The hosts transformed the National Stadium, the venue of the conference – located on the banks of the Vistula River –, into a “fortress”: by surrounding it with high fences. They have hermetically cut it off from the outside world. As many as 6,000 soldiers and policemen offered aerial, ground and naval protection to the thousands of guests – including 18 heads of state and 21 prime ministers – coming from 53 countries. Not even the mermaid of Warsaw – featured on the emblem of the event – could guard the event better than the Polish security forces. The costs of the summit have exceeded 0.5% of the Polish military expenditure.⁶

*The summit took place in the planned way, using traditional working forms and within a new framework of NATO partnership.*⁷ For a long time, NATO has not been

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_135317.htm; Accessed on 28 September 2016.

⁵ This was the fourth NATO summit held in a country which used to be a part of the Warsaw Pact. (The 2002 summit was held in Prague, the 2006 one in Riga and the 2008 one in Bucharest).

⁶http://www.napi.hu/nemzetkozi_gazdasag/rendkivuli_allapot_varsoban.617454.html;

<https://nepszava.hu/cikk/1099408-otven-millio-dollarba-kerult-lengyelorszagnak-a-nato-csucs>;

Accessed on 8 July 2016.

⁷ The summit’s conferences were held in the following formations: NATO-EU Leaders’ Meeting, NAC sessions, NATO-Georgia Commission (NGC), NATO-Ukraine Commission (NUC), the session of countries and organizations

using the traditional partnership organizational forms during the head of state and prime minister-level conference of the North Atlantic Council (NAC); instead, it has been searching for solutions in line with the summit's aims and schedule. The program of the Warsaw Summit has been organized in a similar fashion. The North Atlantic Council itself held head of state and prime minister-level conferences biyearly, but it also held foreign minister and defence minister-level meetings as well. *Montenegro* – as an invited member state – also attended the events. As NATO's Enhanced Opportunity Partners, Finland and Sweden had practically full authority to participate in the Warsaw conferences; that is why NATO proclaimed that the summit would be held within the framework of 28+2 countries. Not long ago, NATO has signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with both states, which makes it possible that in a given case, NATO forces can be deployed to the Scandinavian countries; and in return, Sweden and Finland can offer recipient support there.

NATO's Secretary General signed the *renewed cooperation with the EU* together with Donald Tusk, the President of the European Council and Jean-Claude Juncker, the President of the European Commission. All three leaders will have duties within their respective fields to implement the cooperation between NATO and the EU. The EU leaders held conversations also about Afghanistan and regional security-related topics as well. Federica Mogherini, the High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy represented the EU on the foreign minister-level conferences. Within the NATO-Ukraine format, the Alliance discussed the Eastern European state's security issues with President Petro Poroshenko, and adopted a comprehensive aid package. However, the NATO-Georgia Commission held foreign minister-level conferences only, and have not taken any significant steps forward in relation to the Caucasian country's NATO membership.

The defence ministers conferred about the security, defensive and military tasks – related to the strategic threats coming from the east and the south – in new, flexible cooperation formats – namely the Partnership Interoperability Initiative

participating in NATO's operation in Afghanistan, sessions of states involved in the program aimed at the development of interoperability and defensive capability, and also bilateral and multilateral conferences.

(PII) and the Defensive Capability Building Initiative (DCBI) – created on the Wales Summit. On the other hand, the planned conference with the countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council has been cancelled, even though on the first day of the Summit, NATO's Secretary General had consultations with the Defence Minister of the United Arab Emirates (UAE) on the security situation of the Middle East. The Alliance held a successful meeting with Afghan President Ashraf Ghani and Chief Executive of Afghanistan Abdullah Abdullah, the leaders of the Afghan National Unity Government. During the conference, they discussed the continuation of NATO's mission in Afghanistan (Resolute Support Mission, RSM) and the extension of the Afghan forces' funding till 2020.

On the margin of the highest level NATO meeting – just like during every session of huge, significant international organizations – several bilateral and multilateral meetings, talks and discussions have taken place. For example, the American President of that time, Barack Obama met with the leaders of the EU (during the EU-USA Leaders' Meeting), and discussed Brexit, the fight against terrorism, Euro-Atlantic solidarity and the current state of trade agreements.⁸ Barack Obama held bilateral conferences with the Secretary General of NATO, and the Polish, British and Turkish leaders as well. All member states have followed the pattern, including Hungary, too – for example, the Hungarian Prime Minister had a bilateral meeting with the President of Turkey. The foreign ministers of the four Visegrád countries had discussions with their British partner. They agreed to hold a joint session in autumn to review the post-Brexit situation of employees from the Visegrád countries who took up jobs in the United Kingdom.

The resolutions of the Warsaw Summit

The most important aim of the Warsaw Summit was to revise the NAC resolutions passed during the Wales Summit two years before (between 4-5 September 2014), to make some necessary decisions and give the organization's approval to them. In accordance with NAC's political and military character, the Wales Summit's resolutions had a political nature. However, due to the Ukrainian

⁸ Remarks by President Donald Tusk after the EU-US Leaders' Meeting in Warsaw. <http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/08-tusk-remarks-eu-us-leaders-meeting-warsaw/>;
Accessed on 28 July 2016.

crisis, several decisions were made in relation to military issues, too. The Alliance used this to counterbalance the Russian threat.⁹

Revising the Readiness Action Plan's (RAP) measures was one of the most important tasks of the conference. Several of these measures had been definitively approved. *The new plan indirectly serves the defence of NATO's Eastern borders*, and includes measures that reinforce the guarantees of collective defence in countries sharing a border with Russia. The Warsaw Summit has not changed the coalitional formation of the fight against ISIL/DAESH, though the participants agreed to improve NATO's intelligence and aerial reconnaissance capabilities.¹⁰ *Several measures* made on the Wales Summit have been further reinforced by the Warsaw Summit. Owing to its positive effects, the Partnership Interoperability Initiative will continue with the participation of *Australia, Finland, Georgia, Jordan and Sweden*. The Defensive Capacity Building Initiative is further expanded in Iraq and Libya, and in addition, *Moldova and Jordan* will join the program as well.

The most important questions of the conference could be best assessed by reading the Communiqué on the Summit,¹¹ which summarizes NATO's standpoint on the issues related to the Alliance in 139 points. The official debriefing was only one – although the most comprehensive – of the *nine* documents published on NATO's website during the two days of the summit.¹²

⁹ SZENES Zoltán: Új bor a régi palackban? A walesi NATO-csúcs. *Hadtudomány*, 2014. 24. évf. 3–4. sz. p. 8.

¹⁰ The global coalition – comprising 66 countries – is currently led by the United States. The coalition supports the military operation against ISIL/DAESH, and 22 nation states participate in Operation Inherent Resolve (OIR) with indirect airstrikes. In the course of the kinetic operation – launched on 8 August 2014 – the air force of the Alliance attacked and destroyed 26,374 military targets. So far, the OIR has costed the United States 8.7 billion dollars (there are no available data on the costs of the entire coalition). For further information on the topic, see *The Global Coalition to Counter ISIL (ISIL- Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant)*. <http://www.state.gov/s/seci/>; Accessed on 30 June 2016.

¹¹ Warsaw Summit Communiqué Issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Warsaw 8-9 July, 2016. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133169.htm; Accessed on 10 July 2016.

¹² TÁLAS Péter: A varsói csúcs legfontosabb döntéseiről. *SVKK Elemzések*. http://netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/svkk-elemzesek-2016-10-a-nato-varsoi-csucstalalkozojanak-don.original.pdf; Accessed on 12 July 2016.

While the Communiqué recorded the North Atlantic Council's standpoint, the joint statements reflected the questions of the cooperation agreements with the EU,¹³ Georgia,¹⁴ Ukraine¹⁵ and Afghanistan.¹⁶ Similarly to the Wales Summit, the Warsaw Summit has also emphasized the significance of *strengthening Transatlantic security*. In the course of this effort, the European member states rely mostly on the USA, but Canada might also take up a role on the European scene again.¹⁷ Declarations drawing attention to the significance of hybrid warfare include *political ideas* and *commitments*. In order to counter the new type threats in the cyber space – which, in addition to the aerial, ground, naval and space dimensions, is acknowledged as the fifth operational dimension – the Alliance has made *a pledge to improve cyber defence*¹⁸, similarly to its commitment to increase the defence budget.

The decisions of the Warsaw Summit are the following:

- New partnership cooperation with the EU;
- Comprehensive aid package to Ukraine;
- Projection of stability through partnership;

¹³ Joint declaration by the President of the European Council, the President of the European Commission, and the Secretary General of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133163.htm; Accessed on 10 July 2016.

<http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2016/07/08-tusk-remarks-eu-nato-joint-declaration/>; Accessed on 10 July 2016.

¹⁴ Joint Statement of the NATO-Georgia Commission at the level of Foreign Ministers.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133175.htm?selectedLocale=en; Accessed on 10 July 2016.

¹⁵ Joint Statement of the NATO-Ukraine Commission at the level of Heads of State and Government.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133173.htm?selectedLocale=en; Accessed on 10 July 2016.

¹⁶ Warsaw Summit Declaration on Afghanistan.

http://nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133171.htm?selectedLocale=en; Accessed on 10 July 2016.

¹⁷ The Warsaw Declaration on Transatlantic Security.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133168.htm?selectedLocale=en; Accessed on 10 July 2016.

¹⁸ Cyber Defence Pledge.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133177.htm?selectedLocale=en; Accessed on 11 July 2016.

- Declaring the cyber space as an area of operations, reinforcing cyber defence;
- Improving interoperability, enhancing resilience;
- Continuing the RSM, extending the financial support till 2020;
- Military reinforcement of the southern and the eastern wing of NATO;
- Achieving the primary readiness stage of antiballistic missile defence;
- Supporting the coalition against ISIL/DAESH;
- Launching a new operation in the Mediterranean Sea (Operation Sea Guardian);
- The next summit will be held in 2017, in Brussels.

The other two documents discuss countering threats coming from the cyber space. These declarations include *enhancing the member states' resilience*¹⁹ and *protecting the population*²⁰. It is illustrative of the subject's significance that both declarations were approved by the heads of states and the prime ministers. The summit has introduced a new concept – resilience²¹ – to NATO terminology. It is a word of Latin origin, which stands for the ability to quickly restore something, and it also means financial sources that provide one with the flexibility to rapidly recover and restore the original state or position in harsh situations, despite losses, unfavourable changes, bad luck or some overhauling.²² NATO's scientific literature considers resilience to be an important element of collective defence²³. Enhancing resilience is important from the aspect of each threat type (traditional, hybrid, cyber, CBRN and terrorist threats).²⁴ The collective studying of the Warsaw Summit's

¹⁹ Commitment to enhance resilience.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180; Accessed on 11 July 2016.

²⁰ NATO policy for the Protection of Civilians, 9 July, 2016.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133945.htm?selectedLocale=en; Accessed on 11 July 2016.

²¹ I must mention that a similar concept and set of requirements existed in the Warsaw Pact as well. It was called жизнеспособность, and it can be translated as viability.

²² <http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/resilience>; Accessed on 17 July 2016.

²³ Jamie SHEA: Resilience: a core element of collective defence. NATO Review. <http://www.nato.int/docu/Review/2016/Also-in-2016/nato-defence-cyber-resilience/EN/index.htm>; Accessed on 17 July 2016.

²⁴ The EU's new global security strategy also emphasizes the importance of resilience from the state's and society's aspect as well. Shared Vision, Common

resolutions is essential, since it is the only way to distinguish its results from the decisions of the Wales Summit. The different tasks are interlinked with each other; several measures further strengthen the adaptation pillar of the Readiness Action Plan (such as the forward presence), while others belong to the new concept of countering threats from the southern direction (for example, the fight against ISIL/DAESH, antiballistic missile defence and migration). Some of the decisions renewed the ongoing crisis management (Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan) and NATO's partnership with certain countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Iraq, Jordan and Tunisia).

The Russian threat and NATO's forward military presence

Out of the decisions made during the Warsaw Summit, Eastern Europe's military reinforcement received the greatest attention in the international media. The member states, the partner countries and the Russian media evaluated it in accordance with their own views and interests.²⁵ However, the military decisions should be assessed in their correlations in order to have a better understanding of NATO's Eastern strategy.

The decisions of the Wales Summit were dominated by the crisis in Ukraine. The conflict has not been resolved ever since; in fact, it has been turning more and more complicated. Back then, the Alliance feared that Russia – by avoiding open aggression, and not crossing the threshold of military intervention – would divide the NATO member states and influence the neighbouring countries' domestic policy, and would call in doubt NATO's security guarantees. The fact that Russia would be able to easily occupy the unprotected Baltic territories with a *surprise attack* – thus putting NATO in a critical situation – also increased worries within the Alliance. Based on the power relations in late 2015, the American RAND

Action: A Stronger Europe: A Global Strategy for the European Union's Foreign and Security Policy. 2016. p. 3., p. 2.

https://europa.eu/globalstrategy/sites/globalstrategy/files/eugs_review_web.pdf;
Accessed on 17 July 2016.

²⁵ Külföldi sajtó a varsói NATO-csúcsértekezletről, I–II.

<http://simfalogic.news/kulfoldi-sajto-a-varsoi-nato-csucsertekezletrol-1-resz/>;

<http://simfalogic.news/kulfoldi-sajto-a-varsoi-nato-csucsertekezletrol-2-resz/>;

Accessed on 17 July 2016.

Russian media unhappy with NATO Summit. BBC News.

<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-36745994>; Accessed on 17 July 2016.

Corporation Research Institute modelled how NATO could protect the Baltic States in case of a frontal Russian offensive. The results of the military computer game showed that *the attacking Russian forces would reach Tallinn and Riga within 60 hours*. In the event of such a rapid advancement, NATO would be left with poor and limited possibilities to take action.

The researchers²⁶ concluded that by deploying seven brigades to the region (with additional air support), such Russian attack could be prevented. This idea is supported by the British Lieutenant General Shirreff – NATO’s former Deputy Supreme Allied Commander Europe (DSACEUR) – as well, who envisioned a war with Russia in 2017 in his book, written in May 2016.²⁷ The Baltic States’ fear is not unfounded, since a considerable Russian-tongued population lives in the region (especially in Estonia and Latvia), *and there is a striking contrast between the fully armed Kaliningrad and the defenceless Baltic countries, which constituting a wing of the Alliance*. For many years, Russia has been systematically reinforcing its Baltic region, within which the defence zone of Kaliningrad is especially important. According to the data of scientific military literature, ground forces (79th Guards Motor Rifle Brigade, 7th Guards Motor Rifle Regiment), rocket forces and artillery (244th Guards Artillery Brigade, 152nd Guards Rocket Brigade), air force units (7054th Air Base with bomber, fighter, helicopter and antiaircraft missile troops) and naval forces (Baltic Fleet, 336th Guards Bialystok Naval Infantry Brigade) are deployed to the region of Kaliningrad.

The fleet’s command is located in the city as well, and the Jantar warship building company is operating there, too. As a part of Russia’s effort to transform the city into a bastion, it is planning to deploy the most modern Russian weapons (Iskander-M tactical ballistic missiles, Kalibr cruise missiles and Sz-400 air anti-aircraft missiles), and it is also setting up a new mechanized rifle division in the

²⁶ David A. SHLAPAK – Michael W. JOHNSON: Reinforcing Deterrence on NATO’s Eastern Flank. Wargaming the Defence of the Baltics. Rand, 2016. https://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR1200/RR1253/RAND_RR1253.pdf; Accessed on 12 February 2016.

²⁷ Richard SHIRREFF: 2017 War with Russia. An urgent warning from senior military command. Coronet, London, 2016.

city.²⁸ The claims of the Baltic States were reinforced by Poland's traditional fear of Russia and Russophobia. Later, it was supported by the policy of Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey, which urged a higher level of security.

In the past one and a half year, NATO has done a lot to implement the resolutions of the Wales Summit and strengthen the *Readiness Action Plan*, which stresses the *long-term adjustment* of the military command and control capabilities, and the rapid deployment forces as well. The personnel of the NATO Response Force (NRF) have been tripled, and transformed into a reserve force counting 40,000 soldiers (including a ground division, an air force capable of 300 sorties a day, some necessary naval capabilities, special operations forces, support and service units). The mission of the NRF (to which the military literature refers to as *eNRF*, using the attribute "enhanced") has been extended to include the conduction of *tasks related to collective defence*.²⁹ This is an important change from the rapid deployment forces' aspect, since the former functions of the NRF were aimed at preparing (transforming) for operations outside the area of operations.³⁰

²⁸ Kaarel KAAS: Russian Armed Forces in the Baltic Sea Region. Diplomaatia, International Center for Defence and Security, Tallin. pp.130–131.

<http://www.diplomaatia.ee/en/article/russian-armed-forces-in-the-baltic-sea-region/> Accessed on 18 July 2016.

J. HAWK: *Russian Defence Report*, Fortress Kaliningrad.

<https://southfront.org/russia-defense-report-fortress-kaliningrad/>; Accessed on 30 January 2016.

Edward LUCAS: *The Coming Storm*. Baltic Sea Security Report. Center for European Policy Analysis, Warsaw, 2015.

[http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20\(2\).compressed.pdf](http://cepa.org/sites/default/files/styles/medium/Baltic%20Sea%20Security%20Report-%20(2).compressed.pdf);

Accessed on 18 July 2016.

Sandra KAZIUKONYTE: *The Baltics: Security Environment and practical responses to the Security challenging stemming from the crisis in Ukraine*. CSDS Viewpont.

http://nit.uni-nke.hu/oktatasi_egysegek/strategiai-vedelmi-kutato-kozpont/publikaciok/nezopontok; Accessed on 18 July 2016.

²⁹ The defense ministers decided about the idea of the eNRF on 8 October 2015.

http://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/OtrasPublicaciones/Internacional/2015/NATO_Defence_Ministers_8oct2015.pdf; Accessed on 18 July 2016.

³⁰ Jens RINGSMOSE – Sten RYNNIUS: *Credible deterrence? NATO's new spearhead force*. University of Southern Denmark.

http://www.atlcom.nl/ap_archive/pdf/AP%202015%20nr.%206/Ringsmose%20and%20Rynning.pdf; Accessed on 18 July 2016.

Owing to the reinforcement, the structure of the NRF has changed as well, since the Wales Summit has set up a brigade-level (5,000 soldiers), very rapid (2-7 days) deployment force (Very High Readiness Joint Task Force, VJTF). This extremely rapid reaction force – also dubbed as “Spearhead Brigade” by the media – is comprised of five manoeuvre battalions with the necessary aerial, naval and special operations capabilities, and also support and service subunits. As a result of the development, nowadays the NRF consists of four elements: *the command organizations, the VJTF, the primary tracking forces (two combat brigades) and an additional response force.*³¹

Two Joint Forces Commands (JFC) – located in Brunssum and Naples – take turns to control the NATO Response Force. In 2016, the responsible leading body was the JFC in Brunssum (led by the Netherlands). The NRF is formed by the offered forces of the countries (force generating), which ensure the sufficient number of commands and units within the structure that is necessary to lead and employ the rapid deployment forces.³² The commander of the NRF is NATO’s Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR); however, it is the NAC that gives the order for its deployment. Even though the idea that the SACEUR would be entitled – in his own authority – to deploy at least the VJTF for the sake of quicker decision-making – or, at the very least, hold unannounced inspections of combat readiness – has emerged during some political debates; however, owing to the lack of political will, this solution has never been realized. So far, the Alliance has not been able to elaborate quick decision-making mechanisms, political guarantees and technical solutions necessary for deterrence. In addition, the North Atlantic Council does not want to lose its political control over the NRF/VJTF.

The already implemented measures related to combat readiness are the following:

- Reinforcement of the RNF (eRNF);

³¹ NATO Response Force Fact Sheet. <http://www.shape.nato.int/page349011837>; Accessed on 17 July 2016.

³² In 2016, the ground forces of the eNRF are commanded by Spanish, the air force is commanded by Italian, the naval forces are commanded by British, the special operations forces are commanded by American, the logistics are commanded by Brunssum, while the NBC defence forces are commanded by Polish commands, which are responsible for training and leading the offered units.

- Setting up the VJTF;
- Establishing the NFIU;
- Infrastructural investments, forward deployment of supplies
- Developing new commands (MNC-NE, MND-SE);
- Reinforcement of the naval forces;
- Intensive training (240 exercises in 2016);
- Improving defence planning.

The reinforcement of collective defence-related tasks and the protection of the north-eastern wing rendered the *modification of NATO's command system necessary*. Following the 2010 Lisbon Summit – where several reforms have been decided – the leadership of the Alliance has tried to “slim” the NATO Command Structure (NCS). Only one command was left for each branch of the armed forces (ground, air and naval forces), thus there are not enough forces for the multi-directional, simultaneous commanding tasks. Because of this, NATO has included the Multinational Corps Northeast (MNC-NE) in Szczecin – created in 1999 to command the Polish-Dutch-German corps – in its command structure.³³ Owing to its geographical position, the MNC-NE has been directly subordinated to the Joint Forces Command Brunssum (JFCBS). The personnel of the Multinational Corps Northeast have been doubled (currently 405 soldiers are serving in the Polish city near the German border), its barracks have been modernized, it has been trained to command the rapid deployment forces, and lead an all-arms battle or an operation. Nowadays, soldiers from 25 different countries (even including Sweden and Finland) are serving in the Joint Forces Command.³⁴

The MNC-NE's task is to command the VJTF/NRF forces in the north-eastern region of NATO, observe the security situation and organize the military cooperation in the area. The *six* NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) of the region – in Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Hungary³⁵ and Slovakia – have been

³³ Erik KIRSCHBAUM: Rising Russian Tensions put lonely NATO base in Poland on map. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-ukraine-crisis-nato-outpost-idUSKBN0H711W20140912>; Accessed on 18 July 2016.

³⁴ The NATO Custodian of Regional Security. HQ MNC NE. http://mncne.pl/leaflet/mncne_civ.pdf; Accessed on 18 July 2016.

³⁵ The Hungarian NFIU has reached its primary operational readiness on 15 January 2016 in Székesfehérvár. It will reach its full deployment capability – including the

subordinated to the operational command of the Szczecin Corps as well. The Integration Units' task is to help the quick deployment of NATO forces to the given country, support the activities related to the collective defence, aid the coordination of the allied exercises and trainings and define the requirements for Host Nation Support (HNS).

The NATO Force Integration Units set up in the south-eastern countries (Romania and Bulgaria) have been subordinated to the Multinational Division Southeast (MND-SE) – set up in December 2015 in Bucharest – which will have the same tasks as the MNC-NE, only in the south-eastern region of Europe.³⁶ The new, high readiness military command was established at a Romanian initiative to find balance within the eastern wing of NATO. Owing to the threats coming from the east and the south, Romania and Bulgaria both want to strengthen their defence, especially in the region of the Black Sea. The MND-SE is subordinated to the Joint Forces Command Naples (JFCN), which supervises the preparation of the new body. According to plans, the MNC-SE should reach its full readiness by 2018. At that time, 75 of its 280 soldiers will be from NATO.³⁷

Another reason why strengthening NATO's command structure was important is that the Warsaw Summit *further increased the personnel of the rapid deployment forces*. The most spectacular decision was the reinforcement of ground forces, in the frames of which four battalion battle groups have been deployed to the countries of the north-eastern wing. In addition, a multi-national brigade will be formed on Romanian territories as well. The 1,000 soldiers serving in each battalion will not be permanently deployed; instead, the forces will be maintained through a rotation system as long as it is necessary, since their "persistent" deployment – at least literally – does not violate the 1997 agreement between NATO and Russia. This is an important decision, as originally the Baltic States wanted to have one, while Poland wanted to have two NATO brigades deployed to their national

infrastructural developments – by 2017. <http://www.haborumuveszete.hu/egyeb-hirek/befogadok-nato-parancsnoksag-szekesfehervaron>; Accessed on 15 April 2016.

³⁶ NATO activates new Multinational Division Southeast headquarter in Bucharest. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_125356.htm?selectedLocale=en; Accessed on 8 July 2016.

³⁷ New NATO division becomes functional in Bucharest. Xinhua. http://news.xinhuanet.com/english/2016-05/12/c_135351824.htm; Accessed on 19 July 2016.

territories. The USA played a leading role in the Warsaw decision, which not only set an example of how to take on duties, but also persuaded the USA's French and German partners about the significance of the forward deployment. According to plan, each NATO battalion would be commanded by a "*framework country*" (a reference to the word "framework" used during the Wales Summit), which would provide half of the battle group's force. The other half would be secured by the remaining six member states.³⁸ The declaration states that the USA will be the framework country in Poland, the United Kingdom in Estonia, Germany in Lithuania and Canada in Latvia. Even though the posts of the NATO forces have not been determined yet (it will be decided after negotiating with the countries where they are deployed to), the battalions have to reach full combat readiness by 2017. The leading nations have started to recruit forces and complete the battalion battle group puzzle, in which the four Visegrád countries want to participate through a system based on the rotation of subunits (the replacement a V4 company every three months).³⁹ The preparation of the multinational battalions will be aided by a specialized capability development and training support project.⁴⁰

The military decisions of the Warsaw Summit are the following:

- The forward deployment of four multinational battalions (in the Baltic States and Poland);
- Setting up a multinational NATO brigade in Romania;
- The development of the MND-SE Bucharest (reaching full combat readiness by 2018);
- Reinforcement of the SNMG naval forces;
- Training support programmes (TACET, CJET);
- Finishing the operational planning.

A new NATO brigade will be set up in Romania based on the same principles. Its establishment was initiated by Romania, together with Bulgaria and

³⁸ Zoltán SZENES: Forward Military Presence. Assessing the NATO Warsaw Summit. Defence Review. The Central Journal of the Hungarian Defence Forces, 2016. 2. sz. p. 144.

³⁹ Magyar század is segít a Baltikumban. Origo. <http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20160614-nato-v4-baltikum-magyar-szazad.html>; Accessed on 15 June 2016.

⁴⁰ The Transatlantic Capability Enhancement and Training Initiative (TACET) serves the preparation of the NATO forces that will be deployed to the Baltic region.

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Poland.⁴¹ The framework countries for the “*Black Sea Brigade*” will be two NATO member states, and the Alliance contributes to its development with training support programmes.⁴² Further details have not been revealed about the project yet, but Bucharest has started diplomatic talks with countries that might offer some troops. (Bulgaria has already offered a battalion of 400 soldiers, and Poland, Ukraine, Canada and the USA are also interested in the project). Presumably, the Brussels Summit in 2017 will decide about the deployment of the brigade. The Warsaw Summit does not only develop the ground forces, but also – due to the need to improve naval security (on the Baltic Sea, the Norwegian Sea, the Black Sea and the Mediterranean Sea) and owing to the hybrid threats – wants to *increase the capacity of the naval forces* as well. Even though the documents issued in Warsaw do not publish any information relating to this idea, thanks to the specialized literature on the topic, one can identify Brussels’s intentions easily.⁴³

The Alliance wants to give up its ground forces-oriented approach and outline a new naval strategy. It has been supporting researches within the framework of the “Naval Alliance” project. According to the propositions, NATO’s new naval strategy would be built on the following priorities: 1. reinforcing naval consciousness; 2. reviving the European amphibious forces project; 3. spreading the idea of smart defence to the navy 4. development of the fighting naval forces; 5. sharing the naval know-how; 6. supplying a permanent resource to NATO’s naval forces; 6. ensuring the operational spatial (cyber and space) and communication systems necessary for the naval operations. The decisions of the Warsaw Summit are aimed at increasing the number of ships within the Standing Navy Marine Groups (SNMG) of NATO, which would require the nations to offer more troops. According to some most recent pieces of information, the USA, the UK and Canada

⁴¹ Romania to host NATO multinational brigade. Balkan Defence. <http://www.balkandefense.com/romania-host-nato-multinational-brigade/>; Accessed on 20 June 2016.

⁴² The aim of the entire Combat Joint Enhanced Training Initiative (CJET) is to prepare the NATO organizations that will be created in the region of the Black Sea. <http://www.balkandefense.com/romania-host-nato-multinational-brigade/>; Accessed on 20 July 2016.

⁴³ Magnus NORDENMAN: The Naval Alliance: Preparing NATO for a Maritime Century. Atlantic Council of the United States. <http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/natosource/the-naval-alliance-preparing-nato-for-a-maritime-century>; Accessed on 19 July 2016.

have already offered some new ships to the subordination of the MARCOM; and the member states have also promised to send more ships to participate in the naval exercises. However, the Alliance is still not ready to build a considerable naval capacity; and the Romanian idea of a NATO fleet in the Black Sea has not received enough support either. Among others, Bulgaria has opposed the proposal.

The *capability enhancement measures* of the Warsaw Summit serve to realize the Readiness Action Plan and to develop NATO's rapid deployment forces. However, at a certain point, the decisions exceed the measures introduced by the Wales Summit, as the forces to be deployed to the eastern borders of NATO envisage *the concept of a forward presence*. It seems NATO's leaders do not consider the "distant deterrence" – through the VJTF and the NRF – to be sufficient. The American measures aimed at the rotational deployment of a motorized infantry brigade⁴⁴ from the beginning of 2017 in Eastern Europe also confirm this conclusion.⁴⁵ If we add the fact that each NATO member state will improve their military capabilities – not only the countries which feel threatened⁴⁶ –, an increasingly prominent defensive and deterrent NATO presence will be realized in the Baltic region. All of these events may support the idea that NATO might have to replace the Readiness Action Plan with a *forward defence doctrine*.

In spite of all this, the current forward deployment cannot be equated with such an allocation of armed forces that happened during the Cold War in Central

⁴⁴ Az elrettentést szolgálják a Kelet-Európába szánt amerikai páncélosok. Népszabadság Online.

<http://nol.hu/kulfold/az-elrettentest-szolgajjak-kelet-europaba-szant-amerikai-pancelosok-1608909>; Accessed on 3 April 2016.

⁴⁵ According to NATO's report, in 2016, the member states' military budget has increased by 3%. Even though so far, only six NATO countries have spent more than 2% of their GDP on their defence, the military expenses have perceptibly increased in 16 member states; and in nine countries, they spend more than 20% of their military expenses on the procurement of new equipment and war materiel-related research and development. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_01/20160129_160128-pr-2016-11-eng.pdf; Accessed on 7 July 2016.

⁴⁶ In relation to the Warsaw Summit, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has announced that Germany will increase its defence budget by 2020, while the British Prime Minister at that time, David Cameron has also announced the modernization of the British nuclear submarine fleet.

Europe, when the main efforts were concentrated on defending the borders.⁴⁷ NATO has been taking meticulous care for its deterrence to trigger only a minimal escalation possibility. Even though all possible scenarios of the operational planning will be finished by 2017, the decisions on the forward deployment – which will be made in the Brussels Summit – will depend a lot more on the political-military situation of that time, than on the operational plans based on the worst-case scenarios.

The hybrid threat from the south and the projection of stability

Despite the fact that several of the Warsaw Summit's decisions reinforce the political mission of NATO, they have not received enough attention in the media and in the primary specialized assessments.⁴⁸ These topics and decisions belong to the collective term “the projection of stability”, which has been an important political aim of the Alliance since the Cold War. It might be one of the reasons for the lack of understanding and responses that there is *no coherent, communicable NATO strategy* – such as the one relating to the collective defence against the eastern threat – to deal with the diverse threats coming from the south. Even though before the Summit, NATO's leaders⁴⁹ have been continuously conferring about the significance of cross-borders security, they could not finalize and put together certain topics and decisions, which can be compared to Christmas gifts under the tree,⁵⁰ without any idea to whom give the gifts.

⁴⁷ John MEARSHEIMER: Maneuver, Mobile Defence, and the NATO Central Front. *International Security*, Winter 1981/82. 3. sz. p. 6. <http://johnmearsheimer.uchicago.edu/pdfs/A0005.pdf>; Accessed on 19 July 2016.

⁴⁸ Martin MICHELOT: Warsaw Summit: How will NATO Project Stability? *Defence Matter*.

<http://defencematters.org/news/warsaw-summit-will-nato-project-stability/881/>; Accessed on 27 July 2016.

⁴⁹ Jens STOLTENBERG: 'Projecting Stability: Charting NATO Future'. US Atlantic Council, Washington, D.C.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_129758.htm?selectedLocale=en; Accessed on 6 April 2016.

Alexander VERSHBOW: Strong on Values, Strong on Defence. NATO's role in Projecting Stability to the East and South, London. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_131446.htm Accessed on 24 July 2016.

⁵⁰ Julian LINDLEY-FRENCH: The Warsaw Summit and the NATO Christmas Tree, 2016.

<http://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/?fa=64052>; Accessed on 27 July 2016.

The projection of stability focuses on the security of neighbouring regions and countries, and expresses the idea that *it is not enough to concentrate on the protection of NATO's borders and territory; the Alliance needs to take care of the external dangers and threats as well*. As NATO's Secretary General put it, "To protect our territory, we must be willing to project stability beyond our borders. If our neighbours are stable, we are more secure."⁵¹ Owing to the fight against terrorism, migration and the hybrid threat,⁵² several member states – including Hungary – urge NATO to *deal with Europe's defence issues, which is strengthened by the organization's 360° security approach*.

For this reason, the Alliance has included all relevant tasks in the concept of duty "projection of security". We can enumerate in this group the enlargement of NATO; the joint declaration with the EU; the bilateral and multilateral agreements (with Turkey, Ukraine, Georgia and Moldova); the operations and missions in the Balkans, in Afghanistan, in the Aden Gulf and on the Mediterranean Sea; supporting the coalition against ISIL/DAESH, the questions of antimissile missile defence; cyber defence and the protection of EU's borders at sea. Currently, NATO attaches great importance to helping poorly functioning states (Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya), which – on the basis of the Afghan model – includes providing training, help and guidance. The Alliance involves the region's NATO partner states (Jordan, Kuwait and Tunisia) in this activity, and also improves its relationship with the countries of the Middle East and North Africa (also known as the MENA region).

The idea of the projection of security has been present in NATO history ever since the end of the Cold War. In fact, it has appeared as the new political mission of the Alliance.⁵³ In the 90's, NATO's efforts primarily concentrated on *improving the security of the European continent*, and to achieve this, it prepared new strategic concepts (in 1991 and 1999), intervened in the Western Balkans, reformed its structure (partnership for peace, the Mediterranean dialogue, enlargement and

⁵¹ Jens STOLTENBERG (2016a): i. m. p. 2.

⁵² „Hybrid threats are those posed by any current or potential adversary – state, NGO or terrorist organization – with the ability to – in a documented or presumable way – simultaneously employ conventional and non-conventional means adaptively in pursuit of their objectives.” <http://www.natolibguides.info/hybridwarfare>; Accessed on 12 July 2016.

⁵³ Rebecca R. MOORE: NATO's New Mission. Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World. Praeger Security International, Westport, Connecticut, London, 2007.

transforming its command and control system), and improved its operational and procedural system. It is evident that the *projection of security is connected to the political purpose of spreading democracy*. The Alliance does not only share its military force, but also the ideas behind its creation and the values it represents as well. The second paragraph of the Washington Treaty emphasizes that “The Parties will contribute to the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being.”⁵⁴ The Alliance is making efforts for the ideas of the Atlantic community to take root in the partner countries as well, because it would be the best way to prevent the emergence of military conflicts in these regions. While until the turn of the millennium, the projection of security was concentrated on the Balkans and the Eastern European region, after the terrorist attacks on 9/11, NATO has been focusing its attention on the Caucasus, Middle Asia and the Middle East. On its *Istanbul Summit in 2014*, the Alliance has declared *that it is ready to defend and spread its common values and interests in the Euro-Atlantic region and beyond, if necessary*.⁵⁵ Ever since, NATO has been focusing on its out of area operations, which rendered necessary the improvement of its expeditionary capabilities.

As a counterweight to NATO’s discussions about its globalization, the idea that the Alliance must turn back its attention to its original function – which is defending itself – has emerged as well, under the name “*homeland defence initiative*”. This idea wants NATO to maintain its collective defence capabilities during its expeditionary operations (in Iraq and Afghanistan), and also to prepare for facing new type threats, risks and threats within its own territory. The supporters of this theory use this idea to show the usefulness of the Alliance –from the aspect of national security – to the public. Before the Riga Summit in 2006, the researchers of

⁵⁴ Észak-atlanti Szerződés. Washington, D.C. 1949.04.04. In: DEMETER György (Szerk): A változó NATO. Dokumentumok 1989–1994. Budapest, Stratégiai és Védelmi Kutatóintézet, 1994.

⁵⁵ Istanbul Summit Communiqué. p. 2. <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm>; Accessed on 25 July 2016.

the National Defence University have prepared a parallel proposition – titled “*Transatlantic Homeland Defence*”⁵⁶ – to the most influential decision-makers.

The document listed the following tasks that would help to ensure domestic security: (1) the protection of roads leading to NATO territories and strengthening the security of NATO’s borders; (2) connection and integration of activities related to forecasting, intelligence, aerial activity and anti-aircraft defence; (3) the prevention of terrorist attacks and dealing with their consequences; (4) improving crisis management capabilities from NBC defence to the consequences of big natural and industrial disasters. The researchers have attached a system of methods to each of these tasks, including the improvement of operational capabilities, the training programmes and the establishment or designation of national command posts. Naturally, the idea was not discussed at the Riga Summit – as it was not a national proposal –, but curiously, several of its aspects were included in the Summit’s decisions.

The emergence of the conception on domestic security – formulated 10 years ago – is still interesting, since *many of its elements that the researchers had worded at that time have resurfaced in the decisions of the Warsaw Summit*, too. The current idea of the projection of security is quite similar to the plan that was born in the era of the Riga Summit. However, back then the domestic security dimension of defence aimed to counterbalance the expeditionary warfare in national frameworks, while nowadays it serves the strengthening of Europe’s defence with traditional military forces.

One of the most spectacular elements of the Summit was the joint declaration with the EU, since it directly demonstrated the steps NATO has taken towards securing Europe. Even though the institutional framework of this had been already achieved 15 years ago,⁵⁷ and 22 countries are members of both organizations; the

⁵⁶ *Transatlantic Homeland Defence*. National Defence University, Washington, D.C., May 2006.
<http://ctnsp.dodlive.mil/files/2014/10/Transatlantic-Homeland-Def.pdf>; Accessed on 24 July 2016.

⁵⁷ The cooperation between the two organizations has reached the level of strategic partnership in 2002. In 2003, they signed the Berlin+ Agreement, which allowed the members states of the EU to use NATO forces and equipment in their operations; and they have also founded the NATO-EU Capability Group. Organization level

political, strategic and policy cooperation is far from being ideal. In the past period, one of the main obstacles in the way of joint work has been the conflict between Turkey and Cyprus (Turkey is a member of NATO, but not of EU; while Cyprus is a member of the EU, but not of NATO), but rivalry and bureaucratic problems – present in both organizations – also contributed to the feeling that something is missing from the cooperation. However, the similar tasks relating to the eastern and southern threats urge more efficient cooperation between the leaders of the two organizations, who believe that their partnership should be elevated to the next qualitative level. The activity of NATO's special navy unit (currently comprising seven ships⁵⁸) on the Aegean Sea also reinforces this feeling. By providing pieces of reconnaissance information and maintain an international presence, NATO ships successfully support the guarding service of FRONTEX and the EU member states.

The former aims of the cooperation (full-fledged partnership, improving practical cooperation in crisis management operations, reinforcing political consultation and full cooperation in capability development) have been replaced by new aims that are more relevant to the current security situation. "A stronger NATO and a stronger EU are mutually reinforcing. Together they can better provide security in Europe and beyond."⁵⁹ The new strategic aims include the joint fight against hybrid threat, improving maritime cooperation, taking actions against mass migration, improving cyber security and the development of coherent, complementary and interoperable defensive capabilities. In the forthcoming two years (2017 and 2018), the EU and NATO will organize simultaneous, parallel, but also coordinated exercises to further improve cooperation. The two organizations also want to strengthen the military industrial collaboration and also the joint researches, development and innovation among themselves and the United States.

cooperation during operations has begun in 2003 as well. In 2005, military contact groups have been created within both organizations, and from 2009, they have been organizing joint crisis management trainings, too.

⁵⁸ http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-aegean-sea-eng.pdf;
Accessed on 10 July 2016.

⁵⁹ <https://nato.usmission.gov/joint-declaration-nato-european-council-european-commission/>; 5th paragraph
Accessed on 10 July 2016.

Montenegro's ongoing admission, further supporting Ukraine and aiding Georgia's preparation for its membership also serve the projection of partnership. The Middle Asian country of Afghanistan also had a place on NATO's list of priorities. After the American President has announced before the Summit that – contrary to earlier plans⁶⁰ – the USA will not withdraw the majority of its forces from Afghanistan, and will only slightly reduce the number of its deployed soldiers (out of the 9,800 soldiers, 8,400 will stay in the country), the question of NATO's participation in Afghanistan and the extension of the RSM have been resolved. Now we only need to collect the 1.5 billion dollars that is necessary to sustain the Afghan Security Forces till 2020. The aid to Afghanistan ought to be evaluated by bearing in mind that the country spends 20% of its yearly GDP on the armed forces, while 30% of the Security Forces have left the organization. It also accounts for the continuation of the operation that the central government's power is continuously weakening. It only controls 65% of Afghanistan's territory, while 9% is still in the hands of the Taleban; and the central control over the remaining areas is uncertain.⁶¹

The newest aspect of countering the southern threats is that the NAC has "found" some tasks for NATO, such as the fight against the Islamic State and terrorism, managing the migration crisis and the conflict in Syria, and also offering support to Libya. By employing E-3 (AWACS) type reconnaissance aircraft, NATO will directly support the American-led international coalition's fight against ISIL/DAESH. The Alliance intends to contribute to the region's security primarily by offering training (especially to Iraq). NATO also continues its institutional expansion in the MENA region. Aside from the special operations training centre in Jordan (Amman), in 2017, NATO will open a *new cooperation centre* in Kuwait and an *intelligence bureau* in Tunisia. In addition, it will directly participate in the fight against human trafficking and protecting the naval borders from illegal migrants, through its *new naval operation called as Operation Sea Guardian (OSG)*. According to plans, NATO's naval forces will cooperate with Operation Sophia of

⁶⁰ Obama slows US troop drawdown in Afghanistan. The Telegraph. <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/2016/07/06/obama-slows-us-troop-drawdown-in-afghanistan/>; Accessed on 6 Aug 2016.

⁶¹ US Agency Says Afghan Forces Lost Territories in 2006. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/news/2016/07/mil160729voa05.htm?_m=3n%2e002a%2e1779%2elb0ao003sa%2e1mw1; Accessed on 6 Aug 2016.

the EUNAVFOR MED. The Europe Council has expanded the duties of this operation, which consequently not only fights human trafficking, but also trains the Libyan coastal guard and navy, and in implementing the UN arms embargo in the waters close to the Libyan shores. Even though the details are still unknown, it is likely that NATO will reorganize its Operation Active Endeavour – which has been going on for 15 years – into a mission that directly supports the EU. Simultaneously, NATO will end Operation Ocean Shield (OOS) against piracy in late 2016.

The Warsaw Summit also discussed the current state of NATO's Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD), and approved the reaching of *primary operational readiness*. The BMD Resolution is the second decision (the first one was the forward deployment of ground forces) that Russia vehemently opposes, even though in the course of the Lebanon Summit (2010), it agreed on a joint development with NATO during the session of the NATO-Russia Council (NRC). However, owing to the differing opinions and the worsening relationship of NATO and Russia, the cooperation between the two has not only been cancelled, but Moscow has also been blaming Brussels for developing the antiballistic missile defence against Russia – instead of Iran –, thus tipping over the current balance of power. The Russian reaction to the deployment of antimissile missiles to Romania (and eventually to Poland) has been particularly vehement.⁶² At the same time, the Alliance considers ballistic missile defence a non-Russia-related question to such an extent that even in the course of the Summit, *it was discussed as a part of the measures against the hybrid threat from the South*. Even though NATO's BMD system is currently based on the contributions of the member states, it has been being commanded by the operational centre in NATO's Ramstein Air Base (Germany) since July 2016.⁶³ Currently, the units of the BMD are the following: American radar station (Incirlik, Turkey); Aegis land-based missile defence base in Romania (it has been operating in Deveselu since 12 May 16)⁶⁴ and Poland (it will be operating from 2018 in

⁶² US activates Romanian missile defence site, angering Russia. Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-nato-shield-idUSKCN0Y30JX>; Accessed on 30 Sept 2016.

⁶³ NATO Ballistic Missile Defence. Fact Sheet, July 2016. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160630_1607-factsheet-bmd-en.pdf ; Accessed on 16 Sept 2016.

⁶⁴ Key Missile defence site declared operational.

Radzikovo) and a naval Aegis base with four guided missile destroyers (in Rota, Spain). Other member states (such as the Netherlands, Denmark and the United Kingdom) have been planning to contribute by developing their direct defence and new equipment (radars and Aegis ships). According to the plans of the Alliance, its ballistic missile defence will *reach full operational readiness by 2023*. The BMD system will protect Western Europe from hostile ballistic missiles to the depth line connecting Greenland and the Azori Islands.

In relation to the southern threat, the Warsaw Summit similarly discussed the questions of further developing NATO's *Joint Intelligence and Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)*, which has reached its primary operational readiness in February 2016. Important elements of this plan include the establishment of a new, independent Intelligence and Security Division (led by a new Assistant Secretary General for Intelligence and Security) in the NATO centre in Brussels, and also speeding up the creation of NATO's Alliance Ground Surveillance system (AGS). The idea of the AGS was born in 1992. Ever since, the plan has faced a number of difficulties, until the NAC finally decided on establishing the JISR during the Chicago Summit.⁶⁵ Ever since, the realization of the plan has sped up; the base of the AGS in Sigonella (Sicily) has been activated in 2015, and the test flights have started in December 2015. The air component of the AGS will comprise five RQ-4B Global Hawk type cruise missiles – bought by fifteen member states (Hungary is not part of this project) –, which are capable of covering a territory of 103,000 km², and forwarding high-resolution pictures. The air component will also include other aircraft offered by the member states (France and the United Kingdom). This purchase – which costs 1.4 billion dollars – will be conducted by the NAGSMA, NATO's specialized agency, while an allied industrial consortium (the American Northrop Grumman, the German Airbus Defense and Space, the Italian Selex ES and the Norwegian Kongsberg) will be tasked with their production. The first aircraft is already operable, and it is currently being introduced into the inventory. The stations comprising the ground segment of the AGS will be connected with

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_130721.htm?selectedLocale=en; Accessed on 30 Sept 2016.

⁶⁵ BALOGH Péter: A szövetségi felderítőrendszer korszerűsítése, avagy néhány gondolat a NATO földfelszín felderítőrendszerének megteremtéséről. *Felderítő Szemle*, 2013. február. 11. évf. 3–4. sz.

NATO's signal and information control and reconnaissance equipment and commands, and also the national (ISR, ISTAR) elements as well. Sigonella will receive the system's technical and communications support elements, too. *In accordance with the Warsaw Summit's decision, the AGS must be operable by 2017.* The operating costs of the system will be divided among the member states, irrespective of whether they have participated in the procurement or not.⁶⁶

Turkey plays an important role within the process of handling the southern threat. According to the declaration of the Summit, NATO will continue to maintain the country's aerial defence. NATO has been offering aerial reinforcement to Ankara since 2013, which is ensured by the air forces of the member states on a rotation basis in order to protect the Turkish airspace. Currently, Spain and Italy have deployed one-one airplane battery – within the framework of Active Fence Operation – close to the Syrian border. The Spanish deployed a PATRIOT, and the Italians deployed an ASTER complex, with a personnel of 150 soldiers each, under the control of NATO's Allied Air Command in Ramstein.⁶⁷ However, Turkey's importance exceeds this “temporary” reinforcement, since as of now, an American personnel of approximately 1,600 soldiers (F-15 fighter aircraft and AC-10C ground-attack aircraft companies, Predator cruise missiles and special operations forces) are present in the country, and use the Incirlik Airbase for their air strikes against ISIL/DAESH; and they also have a base in Izmir and one in Ankara. The theatre anti-aircraft system's AN/TPY type radar station is also operating on Turkish territory (in Kürecik).⁶⁸ Even before the Summit, the relationship of NATO and Turkey has not been free of disputes, but after the military coup on 15 July, it has reached *rock bottom*.

The Alliance and Ankara still have very differing views on the crisis in Syria, the refugees, the methods of countering ISIL/DAESH, the measures to be taken against the Kurdistan Workers' Party and the naval presence in the area (especially on the Black Sea). The public opinion polls – that showed that only 30% of

⁶⁶ Alliance Ground Surveillance (AGS). Fact Sheet, July 2016. http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-ags-en.pdf; Accessed on 30 September 2016.

⁶⁷ http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_06/20160613_1606-factsheet-patriot-en.pdf; Accessed on 29 September 2016.

⁶⁸ The Military Balance, Europe. Taylor & Francis, London, 2016. p. 151.

Turkey's population trusts NATO –also prove the Turkish government's contradicting communication about the Alliance. Even before the coup, there has been a huge scandal between the two, since Turkey recalled *Vice Admiral Mustafa Zeki Ugurlu* from his position in NATO⁶⁹, but the Turkish government accused Brussels of being apathetic about the military coup as well.⁷⁰

Following the violent attempt to gain power, conjectures have repeatedly emerged about Turkey leaving NATO (disaffiliation is not discussed within the Washington Treaty).⁷¹ Contradicting news have surfaced about redeploying nuclear weapons from Incirlik to Romania, the reorganization of the Turkish Armed Forces and the reducing combat capabilities of the armed forces. *Following the meeting between Putin and Erdogan on 8 August, the tense and cold relationship between Turkey and NATO faced a crisis, and the trust between them has reached an all-time low.* While I do not think Turkey would exit NATO, I believe that *their relationship should be improved.* Currently, Turkey's NATO membership is beneficial to both parties: on the one hand, it provides some kind of security to Turkey; and on the other hand, it offers a “forward base” to NATO for its fight against ISIL/DAESH, and also for countering other threats from the Middle East. *A lot depends on what policies the two parties will pursue in the future, and to what extent they will consider the interests of each other.* The situation in Syria, the Russian-Turkish

⁶⁹ Three days before the military coup, the Turkish government asked to recall Vice Admiral Ugurlu from his position as the Assistant Chief of Staff of the NATO Allied Command Transformation in Norfolk for being involved in the Gulenist movement. NATO refused to relieve the general (who even attended NATO's war industry day on 26 July). For health-related reasons, Ugurlu also refused to return home. In early August, the conflict has grown so intensive that the vice admiral has asked to be granted asylum in the USA, and subsequently disappeared. But the Alliance was also irritated by the fact that Turkey has circulated a list of the allegedly Gulenist military officers who filled positions in NATO, and also the past within the organization of the military coup's leaders. See Metan GURCAN: Is Turkey abandoning NATO or vice versa? Turkey Pulse, August 2016. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-nato-membership-shackling.html>; Accessed on 28 August 2016.

⁷⁰ Metan GURCAN: Is Turkey abandoning NATO or vice versa? Turkey Pulse, August 2016. <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2016/08/turkey-nato-membership-shackling.html>; Accessed on 28 August 2016.

⁷¹ J. Joseph WILLIAMS Jr: From Solid to Shaky: The Strained Alliance Between Turkey and NATO. Oxford Policy Center, August 2016. <http://oxfordpolicycentre.org/research-papers/Draft-WILLIAMS-Turkey-NATOOxford%20Copy.pdf>; Accessed on 28 September 2016.

relationship, Turkey's "dialogue membership" within the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (recently Ankara signed a bilateral agreement with Peking on countering terrorism), and the state of the talks about Turkey's admission into the EU *might be a continuous fault line in Turkey's relationship with the Alliance*. NATO – together with the EU – should find the way to tie the enormous European-Asian country to the West, thus preventing it from joining the circle of Russia and China's allies. Turkey should be an ally, not a friend to the West.

Cyber defence and the capability to counter it

Aside from the traditional military deterrence, the questions relating to *cyber defence* have been a key topic on the Warsaw Summit as well, therefore I will discuss cyber defence and resilience separately. The leaders of the Alliance have talked about the issue of cyber defence not only within the framework of NATO, but also in cooperation with the leaders of the EU as well. The recently adopted new global security strategy discusses these challenges – which have been increasingly threatening nowadays – in a separate chapter.⁷² If we also add that the OSCE has adopted some new confidence and security building measures relating to the usage of information technology⁷³, then we get a complex idea of the international organizations' coordinated effort against cyber threats. Cyber warfare is not kinetic; it is exceptionally diverse and cannot be predicted. However, it is a phenomenon that can be interpreted and countered.⁷⁴ Approximately 200 million cyber-attacks are launched against NATO's computer system on a daily basis; 200 of which every month constitute a serious threat of penetration. The Alliance has already agreed on the Wales Summit that even in case of a cyber war, *Article 5 can be effectuated*; and simultaneously it has accepted the improved cyber defence policy and action plan.

⁷² MOLNÁR Anna: Az EU globális kül- és biztonságpolitikai stratégiája. SVKK Elemzések. http://netk.uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/svkk-elemzesek-2016-9-az-eu-globalis-strategijaja-molnar-a.original.pdf; Accessed on 12 November 2016.

⁷³ OSCE Expands its List on Confidence Building Measures for Cyber Space: Common Ground on Critical Infrastructure Protection. 04 April 2016. <https://ccdcoe.org/osce-expands-its-list-confidence-building-measures-cyberspace-common-ground-critical-infrastructure.html>; Accessed on 30 July 2016.

⁷⁴ BERZSENYI Dániel: CyCON 2016 – NATO-kibervédelem Varsó előtt. <http://biztonsagpolitika.hu/cikkek/cycon-2016-nato-kiberveelem-varso-elott>; Accessed on 15 July 2016.

In the past two years, several measures have been taken to defend NATO's informatics systems, but the Warsaw Summit has decided about some new related tasks. The organization considers *the processing of the experiments gained during the crises in Crimea and Ukraine*, the examination of the possibilities for the combined usage of military and civilian equipment and the sharing of information to be exceptionally important.⁷⁵

Brussels is planning to set up an *integrated intelligence and data processing department* in the headquarters of NATO. The Alliance has signed a cooperation agreement with its 28 member states; but it has also concluded a technical agreement on cyber defence with the EU in February 2016. The NAC has declared the cyber space to be an area of operations. This might have a positive effect on the prioritization of cyber capabilities in defence planning, the organization of cyber defence during the operations and missions, and also in the field of training and preparation. However, this decision does not mean that the defensive character of cyber policy will change,⁷⁶ even though the experts have been emphasizing that the current approach is unfeasible.

According to the NATO Excellence Centre for Cyber Defense, it is not enough to concentrate on cyber defence; the Alliance ought to have such offensive capabilities that make it possible for NATO to take counter-measures – that are proportionate with the threats – in the cyber space as well.⁷⁷ However, in order to achieve this, NATO needs to change its approach, which means that it has to respond to a cyber-attack with a cyber counter-attack, similarly to how one might launch air counterattacks in case of an air attack. The Warsaw Summit has decided

⁷⁵ NATO and the experts of its member states (600 persons) have practiced the cyber defence procedures and the cooperation according to several scenarios during the exercise called as “Cyber Coalition 2015” (between 16 and 20 November) in Tartu, Estonia. Georgia, Japan and Jordan participated in the simulation exercise for the first time. <http://www.balkandefense.com/natos-largest-annual-cyber-defence-exercise-underway-in-estonia/>; Accessed on 28 July 2016.

⁷⁶http://www.nato.int/nato_static_fl2014/assets/pdf/pdf_2016_07/20160627_1607-factsheet-cyber-defence-eng.pdf; Accessed on 10 July 2016.

⁷⁷ Matthijs VEENENDAAL – Kadri KASKA – Pascal BRAYETTO: Is NATO Ready to Cross the Rubicon on Cyber Defence? NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Center of Excellence, Cyber Policy Brief, Tallin, June 2016. <https://ccdcoe.org/multimedia/nato-ready-cross-rubicon-cyber-defence.html>; Accessed on 29 July 2016.

about the contributions that the member states are required to make and about the joint development projects. These will be revised during the Brussels Summit in 2017.⁷⁸ The pledge to improve cyber defence covers the following seven fields: (1) the most extensive development of capabilities; (2) ensuring the necessary resources; (3) improving international cooperation; (4) improving general knowledge about cyber threats; (5) reinforcing “cyber hygiene”; (6) developing training and education; (7) the urgent fulfilment of the undertaken duties.⁷⁹ It is obvious that international cooperation, and the joint efforts of the governmental, industrial and scientific spheres are necessary for a real success. The Alliance wants to achieve this through the NATO Industry Cyber Partnership programme.

Cooperating with the EU and the “Five Eyes” countries would be especially important. The United States of America, the United Kingdom, Australia, Canada and New Zealand have made an agreement 70 years ago about collecting secret technical intelligence and sharing the information with each another. The alliance could function completely in secret until 1999; but its global character has been revealed to the public after the Snowden scandal in 2013. Nowadays, their joint activity – conducted primarily by technical intelligence services – comprises not only global technical reconnaissance, but also the controlling and the regulation of the cyber space. The cooperation of the five countries have gradually expanded; today we can talk about the “9 Eyes” (the original countries and Denmark, France,

⁷⁸ Even though the Alliance has not published a summary of its member states’ contributions, certain countries have already revealed their offerings to the public. For example, the USA has made a contribution worth 200 million dollars (technical equipment, know-hows, trainings and experts) to the Alliance, which it plans to forward through bilateral agreements and also NATO’s competent centres of excellence and strategic commands. The American offering will be used for *improving combat capabilities and civilian preparation, developing cyber defence and protection against the CBRN*. The Baltic States and Poland will be prioritized during the introduction of the measures that enhance resilience. In the course of the fight against transnational threats, NATO will support some other countries as well (such as Turkey, Romania and Bulgaria). Hungary can expect to have the equipment of its special operations forces supplemented from the contribution. See also: Fact Sheet: US Contributions to enhancing Allied Resilience. The White House, July 09, 2016. <https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2016/07/09/fact-sheet-us-contributions-enhancing-allied-resilience>; Accessed on 17 July 2016.

⁷⁹CyberDefencePledge.

http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133177.htm?selectedLocale=en;
Accessed on 10 July 2016.

the Netherlands and Norway) and the “14 Eyes” (which also includes Germany, Belgium, Italy, Spain and Sweden), too. Within the framework of the so-called focused cooperation, an additional 20 NATO member states and partner countries have also participated in the programme. During the ISAF operation in Afghanistan, the “41 Eyes” cooperation – which the Alliance considers as a pilot programme – proved to be extremely successful. The Russian hybrid warfare and the fight against international terrorism (ISIL/DAESH) also call for the further strengthening of the secret intelligence cooperation.⁸⁰

The topic of *resilience* has been discussed in relation to cyber security, even though it is a well-known fact that defensive capabilities are important not only in the cyber space. While on the one hand, the commitment of the prime ministers and heads of state⁸¹ emphasizes that “resilience is the defining basis of credible deterrence, defence and the efficient execution of the Alliance’s tasks”, but on the other hand, it also states that NATO will continue to improve its defensive capabilities within the entire spectrum of threats. In virtue of this idea, the Summit has adopted the NATO policy for the Protection of Civilians⁸², which is aimed at increasing the protection of the civilian population during NATO’s operations, missions and activities. The document stresses that the duties can only be executed through international cooperation, and by applying the idea of a comprehensive approach, in the case of resilience as well.

The development of defensive capabilities is a significant segment of NATO’s long-term adaptation program, which it attempts to achieve primarily through cooperation with the EU. Cyber defence is an important element of resilience, but the phenomenon must also include protection against weapons of mass destruction, and decreasing the Eastern European NATO member states’ technical dependence on Russia. The development of defensive capabilities is first and foremost a national duty, especially in relation to civilian preparedness.

⁸⁰ <https://www.privacyinternational.org/node/51>; Accessed on 17 July 2016.

⁸¹ Commitment to enhance resilience. 08 July, 2016. p. 1., p. 3.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133180.htm?selectedLocale=en;
Accessed on 10 July 2016.

⁸² NATO Policy for the Protection of Civilians. 09 July, 2016.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_133945.htm?selectedLocale=en;
Accessed on 10 July 2016.

The requirements of resilience are the following:

- guaranteed operation of the governmental and critical infrastructure;
- security of energy supplies;
- ability to handle uncontrollable mass movements;
- security of food and water supplies;
- ability to treat mass injuries;
- defensive capabilities of telecommunications systems;
- defensive capabilities of the transport system.

Putting the development of defensive capabilities on its agenda is an important precondition of NATO's deterrent and defensive program, since the system of requirements for the deployment of NATO's military forces must be guaranteed. During the Cold War, this happened as a part of "theatre preparation", in the East and the West as well, most of time within a governmental framework. The state leaders improved civilian infrastructure and production, and accumulated supplies by also taking military requirements into consideration. The organization of the transport system (railways, motorways, ports and airports), public health system (hospitals, MEDEVAC capabilities, accommodating sick people), the power network, and the material supplies, as well as the establishment of war material workshops and transport capabilities were all parts of a country's preparation for war. *However, nowadays, a significant part of NATO's supplies depend on the civilian sector: 90% of the central logistic sources are secured by private enterprises, and 75% of it reaches NATO troops within the framework of the Host Nation Support (HNS). Furthermore, air traffic, telecommunications, communications and informatics services and IT systems are almost entirely dependent on the private sector. It is an undeniable fact that the vulnerability of social-economic systems has increased and resilience has decreased due to privatization, globalization and the profitability of the economic activity.*

Simultaneously with NATO's forward presence in the East, the above mentioned duties must be reorganized (especially in the endangered countries), and the full-scale requirements of the NATO forces' operation must be guaranteed. We are talking about a dual challenge, to which NATO can only answer with the help of its member states. First and foremost, the conditions must be secured for the NATO reacting forces to be moved forward in accordance with the readiness time. In

addition, the host country ought to secure the necessary services and support, as well as the NATO forces' cooperation with the national authorities. The NATO Force Integration Units (NFIU) – recently deployed to the countries of the eastern wing – will have a key role in the execution of this task, as they will organize the Reception, Staging and Onward Movement (RSOM) of the incoming NATO rapid deployment forces.

The second set of tasks is aimed at enhancing resilience, which would enable NATO's armed forces and the national authorities to act even under the conditions of hybrid warfare, in spite of the enemy's disturbing actions or strikes; and also to decrease the negative effects of such events and restore their operating capabilities. Even though fundamentally, resilience should be secured by the national authorities, the Alliance should also contribute to secure the member states' defensive, resistance capabilities – especially by providing the necessary planning data on the deployment of NATO forces, defining operational requirements, continuously evaluating vulnerability and elaborating suggestions.

Creating the necessary legal framework for the functioning of NATO forces will be an important national duty, in order that the national and the NATO forces be able to counter all forms of hybrid warfare even when they do not exceed the threshold defined by the Article 5 – including also the covered military operations that violate a country's sovereignty. Establishing resilience will be a long-term duty, in which NATO's civilian crisis management organizations must participate as well.

Conclusions

There were great expectations surrounding the Warsaw Summit, similarly to almost every high level NATO conference. NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg has set two objectives for the Summit: (1) *reaching balance* and (2) *continuing adaptation*.⁸³ Before the Warsaw Summit, several politicians of the

⁸³ Press Conference by NATO Secretary General Jens STOLTENBERG following the meeting of the North Atlantic Council at the level of Defence Ministers. http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/opinions_127824.htm?selectedLocale=en; Accessed on 8 July 2016.

different member states have made statements that were not in line with NATO's general political standpoints.⁸⁴

During the preparation of the Summit, the requirement of balance has been continuously being developed. In the beginning, balancing was only aimed at proportionally handling the eastern and the southern threats; but soon enough – based on the suggestions of the South-eastern European countries – it has been expanded to include the balance among the northern (the Baltic States and Poland) and the southern (Turkey, Romania, Bulgaria) wing of the frontline countries. A balance must be reached within the foreign and security policy with Russia, too, as the member states have differing opinions on the threat imposed by the country. As a result of the internal disputes, a *dual approach* has been established, which is aimed at *deterrence* (to calm the countries that feel fear and worry) and *maintaining the dialogue with Russia* (to adopt the views of the member states that would use primarily political and diplomatic means to ease the conflict and the tension). *After the Summit, it can be stated that if the Alliance had not found a balance, it would have seriously questioned the efficiency of the meeting.* Only in such a way could the Alliance handle the different, contradicting statements of the member states, avoid labels like “partition”, “fractures” and “fault lines”, which have been commonly used by the media in the past period.

Aside from the need to strengthen collective defence, yet another requirement for reaching balance has emerged. That is the need to *strengthen the defence of*

⁸⁴ For instance, the German Foreign Minister, Frank-Walter Steinmeier criticized NATO in relation to the Anaconda 2016 giant practice, saying that the organization will have no benefits from “sword rattling and incitement”. *Páros lábbal szállt a NATO-ba a német külügyminiszter. Origo.*

<http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20160618-kemenyen-kritizalta-a-nato-t-steinmeier-nemet-kulugyminiszter.html>; Accessed on 19 July 2016.

Before the Summit, Italian Defense Minister Roberta Pinotta said that NATO's strategy aimed at deterring and preventing conflict renders the fight against terrorism unfeasible, even though NATO and Russia should form a bridge to counter this threat. www.mszfszk.hu; Accessed on 6 July 2016.

The Russian media quoted French President Francois Hollande's statement on the Summit word to word: “NATO cannot define the relationship of Europe and Russia. To France, Russia is not an opponent or a threat, but a partner.” *Russia Threat Takes Center Stage at NATO's Warsaw Summit. The Daily Signal.* <http://dailysignal.com/2016/07/10/russian-threat-takes-center-stage-at-natos-warsaw-summit/>; Accessed on 10 July 2016.

Europe, with special regard to hybrid threats, the fight against terrorism and the handling of the migration crisis. This requirement of the member states (including Hungary) have urged the Alliance to not only perform its classic deterrence-related duties, but also examine its own possibilities and capabilities to determine how it could contribute to the security of Europe – besides managing the Ukrainian crisis – within and beyond the borders of NATO. Even though this mission seems new, that is not the case: in fact, following the decisive London NATO Summit in 1990, the Alliance has set itself the objective to improve Europe’s security. “Today, our Alliance begins a major transformation. Working with all the countries of Europe, we are determined to create enduring peace on this continent.”⁸⁵ The need for adapting ourselves to the new circumstances became important from the aspect of *NATO’s future*. Following the terrorist attack against the USA in 9/11, the Alliance has realized that is not enough anymore to pay attention only to the continent’s security. Security must be expanded, and the adversary must be fought where it appears, and crises should be handled where they emerge. Even though NATO has been paying special attention to new security risks threats since 2010 (as it is even included in the strategic concept of 2010), ever since the Ukrainian crisis has broken out in 2014, it became clear that these threats emerge in an *interwoven, simultaneous, hybrid manner* in the east and the south as well. Although this realization is not new to the Alliance (NATO has defined hybrid threat for the first time in 2011), but handling the new strategic challenges still has not been incorporated in the political, doctrinal and planning systems of the organization, and the creation of adequate capabilities is also falling behind.

It renders the managing of the problem even more difficult that the strategic threats take differing shapes (such as traditional military threats, terrorism and migration); but the complexity of the military-security duties (participants, adversaries, and the extent, range and intensity of the tasks) are also different from one another. While collective defence can be handled in the “old-fashioned” way (by traditional and nuclear military forces), the countering of hybrid threats needs simultaneous international cooperation, crisis management and the coordinated

⁸⁵ Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. 06 July, 1990. p. 23.
http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_23693.htm; Accessed on 10 July 2016.

usage of all collective defence means. It renders the situation even more difficult that the southern and eastern risks and threats have a different effect on the countries of the “hybrid wings” than on the entire Alliance. *For that reason, not only NATO, but all countries must adapt to the new security situation.* This means that the Alliance should not only transform its own system of institutions, forces and capabilities, but it has to urge also its member states to adapt to the new situation. Not only the elaboration of new concepts, strategic principles and solutions is needed for the change; but additional resources ought to be secured, too. *One of the Summit’s huge accomplishments is that the Alliance has set in this direction:* it has strengthened its cooperation with the EU, declared the cyber space to be an area of operations, and joined the effort to solve the mass migration and refugee crisis on the Mediterranean Sea.

Primarily, it was the military measures aimed at guaranteeing the security of the Eastern wing that received the most attention of the Summit’s resolutions; however, it was similarly important that NATO has accepted the challenge of dealing with hybrid risks and threats (including terrorism, cyber warfare, migration and instability). The Alliance has realized that in order to counter hybrid threats, it needs to improve its cooperation with the EU, with the reliable Arab partner states; and it also ought to continue developing its capabilities. The concept of *projecting stability* is a part of this tendency as well, which tries to improve security with non-kinetic forces and means in NATO’s neighbouring countries that are struggling with severe crises (including Ukraine, Georgia, Moldova, Syria, Iraq and Libya).

While we talked about a “semi-turn” in relation to the Wales Summit⁸⁶ (the return towards the Cold War has started), the Warsaw Summit *has brought about a complete U-turn.* The *new policy* includes not only the forward military presence, but also the understanding that NATO must return to the *concept of projecting stability* beyond the borders of Europe. Several decisions of the Alliance are pondering over the question how the NATO forces could be deployed to perform domestic security tasks. The current security approach speaks about how the line between internal and external security has been blurred, which idea is best expressed

⁸⁶ SZENES Zoltán: Előre a múltba? A walesi NATO-csúcs. Külügyi Szemle, 2014. ősz. <http://kki.gov.hu/download/9/1a/c0000/Szenes.pdf>; Accessed on 28 July 2016.

by the concept of *hybrid threat*. In the current security environment, NATO must find the appropriate duties for its military force within the joint defence efforts of the nations and within the international community. It is evident that NATO will continue progressing in this direction at the 2017 Summit in Brussels.

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Abstract

In his article, the author first compares some existing definitions on immigrants and migration. He lists and explains the different types of migration, and assesses also their various security aspects, such as the national, social and economic security risks. At the end of the article, he offers his own views and suggestions on the possible solutions to the current migration crisis.

Keywords: immigrants, migration, migration crisis, migration theory, security risks, threat factors

Without a doubt, the analysis of certain **threat factors** of the migration crisis is a new trend within the security policy. It is illustrative of the topic's significance – and the high level of public interest surrounding it – that if one types the English word “migration” into the Google search engine, the program finds more than 168 million results.

Even though in the last few decades, the main focus of academic discourse has not been migration-related research² – at least on the European continent –, but by today – owing to the phenomenon of the so-called “pseudo-migration” –, it is considered to be a field of scientific research that is quickly gaining more and more importance.

The mass migration causes extremely serious security political problems to the transit and destination countries of the migrants. Despite the fact that the activities of certain media – that glorify political correctness – are aimed at minimalizing, misrepresenting and concealing this issue, it is undeniable that the **threat factors** of migration have multiplied.

¹ Translated by Réka Kacsáncsi.

² I should note that to this day, the topic has been assessed from a criminological aspect only in a strictly scientific way in Europe. See also: KUBRIN, Charis E.: Immigration and crime, In (Ed.:Francis C. TULLEN – Pamela WILCOX): The Oxford Handbook of Criminological Theory, Oxford University Press, Oxford-New York, 2013. pp. 440-455.

There is only a limited number of objective assessments on migration, as the opinion-forming powers and interest groups are trying to explain global events while keeping only their current interests and potential benefits in mind. The parties – which are the formal depositaries of political power in democratic societies – have also been trying to interpret reality according to their own liking. Naturally, one cannot reply to the classical question “Cui prodest?” (Who benefits?) in absolute certainty. We can only resort to conjectures, but these are scientifically irrelevant.

However, we might attempt to – in a “sine ira et studios” fashion – summarize some security political observations on the migration phenomenon within the framework of this study, without anger and bias.

The concept and types of migration

The word migration – which is of Latin origin – stands for the population’s movement and wandering within the territory of a country, and also its resettlement from one country to another. In the narrow sense of the word, migration means changing one’s geographical place.³

Migration is often – inaccurately – equated with the concept of **mobility**. Mobility is the individual’s physical, free movement inside a country or across the borders, with the intention of improving their living conditions. This, owing to the IT developments of the last few years, has been complemented by virtual mobility as well (such as teleworking)⁴.

There have been several attempts⁵ at defining migration.⁶ Some people define **migration** as a process during which a person or a group of people change their

³ BORJAS, George J.: Economics of Migration, International Encyclopedia of the Social and Behavioral Sciences, Section No. 3.4, Article No. 38. February 2000. p.1.

⁴ HUZDIK Katalin: Migrációs potenciál alakulása, és az azt befolyásoló tényezők a XXI. század elsőévtizedében Magyarországon, Doktori (PhD) értekezés, Szent István Egyetem Gazdálkodás és Szervezéstudományok Doktori Iskola, témavezető: Dr.habil. Takács István egyetemi docens, Gödöllő. 2014. p.9.

⁵ The concept of extreme migration is known in specialized literature as well. For further information on the topic, see: KOVÁCS Judit Nóra: Extern migráció és az Európai Unió, De iurisprudentia et jure publico 2014/1. p.87.

living environment or community in a way that their situation changes from temporary to permanent and protracted.⁷

Others believe that migration – unless it is involuntary – is a process whose conditions are set by **mobility**. In the course of migration, masses of people leave from their residences – which have poor living conditions – to a place that offers better circumstances.

One of the standard works among Hungarian specialized literature on migration⁸ sees migration – as a social phenomenon – as a **neutral** concept, which might have both unequivocally beneficial (such as supplementing the population⁹) and unfavourable (for example, human trafficking) effects.

Migration can be interpreted as the result of an individual or a collective will, jointly and simultaneously defined by general social, economic and political processes, the intentions of an individual and some everyday events, too.

A recently published Hungarian research report used the word migrant as a collective term for people who arrive in a given country from abroad, with the intention of staying there for a longer period of time (usually for more than three months). The statistic systems usually register migrants either on basis of their citizenship (as foreigners) or their place of birth (as people born abroad).¹⁰

⁶ See also BOELES, Pieter – HEIJER Maarten Den – LODDER, Gerrie – WOUTERS, Kees: European Migration Law, Intersentia Ltd., Cambridge, 2014. pp.5-6.

⁷ CSERESNYÉS Ferenc: Menekültpolitika és menedékjog az Európai Unióban (1990-1999), Studia Europea, Janus Pannonius Tudományegyetem Európa Központ, Pécs, 1999. p. 11.

⁸ HAZUTZINGER Zoltán – HEGEDŰS Judit – KLENNER Zoltán: A migráció elmélete (szerk.: HAUTZINGER Zoltán), Nemzeti Közszolgálati Egyetem Rendészettudományi Kar, Budapest, 2014. p.6.

⁹ RÁCZ Margit: Uniós kihívások és válaszutak a 2000-es években, Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 2007. p.71.

¹⁰ TÖRÖK Ádám (szerk.): Az Európába irányuló és 2015-től felgyorsult migráció tényezői, irányai és kilátásai – a Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Migrációs Munkacsoportjának elemzése, MTA, Budapest, 2015. p.10.

In the past, typically some **labour market**-related problems incited the movement of people; however, persecution for religious, ethnic and political reasons has a past of several hundred years as well.¹¹

Laura Gyeney believes that from the mid-1980's, a certain way of thinking has evolved, which is characterized by the proposition of a **security continuum**: foreign things are problematic, as they are source of danger or a security risk, since they are on the same axis with terrorists, illegal employees and smugglers. This type of view – which sees migrants as a **source of danger** – has gained a special emphasis especially since the terrorist attacks of 9/11 – which is, by the way, well reflected by the Hague Programme's security-oriented views. However, the demographic issues and the increasing lack of qualified labour force in the EU member states – that have been perceivable in the past few years – render this idea less gloomy. Gyeney believes that the question of migration can be approached from two directions: by assessing its social-economic background or its political (active/proactive) aspects.¹²

Nowadays, several of the world's most economically developed countries have become **multinational**, however, the theoretical bases which would help to interpret the driving forces behind migration are missing or at least incomplete.

These days, a comprehensive theory of migration and international migration does not exist. There are only **theory fractions**, which – most of the time – have developed independently from one another. However, the patterns and tendencies of migration indicate that we cannot use the methods of only one discipline to understand the current migration processes; we have to make assessments on a **multi-disciplinal** level.¹³

¹¹ CSERESNYÉS Ferenc: Migráció az Európai Unióban – A népességmozgások társadalmi és politikai következményei Közép-Európában, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, 2005. p.21.

¹² GYENEY Laura: Legális bevándorlás az Európai Unióba, különös tekintettel a családi élet tiszteletben tartásának jogára, A Pázmány Péter Katolikus Egyetem Jog- és Államtudományi Karának Könyvei – Doktori Értekezések 6. Pázmány Press, Budapest, 2014. pp.32-38.

¹³ MASSEY: (1993) pp. 431–466.

It should be acknowledged that analysing migration as a homogenous concept is an outdated approach. It is more appropriate to recognize the diversity of this phenomenon. On the basis of Charles Tilly's work, a distinction can be drawn among local, forced, circular, chain and career migration. The basis of the distinction is the relation between the sender and the recipient networks.¹⁴

Usually, two aspects of this relationship can be distinguished: firstly, to what extent do the emigrants preserve the positions they held in the sender networks; and secondly, how permanent is their resettlement? Situations when someone only temporarily moves to a different country – for example, as a scientist who was granted a scholarship – do not qualify as migration. Instead, they can be categorized as instances of **mobility**.

Local migration – in its “purest” form – simply expands the geographical spreading of a population. In the course of this type of migration, certain groups move to formerly unoccupied territories (for example, the cultivation of Siberian lands, due to Pyotr Stolipin's reforms a few hundred years ago).

Forced migration means being compelled to leave one's country, which, in some cases, might involve the migrant breaking off all connections with their homeland. Forced migration is usually induced by violent actions (such as the abduction of Africans to be slaves in the USA).

Circular migration is a repeated movement around an imaginary circuit. Those involved in this type of migration preserve their rights and relationships in their homelands. After working for a certain period of time at a given place of the circuit, they periodically return to their homelands (for example, many Mexican immigrants working in the USA belong to this category).

Chain migration happens alongside the relatives-chain among individuals or households related to one another. The resettlement is preceded by thorough social preparations, as a result of which the relatives living in the recipient country offer help, information and encouragement to the newly arrived people (for example, the settlement of people from the Far East to the USA).

¹⁴ TILLY, Charles: Transplanted Networks, In Virginia YANS - MCLAUGHLIN (ed.): Immigration Reconsidered, Oxford University Press, New York– Oxford, 1990, pp. 79–95.

Last but not least, **career migration** is a characteristic of those individuals – and their spouses – who resettle in another country to make use of the opportunities within and among big structures – such as huge companies, states and professional labour markets –, in order to change their living conditions. (For example, a Hungarian IT expert finding employment in London, then in New York or in other metropolises of the world).

These five migration types obviously **overlap with each other**. The reason why it is so difficult to handle the current migration crisis lies within its **complexity**. In the case of the masses coming from Asia, it is hard to decide whether we can categorize their movement as forceful migration, chain migration or career migration, but some among them came only to form **terrorist cells in Hungary**.

John Salt believes that the concept of migration can be approached from the aspects of **distance** (migration from close or far distance, within or from outside the country), **time** (discussing the questions of short term and long term migration) and **motivation** (compulsion or voluntariness). In the latter case, migration is usually connected with some concept of a permanent or a long-term residence. In reality, the latter is not more than a subgroup of the general phenomena of “**displacement**”, which comprises several types and forms of the population’s movement, which – in the course of increasingly institutionalized procedures – can all acquire the exact same meaning. Defining migration poses a risk of arbitrariness, and the chance that the definition will only apply to a certain period of time.¹⁵

2. Theories explaining migration

We can encounter a wide range of theories explaining migration in the specialized literature on the topic. Due to the restrictions on the scope of this article, I cannot analyse them in detail, thus I will only present the ones I consider to be the most important.

The different views on migration basically focus on movements stemming from economic and social reasons, especially those related to the labour market.

¹⁵ SALT, John: Az európai migráció tréség, Regio 2011/1. 178-179.p.

Ágnes Hárs distinguishes two main tendencies within the theories explaining migration: the **balanced-traditional** and **historical-structural** interpretations.

The balanced-traditional model is basically the interaction between the **push and pull** forces. Ravenstein – the British statistician who came up with the theory – believes that there is no significant difference between domestic and international migration.¹⁶ In relation to the interaction between the push and pull factors, Ravenstein emphasizes the importance of an **economic motivation**. The domestic economic conditions “push” the migrants from their countries of origin to their destination, where the appeal of a more promising environment acts as a pull factor.

The so-called **neoclassical** model can also be categorized as an element of this set of ideas. This model states that migration is the result of an individual’s **voluntary** and **rational** calculations, with the aim of improving their economic situation. The process of migration arises from all of these individual decisions.¹⁷

The historical-structural approach – which surfaced as a new set of ideology criticizing the **balanced** (behaviourist) model in the 1970’s – rejected the neoclassical “push and pull” interpretations. The adherents of this ideology believe that – since we are living in a globalizing world, where transnational and international economic and political processes are occurring – the emphasis has shifted to the macro-processes and the wider historical-structural forces. According to this idea, the movement of people is stemming from the **interests related to capital** – the dynamics of capitalism –, which is becoming an international phenomenon that structurally defines migration. These – partially Marxist-oriented – theories consider migrants as a reserve force of labourers, who can be exploited to keep the wages low. In addition, by stressing the threatening fact that they can be easily replaced, the migrants can be kept in check.¹⁸ Basically, all companies that employ people with low education (such as shelf stackers and gas station attendants) are operating in accordance to this system.

¹⁶ For further details on the theory, see LÉVAI Imre: Nemzetközi migráció és világgazdasági ciklus: egy lehetséges kutatási irány, Társadalomkutatás 1993/4. pp. 46-47.

¹⁷ HÁRS Ágnes: A nemzetközi migráció néhány problémájáról. Szakirodalmi áttekintés, Szociológiai Szemle 1992/2. pp. 123-124.

¹⁸ HÁRS (1992), pp. 125-126.

Aside from thoroughly analysing the above theories, Szilveszter Póczik – the author of one of the most comprehensive assessments on the topic in Hungarian specialized literature – has emphasized the importance of the so-called **integration theories** as well.¹⁹

The **network theory** on migration – written by Massey and his co-authors – is quite impressive. According to their concept, one of the most stable bases of migration is the **interpersonal relations**, which are bonds between the former migrants, migrants and the non-migrants in the home and destination countries, formed through kinships, friendships and ties to the migrants' original communities. These relations render immigration more likely, since they are risk-reducing factors (for example, they decrease the costs and risks of displacement).

The network of relationships becomes a form of **social capital**,²⁰ to which people who are looking for employment abroad can rely on. If the number of migrants is at an optimal level, the expansion of this network reduces the costs and threats of the movement. This also makes migration more likely, which might trigger further movements, thus expanding the network even more, and so on. This migrating activity has been spreading with time²¹, and has been increasingly pervading the social strata of the sending community.²²

¹⁹ PÓCZIK Szilveszter: A nemzetközi migráció tendenciái a 20. és 21.században elméleti és történeti nézőpontból, In PÓCZIK Szilveszter – DUNAVÖLGYI Szilveszter (szerk.): Nemzetközi migráció – nemzetközi kockázatok, HVG-ORAC Lap-és Könyvkiadó Kft., Elektronikus másodkiadás, 2013, pp. 46-47.

²⁰ Irén Gödri accurately draws attention to the fact that the cultural proximity between the immigrant and the recipient populations – and also them using the same language – are significant ethnic and cultural capitals. See also GÖDRI Irén: Bevándorlás és etnicitás – összefüggések nyomában, In HÁRS Ágnes – TÓTH Judit (szerk.): Változó migráció – változó környezet, MTA Nemzeti-etnikai Kisebbségkutató Intézet, Budapest, 2010. p. 91.

²¹ MOLODIKOVA, Irina: A keletről nyugatra irányuló migráció jellegzetességei az európai migrációs rendszer összefüggésében: a migráció kontrolljának lehetőségei és korlátai, *Demográfia* 2009/2-3. pp. 115-116.

²² MASSEY, Douglas S. – ARANGO, Joaquin – HUGO, Graeme – KOUAOUCI, Ali – PELLEGRINO, Adele – TAYLOR, J. Edward: Theories of International Migration: A Review and Appraisal, *Population and Development Review*, Volume 19, Number 3, September, 1993, pp. 431–466.

Fundamentally, the assessments analysing the Mexican immigrant communities had the same scientific results. In fact, these researches were developed further into theories like the **cumulated causal theory** of migration. According to this idea, the transnational migration of the labour force can be traced back to several reasons complementing each other. The fact that there is a difference between the wages offered by the areas of origin and the destination areas can be considered as a huge incentive for migration. For this reason, the inhabitants of a region already plagued with unemployment are more likely to find employment abroad. The family members of migrant households are finding employment in different labour markets, including the ones in foreign countries. By doing so, they are attempting to minimize the risks of livelihood. Migration can also be incited by the foreign recruitment of employees, the lack of perspective in the regions of origin, or even by the people's disenchantment with their country's political system.²³

Since migration costs a lot both financially and psychologically to the first immigrants, sometimes it is doubtful who or what group of people finances the travelling costs of migrants who set out on a several thousand kilometres long journey, since they are obviously unable to pay for it themselves.

3. Security political risks of migration

3.1 Ethno-cultural security risk

In accordance with Szilveszter Póczik's opinion²⁴, the big masses of immigrants are comprised of people who own little **social capital** not only in their homelands, but in their potential destination countries as well. The migrants' different system of values and traditions – and the fact that they are not accustomed to a strict work schedule – render the problems even graver. Their various religious traditions, different views on education, ideas about violence and views on physical assault as a method of developing a hierarchy might also cause

²³ MASSEY, Douglas S. – GOLDRING, Luin – DURAND, Jorge: Continuities in Transnational Migration: An Analysis of Nineteen Mexican Communities, *American Journal of Sociology*, 1994, 99 (6, May). p.1497.

²⁴ PÓCZIK Szilveszter: Nemzetközi migráció – biztonságpolitikai, rendészeti aspektusok, In TARRÓSY István – GLIED Viktor – KESERŰ Dávid (szerk.): Új népvándorlás – Migráció a 21.században Afrika és Európa között, IDRResearch Kft/Publikon Kiadó, Pécs, 2011. p.37.

disputes. The migrants' views on women's rights and obligations are a permanent source of conflict²⁵, which is well illustrated by the recent violent sexual assaults against women in the destination countries. The migrants committed hundreds of crimes at New Year's Eve in 2015 in the city of Köln; however, the German police – probably due to political pressure – did not report on the events. After that, they started to come up with ideologies stressing that the crimes were not committed by illegal migrants, but criminals who have been living in the country for a long time. Those familiar with criminalistics are well aware of the fact that drug dealers always try to stay covered to escape the authorities' attention.

Creating a balance on migration is a seemingly easy task, as an SWOT analysis can be used to model the possible benefits offered by migration (population growth, labour force supplementation, populating a country in some special cases, variation within certain services) and disadvantages of migration (the appearance of some tropical diseases, increasing crime, decreasing sense of security, illegal labour, concurrence in the labour market for the poorer members of the society)²⁶. However, in a historical dimension, these cost-benefit analyses only show rather short term results, and they are unable to predict whether something that is beneficial or disadvantageous in the next few years will have a positive or a negative effect on society in the next two or three decades. The **social perception** processes are difficult to prognosticate, and they have the risk of **Janus-facedness**.²⁷

The extent of differences within the upbringing, social, cultural and religious customs, law system and lifestyles of the various groups of people can inherently

²⁵ In their recently published article, co-authors Abdessamad Belhaj and Bianka Spiedl drew attention to a very interesting occurrence: „On 10 September 2016, Ali Khamenei, the most influential religious authority of Iran has issued a fatwa in which he prohibited Irani women from cycling. He explained this by saying that a cycling woman draws male attention to herself, and therefore it is against public morality. He also added that cycling is dangerous to women, as it might break women's hymens.” For further information, see ABDESSAMAD Belhaj és SPEIDL Bianka: A nők a muszlim társadalomban, <http://www.migraciokutato.hu/hu/2016/09/29/a-nok-a-muszlim-tarsadalomban-publicisztika/> Accessed on: 2016 Oct 5

²⁶ SZABÓ A. Ferenc. A nemzetközi migráció és korunk biztonságpolitikai kihívásai, Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2006, p.11.

²⁷ PÓCZIK (2011) pp. 49-50.

cause problems. For this reason, theoretically, a Hungarian waiter has better chances than a Syrian one to integrate into the German culture.

3.2 Political stability as a security risk

First and foremost, it should be noted that migration can trigger serious **political conflicts**. With some time, the migrants – who can be considered fertile from a demographic aspect – might appear as political actors. In times of a close electoral struggle for power, the migrants can easily hold the balance of political power, or some parties – that are attempting to maximize the number of votes – might make concessions to migrants for gaining their political support, which is discriminative against the recipient community. Political views on migrants have been the subjects of heated political debates all around the world. For example, it was one of the most pressing topics during the presidential elections in the USA – which is considered to be the early homeland of democracy –, but it was an important subject matter when a new mayor was elected in Vienna, a city which lies a lot closer to Hungary. Ad absurdum, let's assume that 4-5 millions of migrants – coming from an Asian country with a population of hundreds of millions of people – would wish to settle in a smaller country. After being granted their citizenship, these people could form an immigrant party. If they won the elections, they could change the official language of the country. This is just an unreal hypothesis, but reality can sometimes defy all of our expectations.

We also should not ignore the possibility of a country trying to intervene into another state's domestic affairs through its emigrants. Who knows when and which Islamic state will take measures because of the insufficient treatment of its former citizens' issues? People with extremist religious views²⁸ gaining political power would have some unforeseeable security risks. What guarantees that the immigrants will not pursue subversive activity in the recipient countries to follow the orders from their homelands?

Some migrants are not willing to assimilate, and they are living according to their own "rules". In certain countries, such behaviour might result in the duplication of the legal system.

²⁸ See also: DÁVID Ferenc: Az új évezred nemzetbiztonsági feladatellátásának súlypontjai, Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle 2015.1. pp. 213-216.

However, one should also be warned about the dangers of intensifying contrary processes, like **political extremism** (such as xenophobia).²⁹

3.3 Public security risks

Scientific research has been focusing more and more on the public security risks of migration.³⁰ Public security risks in the sending countries are stemming from standard behaviour, and in the recipient countries, from general irregular activity, and also from irregular activity related to unequal social situations. Due to these factors, irregular activity can be considered partially as a **cultural conflict** and also a **form of behaviour to make up for the lacking opportunities**. Szilveszter Póczik drives attention to the dangers of the so-called **culture-specific crimes**³¹. Just think of the “mafia export” of the Italian immigrants in the USA, or the Albanian mafia in Europe as a special Balkans “export” (which includes prostitution, human trafficking of young girls³², drug-related crimes, etc.)

Judicial sentences against criminals mingled with the migrants do not neutralize the problem of criminality, as it ripples onto the field of law enforcement. The law enforcement authorities have to employ special interpreters, and also a greater amount of special food in order to respect the religious norms of the defendants. In the end, the law-abiding citizens of the recipient countries have to pay for the **excess costs** of these measures. Naturally, the ethnic characteristics of the

²⁹ PÓCZIK Szilveszter: Nemzetközi migráció, kisebbségek, társadalmi kockázatok és megoldások, *Polgári Szemle* 2006/12. pp. 18-30.

³⁰ Right now, I'm not going to provide details on the risks of the infiltration of terrorist cells who exploit migration. For further information on the topic, see GÁL István László – DÁVID Ferenc: A terrorizmus büntetőjogi oldala: a terrorcselekmény és terrorizmus finanszírozása, *Belügyi Szemle* 2015/7-8. pp. 75-80.; HAUTZINGER Zoltán: A terrorizmus elleni küzdelem idegenjogi eszközei, In: GAÁL Gyula – HAUTZINGER Zoltán (szerk.): Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XVI. – „Modernkori veszélyek rendészeti aspektusai”, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoportja – Magyar Rendészettudományi Társaság, Pécs, 2015, pp. 203-212.

³¹ PÓCZIK (2011) pp. 38-40.

³² For further information on the topic of human trafficking, see FEHÉR Lenke: Az emberkereskedelem komplex problémája, *Állam-és Jogtudomány* 2012/4. pp. 397-420.

injured party are perceivable as well (for example, their interethnic/intra-ethnic actions).

It would be hard to deny that the ethnic peculiarities of crimes³³ will sooner or later capture the attention of the law enforcement, too. Owing to the increasing number of identity checks, criminals will be arrested more often, which – in a given case – can serve to strengthen **stereotypical dogmas** and might become a breeding ground for a xenophobic political climate.³⁴

We also should not exclude the possibility that a migrant – who is otherwise engaged in criminal activities – might resort to tricks like “losing” their papers to clear themselves from their criminal past³⁵ and to create³⁶ a new identity³⁷ when settling in a new home.

3.4 National security risks

Experts usually mention among the national security risks of migration the **weakening of a country’s defensive capabilities**. Even though the migrants have a share in the welfare services of a country – including its military defence –, but they

³³ See also KOBOLKA István: Schengen határai biztonságpolitikai – kiemelten migrációs – szempontból nézve, *Tér és Társadalom* 2000/2-3, p.270.

³⁴ The law enforcement forces had similar experiences when checking the papers of Romani people. For more information on the topic, see PAP András László – KÁDÁR András Kristóf – M.TÓTH Balázs: *Diszkrimináció az igazoltatási gyakorlatban: Egy empirikus kutatás eredményei, Rendészeti Szemle* 2009/9. pp. 50-67.; PAP András László – SIMONOVITS Bori: *Ahogy a lakosság és ahogy a rendőr látja – Az igazoltatási gyakorlat tapasztalatai, Fundamentum* 2006/2. pp. 125-135.

³⁵ LAUFER Balázs: *Az illegális migráció és a menekültügy biztonsági vetületei*, In: GAÁL Gyula – HAUTZINGER Zoltán (szerk.): *Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XI. – Tanulmányok „Quo vadis rendvédelem? Szabadságjogok, társadalmi kötelezettségek és biztonság” című tudományos konferenciáról*, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoportja, Pécs, 2010. p. 198.

³⁶ For further information on the topic, see KÓHALMI László: *A migráció és a kriminalitás néhány összefüggése*, *JURA* 2016/1. pp. 94-96.

³⁷ KLENNER Zoltán: *Menedékjog és biztonsági kockázat*. In: GAÁL Gyula – HAUTZINGER Zoltán (szerk.): *Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XV – Tanulmányok a „Biztonsági kockázatok – rendészeti válaszok” című tudományos konferenciáról*, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoportja – Magyar Rendészettudományi Társaság, Pécs, 2014, p. 285. The author draws attention to the „losing” of official documents, which is a very common occurrence among migrants.

do not increase the level of security in their recipient countries, as their employment in a defensive situation would pose such a great risk that would be irrational to take.

Some migrants take up active roles within separatist/fundamentalist groups and sects that are attempting to disturb the order in the given recipient country. According to Hoffmann-Plesch, the bloody events in France have repeatedly proved that there is a connection between the **Islamist-Salafi terrorism** and the appearance of Islam in Europe by means of migration.³⁸ Those second and third generation Muslim immigrants who did not manage to integrate into the secular, capitalist and pluralist society – but on the other hand, they do not have ties to their homeland anymore – deem their deviant behaviour normal, and believe that their cruelty is their sacred duty. Owing to this fact, the conflict between the jihadist-Salafi³⁹ subculture and the so-called central European (for example, German or English) culture can appear as – so to speak – predestined.⁴⁰

Gaining influence over migrant groups can offer favourable opportunities to the adversary national security services.⁴¹ If Hungary participates in military missions against countries from where a high number of migrants have arrived in Europe, than extremist actions – or the organization of those – are expected to take place.⁴²

³⁸ RITECZ György: A migráció trendjei – és ami mögötte van, REGIO 2016.2. p. 125. The author's opinion on the subject is somewhat more nuanced, as he believes that „the bloodshed in France should not really drive attention to the migration, but should rather focus on the problems with integration.”

³⁹ For further information on the Jihad, see KIS-BENEDEK József: A válságkezelés új kihívásai, Katonai Jogi és Hadijogi Szemle 2015/1. pp. 100-105.

⁴⁰ HOFFMANN-PLESCH, von Roland Christian: Deutsche IS-Dschihadisten Kriminalätiologische und kriminalpräventive Analyse des Radikalisierungsprozesses, Kriminalistik 2/2015. p. 74.; It is important to note that according to Péter Tóth – one of the most prominent Hungarian experts on the subject –, terror threat has not increased in Hungary; the situation only seems less favourable in retrospect. See TÓTH Péter: A terrorveszélyhelyzet-diskurzus margójára, Nemzet és Biztonság 2016/1. pp. 43-45.

⁴¹ LAUFER Balázs: A migráció rendvédelmi és nemzetbiztonsági kihívásai. Nemzeti Közszerkeleti Egyetem Hadtudományi Doktori Iskola, Doktori (PhD) értekezés. (témavezető: Dr.Gubicza József t. alezredek). Budapest, 2013. pp. 69-70.

⁴² RESPERGER István: Biztonsági kihívások, kockázatok, fenyegetések és ezek hatása Magyarországra 2030-ig, Felderítő Szemle 2013.december. p. 32.

The migration crisis that Europe has to face nowadays would undeniably require the political decision-makers to significantly increase the financial and human resources for national security. The appearance of such a huge number of migrants currently renders impossible for the different national security services to filter out the terrorists from among the migrants; and there is only a minimal amount of **feedback** in this respect.⁴³ We can only hope that the different terrorist groups have not spread/are not currently spreading their cells in the country.

3.5 Economic security risks

The fact that the access to financial resources of the recipient country (such as the capital and the wages) shows a quite different picture on the side of the natives' and the immigrants' system of relationships should also be mentioned among the **economic security risks** of migration.⁴⁴ The migrants often have to face a situation when they are over- or underqualified for a job, and – in comparison with the native employees of the recipient country – they are offered much lower wages.⁴⁵ Naturally, all of these factors contribute to the spreading of illegal employment, which might cause **budget deficits**. Huge numbers of unqualified workers have a detrimental effect on the regional/international competitiveness of the given region.⁴⁶

A significant part of the income produced by migrants on the black market does not become a part of the recipient country's economic "blood-circulation", and it increases the wealth of other states.

3.6 Threats to the social and educational benefits

The appearance of immigrant masses in the social welfare system of the recipient countries is often included among the **social** dangers of migration. For example, we can mention the **exponentially increasing** requests by migrants to be

⁴³ CSATLÓS Fruzsina: A menekültkérdés kezelésének nemzetbiztonsági aspektusai válságövezetekben és itthon, Szakmai Szemle 2014.2. p. 165.

⁴⁴ PÓCZIK (2011) pp. 40-41.

⁴⁵ In relation to the migrants' role on the labour market, see BRÜCKER, Herbert: Arbeitsmarktwirkungen der Migration, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 44/2009. pp. 6-12.

⁴⁶ PÓCZIK (2011) p.55.

granted social welfare benefits and the health services without social insurance⁴⁷, which can easily impede the normal functioning of the entire social and health care system, from an economic and a human resource aspect as well. Some of the migrants require a higher level of health care, even if financing such services is unrealistic for them. All of these factors increase tension among both the immigrant and native communities of the recipient country.

It is important to mention the irregularities within the access to the **educational system** as well. The appearance in the educational/university educational system of those migrants who do not have any prospect hinders the chances of social mobility, and this – on the long run – might cause frustration among the migrants. We also should not ignore the fact that the system of cultural traditions⁴⁸ in the recipient countries might also suffer some serious damage, which might dissipate an otherwise functioning community. The compulsory education in the recipient countries might be a buffer zone: the native community either has to provide education to the immigrant children in their native languages, or try to integrate them into the functioning educational system. Conflicts are expected to arise during the integration process, no matter which solution the recipient country chooses.

3.7 Health-related security risks

A huge number of migrants are arriving from territories where public health is inadequate, and this might potentially pose an **epidemic threat**.⁴⁹ Currently, the

⁴⁷ For further information on the topic, see RITECZ György: A migráció kockázatai. In: GAÁL Gyula – HAUTZINGER Zoltán (szerk.): Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XIV – Tanulmányok „A változó rendészet aktuális kihívásai” című tudományos konferenciáról, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoportja – Magyar Rendészettudományi Társaság, Pécs, 2013. p. 257.

⁴⁸ At this point, I would like to refer to some trivial matters, such as the transformation of the recipient country’s culinary culture. While in certain Western European countries, sausages and hamburgers used to be the most common street foods, nowadays gyros is sold almost everywhere. Not so long ago, we talked about the “McDonaldization” in certain Western sociology and political science journals, but these days we can freely use the term “gyrosization”.

⁴⁹ SZILÁRD István – BARÁTH Árpád: Migráció és egészségügyi biztonság: új foglalkozás-egészségügyi kihívások, In GAAL Gyula – HAUTZINGER Zoltán (szerk.): Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XII – Tanulmányok a

migrants surpassing Hungary – and also those who are intending to permanently stay here – do not undergo any extensive screening tests. Moreover, the illegal immigrants represent a blank spot within the Hungarian health services. I agree with those who believe that people who regularly come into contact with the migrants by profession (such as immigration experts, policemen, security guards etc.) should immediately receive vaccination. It is perceivable that the rare diseases – and the ones that practically disappeared due to the population’s vaccination – can easily cross the borders today. The Zika virus – which appeared “just yesterday” in Brazil – might make it necessary “today” for Hungarian pregnant women as well to get vaccination against it.

3.8 Environmental security risks

Basically, every country is attempting to satisfy the everyday needs of its population by using its available natural resources. The natural resources are not unlimited, and if suddenly a much higher number of people would want to gain access to these goods, a serious conflict would break out. The demographic boom only increases humanity’s lack of food and energy.⁵⁰ Sooner or later, **world hegemony** will be determined by those who own the **water resources** of the Earth. Even though Hungary has significant water resources, they are quite vulnerable, too, as more than 90% of the water in Hungarian rivers is coming from foreign lands. The water reservoirs in the mountainous water basins – that considerably change the flowing of water⁵¹ – only render the situation even more difficult. Humanity has to face one of its most complicated problems due to eco-migration.⁵²

„Rendészeti kutatások – a rendvédelem fejlesztése” című konferenciáról, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoportja, Pécs, 2011. pp. 269-270. „Even today, migration trends pose a serious health risk: It is well observable in the annual issues of the WHO that there are many times more occurrences of the spreading (prevalence and incidence) of the so-called ‘indicator diseases’ – such as HIV or TBC – in geographic regions considered as sender countries or countries of origin (Africa, the Middle East and Southeast Asia) – from a migration aspect – than in the destination countries (in the EU and the United States).

⁵⁰ RESPERGER (2013) pp.16-17.

⁵¹ LIGETVÁRI Krisztina: Magyarország vízbiztonsági problémái a világ-és Európai Unió tendenciák tükrében, Hadtudomány 2013/1. p. 8. (Electronic issue)

⁵² SZALKAI-SZÉLL Attila: Az édesvízhiány hatása a világbiztonságra, különös tekintettel a Közel-Keletre. Doktori (PhD) értekezés. Nemzeti Közszolgálati

We also should not ignore the fact that in certain regions, mass migration could even cause **food shortage**.⁵³

4. Some remarks and suggestions

Currently, migration occurs mainly for economic reasons, but what will happen when it is triggered by climate change, which is a result of humanity's activities destroying nature? Migration generated by **climate change**⁵⁴ might set off such processes⁵⁵ that might easily become unmanageable,⁵⁶ and sooner or later will lead to a series of permanent **armed conflicts**.

Ferenc Cseresnyés – one of the most prominent figures in Hungarian migration-related research – was correct when he said that with time, economic migrants will be far outnumbered by political migrants, but even they will be

Egyetem Hadtudományi Doktori Iskola (témavezető: Dr.Szabó A. Ferenc egyetemi tanár), Budapest, 2012. pp. 27-34.

⁵³ For further information on the topic, see KAISER Ferenc: A túlnépesedés és globális biztonsági kihívásai, II. Nemzet és Biztonság 2011/9. pp. 18-19.

⁵⁴ PÓLYI Csaba: Kitekintés és reflexiók a nemzetközi migrációról, In TARRÓSY István – GLIED Viktor – KESERŰ Dávid (szerk.): Új népvándorlás – Migráció a 21.században Afrika és Európa között, IDResearch Kft/Publikon Kiadó. Pécs, 2011. p. 29.

⁵⁵ See also SALLAI János: A globalizáció egyik legnagyobb kihívása: a felmelegedés, In GAÁL Gyula – HAUTZINGER Zoltán (szerk.): Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XIII. – Tanulmányok „A biztonság rendészettudományi dimenziói – változások és hatások” című tudományos konferenciáról, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoportja, Pécs, 2012. pp. 207-211.

⁵⁶ SZALKAI Attila: A kényszmigráció biztonságpolitikai kockázata a 21. század elején, Nemzet és biztonság 2010. március. p. 65.: “The sudden increase in the population of the Sahel region’s countries and the spread of certain epidemics (such as AIDS) gave rise to a number of economic push factors as well (deforestation, incorrect agricultural policies), which tipped over the fragile economic balance in the region.” For further information on the topic, see PALIK Zsuzsanna: A víz biztonságpolitikai szerepe Magyarországon, In GAÁL Gyula – HAUTZINGER Zoltán (szerk.): Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XV – Tanulmányok a „Biztonsági kockázatok – rendészeti válaszok” című tudományos konferenciáról, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoportja – Magyar Rendészettudományi Társaság, Pécs, 2014. pp. 83-84.

overpowered by a third group, the victims of natural disasters.⁵⁷ These are certainly prophetic thoughts.

The current wave of migration might be an eye-opener to those theoreticians who are polemicizing about the idealistic process of the establishment of multicultural societies, and who believe that only the recipient countries are responsible for the integration-related and other problems of immigrants. However, in my opinion, the tension between the different ethnicities is much deeper and more complex.

Egedy was right when he said that the **myth of otherness**⁵⁸ serves the **full relativity of values**, and not the plurality of them. For the sake of preserving their own integrity⁵⁹, the recipient societies as political communities – in some cases – rightfully restrict diversity and expect **assimilation**, or else – in times of crisis – the ethnic groups might turn against each other. The citizens of the recipient countries are not always responsible for the migrants' difficulties with acculturation.⁶⁰

By the end of the 20th century, several state mechanisms – that authorized themselves to act as **therapists** – consider it their task to “re-educate” its citizens and make them more “sensitive” towards multiculturalism. Such a retrograde, dogmatic approach puts often in question the traditional **European system of values**, which used to serve as a firm and solid base to reject extremist moral and cultural relativism.⁶¹

⁵⁷ CSERESNYÉS Ferenc: Migrációs potenciálok és trendek Európában, Régió 1996/4, pp. 25-30.

⁵⁸ We have reached a point where – in certain places – Christmas celebrations cannot be held in the schools; they have to call it „pine tree holiday” instead. For further information, see EGEDY Gergely: A multikulturalizmus dilemmái: nagy-Britannia példája. Polgári Szemle 2006/6, http://www.polgariszemle.hu/?view=v_article&ID=111&paging=1 Accessed on 5 October 2016

⁵⁹ One can read about quite unusual things that are currently happening in Germany using the slogan of tolerance. In some places, German girls should not wear skirts, because it disturbs some of the migrants. It is also questionable why women are prohibited from getting a driver's licence in certain migrants' countries of origin?

⁶⁰ For further information on the topic, see SIPOS Szandra: A migráció főbb pszichológiai megállapításai, Nemzetbiztonsági Szemle 2016.1. pp. 29-30.

⁶¹ EGEDY Gergely: A multikulturalizmus kihívása: értjük-e Európát? Kommentár 2016/2. p.73.

The **uniqueness of cultures** can be easily acknowledged, but achieving the equality of cultures is not only impossible, but undesirable as well.⁶²

Susan Moller Okin believes⁶³ that multiculturalism is incompatible with – among others – the protection of women’s dignity, since the **undiscriminating acceptance of cultures** sanctions several practices – from the mutilation of female genitalia to the forced marriages – that cannot be reconciled with the principles of the Christian and Jewish culture.

Despite the unsubstantiated allegations of some other cultures, the Western civilization has reached unique, exceptional intellectual achievements. The aim of these attacks is to shake **Europe’s self-confidence**, and turn the continent against itself.⁶⁴

Multiculturalism **romanticizes** “otherness”, but Europe cannot be institutionalize those humiliating daily practices of some other cultures that seriously violate human dignity.⁶⁵

A study on the topic – that was published a quarter of a century ago⁶⁶ – raises the question whether international migration will provide a chance for the world or pose a global threat? It seems that after all this time, we are still hardly any closer to answering this question.

Nowadays, the more developed part of the world – in an economic sense – is facing **demographic problems**⁶⁷; the Euro-Atlantic civilization is aging. From an economic standpoint, bringing cheap, uneducated labourers to the country – which is in the interests of multinational companies, and offers a possible, alternative solution

⁶² EGEDY (2016) p.85.

⁶³ For further information on the topic, see OKIN, Susan Moller: Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women? In Joshua COHEN – Matthew HOWARD – Marta C. NUSSBAUM (Ed.): Is Multiculturalism Bad for Women?, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1999, pp. 7–24.

⁶⁴ EGEDY (2016) p.85.

⁶⁵ EGEDY (2016) p.75.

⁶⁶ FÓTI Klára: Nemzetközi migráció: esély vagy globális veszélyforrás? Szociológiai Szemle 1992/2. p. 59.

⁶⁷ LÓWINÉ Kemenyeczkai Ildikó: A migráció, mint biztonságpolitikai kockázat várható alakulása és hatása a biztonság dimenzióira 2030-ig, Hadtudományi Szemle 2015.1. pp. 197-198.

to the demographic problems as well – seemed like a good idea. However, the competent persons have forgotten about the tsunami of problems that this step can bring about. In my opinion, measures to **urge starting a family and having more children** would be a lot more efficient and less problematic.

It is also clear that the EU simply cannot handle⁶⁸ the problem of migration⁶⁹; there are serious problems with its realistic self-defence abilities. All of this is dangerous, because it insinuates the idea to the masses that democracy is an outdated political formation, and only a dictatorship can effectively, quickly and fruitfully react to the threats.

The quick decision-making mechanisms may easily shade a nostalgic light on dictatorships. In reality, using the uncontrolled policy of a “firm hand” is an authorization to establish a dictatorship. It is the intellectuals’ task⁷⁰ to draw public attention to this issue, even if the media attention surrounding it is limited.

If the Western type democracies were to help the sender countries with **investments** and **technological help** – in order to compensate for their economic instability, which is partially stemming from demographic overpopulation – it would be one of the most efficient ways of handling the migration crisis.⁷¹ Europe may

⁶⁸ Angela Merkel’s political concept – which relies on the hope that Turkey, a country not part of the EU, will protect the borders of the EU – is a mistake, and a dream that is doomed to fail.

⁶⁹ For further information on the topic, see TÖTTÖS Ágnes: A közrendre, közbiztonságra veszélyesség uniós szabályozása a legális migráció területén, In Gaál Gyula – Hautzinger Zoltán (szerk.): Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XIII. – Tanulmányok „A biztonság rendészettudományi dimenziói – változások és hatások” című tudományos konferenciáról, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság Határőr Szakosztály Pécsi Szakcsoportja, Pécs, 2012. pp. 285-297.; ERDEI Nikolett – TUKA Ágnes: Az Európai Unió migrációs politikája napjainkban, In TARRÓSY István – GLIED Viktor – KESERŰ Dávid (szerk.): Új népvándorlás: Migráció a 21. században Afrika és Európa között, Publikon Kiadó, Pécs, 2011. pp. 247-254.

⁷⁰ In relation to the legal experts’ responsibilities to ensure that the state is functioning under the rule of law, see FINSZTER Géza – KORINEK László: Maradhat-e az alkotmányos jogállam Magyarországon, Jogtudományi Közöny 2015/12. pp.576-579.

⁷¹ADAM, Rudolf: Demographie und Sicherheit - Acht Thesen zur künftigen Beziehung von Bevölkerungsentwicklung und Sicherheitspolitik, Internationale Politik 2006 Heft 12. pp. 24-32.

seem like a five star hotel to the migrants⁷², but unfortunately, that is not the case at all.

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⁷² KIYAK, Mely: Europa: Die Villa mit fünf Sternen, Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 35-36/2008. p. 3.

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THE EURO-ATLANTIC INTEGRATION OF THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

Abstract

The early parliamentary elections held on 11 December 2016 were supposed to resolve the deep political and institutional crisis in the Republic of Macedonia.¹ After the successful elections, the government of Zoran Zaev took the office in May 2017, with a strong assistance of the European Union and the United States. The new government is expected to solve not only the domestic issues, but also to redirect the country on the European track.

Although the European Council granted the country candidate status in 2005, Macedonia was unable to start the accession negotiations with the European Union. In addition, Greece vetoed Macedonia's entrance into NATO because of their name dispute, which is still an unresolved issue between the two countries. Despite all the difficulties, Macedonia is still committed to the Euro-Atlantic integration.

The aim of our article was firstly to present the background and the causes of the above mentioned political crisis, and secondly to analyse the possible effects of the elections on the EU integration process. We strongly argue that the Euro-Atlantic perspective of the Republic of Macedonia would ensure the long-term stability for the country.

Keywords: Macedonia, political crisis, EU, NATO, Euro-Atlantic integration;

1. The external and internal causes of the political crisis in Macedonia

Comparing to other former Yugoslav countries, the independence of Macedonia generated different types of debates in the Southeast European (SEE) region. This territory belonged to Serbia during the Second Balkans War, thus it automatically became a part of the Kingdom of Serbs Croats and Slovenes

¹ As the term Macedonian has also national and geographical connotation, we felt important to clarify that in our paper we define the national identification of the people of the Republic of Macedonia. In our paper we are using the official name of the country: Republic of Macedonia, or Macedonia to name the country.

(Kingdom of Yugoslavia from 1929). After the Second World War, Macedonia² became one of the republics from the newly formed Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (SFRJ).³ The crisis of the Yugoslav system also affected Macedonia in the 1970s and 1980s.

Finally, Macedonia - just like the other former republics - decided to leave SFRJ after holding a referendum in 1991. The turnout at the referendum was 76%, and 95% from them voted to leave SFRJ and organise an independent and sovereign Macedonia.⁴

The ethnic Albanian community of Macedonia boycotted the referendum. This phenomenon was quite popular that time in the newly forming multi-ethnic states all over the Balkans (for example ethnic Serbs in Bosnia and Herzegovina).

Immediately after the independence, a serious conflict appeared as Greece did not recognise the constitutional name ('Republic of Macedonia') as the official name of the country. No solution has been found ever since. It is for that reason that Macedonia's name in the international organizations is FYROM (Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia).

The reason behind Greece's action is not to question the territorial integrity of the country, but to question its name itself.⁵ On the other hand, many author claim that the dispute between Greece and Macedonia is a very serious dispute on identity questions.⁶

The Progress Reports, published by the European Commission, are proving that Western Balkan countries⁷ have still difficulties to fulfil these obligations in the European integration process.

It is clear now that in the moment of its independence Macedonia had to deal with many external problems, which put the country under a serious pressure. Still,

² People's Republic of Macedonia.

³ PÓKA, 2017, pp. 21-22

⁴ History of Macedonia

<http://www.historyofmacedonia.org/ConciseMacedonia/ShortHistory.html>

(Accessed 22 09 2017)

⁵ Interim Accord between the Hellenic Republic and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, 1995.

⁶ HAJDÚ, 2010, p. 63

⁷ Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo, Macedonia, and Albania.

this unfavourable international situation was not the only problem of the young country. Macedonia was one of the poorest and weakest former Yugoslav republics. In addition, Macedonia - just like the other countries in the region - had to deal with the difficult issues of the transition process (rule of law, high level of corruption, lack of free media, free and equal elections, and accountability).

On the other hand, in the past few years special attention has been paid to the domestic political issues in Macedonia. The reason for this special attention is obvious: the country is being stuck in the Euro-Atlantic integration process, while a very serious and complex political crisis has emerged. The complexity of the Macedonian crisis lies not only in the difficulties of the transition process, but also in the question of the Macedonian identity.

Besides the above-mentioned disputes with its neighbours, it is also important to talk about the ethnic divisions of Macedonia. One third of the population is ethnically Albanian and their goal is to become constituent nations in Macedonia, while Macedonians aims to keep the country as a nation state.

The political background

In the case of Macedonia, it is obvious that we need to talk about crises instead of one single long-lasting crisis. In order to understand the (triggering) causes better, we have to distinguish the components of the crises. Therefore, we need to talk about the *external* and *internal* causes, which culminated in a big political and institutional crisis.

The *external* causes are the followings: 1) name dispute with Greece, 2) dispute over the religion with Serbia, 3) dispute over the Macedonian language (and independent national existence) with Bulgaria, 4) dispute with Albanians (Albania and Kosovo) about the unilateral or federal arrangement of Macedonia, 5) and finally the stuck in the Euro-Atlantic integration process (enduring EU accession process, and veto of the NATO membership).

The internal causes are the followings: 1) difficulties of the political and economic transition process (corruption, unemployment, question of the rule of law, disputes between the political parties), 2) the question of identity and ethnical tensions (primary between Macedonians and Albanians⁸).

⁸ Throughout the study, we use the word 'Albanians' to talk about the minority group within Macedonia.

Nevertheless, the EU's interests are very obvious in the Western Balkans. Immediately after the end of the Bosnian War (1995), the EU aimed to promote and support regional initiatives, as regional cooperation is one of the best (*soft* politic instrument) ways of reconciliation and after the Kosovo Crisis (1998-1999), the EU decided to offer the perspective of membership to the countries in the region.

The 2001 insurgency in Macedonia almost caused a civil war between Macedonians and Albanians. The armed conflict was stopped with the assistance and successful intervention of the international community, namely with the help and mediation of the NATO, EU and the USA. The armed conflict resulted in a peace agreement, which aimed to reorganize the interethnic relations. The Ohrid Framework Agreement (OFA) was signed in Skopje on 13 August, 2001. As a matter of agreement, the OFA secured a wide range of rights to the ethnic Albanians in Macedonia, and tried to establish a model of consensual democracy.⁹

With the OFA, the Albanians implicitly became constituent nations of Macedonia.¹⁰ In the light of long-term experiences of the OFA, we can conclude that the consensual model was not as successful as it was expected.¹¹ The OFA intended to be a model but in reality the agreement failed to solve the prevailing interethnic problems.¹²

After the unsuccessful NATO Summit in Bucharest in 2008, Macedonian political leaders should have developed a new political concept, in order to put the country back to the Euro-Atlantic track. The problem was that they did not possess such a concept. Therefore, the veto on the NATO membership and the enduring EU integration process revived tensions. The economic crisis has hit hard the country, and social problems were supplemented with the wave of foreign policy failures. Prime Minister Nikola Gruevski and the governing The Internal Macedonian Revolutionary Organization – Democratic Party for Macedonian National Unity (VMRO-DPMNE) were not able to overcome the problems after the early elections held in 2014. Indeed, it was that time, when the domestic political crisis erupted. After the victory of VMRO-DPMNE, the leader of the Social Democratic Union of

⁹ STOJKOVSKI, 2010, p. 89

¹⁰ SULEJMANI, 2011, pp. 61-67

¹¹ BRUNNBAUER, 2002, p. 16

¹² REKA, 2011, p. 12

Macedonia (SDSM) opposition, Zoran Zaev did not recognise the election victory of Gruevski. Anti-government protests started at the same time, too. Those scandals came to light from the political elite's side were able to undermine the trust of the democratic political institutions.¹³ The Kumanovo incident¹⁴, which happened at that time, risked the escalation of the interethnic tensions again.

2. The EU accession process of Macedonia

The Kosovo Crisis indicated that the previous efforts of the EU were not sufficient, and demanded a new approach to the Balkans. In June 1999, the Stability Pact for Southeast Europe was launched, with the aim to provide a long-term solution to the security challenges in Southeast Europe.¹⁵

That is why the Stability Pact was an important milestone on the road to the Stabilisation and Association Process, because it has placed the relation between the EU and Western Balkans within a new framework. The goal of the European Union with the Stability Pact was to create an own cooperation framework with the states of the Western Balkans.

In 1999, the European Commission announced the Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) for the region. The SAP is until today the main instrument of the European Union to accomplish the Thessaloniki Agenda. Therefore, the SAP aims to enhance security and development of the region and to advocate the establishment of regional cooperation. The SAP allows the countries within the region to achieve a strategic role of the EU relations, and it aims to create the conditions for the EU membership.

The goal of the SAP is not only to stabilise the region, but also to ensure the perspective of a possible EU-accession in the future. The SAP gives space to the common political and economic goals. The EU implemented a strengthened approach, with the aim to facilitate the process of stabilisation, and after that also the accession.¹⁶

¹³The higher education reform, planned by the Gruevski Government triggered protests in Skopje, which later spread over in the country. At the same time, tensions have been increasing between VMRO and SDSM.

¹⁴TALESKI, 2016

¹⁵DELEVIĆ, 2007, pp.: 17-19

¹⁶EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016b): Stabilisation and Association Process http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.htm (Accessed 20 September 2017)

The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) intends to promote the relation between the countries.¹⁷ The SAA is a framework in which the communication between EU and the WB6 countries takes place. This process helps to meet the criteria defined in the SAP.¹⁸

The SAP allows the possibility to systematically develop and define the necessary conditions and preconditions concerning accession. These conditions and preconditions are focusing on 4 areas: contractual relationships, trade relations, financial assistance, and finally regional cooperation and good neighbourly relations.¹⁹

In details:

- 1) The current economic and financial support systems should be further developed, which of course does not exclude the possibility of new economic and trade relations.
- 2) The quality of democracy should be improved and the civil society organizations should be supported.
- 3) The cooperation between the areas of justice and home affairs should be promoted, because of the security aspects.
- 4) The development of political dialogue should be strengthened, facilitating the communication between the countries.²⁰

¹⁷ KEMENSZKY (2008): A nyugat-balkáni uniós stratégia fejlődési irányai: stabilizáció és / vagy csatlakozás? p.: 4
<http://www.grotius.hu/doc/pub/TFWKXA/77%20kemenszky%20agnes.pdf>
(Accessed 20 September 2017)

¹⁸ EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016): Stabilisation and Association Agreement http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/saa_en.htm (Accessed 29 September 2017)

¹⁹ Stabilisation and Association Process – SAP (2014) <http://www.eu.me/en/2014-11-19-11-15-23/item/283-stabilisation-and-association-process-sap,2014> (Accessed 20 September 2017)

²⁰ EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016b): Stabilisation and Association Process. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/sap_en.htm (Accessed 20 September 2017)

It is also important, that besides setting the goals of the SAP, the European Union ought to make some promises as well. These are outlined in three different points: economic, trade, and full EU membership. These promises are integrated into the SAA framework established by the EU.²¹

In conclusion, it can be stated that the most important elements of the SAP are fundamentally determining the relations between the WB6 countries and the European Union. These contractual relationships are created bilaterally, and are in harmony with the SAA.²²

The candidate countries have received a considerable amount of funds from the EU. The EU funding and support are provided within the frameworks of the Instrument for Pre-Accession Assistance (IPA). The IPA consists of five important components:

1. Transition Assistance and Institution Building;
2. Cross-Border Cooperation;
3. Regional Development;
4. Human Resources Development;
5. Rural Development.²³

For the period 2014-2020 IPA II, will have a budget € 11.7 billion. The beneficiary countries are the six Western Balkan states.²⁴

²¹ DELEVIĆ, 2007, pp.: 25

²² DELEVIĆ, 2007, pp.: 25-29

²³ EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016c): European Commission – Enlargement. IPA. http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/policy/glossary/terms/ipa_en.htm (Accessed 20 September 2017)

²⁴ EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016a): Overview - Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/instruments/overview/index_en.htm (Accessed 20 September 2017)

1. The EU candidate status and the SAA entry into force in the Western Balkan countries

Country	EU Candidate Status	SAA in force
Albania	Candidate	2009
Bosnia and Herzegovina	Potential Candidate	2015
FYR Macedonia	Candidate	2004
Montenegro	Candidate Negotiation Process started	2010
Kosovo	Potential Candidate	2016
Serbia	Candidate Negotiation Process started	2013

Stuck in the integration process

Just like in the case of the other WB6 countries, the main goal of the Macedonian foreign policy is the Euro-Atlantic integration. Macedonia in fact, at the beginning of this process was more successful than the other countries from the region. The Stabilisation and Association Agreement (SAA) entered into force on 1 April, 2004. After that, the European Commission confirmed the candidate status for Macedonia in December 2005.²⁵ Even gaining the candidate status, Macedonia could not start the accession negotiations with the European Union, because of the lack of consensus among the EU institutions, and due to the veto of Bulgaria and Greece.

²⁵ LŐRINCZNÉ, 2013, p. 66

All of this has had a negative impact on the domestic politics of Macedonia. In addition, Greece vetoed Macedonia's invitation to the NATO at the Bucharest Summit. These two fiascos caused divisions among the parties.²⁶ This uncertainty slowly contributed to the destabilisation of the country.²⁷

3. The role of the EU in the crisis management

The international community has always played a defining role in the Balkans. It contributed to putting an end to the wars of the 1990s as well as to promoting peace and security, along with the perspective of helping Balkan countries become parts of the Euro-Atlantic integration. Although the EU and the USA demonstrated a significant engagement towards the area, their approach slightly differs. Despite the EU's efforts to maintain stability in the Western Balkans and to prepare the countries for accession, in many cases it was not able to successfully facilitate its goals on its own. On the other hand, the changing political climate in Washington has not altered the fact that the USA, if called for an active involvement, is still able to solve issues in the region. Thus, the crisis management in Macedonia over the past two years and a half represents one example of how the international community works in case of a political crisis.

The EU's active contribution as a mediator could be considered an essential element of its foreign policy.²⁸ Since the introduction of the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) by the Maastricht Treaty (1992), the main goal for the EU is to solve all the emerging conflicts in Europe without any further (international) assistance. Although this agenda has been stressed several times, still, preserving peace and stability without the USA's involvement has rarely been materialized.²⁹ As the flagship mediator in the Western Balkans, the EU still lacks the ability – but not the toolkit – to properly manage the domestic and foreign issues of the countries.

²⁶ TRAN (2008): Macedonia walks out of Nato talks.
<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/03/nato.ukraine> (Accessed 20 September 2017)

²⁷ BRAUN & NÉMETH, 2016, pp. 2-3

²⁸ In case of the Western Balkans, as the top target for enlargement, active involvement from the EU's part is a must.

²⁹ Although it actively participated in ending the armed conflicts and resolving bilateral issues, the EU only achieved little success by itself. Examples would be the management of the peaceful break-up of Serbia and Montenegro (2006) or the Brussels Agreement (2013) between Serbia and Kosovo.

The EU has taken several steps to restore political stability in Macedonia. The long-awaited breakthrough came as the so-called Pržino Agreement (2015) had been signed between the four main political parties in the country.³⁰ Further, it was also decided to hold early elections so as to put an end to the crisis once and for all. This compromise highlighted a roadmap for stabilisation, but only a few criteria (e.g. establishing the Special Prosecutor's Office) have been met since then. It is worth mentioning that the date for snap elections had been postponed twice³¹, as well as that further complications emerged from the lack of the parties' willingness to cooperate and prepare for the elections. Moreover, the fragile nature of the EU-backed agreement quickly became apparent as a new wave of demonstrations has arisen shortly after the signature.³² Even after the elections, the EU was not able to bring the political stalemate to an end; the visits from EU Enlargement Commissioner Johannes Hahn³³ and HRVP Federica Mogherini³⁴ did not have an impact on the internal politics in Macedonia.³⁵ Although the transfer of power had been accomplished by the end of May, the EU failed to reach this breakthrough on

³⁰ EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016d): Agreement between the four political parties 20 July, http://eeas.europa.eu/archives/delegations/the_former_yugoslav_republic_of_macedonia/press_corner/all_news/news/2016/2016-07-20_agreement_en.htm (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

³¹ During the second occasion, it was the international community (the EU as well as the USA) who voiced concerns on the democratic nature of the upcoming elections. Nevertheless, elections were held on the 11th December 2016, but it did not solve the prevailing political crisis.

³² President Gjorgje Ivanov gave political pardons to 56 high-ranking officials/politicians which made the work of the Special Prosecutor's Office redundant. The national and EU pressure to withdraw this act was successful, but clearly shows that a long-lasting (political) peace could not be reached by the Agreement.

³³ MARUSIC, Sinisa Jakov (2017): EU's Hahn Makes Crisis-Solving Dash to Macedonia, *Balkan Insight*, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/hahn-in-crisis-solving-mission-to-macedonia-03-20-2017> (Accessed 20 September 2017)

³⁴ EWB (2017): Mogherini in Western Balkans: Key messages, *European Western Balkans*, <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/03/08/mogherini-in-western-balkans-key-messages/> (Accessed 20 September 2017)

³⁵ President Ivanov refused to give the mandate to the SDSM to form the government after the winner party, VMRO-DMPNE failed to do so. Ivanov's reasons included the fears of breaching Macedonia's unitary character and its national interests. Moreover, the President found this option unconstitutional.

its own. As the American diplomacy took a more pragmatic approach in the Balkans again, it seemed that it paved the way for forming the new government and finishing the political crisis.

From Washington's part, it took only a single visit from Deputy Assistant Secretary Hoyt Brian Yee to put pressure on Skopje.³⁶ That sudden shift confirms that the USA still has an enormous role in the region, when it comes to crisis management. Furthermore, it is also a strong critique for the EU: despite its presence and proximity to the Western Balkans, it is unable to work out long-lasting and stable conditions without Washington's assistance. The USA's return to pragmatism in the region might be surprising as US President Donald Trump seemed to have no further interest in Europe. As he criticised the European allies' contribution to NATO several times, one might have thought that Washington was not committed enough to European security and stability anymore. However, Montenegro's accession to the Western military alliance and the USA's proactive and effective role in solving the Macedonian political stalemate rebutted the abovementioned claims. In fact, Washington's role may be intensified (again) as the international community perceives the growing Russian influence in the Balkans. The fear of Russia in the region is very much grounded, considering the presence of Russian media and propaganda, the support of nationalist parties and spreading anti-Western rhetoric. In the case of Macedonia, Moscow not only supports the VMRO-DPMNE, but tries to uphold ethnic tensions between Macedonians and Albanians in the country.³⁷ Owing to this issue, we can expect a rise in the American influence and support for Macedonia's bid to join the NATO.

Another remark on the international community's presence in the region is that caution is very much needed. The efforts to resolve political crises and disputes between states might backfire as it could possibly be considered as unwanted by the society. In case of Macedonia, for example, protesters against the Gruevski-led

³⁶ BLIZNAKOVSKI, Jovan (2017): Macedonia has a new government: What next for the crisis-ridden state?, EUROPP, <http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/europpblog/2017/06/02/macedonia-has-a-new-government-what-next-for-the-crisis-ridden-state/> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

³⁷ HARDING, Luke (2017): Russia actively stoking discord in Macedonia since 2008, intel files say, Guardian, <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/jun/04/russia-actively-stoking-discord-in-macedonia-since-2008-intel-files-say-leak-kremlin-balkan-nato-west-influence> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

government did not want new elections as they believed the VMRO-DPMNE would be the winner again³⁸ – and it happened. Thus, the EU-backed idea of having early elections was not even welcomed by the ones who wanted changes. The population's attitude toward the international community's actions, in that sense, could actually be helpful for the anti-Western (and pro-Russian) voices and strengthen the rise of nationalism. As still, after all these efforts made by international actors, Macedonia remains deeply divided over political and social issues.

Overall, Macedonia, along with the rest of the countries in the Western Balkans, still needs supervision and guidance from the EU *and* the USA. That should be ensured by the international community as well: without their proactive engagement in crisis management in the region, it might not be successful for these countries to continue (or even start) their Euro-Atlantic integration. As for the EU, rethinking its ability and showing stronger commitment toward the Western Balkans is essential. Moreover, the EU integration process itself is not enough to end bilateral disputes and/or to supervise the democratisation and stabilization efforts in the area. The USA, on the other side, ought to keep its presence, but it must cooperate with the EU in a more intensive manner. It means that having a united voice and managing crises together in the region might help to reinforce the EU's (lacking) credibility in these countries.

4. Back to the Euro-Atlantic road

The Zaev-led government declared the continuation of the Euro-Atlantic integration as the top foreign policy priority. To achieve this prosperous goal, internal reforms, compromises and society's support are strongly needed. And still, years without any visible progression have resulted only in new obstacles for Macedonia – parallel to the old, unresolved difficulties.

The obstacles in front of Macedonia's accession to EU derived from two sides: from bilateral issues, and from the lack of normalisation and democratisation. As for the

³⁸ VMRO-DPMNE has a stable voting population as many of them work in state institutions. Taking no risks losing their jobs, they and their families 'are forced' to vote for the party at any circumstances.

first problem, steps have been taken to rebuild friendly ties and trust with Macedonia's neighbours, which would make it easier to solve the long-standing disputes – especially with Greece (see also the *Regional relations* section). It is a highly essential criterion, because unanimity from the EU institutions (states) is needed for moving forward with the candidate country's integration.

Although the EU welcomed the formation of the new government, it still urges all parties to work together to stabilise the country and implement institutional reforms.³⁹ More precisely, the Pržino Agreement (2015) along with the Urgent Reform Priorities⁴⁰ need to be realised. Therefore, the country ought to make efforts to strengthen the rule of law (accountability, fighting against corruption, building trust between the society and institutions), moving forward with the judicial and electoral reforms as well as restoring media freedom. Lastly, the multi-ethnic character of the country must be preserved and the rights of minorities (especially Albanians) must be extended. In order to reach these objectives, the EU gives its full support and actively supervises the fulfilment of the Urgent Reform Priorities, together with the unbiased work of the Prosecution. By implementing these reforms as well as resolving the bilateral disputes, Macedonia would finally be able to start the accession progress.

On the other hand, the interest in joining the EU and – from the EU's side – going on with another round of enlargement is declining. Problems inside the EU (e.g. Brexit, rising nationalism) as well as the *enlargement fatigue* have once again overshadowed the Western Balkans's integration. As already stressed several times,

³⁹ EEAS (2017): Skopje: Mogherini and Hahn welcome vote for new Government. https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage_en/27303/%20Skopje:%20Mogherini%20and%20Hahn%20welcome%20vote%20for%20new%20Government (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

⁴⁰ EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2016e): Urgent Reform Priorities for the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. https://eeas.europa.eu/sites/eeas/files/urgent_reform_priorities_en.pdf (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

no enlargement would take place before 2020⁴¹ – a new date that has been set by Jean-Claude Juncker, President of the European Commission.⁴²

To earn a formal invitation to the NATO, the Macedonian government ought to work on the internal normalisation and democratisation process. Most importantly, the rule of law, along with the economy, must be strengthened as well as steps should be taken to decrease the level of corruption. The greatest challenge that erects an obstacle between the country and NATO is the name dispute with Greece. In the NATO Summit in Bucharest, Macedonia got very close to getting an invitation from the Western military alliance. As a result of Greece's veto over Macedonia's name, however, that invitation never materialised. During the Summit, the only objective that was declared is that the process of NATO accession would only go forward if Greece and Macedonia mutually accept a solution to their bilateral dispute, under UN supervision.⁴³ This 'demand' has been repeated in almost every NATO summit, including the Warsaw Summit (2016), where "intensified efforts"⁴⁴ were asked for again by the NATO Heads of State and Government.

Right now, it seems that both the Macedonian and Greek sides are open for negotiations regarding the name dispute. According to some experts⁴⁵, it is even possible that Greece would allow Macedonia to join the military alliance under its provisional name (FYROM). Another scenario could be for Macedonia to get an invitation to NATO on a condition: solving the name dispute until every member of

⁴¹ During the mandate of the current European Commission or the European Parliament.

⁴² EUROPEAN COMMISSION (2017): President Jean-Claude Juncker's State of the Union Address. http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_SPEECH-17-3165_en.htm (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

⁴³ Some call this a 'conditional invitation'.

⁴⁴ RISTIĆ, Nikola (2017): Bartol: Resolution of name issue crucial for NATO accession of Macedonia. European Western Balkans, <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/07/19/ewb-interview-bartol-resolution-name-issue-crucial-nato-accession-macedonia/> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

⁴⁵ COOPER, Harry (2017): Macedonia renews push to join NATO under provisional name, POLITICO, <http://www.politico.eu/article/macedonia-nato-nikola-dimitrov-renews-push-for-to-join-nato-under-provisional-name/> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

the alliance ratifies Macedonia's accession protocol.⁴⁶ This would result in intensified efforts from both parties to find a mutually acceptable solution in time.⁴⁷ As far as NATO is concerned, it support the closure of the bilateral issue. Moreover, the renewed fear of Russian influence in the Balkans (especially in the more fragile states, including Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina) gives an extra motivation for the alliance to support Macedonia's bid. Until then, Macedonia participates in the Partnership for Peace program⁴⁸ (1995) and maintains its relations with the alliance through the Membership Action Plan (1999).

Regional relations

The first hundred days of the newly formed government saw a significant new impetus to maintain regional relations. Undoubtedly, the main goal of the intensified foreign policy is to solve the prevailing bilateral issues in to the hope of avoiding further obstacles and objections against the country's Euro-Atlantic integration. Although the results from the last few months are often marked as a 'breakthrough', it should be noted that the long-standing issues – such as the name dispute with Greece or the diverging views on the linguistic and historical ties with Bulgaria – will not be solved in a short term. Furthermore, new regional problems could also arise – e.g. the diplomatic row with Serbia – that would easily undermine the Zaev-led government's work and credibility. This chapter describes the achieved results, the possible outcomes and the outstanding bilateral issues between Macedonia and its neighbours: Bulgaria, Greece, Serbia (and Kosovo), and Albania.

Bulgaria

On the 1st of August (2017) Bulgaria and Macedonia signed the *Treaty on friendship, good neighbourliness and cooperation* in Skopje. The goal of the treaty, which has been marked as a 'historic' one, is to create a confident atmosphere for further talks and improve economic ties. Also, most importantly, Sofia pledged not

⁴⁶ In the case of Montenegro, it took more than a year to ratify its accession protocol. This might give an estimated time for Macedonia (and Greece) to solve the name dispute.

⁴⁷ MARUSIC, Sinisa Jakov (2017): Macedonia's Regime Change Boosts NATO Accession Hopes, Balkan Insight, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-boosts-its-nato-accession-hopes-05-31-2017> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

⁴⁸ The country plays an important role in the NATO's Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan by training and giving assistance to the Afghan security forces.

to block Skopje's efforts to its Euro-Atlantic integration. Instead, Bulgaria will support its neighbour's desire to get into the EU by offering technical assistance.⁴⁹ Moreover, the country will hold the Presidency of the Council of the European Union from the beginning of 2018, which can possibly be a good timing to move forward with Macedonia's EU accession as well.

The first positive change the treaty brought is Sofia's decision to reopen its commercial and economic service centre in Skopje to boost economic ties.⁵⁰ Further, the parties also agreed to increase the security of the energy supplies by building a new gas pipeline between Macedonia and Bulgaria.⁵²

The treaty, however, is not unanimously considered as 'historic'. The opposition in both countries – the VMRO-DPMNE in Macedonia and the pro-Russian Bulgarian Socialist Party in Bulgaria – voiced its dissatisfaction as they believe the documents go against their respective country's own national interests.⁵³ These critics are trying to undermine their governments' foreign policy success by referring to the long-standing issues between the neighbours that the treaty touches only delicately. For example, it does not deal with sensitive issues, such as language, national symbols and history.⁵⁴ Overall, it was important to separate those problems from the ones that might block Macedonia's bid into the EU and NATO.

⁴⁹ MARTINO, Francesco (2017): Bulgaria and Macedonia, good neighbours?, <https://www.balcanicaucaso.org/eng/Areas/Bulgaria/Bulgaria-and-Macedonia-good-neighbours-181841> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

⁵⁰ The centre was closed at the end on 2015.

⁵¹ CHERESHEVA, Mariya (2017): Bulgaria Reopens Commercial Service in Macedonia, *Balkan Insight*, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/bulgaria-re-opens-commercial-and-economic-service-in-skopje-08-18-2017> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

⁵² During that day, a Memorandum of Understanding and Cooperation on Natural Gas has been signed too.

⁵³ CHERESHEVA, Maria-SINISA, Jakov Marusic (2017): Macedonia-Bulgaria Treaty Meets Suspicion in Both Countries, *Balkan Insight*, <http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/macedonia-bulgaria-treaty-meets-suspicion-in-both-countries-07-14-2017> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

⁵⁴ As an evidence, the treaty was scheduled to be signed a day later, on the celebration of Ilinden, a historical event that is significant for both countries. To avoid any dissent, a new date had been chosen.

Bulgaria is a minor obstacle for Macedonia, but the treaty was a good starting point for the Macedonian government's foreign policy. The way the treaty was successfully reached was praised by the international community as an example on how bilateral issues should be resolved. Although the treaty might have a positive impact on Macedonia's bid to NATO and EU, other disputes still remain.

Greece

Greece's constant vetoes have been the greatest obstacle to the country's bid to EU and NATO. Macedonia is clearly working on re-establishing confidence with its southern neighbour so the almost three-decade-long name dispute could finally end.⁵⁵ Recently, the main purpose was – just as in the case of Bulgaria – to build confidence for further talks. Although no progress has been achieved on the name dispute, two factors, which may herald future results, need to be highlighted. Firstly, Athens is also in favour of resolving the bilateral issue and assured Macedonia of its support for Euro-Atlantic integration, citing that it “wants [its] northern neighbour to be part of the EU and NATO”.⁵⁶ Secondly, even the UN's special envoy, Matthew Nimetz visited Skopje – for the first time since 2014 – to relaunch talks between Greece and Macedonia. Therefore, hopes are high to resolve the name dispute which could assure Skopje that Athens would not veto its integration process anymore. Actual talks on this bilateral issue would seemingly start after the general elections to be held in Macedonia (in mid-October 2017). The results of these talks are expected around 2019 – before the presidential elections in Macedonia and general elections in Greece.⁵⁷

Terminating the name dispute is the boldest yet hardest task on the government's agenda. As for now, both parties are willing to relaunch the conversation after all the failed – UN-backed – rounds. On the other hand, neither

⁵⁵ The importance can be seen as the Macedonian foreign minister, Nikola Dimitrov's first trip abroad was to Athens. Further, over the past three months, he met his Greek counterpart, Nikos Kotzias twice.

⁵⁶ EWB: Kotzias (2017): We want Macedonia to become part of NATO and EU, European Western Balkans, <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/08/31/kotzias-want-macedonia-part-nato-eu/> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

⁵⁷ EWB (2017): “Kathimerini”: Next year may be crucial to resolve Macedonia's name dispute. European Western Balkans, <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/07/24/kathimerini-next-year-may-crucial-resolve-macedonias-name-dispute/> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

Greece nor Macedonia would be willing to soften their own position regarding Macedonia's official name. Achieving a solution would be highly beneficial for the country itself as it would get a green light for joining the EU and NATO soon. As for the government, it would be in difficulty, if it were to agree on a deal which is not supported by the majority of the population. Finally, the Macedonian government's aim at showing readiness would surely impress the international community.

Serbia

Despite temporary disagreements and Belgrade's support towards VMRO-DPMNE, political and diplomatic relations between Serbia and Macedonia are stable and balanced. Since the formation of the new government, a few short-term political issues reached the surface, endangering the good neighbourly relations.

The disputed status of Kosovo is one of the permanent sources of conflict. Although Skopje recognized the Republic of Kosovo as an independent state, it does not, however, support Pristina's attempts to join international organizations (lately the Interpol and the UNESCO). Abstaining can be understood as gestures not to provoke Belgrade and maintaining the (often fragile) good relations with the country.

A more worrisome issue has appeared in August 2017, when without any visible actions, Serbia withdrew its entire diplomatic staff from Macedonia. The reasons behind Belgrade's drastic action might be the upcoming UNESCO vote on Kosovo's membership which Skopje might have supported. Another, more realistic reason is a spying/intelligence scandal between the countries that took place behind the scenes. Alexandar Vučić, President of Serbia as well as Serbian Foreign Minister Ivica Dačić commented that Macedonia perpetrated „very offensive intelligence actions against the institutions of Serbia.”⁵⁸ Moreover, unnamed foreign powers also played

⁵⁸ MACDOWALL, Andrew (2017): A Series of Balkan Spats Shows the Weaknesses of EU, and Regional, Integration, World Politics Review, <https://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/23138/a-series-of-balkan-spats-shows-the-weaknesses-of-eu-and-regional-integration> (Accessed 20 September, 2017)

a significant role against Belgrade by interfering with Serbia's internal affairs.⁵⁹ Behind this diplomatic row is Goran Živaljević, former deputy director of the Serbian Security Information Agency, who is currently a liaison officer at the Embassy of Serbia in Skopje. He was seen at the parliamentary session when the attack against the members of SDSM and the Albanian parties took place.⁶⁰ His role during the attack is still unclear, but his presence might have been enough for both countries to be more suspicious on the other's secret and intelligence services. A couple of days later, the diplomatic turmoil has been solved as Belgrade and Skopje pledged to strengthen communication and to help each other's EU integration path. Their joint statement,⁶¹ however, does not mention Kosovo, the above-mentioned scandal or anything as a root cause for Belgrade's action.⁶² Nevertheless, Skopje stressed the importance of solving and not creating bilateral disputes; a pragmatic attitude which can also be observed in the new Macedonian government's foreign policy.

Albania

Although inter-ethnic relations between Macedonians and Albanians inside Macedonia are very turbulent, little or no trouble hardens the relations between Tirana and Skopje. Both countries share the same vision: continuing their Euro-Atlantic integration.⁶³ Therefore, working together to become full-fledged members of the EU and to preserve regional stability and cooperation are essential priorities for both countries. Moreover, the adequately secured rights for the Albanian minority in Macedonia is also a prominent factor in the bilateral relations.⁶⁴

⁵⁹ Although unnamed, but they might have been referred to the activities of the USA and/or the CIA.

⁶⁰ EWB (2017): Intelligence scandal rocks Serbian-Macedonian relations, European Western Balkans, <https://europeanwesternbalkans.com/2017/06/05/intelligence-scandal-rocks-serbian-macedonian-relations/> (Accessed 20 September 2017)

⁶¹ The statement was released by Vučić and not by Ana Brnabić, Zaev's Serbian counterpart, which gives an interesting thought on who is in charge of the Serbian politics.

⁶² B92 (2017): Vucic-Zaev call statement doesn't mention Kosovo, or spies. https://www.b92.net/eng/news/politics.php?yyyy=2017&mm=08&dd=23&nav_id=102141 (Accessed 20 September 2017).

⁶³ Albania has been a member of the NATO since 2009.

⁶⁴ EWB (2017): Zaev and Rama: We share a common vision for Euro-Atlantic future of Macedonia and Albania, European Western Balkans, 110

The new Macedonian government set a clear priority: getting rid of every (bilateral) dispute it currently poses with its neighbours. Most notably, it seeks to rebuild regional ties and solve prevailing disputes with Bulgaria and Greece, so that those countries not block its Euro-Atlantic integration. Keeping this purpose in mind, small yet important steps have been taken, which highlights Skopje's willingness to make gestures and proactively work on solving the disputed issues. This strategy is useful for two reasons: 1) Skopje can make steps towards its neighbours and could re-establish good relations that might be essential to solve difficult disputes later on; 2) It can portray itself towards the international community as a problem-solving, dynamic government.

Conclusion

Our article tried to present the challenging obstacles of the Euro-Atlantic integration process of the Republic of Macedonia from a European point of view. As the successful integration is a crucial interest of the European Union regarding security issues, the EU has to pay more attention towards the problems and crises in the Western Balkans. The EU's accession mechanism tries to bring stability in the region by focus on solving the regional conflicts and improving relations between the states. However, the case of Macedonia shows that unresolved domestic issues might quickly lead into serious political and institutional crisis. Moreover, the USA's active involvement and successful attempts to resolve the internal and external challenges in the region proves that Washington is still committed to the Balkans.

As a matter of fact, it sheds light on the EU's inability to settle these disputes without further assistance. Therefore, European decision-makers should realise that the importance of the integration does not lie only on the stability but also on other issues. On the other hand, the new Macedonian government also ought to make more efforts in order to fulfil the EU accession criteria. This might require a new type of cooperation between the two main ethnic groups of the country.

The same conclusion can be drawn regarding Macedonia's NATO accession, because a greater attention must be paid to solving the bilateral issues (especially the name dispute with Greece). Furthermore, the country's accession to NATO is important to preserve European and regional security, and to mitigate the Russian or other negative influences on the Balkans.

Nevertheless, recent events have proved that in order to maintain stability in the region a further democratisation and Europeanisation of the Western Balkans is unavoidable.

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ATTILA BUGYÁKI

BITCOIN ON THE DARK SIDE OF THE INTERNET

Abstract

Based on the findings of the investigations following the 9/11 attacks on the USA, the terrorist organizations – besides using the regular Internet, which does not require any special knowledge or technical support – in order to achieve their goal by elevating destruction to a then unthinkable level, used the easily accessible “dark internet” (which provides almost perfect anonymity) to organise their actions and communicate with each other. The existence and expansion of this legal and illegal virtual world opened a serious security risk in the cyberspace, which is easily available to and widely used by criminals and terrorists, risking our peacefully functioning everyday life. As a result of technical development, powered by globalised economy, the geographical distance has evaporated. The quantity and fast flow of online information, the existence of decentralised virtual payment methods, such as Bitcoin, together with the variety of closed, secret channels, have reached a level which, for law enforcement bodies, is difficult to cope with effectively and in a professional way. Admitted or not, digital development is on an uncontrolled path, which, regarding security, leads to an unpredictable outcome.

Keywords: Bitcoin, dark internet, deep web, virtual currencies, money-laundering

The dark internet, in the shadows of the virtual world

In the globalised 21st century, only a few people have never heard about the internet, or used it daily. The majority, with access to the internet, includes everyday users, who browse, download, make transfers, chat; while others, only a few clicks away, are users with generally different purpose, having access to the dark side of the internet – basically legal sites, used for illegal purposes – a space for permanent or occasional communities of criminal activities, called *dark net*⁶⁵ or *deep web*,⁶⁶

⁶⁵ It is also called dark or hidden internet.

operated in closed, independent, internal TOR⁶⁷ networks, hidden in the giant world of cyberspace.

As a network of encrypted transfers and randomly connected computers, this part of the global internet forms a maze, a *labyrinth of undetectable, anonymous network* for all the parties of transactions, with no available information on their identities and whereabouts.⁶⁸ The basic purpose of TOR networks is not encryption, but ensured anonymity, principally granting anonymity, not protecting the data concerned.⁶⁹

Principal development of TOR system was – officially – carried out by US Marines,⁷⁰ later concluded by Electronic Frontier Foundation.⁷¹ To preserve the original purpose of this system, it had to be open for all users, with legal or illegal

⁶⁶ In a 2001 study, Michael K. Bergman states deep web can be 400-550 times larger than the open internet, with faster upload of many times more detailed information. Despite this, the number of users is only a fraction of the usual internet. For unexperienced users finding data in the deep web is a difficult task, concerning the level of information of sites and their needed passwords, also with slow download and unusual user interfaces. Bergman, Michael K.: White Paper – The Deep Web – Surfacing Hidden Value. Journal of Electronic Publishing, Volume 7, Issue 1: Taking License, August 2001. <http://quod.lib.umich.edu/jjep/3336451.0007.104?view=text;rgn=main> (December 28, 2016)

⁶⁷ TOR (The Onion Router) indicates encrypted network, providing anonymous presence on the internet (e.g. when browsing), together with access to censored content (e.g. avoiding filters). Its name comes from its mechanism: the initiator's "packages" are encrypted over and over on several levels, just like the layers of an onion. The onion domain is available once the TOR proxy network is downloaded. Using these sites, access can be granted to various information of illegal nature. TOR: Overview. <https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en> (January 03, 2017)

⁶⁸ The „usual“ internet is composed of computer networks, communicating with each other in a transparent way, which is less preferable for users with illegal purposes.

⁶⁹ There are no basically unbreakable encryption protocols, all codes are breakable. Only time, energy and resources are needed to do so.

⁷⁰ TOR: Overview. <https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en> (January 03, 2017)

⁷¹ This international non-profit foundation was started in San Francisco, in 1990, to provide protection for digital rights, answering the law enforcement bodies declaration, citizens are not aware of the protection needed for their civic rights on the internet. About Electronic Frontier Foundation. <https://www.eff.org/about> (January 10, 2017)

purposes – communicating with each other electronically, operating their computers, granting capacity for protocols to anonymize this communication for all parties involved. The growing number of clients⁷² grants the anonymity of all users, including protection of illegal use and transactions.⁷³

The dark internet is a closed group of users, opening up only by invitation. It was principally created to provide protection for freedom of opinion and speech, to avoid political censorship in countries with governments hostile to these values. The criminal groups also understood the availability of this shadow-world to build up and expand their own networks, communication channels, black trade markets, financing their activities, including anonymous digital currencies. It would be naïve to say that only criminals and illegal users share this network. There is a grey zone, including clients from businesses, political and diplomatic communities, governments, terrorist groups and secret services. Anonymity is a value, praised by many. Ironically the very same network can be an instrument of criminal activity and law enforcement alike, without any knowledge of how close they are in the virtual world.

Entering and browsing in this world are similar to normal internet activities, although totally different products and services are offered, with no browsers (surfing without Google!), and only links being available. Offering space for transactions of any nature (arms, explosives, drugs, sex, paedophile content, forged money, anonymous bank accounts and bank cards, money-laundering, assassinations, human experiments or forbidden products) is the real risk of the dark internet, functioning as a virtual showroom, generating transactions worth millions of USD every day.

Virtual currencies, the Bitcoin

Virtual money or *virtual currencies* are defined by many, without a generally accepted definition. European Central Bank in 2012 defined it as “*a type of unregulated, digital money, which is issued and usually controlled by its developers,*

⁷² As to some studies, by the end of 2013 the number of users reached 4 million on thousands of servers, generating huge data traffic. Dredge, Stuart: "What is Tor? A beginner's guide to the privacy tool". In: The Guardian, 5 November 2013. <http://www.rogerclarke.com/DV/Dredge-131105-WhatIsTor.pdf> (January 03, 2017)

⁷³ The system cannot be terminated without closing off all users, a mission impossible.

and used and accepted among the members of a specific virtual community."⁷⁴
Generally speaking it is a huge virtual store for electronic cash of a secret society, with all members bound to accept it.

Virtual currencies are either with identification, or without identification, depending on whether they contain any information regarding their owners. Virtual currencies with identification are connected to a certain person (or group), therefore they are easily traceable. However, in order to keep one's anonymity, a virtual currency is needed, which does not only facilitate payment, but also guarantees that the parties will remain in the shadows. Of all virtual currencies available, the obvious choice is the first decentralized cryptocurrency, Bitcoin.

On January 3, 2009, 21 million Bitcoins were issued and distributed among those programmers who participated in or helped the process. The creator of Bitcoin was a presumably Japanese hacker or hacker group, unknown to this day, under the name Satoshi Nakamoto.⁷⁵ The issuing procedure was set up in four-year periods,⁷⁶ in the first period half of the total Bitcoin amount (10.5 million Bitcoins) was distributed. In the subsequent periods, half of the remaining amount is distributed in each period,⁷⁷ until-all the Bitcoins are gone. Bitcoin has smaller units; the smallest one is called satoshi.⁷⁸

⁷⁴ Virtual Currency Schemes October 2012 – European Central Bank – Eurosystem. Germany, 2012. 5. p.
<https://www.ecb.europa.eu/pub/pdf/other/virtualcurrencyschemes201210en.pdf>
(January 16, 2017)

⁷⁵ Satoshi Nakamoto right after the US banking crisis, in October 2008, issued a 9-page white paper on the Internet, concerning the theory of virtual money – the block-chain technology responsible for credible accounting of transactions. Nakamoto, Satoshi: Bitcoin: A Peer-to-Peer Electronic Cash System. <https://bitcoin.org/bitcoin.pdf> (January 10, 2017)

⁷⁶ „Four year” has no reference to the calendar; they mean 210,000 mined Bitcoin blocks, meaning the last distribution happened in July, 2016. Till now 16.4 million Bitcoins were issued, making mining even more difficult. Bitcoin charts. <http://bitcoincharts.com/> (May 31, 2017)

⁷⁷ As to recent prediction, all 21 million Bitcoins are due to be issued by app. around 2040.

⁷⁸ A Bitcoin can be divided till eight decimals.

Bitcoin is a decentralized financial system, independent from countries and banks, backed not by a central bank, or any monetary institutions,⁷⁹ but by series of computer generated figures, securing anonymous transactions in a safe, closed environment, realising invisible transactions among digital, online “wallets” of electronic address owners.⁸⁰ Therefore, unlike typical electronic payment methods, Bitcoin is not subject to any regulations or limitations of authorities or issuing bodies. Transactions are protected by a complex system of digital signatures combined with complicated encryption and verification methods, based on the cumulated counting capacities of all computers used by the clients. In order to transfer, only a 33-figure alphanumeric account number is needed. Potentially erroneous transfers are irreversible, filing for complaints or asking for compensation is not possible.⁸¹ Although Bitcoin enables online transactions through secured channels, the transaction itself, and its history can be tracked all the way, but, lacking identification data attached to the account numbers, the owners cannot be identified. So Bitcoin is an open source, digital payment method. It enables the owner to decide, whether the transactions should be public, or anonymous.⁸²

There are three ways to obtain Bitcoin. As it already exists in the real economy, the easiest way to own Bitcoin is to purchase it for real money on Bitcoin exchanges,⁸³ or other similar fora, or via Bitcoin “ATM”, where real and digital currencies⁸⁴ are connected, and therefore can be exchanged. The second option of

⁷⁹ Not centralized, so without any official backup (i.e. gold), or economic performance represented by a state.

⁸⁰ Bitcoin has a decentralised system, similar to torrent technology, powered by database of closed, peer-to-peer networks.

⁸¹ Based on the nature of Bitcoin, no claims are possible, although bona fide refund is possible.

⁸² Attaching personal data to a Bitcoin account is regular, in case the owner has no intention or reason to save its anonymity, or openly using it in a transparent way.

⁸³ Bitcoin has a net worth of app. 31.89 billion USD as to end of May, 2017, a Bitcoin is app 2,000 USD. Current price depends on hacker attacks, or growing demand in countries with forbidden exchange of local money to USD (i.e. Iran), or with a high-rate inflation, where people find haven in Bitcoin for their savings. Bitcoin charts. <http://bitcoincharts.com/> (May 31, 2017)

⁸⁴ The first „Bitcoin ATM” was installed in Vancouver, Canada in October, 2013, in Europe in Helsinki, Finland two months later. Hungary was the 20th country with a „Bitcoin ATM” (Anker Club, followed by another one since). Ngo, Diana: A Short History Of The World’s 400 Bitcoin ATM Machines. May 29, 2015. <http://afkinsider.com/97249/a-short-history-of-the-worlds-400-bitcoin-atm-machines/> (January 03, 2017)

obtaining Bitcoin is by getting a Bitcoin transfer to our virtual account in exchange for goods or services. The third option is “mining”,⁸⁵ receiving Bitcoin in exchange of the computing capacities of our computers online, which is not cost effective method any more, therefore in most cases it is not worth the efforts.

Bitcoin – also called the king of virtual currencies or digital gold – combines the anonymity of cash with the speed and flexibility of online transfers. Not having any materialised form, Bitcoin exists only on the internet, although as a QR⁸⁶ code, Bitcoin can easily be attached to any physical objects, therefore it may exist also online or offline. Being a unique technology, Bitcoin cannot be forged, although hackers may stole or attack it,⁸⁷ most often trying to destroy the system, rather than using the stolen amount.⁸⁸ Customer demands and habits define its flow, and its value is based on how much real money is exchanged for it. It is not subject to inflation, but because of the high and fast exchange rate risk, it is usually used for transferring smaller amounts.⁸⁹ Parties can settle their business (financially) without a third, intermediate party or institution (monetary institution); thus being in direct contact with each other, allowing immediate flow, paying no bank fees, exchange rates or taxes.

Based on the last years’ experience, Bitcoin could succeed over the rivals by using a better verification protocol. Being independent, global and having the same value everywhere contributed to its overall popularity. Although there is no financial

⁸⁵ „Miners” are users, providing access to their computers of high capacities for the Bitcoin network, enabling the network to check and control the transactions. To verify a transaction, a minimum of six users must agree.

⁸⁶ Quick Response code, a two dimensional barcode.

⁸⁷ Bitcoin can be stolen, but existing in a closed system, latest by transfers the user can be identified. Unused, the stolen amount will hide undetected, just like the 120.000 Bitcoins (worth 65 million USD) stolen in August 2016 from the Chinese Bitfinex, the greatest Bitcoin exchange. Also 19.000 Bitcoins were stolen from the US Bitsamp, early 2015, or 650.000 Bitcoins from the by that time greatest Japanese exchange MT Gox, 2013. Turzó, Ádám Pál: Hamar talpra állt az ütésből a Bitcoin. In: Világgazdaság, Augustus 09, 2016.

<http://www.vg.hu/penzogy/befektetes/hamar-talpra-allt-az-utesbol-a-bitcoin-473795> (January 10, 2017)

⁸⁸ I.e. speculation concerning exchange rates, competitive transfer, or simply a personal hobby.

⁸⁹ As exchange rate varies hectically, together with the amount of Bitcoin owned by the developers and initial users, many consider Bitcoin as a kind of pyramid game.

backup behind it, however the expanding number of users, the global computerised system (p2p) based on mutual understanding and consent, its safeguarding technology, and the constantly expanding number of locations accepting it – so the trustable market and the dependable network – serve as a type of warranty.

In the United States of America, in the summer of 2013, the Texan court ruled in a case concerning a pyramid game, and it was the first to state that Bitcoin was a form of real money,⁹⁰ followed by the British government, and later on by several financial institutions, in accepting its existence. However, Bitcoin has no legal regulations or a generally accepted definition in the European Union or in Hungary. It is not considered to be a currency or an electronic payment method, Bitcoin was labelled as a trafficable good by the Finish Central Bank.⁹¹ Lacking official recognition, Bitcoin has no ISO code,⁹² instead it is generally abbreviated as BTC. Hungary does not forbid its usage, but some countries, including China and Russia are opposed to using Bitcoin in trading. Although there are efforts to harmonize the regulations on Bitcoin, these efforts are only in their infancy, with only helping risk minimization.

COinpay Plc. estimates the value of Bitcoin use in Hungary is roughly 8 billion HUF, with only a few hundred owners.⁹³ Approximately a thousand locations accept Bitcoin in Hungary (dentists, taxis, restaurants), but its main advantage is abroad, where one may use it in many more locations.

Following the success of Bitcoin, many enterprises introduced similar virtual currencies, trying to perfect decentralized virtual money. Of all of these, the Ethereum, introduced in summer 2014, seems the most promising. Often called the

⁹⁰ Hill, Kashmir: Federal Judge Rules Bitcoin Is Real Money. Augustus 07, 2013. <http://www.forbes.com/sites/kashmirhill/2013/08/07/federal-judge-rules-bitcoin-is-real-money/#360aba524fba> (January 14, 2017)

⁹¹ Pohjanpalo, Kati: Bitcoin Judged Commodity in Finland After Failing Money Test. January 20, 2014. <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2014-01-19/bitcoin-becomes-commodity-in-finland-after-failing-currency-test> (January 03, 2017)

⁹² ISO code is a three digit international standard for marking currencies, not to be mistaken with the abbreviation of currencies. Country Codes – ISO 3166 – What is ISO 3166? http://www.iso.org/iso/home/standards/country_codes.htm (January 14, 2017)

⁹³ As Bitcoin has app. 5 million users world-wide, COinpay Plc. launched a platform, enabling Hungarian commerce to accept Bitcoin, without taking the risk of varying exchange rates. BTC elfogadás. <http://www.btcelfogadas.hu/> (January 03, 2017)

little brother of Bitcoin, because of their similarities, Ethereum offers more programming smart-contracts, which represents Ethereum's uncontested novelty and indicates its not-yet-known future and countless potential. This feature ensures that once the previously determined contractual conditions are fulfilled, payment is automatically transferred, enabling the two parties, who may be strangers, to do business, as the system guarantees the fulfilment of predetermined contractual terms. The crypto-currency of Ethereum is ether (ETH).⁹⁴ Whether Ethereum can compete with, or outgrow Bitcoin, is still a question.

Criminal activities gaining space through dark internet

While in the greater part of the 20th century, criminal activities were generally associated with physical, local deeds (theft, embezzlement, robbery, manslaughter, breaches of peace), nowadays, global computerized criminal activities⁹⁵ are expanding. Besides hackers, hacktivists, crackers, pirates, industrial spies and terrorists, mostly members of organised criminal groups commit the crimes. Offline crime used to be relatively easy to investigate, but detecting and tracking illegal activity in cyberspace is more complicated and complex. In this dark world, besides identifying the criminals, it is also necessary to discover the channels of communication, the modus operandi, and the programs used to crypt their identity. Having discovered their potential, the virtual electronic currencies became one of the criminals' favourite currencies. Although there is no perfect way to circulating money, in the 21st century Bitcoin seems to be the safest way to obtain, possess and transfer or to launder money, in anonymous and untraceable ways.

The most popular website on the dark net to provide illegal services was the Silk Road, also called the Ebay⁹⁶ of drugs, was eliminated by the US authorities in

⁹⁴ In 19th century physics ether was considered as an undefinable material filling the Universe, the developers of Ethereum would like to fill the cyberspace this way, being present in the whole digital Universe. Bitcoin 2.0 – Ethereum. September 02, 2014. <http://alapblog.hu/bitcoin20ethereum/> (January 10, 2017)

⁹⁵ Computerized criminal activities include all activities performed by IT technologies and systems, as a result of globalisation, expanding fast and unstoppable in Cyberspace.

⁹⁶ The website offered services similar to Ebay, with direct contact of vendor and buyer, including the chance to evaluate to other party, safeguarding the trust to Silk Road.

October, 2013 after two years of operation.⁹⁷ Silk Road offered safe transport of selected items (i.e. drugs) via standard postal services, hidden among the millions of packages delivered daily. Packed in a most common way (smell-free containers, labelled as ordinary products, extra weight was added when necessary), the chance of getting caught the given package was easily minimized. Payment was to be made, naturally, in anonymous Bitcoins. Only physical check – opening up the packages – could identify drugs in the package, meanwhile offering a chance to the purchaser to deny any connection to it, claiming false delivery. Lacking any evidence, the authorities had to nonsuit the action. Silk Road had 900,000 users, generating an estimated 1.2 billion USD⁹⁸ of traffic while in business. Ross William Ulbricht,⁹⁹ the founder and operator of the website, was charged for drug trafficking, money-laundering and solicitation to commit murder, and sentenced to life in February, 2015. It is important to note that Ulbricht was not caught due to a technical failure of the system, or an anonymity breach of Bitcoin, but to the simple negligence of basic security rules (connecting himself to Silk Road by using his own name in his email correspondence), which enabled the authorities to identify and track him down. It was the hiring of a contract killer after a financial dispute that resulted in his arrest.

Organized crime used to launder its income through the banking system, the sums amounting to millions of USD, received from black market transactions, prostitution, trafficking of arms, people and human organs, or fraud. Nowadays, digital, anonymous, non-centralized electronic currencies are playing a bigger and bigger role in this, allowing the use of all their advantages by the criminals. In some cases, the blackmailed people could pay by Bitcoin¹⁰⁰ for their kidnapped family members,

⁹⁷ After Silk Road was shot down, obviously new actors turned up, so trafficking of drugs still flourish on the dark net.

⁹⁸ Estimated by Forbes. Greenberg, Andy: End Of The Silk Road: FBI Says It's Busted The Web's Biggest Anonymous Drug Black Market. In: Forbes Magasin, October 02, 2013.

<http://www.forbes.com/sites/andygreenberg/2013/10/02/end-of-the-silk-road-fbi-busts-the-webs-biggest-anonymous-drug-black-market/#7599d3d0347d> (January 14, 2017)

⁹⁹ A.k.a. Dread Pirate Roberts on the deep web.

¹⁰⁰ Banking transactions are easy to be tracked, so criminal communities prefer to save their money (income from blackmail or ransom) in Bitcoins, mostly because of the irrevocable nature of Bitcoin transactions. In September 2012, a hacker (later arrested) demanded Bitcoin, worth of 1 million USD from a Republican presidential

Criminal networks excel in using the hidden, invitation-only, closed and anonymous channels of dark net, safeguarding their internal, everyday communication, in order to organize their illegal activities. Not having any in-person contact, these participants and their activities are harder and harder or even impossible to monitor and track, especially due to the closed system, which denies access, therefore their discovering represents a serious problem.

The advantages of the anonymous cryptocurrency were not ignored by “financial terrorism” either. ISIS is constantly present in cyberspace, using Bitcoin worth millions of dollars, to carry out activities of propaganda or intimidation. Just a year ago, one of the most prominent hacking team, the Ghost Security Group, identified Bitcoin accounts worth \$3 million, linked to ISIS, together with websites of the dark net, used for donations.¹⁰¹ ISIS is financed by fiscal assets mostly deriving from criminal activities, loots (from robbery, confiscation of cash or goods, or taxation in areas under their control), revenues coming from operating oil wells and exporting oil, computerized crime, or by foreign donations. According to recent data, donations in Bitcoin make up only a fragment of these revenues, but the use of Bitcoin in connection with these anonymous transfers, financing foreign actions and recruiting, or purchasing products of illegal nature on the dark web, is a perfect choice, bypassing the customary or alternate (middleman-based) banking system.¹⁰²

Uncontrolled expansion of virtual currencies could pose a serious risk to the political, economic and financial system of any state, affecting the global economy as well. If the citizens and investors of a country lost their confidence in their own

candidate Mitt Romney and his wife, in exchange of not disclosing their tax report, concerning data compromising the presidential campaign. Kelly, Meghan: Bitcoin value spikes after hacker demands ransom in the currency. September 05, 2012. <http://venturebeat.com/2012/09/05/bitcoin-value/> (January 03, 2017)

¹⁰¹ Hacktivists did identify and attack many accounts containing sums of money previously, but were unable to identify to source of money on it, whether it was bought or mined, could not be stated. Sameeh, Tamer: ISIL Militants Linked To France Terrorist attacks Had A Bitcoin Address with 3 Million Dollars. November 14, 2015.

<http://www.newsbtc.com/2015/11/14/isil-militants-linked-to-france-terrorist-attacks-had-a-bitcoin-address-with-3-million-dollars/> (January 10, 2017)

¹⁰² There are branches of banks still operational in ISIS controlled areas, offering uncontrolled possibilities of banking procedures for ISIS or ISIS-affiliated person,

currency and exchange their savings for Bitcoin,¹⁰³ their move would devalue the national currency, risking even its existence. Also, because of the anonymous nature of Bitcoin, these savings and their owners would be outside of the regulated economy, (including the bank sector) out of reach of any control or influence of the state, resulting in the total collapse of the financial system, then the economic sectors, finally the political system, as well. From the aspect of Bitcoin of course this procedure would mean the increase of its value, and the acceleration of its expansion.

Countermeasures against the virtual currencies

Knowing the complexity of the problem, it is obvious that the law enforcement bodies can only fight effectively against the virtual currencies representing a new kind of challenge, if they resort to a new type of vision, approach and practice.

In today's world there is a tendency of increasing the number of online bank transactions, which means that bank transfers are mostly done electronically. At the same time, more and more people turn to virtual currencies, which could supplement real currencies. Using them to cover up illegal actions is not the fault of the digital currencies, but that of their users. With better regulation and legal infrastructure, Bitcoin can be an effective and full alternative to the current banking system, which has been struggling since the 2008 financial and economic crisis, and it might even become a global currency.

Authorities have realized that successful law enforcement against criminal groups of organised crime and terrorism requires international cooperation, with special attention to harmonised legal system and regulation concerning information technology. Along with these regulations, access to channels of any kind of communication (let them be secret or not, closed source or open but anonymous) or transfers (full transparency) have to be available, and putting them in a database is

¹⁰³ In June 2015, Greece's financial troubles (difficulties in redeeming an instalment worth of 1.6 billion euros to the IMF) raised the issue of Grexit (Greece leaving the Eurozone), increasing investments in gold, but, as new element, in Bitcoin. Kelly, Jemina: Bitcoin surges as Grexit worries mount, posts best run in 18 months. June 16, 2015. <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-eurozone-greece-bitcoin-idUSKBN0OW2DS20150616> (January 15, 2017)

vital, too,¹⁰⁴ If all these fail, their enforcement will have to be a priority, using new special IT tools. In order to effectively achieve results, sanctions need to be introduced, and new forms of felony must be incorporated in the Criminal Code, concerning the new criminal deeds. Constant evaluation of the events, results, raising new proposals, predictive analysis on criminal methodology, and countermeasures have to constitute a continuous effort, and this can only be achieved by a teamwork of international specialists, with expertise on analysis or operational methods.

All enterprises issuing, dealing with or offering service related to virtual currencies should be subject to anti-money laundering legislation, just as customary financial service providers are subjects to these detailed and strict rules. By marking digital virtual currencies, i.e. attaching personal identities to them, not only their anonymity, but also their easy transfer can be limited. Of course, these would be an earthquake on the market of virtual digital currencies, basically created to be anonymous. Thus, the cycle of creation, transfer and receiving these currencies could stop, leaving a more transparent, whitened market of electronic currencies, without the anonymous attributes.

The basic aim of creating dark internet was granting safe space for uncensored freedom of speech and opinion, so any effort to set the boundaries of the dark net, should also respect this principle, but regulation and personalisation of anonymous networks are also needed.

Obviously, besides the law enforcement bodies, the financial institutions (banks, exchange offices, stock brokers, etc.) also advocate most loudly for the regulation of virtual currencies, driven by their will to close the channels of any expansion of virtual currencies, as these new fiscal phenomena risk their profit, their

¹⁰⁴ The proposal of the European Commission represents a milestone, concerning the amendment of the regulation on anti-money-laundering, setting up a database, including digital currencies, filled with personal data, helping to increase law enforcement activities in our changed environment, enabling better focus and cooperation. An increase in technology to effectively identify anonymous networks is badly needed. Cimpanu, Catalin: EU Plans Database of Bitcoin Users with Identities and Wallet Addresses – EU gets closer to ending Bitcoin anonymity. July 26, 2016.

<http://news.softpedia.com/news/eu-plans-database-of-bitcoin-users-with-identities-and-wallet-addresses-506650.shtml> (January 10, 2017)

usual way of activities, and are reshaping the market of financial services. Their goal is not necessarily to cease the existence of all virtual currencies, but to lay the common standards and regulation for all participants, so that all parties can compete with equal opportunities.

Conclusion

The World Wide Web is fully integrated into our way of living, including its benefits and risks, one must learn to handle and control. Using wireless technologies, internet is easily accessible through a mobile phone or a computer anywhere, with no distinction concerning the legal or illegal means or purpose of the access. Development of IT technology includes also the development of ways and means of criminal groups and activities, a chance these groups mercilessly take advantage of. Criminal acts in the real life are present in the virtual world as well. The system is effective due to its speed, and safe due to the anonymity it provides. These virtual channels are available for anonymous money transfers, but also grant access to a fast and interactive communication, and help in recruiting new members for these activities.

Virtual digital currencies, primarily Bitcoin, appeared only a few years ago, but are easily accessible by now, avoiding customary banking system, offering criminals the advantage of fast, easily accessible, untraceable and anonymous money transfer, which is very difficult for the law enforcement organizations to cope with.

Whether virtual dark net will be a blessing or a curse, nobody knows. However, one thing is sure: due to globalisation and the revolutionary development of IT technology, organised crime and terrorism have no physical boundaries anymore, so any event that occurs thousands of miles away, can become a local challenge in a short period of time, demanding preparedness to react promptly. Effective solutions and new approach are vital, with individual safeguarding capacities, perfected in international cooperation...

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Abstract

Nowadays, there have been many debates on the future implications of nanotechnology. The development of wireless sensor networks was first motivated by their military applications, such as using smart networks for battlefield surveillance.

With "smart dust", the technology has the potential to create many new things and devices. It can do so, especially with a vast range of applications in the fields of medicine, electronics and energy production.

The sensors – sized about as grain of sand, in them piezoelectric crystals – convert the information into ultrasound. Well-known, the smallest thing we can see is around 100 microns sized. When the development started, smart dust had a diameter of around one to two cm, nowadays their size is around 50 microns.

However, scientific advances have moved the smart dust motes from everyday sensor technology applications to communication networks devices.

Keywords: science fiction, smart dust, nano technology, Internet of Things, smart grid

ANTECEDENTS

As a future student of the National University of Public Service, Doctoral School of Military Sciences and Military Engineering, I have applied my mind to my third research area – defence, electronics, IT and communication. I have not had the chance to think over how complex and at the same time diverse scientific area I had chosen, which will offer me and all my fellow students a lot of new information and knowledge, and not only the past and present of this research area can be studied, but also its fantastic future can be forecast. Primarily – as an IT expert – my first serious task was to focus on supplementing my “lack of knowledge” in the area of defence electronics.

Soon, I realised that also with respect to other areas, I need to learn significantly more. Very quickly, already at the beginning of my studies, I have precisely and clearly noticed; how logically the different scientific areas have been built-up within the defence technical sciences. The established logical sequence of “defence, electronics, IT and communication” is rectilinear, and is one of the most important military (defence, strategic) areas.

Any defence electronics device is unimaginable without effective IT support.¹ The rapid improvement in the IT area has established new prospects and the basis for the most during innovative ideas, which, of course, necessarily appeared in military developments.

At the beginning of the 1970’s, in the United States of America, a handful of scientists, engineers, defence suppliers and a few officers of the American Air Force gathered to establish a professional group. The goal of the group was to elaborate on how such machines could be built which were to operate without the intervention of humans, and, furthermore, to find out how they could convince the reluctant Pentagon, about the advantages of using robots on the battlefield.

Since then, in the last decades, a new huge industry branch has appeared, and the Association for Unmanned Vehicle Systems International² has turned into a significant organisation. Nowadays, neither the army nor the majority of the citizens need to be particularly convinced about the advantages of unmanned combats and battle robots.

NEW CHAPTER OF GLOBALISATION

Beyond the traditional IT approach

The appearance of cloud-based solutions, shortly IoT (Internet of Things)³ refers to mapping the physical and a virtual world space. We can dynamically make changes to the correlations; we can get rid of traditional limitations also in the real physical world by using the latest digital tools, such as 3D sensors, robots, drones, etc. We are now able to accomplish our ideas independently of space and time. This

¹ Information Q, “Computer at our Defence”. www.informationq.com/uses-of-computers-in-different-fields-areas-sectors-industries-education Accessed on 15 August 2016.

² All things UNMANED, <http://www.auvsi.org/home>, Accessed on 9 January 2017

³ The billions of new “things” joining the internet indicate the arrival of an exciting, new era. The is an Internet of Things

offers such opportunities to anyone we have never heard about before. The cost-effectiveness of computer technology capacity has been increasing manifold, due to the appearance of cloud-based solutions; nowadays it is not required to invest into the establishment of such capacities, and even a smaller sized company is able to use complex digital functions as a service. The way to development and growth is to grow together with a big company by trying to reach higher and higher on the ladder, or by joining a larger network of a bigger, global company. New technical idea is that communication requirements of the smart grid stakeholders (public utility services, regulators, and consumers), furthermore, that of the telecommunication industry (manufacturers, and SDO service providers) are evaluated and developed directly by intelligent network applications. The transformation is happening in an exponentially increasing pace. High performance optic and mobile networks have been globally installed. With the proliferation of smart phones and other devices, nearly all consumers with purchasing power are digitally accessible.

The majority of Hungarian companies engage with global companies as suppliers, therefore for them it is crucial to adjust their operation to the virtual models. Only those Hungarian enterprises have the chance to survive, develop or grow which are able to recognise and implement the latest solutions in their business processes and in their supplier and buyer “smart” systems.



Figure 1. The Internet of Things promises a brighter future⁴

⁴ World 4.0 The Internet of Things promises a brighter future. http://www.hitech.at/site/library/frame/hitech_022013.pdf, Accessed on 28 October 2016

Hungary also has to hold its ground in this more and more intensive global race. It can only be the winner of the above process if it is able to recognise its opportunities in time, if it supports the innovation activities of its companies, and if it increases its “Industry 4.0” initiatives.⁵

INFO-COMMUNICATION DEVELOPMENT

Thanks to the information technology development, an increasing number and more diverse types of devices and information channels have become suitable for worldwide (global) communication, via smart networks. The main point of communication between the elements of intelligent networks – sensors, meters, service centres, front-pages – is the establishment of a secure, two-way information service and the provision of real-time data supply.

The billions of new “things” joining the internet indicate the arrival of an exciting new era. The IoT transforms not only cities, industries, and companies, but also the lifestyle of human beings.

The aim of my publication is to promote understanding of the actual trends, by considering the possible areas of “smart” developments, based on future information technology. Applications designed for the measurement and optimisation of energy services offer user-friendly handling for all users.

Their immanent potential – similarly to the opportunities offered by smart grid networks – has opened up new areas at global level which may significantly change the operating procedures for everyday users, and companies in the areas of industry and agriculture. With respect to the development of devices, the new technology is available not only in printing, but also in collaboration within the virtual world (3D virtual lab).

3D mice, mobile phones, laptops, glasses, and establishing a new foundation for motion and sense detection clearly indicate the way towards the establishment of smart networks at an increasingly higher level. Goal for development is the generation of power required by the ever increasing and expanding high-tech solutions, we will use renewable energy sources in the future.

WILL THERE BE A “CLEAN WAR”? – THE DRONES APPEARED

⁵ Magyar vállalatok az Ipar 4.0 ban, http://gyartastrend.hu/jovogyara/cikk/magyar_vallalatok_az_ipar_4_0_ban, Accessed on 23 September 2016.

Naturally – or unfortunately –, every new development may carry a negative impact as well. In the army of the United States of America, already thousands and thousands of robots are in use, such as remote controlled airplanes, mine clearing devices, and transportation devices, reminding us of the imperial walkers of Star Wars.

To put it simply, robots are machines which are operated based on the operating principle of “sense-think-act”.⁶ Namely, the robots, with the help of their sensors, collect data about the world surrounding them. After processing these data, they forward them to additional computer-based processors, or maybe to an artificial intelligence programme, which will make the appropriate decisions by the utilisation and assessment of the information. Finally, the mechanical systems called ‘effectors’ execute some kind of physical action in their environment.

Nowadays, we are living in the era of drone development dynamic propagation. The scale of development can only be compared to the PC revolution in the 1970’s. The use of drones surpasses by miles the law enforcement and initial military application area. Nowadays, they are spreading fast also within the civil sphere. (For example, they are used in flood protection or aerial photography) Their application is basically limited only by the creativity of the developers. No secret, the American army pumps significant capital into robotics research, because the use of robots is more suitable for performing certain tasks than humans. The majority of the currently used robots are remote-controlled, but there are significant developments using artificial intelligence. (New milestone, the unmanned aerial vehicles UAS, UAV and other drones system-level application.)

BIG JUMP – DEVELOPMENT OF IT TECHNOLOGY

Within a few decades – maximum within fifty years – information technology (parallel with communication technology) will have gone through great improvements with respect to all parameters. By now, nearly everyone applies and uses a series of 5+ generation IT devices in their everyday life.

⁶ Sense, Think, Act for Unmanned Robotic System. <http://sine.ni.com/nievents/app/overview/p/eventId/39641/site/nie/country/us/lang/en>. Accessed on 22 May 2017

Let us just see the difference between the technology in the early 1990's and an iPhone5. I am confident that after several generations of iPhone development, Apple will also apply this technology.

We should not forget about nanotechnology developments operating within a domain of 10^{-3} mm, which are able to exceed the knowledge of old large-sized computers. (They were as large as a gym room, with a size of 100-160 m²).

One of the key areas of my research is the currently globally applied Smart Dust, which has been developed exactly within the above indicated order of magnitude. Several reputable universities of the globe, (such as Berkley, Stanford, Brown, etc.) and big companies (Intel, Philips, Shell, HP) turned towards this topic with an unbelievable impetus and started new developments.




Figure 2.

The beginning: IBM 360, ESZ-R-40, -60, etc. The old biggest Computer (both IT and ICT refer to the use of a range of IT)

At the line end of time and technology, nano-sized devices (2020/10⁻³ mm) are already present. One of the key areas of my research is the currently globally

applied Smart Dust, which has been developed exactly within the above indicated order of magnitude.

SMART DUST, the new generation of extremely small info-communication systems

But what kind of device does smart dust, and what can it be used for? When the development started, smart dust had a diameter of around one to two cm, nowadays its size is around 50 microns. (The smallest thing we can see is around 100 microns.)

One of these developments involves the so-called “smart dust”, referring to the new generation of extremely small (micro/nano-sized) info-communication systems, able to perform wireless communication. Processes which can be tracked from miniature mobile devices are already available at a residential and industrial level; furthermore, the applications developed for the measurement and optimisation of energy services offer user-friendly handling for all users.

According to the celebrated future researcher Parsons, who delivers design/design-built, program/construction management, systems design/engineering, cyber/converged security, and other professional services packaged in innovative alternative delivery methods to federal, regional, and local government agencies, warned that continuous miniaturisation is one of the largest threats in the coming five to ten years, on the other hand, their application may provide significant support for all sectors with smart grids, for example education, or health care.

WE CANNOT IGNORE “CIVIL” APPLICATIONS EITHER

The use of new info-communication devices is, of course not the privilege of the energy sector, their application may provide significant support for all sectors with smart grids, for example education, or health care. The clinical application of smart dust is probably the most shocking among the implantable developments. Smart dust particles, which are smaller than sand grains, equipped with their own

antennas, organise themselves in a network within the body and they are able to carry out a whole series of complex processes.⁷

Maybe we could describe them as a “nano-army”, which could also put up a fight against malignant cells, or which could alleviate pain and, of course, are able to store the encrypted storage of the host’s personal data.



Figure 3.

The clinical applications maybe the most shocking⁸

Source: About Day1 Health (Pty) Ltd, http://www.day1health.co.za/About_Us.aspx. Accessed on 19 May 2017.

With the help of smart dust, one day doctors will be able to work within the human body without opening it up, and information will remain confidential until the host makes them accessible within its own nano-network. Maybe, it is an even more futuristic idea that smart dust is spread in the air and after breathing it in, it connects to our nervous system, and when we are standing in front of an ATM, we think of our PIN code, the smart dust detects the thought and forwards it, so our bank account can be accessed immediately.⁹

⁷ Smart dust future. <http://www.nanowerk.com/news/newsid=8535.php>, Accessed on 19 May 2017.

⁸ About Day1 Health (Pty) Ltd, http://www.day1health.co.za/About_Us.aspx. Accessed on 19 May 2017.

⁹ QUORA, “Who controls the world?” <https://www.quora.com/Who-controls-the-world>. Accessed on 15 Marc 2017

The new developments – similarly to the opportunities within smart networks – have opened up a new area at global level, which may significantly shape the operating processes of everyday users, companies, industrial and agricultural areas. Many industry observers predict huge micro-grid investments. These thoughts may seem to be fantasies, but, theoretically, all of this is possible now. The threat of tiny intelligent particles against the security of an organisation is insignificant at the moment. But, in order to avoid the previously mentioned event, first of all we need to imagine how big of a threat this technology poses to everyone. Practically all net-users can become a target.

SMART MILITARY APPLICATIONS

The slogan of new rules for new tools does not refer only to new wars, but to the used weapons as well. The next “dirty” conflict may start in the virtual world, and can destroy the earth.¹⁰ It is but natural that companies specialised in military development also take a share in the largest business enterprises. The battlefield application of new and even newer devices radically changes the concept of information space and the conditions of achieving information-based dominance.

Nowadays, it is not a secret either that several billion US dollars were allocated in the classified budget of secret services, for strengthening the attack potential within the category of military operations against computer networks. Micro/nano-sized devices (or even smart knowledge) may constitute determining elements in the network-focused warfare, through special established “network” and robot soldiers.

¹⁰ World War III will be fought on the internet.
<http://theweek.com/articles/441194/why-world-war-iii-fought-internet>. Accessed on 21 April 2017.



Figure 4.

We are able to do anything...

"If required we explore, if required we attack!"

Source: <http://www.sciencephoto.com/media/348355/view>, with self-made illustration

Many people – and not without reason – see the process as the creation of an Orwell society, which is controlled by Big Brother, who knows, sees, and controls everything. These and similar applications may have unavoidable consequences for all parts of the society.

Despite all this, certain people consider this direction of development to be positive, by keeping in mind the efficiency of criminal prosecution, elimination of election fraud, revolutionising medical information handling, and the safety of children.

CONCLUSION

Is smart dust the pinnacle of Internet of Things creativity?

The direct linking of our brain with computers is not only a science-fiction fantasy (or nightmare) any more. Nowadays, we can imagine implanting electrodes of nano-size that we are able to decode in real time, and through this, we are able to control external devices. In a hybrid or guerrilla war, when an important aim is to collect information, we can hardly distinguish between civil and military targets. Nowadays, secret services pursue not only local or regional intelligence activity, but

also want to take control over the world-wide-web, in order to prepare for a digital war. Many believe that it is the first fatal step when humanity hands over the control of its future to software-based artificial intelligence.

The emerging of Smart Dust technology will become a determinative trend, within ten years in our country too. I truly hope that new technologies will support the development of humanity towards the right direction, based on the principles of controlled security and peace-keeping, alongside the practice of common sense. According to my friends – and also to me and many others – despite the above strange pieces of information – everybody would like to sleep peacefully. Perhaps, we are starting to play God. If really that is the case and the scientific research continues with the same intensity, the sad destiny may be inevitable.



Figure. 5.
Maybe just my nightmare

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