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2007

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EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES

Major General Ferenc Kovácsics, MSO

SPECIFIC AREAS OF SECURITY-POLICY, PEACE-SUPPORTING OPERATIONS

Our globalising world, our surrounding, seen as members of NATO and EU, is becoming wider; regions are affecting Hungarian interests which previously have not built part of the Hungarian strategical - security policy concept. We all know that on the strategic level for the Hungarian forces supporting the enforcement of the national security interests of the Republic of Hungary in inland as well as abroad, is the aim of the XXI. Century, as opposed with the previous almost solely military aim.

We can state that currently the Republic of Hungary is not threatened the traditional military aggression and that is not to be expected in middle-terms either. The protection of our country is inseparable from regional security, so our armed forces must be capable to fulfill peacekeeping duties within the frame of Allied, European Union, UN and others coalitions , beside insuring the suzerainty of the country. For the Hungarian Army the emphasis has shifted from area-protection to duties beyond the borders.

Parallel with the Hungarian Army, the Military Security Office also had to adapt to the changed circumstances, to the increased requirements, to fulfilling duties under specially changed circumstances, upon which part of the national security duties - previously almost solely inland - became international.

As a result of the constant political, economical and social changes our globalising world - already mentioned - is suffering from many different types and intensity of conflicts. From the aspect of the Hungarian participation, the Balkans, Afghanistan, the Near-East, and the so called countries of the Third World are the priorities. Mutual characteristic of the conflicts arising from the collision of interests is that the aggression stops only as a result of a military force coming from outside, and only with enforcement can peace be established and maintained.

The peace-supporting operations include a wide and diverging topic touching many professional areas. Today various studies and good lecturers help

the necessary experience-exchange, the constructive dialogues and the way of thinking together, cooperating effectively in solving the problems.

I think our topic can be considered as a priority, because today, one of the most important (if not the most important) new tasks of our national armed forces is **the participation in the international peace-keeping and peace-making operations**. These operations are focused on since the end of the cold war because after the two sides are not opposing each other, the Security Council is more effectively capable of waiving with the rights given by the UN Charter, to permit peace-keeping operations.

Nevertheless, for the time being, peace-keeping means a quite new role for the armed forces, where they meet special forms of low-intensity conflicts of which we do not know much about. The aim is primarily not the participation in the conflict but the handling of it, to - without violence - prevent the conflict from becoming violent.

In the current international situation increased efforts are taken to solve the conflicts upon the provisions of Chapter VI. and VII. of the UN Charter (peaceful solving of conflicts, activities in connection with endangering and offending peace, aggression). Upon these regulations the UN had worked out many conceptions and operations, and determined the procedures of organising and implementing such missions. Regarding events affecting international security the states can be requested to participate in such missions.

Peacekeeping means a wide range of operations which is carried out by the international community in case of conflicts within or between countries, according to the mandate of the competent organs of the UN and other regional security organisations. Their implementation is carried out with total consent - accepted by the opposing parties of the conflict - in the interest to keep or restore peace, and humanitarian aid.

According to another phrasing, peacekeeping is "prevention, restraint and ending of hostility between or within countries, with the intermediation of an internationally organised and directed third party, with use of international military, police and civilian force to restore or maintain peace".

The uncertainty of the general concept arises from the fact that the conflicts differ from each other regarding content and settling, because the political circumstances, the development of the economy, the culture, the geography and climate make repeatment nearly impossible. The solution must be adjusted to the local circumstances and specialities. The differences turn up more in the praxis, when the conditions must be clearly determined, upon which such an operation can be carried out. Many times it was the neglect of the

specialities of the crises detaining the world organisation to achieve greater results in solving the crises.

In the reorganised international system - looking at security in a complex way - one can see that traditional and new, global security risks are present at the same time. The new threats and challenges are more diversified, are less visible and predictable. Characteristical tendency is the constant obliteration of the line between outside and internal risk-factors. To the new challenges it is the cooperation within international organisations, institutions and other structures offering the most effective answer.

The peace-keeping, peace-enforcement or peace-making operations depend on the participation of the member-states and from empowerment of the Security Council.

The member-states are sending more and more troops abroad in operations with the aim of re-establishing peace and security in an unstable region. It is important to note that all deployment must be carried out according to international rules and principles. The most important ones are layed down in Chapter 5, which is the **National security-policy and international regulations.**

From the perspective of a good ruling it is worth and advisable, within the system of control and balance between parliament and government, for the parliament to have an opportunity to participate in the decisions regarding exerting armed forces abroad.

We discern different sorts of international peace-missions:

1. *Peace-making*

Peace-making means the application of diplomatic means with the aim to persuade the parties of the conflict to stop hostility and to start negotiations to settle their dispute in peace. The UN can only take preventive measures when the parties of the conflict accept its participation. So peace-establishing excludes the use of force against one side to enforce stopping hostility.

1. *Peace-keeping*

Peace-keeping emerged at the beginning as a mean of handling conflicts between states. Troops of many countries under UN command adopt it to help control and to solve armed conflicts.

Today the aim of peace-keeping is to handle conflicts and civil wars within states. The tasks of UN peace-keeping forces - soldiers, policemen and other civilians - extend from keeping the opposing parts away from each other to insure their peaceful cooperation.

This means that they help in fulfilling peace-agreements, in controlling cease-fire, establishing buffer-zones and even in establishing political institutions, in cooperation with governments, social organisations and local civil groups in order to insure quick aid, disarming fighting parties and re-integrating them back to society, mine-clearance, organising and performing elections as well as promoting maintainable development.

The member-states provide their troops and armament of policemen on a voluntary basis, because the UN has no army. The election and human rights observers, as well as other civilians often cooperate with the staff in uniform. The strongest "weapon" of peace-keepers is the objectivity with which they carry out their duties.

3. Peace-enforcement

In the case of enforcement-measures the Security Council authorises the member states to take all necessary measures to achieve the goals. The understanding of the involved parties is not needed. There were only a few occasions when enforcement-measures were taken as in the case of the Gulf-war, Somalia, Ruanda, Haiti, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Iraq. These peace-enforcement operations stand under the command of one country or a group of countries and not under the command of the UN.

The provisions of the UN Charter regarding international peace and security insure the basis for peace-keeping and peace-enforcement.

4. Peace-building

Peace-building includes activities of which the aim is to support nations in strengthening peace after the conflict. These operations have a very wide range of mandates regarding their tasks of state-establishment and reconstruction.

5. Humanitarian missions

The aim of these missions is to provide humanitarian aid in case of civil wars, starvation and natural disaster - floods, drought, storms and earthquakes. Many participants want to give help in these emergency-cases - governments, social organisations, UN-offices - when the logistical assistance of the armed

forces is required as the only possible way to insure the achievement of the aid-programs.

Unfortunately today, while accomplishing peace-missions, in most of the current operational areas one has to face high terrorist threat based on **anti-Western Islamic extremist ideology**. The influence of the radical ideology in the countries with great Islamic population (e.g. Iraq) can further increase. The expansion of extremist ideologies can be further strengthened by political, economical problems as well as by permanent political instability.

The greatest problem is the expansion of Islamic radicalism in North-Africa, Near-East and Middle-Asia. The strategical goals of Islamic radicalism are establishing Islamic states based on political fundamentalism and stopping Western influence in *Islamic areas*.

Although the most probable source of the current terrorist threat is the extreme Islamic fundamentalism, we must count with international terrorism based on other political motivation arising from unknown political-economical surroundings.

According to international experiences, state-sponsored terrorism shows decreasing tendency, but with the changes of political circumstances it could again be strengthened, so terrorist groups could win protected bases and significant support.

The most frequently used method of terrorism remains the attack carried out with traditional means - first of all with explosives. We can count also with the fact that terrorists will use modern military technology to increase their destroying capability and to overcome strengthened security systems.

The means of terrorism will probably develop further through improvement of the acquisition of traditional weapons and of the capability of biological and chemical warfare. It is not probable that in the near future terrorists will acquire fully developed mass-destruction capability which could be used as a weapon but we must count with the increase of destruction-capability in this area.

The terrorist organisations in many cases insure their financial-functional base interwoven with organised crime, so most part of their income arises from this cooperation.

In drug-trafficking the terrorist and organised crime groups - mainly in Latin-America and Asia - have built out a joint distribution-network and keep

drug-producing and manufacturing areas from Middle-East to Asia under control.

According to information available, international terrorist organisations financing their activities through drug-production and drug-trafficking are looking for contacts with organised criminal groups dealing with arms-trafficking. They are trying to get weapons for drugs.

The terrorist organisations try to legalise their illegal incomes - just like organised crime groups - through money-laundering, so the investigation of the financial line of the support to terrorists and closure of the money-sources arising this way is an important task for all countries fighting terrorism.

The Military Security Office participated in the operational security tasks of the Hungarian troops serving in the missions abroad - among others in the Bosnian SFOR, at the Hungarian Army's Engineer Contingent in Okucani, at the Transport Battalion in Iraq, at UNFICYP in Cyprus, at the Military Police Contingent of the Hungarian Army in Sarajevo and in Bosnia-Herzegovina, by ISAF in Afghanistan, by KFOR in Kosovo and by EUFOR.

According to the information available general threats against the contingents are:

- different terrorist and sabotage operations, attacks against aid-transports,
- nationalism, extremist religious-political activities,
- activities of different guerrilla-groups with different nationalities and citizenships,
- grievances of ethnic groups, "special attention" of the locals,
- organised crime (which is often based on traditions, insures basic income, and is carried out by families, clans),
- Islamic aim to win space,
- activities of non-governmental or humanitarian organisations, which, beyond winning local inhabitants, could serve the concealment of the real aims,
- drug- and weapon smuggling, prostitution
- problems in identifications, lack and forging of documents, licence-numbers.

**HUNGARY'S PRIORITIES ON PEACE SUPPORT OPERATIONS IN
THE PERIOD OF NATO ACCESSION**

"Humanity should question itself, once more,
about the absurd and always unfair phenomenon of war,
on whose stage of death and pain only remains standing
the negotiating table that could and should have prevented it."

Pope John Paul II¹

1. Introduction

The fall of Communism in Europe, and the end of the bi-polar order put an end to the artificial and forced separation which had been keeping Hungary out of the mainstream of European development for the last 40+ years. Once that obstacle was removed, a consensus was reached by all Hungarian political parties to become a modern European country in the quickest possible way and with the least sacrifice and develop an economy and culture, social and political structure bases on solid grounds by becoming part of the European and Euro-Atlantic co-operative institutions.²

The changes that took place on the European continent also brought new challenges, risks and dangers to the surface. The threat of regional crises and spillover, the impact of such crises on neighboring countries, (refugees, environmental disasters...) international terrorism, and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction all comprise new challenges for security cooperation and new types of military operations other than war. Hungarian foreign policy, from the start considered Europe and Euro-Atlantic organizations (OSCE, EU, NATO, Council of Europe, and OECD) as part of one and the same "united system as mutually complementing and reinforcing components of the same structure."³

Therefore, Hungary set the goal of meeting the criteria and thus achieving full membership to all of these Institutions. But along with full membership comes the responsibility to cooperate and participate in initiatives agreements and operations set forth by these institutions. Hungary was at the forefront of the former Warsaw Pact countries to meet their objectives and has been proactive in

¹ <http://www.peaceheroes.com/quotes.htm>

² www.kum.hu/siwwa/online/10025040.html

³ *Ibid*, p.3

participating in MOOTW and Peace Support Operations mandated by the UN, NATO and the other regional security regimes. This essay will be an examination of Hungary's move from "consumer to provider" concerning security organizations and their peacekeeping efforts in the period of NATO accession.

2. Hungarian Defense Forces Development in the '90s

Beginning with an overview of the Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF), one must remember that the HDF entered a period of radical transformation after the world left behind the bi-polar opposition while Hungary went through a major overhaul of its political and economic system. The inevitable reform of the armed forces was motivated by two factors; first the general need for democratic development and modernization, and second, the commencement of preparations in Hungary for NATO membership.⁴

That time the HDF consisted of two main components, ground and the air force. The armed forces have three principal categories, Main Defense Forces, Reaction Forces and National Support Forces. It is the Reaction Forces who are combat ready, and provide most of the personnel for Peacekeeping Operations (PKO) and have the following functions: "alert duty, participation in crisis management, the fulfilment of Hungary's international commitment and participation in rescue operations in case of the natural disasters."⁵ A Peacekeeping Force Training Center was created in 1994 that had the organizational status of a regiment. To participate, a soldier would have to have completed 12 months of mandatory military service, passed aptitude, medical and physical tests and then pass an interview. Those who meet the requirements must sign a two-year contract.

The assembled Peacekeeping Company underwent a four-month-training period of refresher drills, NBC warfare protections and specific systems training. "A month is dedicated wholly to specialties encountered in peacekeeping scenarios and specific UN procedures and English Language Training"⁶ The Center has since closed and now peacekeeping training and drilling are completed by the 88th Rapid Reaction Battalion deployed at Szolnok with the Air Force base.

Participation in NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) Programme was the first step towards establishing interoperability of the HDF. Hungary joined NATO's PfP in 1994 and has designated units to participate in PfP operations

⁴ Ibid, p.1.

⁵ <http://www.ekormanyzat.hu/english?kateg=english:1258>

⁶ Hilarie McCoubrey and Justin Morris, *Regional Peacekeeping in the Post-Cold War Era*, (The Netherlands, Kluwer Law International), 2000, p52.

and exercises. The HDF feels a unique responsibility for the security of the region and in accordance with the spirit of PfP, they consistently strive to promote and expand relations and cooperation with the defense forces of the neighbouring countries which will be discussed later in this paper.

3. Hungary in Co-operative Security Institutions before 1999

At the Rome Summit in November on 1989, Heads of State and Governments of NATO member countries established the framework for the co-operation to be developed with countries of Central and Eastern Europe by creating the North Atlantic Co-Operation Council (NACC).⁷ It is a forum for dialogue for NATO and new democracies over issues of security, cooperation, transparency and mutual confidence. The multifold, dynamic and continuous development of relations between Hungary and NATO can basically be traced to three different but interlinked groups. The first is the system of bi-lateral relations between Hungary and NATO. “The establishment of official relations between Hungary and the Alliance is considered as dating from June 29, 1990 when the Hungarian Foreign Minister for Foreign Affairs, first visited NATO HQ in Brussels.”⁸ Many subsequent meetings between Governmental leaders and NATO high level official took place in the following years.

This was taken to the next level with the creation of PfP in June of 1994. Within this program new opportunities for cooperation and joint endeavors were created. Hungary was eager to not just be a participant in PfP but a provider as well. Hungary hosted two exercises early on. In 1995 the Hungarian-German-British led staff participated in Co-Operative Light 95 in Hungary. Also, Szolnok hosted exercise Cooperative Chance in 1997. Later that year they came to train in American for the first time in history in exercise Cooperative Nugget. Second is Hungary’s participation in the activities of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council have also kept it engaged in informed on the issues of security for Europe. Hungary is one of the founding members of the organization. Last is Hungary’s membership to OSCE, (formerly known as CSCE). In December of 1994 the OSCE Summit was held in Budapest. The central mission of OSCE is to build a stable and secure community and address the new conflicts or revival of old ones in the CSCE region. It is meant to be a primary instrument for early warning, conflict prevention and crisis management using *inter alia*, its peacekeeping operation and mission.⁹

In order to strengthen OSCE for peacekeeping operations, the following functions were established: to strengthen the capacity and activity in preventative diplomacy, enhance security and stability through arms control,

⁷ *ibid.*

⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs online: <http://kum.hu/siwwwwa/online/100204090.html>

⁹ Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe 1994 online <http://www.osce.org/docs/english/1990-1999.htm>

disarmament and confidence and security building throughout regional levels. Within the Code of Conduct on Political-Military Aspects of Security section VI the following objectives concerning Peacekeeping Operations were iterated:

- The Participating States stress the importance both of early identification of potential conflicts and of their joint efforts in the field of conflict prevention, crisis management and peaceful settlement of disputes.
- In the event of armed conflict, they will seek to facilitate the effective cessation of hostilities and seek to create conditions favourable to the political solution of the conflict. They will cooperate in support of humanitarian assistance to alleviate suffering among the civilian population, including facilitating the movement of personnel and resources dedicated to such tasks.¹⁰

In 1995, the U.S. Embassy assessed Hungary's progress toward interoperability and participation in multinational PKOs and MOOTW. Some of the highlights regarding PKOs were as follows:

- Went from minimal to maximal PFP participation, hosting a bilateral search and rescue exercise with the U.S. taking part in "Cooperative Nugget", hosting "Cooperative Light", and participating in all but two other PFP exercises.
- Strongly supported AWACS flights in Hungarian airspace and offered the use of Hungarian airfields and facilities in the event of the withdrawal of UNPROFOR.
- Sent Peacekeepers-trained at Hungary's new Peacekeeping Training Center –to the MFO force in the Sinai and the UNFICYP on Cyprus.
- Outlined with Romania a 15-point program of military cooperation-including the first ever joint exercises, direct links between border guards, and establishment of a "hot-line" between the two militaries.
- Signed a Memorandum on Military Cooperation with the U.S. and agreements on security of military information (GSOMIA) and exchange of military data.
- Hosted the first planning meeting and pledge to co-sponsor the U.S.-U.K. proposal for an Anti-Personnel Landmine control regime.¹¹

During the accession talks Hungary declared its full agreement with the goals laid out in NATO's Strategic Concept and its readiness to assume all the obligations stemming from the Washington Treaty "that it wanted to participate in NATO's integrated military structure as well as its defense planning

¹⁰ Ibid

¹¹ Newsletter #2 (08/02/86) Hungary and NATO, online, <http://mkogy.hu/naato/aneews2.htm>

process.”¹² Hungary’s position was that they did not want to be only a consumer but a provider of security as well, which was taken seriously by NATO. According to Hungary’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, they were able to provide a “particular Hungarian ‘surplus’ in the case of problems where they have accumulated substantial experience due to their history, set of relations and geographical proximity.”¹³

NATO also looked to Hungary as the state most closely situated closely to the Crisis in the Balkans. Keeping the goal of enhancing regional stability in sight, Hungary has established the afore mentioned Joint Hungarian-Romanian Peacekeeping Battalion and the Hungarian-Slovenian-Italian Brigade ready to commit troops to various PKOs in the region. During the Kosovo crisis it became evident that Hungarian membership to NATO allowed for a level of security that they could not otherwise achieve, and that they have a tangible say in issues related to European Security Policy.¹⁴ The Kosovo campaign and the following Peacekeeping operations were the first post-Cold War fulfilment of Article 4 mandate which combined both peacemaking and peacekeeping.

4. Hungary’s Participation in Bosnia IFOR/SFOR

The cooperation pursued in the framework of the IFOR/SFOR operation in order to bring about a settlement of the crisis in the former Yugoslavia is a particular and extremely important aspect of relations between Hungary and NATO. Following the conclusion of the Dayton Peace Agreement Hungary reacted positively to the request of the Alliance to provide bases and logistic support on Hungarian soil to the U.S. forces taking part in the IFOR operation and the multinational Nordic Brigade. It also enabled the international forces participating in Operation Joint Endeavor to transit though Hungarian territory as well as take part in the efforts aiming at the settlement of the crisis in Bosnia with an engineering battalion.

Concerning Hungary’s participation, H.E. Javier Solana, Secretary General of NATO in 1998 made the following remarks at a speech delivered to the Hungarian Parliament. From the earliest days of the UN Protection Force, and later the Implementation and Stabilization Forces, Hungary has been a stalwart friend. The Hungarian Government and people have shown their support, cooperation and hospitality to the multinational endeavors to bring peace and democracy to the Balkans. When NATO asked for bases in Hungary, the request was quickly granted. Mounting successfully these large multinational

¹² <http://kum.hu/siwwa/online/10025040.html>

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ Michta, Andrew, NATO After the Kosovo Campaign and the KFOR Peacekeeping Operations: What has Changed?, online http://wwics.si.edu/index.cfm?fuseaction=topics.publications&topic_id=1422&group_id.html

peacekeeping operations could never have been accomplished so effectively without Hungarian support...¹⁵

The peace implementation/peacekeeping mission on Bosnia-Herzegovina was approved by resolution 1031 of the UN Security Council that set forth a NATO-led multinational peace implementation force (IFOR) to provide for a peaceful settlement of the Bosnian crisis. After the signing of the Dayton Peace Accord NATO and PfP countries contributed to the 60,000 strong IFOR unit. The Republic of Hungary joined the IFOR mission on December 2nd 1995 based on the resolutions adopted by the Hungarian National Assembly: 112/1995(XII.2) on the transit and the temporary basing of IFOR troops in Hungary and 114/1995(XII.12) on the deployment of a Hungarian Engineer Contingent deployed to Okucani by January 31 1996. The engineers were assessed to be fully mission capable from February 3rd of the same year.¹⁶

Noting the fact that some of the situation had stabilized, the UN Security Council approved resolution 1088 on in December of 1996 to establish the stabilization force (SFOR). Hungarian participation in SFOR happened on the basis of resolutions passed by the National Assembly: “109/1996 (XII.17) on Hungary’s participation. Resolution 61/1998(IX.30) decided the assistance to be provided for troops relieving SFOR units and they were still participating under the same resolution until December 2003.”

Hungary had a threefold role in the IFOR/SFOR mission:

- Host Nation support-this encompasses the permission to allow the use of facilities, training ground, assets and materials, air space, frequencies as well as the coordination of traffic and a rapid settlement of arising problems.
- Transit-Hungary grants permission for uninterrupted transit on road, rail or by air through the country. In numbers this means more than 22 thousand air assets, 3500 trains, 320 thousand ground vehicles and 740 persons transited through Hungary.
- Troop contribution- Hungarian Engineer Contingent performed the significant tasks of road and rail repair (Tuzla, Zvornik), bridge construction (the Old Bridge at Mostar) communal reconstruction (Okucani, Novi) and other technical projects.¹⁷

Originally the Engineers were numbered at 416, but have been reduced to around 200 persons. The Hungarian Engineer Contingent (HEC) was and is fundamentally active in bridge building, construction and repair, road and rail

¹⁵ Javier Solana, Former Secretary General of NATO at the session of Foreign Affairs and Defense Committees of the Hungarian Parliament Budapest, 26 February 1998. <http://www.kum.hu/siwwwwa/online/10025011.html>

¹⁶ Peacekeeping Operations, online, http://193.6.238.68/mod/Bkennnt_e.html

¹⁷ Keszte, Gabor, editor, National Defense 2001, Armedia Publicztions, 2002. P17.

reconstruction, snow clearance and de-icing as well as terrain reconstruction works. The positive changes in the stabilization of the military situation contributed to fundamental changes in the tasks of SFOR. “Classical Peacekeeping” tasks were supplemented by reconstruction and tasks to assist in normalizing the life of the civilian population.

Over 360 projects carried out in all, including 88 projects during IFOR. 30 bridges with a total length of 2100 meters have been launched. Seven bridges have been de-launched. 32.4 kilometers road have been built and repaired, while 65 kilometers railway have been mended. The Engineers have mine-cleared more than 200 000 square meters and conducted 2210 diving operations. Among other construction works are 1800 square meters of parking lots, 27 helicopter landing sites, clearance of 2600 square meters of riverbeds, and 250 meters of sewage system.¹⁸

The forces of the Contingent have been making a name and prestige for themselves over the last five years. It's shown activity in the peacekeeping mission has been instrumental in forming a positive image about Hungarian Defense Forces, Hungarian soldiers abroad, and proved that the Hungarian Defense Forces are ready and have the ability to participate in international operations. Since Hungary joined NATO in 1999, this country therefore served in SFOR first as a Partnership for Peace (PfP) country, and then as a full NATO member.¹⁹

The initial oversized structures of the IFOR/SFOR served the purpose of military deterrence but NATO has realized that it has to create a more flexible and efficient force using smaller numbers to meet the many challenges of PKOs. Besides the reduction in force numbers there are continuous changes in the composition of SFOR troops. The HDF experienced some frustration that is not uncommon to all peacekeepers. They found that there must be an intrinsic motivation coming from the local population and leadership to truly make any PKO successful. Implementation of the Dayton-process is hampered by the slow progress of the civilian implementation, which can mainly be attributed to the lack of the willingness to cooperate on all sides of the parties.²⁰

5. KFOR

Acting upon the request of NATO, the Hungarian government, on June 15th 1999 proposed to the National Assembly the sending of a Hungarian Battalion with a maximum of 350 soldiers to the Balkans. The bulk of the HDF Guard and Security Contingent came from the 62nd Bercsényi Miklós and the

¹⁸ www.nato.int/fyrom.htm

¹⁹ Hungarian Defence Mirror, online <http://honvedelem.hu>

²⁰ Keszte, Gábor, editor, National Defense 2001, Armedia Publications, 2002. P15.

5th Bocskai István Mechanized Infantry Brigade from Hódmezővásárhely and Debrecen.²¹

In June of 1999 troops left for Pristina and then came under the command of the KFOR HQs. For the next year the soldiers would conduct Security and Guard duties. On the 15th of June 2000, the Klapka György Mechanized Infantry Brigade handed over the responsibility for guarding Mount Goles to soldiers of the Multinational Brigade Center (MNBC).

The Commander of the HDF, Chief of Staff issued an order that same year to supplement the battalion with a 14 person strong HDF preventative Medical Laboratory to provide care to the full ranks of KFOR.

The main mission of the HDF Guard and Security Battalion (338 person strong) was to provide immediate security of KFOR main HQs and to maintain a constant watch in the ranks of the immediate reaction units, which was ordered to carry out the tasks in the area of responsibility of the MNBC. The personnel of the battalion were solely volunteers, through competition-who serve as professional and contract soldiers (officers NCOs and warrant officers).

6. Peacekeeping Operations Elsewhere

The Republic of Hungary took an active part in the multinational peacekeeping operations of the United Nations and OSCE since as early as August 1988.²² One of the most significant early multinational mission that the HDF participated in was the Multinational Force and Observers mission that controlled the implementation of the Camp David Agreement signed by the U.S. Israel and Egypt. The HDF sent a mixed military police team to the Sinai-peninsula in 1995 carrying out the following tasks:

- to formulate proposals to the force commander about military policing issues
- liaison with police authorities of the host countries providing investigative work, physical control and crime prevention, and traffic regulation.
- patrol duty
- escort service.²³

Hungary also served in the UNFICYP mission in Cyprus. The HDF began with 4 military observers in August of 1993 and by 1995 had increased its participation to 114 persons. They serve as part of the Austrian-Slovenian-

²¹ Kosovo Force, KFOR Contingent: Hungary, <http://www.nato.int/kfor/kfor/nations/hungary.htm>

²² Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Hungarian Defence Forces, on line, <http://kum.hu/siwwwwa/online/10020493.html>, p 7.

²³ Keszte, p13.

Hungarian multinational battalion. The performance of the Hungarian unit demonstrated even in high intensity conflict situations, has been appreciated by both the Austrian and UNFICYP Commands.²⁴

After signing the Memorandum of Understanding with the Austrian party, the United Nations approved an increased Hungarian participation to comprise a unit under subordinate to Austrian command. At the present, the representatives of the Hungarian contingent are “functioning as Head of Personnel Department of UNFICYP HQs and Chief Duty Officer.”²⁵ The increased participation reflected in the force structure such as an independent Hungarian company. Medical, communication and administrative support of the company was comprised of 10 soldiers.

7. Hungary’s Balkans Policy

One of the main goals of the Hungarian Republic’s security and defense policy was to promote the sustainment international peace and to strengthen the security and stabilization of Europe and the Euro-Atlantic area. The center of interest of the international community (NATO, EU) had moved from the so called traditional crisis areas towards new regions as Afghanistan and Iraq. Hungary was fully committed to participate in these engagements and to contribute to the efforts of the international community. In addition to this, Hungary has a permanent interest in continuing the efforts to enhance stability in the Balkan region as well as in the economic rebuilding and the establishment of normalcy the countries there. In co-ordination with its security and defense policy principles, Hungary had about 1050 military personnel in crisis management and peace support operations in different parts of the world taking its international share in the war against terrorism.

In the ISAF operation there was a small medical contingent that consisted of 6 personnel who remained in service till the end of 2004. UN SC Resolution 1510 extended the mandate of the ISAF to areas beyond Kabul. The Hungarian National Assembly, with its resolution passed on 10 Oct 2003 allowed a maximum of 50 military personnel to serve at a time in ISAF, or its follow on mission led by NATO in individual positions. The 50 allowed positions were filled with staff officers from NATO HQ, experts in the German led Kunduz PRT (Provincial Reconstruction Team) and as engineers or road constructors, specialists or as military observers.

In order to assist Coalition Forces in rebuilding Iraq and instituting democratic Self Government, the National Assembly Resolution 65/2003 (03

²⁴ Peacekeeping Operations online, http://193.6.238.68/mod/bkefennt_e.htm

²⁵ Ibid

June), approved the participation of a 300 person Hungarian contingent to serve in SFIR (Stabilization Force in Iraq). The transport battalion and some staff officers are part of the Polish led Multinational Division having its HQ in Babylon (South Center Sector). The battalion carried out transportation and escort tasks in the interest of the division, but occasionally it took part in the transportation of humanitarian materials. The National Assembly extended the service time of the contingent till 31 December 2004.

As far as the new century was concerned Hungary supported the continuation of a coordinated NATO-EU strategy for the Western Balkans. In this regard, the identification of specific joint objectives and assets to achieve them were highly preferable for Hungary in order to make reasonable division of tasks among international actors (NATO and the EU along with other international actors in theatre).

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THE BORDER GUARDS' PREPAREDNESS TO THE SCHENGEN REGIME

1. Legal Status

1998 was a key year in the life of the Border Guards (BG). The last conscript demobilized in April and ever since that time the law enforcement tasks are performed by professional soldiers. These tasks were regulated by Act XXXII of 1997 on Border Guards. Up until 2005, the BG was an institution with a twofold legal status. One was responsible for the armed defence of the country while the other one was in charge of law enforcement, i.e.: controlling passengers, vehicles, checking documents, using means of coercion. As of January 2005, this twofold legal status discontinued since the amendment of the Constitution (Act CIV of 2004) changed it into being an institution solely responsible for law enforcement supervised by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and controlled by the Government. The country's accession to NATO and the EU had a great influence on these changes. The amendment of the 1997 law, however, did not settle the constitutional changes, the construction of a modern institution, the potential merger with the Police, its own independence, or the legal status of its employees. All this led to constant uncertainty at the very period of preparation to the Schengen Regime. They have been working on the modification of the law for more than a year but there are many aspects that hinder the reform of this law. The bill requires a qualified majority vote while the constantly changing Community law (codex on border crossing, decree on cross-border trading, law enforcement database, cooperation of authorities in Member States, creation of joint duty places) impedes legal reforms.

2. Preparation Scheduling

Parallel with the change of the legal status of the border guards and the switch to employing professionals, two new training institutions were created on the outskirts of the capital; a vocational secondary school focusing on border law enforcement and an adult training institution on management (BVTI).

The very fact that the leaders of the Hungarian Border Guards were preparing for the implementation of the Schengen Agreement, its Implementation Agreement and the related regulations, (shortened to Schengen Regime) played a great role in shaping the structure and objectives of the BVTI. Hence, the very first course and successful application of the BVTI was on the Schengen Supervisory Standard, where the leaders of the BG studied the theory and practice of the Schengen Agreement in Germany. All regional and HQ leaders of the BG

were trained on a biweekly basis based on the findings of this study visit, where they learned about the EU, the Schengen Regime and their future inflicted by the Amsterdam Treaty. The concept of freedom, security and law of that time changed significantly due to the a few terror attacks and the enlargement of 2004. In other words, the internal and external security became more vital, leading to a forced improvement of cooperation of the Ministries of Justice and Internal Affairs, this resulting in demanding faster preparation of the Border Guards. The most tangible demands were voiced over cross border organised crime and illegal migration.

Based on previous experience the preparation of the Hungarian Border Guards shall take place in two phases. The first was the accession to the EU when certain measures were already introduced, while the second will start when all other regulations will be applied as we join the Schengen Regime. The scheduling of this process is the following:

- It appears in the mid-term strategy of the BG
- The ministerial decrees of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (17/2001, 32/2002, 3/2004, 33/2005)
- The Schengen Action Plan
- In the adoption of the National Programme of the communal achievements
- Progress Report of the Commission
- And finally it is determined in the preliminary control and the communal achievements

On the other hand, this is also a process that started in 1989, gained momentum in 1997 when the law on guarding the borders and the BG was passed and is expected to end in 2008.

The BG's profile of protecting security and law and order was strengthened by the law on the international cooperation of law enforcement agencies, the law on the entry and residence of foreigners, the Criminal Code, and the statute of criminal procedure. These laws made it possible for the Border Guards to efficiently step up against illegal migration, against international organised crime and to play an active role in establishing law and order as an investigative authority responsible for minor offences and alien policing.

Based on the experiences of the Schengen countries the Hungarian BG increased its staff by 2000, most of whom contributed to the reinforcement of the external borders.

In order to properly train the staff, vocational schools were created for border law enforcement while new departments were opened for training officers at the Police Academy and at the Miklós Zrínyi National Defence University. The entire staff of the Hungarian BG underwent an EU-training with

the contribution of EU member experts while they also take part in updating trainings on the Schengen Regime in 2005. Moreover, the Hungarian BG takes part in training professionals from countries awaiting accession.

3. Technical preparation

As of 1999, the BG began its technical development mainly from PHARE funds in order to grow into an institution that uses the most up-to-date technology. One of its main goals was to build-up a proper IT (information technology) system that allows SIS development and assists frontier traffic control. There was also need to purchase document scanners, endoscopes and CO meters. In order to enhance its reconnaissance ability the BG acquired night-vision devices, thermo cameras, and motion-detectors, all working in a unified structure. In order to become more mobile, they also purchased portable deployment centres, vehicles equipped with thermo cameras, special surveillance buses.

To synchronise all these, a GPS-based guiding system was built-up on the frontiers, while a country-wide structure is being built as well. Four surveillance centres were reconstructed on the Ukrainian border, while two were rebuilt on the border with Serbia. All these projects were implemented with the assistance of PHARE funds; EU resources thus totalled 16 billion HUF in the technical development of the Hungarian Border Guards.

The above mentioned legal, structural, and technical developments led to an increase in the efficiency of the institution. A telling example is the percentage of the detected illegal migrants that grew from 60% in the late 90's to 90% of today. (**Table 1.**)




Table made by Dr. Ritecz György based on the data of the HQ of the BG

The Schengen Fund with its total sum of 24 billion HUF may also be used as further source of development. Up until spring of 2006, however, only 8 billion has been used. This low percentage indicates that there is still a lot of work to be done in order to take full advantage of the Schengen Fund.

The operational costs have to be granted from national sources and even this is problematic. There is a brand new, high tech surveillance boat on the Danube I saw with my own eyes, equipped with the most up to date devices and procured for tens of millions of HUF that is anchored in the port as there is hardly any money for its operation.

In order to solve all these complex issues, the BG developed a multi-faceted solution. One of the answers is the Integrated Management Centre²⁶ through which the BG coordinates the national activities concerning illegal migration of the Police, the Office of Immigration and Nationality, the Hungarian Customs and Finance Guard, the Hungarian Labour Inspectorate.

There is a strong need to implement the Integrated Border Management (IBM) in the spirit of the Hague Programme, i.e.: to apply an effective and harmonised structure of the available human, technical and financial resources. This necessity does not only concern Hungary, as you can see in the figures of the neighbouring Austria (**Table 2**).





Diagram made by Dr Ritecz György based on the data of Organisierte Schlepperkriminalität Lagebericht für Jänner 2006 – Republik Österreich Bundesministerium für Inneres

²⁶ Joint directive nr. 2/2002. of the Ministry of Internal Affairs, Ministry of Finances and Ministry of Social Welfare. 20/2004, 3/222004 Ministry of Internal Affairs directive

The structure of the screening possibilities build-up an interrelated organisation, which illustrates the systemic character of the preparation to the Schengen Regime: (Table 3)



1. Political, economic and informative means of handling migration
 2. Applying visa requirements
 3. Transferred document experts
 4. Using liaison officers *May be used in connection with countries of origin, while*
 5. The responsibility of carrier
 6. The structure of border surveillance in transit countries
 7. Safe third countries *Are operational tasks for transit countries, whereas*
 8. The strict surveillance of external borders
 9. Taking harmonization measures
 10. Checks in deep territory
- Are the responsibilities of EU member countries²⁷.

As long as the IBM structure will be functioning, the countries' law and order can be maintained even after the suspension of border control. According to the third clause of the Accession Treaty, the new member countries had to fulfil certain regulations of the Schengen Regime at the time of the accession²⁸ while many others could wait. The matter of border law enforcement and the time of the suspension of internal border control depend on when these regulations will be completed. These tasks were regulated by the Government Decree²⁹ on the adoption of the Schengen Regime accomplishments.

One of the newest developments was the establishment of the AFIS system, although the number of ultimate users has to be increased in order to

²⁷ Based on Dr.Ritecz György's PHD dissertation

²⁸ See Annex 1 of the Accession Treaty

²⁹ 23282004. (XII.21) Government Decree

carry out a quick and effective procedure. The creation of the Digital Unified Radio Transmission (DURT) system is also a quality step towards the construction of a well-functioning scheme. By mid-2006 this service will be operating in Budapest and its area while by January 2007 it will run nationally. In order to fully take advantage of the possibilities of the system and to perform the tasks successfully, there is a need to purchase equipments worth 28 billion HUF so all authorised agencies can make the most of it. The applicability of controlling the internal border and chasing the perpetrator over the border is the condition of the operation of the DURT system, thus keeping deadlines is important. The above-mentioned system is a significant element of the deep territory actions, the illegal migrants' screening net or the deployment management schemes.

Based on the positive experiences gained through the provisional operation of the FADO system, the secured information sharing and database system will start its full operation by mid 2006. Under the coordination of the BG, all authorised agencies (such as the BG, Police, the Office of Immigration and Nationality, embassies, security services, intelligence) may be able to use the Hungarian system that detects forging named NEKOR.

As a part of the international information sharing system, a joint Hungarian-Romanian contact site was created in early 2005 while in 2006 a similar site was formed at a border crossing with Austria where border guards work mutually with the police thus strengthening crime prevention and law enforcement.

As a sign of respect and acknowledgement of the international BG community, Hungarian border guards showed up in FRONTEX over the last year. (Vice president, head of land border unit, member of risk analysing unit). A Hungarian general is the head of one of the most important border law enforcement projects of the EU, called EUBAM, while there are 5 Hungarian border guards involved in settling the Ukrainian-Moldavian border dispute as well as in supporting the development of BG agencies.

Hungary is also the proud coordinator of the West-Balkan states' internal and justice matters within the frames of the South-Eastern European cooperation and the Salzburg process. The Regional Border Law Enforcement Centre that has been actively and successfully operating for one and a half years as the joint project of the Ukraine, Poland, Slovakia and Hungary, as well as that of the IBM received EU funds through two tenders. The cooperation on the Romanian and Serbian borders as well as the reinforcement of the IBM tactical exercises operate with the international assistance of Austria, France, Spain and the EU. Hungarian and Spanish border law enforcement agencies train their Turkish counterparts in the framework of Twinning Programmes.

New legislation and amendments are necessary in order to increase security and deal with migration in the following areas:

- The regulation of residence of citizens of the European Economic Area (EEA), as the Alien Police Act of 2004 contains only adjustments regarding EEA citizens.
- To reconcile matters of judicature and judicial harmonization concerning the entry and residence of third country nationals. The Alien Police Act shall regulate the support of legal migration in order to step up successfully against illegal migration. This is also how the framework of authorities shall be determined, standardizing the regulatory measures and powers.
- The full harmonization of many EU directives, community definitions and regulatory measures. There is a need to find a solution for the disappearance of asylum seekers during refugee status determination procedures (RSDP) (the rate is half of the applicants) by means of accelerated procedure, better IT cooperation between authorities (fingerprint database), and application of agreements on deportation. Proceedings may be conducted at the state borders³⁰, however, it is difficult to harmonise these actions with constitutional regulations.
- Enhancing public order and security would be cheaper if the Border Guards conducted the whole misdemeanour proceedings as divided authority (Police + Border Guards) is more expensive. Violation of law would be handled by a single authority. It would not be a need to detain perpetrators at police stations for offences of illegal border crossing, infringement of documents, of law enforcement, of vandalizing or forging landmarks, or any infringement of the Alien Police Act. Authorizing the Border Guards to fine perpetrators on the spot would also be justified.
- Another task is to make new legislation regarding the abandonment of border checks within the Community borders and to draw up norms concerning the formation of unobstructed crossings in order to create the ability of temporarily reinstating border checks anytime. The adjustment of the system responsible for the provision of instruments and personnel controlling the internal borders has been postponed for years, while the Commission expressed its interest about these plans.

4. Concerns

The European Union has been transferring the financial support from the Schengen Fund, the most significant source of development, in three

³⁰ Council Directive 2005/85/EC provides other authorities apart from those carrying out immigration controls to process cases at the border (Article 4. paragraph 2.d). As regards personnel the only requirement is that the procedure should be carried out “by persons with appropriate knowledge of the relevant standards applicable in the field of asylum and refugee law”(Article 35. paragraph 3.d)

instalments, taking place after the financial decision of the given year. The European Commission adopted a resolution in December 2004 on the financial support concerning Hungary in 2004. Accordingly, the first instalment was transferred at the end of December 2004. In the meantime, the European Commission adopted another resolution in December 2005 on the Schengen Fund regarding the financial support directed to Hungary in 2005. Fifty-five million euros were transferred to Hungary at the end of December 2005 based on this resolution.

Developments sponsored through the Schengen Fund need to meet the requirements of one of the following four objectives:

- The main priority is the development concerning the guarding of external borders of the EU, thus a number of land, blue and air border crossing points, foreign representation, law enforcement office, technical equipment of border control, as well as the training of professionals are to be developed.
- New measures will be taken in order to improve the efficiency of deep territory surveillance. Steps will be taken towards an integrated Border Law Enforcement body, towards the modernization of controlling capability of international waterways and towards the creation of modern aerial and highway patrol.
- Enhancing data disclosure capability in order to increase efficiency (harmonization of records, exchange of data, and the creation of possibilities to control travel documents supplied with biometric marks in order to achieve quicker and simpler alien police administration.
- Development aimed at enhancing the cooperation capacity and competence of international law enforcement agencies. Cross border crime detection and investigation is funded as well as the development of the network of liaison officers.

December 31, 2006 was regarded as a deadline for signing the contract based on the 35th § of the Accession Treaty concerning the allocation period of the Schengen Fund in Hungary. According to the Commission's interpretation issued in 2006 however, the end of 2006 is the deadline for the implementation not that of contract signing, therefore developments must end by December 31st 2006. Even though two Commission resolutions regarding the Schengen Fund stipulate this expectation, it is contradictory to the Accession Treaty, to other expectations embraced in the resolution, to payment regulations and to the practice of the Schengen Funds' utilization system. Moreover, the drafting of Brussels' set of requirements, as well as the first financial decision and the transfer of the first instalment was delayed by the Commission for more than a year. The national developments concerning the second generation Schengen Information System (SIS II) - which are also covered by the Schengen Fund - may only be determined with detailed knowledge of the technical parameters

coming from Brussels. Additionally, many complex - thus long-term projects - are to be implemented with the assistance of the Scheme Fund.

Having regards to the above mentioned, Hungary requested the extension of the implementation deadline from the Commission in accordance with the Accession Treaty. If this request is rejected, two thirds, or even half of the HUF 42 billion financial assistance may be lost for us.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs' indicative programme covering the investments subsidised by the Schengen Fund meets all four objectives mentioned above ranging from the construction investments related to the Border Law Enforcement offices through special instrument procurements to complex IT developments. The ultimate beneficiaries of these developments are the Border Guards and the Police (special deployment instruments, vehicles, clothing, Border Law Enforcement appliances and trainings). Developments affecting the Ministry of Foreign Affairs include the improvement of IT infrastructure of the foreign representations, while that of the Secret Services consists of the upgrading of border traffic control and enhancement of the capacity of criminal proceedings. The proportion of IT development is rather substantial; the central component of the national SIS II system is also covered by the Fund.

The implementation of developments related to internal affairs started in the autumn of 2004. Up until spring 2006 ten contracts were signed on development proceedings and on involving external experts, the latter covered by the expenses of the project management. That is only a fragment of the whole work. Instead of the planned 3 billion HUF for the Border Guards complement increase only 1.8 billion HUF was transferred as provision for Central Headquarters of the BG and the involved BG HQs. The trainings within the Border Guards have also started.

Altogether 8.7 billion HUF is tied-up by contract from the Schengen Fund to finance developments related to internal affairs. The new project structure formulated in autumn 2005 has not accelerated the process either as no public procurement procedure has been announced since then.

The Customs and Finance Guard is entitled to use 6.2 billion HUF from the Schengen Fund for its developments. The development of 11 road frontier stations are planned (Záhony, Barabás, Lónya, Létavértes, Bácsalmás, Tiszasziget, Hercegszántó, Beremend, Udvar, Berzence and Letenye new motorway border crossing point). Only the Project Management Expenditure was used until the beginning of 2006. The reason for that was the occurrence of unforeseen obstacles during the preparation period of most projects. These were out of the competence of the Customs and Finance Guard (e.g. the property relations of land involved in the development are unsettled, expropriation had to be ordered but the proceeding takes longer than expected)

Execution and utilization are also delayed by the fact that several bodies have to cooperate. The Government Decree³¹ on the financial planning, implementation and control of the use of the Schengen Fund, as well as the cooperation agreement between the national development agency's central contracting unit and the Customs and Finance Guards clearly separates the actual user of the fund and implementing agency responsible for the running of the public procurement procedure. Drafting the implementation plans and professional administration, is thus rather difficult, as well as the drawing up the call for tender and that of quality assurance. In consequence, the Záhony development was taken out from the Indicative programme and the requirements of technical implementation were lowered. As a result, sources became available, which can be rearranged, while the Záhony development has to be financed from the national budget.

The development of the Mohács blue border crossing point and Eperjeske rail reloading station subordinate to the Ministry of Economy and Transportation cost 3.57 billion HUF, out of which 2.85 billion HUF is financed by the Schengen Fund. On the expense of the project management the ministry had the implementation plans drawn up. Altogether 56 million HUF has been paid. The public procurement procedure concerning building constructions was launched in November 2005.

As seen from the examples above, the delay experienced during the preparation of developments is significant. The original deadline set for the use of financial support of the Fund is hard to meet, that is to say the development will not be finished by December 31, 2006. Even in case of a successful public procurement procedure, the development cannot be completed before September 2006. It is vital that the European Commission allows the use of support in 2007 as well, because without that the ongoing developments have to be fully sponsored by the Hungarian budget.

S, as an EU level IT monitoring system, serves two purposes: maintaining public order and security (including national security) and the freedom of movement of individuals. SIS is basically one of the most important, so called compensational measures that have to be taken in order to discontinue frontier control at the inner borders. It ensures the access to warning marks of individuals and subjects for border guarding, police, alien control, visa granting, customs and judicial (courts, public prosecutor offices) institutions, document bureaus and the competent national security bodies.

A feasibility study was drawn up on the Hungarian accession to SIS II, financed by PHARE 2002. With a view to the Hungarian accession and according to the decree of the Ministry of Internal Affairs on the implementation

³¹ Government Decree 179/2004. (V. 26.)

of preparation tasks³², the IT development is being completed on the basis of this study which is continually altered. In October 2005 the Central Data Processing, Records and Election Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs became the implementing and operating organization of SIS II system integration centre. The SIRENE authority that ensures the exchange of complementary information was placed at the Centre of International Cooperation of Law Enforcement Agencies of the National Police Headquarters. The preparation for proclaiming the implementing-developing procurement tenders is ongoing. The preparations of contact points of national systems have started at the SIRENE office, while all others are under investigation.

The Minister of Internal Affairs ordered the set up of a Legal Committee that prepares the necessary Hungarian legislation for the accession to the SIS II system by 31st October 2005. The Members of the Committee are the delegated representatives of the involved administrative organizational divisions and institutions subordinate to the Minister of Internal Affairs. The Ministry of Internal Affairs requested the data protection ombudsman, the Ministry of Justice, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of the Treasury to participate. The committee has been set up; it performs its tasks in accordance with the legal acts of the Community and the Union.

According to the Schengen Action Plan, a firm and unified IT background is necessary under the control of the Ministry of Internal Affairs to reach the following objectives: to develop protected and safe IT and data processing centres, unified data transferring and telecommunication infrastructure, that enable the exchange of data between the national contact points, the Visa Information System (VIS), SIRENE offices and the Hungarian partner institutions. In order to carry out this task, computers, storage and active network devices were and are still being purchased for the BG and Police sponsored from the Schengen Fund and PHARE programme.

No decision has been made by the Union on interlinking SIS II and VIS. If the interlink takes place at a national level and not centrally, the Ministry of Internal Affairs will have a feasibility study on it as well. The European Commission has started to investigate the possibility of mutual cooperation between SIS II, VIS and Eurodac³³.

³² 7. 33/ 2005. (BK 19) Ministry of Internal Affairs decree

³³ See 15122/05 CATS 82 ASIM which tries to reduce the following deficiencies: limitations to alphanumeric searches, no benefits for frequent bona fide travelers, identification of illegal immigrants is difficult, inefficiencies in the adaptation of the Dublin II Regulation, no possibility to use asylum, immigration and visa data for internal security purposes, not all categories of third-country nationals are checked, incomplete monitoring of entry and exit of third country nationals, lack of biometric identification devices, no registration of EU citizens at European level, the identification of victims of disasters and unidentified bodies.

In order to join the SIS II system, the current IT infrastructure needs to be improved based on the requirements of high technology, and the development of protected and safe national communication solution. The IT readiness of the institutions has been examined. Developments of supply and technical standard of IT devices and integrated systems are most needed, both in quality and quantity, at the Border Guards and the Police.

It is also necessary to strengthen the IT setting ensuring the operation of national database at the Central Data Processing, Records and Election Office of the Ministry of Internal Affairs (Central Office). In order to carry out those tasks devices have been replaced, through PHARE 2002 and 2003, the Interim Support and the client and computer procurement process which was implemented in the first phase of the Schengen Fund. Purchasing and starting the operation of device sets and enlargement of storage mechanisms of SIS II integration system centre is a central investment task. Apart from the replacement of these client devices, these investments influence the exchange of the regional and local work setting.

With the above mentioned developments, an adequate foundation for the IT infrastructure of the future developments and up-to-date instruments for safe operation became part of the system. A larger quantity of client instrument is planned to be procured right before adopting the Schengen regime and after the instruments requiring longer development period are procured and put into operation.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs started to prepare for the SIS II accession in time. It delegated well educated and prepared experts to the institutions of the European Union (workgroups of the Council and the Commission). They took a significant part in both the adaptation of information and the representation of Hungarian interest. In February 2004, parallel with the delegation to the institutions of the Union, the SIS II workgroup was set up. This workgroup evaluates the documents issued by the Union and makes decisions on the national development. The Hungarian workgroup cooperated on the main decision-making points of the above mentioned feasibility study.

The European Commission signed a contract in October 2004 with a consortium made up of HP and Steria, the main contractors who won the IT tender for developing SIS II and VIS. What may have an impact on the time span of the project is that the contractors, as a result of a lawsuit³⁴, submitted only the temporary version of Interface Control Document that is necessary for

³⁴ The implementer, who lost the tender, commenced a law-suit against the European Commission and the Court of First Instance suspended the implementation of the project. The court delivered judgement at the end of January 2005 and dismissed the case concerning the plaintiff's request to take temporary measures. Subsequently, the plaintiff withdrew the charges in February 2005.

putting out for national tenders. The responsible project manager of the Commission called the tender winner consortium to sack their project manager from carrying on the duties of SIS II and to assign a new project manager. All these aspects caused further delay and problems, while the human resource shortage occurring at the Commission also triggers trouble.

The Commission indicated that concerning the SIS II data transferring network the s-TESTA technical specification is being confirmed. The Commission does not consider the alternative plan concerning the network necessary. In spite of this, currently used networks are examined at the request of Member States. The s-TESTA, a large bandwidth network financed by the central budget of the Union, is favourable for Hungary.

In the short run, a decision of the Commission is needed in order to amalgamate SIS II and VIS at Community level. Experts supported this idea, thus the March 2007 deadline for implementing SIS II remains the same, but the merger of SIS II and VIS takes place by the end of 2007, this indeed determining the progress of national projects. Introducing SIS II requires carrying out tasks from the new Member States and also from those who are currently using SIS II, as they have to modify their national system and time is needed for the switch-over. The fact that some old Member States have interest in keeping the current system and have a hard time accepting the different approach of the Commission that is authorized with the management of the project, need to be taken into consideration. This is part of the reason why there are complaints at experts' meetings concerning the lack of technical information and financing difficulties at a national level.

Unfortunately, there was a considerable fluctuation within the staff participating in the Hungarian preparation for SIS, which slowed down the preparation process, thus the adaptation to SIS II of the national IT system is behind schedule.

The own contribution needed for the effective cooperation was often missing, which precluded the possibility of submitting co-financed applications. These were small amounts compared to the expected support and professional, international profit, so they were rather considered as management failure.

It is problematic that Ferihegy International Airport has a new owner (BAA International Holding Ltd.) as its expectations do not match the formerly drawn up plans so the Schengen developments implemented so far have lost their relevance. A new concept therefore needs to be formulated and the deadline is quite short. The surveillance conditions of small airports (Pogány, Taszár, Szeged, Békéscsaba) on the other hand are not adequate either.

Although Hungary participated actively in the creation of ILO-Net and the accompanying legislation, due to scarce sources, there is only one migration

liaison border guard who works in Berlin and one Office of Immigration and Nationality employee in Beijing while other Member States subject to illegal migration employ dozens of liaison officers in the countries of origin and transit countries.

To sum up, there are several risk factors in the central projects of the Union, which occur in the sphere of interest of the Commission and other member states and can delay the implementation of the project over the final deadline of March 2007. According to some, 6-18-month delay is anticipated. The conditions to pass a Commission resolution on authorizing the unlimited implementation of the Schengen regime are the following: testing the central SIS II system, implementing the central system, reorganization of old Member States, integration of new ones, the visit of the assessment committee and submitting its report. The delay of certain central or national projects is a major risk factor and may result in the rescheduling of our accession date set for October 2007.

Border control is hampered by the fact that the mobile screening instruments are not perfect, the mobile inspection instruments of the quay are insufficient, pre-screening is not possible. At the same time, most of the available instruments are unutilized because of the restriction on operational costs (accumulators, fuel-shortage).

A major concern, besides the unsettled organizational issues, is how to ensure the operational setting. In recent years, law enforcement developments and the material costs of the organization were not in accordance with each other, the latter even decreased³⁵ in total. Several devices therefore cannot be or can only partially be utilized and this hampers the proceedings and delays the taken measures.

The preparation is also impeded owing to the lack of knowledge of foreign languages. This applies to the working languages of the Union and to the languages of the neighbouring countries as well, which is highly worrying. This is why 1600 people were to attend language courses, which have not started until spring 2006. The courses will probably start in the second part of 2006, thus fewer people can participate for a shorter period of time. The goal, to have 2-4 border guards at each service group who speak English and the language of a neighbouring country respectively, cannot be achieved. The professional training of the permanent staff was also to be financed from the Schengen Fund, it initially included 6262 people, but not all of them will eventually receive this training. Surveys concluded by the BG also showed that the communication skills of the staff are inadequate and the competence level of implementing the

³⁵ All this comes at a time when the BG is bound to make a 5.6 billion HUF; i.e.: they would need to sell the premises of the national HQ in order not to close the financial year with 15% deficit. It is worth noting that the BG has never closed the year with a deficit.

Schengen regime is low. In addition, there is not a lot of visual aid available to be used at the trainings, especially at local level. The training methods are not varied, there are few simulation exercises, and the training materials are abstract and not adequately specified for the given position. In addition, the basic knowledge of those who graduate from law enforcement secondary schools is imperfect.

The efficiency of the law enforcement system and IBM is impeded by the lack of the real power of other outer screens. Foreign missions, for instance do not feel the responsibility for visa procedures because of the divided authority of visa granting; the issue is rather a question of profits for them. There are few liaison and migration law enforcement officers; contact making with partner authorities and authorities of foreign countries is slow, as well as personal work relations that are often imperfect.

Fear of losing one's job is dominating border law enforcement activities. Questions that arise are such: What is going to happen with the organisation? Is it going to be merged with the Police? Is it going to stay independent? What will be the fate of those working at the internal borders? Where will the external border be? What kind of regime will be applied at the Romanian-Hungarian border? All this living uncertainties divert the attention of the border guards from the preparations to the Schengen change.

5. Monitoring and Evaluation of the Preparation

The date of accession to the Schengen area of the new Member States was set to October 2007 by the Hague Program and the Schengen Assessment workgroup. The schedule:

- Conducting national questionnaire survey for the Secretariat of the Council by 1st December 2005, then submitting it on 10th January 2006 in Brussels, where additional questions were raised from Hungary, which were answered in March 2006
- Onsite inspection (phase 1.: areas not dependent on SIS, phase 2.: conditions on implementing SIS)
- The seven expert missions draw up a report in the Schengen Assessment Workgroup
- Submission to the Council
- If the Member States meet the criteria, Council Resolution on ceasing border control at the internal borders. The resolution will be passed in September 2007 at best, based on which the whole Schengen regime can be implemented in October 2007.


According to this schedule, the Assessment Committee's work in Hungary is as follows:

- Cooperation of law enforcement agencies: 15-19 February 2006

- Data protection: 6-8 March 2006
- Land borders: 20-27 May 2006
- Air borders: 15-19 June 2006
- Assessing our consulates in third countries: Kiev, 19-30 June 2006, Belgrade, 18-29 September 2006

No deficiencies were found during the monitoring of the police cooperation of February and the data protection of March. Within the frame of the Schengen cooperation of law enforcement bodies, an evaluation studied the border crossing of Hegyeshalom-Nickelsdorf that operates as a joint contact place, the situation of the accessible records and the local possibilities and content of the data and information exchange as well as the guarantees of participating in cross border monitoring and pursuits. **Table 4** may help the analysis of the preparations. It illustrates the structure of expenditures without wages

Budget of the BG without Wages (Thousand HUF)



Source: Budget department of the BG's national HQ, and law no. CLIII. of 2005 on the budget of Hungary.

In the country evaluations the Commission raised the attention to the deficiencies of operating conditions, while the area has received funds worth of several billion HUF and the 2007-2013 budget also reserves a significant sum to strengthen the external borders.

6. Conclusions, recommendations

- The consistent application of the integration programme, which started when BVTI was set up in 1998, discontinued (dissolution of BVTI). It leads to the competence deficiency of the whole permanent staff. The current training might lead to further controversies, for example the joint training of officers and deputy officers is not adequate as their tasks are completely different, or the fact that those who work on different fields receive the same training.
- The integration administrator of the EU position, which was created after the reorganization of 1998, was filled according to human resource interests and not that of professional requirements. As a result the undisturbed preparation was made impossible.
- The current situation should be evaluated in a complex way and the overall issue of security should be managed at governmental level while adjusted to the arising tasks. The National Development Plan II would suit this need if security was treated adequately and in a broader, modern sense as mentioned above. The tasks and the future of the Border Guards and border law enforcement can only be determined according to this.
- Increasing the capacity of the participating organisations is essential for the use of financial support provided by the Schengen Fund in order to accelerate the proceedings and to utilise the sources of the Fund in the best possible way. Professional grant writers can only achieve this.
- Developments, planned to be financed from the Schengen Fund but cannot be implemented before the deadline, should be financed from government sources as developments cannot be stopped halfway through. Steps should be taken in order to use other financial support (PPP Construction, Norwegian Fund, Swiss Fund, structural or cohesion funds)
- It should be assessed what necessary governmental measures should be taken to ensure the infrastructural Schengen requirements of border crossing control.
- In accordance with the deadline set by the Accession Treaty the European Commission should be persuaded to extend the deadline of the application of Schengen Fund sources until September 2007.
- Implementing the national system of SIS II. Managing the above mentioned risk factors and involving the participating organizations.
- Carrying out the necessary and suitable judicial harmonization and other legislation tasks as soon as possible.
- Clear decision on the border guards and its permanent staff, who work at the internal borders and carry out the subsequent legal, human resource, budgetary tasks.
- The operational costs for the border law enforcement tasks should be guaranteed.

THE USE OF ENEMIES

“Kill one to terrify ten thousand”
(ancient Chinese saying)

Ever since the monster of communism disappeared, the witchcraft of globalisation have overcome the Northern hemisphere. Aimed at integrating the peoples into a mass of consumers, globalisation is obviously making at the world with its ideology. Its formula is quite simple: arbitrary interpretation of facts and events.

That formula is about to persuade us about mankind’s being united in a universal civilisation by modern transportation and telecommunication. Should someone disagree, he is likely to be subdued by force.

That formula suggests that the world consists of two main parts: one is the developed, post-industrial West, trustee of future civilisation; the other is the developing East.³⁶

On the one hand, objections to that compulsory international civilisation may not be without reasons. On the other, such objections may give way to totalitarianism on an international scale, neo-liberal economy provides fertile soil for that by creating and re-creating impoverishment the world over. The IMF dictates and peoples of the ‘developing countries’ are not given the chance of choosing *their own pace* of adopting neo-liberalism’s main ideas. One may not hesitate too much to say: the very monetary ‘solutions’, which have become ‘traditional’ over the past number of decades, offer no solutions at all. They widen the gap between developed and developing countries, and fuel revolutionary radicalism among the impoverished.

At the dawn of the new millennium the ‘traditional way to overthrowing governments’ is anachronistic. The world outside the West, mainly the far-eastern societies, have built up their own economic potentials upon which they base their military strength. Traditions and cultural heritages are re-valued. Therefore, the security of world-economy and world-politics is about to be re-mapped. All in all it is the arms-race (as well as re-appropriation of the markets

³⁶ In the first eleven volumes of his *Study of History* Arnold Toynbee enumerated as many as eleven civilisations. In Volume No. 12th he put that number to 35. In his posthumous opus as many as 38 civilisations were named.

related to it) that generates conflicts, social and economical polarisation, while clashes are seemingly triggered by additional factors.

Changes in redistribution-policy further enhance social polarisation, thus the poor become naked in more sense than one; the consequent social tension is likely to end up in fierce conflicts. Religion-based scales of values as well as ethnic-based nationalism may aggravate clashes. Such clashes are likely between the rich and the poor rather than between the classes.³⁷

Revolutions (even the so called ‘white ones’ organised by top leaders) are doomed to be a failure. The 1978-79 Muslim revolution in Iran has dispelled illusions about the Muslim countries’ quickly fitting themselves to an American-organised, civilised and democratic modern world.³⁸ National modernisation is hindered by traditions; globalisation whips up resistance by trying to do away with them.³⁹

One cannot do without enemies

Ever since the end of the Cold War the US have been trying to grapple with the world. The *Reds*’ empire, with its nuclear weapons and Marx-originated ideology, was first and most of all a military and social challenge to America. It was a West against East tug with a North-South demarcation line across Europe. The Middle East oil fields are of economic importance, and the *Green Peril*, which has opposed Israel for half a century, is not something to overcome by regular military forces. *That* North against East tug is as old as centuries, the last curtain started by the British creating Israel among Arabic nations after World War II. There seems to have formed an East-West demarcation line, along which Russia himself has had to redeploy his army units.⁴⁰

However, there are similarities with the Cold War: the enemy is again labelled ‘a monster’, ‘a nightmare’. The media in the West frequently air interviews with ‘specialists’ who insinuate as if intolerance, fundamentalism and

³⁷ At the same time the world figures quite clearly show that, without a re-grouping of economic and intellectual resources, two-thirds of mankind will remain in poverty. Although in appearance the world has moved towards levelling in recent decades, since the development in Asia and Latin America has deduced the proportion of hopelessly backward countries from 72 to 35 percent, the average difference between the most developed twenty countries and the least developed twenty countries has grown from the thirty-fold of 30 years ago to sixty-one fold. The twenty richest countries use 85 percent of the world’s resources, with the United States alone consuming two-fifths. Less than one percent is left for the poorest twenty.

³⁸ For further details see Endre Szénási *The Shift in Security Policy after the First Globalisation War*

³⁹ Led by Kemal Atatürk in the first quarter of the 20th century, the Turkish revolutionary modernisation flourished on a non-national soil, and globalisation was not yet looming.

⁴⁰ Hadar Leon T.: *Quagmire; America in the Middle East*. New York, 1993

aggression were characteristic of Islam. Papers with very great circulation – like *Foreign Affairs* and *The New York Times* – publish(ed) such views in series. They appear(ed) not by chance; they are tools of mass psychology aimed at preparing public opinion for actions to come. As a Hungarian expert put it: “NATO officials are looking forward to hearing either about Muslims coming to attack or about NATO’s preventive strikes, crusades of our time”.⁴¹

Nonetheless the US may not know where to search for the terrorists to hunt them down. As long as that question remains unanswered, the only ‘possible solution’ was to dub president Saddam Hussein of Iraq ‘*The Most Evil*’.

“Western politicians are easy to lash out at non-Atlantic affairs; one is sure to notice the double standard of western moral. That moral contradicts the much advertised idea of ‘the same standards for all’.”⁴²

Organised crime is deeply rooted even in the richest and strongest country of the developed world: the United States. American citizens can also be blamed for terrorist attacks which demanded a heavy toll of life. (Take the one in Oklahoma for example.) “Western leaders tend to speak condescendingly of crimes – the Mafia, organised crime, religious fanaticism, terrorism etc. – they themselves cannot overcome in their own countries. So the question remains: on what moral ground do they stand?...As president Bush put it: ‘terrorists, terrorist states contra us, the civilised, the free democracies’.”⁴³

So what are the alleged ‘western values’? Are they these double standards? If we are to adopt them, we are to adopt moral impurity.⁴⁴

A new phase of security-policy

On land the legendary Red Army represent an incomparably strong military force no more. Consequently there has been left no power to threaten Europe’s security since the early 90s. The Old Continent has suffered no aggression *from outside* for centuries on end.

Having overcome an identity crisis after the disappearance of the bipolar system, NATO proclaimed its endeavour to achieve full independence in terms of strategy. At the same time NATO offered the rest of the countries of the world a universal system of mutual interdependence, which is to replace self-determination and self-defence.

⁴¹ Géza Ankerl: *Nyugat van, Kelet nincs*. pp. 179. (Osiris, 2001)

⁴² Endre Szénási *The Shift in Security Policy after the First Globalisation War* pp. 94

⁴³ *Op. cit.* pp. 95-96.

⁴⁴ Samuel O. Huntington: *The West Unique, not Universal* *Foreign Affairs*, Nov.-Dec. 1996

If no intervention – like that in the crisis in Kosovo – is expected, one can say that the unipolar world-order left the NATO-countries without rivals. Two alternatives showed: NATO was *either* to restrict its activities to self-defence and stay within the frontiers of the member countries, *or* to co-operate with the United Nations and play the role of a global pacifier. (The latter option implies agreement on behalf of every one of the world’s great cultures.)

The September 11th attack against the US has put security-policy in focus. President Bush announced there was need for a new role of NATO and for special army units. He did it even though he himself had criticised his predecessor for casting the US the duty of a global gendarme. George Bush Jr. announced a new military doctrine at the beginning of June 2002. It goes that the US can no longer trust that a forceful retaliation could deter any possible aggressor. Instead – so goes the new doctrine – preventive strikes are needed against terrorist organisations. “According to the president, such organisations were homed by some sixty countries all over the world. That implies a gendarme operation incomparable in mankind’s history.”⁴⁵

In addition to the first two, this is the third option. Should it be accepted, NATO is likely to become a tool at the hands of the dictator-hearted neo-colonialists. *That* entails heavy burdens for the present as well as for the future.

Terrorism – asymmetric warfare

No doubt, future confrontations may be not only heavier than the previous wars but much different from them as well. They may also assume a completely new stile of belligerency.

Terrorism is not a modern phenomenon; history has known quite a number of such events, but those were committed on personal ground against the life of one or another individual. The September 11th attack was both of new quality and of new age. That was a consequence of a new world-order; a weird reaction to a more and more unjust system that conquers the world. The unpredictable nature of such a reaction is of global concern and it gives way to new methods of defence.

It knows no frontiers	for conflicts overlap frontiers;
<i>It is invisible</i>	for the terrorists stay hidden and the outlines of their organisations are not known;
It is prolonged	for the terrorist groups are not subordinated to one headquarter; the defeat of one group leaves the fighting strength of other groups untouched. There is

⁴⁵ *Bush új doktrínát hirdetett meg* Népszabadság, June 11, 2002.

neither definite victory nor definite end to that. Occasional victories are due to intelligence rather than to combat encounter;

It is universal

Information technology and computerisation enable terrorists to co-ordinate their attacks via INTERNET;

It is open

for the requirements of effective counter-measures would be in contradiction to the basic principles of the open societies, and it remains to be seen whether a happy medium can be worked out at all.

The US national military strategy names terrorism as one of the dangers. It also names the nuclear war 'a defunct danger'. The main factors endangering US's security are as follows:⁴⁶

- "regional menace;
- asymmetrical challenges;
- trans-national threats;
- unpredictable dangers."⁴⁷

Experts have come to the conclusion that "anti-terrorist war includes both defensive and offensive actions".⁴⁸

Are there any special interests?

Are there any special interests of any groups of NATO? That question may give way to wildest guessings. Some experts say that the anti-terrorist countries seem to work by a kind of 'division of labour': the US is waging war, the United Nations provide food-aid, and the EU gives the finances. If that is so, such division of labour is perhaps the best choice for the EU under the circumstances.

As a matter of fact there is hardly any reason for us to assume that the US officials are happy about Europe getting united. In terms of culture, traditions, education, the number of population etc., Europe is about to reach better positions than those of the US. The US will soon have to face a strong rival on the markets the world over; an obvious sign of that was the sanctions to protect US's metallurgy against import from the EU. Square and fair analyse support that the US would be better off with a different 'division of labour', in which the EU should wage war, the United Nations should provide food-aid, and the US

⁴⁶ National Military Strategy of the United States of America, 1997., CJCS, Washington

⁴⁷ Tibor Kőszegvári *A nemzetközi terrorizmus elleni harc*. In; Hadtudomány 2002/1 pp.9

⁴⁸ Op. cit. 7

should give the finances. Since the US drains profits from Europe, such a 'division of labour' equals to the profits directed from Europe to Europe as if they were of American financial contribution. By infuriating international terrorism and directing it against the EU, America could fend off attempts and get rid of a rival.⁴⁹ That would be 'killing two birds with one stone'. One may even suspect that the US is not sincerely interested in bringing the problem of terrorism to a solution.

It is not America's safety that we must work for. It is the safety of all nations including that of the US. Every one of the nations has the right to security. One cannot bluster at the world with his nuclear weapons *and* demand non-proliferation at the same time. If nuclear, chemical and biological weapons remain assembled ready for use, that implies that sooner or later other countries shall also produce such weapons. "Of all nuclear powers neither Russia nor China dropped the bomb. It was the democratic and civilised US that dropped nuclear bombs fully aware of the their power of destruction."⁵⁰

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⁴⁹ As it is known, the EU formed its quick reaction force on November 21st 2000, which is to be ready for combat in (or after) 2003. Some one quarter of a million soldiers are needed to provide for the shifts and the auxiliary units of the six thousand odd troops which are to make a bridgehead – within a scope of 4000 kms – in not more than sixty days after relevant command and hold on for at least one year. Europe, especially her part west of the Helsinki-Istanbul line, has not had an *outside intervention* for centuries on end now. It is quite disturbing to see that a 'quick reaction force' is to be put in 'within a scope of 4000 kms'. Chances are that as soon as they are ready to fight they shall get involved in some 'mop up' operation, and the shift of 'division of labour' shall take place.

⁵⁰ Géza Ankerl: Nyugat van, Kelet nincs. pp. 179. (Osiris, 2001)

SLOWING DOWN OF GLOBALISATION AND THE EUROPEAN SECURITY

"... the future is a extraordinarily chaotic and very terrifying." [4, p.21.]
Immanuel Wallerstein

1. Introduction

Due to the events of September 11, 2001 globalisation as a process in our interpretation has come to a sudden standstill [9, p.49.]. The defense and security measures introduced globally have seriously curtailed the major privacy rights from the viewpoint of the creation and further development of the global information society. As outlined below in detail, globalisation is basically a positive process despite its contradictions. Whereas its advantages seem to get lost due to the above-mentioned slowing down, the value of hopes exceeds far the losses of the side-effect. Accordingly, new danger and threats have appeared, instead of complex solutions expected from the globalisation false ones are shaping. In our opinion all this directly affects the European Security and Defense Policy. In the first part of the study we present the concept and the phenomenon of globalisation in our interpretation, and you will find another interpretation relating to the circumstances preceding September 11, 2001. In the second part we outline the major implications arising from slowing down from the aspect of the European Union's security.

2. The basic nature of globalisation till September 11, 2001

The evolution of the networked global society

"The modern centralised nation-state has gradually lost its functions" – says Kristóf Nyíri in his study entitled "the Global society and the local culture in the age of networking" but he also adds that "this loss of function is by no means total" [12, p.1291]. Nyíri quotes from Manuel Castells the following: "The state has not disappeared has simply become smaller in the information era. It grows wild in the form of local and regional governments dispersing the world with its projects, building up separation layers and negotiating with national governments, multi-national companies and international organizations. The era of globalisation in the economy is the era of localization in the operation of the state. What local and regional governments lack in terms of power and assets it is replaced by flexibility and networking. If

anybody or anything, only such governments can meet the global networking dynamics of the economy and the information. [12, p.1292].

The loss of functions in the modern nation-states is usually connected to globalisation. Here, it is indispensable to properly clarify the connection between cause and effect. If we define the concept of function as a connection between the objective social needs and the available resources for their gratification, then we can appoint that the cause for the loss of function is dual. From one hand the resource-needs for solving the problems connected to globalisation are going to be beyond the individual possibilities of the most powerful nation-states and on the other hand – which is the crucial cause – the accession of the effectiveness of resource exploitation-designs at nation-state level can not keep pace with the accession of objective needs. The loss of function of modern nation-states is arising from the fact that it can less and less fit to the objective social needs appearing over against it.

Accordingly to this, globalisation is not the cause for the loss of function of nation-states, but it is rather an answer of humanity to the challenges turning up from this loss of functions.

The main aspect of the answer is the process of implementing the global informational society as a networked society.

The nation states losing their functions, especially those on the semi-peripheries or the peripheries, tenaciously oppose the global transformations. These states, bent on justifying their *raison d'être*, can cause considerable damage to the population of a given country. The transformation (reform) of the out-dated etatist organisational and institutional systems requires democratic conditions. The new forms of democracy are expected to appear in the informational society.

The age of informational society will arrive when the virtual worlds created by human imagination will be reified on the basis of the achievements of electronic technology, and the participation of people in these virtual worlds becomes wide-spread, general and routine. All this will lead to a fundamental, radical and global rearrangement of social relations. I assume that virtual worlds will become as wide-spread within the decade as watching television is today.

The „medium” carrying the structures of the information society is the cyberspace (translated to Hungarian: *kíbertér*). The cyberspace is the rapidly widening universe of the virtual worlds. We can join the cyberspace via local virtual worlds. The cyberspace technology connects the functions of the computer with the abilities of the human. The cyberspace with its virtual environment and simulated world constitutes a certain metaphysical laboratory,

a device for controlling our sensation of reality. The cyberspace is more than an electronic medium, or the latest achievement of computer interface design.

In some ways the term „virtual world” may be deemed to be in correspondence to the term „real virtuality” applied by Manuel Castells in his work *The Information Age*. Castells used this term to express the situation, in which – as he writes – the virtuality becomes our reality [12, p.1291].

Considering their basic nature the virtual worlds can be deemed to be in correspondence to „World 3”, discovered by Karl R. Popper, i.e. the existents of the world created by human spirit.[15, p.58-70.] Likewise Popper I believe that the physical world (World 1) and the world of the conscious procedures (World 2) are in close relationship and interaction with one another and with World 3. I add, that the interaction manifests itself in a certain objectification: in a series of being made objects the existents of World 3 may assume the co-ordinates of physical existence. In our case we speak about such virtual worlds, in which this objectification takes place on the basis of the achievements of electronic development.

The main function of World 2 – as Popper writes, - is to produce things pertaining to World 3, and to serve as a medium which may be affected by things of World 3. For my part I feel the question to be open, whether this particular objectification process, during which the virtuality becomes real with the mediation of a digital medium can exist without the mediation of „existents” of World 2, to be precise can something else (e.g. artificial intelligence) take over this mediating role.

The objective knowledge itself belongs to World 3, and it constitutes the most important part of World 3, that part, which has the most significant influence on World 1. The objective knowledge taking Karl R. Popper's example again – consists of conjectures, hypotheses and conceptions[16, p.20]. These usually appear i.e. „objectify” as books, papers and lectures.

Thus in this sense it is correct to treat the informational society and knowledge society as synonyms, since on the basis of the achievements of the electronic development an unprecedented effective and qualitatively new objectification of the knowledge may take place. The increase of the acceleration of the objectification and its unlimited, global (and even in a certain sense cosmic) extension and/or possibility of extension are specially important. This extension is provided by the global telecommunication networks offering practically unlimited bandwidth of data transmission. Sensation will expand globally, and the content of the notion of „space” will also change. The localization of the statehood and the understanding of its true nature is in close connection with the less usual interpretation of the conception of „location”.

After all „local means regional;” - writes Nyíri Kristóf - and we could think, that the location is simply defined geographically and physically, and not determined by remote relations. Appearances are deceptive. If we consider „location” more than mere geodetic co-ordinates, we can soon realize, that the location-places are social constructions.... Conceptionally location can be grasped as a meeting point, an intercrossing point of activity fields, connections and vital relations, influences and movements.” [12, p.1292.]

The „location” of this interpretation is the real living-space of the civil organizations of the information society. The „location”-s that can be characterized with various co-ordinates of existence may serve as the basis of the symbolic „interactivity” or the real communal interaction. „The virtual communication assumes real fundamentals: the citizens of the „global village” of McLuhan after all should belong to true communities as well” [12, p.1293.]. Belonging to true communities, in order to be more precise a specific form of this belonging to, - as it was conducted [8, p.153] - is one of the basic conditions of the safety of the information society.

Widening the conception of location (in the way as we described above) opens new dimensions for NATO to substantiate its future role as a global actor. Similar possibilities occur for the European Union as well.

Information society – the end of history

A person joining a virtual world is exposed to a considerable number of dangers ranging from a violation of basic human rights to immediate physical or neurological damage, as we discussed it elsewhere [8, p.148-150]. Therefore the operation of virtual worlds involving wide masses requires social conditions in which human and personal rights enjoy a higher protection than they ever did before. This is a social formation in which personal liberty will be protected, to quote Karl R. Popper again, from „every kind of domination with one exception, the rule of sovereignty and the law” [15, p.169.]. This can be achieved through the so-called democratic forms of government.

The security of informational society, for the first time in history, is based on an unflinching and clearly manifest manner on the personal security of the member of society, of man, i.e. directly of the „participant”, without the intervention of any kind of hierarchy. This breaks with a tendency that continued from slave-owning societies to modern industrial ones, namely the misrepresentation of particularistic, factional interests as public interests through the insertion of power hierarchies. The security of the members of the global informational society, therefore of the individual, will directly and with increasing exclusivity replace the security provisions protecting the conditions in which these particularistic interests, misrepresented as public, could be

pursued. Thus we can say that the development of informational society is also the „end of history”.

By saying this we also mean that informational society is the final episode of a limited story of development in the sense that Fukuyama describes with the following words: both Hegel and Marx assumed that the development of societies is not open-ended, and that it will come to an end when mankind finally succeeds in developing a form of society that satisfies its deepest and most basic desires. Therefore both thinkers posited the thesis of the „end of history”: for Hegel it was the liberal state, for Marx the communist society”[2, p.7.].

Globalization

I dispute the view that regards globalisation as a phenomenon dangerous to social progress on the basis of its indisputably present numerous, and even proliferating⁺, detrimental accompanying phenomena, and one that can only be checked by strengthening the boundaries of nation states. The prevention of the threats expressed in visions of „the world domination of capitalist companies”[7] is actually least efficiently served by a further entrenchment and isolation behind the boundaries of the nation state. Following Karl R. Popper we can say that especially in the case of small states this kind of solution is useless and can even be dangerous[15, p.175-178.]. Globalisation is not the result of some kind of world-wide concentrated manipulation by international monopolies, but the result of a natural process of development which is nevertheless pregnant with dangerous potential side-tracks.

Regarding the basic nature of globalisation it is definitely impossible to safely assume that it is essentially economic and that the universalisation of culture will merely follow on the heels of the economic processes. In reality, we are still at the beginning of the economic process [18, p.8.] in spite of the fact that the economic signs are becoming easier to read. The new quality on the basis of which we could talk about a global economy is yet to appear.

It follows that the evolution of the informational society is primarily not an economic but a cultural process. As described by Samuel P. Huntington: in industrial societies „the world... is a developed international system, but as an international society it is still very elementary” [5, p.74.]. The characteristic of informational society is exactly that it is an international (global) society based on a common cultural foundation. The common cultural foundation does not mean homogenisation, but the expansion of the possibilities of knowability and interaction, and therefore the enrichment of individual cultures. We agree with

⁺ ⁵¹ The previous statements of the author [9] are consonant with the standpoint of Thomas Friedmann [1]. Friedmann sees globalisation as a positive phenomenon, because of the opportunities that it offers to a wider range of people [14, p.3.].

Huntington in that it would be illusory to believe that the current Western civilisation can also become the universal civilisation of the world [5, P.76].

The information society is a global phenomenon, but its evolution is uneven. The basic characteristic of these uneven lurches is the centre-periphery relation. The development of the global information society is of course linked to the centre. It was in the centre that the fundamental and radical transformations began that can be linked to the evolution of the informational society. Regarding the evaluation of our own current situation we agree with Immanuel Wallerstein's judgement: „In my opinion Russia, due to its character as a mainly military power, belongs to the semi-periphery. The same goes for Hungary, because of its economic development. Bulgaria, for example, definitely belongs to the periphery [7]. The essence of the matter is that the Central and Eastern European region does not belong to the centre, and neither does Latin America or South East Asia” [4, p.21.].

We have to mention that the situation has obviously changed since the above “classification” by Wallerstein. Due to its high development rhythm, Russia has approached the centre while Bulgaria has caught up with e.g. Hungary from the periphery. The process of closing up of the various nations and regions may be also damaged as a result of the slowing down of globalization. The previously well-perceivable tendencies have been broken: there is nothing which would give an orientation in the direction of closing up.

3. The impact of slowing down on the European Security

The major reasons for the slowing down

In case we admit the above approach according to which globalisation is the process of developing a global information society and we agree that the basic condition for this evolution is the personal security of the “participants” as a main priority against everything then we immediately recognise the reason for slowing down. It is nothing else but the impact, of the security measures introduced following the terror acts of September 11, 2001 on the privacy rights, a security campaign lasting up to now. Certain security measures have, paradoxically, weakened the security of the people on other areas or at least caused serious potential threats.

Identifying the risks requires a separate discussion. Promotion on this field depends on the time when the civil organizations that will be able to fight against for the protection of the privacy rights come to life or are developed and when the user communities are restructured. Up to now there seems to be no guarantee for their occurrence thus it is possible that slowing down may be a dangerous embranchment in the history of globalisation, the process may change direction, and the implementation may follow another route. It involves a great

danger of causing a change in the direction - unfavourable interaction with other factors - followed by the phenomena justifying those who mentioned the harmful nature of globalisation.

There is another reason for slowing down, namely since 2002 in the United States of America the majority of governmental grants have been transferred from the IT to the biotechnology business. Consequently the IT business has lost its key role and has gradually become “industrialized”, i.e. it has been merged into other industrial businesses. An important development can only be seen on the “border areas” as it is shown by the experience of CeBit of this year, IT world fair organized in Hannover. These are the IT applications on the field of nanotechnology, biotechnology and the various fields dealing with “human researches”.

Handling the multi-national security problems, creating its conditions

The major feature, the accompanying phenomenon of the globalisation is the start of creating the new global institutions. For a long-time (in our opinion until 2003-2005) three major institutions seemed to have handled global problems by working with one another in a division of work. These are the UN in the field of general political issues, the NATO in the field of security issues and the OECD in the field of economic coordination. Without going into details it can be stated that while the institution of UN is characterized by the research of new possibilities, the importance of OECD has considerably decreased, it is only the NATO that has chosen a direction enabling it to take a global role. “Despite its cumbersome decisional process, NATO could get a second wind as a security organization.” – writes Veronica Necasova referring to Fukuyama. [11, p.6.]

In the success of further developing NATO the following facts have a share in transformation processes of the NATO which has been based on a well-elaborated strategy and implemented by a separate institution founded for this purpose (Norfolk NATO Transformation Command - ACT). In spite of the good organization and the institutionalised conditions the future role of NATO as a global “actor” is considered as risky from various aspects. The greatest problems are the conflicts and contradictions in the relationship between the NATO and the European Security and Defence Policy* In the field of the decision-making mechanism a step forward should be made within NATO. We agree that the following problems come from the current order of the decision-making:

- „The first problem is that the old European members of NATO in particular are less and less committed to the alliance. They support NATO rhetorically, but hardly live up to commitments ...

* „Most members of these two organizations agree that the relationship is plagued by mistrust, unhealthy competition, and information sharing problems, but neither NATO nor the EU has stepped forward to solve the problems.” [17, p.48.]

- ... As a consequence, there is the second problem that NATO has lost its function as the primary forum for achieving political consensus on security questions. Slowly but steadily, NATO is improving its military capabilities. At the same time, there is less and less consensus on how and for what purposes these forces will be used. Does NATO have to tackle drug trafficking in Afghanistan – yes or no? Will NATO need to be engaged militarily in Iraq – yes or no? What about the security challenges beyond the classic NATO agenda? What is NATO’s view on the final political status of the Balkans? ...
- ... Alas, in the last three years there has not been a single NATO meeting at ambassadorial level dealing with Iran. Instead, Brussels is overburdened with day to day operations. How can an alliance which is hailed as the linchpin of Western security dare to ignore crucial issues like Iran?” [6, p.7.]
- The success of NATO’s transferring into a global security institution depends on if it is able to give appropriate answer to such and similar questions.

The European Security and Defence Policy developed as a result of building up the second pillar of the European Union, and the European Defense Agency, its institutional condition can also be characterized by the research of new possibilities. Without going into the related disputes over the analysis of the continuously reproducing contradictions we try here to give our own position. Accordingly, we raise the issue that gaining ground of the efforts aimed at developing a complex – covering all fields of security - independent European Security and Defense Policy (ESDP) represents serious risks. It has to be noted that the reproduction of the security-defense functions lost, dead on the level of the countries forming the European Union that is on nation-state level– at least on full-scale - is not possible on the level of the European Union. Certain security problems now point beyond or have pointed beyond the possibilities of the Union even at the foundation of the Union. These are the energy-security issues, the fight against terrorism, the problems relating to cyber security etc.

The ESDP adjusted to the possibilities of the European Union should be selective. The questions, issues, problems that can be managed within the frameworks of the European Union have to be identified well and separated from those requiring a global approach. It is obvious that the solution of the latter has to be referred to the competence of the NATO. The ESDP should formulate only the major guidelines in the respect of these issues.

New order – multi – multilateralism

According to the above the European Union and the European Security and Defence Policy can show an example for what Fukuyama has formulated as follows: “The answer is likely to be not a different global institution but rather a

multiplicity of international organizations that could provide both power and legitimacy for different types of challenges to world order”. It is not in the interests of the European Union if it tries to fully revive on the European Union level the lost nation-state functions of the member-states, but if it is able to connect them to the operation of the institutions that are globally appropriate for realizing certain functions. Various factors are for believing that it will be first needed in the respect of the already-mentioned security functions. We have to do everything possible that the European Union should respond to the slowing down of the globalisation by the accession to the work of the institutions appropriate for global functionality and not by creating the independent functionality.

4. Conclusions

Because of the events of September 11, 2001 the globalisation has come to a sudden standstill. By virtue of this standstill such trends had been refracted, those of which arcs were considered to be predictable. Moreover organisations of nation states and international organisations have endured loss of functions. Important virtual needs (including security) are to be explored. It means a big threat for the European security, if the European Union lock itself in or turns toward autarchy instead of meeting challenges that arise from the more and more opaque and complex global relations. The Union should note that NATO can provide for EU members those institutional frameworks that are appropriate for solving global security problems. Operation under the flag of EU outside the territory of the European Union has limited potential. A policy, that intends to forge the NATO-EU members into one without preliminary decision, in no way could be accepted. This would be contradictory with the decision-making culture and traditions of the NATO. Instead, there is a need for a “multi-multilevel” ESDP. This should trend toward to make the NATO as comfortable for the European Union as possible, but at the same time do not cause the loss of interest in cooperation from the American point of view. The role of the European Defence Agency, at least in the point of global security questions, should not be the organization of separate operations, but the fostering and generating reconciliation and dialogue between member states. Moreover a Defence Agency (the EU) should join into the process that can be characterized by the followings: “A world of multiple competing and partially overlapping international institutions has already started to take shape over the past decades, primarily in the economic sphere, but with increasing implications for how international political problems will be addressed.” [3. p.163.].

The European Defence Agency’s important task could be the coordination and encouragement of those researches, that are intend to reveal the development of the defence-security needs. Naturally the Agency organizes, coordinates and in case of competence leads the solution of all those defence,

security tasks that are not functionless from the view of the Union's possibilities and needs.

The experiences of multi-multilevel solutions appearing in the view of gratification of the defence security needs, help to prepare for those times, when we should certify differentiated approaches concerning global challenges among the framework of the other two pillars. It can not be sufficiently emphasised that preparing for such a cooperation, is not a task only for the institutions of the EU, but tasks connected to this appear in the level of the member states as well.

The preparation's important infrastructural condition is to develop a new security culture that can gain ground. To promote this, is the task of both nation state and EU organisations. The development of the new security culture in an appropriate pace - as we set forth in details previously [10, p.172.] – will contribute to reconstitute the process of globalisation into the right direction. By this we mean that the globalisation will turn toward the development of the informational society. A lot depends on if the European Union is able to change the paradigm that leads to the cooperation with “multi-multilevel” institutions and to the acceptance of setting these up.

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CURRENT ISSUES

Colonel István Tarján

TERROR THREAT REGARDING THE HUNGARIAN DEFENCE FORCES AND MINISTRY OF DEFENCE AND COUNTER-TERRORISM ACTIVITY OF MILITARY SECURITY OFFICE OF THE HUNGARIAN REPUBLIC

In this article I will sum up the assessed terror threat regarding the Hungarian Defence Forces (HDF) and Ministry of Defence (MoD) and the counter-terrorism activities of the Military Security Office (MSO). I will try to introduce the current situation we are facing at MSO, sum up the threat level within Hungary and at our deployed units. I will briefly summarize the possible tasks the HDF may have in fighting against terrorism, then provide an overview of MSO's place, role and activity in Counter-Terrorism (CT).

1. General assessment

In several countries of the region significant changes have gone through of primarily political nature. However, their results were manifold: military , economic, migrational developments, complex internal conflicts that were hard to cope with including national, ethnic, religious and cultural conflicts.

As Hungary gradually became politically and economically more and more open, the number of potential targets for terrorist attacks (including personnel and institutions, facilities) have increased. The increasing rate of legal and illegal immigrants from Islamic countries may become a risk factor as well.

But it must not be neglected, that just as globally, in our region as well, the Islamic religion is spreading, primarily with migration but converting activity can be detected as well. I have to emphasize : **Islam as religion does not equal to terrorism.** It is a natural phenomenon that the number of Islamic NGOs and houses of prayer increase. With this comes the fact that Islamic terrorist groups often exploit such covers for operational purposes (for travel, rest, delivery of documents and equipment).

Based on our own intelligence and experiences in the past few years, and information from our national and foreign partner services we can say that **there is no imminent terrorist threat within Hungary.** Personnel and facilities of

the HDF and MoD within Hungary have not been targets for terror attacks during the past few years.

However, we have to take special care to extremist organisations and organised crime, as these groups are eligible to commit terrorist attacks or can become pawns or accomplices of terrorist organisations.(for example as the explosives used in the Madrid terror attacks were purchased from organised crime)

Hungary, partly because of her NATO membership, took more active part in international crisis and peace missions, gave airspace and airports for air operations and provided logistic base for operations support. These also may become triggers for attacks by terrorists from the crisis countries or their sympathizers.

We also have to note, that the latter factor may make Hungarian military units targets **abroad in theatre**. The local residents or part of them may not regard the international forces as peacekeeping / -enforcing forces, but as invaders and could react violently to a perceived occupation.

The counter-terrorism / security activity in these circumstances posed a new challenge to MSO - formerly operating exclusively within our national territory . This challenge lays in the foreign environment and the limited availability of personnel and equipment.

2. The role and tasks of the HDF in the fight against terrorism

First of all, I have to emphasize that the use of military force is not the most effective way to fight terrorism strategically. If we consider the history of combating ethnic or religious terrorist groups, we'll see that ultimately the question was resolved on political level. Naturally, on the tactical level, it is inevitable, that the use military or similar force is needed to prevent imminent danger or to take out certain groups. However, most experts agree in that to take **effective measures against terrorism cannot be narrowed down to exclusively military or intelligence issue.**

Military experience of the close past clearly show the need for doctrine, forces and technology different from the previously accepted to cope with the challenges and threats of the 21st. century.

General direction is to create smaller, but more mobile and efficient armed forces. Precision, individual skills of highly-trained personnel becomes priority. This is especially true for the fields of intelligence and electronic warfare as well. Modern technology – with an emphasis on information

technology - ,mobility (airlift) and quick reaction capability is required. It is also expected to utilize equipment and methods to enable the achievement of military victory with a minimal loss of human lives. In order to be able to employ the modern technology and doctrines highly trained personnel are needed, whose training already incorporates the advanced ideas.

3. MSO's counter-terrorism / security activity

Based on the Hungarian law on National Security Services (Act CXXV of 1995) MSO is responsible for detecting and countering terrorist acts or such plans targeting the Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Defence Forces and their subordinated units.

This makes clear that MSO's CT tasks are not based only on the 9/11 attacks, it has been a priority field before as well, as the HDF may become indirect target of terrorist groups in order to acquire the weapons and explosives kept in different military facilities. We must not forget that time to time there have been some criminal acts within the HDF in order to acquire weapons, ammunition, or explosives. Such crimes may also be preparation for terrorist acts.

During the past few years there have been attacks against military facilities in which the acquisition of weapons was the goal:

-in 1999 two brothers wearing masks attacked the gate guards of the Bolyai János Military College after successfully sneaking in the school by climbing over the fence. In a surprise attack on the soldiers at the gate stabbed three conscripts with daggers, before the duty officer shot them. One of the assailants was a former student, thus he had been familiar with the place and routines of the guards.

-in 2001 in Veszprém, unidentified attacker(s) climbed over the fence of the 1st Logistic and Support Regiment's facility and disarmed the 2-man patrol , robbing their automatic weapons.

These cases must be treated with exceptional care, as the stolen weapons might also become equipment to launch terror attacks.

MSO's **first priority is prevention**. Thus we attribute exceptional importance to facility and personnel security. To prevent similar incidents as the aforementioned ones, we constantly coordinate with the commanders and assess the threat level and the level of security of the facilities. To be realistic, we have to mention that time to time limited budget hinders the purchase of high-level security equipment.

There have been several threats of violent acts against military facilities – but these have never gone beyond the level of threatenings. These cases are mostly include grudge of persons formerly in contact with the HDF or military personnel. Investigation of the threateners showed in most cases psychiatric problems – they wanted to call attention to their problems. Our experience is that such persons remain at the level verbal or written threats, and do not take steps to realize them.

I have mentioned extremist or organised crime groups and the importance of their monitoring. MSO actively conducts operational activity in this respect. So far, we have not discovered indicators that the MoD or HDF would be targets of these groups, but we nevertheless put emphasis on preventing possible attempts to target the military.

Regarding **personnel protection** I have to mention, that - especially since our accession to NATO – we have increased tasks to provide operational security to high-level events with VIPs. (Such was the air show at Kecskemét – on 6-7 August 2005 – with more than 108 aircraft and 100,000 visitors, including several VIPs.) Naturally, these tasks are conducted in close cooperation with our partner services.

Hungary – based on international requests – with Parliamentary approval contributes maximum 1000 soldiers to missions in four crisis areas. Additionally there is a relatively large number of individuals serving in different deployments, all together in 14 countries, including Africa, Asia and the Middle-East.

The foreign deployment of HDF units posed a new challenge to us, as our CT activity we previously did on home base, had to be expanded. Security preparation is started on home base already and if a contingent is above 100 personnel, one of our colleagues is deployed with them.

As we attribute a great importance to security for the deployed units, our colleagues not only take part in training with the units, but as part of the preparation for deployment they also hold security- and terror-awareness briefings to provide an overview of the threat level and the threats of the deployment area.

An additional part of the security preparation is that personnel are screened / vetted prior to deployment. Security screening / vetting is also part of MSO's tasks.

The focal deployment areas where our biggest units with MSO officers are: KFOR (Kosovo); EUROFOR MSU (Bosnia); ISAF/PRT (Afghanistan); UN

mission UNFICYP (Cyprus). (Based on mandate by the Parliament a 292 strong transport battalion served in Iraq between 15 September 2003 and 17 December 2004. They were under Polish command in the Multinational Division.)

In summary, we can state the following concerning our troops deployed abroad

According to our assessment, generally personnel carry out their tasks in hostile environment, with increased terror threat. Thus exceptional care must be taken to provide operational security support to these. Terror organisations and their members are more likely to operate in their familiar environment – especially at areas where the local residents sometimes support them – than in foreign countries thousands of kilometres away.

As there is a realistic terror threat CT becomes priority issue for us, especially in the aforementioned four areas. We attribute special importance to any information that may affect area of responsibility (AOR).

Regarding all main missions we can say that there is a good cooperation with colleagues of partner services. Through regular consultations with the commander of the unit we assess the security situation and advise for necessary measures. Our colleagues at home base are also prepared to provide operational support to Hungarian contingents.

4. Cooperations

In order to be able to provide adequate national security protection to the MoD / HDF and their subordinated units and personnel , we have formed and conduct active cooperation with national and foreign partners. Nationally we cooperate with our partner Hungarian national security/intelligence services , police, border guard, the 24-hour duty service of the HDF General Staff, and commanders of the units.

There is a constant exchange of information with the Ministry of Justice Centre against Organised Crime and the National Investigation Office. We also take part in the CT Coordination Committee – comprised of national law-enforcement and national security/intelligence services. Furthermore MSO maintains contact and cooperates with NATO, allied and other partner countries' military CI services in bi- and multilateral levels. Cooperation with allied and neighbouring countries is a priority.

All together I can say that MSO has received and is ready to provide support to effectively fight terrorism. We are convinced that in close cooperation we can overcome future challenges.

Colonel Ing. András Tóth

INTELLIGENCE SUPPORT TO THE HUNGARIAN-LED PRT IN AFGHANISTAN, BAGHLAN PROVINCE

We all know that the Alliance lays special emphasis on the organization of effective intelligence in NATO-led military operations. On the basis of our experiences from many operations over the last few years, a nearly standard Intelligence Support System has been developed, which includes tactical, operational and strategic level intelligence activity, and correctly mixes the different Intel disciplines from reconnaissance through HUMINT to the highly technical intelligence like SIGINT, MESINT and so on. This system takes into consideration and also respects the special national Intel interests of contributing nations, and makes it possible for the national agencies to be present on the mission area with their operational assets linked to the mission Intel support system which constitutes mutual advantage and benefit for both the nations and the mission command.

The Hungarian PRT in Afghanistan is the first Hungarian military contingent where we deployed a fully NATO compatible Intel structure even if our assets are limited compared to the Intel assets supporting the Dutch PRT contingent we have recently replaced. This is the first time that our forces deployed in the area incorporates tactical collection, analysing capabilities and a National Intelligence Cell linked to the ISAF Intel System.

Let's take a closer look at the Intel structure supporting our PRT contingent. This structure can be divided into two parts. The operation of the Hungarian NIC (HUNNIC) deployed at ISAF HQ and the operational level Intel support of the PRT Commander is the responsibility of the Military Intelligence Office while the Army is responsible for the tactical intelligence, that is for the operation of S2 and its collection forces.

This structure is not a completely new one since some of its elements existed previously during the deployment of the Hungarian light infantry company in Kabul. The novelty in the structure is that this time, contrary to our previous 12 year long mission history, the HUNNIC will be compatible with NATO requirements not only in its name but also in organization and function. Due to this new, separate HUNNIC we can withdraw our trained Intel officers from different staff positions in the Hungarian contingent, taking their dual-hat off.

Since a Hungarian contingent has for the first time been assigned a separate AOR, and has to take its own responsibility for everything including intelligence, we have been forced to deploy collection assets in the area as well. These assets consist just of HUMINT forces so far, but in the future UAVs are planned to be deployed too.

As for the contacts and communication between the elements of the structure the great geographical distances constituted another problem since in Kabul all the elements of the previous system were placed close to each other which made the communication easier.

Now we shall provide the necessary technical equipment for the timely and secure information flow between Kabul, Masar-e-Sharif and Pole-e-Khomri. Personal contacts are limited, therefore MIO appointed an analyst into S2 staff and provided secure communications means for him.

For the moment communication with the RC North is provided by ISAF channels. At this command only Army officers are serving in different staff positions, two of them at G2, and they are our liaison officers.

According to the organigram of the PRT contingent MIO will be able - in case of necessity – to appoint an officer to the Regional Command as a National Intel Support Element.

So, this is our structure. The PRT Commander can get intelligence from 4 different sources: from his own collection assets, from the Northern Regional Command, through HUNNIC from ISAF HQ databases and from MIO.

As for the intelligence submission toward the Hungarian political and military leadership and the Operational Center our system is dully diversified. /I am talking about intelligence only, since information is flowing through command and security channels as well./

MIO - beside operating a secure communication system among MIO, HUNNIC in Kabul and our analyst serving at PRT S2 in PeK, which enables us to get almost real time information related to the activity and security of the contingent - operates also the whole range of its collection assets in Afghanistan.

The other player in operating the Intel system, the Hungarian Army has also made a lot recently in order to provide Intel support to military contingents in a professional way. Taking use of the assets and facilities of the 24th Recce Coy spending substantial financial means established a very functional

HUMINT Training Center, effective training and created considerable and well-trained HUMINT forces.

The first HUMINT teams deployed had short time to put their knowledge into practice but now in Kosovo and Afghanistan they proved that they can fulfill their job in a highly professional way.

As a result we can state now that the Hungarian Armed Forces are in the possession of a new, very useful capability which is also required by NATO more often recently.

We should be also aware of the fact that this capability will be a real one only if the number of trained personnel will be large enough to provide the necessary strength and full rotation in all the mission areas. In my view our development efforts should be continued otherwise our recent achievements could easily be wasted. And that would be a real pity!

CONSULTATION

Lieutenant-Colonel Josef Németh PhD

IRAQ –AFTER SADDAM FOOLEN

The 3rd Gulf-war had broke out 5.30am on 20.03.2003 local time with an air strike against Baghdad, the capitol of Iraq, which had carried out two US F-117-A “Stealth” fighter. The US-UK coalition’s air operations had made an effort to eliminate the political elite of Iraq, and paralyse or destroy the Iraqi air defence. Due to unsuccessful efforts to neutralize Saddam Hussein, in contrast with the original plans, the US HQ ordered the army to forward operations...(1) With this the US HQ, surprisingly, had changed the choreography of first war.(2) The political leadership and command of Iraq was not prepared for devastating strike of the coalition against the communication lines. Thus, there was not proper connection between the Iraqi army and the leadership. Therefore and because of the shock of surprise, they did not destroy and set the oil wells of South oil-fields fire. Saddam had divided the country into 4 parts, and made his relatives or confidants leaders of different parts of the country, who assured Saddam of political control of the army.(3) Only with the authorization of Saddam, could the army leaders carry out any operations. For this reason, the situation became lethal for the Iraqi army, with the annihilating of the communication lines.

The tasks of US forces were to occupy the central part of Iraq, and the UK made responsible to the occupation the city of Basra and the outskirts of the town. (4) The Kurd Democrat Party and the Kurd Patriotic Union joint forces (5) with Kurd Liberation Army (Pesmergs) (6) and this helped the coalition forces to liberate, North part of the country, the densely populated area by Kurd, upon the agreement with US. The west-friend Sunni Kurd organisations won ground, and at the same time the Ansar al-Islam (7) Siit terrorist organisation loyal and supported by Saddam was forced to give up its original bases (near Es-Sulejmanija, Csamcsala) and deployed its activities to the central region of Iraq, dwelt by Sunnis. The Kurds continuously kept up their administration organised in 1992, in the three quasi-independent areas (8) established in 1974. (9)

In spite of the Iraqi supreme command have powerful field units (21 div., and four of them the elite Republican Guard) the coalition forces rarely found with Iraqi units up to the so-called „red line”. Coalition forces have met the first massive resistance near the capitol, and during these battles, two divisions of the Rep Guard destroyed. The US forces occupied Baghdad without particularly significant loss, because the civil and army leaders had committed treason.

On 9 04 2003 the capitol of Iraq seized by US forces. After receiving this information, Saddam and his near political elite went into hiding, and encouraged the inhabitants to fight against the occupying forces. < *Let our towns buildings and swamps be our jungle* > (10) The quick success of the coalition and the effect of the powerful psychological warfare, made the Iraqi forces, deployed in the North region of the country, mostly populated by Sunni Arabs, to have their positions and weapons behind, or to surrender to the in-coming coalition forces. (11) They had no chance against an irresistible military force. A minor part of inhabitants who welcomed the coalition forces as an Army of Liberation, but for the most of them, it was indifferently. The Siits could not forget the year of 1991, when the coalition forces passively watched their revolt in Basra, which suppressed bloodily. At this time, Saddam could stay in power due to US strategic considerations. The opponents of the occupation, which main core consisted of civil clothes ex-guards, ex-security agents and the Baath party functionaries, turned to guerrilla war according to plans prepared by the Generalissimos, the tactic of quick and flexible fights of the decentralised forces taking advantage of all possibilities. (12)

With the collapse of the centralised Saddam administration, in the country with the exception of the North region inhabited by Kurd anarchy had blown up. Immediately had begun personal reckonings and plundering.

Accomplishing the quick and successful operation „Iraqi Freedom”, with only a few loss of personnel, Saddam’s autocracy was overthrown, hope rose in the people, that it was the end of starving, misery and the atmosphere of fear. The coalition forces began to discharge POW-s and to collect the hidden arms, weapons, and explosives. Based on the above Pres. G Bush announced on the board of the „A Lincoln” carrier, that „the important military operations” in Iraq were finished successfully. The West wanted to achieve, that the new Iraq should not threaten in the future Western countries or other countries around Iraq. Therefore the main aim of the Western countries is rebuild democracy and to develop economy along the principles of free-market in Iraq. However, this process made more difficult, because Iraq was not a homogeneous nation, so it is not possible to follow a centralised nation-building policy. The Sunni elite ruled long on the Siits and Kurds, provoking their antipathy. Moreover, the Kurds had long dreamed about a new independent Kurdistan, but if it came true, the destabilisation in the region would expand. Therefore – focusing on the one of the most important geological region of the world – in April of 2003 the leaders of the most powerful European countries in economies and military declared in St Petersburg that the occupying forces should have given the main tasks of rebuilding to the UN after the security circumstances in Iraq became safe.

State of transition

Overthrowing autocracy and the liberation caused automatic collapse of central administration. Therefore, the Bush administration assigned ret. Gen. J. M. Garner to establish a new Temporary government. As the first step, the Bureau of Rebuilding and Humanitarian Aid (BRHA) lead by Mr. Garner announced a meeting at airbase of Ur for the middle of April 2003. On the meeting, approximately 200 Iraqi leaders participated; more of them came back from exile. The chosen leaders determined as most important tasks to create new constitution, rebuild the damaged hospitals and bring the ex-regime leaders to trial. The participants agreed unanimously on a declaration 13 articles, which enclosed conceptual proposals for the government later to be established. Among others, they made proposals on federalism, restore legal rights, democracy, and respect different opinions. Ignored political leaders (13), those who were absent, declared this meeting illegitimate. They objected no one represented the groups, which had earlier fought to Saddam. This situation predicted that serious fights could expect among the internal opposition and the leaders who returned from exile. More and more self-appointed candidate leaders appeared who refused to recognize anybody as their superior except themselves. At the same time, the tribal aspects and the vigorous total nationalism took shape, which represented antipathy against the West. Furthermore, this situation made clear, if a clear democracy model could created in Iraq, the more reaction Siits could vote for or down everything. (The Siits population of Iraq is approximately 60%) It was an important element as well, that the US war against Saddam had been supported by well-organised Iraqi Kurd lead by the two clan-leaders.(14) As a result, their leaders could take part in the political develop-ments of new Iraq and won significant positions in the new administration supported by the US. In return for positions, they had to give up the idea of Kurd independence (15) and annex ion of Kirkut and surroundings. (16)

The next meeting held in Baghdad, 10 days after, where the 300 participants represented the almost all religious on nationality groups of the country. In their meeting, they made a decision to call a National Conference (NC) in a month. They set an aim to establish a post war Temporary Government and to decide whether the Iraq should lead a council or a head of state. They accepted a decision with eight articles, in which the most important terms were: the restore legal rights and refuse the collecting of weapons.

Same time begun increase the political parties, day by day. Until now unknown religious, tribal organisations have appeared and demanded positions and goods. The tribes began to organise local authorities, but they had not any competence or local budget.

In May 2003 the US and UK requested the UN SC to stop the sanctions which had been inflicted against Iraq 13 years ago, and in order that they could control the country for year at least. The US-UK occupation of Iraq approved and legitimated by Number 1483 decision of UNSC on 22 of May 2003. Particularly with this decision entrusted the oil – incomes managing to them.

Meanwhile the Bush administration assigned a new governor Mr L. P. Bremer diplomat instead of ret. Gen. Garner, who got quite narrow possibilities of act. For the Bureau of Rebuilding and Humanitarian Aid (BRHA) Mr Bremer created a new organisation, the Temporary Authorities of Coalition (TAC). Particularly this organisation worked as a Temporary Government. When this organisation had competence, legislation and controlled the country by rules and instructions. Its responsibility for maintain integrity of territory of Iraq, create of public security, task of humanitarian and rebuilding and restore the civil administration.

After UN decision Mr Bremer officially dissolved more ministries (internal, military, information), disbanded the Iraqi army, the state-party Baath and every other organisation, which directly served Saddam's autocracy (National Security Judgment). Considering confused security situation (anarchy, robbery) thinking the local political superiors and surveying his own influence Mr Bremen did not establish Temporary Government in the first period. As a temporary solution, Mr Bremen created a so-called consultative body Temporary. Cabinet parallel with Temporary Authority of Coalition (TAC) lead by him. However, ministries were lead by ministers assigned by TAC, but TAC's experts controlled their work.

Behind the scene run hard political negotiations. In addition, they had to perform security check the representatives, who take into consideration. The Iraqi political groups did not submit to establish civil authorities right now. Therefore, they hold a so-called „Leaders Council” meeting where they decided that make a protest to the occupation forces. Though Mr Bremer made a promise that a meeting would have called by July, establish a Temporary Iraqi Government, the different Iraqi political groups were unimpressed. Delegations sent to Washington and London to put pressure on the preparation of elections as soon as possible. Regarded many persons moderate, among them Muhammad Bakra l-Hakim ayatollah, arrived from Iranian exile after 23 years, demanded let he Iraqi people control their destiny. The personnel of Iraqi army made the security situation worse because they did not get pay their annuity. They declared a „war” if their salary would not be paid. Before the war, all criminals (130 persons) got free by Saddam's directions, so this increased the chaos as well.

The Temporary Authority of Coalition and the Temporary Protectorate accepted an agreement to accelerate the hand-over of power on 15 of Nov 2003. According to this agreement the US accepted that a Temporary National Assembly would set up, which elect the Temporary. Government. After than the Temporary National Authority dissolves. They agreed on that until acceptance of new Iraqi Constitution a so-called basic rule - Temporary Administrative Law - would be effective which text will work out to 28 of Feb. 2004 consulting with Temporary Authority of Coalition. The new Constitution, which changes the Temporary Admin Law, has to work out and agree the Constituent Convention – formed to 31 of May 2003. On the base of New Constitution should organize the elections of National Assembly to 31 of Dec 2005. The political intermediate should particularly finished by this. (17)

The legislators of course could not present the Temporary Constitution to the deadline. They could not agree on the role of Islamic rules in the new Constitution, the country will be unified or consists of 3 parts and the controlling it, task of paramilitary organisations, the budget and representative proportional number of women in the Government, subordination of provinces, number of leading council and the official language (Arabic, Kurd or the Turkish as well). The Council at least accepted the principal of federalism – state consists of three parts- so the territories populated by Kurds remained under Kurd control. They agreed on, that they would make a decision about other unsettled questions after elections. Thereupon they signed the Temporary Admin Law on eight of May 2004. According to state in this document, the first term of temporary period is 30 of June 2004 (18), when the Iraqi Temporary Government take over the authority from Temporary Authority of Coalition, which wound up the same time. The second regulation of the Law was that the National Council should elect until 31 of Jan 2005, which will set up the Temporary Government. The Temporary Government set as a task to wok out a new and final Constitution until 15 of Aug 2005 and the draft of Constitution put to the vote 15 of Oct 2005.

The Iraqi internal situation bore the marks of divided and the manoeuvring of Siits and Kurds parties. A Head of State elected who hands concentrated little power. This turned on that G. M. A. Javer elected President, and every tribe leader accepted him at least. Mr. Javer has already been a Member of Parliament in a period of Saddam's years. He lived in Saudi Arabia, when he emigrated.

Dr. Ijad al-Allavi (19) neurologist appointed Temporary Prime Minister, who lived in emigration in Great Britain. After arrangement those two important events the Temporary Council had dissolved itself effective immediately and gave its limited power to Allavi administration. The main ethnic and religious groups gave place in the new Temporary Government, and Ali Sistani the main

Ayatollah (20), the most powerful Shiit religious leader in Iraq, approved its work. The Allawi Cabinet commissioned as a main task to prepare the Temporary National Council elections in Jan. 2005. The further activity they should have restored the administration, the public services promote the formation of democratic establishments, start economical productivity, privatisation and break down military resistance in the Sunni regions. Realization the majority of recent tasks did not make the disadvantageous social, political and security possible. The religious, tribal, and ethnic character of Iraq society intensified and it set the marks of every segment of life.

The participant organisations of political life agreed to establish a National Council consists of 100 persons, which control the activity of Temporary Government until the elections in Jan. 2005. For this reason organised the National Conference of Iraq in Baghdad from 15 of Aug. to 18 of Aug. in 2004. The 1300 delegates represented all ethnic and religious groups and parties of Iraq. On the conference arranged that the National Council could veto the resolutions and decrees of Council of Ministers with 2/3 proportional number of votes, could stand in for Head of State in case of registration or death, and could accept the budget. Members of Temporary Protectorate got 19 seats in the National Council, and the remaining seats got the representatives of 10 greatest political organisations (National Agreement of Iraq, National Congress of Iraq, Kurd Democratic Party, Patriotic Union of Kurdistan, al-Dawa, Senior Council of Islamic Revolution of Iraq, Islamic Party of Iraq, Movement of Constituent Monarchy, Communist Party of Iraq and Independent Democrats of Iraq). The temporary National Council took an oath of office on one of Sept. 2004. Faud Massum, leader of Patriotic Union of Kurdistan elected President.

Security situation

In consequence of collapse of central administration and the operations of coalition forces, a vacuum of power rose, and the Shiit tribal leaders took advantage of this situation immediately. They took control over their settlements and begun establish of local administration based on tribal and religious basis like in Iran. This situation contributed that the coalition forces did not seize the settlements, just outflanked, because of minimize the loss of inhabitants, and avoid the religious conflicts and the street fighting. The coalition forces hunted only the leaders of regime and those who offended against Human Rights. In the final operational phase, the coalition forces let the Shiit paramilitary groups, which operated in the same area, to redeploy to the South-West region of the country that increased the power of Shiit leaders. With this, the allies made bigger place to the influence of orthodox Islam, and the religious fanaticism supported by Iran. In the same time, the allies failed initiate the Sunnis to the stabilisation of local security and defend infrastructural constructions, which are in their territory. Moreover, the US forces regarded as rebels every armed group

independently from that; they have ancient rights to self-determination, and carrying arms. It accepted even in the Saddam regime as well. Therefore, the most parts of tribes, living in Anbar region, did not support the attacks (21) on their places; moreover, they step up with military power against al-Kaida and personnel of other terror organisations.

Give the temporary leaders of the country trouble not only the divergence of political powers, their fights for positions and the every day crimes, but also the pledged aids (22) arrived late and missed the trained cadres. Restrained the peace process as well, that the executing brigades established under the wings of different parties, in order to revenge the committed crimes against people. These groups tried to kill the most prominent and cruel persons of the fallen regime. They got equal with real and imaginary enemies as well. It went a great way to huge amount of victims that the Iraqi military and security organisations dismissed. The established new organisations, are crude, and rival each other. The most part of employed personnel were un-drilled and without motivation. Significant majority of them joined to the organisations to insure their living, and for a reason they did not take their tasks seriously. The instable security situation made worse the huge unemployment (23), crime and the corruption, which weave every segments of life in the country. The plundering, the anarchy changed organised riot at least.

The first period of occupation, the Saddam loyalist powers (24) and the extreme gunmen, infiltrated from abroad, attacked only the personnel of coalition forces. Later became target the personnel of new security and administration organisations. This progress was broken off in Aug. 2003 when first time the Jordan Embassy and 2 weeks later the UNHQ blown up by unknown victims. At this latest attack lost his life Mr Sergio Vieira de Mello, the special envoy in Iraq of UN. Secretary General Kofi Annan. By this time, the relevant experts warned that the method and the target selection refer to organisations, which are standing near al-Kaida or confess its ideology as their own. Therefore, Iraq wriggling in chaos became the scene of Islamic terror movement, the Holy War. The most important aim the al-Kaida was co-ordinate and inspires more effective fight extreme Islamic groups who had rival each other in many instances. After blowing up at the local centre of international organisation, the attempts against Iraqi inhabitants sudden increased. The extremists with their terror attacks, murdering, kidnappings, bombings, executions against non-combatant Iraqi citizens forced back the main residential services to the minimum level, with which they aimed to incite the masses to rebel against the US and its allies. They prove to the Iraqi people, who live in permanent fear, that neither the coalition, nor Temporary Iraqi Government could promise them the suitable living conditions and security. West effort to build the stable democratic Iraq made difficult two bordering countries Iran and Syria. Iran has influence on the southern and eastern region of the country and

aims to control over Iraqi Shiites fellowship. Therefore, Iran supports armed groups to destabilise the moderate Shiite majority. The Syrians sympathise their ex-fraternal party Baath Party, not noticed the recruiting gunmen on Syrian territory and they did not make an effort to prevent different rebel groups penetrating the border, moreover sometimes Syrians helped them.

Most Shiite pilgrims arrived in Iraq to the religious celebrations (Asura, Ramadan, and Hadzs). To cover with this lot of extreme terrorist arrived into the country (25).

The Shiite rebels broke up riots in April 2004, in the regions where they have massive support. The focus point of this situation was that the coalition forces decided to take effect the warrant of custody against Mukkada as-Sadr radical preacher, which given out month ago. The young religious leader was accused that he took part in the killing of Shiite leader Seid Abdul Madzsid al-Kohi one year ago, who supported by US. After the localization this situation, on 5 Aug. 2004 broke out the second Shiite revolt lead by as-Sadr. Sistani Ayatollah made an agreement with Mukkada militia due to ruin of security situation, and according this the Mukkada begun vacating of the holy places, which used as a base. (27) The temporary position loss of militia caused not only has loss of personnel but they used holy places for fighting acts, which did not like most of faithful people. More over this situation escalated when radical Shiites intellectual leader Kazim al-Hussein al-Haeri great ayatollah declared on 5 Sept. 2004 that they separated from as-Sadr, who earlier was his protégé, efforts. Naturally, the young preacher's cease-fire policy, and actions moved to political fields did not like the leaders of most radical groups. Therefore, they left the organisation with their followers and carried on attacks against the coalition.

With this we can determine, that the most part of Shiites do not support the rebels, but they do not regard the presence of international forces either. Ten thousand of Iraqi people who arrested innocently and lots of them, who were humiliated (28) tortured in order to get operative information, damaged the prestige of coalition forces. (29)

At the same time, it was clear that the Iranian Government made heavy influence to the Iraqi events, behind interfered in the format of new Iraqi society. The interests of Iran are specifically contradictory. On the one part Iran do not want a strong Iraqi power (military, economy) or a US related Government. On the other side for the Iranian Government undesirable to strong restrain of stabilization process, because it would cause the nationally partition of Iraq. Therefore, to establish the independent Kurdistan may inspire the Kurds in Iran to join the independent Kurd state. The third time, Iran interested in that the Iraqi stabilization process engages the coalition forces, 1st of all US.

Therefore, Iran made heavy efforts to push collaborates to important political and economical positions, in order to have influence on strategically decisions. Besides Iran, support Iraqi radical Islamic groups with money, information, and weapons until the middle of 2004. From this period, Iran inspired the Iraqi Siit groups, which connected, instead of resist, corporate with the coalition forces. Iran stopped helping to Mahdi Army, lead by as-Sadr, according to change of Iranian policy. At the same time Iran helped return to Iraq a part of refugees and outcasts (about 1.000.000 person), who were left Iraq during Saddam regime.

At the beginning of elections more and more threat and attacks accomplished against electing-bureaus in the central regions, members of local administration and persons who assisted preparing the elections. Here operating armed groups aimed to keep away Sunni community from the elections. Besides only the mixed, Arab, Kurd, Turkish, Assyrian, dwelt area, Kirkut security situation was instable.

In the vote, contest the members of ex/regime party reorganised as a Reform Party (al-Islah). The political wing of party undertakes the representation of Sunni inhabitants and abstained from attacks against international forces, and made stronger their political influence. In the interest of this, the members were anxious to infiltrate into the lines of the Government offices and the Security Forces. Opposite this, the military wing played active roll in the attacks against the coalition forces.

The effect of security measures which were initiate to the elections (close borders, prohibition of flying, curfew) happened relatively less attacks.

Iraq after the first election

Siits organised themselves to the Iraqi League and won the elections with 4.075 million votes (47, 6%) on 30 Jan. 2005, with 60% participating proportion (30). On the 2nd place got the Kurds with 2.175 million votes (25, 4%)(31). The Siits League 140, Kurd Coalition 77 and the 3rd place with 40 got the Iraqi List a secular group lead by ex/Prime Minister Ijad al-Allavi from the 275 seats in the parliament. Therefore, the process of set up the Government happened in the frame of Siit – Kurd negotiations and with narrow party interests after long delay in Feb. and Marc. 2005. The Kurd Coalition and the United Iraqi Coalition argued the possibilities of integration of militia members into the security forces. In consequences of rigid attitude of Kurd leaders they refused every proposals which resulted in decrease their military abilities and enforcement of interests. Finally, they agreed that the questions would arrange in the frame of debate about constitution. The Government formed 3 month after elections, lead by Ibrahim al-Dzsaafari. In the Dzsaafari cabinet had position 17 Siit, 8 Kurd, 6 Sunni politics, and 1 Christian. The two major political coalitions fought cruel

political battles for key-positions (defence, internal, oil) and argued about status of Kirkut. The constituent convention elected three members of Presidential Council on 6 Apr 2005 according to agreement of Siit-Kurd political coalition. The head of state had been Dzsallalal Talabani Kurd leader and his 2 deputy head been Sunny Gazi al – Javer, former head of state, and the Siit Adel Abdel – Mehdi, former minister of finance.

Meanwhile Sunni parties, which boycotted the elections, argued the future of Iraq in early Feb. 2005. The representatives declared, that in contrast with their previous declarations and point of view, they would play roll in the political life of Iraq and the work out of new constitution.

The other important criteria of the transition period had begun with significant delay because of work out the new constitution. Later 15 joined constituent convention, consisted 55 members, and this lead to conflict and exclusions from Negotiations because of their different opinions. This situation projected in advance that the draft of final constitution would have not been ready by 15 Aug. 2005 US appointed. The representatives of Sunny withdrew from negotiations after frequent on 28 Aug. 2005. The draft of constitution introduced to the convention and accepted without vote .In spite of checking were resumed and more changes war made by this. The convention accepted the new draft of constitution on 28 Sept 2005. According this Iraq republic is a Federal state, which consists of a capital, other regions, decentralised protectorates and local authorities and the autonomic Kurd territory. The state religion is Islam.

Siit-Kurd coalition made on agreement with the Sunny Islam party before referendum on 15 Oct. 2005 if the Islam party support their acceptance of constitution draft they will propose modification it after the parliament election in Dec. 63% of citizens, who entitled vote, took part in the election (32).78% of electors accepted and 21% refused the new constitution. Based on the direction of Temporary Administrative Law, it made to protect Kurds, the constitution need to renegotiate and rewrite if in 3 protectorates of 18 the 2/3 of citizens refused constitution or a low. Only two of three Sunny regions refused the constitution above the prescribed rate in al-Anbar 96.9% and Sallah al – din. (81.75%) in Niniv region, the 55.08% of electors vote against the suggested document. So the new constitution became if effective by the reason of existing legal standard.

During the elections the Kurd in prove on they importance (33) which meets they ratio due to this the Kurd obtained more advantages. They reinforced the in dependence of the region; it has been since 1991 Gulf-War, kept the influence of central administration, localized their area from violence. The Kurd mobilised impressive efforts to integrate Kirkut, which is rich in oil and

controversial affiliation, into Kurd region but the Sunny and Turks, supported by Turkey prevented this all-available means.

More important political grouping

United Iraqi Federation It consists of more Siit groups. Among them the Senior Council of Islamic Revolution of Iraq (SCIRI) lead by Ald-el Aziz al-Hakin and the joined of Muktada, movement lead by as-Sadr radical Imam has the greatest basis. In their political program they promised the union of nation, fulfilment of the new constitution, withdrawal of coalition forces and the work of administration without politic.

Kurd Coalition The Kurd Democratic Party lead by Masud Barzani and Kurd Patriotic Union lead by Dzsasal Talabani, president of Iraq, belong to collations. In their election campaign, they professed freedom, further political and constituent advantages independently of political and religious affiliation.

Iraq National List This joined the secular parties (Communist Party of Iraq, Independent Democrat of Iraq, and Iraqijun). These parties propagated a secular democratic Iraq.

National Congress List of Iraq Lead by Ahmed Tsalabi it left the Allavi coalition in Jan because some group wanted to create an Islamic state. Agreement front of Iraq it formed from three Sunny party collations. In their election program, they promised finish occupation strengthening of patriotism exclusion the existing constitution and ex-members of but party from public life and rewrite the laws, which state the dissolution of former Iraq army.

The Iraq political elite thought most important questions, which need to solve to force back violence, corruption and religious conflicts, the withdrawal of foreign troops, and the clean elections. The Sunny were dead against the question of regional autonomy because they esteemed that if it would be accomplish the poor regions, inhabited by Sunny, would absolutely omitted from the economic growth. The vital problem of the bellow presented Sunnies in the power was that the Siit majority government overlook the penetration of Siit gunmen into the ministry of internal affairs and defence. These persons accomplish executions kidnaps with official background, (uniforms ID cards vehicles arms), and fear people.

Security situation

The loose coalition of Iraqi rebels got more and more powerful; their attacks were more and more coordinated. They carried out well-organised hits and attempts Their main goal is to fear the personnel of new Iraqi Army and

police, supported by its allies and US. For this reason, the cruel attempts against recruiting bureaus, military and police objects and vehicles became daily. The attacks of Sunni rebels and terrorist groups against Shiites increased continuously the ethnic and religious difficulties between them. The radical Shiites did not wait for countermeasures of Government, they got revenge in their hands. The devices, methods, and characteristic they used, the same on both side. They used hidden or covered explosives in vehicles and near the routes, grenade launchers, and suicide assassins in busy public domains (market, bureaus, centre of educations and labour).

Abu Musab az-Zarkavi the leader of Iraqi al-Kaida groups, in his speech; it published via internet in summer 2005 appealed to Muslims: *“A few thinking the rebels divide 2 parts: honourable rebels who fight against faithless and dishonest rebels who attack Iraqi people. Therefore, we declare that the Iraqi Army is the Army of perfidious and mercenaries which allied with Christians to annihilate Islam and fight against Muslims. So we will fight against the Iraqi Army as well ...”*

According to procedure started by Temporary Authorities of Coalition in 2003 the 90% of personnel of Shiite and Kurd armed groups would have disarmed by 2005 elections in Jan., and the 10% of remaining would have enlisted to the Army or disarmed. Instead the Kurd and Shiite leaders accomplished partly and slowly the dissolution of their armed groups because they feared the rival armed organisations and the indecision and weakness of central administration. The concept accomplished in the North region of Iraq when the decisive majority of Kurd gunmen integrated into the Iraqi National Guards.

Before elections the rebels and terrorists, just like earlier, wanted to fear and kept away electors from the elections. Mostly political crimes and attempts happened in the central and northern areas and regions inhabited by Kurds.

Iraq after second election

7650 delegates of 305 political organisations competed at the final parliamentary elections, which authorised them for 4 years mandate. In the new election system, the inhabitants of 18 protectorates represent proportionally. So, the defeated of previous election, the Sunni too, independently their participating proportions, got some seats, because of 3 protectorates mostly inhabited by them (Ninive, al-Anbar, Salah al-Din)

The Shiite coalition, United Iraqi Coalition, won (128 mandates) the elections on 15 Dec 2005. From this, the movement of as-Sadr radical faith speaker has 30 seats. However, they could not reach the 2/3 majority even nor their Kurd allies (53 mandates) because they formed National Front of Agreement and

Consent developed by most powerful Siit parties and other secular nationalist parties got 80 mandates. It predicted that the parties could elect the Head of State and Prime Minister only with hard political fights and agreements. The result of West friend, enlightened political powers were significant behind from expected. For this, the Siits could prevent participation in the Government the secular Ijad al-Allavi and the political powers behind him.

The UN interested in set up a National Government because this process result the waste of Iraqi rebellion, according to their appreciations. If the cabinet works properly, it could isolate the radical religious powers and help the rebels, who are on national base, to integrate to the progress of political transformation.

Ibrahim al-Dzsafari suggested the Siit majority was not acceptable for minority Kurds and Sunnis because he too partial with his religious trend, furthermore he could not raise the living standard. Nuri al-Maliki (38) Siit politic, who accepted by all political groups, got mandate forming Government on 22 Apr 2006, as a result of 4 month political negotiations. At the same day, the parliament made a decision that Dzsasal Talabani would be the Head of State for the next official term, but a Sunni and a Siit deputy appointed at his side (Adil Abul Mahdi, Tarik al-Hasimi). The main demands against Prime Minister were that the policy makes sure the public services, disarmament of armed groups, increase the action ability of secure forces ease religious conflicts and boost the economy.

Abdel Aziz al-Hakim the leader of SCIRI negotiated in Washington on early Dec. 2006 and asked the US administration that the US forces remain in Iraq in the interest of fight against terrorists.

Security situation

The religious clashes threatening civil war begun on 22 Feb. 2006 after the “Gold Mosque”, superior holy place of Siits, blew off. Unknown gunmen, presumably belonged to al-Kaida, disarmed, bound the guards, blew up with two explosives the dome of mosque, and damaged the minaret. Reason for this, cruel attacks hit Sunnis in more cities, dozens of mosques set on fire or damaged. The Sunnis committed attacks, attempts against Siit political and religious leaders, people, and mosques in replay. The Iraqi political and religious leaders denounced the cruel actions. In spite of the political agreements, the cruel actions and attempts followed 140-150 times per a day. These happened mostly in the capitol and North from Baghdad, and in the western regions. In the same time, the rebels and terrorist groups regularly committed sabotage actions against strategically significant oil-pipelines and power-lines. This result in the supply of fuel and energy worked irregularly. It followed that increased the

discontent and this situation more increased the corruption and the lack of security.

This situation grew worse when the Shiites divided into 2 factions. One of them is the Badr-Brigades, the armed wing of SCIRI and has about 15-20 000 gunmen. Its warriors drilled in Iran and the supplies arrived from there as well. The other rival group is Mahdi Army lead by radical religious leader Muqtada as-Sadr, which has about 8 000 warriors they rule the Nidief in South Iraq and the most poor parts of Baghdad. Almost all of its warriors are young unemployed. They finance themselves from smuggling of fuel and gas, donations and gathering money for defence. The clashes between them are going on in the capital and in other bigger towns.

The radical Sunnis fight against US troops in the group of al-Kaida, resistance lead by former Saddam military and police ex-officers, secret agents(39)These organisations set up as a military hierarchy and the salary and supplies of members provided from the huge amount of hidden currencies (40) which concealed during Saddam ages. The Sunni tribal leaders developed a private paramilitary organisation Revolutionaries of Anbar in early 2006.

In the North, the Kurd Pesmerg militia (about 55-60 000 warriors) a well organised, fit for action and has been in arms for a long time, guarantee the peace for their inhabitants. They only operate in North Iraq and subordinate to the Kurd autonomic Government. Although, nowadays among the dissatisfied Kurd with the huge corruption and the dictatorship methods of 2 clan leaders getting stronger the Ansar al-Islam terror organisation, founded in 2001, which became weaker during US operations in 2003. In the summer of 2003 Iraqi Arabs and warriors arrived from abroad, reorganised, and at the end of the year took the name Ansar as-Sunna. The organisation takes part in the resistance and wants to force the coalition forces out from Iraq.

The Iraqi group of al-Kaida consists of foreign faith warriors (41). They reserves continuously arrive from Islamic countries and from Western Europe. Most of them are un-drilled just the veterans who fought in Afghanistan have serious battlefield experiences.

Beyond above mentioned uncountable private militia is stand under the control of different tribal, religious leaders and political parties. Many of them fight each other.

A part of inhabitants could not stand the mad cruel and destroy any longer, organise themselves self-defence group, undertake more and more roll in the fight against rebels and terrorists.

A special police team the Wolf Brigade, consists of 2 000 mostly young Siit warriors, accomplish annihilation of rebels as well. This organisation established by the Iraqi Army and US and they finance its works. They fight with extraordinary brutality.

The militias of contrary religious denominations indicate the most danger to future of Iraq, because they build on a well work hierarchy and with hidden supports of parties, which got in the parliament they could infiltrate into the administration.

Religious, national and denomination passions dominate The Iraqi state in the present. There is a fact, that the loyal powers of Saddam begun the rebellion against coalition forces and the new Iraqi administration. For these days, the land of Iraq became a theatre of complex conflicts, battles of groups and organisations, which set different aims. The nationalists want to drive out every foreigner. The Siit and Sunni fanatics fight a holy war against faithless its allies) and (US. The Sunni rebels attack Siit inhabitants systematically because the Sunnis are hireling of US and thought they are the cause of pushed back of Sunnis. Since the Iraqi authorities and the US forces could not stop these actions, the Siit paramilitary groups took organise of defence into their hands. In the name of law, they send killing-brigades to civilian Sunni inhabitants. This spiral of hostilities drifted the country almost to the civil war. Meanwhile the Iraqi politicians made signs to each other. During investigation of violent events, which seem to causal could point out that the victims have been chose by the reason of origin, denomination, opinions, occupation after a careful consideration. One part of victims were Sunni or Siit prominent persons, the other part of them used to get in into strategic objects or attack them. The third category was civil inhabitants. They have to die to produce as much fear as possible.

However, stabilise the security situation need the active co-operation of Iraq. In spite of the US and its allies drilled, a security force with 3000 personnel the US could not hand the cleaned areas from rebels and other armed groups over them because their conditions (42) and transformation (43) of religious composition is not the required. One hand this hold back the rebuilding ant the other hand the US troops could not demilitarise other infected areas. The execution of Saddam and companion in consequence of war crimes was a symbol regarding future of Iraq. In Dia Raswan Egypt political analyst opinion, "The legal proceeding creates a precedent in the Arab world that directly makes weak the power positions of some leaders." (44)Sunni resistance and increasing of religious-ethnic crimes expected because of execution of Saddam and its circumstances.

Summary

The Iraqis who has deep historical sense (they are the one of the most ancient nations with culture civilisation) have lived under fear and ruthless suppression for decades. For this and exceptional treatment with Sunni Arabs and inflaming tribal conflicts of Saddam policy resulted in decline the national unity. Because of brutal dictatorship, the internal opposition became demora-lised, was crushed, and divided. President Saddam systematically annihilated those persons who revolted against him or was expected it. During his rule, because of oil Iraq was one of the richest Arab countries in the region, but sunk to the level of poor African countries. Known, that the wars(45) broken out by Saddam the states in the region want a weak, pulling apart, Iraq which could not threat their interests and unable attack

In Consequence of US, political and military suppression the Baghdad administration did not know when the allied forces would attack. For this reason the war industry and the Army should kept in highest readiness. It caused difficulties in supply of goods and energy, which resulted more dissatisfactions among the most oppressed ethnic groups.

The military action launched to overthrowing the Saddam regime onsisted of heavy air strikes, psychological warfare and operation, which aimed to envelope the capitol. The Anglo-Saxon allies after their quick and annihilating victory in Iraq, due to high tech US technology, begun rule the country, which belongs to the different civilisation culture, with classic occupation methods. The US in authorative manner planned to form Iraq with producing a western type democracy. The western political system and its establishment are absolutely far from Islamic world. The situation getting more difficult because Iraq is a country, in which live three different ethnic and religious groups, who are opposition with each other. This country formed by interests of British colonizers from three protectorates of Ottoman Imperia. This conglomerate was keeping with blood and steel. The mass base, the political elite, and the personnel of power organisations of dictatorship gave the Sunni Arab citizens, who were minority, compare to Siits. Therefore, they made brutal suppression and some times genocide against the rebelling Siits and Kurds. After defeating Saddam, the Sunnis got into fear from power and sunk into poverty because of loss their job.

A part of their religious and political leaders run away, the other part of them killed. They depended on the terror organisations of al-Kaida threaten from Siits brutality, which gave hope compensation of suppress and influence of Iran.

According to my opinion the US, administration did not take into consideration that occupying Iraq and secure the rights and living conditions

need to apply a bigger military power than the task force, which had put into action. Therefore, the US was unable to envelope, disarm and guard the enemy forces, and could not take possession their weapon and ammunition stores. There was the other problem that US thought with just quick victory and the co-operation of citizens. Because of this the US administration did not prepare the own troops nor Iraqi political oppositions to the period after collapsed of Saddam regime. Therefore, the oppositions could not gain the trust of inhabitants, and did not take part to organise estate and administration. They missed pull the local tribes into the organising process. This situation might caused that the US leaders excessively trusted in some so called prominent Iraqi persons, who had lived in west for ages, and they overstated their roll in the Iraqi political life, and possibilities. They did not take into consideration that the terms changed during they escaped from Iraq. Remove the members of Baath Party from the administration, dissolve Army and Security Services were a big mistake. At the same time, the US undervalued the supporters of the Saddam regime. US did not take into consideration that during the war in 1991, the Shiites rebelled in South Iraq, but they did not help them effectively. The US had possibilities, but did not protect citizens from the blood feud of Saddam. Therefore the majority of Shiites hate the US, moreover a part of them take to think of "State of God" which is based on Islam just like in Iran. The US increased the false instructions with that, they divided commissions and money almost among US companies to the post war rebuilding developing and creating work places without a question of Iraqi. The amounts of money did not get to the suitable places and this increased the feeling of degradation, defencelessness and the uncertain of existence in the Iraqi citizens. This situation got worse when US watched idly in the 1st period the carrying off the state and private property, disturbing order and taking shape anarchy.

As a summary could find out, that the military intervention caused destabilisation in the Middle East but not the establishing US type democracies according to domino-principle. A power and ideological(46) vacuum had risen, and the neighbour an estate countries trying take advantage of this except Kuwait. It seems that US did not arrange itself to solve the post war difficulties (non-conventional warfare, unemployment, operation of public utilities and establishments). However, the radicalization or not of Arab world depending on that US internal policy in Iraq will be successful or not. Modernization of the country should achieve with taking into consideration the local specific circumstances (tribal points of view, nationalism) in such a way that the present Islam world main characters (corruption, absence of human rights) should driven back according to possibilities, and the injured interests opened from it compensate other achievements. It is clear that no one can build an artificial nation in this region. It is absurd to create a colourful, democratic country a day after day, even not in Europe, mainly brutality. This has social and historical

conditions, since in west these political systems, which are samples nowadays, have took shape for centuries.

The peacemaking concept by US could not be accomplished until the end of Jan. 2007. Up to this day, they could not care of security of civil inhabitants. This could not be accomplished because the initiative is mostly in the hands of non-officials (religious and ethnic militia, terror and crime organisations). In the present Iraq the temporary alliances of these fight each other and the weak central power, its armed forces are under heavy religious and ethnic influence as well, and fight with the coalition forces which support the central administration. They set up a Shiit-Sunni-Kurd federation indeed, after a long and heavy political negotiation, but the agreement of effective dividing of power among the 3 main political actors did not happen yet. The established democracy characterizes now a weak central Government, strong regions, and a National Council with wide rights. Besides, the Kurd autonomous region has its own parliament and Government. The official state religion and the main source of codification is the Islam.

However, there is not clear such an all-important question, whether the theocratic point of view of Shiits or the more secular point of view of Sunnis will be the normative according to the political system of the country. To achieve this without coercion, need to select acceptable device for every entity to solve their radicals. The coalition forces need to guarantee the mixed inhabited areas (central part of Iraq) by Shiit and Sunni. As a matter of course, they could not omit the other countries in this region from strategic negotiations. The countries and the "Kurd affective" Turkey as well, who support both the Sunnis and Shiits need to have a concern in the put order and the Middle East peace process.

Otherwise, the conflict could spread to the surrounding countries.

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Notes

1. Divisions, accomplished the attack (3. US infantry, 1. US Marine, 7. UK armoured)
2. Preparation of 1991 war has continued for 39 days
3. 3 of them have not any military qualification
4. after massacre in 1991, it was a prohibited area, secured by US fighters
5. the 2 parties usually stood against each other during last decades, before US occupied Iraq, they reached an agreement, and supported destroying dictatorship
6. it means: “Who face the Death”
7. it means: “ Warriors of God”, it is the successor organisation of Islam United Movement for Kurdistan founded in 2001 by warriors who came back from Afghanistan, and called faith Muslims to fight against US, Israel and its supporters
8. Arbil, Al-Sulaymaniah, Duhok
9. Has own parliament an government
10. Tarik Aziz ex-deputy
11. has fallen on 13 April 2003 as a last nest of rebellion, Tikrit is the closer line of Saddam
12. the guerrilla warfare only could exists in an area, where they get all support from inhabitants, and the police and the army sabotage the orders of occupying authorities
13. Among them numerous religious (on Islamic base)
14. Masud Barzani and Dzsasal Talabani
15. that the US and UK does not support, the surrounding countries, mainly Iran and Turkey definitely oppose
16. Turkey to prevent the turkis inhabitants of city has promised military actions, but desisted from it, because of impressive pressure of US administration and adequate guarantees
17. with this the US wanted to sign to arab countries and the world, that they is not an invaders, but has brought democratic changes for the oppressed people of Iraq and took Shiite partie in advantageous position
18. It has happened on 28 of July because of security reason
19. He was the leader of National Agreement of Iraq in exile
20. In his activity follow the traditional religious worth, and exert himself and other prominent religious persons from politic. His opinion advocated in “fatva”, in a religious decret.
21. it endangers their traditional smuggling actions
22. for the majority of inhabitants the UN program “ Food for Oil” offered relative welfare, but the war drove starving and the uprising of crime
23. dissolving the army and police more 100 000 young people “got to the streets”
24. It is composed of the members of the destroyed Fedajin forces, Special Republic Guards and members of extreme Islamic groups
25. Members of Hezbollah, Islam Djihad, Islam Movement, Warriors of Jerusalam terror organisations
26. El/Amara, Basra, Sadr district of Baghdad, and en-Nasirija
27. mosque Ali and Kufa

28. e.g. in Abu Ghraib jail, as it known from the media
29. not excuse they from their crime, they wanted to recon the terrorist, ant they have massive casualties
30. the last census was in 1987 in Iraq, where the security situation allowed, meanwhile the country suffered from more 100 thousands emigrations and war causalities. So the 27.000.000 demographical data is estimated
From this 15.000.000 registered (1.608.000 Kurd) and 8.000.000 voted. Iraq and the countries in which there are numerous refugees allowed that the Iraqi subjects over 18, could vote.
31. In the 3 Kurd protectorate, more than 90% of entitled to vote participated
32. In the kurd protectorates the participation was at 35-36%
33. presumably cheated, their activists voted in other districts, because the number of voter were beyond registered with more 100.000
34. His brother Mohammad Bakir al-Hakim found SCIRI during exile in Iran. Returned in 2003, and fallen victim to a bombing attempt in Nedjef at mosque if Ali imam. Al-Hakim ayatollah in his speeches condemned attacks against coalition forces, but expressed that was everybody interest the leaving US forces from Iraq
35. it is the most former Shiite religious movement founded in the 1950 years
36. his father, Mohammad Sadik as-Sadr ayatollah killed in 1999 by assassins of Saddam
37. he was the leader of the Iraqi National Congress, worked in exile
38. He escaped from Iraq in 1979, lived in Syria and was a prominent member of Al-Dawa Party
39. Among them the most considerable organisations, Fedajin of Saddam created in 1994, and Djais al-Ansar al-Sunna created in 2003.
40. they managed to put in secure many US dollars before Iraq had been occupied
41. mainly they came to fight from countries of Africa an Palestinian territories, but there are many western European citizens in the lines
42. according to US sources all divisions deserted, and whole police companies had been dissolve because they took part in crimes against inhabitants
43. increasingly number of Sunnies are forced to leave security forces
44. M Szikora: Dead or alive? Hetek, X/46
45. attacked Iran in 1980, in 1990 Kuwait
46. ignore the pan-Arab, nationalist idea which connected to Baath-Party pulled back the Iraqi identity, and instead of them put the fore the ethnic and religious differences

WHO ARE GOVERNING THE INTERNATIONAL MIGRATION?

To the question above we could give the simple answer that the migrant person and the central authorities are the main players. This article however states that nowadays there are four interests to be reconciled during the process instead of the earlier two. This fact, together with the growing number of participating countries being involved in migration, makes migration a multicultural challenge. The need for security and the utility of migration are forcing differing interests to be negotiated, during which the questions of how and why are also considered. (*Szabó A. F. 2001.*)

The need for multi angle consensus

Already at the beginning of the seventies there have been initiatives started for the shaping of international migration. The initiators of the strategy tried to harmonize increasing migration with the development of democracy. Global migration soon became a central element of foreign policy. (*Tóth J. 2001*) With this the question immediately moved beyond the level of national strategy. While becoming a mass issue, and in relation to international and local recession, migration appears in the dialogue of employers and employees, for example as part of establishing further decreases of local minimal wages. The globalisation of both, migration and economy happened parallel to each other.

It is known from literature that the four laws of freedom, the harmonized movement of goods, capitals, services, and labour means free movement, which is the principle of most political and economic areas; this is how they are able to respond to market needs in a flexible manner. Still, free movement remains only a theory, because the motion of these elements will always be limited in some ways. It is clear, that these four are related; therefore dependency is a natural outcome. The arrival of foreign capital means need for either local or imported labour. (*Dövényi Z. 2005*): With the upswing of national export production (mainly from the foreigners owners) emerges the expectation of free trade. The return on investment needs labour, market, and services. Especially taut is the situation when production requires skilled, highly educated labour, and the chances for this are increasing with the growth of knowledge economies; this leads to either sourcing from abroad or to the relocation of production abroad onto the market of skilled labour.

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During the last two decades in some of the geographical regions these questions emerged with high tension. With the relocation of manufacturing industrial production in the emerging economies area, labour recruitment has happened, and this either kept in place or attracted labour. (*Nijkamp 2002*) For example: the creation of assembly factories, maquiladores, Bracero program, in the world's largest illegal border zone, on the American-Mexican border. The United States liberalized the trade of goods, funds, and services, but not the crossing of its borders.⁵⁴ The liberalization of goods, funds, and services should be interlocked with free movement of people.

Those countries that did not take this step developed several forms of border alliances so wishing to regulate labour market redundancies. The ILO Multilateral framework on labour migration in September 2005 reinforces that migration has fundamental role in employment.

In countries with high migration tension and especially high illegal migration, during the eighties, one after the other legislative regulation has been introduced. This made it possible for several years illegally but also independently living, residing, and working people the attainment of legal residency or even final settlement. The way it was formulated is very expressive: "bring them out of the shadow".

The regulation of border crossing migration contributes on a large scale to the increasing of available profit and security. Understanding national practices helps formulating our own national legislation, and furthers the standard handling of migration in several countries. Cooperation and joint legislation means broader opportunities. (*Illés S., Michalkó G. 2005*)

Fundamental documents on host environment and free flow are renewed continuously.⁵⁵ National dialogue and legislation has to be based on these documents. According to the declaration of human rights all people must have the opportunity to be able to carry out effective work equivalent to their ability

⁵⁴ Right here typically 1.5 million people enter, three times that of the European entry. Strong increase of illegal entry is experienced; such as in Great Britain during the last ten years illegal entry and stay of people having been discovered by border control increased fifteen-fold. Apart from being a security threat, this also means that unlawful entry has developed into a line of business related to black economy. The American entry is not only one of the most expensive ones, but also involves masses. On this border the 10 billion dollar "industry" adds up to half of all illegal entries in the world. The here generated money looks for such investment that brings enough return. This is an unpleasant, security threatening circumstance of movement.

⁵⁵ Freedom of Association and protection of the right to organize convention, 1948. Right of collective bargain 1949. Forced labour convention 1930. Equal remuneration convention 1951. Discrimination convention 1958. Minimum age convention 1973. Worst forms of child labour convention 1999.

at home or abroad. The free movement right of people is fulfilled when they have the necessary information at their disposal about what to expect in the new environment. A kind of assistance service is practical which helps legal orientation, and is extended to social and personal services, that are vital when entering a new legal system.

Advantages of migration are to be exploited via multilateral harmonisation, during which employers, employees, and government representatives, and NGOs are present. Regular deliberation by these entities ensures continuous dialogue between government agencies and regional representatives. While it is the independent duty and responsibility of all states to develop a national strategy, yet they proceed properly if they observe the relevant and standard national practices. These apply to regular data collection, labour market analysis, and the use of good practices of other countries. Knowing the international and domestic labour stream is the basic interest of all countries.

While developing the national strategy participants' transparent and public politicising has to be considered. While negotiating interests, the debate can be extended to questions that have not yet been on the agenda. Coordination and cooperation of labour flow has to function actively together with one-on-one and institutional counselling. Practice formulated this way can better respond to daily challenges.

To be able to value the labour movement processes of a given country, labour source demographic trends are needed and one has to have continuous knowledge about the situation of regional labour market demand and supply. To enforce sector, professional and regional points of views it is crucial that parameters and aptitudes are known, and clear images of the future exist. During this process basic educational rights and health services must have a special role. During the process of integration a welcoming and cooperative environment is necessary. Locals should feel that new arrivals are needed; they will live together. Social dialogue is a basic need. Representatives of interest like the grassroots and civic organisations should be involved, and they should acknowledge effects mirrored in migrants, and verbalise emerging questions. During the conciliation process participants can be motivated to set tasks and goals. The effectiveness of this work can be significantly increased by building direct connections between people carrying it out.

Surveying the life and work environment is related to safety, the work of authorities, the beholder of central power, the state's image in the migrant. Continuous monitoring of this process permits intervention when initial goals are deviated from.

An important element of reaching goals is the prevention of disturbing effects of migration. Unlawful entry, residency, and human trafficking makes multi national filtering and information flow necessary.

In relation to increased skilled international labour recruitment, and that people within the local economy, the permission of missing labour entry cannot substitute for migrants, and the preparation and controlling of ethical codes of conduct are necessary. Is foreign labour and its free entry truly necessary? Could demand be fulfilled with local labour? (Rédei 1994) I note that in countries with more developed practices analysis is requested to show how much mutual benefit the arrival means.

Consequently the key question of migration utility is how much of local supply we are able to discover and choose effectively from. The other key issue is the implementation of successful use of foreign labour.

Governing the course of international migration

Deliberate and coordinated governance of spatial migration processes definitely increase its advantages. Harmonisation helps migrants to face expected environmental impacts and disturbances during integration can be reduced. When formulating strategic goals of a given country's migration one needs to continuously monitor the demography, the labour market and regional images of their future, and that of inner needs, and these must be connected to regional goals. The following are also important goals: increasing the younger age cohort, equalizing age groups, filling skill gaps, developing domestic manpower, passing over locally unwanted jobs to migrants, and increasing human capital.

All this should be done within an institutionalised framework, where not only the legal tools, but even desired goals are negotiated. It is advisable that the institution dispose of up to date advisory services that introduce demand and supply by profession and area.

In the area of international migration in Europe we witness the loosening or lifting of restrictive policies. (*Berneke Á. Kondorosi F. Nemerkenyi A. Szabó P. 2003.*) Yet in Hungary migration policy strategies are just being formulated at the national level. During this process some professional areas are better able to formulate more measurable and understandable images of the future, for example demographic questions, therefore they are in the cross-fire of disputes. Other areas, like the labour market, are unable to state in the longer run and in detail what kind of people and skills we would require? In turn it is also hard to say: wherefrom? Experts understandably point to those source regions that possess notable migration potential.

Traditional actors of migration are the migrant and the host country. With globalisation multinational companies joined the circle. For them the free movement of highly skilled labour between countries is essential and for this reason they expect increased flexibility from target countries. Nowadays negotiations involve three interest groups. For integration to be long lasting and as complete as possible it is important to explore the place of residence. Interests of the locality and regional characteristics must be taken into account, with which the subsidiary of migration is strengthened (decisions must be made where they are rooted).

Successful integration for the state means security and the use of quality labour, skill matching effective work for the migrating person, and a sorting surplus for the owner. Therefore one of the key questions of the future is: how does the global business viewpoint of production relate to the individual mobility decisions of labour? How does all this manifest itself in a national strategy? How advocate participating actors' points of views assert themselves during the policy implementation?

Migrations processes do not happen spontaneous rather emerge through implementation, with the harmonisation of decision making and executive powers. So the successful decisions of migration policy are always a reflection for those, who are hesitating to do the same. The realised cases are experienced way for those who became satisfied by the new situation.

With the strengthening of globalisation corporate interest is increasing; players of the business world are present at the migration discussion tables. They argue to express their goals, which is mainly to have an evermore increasing circle for choosing the best possible employee. In some cases we witness them arguing on the side of entry, while the real motivation is simply the fact that the firm just relocated to the given country. Business people are highly interested in employing the qualified labour necessary for the enterprise, and momentarily this is in line with the interests of the country. Regarding the regulation of the masses countries are interested in restrictions (protecting the domestic workforce), and respectively recruitment (in areas of labour shortage). Restrictions hinder unwanted influx, hard to control mass entry; recruitment permits best age and profession based choices for the country. The goal of lands is the national level sometimes is not extended for the metropolis regulation. (*Mészáros 2000. Becsei J.2003. Bartha Gy. 2001.*) In the migration orientation is the primary aspect is security, which in turn is related to yield.

Migration interests and the profits to be made should be responded to with active selection requirements that create security and follow utilitarianism. Migration limitations and preferences must be utilised parallel to domestic subsidies and these must be applied at the regional level. Business entered the

field of national economic regulations, and they are present in the case of migration; however in this area national interests are difficult to enforce.

The role of the state in the area of migration management decreases in spite of its efforts. Its role decreased even further after the traditionally open nations chose the principle of subsidiarity, making decisions on the level where they emerge. However, the regional level got stronger and with that the harmonisation process now involves four players: the migrant, the host country, the multinational company, and the proprietors of the region.

The subsidiarity of migration

A person that was welcomed based on countrywide and national rules lives on a specific geographical location. It is expedient to make related decisions right where their impact will be most felt, and so a kind of subsidiarity manifests itself. Most large host countries believe, that the special choices of migration best be oriented by introducing interested parties to the goals of regional development plans before settling, and builds so called sponsorship based family ties. With this they are able to channel centrally supported integration, and the formulation of professional expectations based on area preferences and funds. With this they also make sure that placement into the new environment does not happen randomly.

These days most host countries recognise that migration can be directed and means surplus: by means of migration profits are attainable, and the economy gains new resources. Earlier a given country's population was meant to be kept in place by bringing international developments to that country. This combination of migration and development did not return the expected results. Readiness for mobility, and new regions joining world processes made new masses to hit the road. As a spatial result of developments people who gained experiences and skills in the developed world returned in increasing numbers to their country of origin. Homecoming programs became part of national development strategies in several countries, such as the Gulf States, China, and South-Africa. Business developments target emerging regions, because there the consumer market, and the more competitive production, motivates even the highly educated to head to the regions where their abilities are most valued. This way migration directions are modified and are diverted from the developed world to the developing world again with which special reorganisation begins and migration movements could become more balanced.

We can conclude that alongside the three existing interest groups of migration issues (the business owner, the country and the migrant) appears and gains strength the fourth actor, the regional interest group. Certain areas, cities recognised opportunities for new resources to be gained from migration, and that carrying our principles in practice based on strategic expectations they are able

to reach their goals faster. We can talk about regional cooperation not only on the level of countries, but also on the level of regions and cities. Regions that are especially attractive to migrants are increasingly concerned about the selection of settlers. While the national legislation formulates main directions and quotas, at the same time regions build continuous and personal relationships with the people.

In the main receiving countries, like Canada, USA and Australia are the best examples that regional interests can be reflected in the evaluation scores of the applications. They make it clear that those who choose to settle in less attractive left behind areas will receive allowances. In the future those regions that are able to use migrants for the speeding up of their economy will expectedly use such strategies. It is advisable that during the shaping of national migration policies delegates of interested regions be present during the formation of geographical and economic opportunities of settling. International technical support, the sharing of global and local costs also relate to concrete geographical area, and therefore multidirectional area goals and practices must be taken into consideration.

Today strategists are not only interested in the impact of future events but also look for the influences of particular not happened affaires. Efforts to make central and regional processes controllable means that advantages and disadvantages of this are recognised. Such is for example the intention of international education, to develop local reference capital.

Migration research emphasizes that the main goal of movement is the reaching of a better quality of life, happening step-by-step. (*Hajdú Z. 1998. Kovács Z. 2002*) Migrants are thinking in a longer time period, and with the change of living space they wish to increase their chances on the mobility market; skills and abilities being gained on several locations are accumulating into human capital, and in turn this provides even more choices for them. (*Sík E. 2002*)

With the movement not only skills and abilities, but also the migrant's culture and values are passed over. The migrant pays taxes and other fees, where the movement is directed to, and this means income for the given country. Age based selection of migrants is also important for the following reasons:

- Hosted people in less advantageous situation than that of the welfare of the host country mean heavy social burden, can have a disturbing effect on local society, and with this worsens the climate of the hosting place.
- Their pension is paid in the host country.
- The highly skilled mean human capital import.

- For the host country is not necessary to develop the local education system especially not according the local needs. It could be more flexible.

One of the possible local social outcomes of migration is hostility against foreigners, especially when new arrivals are sponsored by public funds. In this case attitudes toward the migrants and migration in its entirety can create xenophobia. Public opinion is influenced by the everyday behaviour of migrants. When selection comes with proceeds, better relationships are created with locals, the host culture is enriched, and this means that integration is successful. This indicates that a one-sided view of migration, rather than facilitating the process, on the contrary, prohibits its success. Harmonised and convergent practice can be the basis of a long-term and effective migration policy.

No doubt about it, migration event is a challenge for both the arriving person and for the host environment. In the case of permanent or mass-migration it is a great risk. The lack of proper preparation, unknown aim of migration⁵⁶, mostly permits the reaction to the occurrences only. An elevated risk exists when illegal entries are high, incidentally an unexpected influx is feared, especially when alarm systems are not in place.⁵⁷ It is also an axiom that lawful entries go hand in hand with an increase of illegal movement.

According to the expansion accelerating notions of the European Union's Lisbon strategy, in the future with the free flow of services a more competitive situation can be achieved. Some deceleration in this area is felt, due to the forced application of the "principle of origin", based on the fear of some service industries penetrating other national markets.⁵⁸ Discussion series that were started in the spring of 2005 stressed that opportunities for inner market of services must be developed, and at the same time potentially the European social model has to be preserved. By now the member states only need to agree upon how the labour force fits into the social model? Several signs indicate that the

⁵⁶ For a deeper understanding of migration aims thorough preparation is necessary. In several countries online questions are welcome, and legal answers are given to the enquirer, which means information for both the migrant and for those who run the website.

⁵⁷ In the United States a yearly 12 million of illegal entries is estimated, which is increasing continuously since the pre-filtering Ellis Island was closed. In the 1950s this was equal to six years of illegal entry. This means 4,000 undocumented entries of people/day, and it is endangering national security.

⁵⁸ According to this, all enterprises could provide services anywhere in Europe based on the member country specific rules of the site of registration (in other words in the country of the original business address where the company was primarily registered). An important limitation is that the temporarily relocated employee must receive the prescribed minimal wage of the country of destination. In this case it is expected that new member states with low wages will see a strengthening of services and this would lead to the increase of eastern wages.

continent with increasing numbers of member states is not prepared to harmonize free flow of economy with the unobstructed movement of labour.

Liberal economic environment, limited movement of labour

In accordance with the principles of free flow, economic co-operations are established with the goal of utilising every element of this flow in favour of profit making. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) means one of the world's largest migration fluxes, with making it possible for Mexicans, Canadians and Americans to migrate freely with the goal of finding a job. In practice however the system does not mean circulation but rather it means a one way attraction.⁵⁹

At the beginning of the 1990s Hungary with issuing the "world" passport to its citizens received the ranking of a "safe country". In 1993 we became members of the European Free Trade Association (EFTA), and in Central Europe we have become leaders in the area of foreign investment. The free flow of goods, funds and services was realised. Nevertheless after we have joined the Union in 2004 it could only be fulfilled with two countries signed bilateral agreements for workforce flow without limitations. In other new member states of the European Union, similarly to the United States, more attention was paid to the free flow of funds, goods and services than to human resources. Liberalisation could be regarded complete if it is extended to the movement of people.

Migration related co-operations between nations are only consultative. Agreements are being signed for the surveillance in areas of joint interests, and for the preparation of contracts and regulations. All this is based on the recognition that together they can function more effectively. The Budapest-process that started in 1991 set the target of harmonising visa regulations between Central-European and host countries. (*Bottlik Zs. Kocsis K. Tátrai P. 2006*) One of the main points of the collaboration between CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) countries was border control, and in the lime-light of interest stood the main route of migration from Asia via Russia. This year the implementation of the Schengen Convention denotes one of the top tasks. (*Kobolka I, 2000. Sallai, Ritecz 2002.*)

Often these co-operations create forums of dialog for the sending and hosting countries. An example for this is the so called Pueblo-process between the United States and Mexico. NAFTA during negotiations draws the attention of some countries' governments that they are responsible for improving the quality

⁵⁹ The movement happens in the following categories: trade and investment, business visit, professional pursuit, intra-company relocation. At least secondary education is expected, and in the case of highly educated Mexicans quotas are applied.

of life of people living in their homelands, and with this they can stop the possible outflow. In order to prevent unexpected and mess influx most countries collect information about the main emitters via a so called early surveillance system. They strive to multilaterally measure migration related intentions by operating virtual secretariats or by public, opinion requesting and legal help providing news.

The good practices of large host countries

In the traditional host countries 1.1-1.3 million people are settling per year, which is half of the world's entire migration. One can add to these almost half-a-million permanent employees. Australia, Canada and the United States dispose of high per capita national income, a welfare state, and attractive opportunities, which is part of a historically evolved practice. Still, even in these countries less than the quarter of admissions is happening based on education, and 60-70% is realised based on family reunion. Family reunion does not permit profile-based selection. However, the course of migration can be best directed when admission is education based. The application of the score system proves to be a rational tool.

Many countries report, that the proportion of those requesting permanent residency or immigration after entering the country could be as high as 40 percent of all entries. For this reason not only should pre-entry control and filtering be focused on during implementation, but also those should be surveyed who after entering wish to stay when getting to know the new place. Therefore migration control differentiates pre-entry and post-entry monitoring. The host country wishes to let in only those who are welcome, those who don't pose any threat, and the ones that are needed within the economy.

In Canada the system elements are public; anyone can calculate his or her chances. Most scores are given for education and language skills⁶⁰; family relations carry the lowest value. Most education related points are given for scientific qualification, or for seventeen years of documented and continuous full-time education. Experience carries equal scores than education when someone is working in his or her profession: every profession specific year is 10 points, and all other years deserve only 5 points. It is remarkable, that degree, skill, experience, and ability are often considered the same way during the process of entry. Since data collection based on qualification can unequivocally

⁶⁰ Generally the so-called Canberra-study is applied, which standardises the interpretation (and naturalisation) of degrees and qualifications (OECD [2002]). The summary is known as the "Canberra manual" supports statisticians' uniform interpretation. Namely in some countries not only is the degree and qualification reviewed but also whether the person works on its field of qualification (the person is active on a degree relevant field)?

be carried out, therefore statistics pertain to this.⁶¹ When it comes to age, people between 21 and 44 can get the maximum points.⁶²

In the score system of Australia, half of the points are given for abilities, followed by age, and language skills. In case of abilities those can get maximum points who possess the experiences signalled on the list of professions. The list of necessary and scarce jobs is maintained continuously in accordance with labour market feedback. Consequently, applicants possessing the sought after professional abilities, can obtain half of the possible points. Those who are ranking based on a broader term or have a different, but not listed profession, get fewer points. Another half of human capital evaluation is age, if someone is between 18 and 29; above 44 years of age decreasing amounts of points are given.⁶³

If we follow the best practice of main receiving countries, it is important to mention, that immigrants in the first two preference groups can get permanent residency without human resources research carried out on the job market of the United States, because they are welcomed based on their personal (and geographical) features, while members of the third group can only become permanent residents after a US employer sponsors them. Like the worldwide known green card, lottery program, which attracts approximately the global interest. It can be demonstrated that education and origin are downright proportional to geographical distance among US immigrants. The specialised and highly skilled are recruited from distant lands, while uneducated are from close neighbouring countries.

This is why the process of integration must be handled with special care by the central powers, because in case of a stay ending with a failure it is mainly the educated people that are able to find new opportunities in other areas of the world. They are relocating quickly. Therefore successful integration means quality labour being secured by the state, qualification appropriate and effective work for the migrant, surplus for the owner, and increased human capital for the place of residency.

⁶¹ Skills, abilities, and trainability in favourable cases result in a further 10 points. One gets the most points if English is spoken as a mother tongue, and scores decrease in accordance with the level of knowledge. In case of a documented job offer one can get the highest employment related rating.

⁶² People above 45 get 8 points, above 48 they get 2 points, while below 16 and above 49 they cannot get scores for their age.

⁶³ One can get a maximum of 20 points for English language knowledge. A further 10 points can be given for experiences in the list of professions. Similarly to practices in other countries, when someone (or the spouse) has a job offer from the given country plus points are due. Bonus points are gained by Australian degree or education, or for investing 100 Australian dollars. New Zealand introduced its score system 10 years ago, with similar considerations, only set lower point values. In their case also training and degree (or certificate) means the greatest scoring opportunity.

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Colonel László Lenkey

**JUSTIFICATION OF "ZERO TOLERANCE"
IN THE HOME DEFENCE**

The National Security Strategy of the Republic of Hungary states that within drug-trafficking Hungary can be considered as a traditional transit-country. But with the increase of domestic demand Hungary became a consumer country, which has an affect on the growth of organised crime. The increasing problem is alighted by the growth of regular or occasional drug-consumption experienced among the younger generation.⁶⁴

Introduction

As we know, the army is also not free from deviancy present in the civilian society. So is the case with drug-crime as well. One of the reasons for this is that the procedures in the society have an effect on the soldiers just as on others. Another important factor is that the army is functioning under such life- and working conditions which, compared with the civilian sphere, put much more burdon on soldiers. Just think about the physical requisition which needs good training, the bigger stress and psychological burden the soldiers have to undergo. The personnel has to face the inevitable coexistence, carry out orders and meet expectations daily. In the case of our soldiers participating in international missions this increased requisition is amplified with the so-called 'war/combat stress', which also has an influence on them. Beside all this, the army is considered to be an increasingly dangerous factory, where the workers are dealing with weapons, explosives and other dangerous war-materials. Although the Hungarian Army does not belong to the main social institutions, it still has to take part in the socially useful activities, which could in the long-term lead to ease the drug-problem. The Hungarian Army is primarily interested in the fact that among professionals or contract-soldiers serving in the army, no one should be affected by drugs. Every indication shows that the unfavourable procedures of the society - in spite of our efforts - are present within the barracks. So today drug-consumption and other, by law-sanctioned forms of behaviour in connection with drugs are already present within the army as well.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ 2073/2004 Government's resolution on the national security strategy of the Republic of Hungary

⁶⁵ Drug-strategy of the Hungarian Army, 1999, p.1294

Criminological approach of drugs within the army

Legislation also pays special attention to the special threat against the armed forces. After modification of the Criminal Law of 1. March 2003, when abuse of drugs is committed within the establishment of the armed forces, of the police or of penal authorities, it is the aggravated case of the criminal activity and is determined as a criminal offence to be punished by five to ten years of imprisonment.⁶⁶

According to the Act on the national security services, the Military Security Office of the Republic of Hungary is regularly collecting information on organised crime threatening the security of the Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Army. The Act pays special attention to the importance of the fight against drug-consumption and drug trafficking.⁶⁷ The tasks laid down in the Act are to be understood only within the competence of the service. We consider the investigation of the drug-crimes directly endangering the Ministry of Defence and the Hungarian Army, as well as the prevention of such crimes as our compulsory task. Within the army, the Military Security Office (MSO) is the organisation which, upon legal authorisation, as a secret service, cooperating with the competent law enforcement authorities and partner national security services can step up effectively in fighting crimes belonging to this category. During these activities we rely on the commanders of the military organisations as well as on the medical service of the Hungarian Army. In these cases we are talking about duties to be carried out in cooperation with the competent organisations, which have increased the effectivity of our operational work regarding drug-crimes within the army.

Based on the information collected by the MSO and the cases brought to court we must state that during the past years, the number of regular drug-consumers and of those trying it out - in spite of our preventive measures - have constantly increased within the army. Although it is true that with the dissolution of conscript-service the number of drug-consuming soldiers in absolute value has decreased, but regarding personnel-categories the rate of growth did not slow down. In accordance with this tendency, the estimated rate of the hidden drug-abuse had also increased [i1]. According to the investigations of the past 3 years, among contract-soldiers this growth-rate is over 40% yearly [i2]. Among the professionals usually those persons consume drugs regularly who have become drug-addicts already in the civilian life. So people suspected with this activity are mainly contract-soldiers. But it is interesting that the increase of narcotics have also effected students in the different military schools as well. Although rarely, but we have already met cases when a professional officer or NCO was involved using drugs. The soldiers consume mostly

⁶⁶ Act No. IV of 1987 Criminal Code, Section (2) of § 282/A

⁶⁷ Act No. CXXV of 1995 on the national security services, § 7

marihuana with THC (tetrahydrocannabinol) and the so-called disco-drugs. At the same time we must see that overall in the country hard drugs are winning space. According to available information we can predict that these drugs will turn up in increasing numbers by the soldiers. We must also count with the fact that drug-addiction will also bring the increase of the number of crimes related with it. We have experienced at our troops that drug-addicts try to get money needed for drugs through other general crimes. The efforts of drug-spreading networks trying to infiltrate into the army is becoming more perceptible. The well-organised drug-dealer networks which consider soldiers as targets of drug-consumption, are present in the neighbourhood of the barracks. About civilians delivering drugs into the barracks - because legislation provides the MSO with no authority-rights to take measures against them - we have regularly informed competent organs of the National Police. We passed on the evidences in these cases. At the same time we can say that for the time being, no bigger quantities of drugs are being brought into military sites but in some barracks trafficking of small quantities have started. We are more often experiencing the presence of drug-dealer cells of soldiers specialised in occasional drug-acquisition and consumption, as well as in internal distribution. According to our experiences the soldiers involved in these activities acquire drug enough for 5-10 persons. They consume this amount within 1-2 days. The committers consume this openly, sometimes even in groups. It is not typical that internal perpetrators would store bigger quantities in the military sights or would establish drug-depos, although we have already seen individual cases. In connection with a contract-soldier serving in one of our units, information arose that a bigger quantity of marihuana is being stored for trafficking purposes. We have had evidence on contract-soldiers operating as couriers in drug-distribution networks. In all cases we have taken the necessary measures.

Drug-criminality had not avoided the defence sphere and it is not expected that we will be able - in spite of our determination and professional efforts - to save the intactness of the Hungarian Army. But the illegal activities can and should be kept under control, they can be influenced. The interests of the army demand that drug-abuse should not turn up among the personnel of the organisation. Today - either in the short term or the long term - we can determine as a realistic goal to keep the number of soldiers influenced by drugs as low as possible, so that they do not endanger the missions of the army.⁶⁸ This goal is actually the tinged wording for "zero tolerance".

The appearance of "zero tolerance" in the Hungarian drug-policy

In the second half of the 90's the legislators have more consistently stepped up against organised crime. That had an effect on the "abuse of drugs" criminal offence with the fact that the Act No. LXXIII of 1997 modified the

⁶⁸ Drug-strategy of the Hungarian Army, 1999, p. 1294

Criminal Code again and separated demand and supply more precisely and raised the sanctions of drug-offences connected with organised crime. But on the other side, for committers of small quantities it made it possible for the jury to inflict sanctions of utility work instead of imprisonment or penalty. At the new modification of the criminal laws the Act No. LXXXVII of 1998⁶⁹ created a big debate. One of the most important changes is that besides listing the ways of commission the sanctions for consumption also appears in section (9) of § 282:

"Who with the violation of the official regulations consumes drugs ... when a more serious criminal offence is not realized, commits a delict and is to be punished with up to two years of imprisonment."

This was the section, which blew up the emotions during the preparation phase of the modification of the act. This is emphasizing the "zero tolerance" represented in the Criminal Code. The member-states of the European Union have accepted different solutions regarding punishment for drug-consumption. One of the models is the "zero tolerance", that means a conception lying on total prohibition of drugs. But there is a difference regarding degree of prohibition, size of punishment, activities and forms of behaviour (e.g. evaluation of consumption and distribution). Every illegal activity in connection with drugs is prohibited and is sanctioned seriously. Prohibition is enforced both on the demand and the supply side. Detaining the acquisition of drugs, sanctioning distribution and consumption could prevent the growth of consumption, and finally this could mean forcing back the phenomenon. According to some evaluations the "zero tolerance" theory - although logically built - did not bring the results expected because social intervention has sometimes contrary, unprognosable effects. The problem becomes more serious if with the increased sanctions criminal activity connected to drugs increases. Ones participating in these crimes try more to conceal themselves and their illegal activities. This model needs a lot of money and high professional knowledge from the side of the law authorities. But the aim cannot be totally implemented even by great costs. This model - in its simplified form - does not take some of the UN recommendations into consideration. For a more effective sanction it does not consider prevention and distraction as its task.

Opposers of total prohibition imagine masses of those trying out drugs or occasionally consuming it, imprisoned, which was underlined by representatives of legislators' intention during the debate. It seemed like instead of assistance sanctions will be emphasized more, so the drug-situation in Hungary will become worse. The Criminal Code insured distraction only for drug-addicts with the restriction that only when the production, acquisition or other criminal activity in connection with drug, sentenced with no more than two years was on the drug-addict. Distraction must be medical treatment. So the

⁶⁹ Act No. LXXXVII of 1998 on modification of the criminal legislation

"most severe drug act of Europe" was born. This expression was brought in the headlines, used by politicians. Does a good drug-act exist? How can a legislation regarding drugs be good? During the debate nobody cared about the professional inaccuracy of the expression. In the background of this modification was the intent to have a more severe legislation. The legislator wanted to force back drug-abuse both on the demand and the supply side with the means of the criminal law. So the circle of punishable activities was widened. It defined production, acquisition, possession, import and export, as well as transiting drugs as basic criminal offences and all other forms of realization as aggravated cases. Consumption was considered to be a secondary crime because typically it is connected to other forms of criminal activity as production, acquisition and possession. It stated that "drug-abuse" can only be committed intentionally. The committers must be aware that the object of the perpetration is regarded as drug. According to the effective Criminal Code of March 1999 the behaviour of the perpetrator is defined as:

"Who, with the violation of the official regulations, offers, hands over, issues or trades with drugs, commits an offence and is to be sanctioned with two to eight years of imprisonment."

It sanctions trade, use of weapon, possible dealer's behaviour of a person carrying out public tasks or distributing in a criminal organisation. A new element is the introduction of the protected sights.

"The sanction in case of section (2) is five to ten years of imprisonment when the criminal activity is carried out in buildings or surroundings of education, public education, childcare, general education, or in the sights of armed forces or penal authorities".

Acceptance of this innovation was clear but the difficulty is in bringing evidence on it. You cannot put a camera or a policeman everywhere. The main aim of the criminal-policy behind the act was the establishment of a "drugfree society". In spite of this noble effort, in the praxis of the working days there were no favourable changes. A big fault of this legislation was that it left the occasional consumer out of the favour granted to drug-addicts. After medical experts declared drug-addiction, the committer had the possibility - if the crime committed was sentenced with no more than two years - to have the case distracted. The accused person had to prove with a document until the sentence was made that he had received at least a six-months medical treatment. This - as a reason to abolish punish ability - lead to stopping the criminal procedure. Until the 1. March 2003 the occasional consumer was not granted this favour.

The deficiency of the Act of 1998 was redressed by the Act No. II of 2003 but many questions are still not settled. It leaves out consumption as an

independent form of behaviour but still sanctions acquisition and possession of drugs. Consumption is regarded as a criminal activity through acquisition and possession because although the expression itself is not included in the Criminal Code, it is impossible to consume drugs without first acquiring or possessing it. Naturally, it is also considered as acquisition if somebody accepts drugs offered free of charge.

According to the compromise⁷⁰ adopted in many states of the European Union the legislation realises mainly the prohibitive drug policy. In this compromise as well the criminal law regulates the offence of drug-abuse but uses also other means for prevention. In some cases it allows distraction. It considers ones belonging to the demand side mainly as ill, and is looking at treatment as the goal. It widenes out the possibility for distraction, makes it possible also for occasional consumers. But at the same time it excludes those who commit this crime as dealers. In case of selling drugs distraction cannot be applied. Those are wrong who say that the modified legislation of 1. March is helping the activities of the dealers. Dealers can not be exempted from sanctions as consumers. The act deals specially with offences against persons not having reached the age of 18. It separates regulations regarding consumers of drugs and dealers. It provides special rules about the activities of addicts. Next we will examine, in spite of the noted contradiction, whether "zero tolerance" could be used to force back drugs within the armed forces.

"Zero tolerance" in the army

Today, when professional and contract soldiers are admitted into the army, most of the time there is no sign of the candidate's drug-addiction. But we know that some of these candidates come from social surroundings facing this problem. To decide whether a drug-addict could become a soldier, the "no" comes automatically as the answer. How can we give a weapon in the hands of a person whose reactions are unforeseeable because of the consumed drugs. Accordingly, no one can be in working relation with the Ministry of Defence, with its background-organisations or with the Hungarian Army when during the medical aptitude examination the drug-test is positive. He will be refused also in the case we receive confirmed information that he has already got into contact with drugs as a dealer or as a consumer. So the first step on the way to being "drugfree" is operating an effective wide-ranged filtering system.

⁷⁰ Regarding EU-member states - beside total prohibition and compromise - there is a third form of judgement of the drug-phenomenon. This is the so-called Dutch model based on classification of drugs. Main point of this is that it devides drugs into two groups: drugs with acceptable and with unacceptable risks. Law enforcement activities are strictly limited to the latter. The aim behind the rules is often noble and the legislator is of good will. But in the praxis the original aim can often turn backwards. (The author)

Thinking further raises another problem, which has a more difficult solution. The question is how should the service-relation of a professional or contract-soldier be affected by his drug-addiction revealed during his service. A logical answer could be that drug-addicts cannot be members of the organisation. Nobody argues about the need to eliminate the crisis-situation created by a soldier consuming drugs. An obvious solution to this problem is to terminate the working relation with this person. Currently the regulations about the medical, psychological and physical aptitude of soldiers are not clear regarding this possibility. Because of the lack of a clear definition, although criminal procedure may be initiated, this alone does not certify the termination of the service-relation. It should be made clear to everyone that by drug-tests carried out among the active personnel, the one-time positive result will be considered just as the result of the test by the carrier-aptitude examination.⁷¹

Further questions arise from cases of soldiers who consume drugs occasionally, but are not yet drug-addicts. Although the results of the laboratory test show clearly the presence of a drug in the body but the quantity of it - because a long time has passed since consumption - does not reach the level of punishability. Today there are many drugs, which dissolve within a few hours. And drug-consumers like to use natural or synthetic medicaments, which speed up the purging of drugs from the body. It also happens frequently that the soldiers obliged to undergo drug-tests try to manipulate the results when taking the sample of urinary - more or less successfully.⁷² Under such circumstances it is quite difficult to have court-evidence on drug-abuse. In these cases drug-consumption - independent from the fact that there are traces of it - is not considered as a criminal offence or as an illegal activity, so not even a disciplinary procedure can be taken against the soldier. Motivation is different by occasional drug-consumers and by those who just try it out. But from the aspect of a security risk every form of drug-consumption within the army must be considered as a special threat, even as a timebomb.

The question arises also, what is the responsibility of the army in educating its personnel consuming drugs to live a healthy life. At the same time we also have to clear where the line of responsibility lies in the judgement of activities of soldiers influenced by drugs, when they endanger fighting capability, technics and security. Could the social and medical system, which is helping drug-addict soldiers return back into the system, be made consistent with the main functions of the army. When we look at the answer on a rational base, considering the fact that the number of soldiers getting into contact with drugs is increasing, and the fact that the size of the army is decreasing, we must

⁷¹ 4/2003 Decree of the Minister of Defence regarding the medical, psychological and physical aptitude of professional and contract soldiers

⁷² Possibilities of proving drug-consumption, Tibor Veress, 2000. (html from 20. December 2005)

admit that the answer is no. Nobody has the right to endanger the life of others with the unpredictable behaviour of a soldier under drugs or under medical treatment for drug-addiction. I think it is important that in case of these criminal offences, deviances carrying greater security risks, the right of the society to protect itself should not even for a minute be endangered because of the personality-rights of criminals. That is true from the side of the criminal law. It is just as important in the everyday of the army to prevent possible dramatic consequences. This idea is the base for the new understanding preferred by, and only adoptable for, the armed forces and law enforcement organisations, which stands near to the much-debated "zero tolerance" theory.

Because of the increased security risks mentioned above, because of the special circumstances, I do not see any possibility for the use of distraction. Drug-consuming soldiers must leave the army at once. Regarding the armed forces and the law enforcement organisations I consider the "zero tolerance" as the only solution, insuring that drug-addict persons could vindicate their right for distraction through civilian organisations. After their discharge from military service as civilian citizens, they also have the right to medical treatment. I consider it an urgent task to work out the necessary legislative background.

It is still not cleared yet what the normal praxis should be against those occasional drug-consumers whose presence during the time of drug-consumption and the following crisis-period means the same risk factor. I think the conditions of a system of measures should be laid down when there would be a possibility to discharge soldiers involved in occasional drug-consumption even in the lack of final judgement. By some commanders we experienced the false aspect which could be traced back to misunderstanding the principle of presumption of innocence. They say that until there is no final legal judgement, no measures can be taken against the soldier, so he cannot be discharged. A court-procedure in drug-abuse, depending on the number of persons involved, could last for months. So because of the presence of the drug-addict soldiers the threat-level will not change. For the move in a positive direction I consider the common understanding and consequent implementation of the order 51/2005 of the Chief of the General Staff of the Hungarian Army⁷³ as very important. According to this regulation the competent commander must examine carefully all circumstances excluding the capability for the service of soldiers consuming drugs. In justified cases they have to immediately initiate repeated medical and psychological examination of that soldier. In the interest of further decreasing security risks, the legislative background should be worked out as soon as possible. The "indignity" phrase in the Act about the rights of soldiers could be appropriate to handle this problem.[i5] But the legal means alone against the drug-phenomenon reaching an increasingly dangerous size are not enough to

⁷³ 51/2005 order of the Chief of the General Staff of the Ministry of Defence on tasks on strengthening the disciplinary situation within the Hungarian Army.

establish the internal security of the Army. There is more need to follow the competent minister's decrees, orders and rules, to set high standards and to stabilize military discipline. When we can achieve that the drug-phenomenon will be evaluated by all commanders the same way, as increased security risk, that would mean half of the success on the way to force back narcomania.

Conclusion

As the effect of liberalisation of the Hungarian drug-policy, a great part of the society is inclined to consider drug-consuming young persons, as well as soldiers more as victims as citizens who have committed crimes. I think it is important that all high positioned military leaders evaluate this question the same way, because sometimes we experience this theory in the army as well. This statement could be acceptable in the case of a child or juvenile drug consumers. But I think it is a mistake to look at it like that after we changed to a professional army. We must not forget that adult men and women are serving in the army, who are fully aware of their legal liabilities. Because the criminal law only defines the intentional form of drug-distribution and consumption, adults, professional and contract soldiers can not become innocent victims of drug-crimes. By judging drug-consumption, the basic human right of protecting personality rights, to be able to return back to society comes in the foreground sometimes also in the army. I accept the statement that one of the main questions is how could these persons be guided back to the right track. I am also convinced that a severe sanction of imprisonment is not always a good solution. In our society it is always a controversy what the effect of the sanctions will be. I also think that the imprisonment of curious young persons should be avoided. Drug-consumers should not be sanctioned the same way as drug-dealers. At the same time I think that regarding the rights of distraction of drug-consuming soldiers and the enforcement measures connected with the self-protective mechanism of the society, the right ratio should be chosen. But I want to emphasize again, considering the increased security risks, I think that the rights for distraction of drug consuming soldiers, exclusively with the consequent application of "zero tolerance", is only possible outside the Hungarian Army.

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- 66/2003 Order of the Minister of Defence on supervision of the personnel of the Hungarian Army regarding the status under the effect of drugs, drug-consumption or possession

Lieutenant-Colonel Károly Tanai

THE ROLE OF MEDIA AND THE IMPORTANCE OF IMAGE AT THE ARMED FORCES

Summary

The dynamic transformations of global politics require quick and flexible adaptation by the participating parties. Information is one sine qua non of successful reaction. Media are one of the most important carriers of these informations. Thus – especially since 9/11 – the importance of printed and electronic media have been treated with higher regard. For an organisation (business, non-profit or governmental) efficiency is effected also by their relation to the circumstances. This is especially true to the armed forces and services. In this article through theory and practical examples I wish to highlight the vital need for an organisation to form a constructive partnership with media for a positive image.

Introduction

The 21st century – with the constant overflow of information – is the age of quick decisions. Making quick and good decisions seems to be a constant controversy. Long thinking and contemplation over the possible solutions and consequences is no more an option. Decisions must be made quickly and possibly well. What can we rely on, what can motivate us in such situations? Intuition, prejudice, personal interest, experience or up-to-date, processed information from media!

It is a scientifically proven everyday experience, that nobody is free from the „influence” (effect) of media. No organisation can afford to be negligent in being in contact with the media without serious consequences in the future of the organisation. For them it is possible to create their image and make influence through media. The image of an organisation is nothing but the sum of peoples’ impressions, feelings and attitudes towards it. To ensure that these are positive, all organisations must take exceptional care how they shape their profile.

Members of the HDF also get in contact with members of the media – especially in missions – unexpectedly, or in home territory in organised form at certain events to support organisational goals or to inform the public as part of the planned communication process. Communication is not only an obligation by law, but it is also in accordance with the interest of the organisation to efficiently fulfill its goals of defence. Legal obligations and organisational

interests determine the qualitative requirements of communication. In order to meet these it is also useful to prepare – beside the commander and the PR personnel – those who during their normal duty may not be in contact with media, but may appear in media any time. Communicational abilities can be improved.

In order to form the professional armed forces, every serviceman must be able to support organisational goals by masterfully handling media as well.

In several NATO nations, it is a requirement for professional soldiers to participate regularly in media trainings as part of regular training. Dealing with media is part of every exercise, not only for the commanders, but for staff and soldiers as well.

Practicing dealing with media, giving interviews is basically not a question of money, but organisation, whether it takes place in barracks or in the training field. It is not indifferent for the organisation if either spontaneous interviews or planned media releases achieve the desired goal or not.

Today, when as part of the enhancement of professional skills the ability to deal with media is a vital part of quality training. [1]

Media Theories in a Nutshell

Through the history of its development, media as a science has proven its importance, a sign of which are the different theoretical approaches to it. I would like to mention only a few of the countless media theories, only to highlight the colourful nature of the theoretical background. In the following I collect those scientific theories and empirical studies in chronological order, that try to answer the question above and which are held to be milestones of media-studies (i.e.: the ones that are the most referred to).

The Bullet Theory

Public and scientific thinking of the 1920's and 1930's were characterised by the bullet theory. According to this media has a great and direct effect on people: from media – press, film, posters, and radio – messages as bullets hit the audience, making lasting changes. The theory is also called hypodermic model, referring to the messages being injected under the skin of the audience, as media works a great and direct influence on public opinion. The theory was elaborated most coherently by Harold Lasswell in his work titled “Propaganda Techniques in the World War” (1927).

The “two-step flow of influence” theory

After the theories of the ‘20s and ‘30s attributing great influence to media, in the 1940’s a new paradigm appeared in scientific researches: the two-step flow of influence model, which said that media can only influence public opinion a little and limited way. Paul Lazarsfeld and his colleagues in their work titled *The People's Choice* (1948) studied the effect of the presidential campaign in Ohio in 1940 on the voters. During the campaign, they conducted regular tests for six months, and the experience was, that people’s political preferences have barely changed, i.e. they were resistant to attempts of influence. Their conclusion was that people are active and critical participants of the process of mass communication. Lazarsfeld and his colleagues thought: media influences the thinking of the voters only indirectly, in two steps. People primarily listen to authoritative persons from their surroundings – e.g.: family, work place – so the interpersonal communication has a greater influence than the media. However, the ones who are influential in forming others’ opinion, primarily rely on media when forming their own views – thus in a limited, indirect way media has an effect on people.

The „selective perception” theory

The selective perception theory was looking for the answer to the reason of the limited influence of media on society, i.e. why political campaigns have a low efficiency. Joseph Klapper’s work, “*The Effects of Mass Communication*” ([1949] 1960) explains Lazarsfeld’s research results by assuming that people make selection among the messages they are bombarded by. They are looking for the messages that confirm their opinion and avoid the contradictory ones.

Klapper distinguished three levels of selection:

1. Selective choice means that people do not follow newspapers and programs of which they know to contain opinions contradictory to their own, or are based on opposing views;
2. selective perception means that – even if they meet such – they ignore messages opposing to their opinions;
3. selective memory means that if they accidentally meet opposing messages and remember them – they forget them quickly [2]

The aforist media theory

In 1962 and 1964 Marshall McLuhan published his books that are still his most well-known works, “*Gutenberg-galaxy*” and “*The Media understanding*”. In these two works he came up with the following two important thesis: western civilisation was greatly influenced by phonetic writing and especially book printing, and in the mid 20th century a change has begun in which the written

media is substituted by the new electric media, and this transformation will have some serious consequences.

McLuhan lists all human product among media, e.g. clothing, money or electric light. He says, that technology, tools and surroundings – from the first stone axe to the computer networks – relate back to people, on their senses-based perception.

Electric media — telegram, radio and television — are a new level of this „narcotic” media environment: the mechanical principle of the series of individual element are substituted by the directness of electricity, that conquers space and time, we start to live the world in global networks. Man in the age of electronic media amputates his own central nervous system and mind.

For McLuhan the importance of media was in this effect and not in the content. This is the background of his most well-known statement: the media is a message. In a book published later, he transformed this into: the media is a massage. McLuhan predicts that information will become a decisive factor in valuation as provided by electronic media, and man will completely become a “nomad” gatherer of information in the future. [3]

The Cultivation theory

The determinant media-theory of the 1970s is the cultivation theory of George Gerbner, that also seemed to acknowledge the great social effect of media. A major factor for the new theory was that by this time television was commonly widespread, and it seemed to have a bigger effect on public opinion than the printed press and radio. Gerbner said that the effect of media comes through in the long run, it works cumulatively making the heterogenous opinions in society homogenous. He said that tv – which has become more important than personal experience as a source of information – does not only holds a mirror to “reality”, but it also forms that: by rearranging pictures of reality according to certain rules, it creates a new (virtual) reality. Media are selective: they prefer certain elements of reality, while pushes others into the background. Thus, according to Gerbner, media have a disculturalrole – influencing culture and perception of culture –, i.e. those who spend a lot of time in front of the screen, gradually accept picture as shown in TV as a true depicting of “reality”.

The agenda-setting theory

The agenda-setting theory again seems to strengthen the scool of limited influence. Bernard Cohen wrote about it first in his book titled “The Press and Foreign Policy” (1963) , that media – especially news media – do not say what to think, what to think about. Although the agenda of the media influences the

agenda of the public, but it has no big effect on the interpretation of the issues on the agenda.

Maxwell McCombs and Donald Shaw in “The agenda-setting function of mass media” (1972) referring to the 1968 research in Chapel Hill, North Carolina during the election campaign, say that, media plays the role of information gatekeeper. From among the almost endless number of events in the world they put only a limited number of events into the news. Editors, journalists and broadcasters by choosing and presenting the news play an important role in forming the political reality. Readers get to know not only the actual event, but also the importance attributed to it. Thus, by selecting among events media make an order of importance – a hierarchy – they position some events as more , some as less important. Most people think the most important events come at the beginning of the news, published on the front page, and of which media provide longer reports. However, how people judge the events are not relevantly influenced by media. Realising the priming role of media have considerably influenced reality: one of the goals of modern political communication is the successful priming, i.e. political communicators to achieve in putting issues on the agenda that are advantageous for their party or disadvantageous for the political opposition.

The framing theory

If the agenda of the media is able to influence the agenda of the public and politics, the question comes up that who influences the agenda of the media. One of the possible answers is the they are the owners of the media empires, the sources often quoted in the news and other power factions have decisive influence on media content. According to the framing theory attributing great influence to media they are under the influence of the political and the economic elite, while ordinary people – lacking of money, power, and skills – have access to media only as recipient. Opposed to the “masses” the elite are able to efficiently influence media messages. For this, the messages conducted by media – especially news – are not shown objectively, but are distorted, i.e. put into an interpretational frame highlighting certain elements of the context of events while leaving others in the background. Thus during the presentations of political problems, news automatically offer certain interpretations and prefer these instead of others – offering the “preferred” reading.

Since the appearance of Internet, the most important traditional media – newspapers, radio and television – have lost their hegemony over information and opinion formation. The World Wide Web does not offer everyone the possibility to check information from different sources but also to express their opinions, i.e. it – at least in theory – equalizes disadvantages of social status. At the same time Internet sources are often not thought to be reliable, and access is

not really universal, the most disadvantageous social groups have limited access which limits its role in social communications.

“Uses and gratifications” model

The “uses and gratifications” model is an other one of the limited-influence group formed a few years later. According to this, each person has individual pattern of media usage. The recipients have different needs, expectations which they satisfy during their media usage. In other words, it is not the media using (influencing) people, but them using media; it is not the media forming the public opinion, but dominantly the audience forms media according to their own needs. People actively select, looking for the channel that suits their needs the most, if a channel does not satisfy them, they switch.

“The Uses of Mass Communications by the Individual” (1974) by Jay Blumler and Elihu Katz sais that people use media to satisfy their own social and soci-cultural needs. The most important goal of media usage is the fulfillment of the needs, i.e. joy.

The authors list the most important media usage as follows:

- learning and information gathering: people acquire knowledge of the world by TV,
- social contact: people have different relations to the characters shown on screen and discuss the events,
- escape: people watching TV can temporally escape from difficulties of reality,
- pleasure and spending free time.

The “uses and gratifications” model meant a new paradigm in the studies on the relation of the public and media. From this point studies do not focus on the effect of media on the public , but on how the audience is using them – how they influence media usage. Studies try to discover what factors influence the interpretation of the messages.

The „spiral of silence” theory

This theory was formed by the German politologist and public-opinion researcher Elisabeth Noëlle-Neumann in her work titled “The spiral of silence: a theory of public opinion” (1974). Noëlle-Neumann says that people who feel that their opinion is accepted in public opinion like to share their view, but those who feel they are on a different platform, being afraid of social isolation, rather keep quiet or change their opinion. In other words: people are different in private sphere – among family, friends – and in front of public. This forms a

kind of spiral of silence: the dominant view gets stronger, and the opposing view gets on the margin. So media influences people by making the impression that they have a minority view. The theory is based on the idea, that their interpersonal contacts, their being accepted by others are more important for them than giving their own opinion and they are afraid: voicing their opinion may be disadvantageous for their existence, career. [4]

The „Concept of media events” theory

One of today’s major media theory is the concept of media events by Daniel Dayan és Elihu Katz, in their book “Media Event”. By this term they mean such highlighted, celebrational events as the landing on the Moon, the visit of Pope John Paul II. to Poland in 1979-ben, Kennedy’s funeral or the marriage of Princess Diana and Prince Charles. The basic idea of the authors is that in modern, segmented societies some “mechanical integration” which interests every member of the community. Media events strengthen social solidarity and have key role in confirming values and society.

The authors also tried to set up the types of media events and made three distinctions: “competition”, “conquest” and “coronation”. “Competition” are the different highlighted sports events and political elections. Their characteristics are that they stick to rules, and if we want to compare them to mythical structures, they resemble to the hero’s trials. The “conquest”, like the moonlanding is when the heroes step over the former boundaries and create new rules and new symbolic order. The “coronations”, e.g. weddings and funerals are about celebrating the hero. These are the most ceremonial, the most traditional. In the first type the audience can judge and cheer, in the second can be amazed by the hero, while can participate and pay homage in the third. [5]

Beyond the theories that confirm the scientific nature of media theories, I find it important to demonstrate the importance of media through two major terror events.

The Munich Olympics

On 5 September 1972 at dawn, the 8 man commando of the Black Septmeber climbed over the fence of the Olympic village and approached running 31 Connollystrasse, the quartes of the Israeli olympic team. There Moshe Weinberg the wrestlers’ coach resisted and attacked the leader of the terrorists so they killed him. They took hostage ten sportsmen awoken from sleep of whom they instantly killed Yossef Roman who attacked them.

The first message of the Palestinians was only this : “Inform the Israeli government immediately!” They quickly made clear that they have nothing to do with German authorities, they demand the release of 200 imprisoned Palestinians from the Israeli government. The first deadline was 9.00 AM.

Golda Meir the Israeli Premier was not willing to let any prisoners released, but offered the Germans to send a special commando to Munich. However, they wanted to cope with the situation on their own. With different reasons they managed to postpone the deadline, until in the evening Issa had enough of the situation and demanded an airplane to take them to Cairo, to continue negotiations with the Israeli government from there. Two helicopters took the terrorists and the hostages from the Olympic village to the NATO airbase at Fürstenfeldbruck. The Germans attempted to free the hostages there. The sharpshooters opened fire as Issa and one of his men were heading back to the helicopters after checking the plane. A two-hour fire fight broke out that the German commanders could not control and nobody could oversee in the darkness. After one hour that the fire fight broke out, the Palestinians fired at the Israelis kept in bounds in the helicopters and also threw a grenade in one. For one more hour the Germans could only watch from a distance as the dead bodies of the sportsmen turned to ashes in the burning helicopter. Finally, they managed to capture three terrorists. The result of the rescue attempt was a disaster – one German, five Palestinian and nine Israeli dead. The captured terrorists had to be released a month later when Palestinians hijacked a Lufthansa flight. The bodies of the five dead terrorists were released to Libya where they were buried as martyrs with thirty thousand people attending the funeral.

The hostage taking attempt itself was a failure for all three parties. The Germans could not provide the security of their first Olympic Games after Hitler's, and due to their failure again Jewish blood was shed on German soil. The Israelis lost nine members of their Olympic team – only those survived who went out that night. The Palestinians could not reach the goals of the attempt, lost five men and had to endure the Israeli retributions.

As all terror attacks, this consisted of two parts as well. Beyond the actual action in Munich the events appeared thorough media as well. According to estimates, more than 500 million people followed the events of 5 September across the world and on this second level it was a victory for the Palestinians.

By the attack on the Olympics, the Palestinians achieved several goals at once. They did not have to find another way to draw media attention, as the media concentrated at the same very spot in those days. All they had to do was to walk into the carefully chosen place in the right moment and immediately they got such attention as no other hostage taking before. The main part of their action was not drawing counter-attention, but to disrupt a sports event.

They invaded a “competition” type media event mainly to conduct transmission communication⁷⁴. Their message was twofold: an actual demand to the Israeli government and in a wider context the desperate situation of the

⁷⁴ Realised, deliberate action to spread a piece of information through information channels.

Palestinians. Although the first was a failure, the second was cleanly successful, as they could draw the attention of hundreds of million people.

As the Palestinian spokesman evaluated the Munich attack: “Not a bomb exploding in the White House, not a shell in the Vatican, not the death of Mao, not an earthquake in Paris could have shaken the conscience of people as our Munich action... As if we had painted the name of Palestine on the top of a mountain to be seen from all four corners of the world.”

The attack took the events from their regular flow and placed them into a new context. From the terrorists’ first message at dawn an other form of media communication also came to existence, through which they used media to spread their political ideology across the world. The 500 million who sat in front of the screen to “participate” in the events, got back to the real everyday world and had to face current political issues. (They were aware of this, that is why the decision was made to continue the Olympics. The final reason after a long debate was that the Olympics cannot end with the pictures of the dead bodies at Fürstenfeldbruck.) 9/11 2001

The goal of 9/11 – opposed to the Munich Olympics – was drawing attention. There was no message connected to the airplanes impacting the twin towers and nothing was left of the attackers either. (The perpetrators presented by the US government will stay questionable. Mohamed Atta remains only a face that was connected to the attacks later, a face that played no role for the audience during the events – opposed to Issa, who coordinated the Munich attack in front of 500 million viewers, and who could be identified and filmed even in death.)

The aim of the 9/11 attacks was to create “space and time” achieved by three characteristics of the attacks.

Fist was to threaten the centers of the world shown in global media. These cities suffering blows banished all other news for a long time. The news were taken over by other western television broadcasters, based on the established tradition that CNN is responsible for prioritisation of world events, thus even those TV stations interrupted their scheduled program for which not New York and Washington D.C. are in the centre of the universe.

The other important element is that the attacks were such spectacularities for TV that previously could only have been seen in Hollywood movies. With the television getting everywhere the moviemakers were forced to make more and more spectacular films. The 90’s was an era for disaster movies: flood, fire, tornado, volcanoes in the middle of cities, aliens and dinos - US cities got their share. Although that all stayed on screen, the audience could familiarize with

pictures of collapsing skyscrapers. 9/11 put the Hollywood script in reality. Television stations could not resist such a scene, and the viewers shock was probably enhanced by seeing the movies come real in news programs.

The third element, that made the whole event for the media impossible to handle was its irrationality. One morning Americans woke to see that their own planes, with their own people on board crash into their own buildings. The attacks were inside (because of the disaster movies) and outside of their picture of reality at the same time.

The attacks by their sacral and symbolic locations, huge scale and spectacularity and irrationality achieved to become media event.

However, the ritual meaning of 9/11 was the transition from “Order” into “Chaos”. The making of “Chaos” was achieved by depriving the event of rationality and context. While Issa put the Munich Olympics into new context, to 9/11 no message was attached outside the spectacular destruction of symbols of US power and global capitalism. The actor was missing behind the event, being obvious and invisible at the same time. Although the planes crashing into the towers were brutally real, these were not connected to faces, messages, people. While it was all obvious from the first moment that a huge human effort lies behind the attacks – organisation, timing, trained pilots – the human slot was unfilled all along, the perpetrators perished with their victims.

No rational explanation was connected to the destruction of the symbolic places. This is the main point of the mechanism of 9/11 taking effect. Sinking into “Chaos” substituted the time for moral reflection.

To lighten its impact, to lead the audience back from “Chaos” into “Order” (to re-establish the sense of safety) the targets had to provide for the missing message and had to put a narrative behind the events. The quickly made official narrative finally could put the attacks into context on several levels. The focus of the story became the charismatic personality of Osama bin Laden and his unordinary career, and the religion based terror organisation he founded, Al-Qaeda. In the wider context it was the revitalising Islamic fundamentalism, thus the shadow of 9/11 was cast to many places from the Taliban’s Afghanistan to Iran and Palestine.

The quick flow of events demonstrated the forced search for a context. US experts started to voice already on the day of the attacks (!) that the terror attacks could have been related to OBL and that there were several indicators pointing to Al-Qaeda being responsible. Next day Bin Laden said, he had thanked Allah for the attacks, but he had had no role in them. On 15, when Afghanistan was already preparing for war the Taliban government threatened

the neighbouring countries not to help the US and masses started to leave the bigger cities, OBL made a similar announcement: “I pledged loyalty to mullah Mohammed Omar. My oath does not permit me coordinating such actions while my stay in Afghanistan.” Despite his statements, President G.W. Bush issued the famous „wanted dead or alive” proclamation without showing any hard evidence already on the 17. next day – according to an Iranian newspaper – OBL with an entourage of approximately 30 man escort on eight armoured cars left his last known residence and stepped into the symbolic world of the mythic figures of the new millennium. [6]

Conclusion

It is quite evident that media everywhere depends on the rest of society, reacts to basic motivations and is subverted to sources of economic and political power. Nowhere, nobody expects the media to conduct direct control for their own purposes beyond directing attention, informing, entertaining, making profit, etc. The freedom of speech guarantees that opposing views, criticism, and alternatives be shown on media, but this can be better explain with the term “influence”. [7]

As for the armed forces it must be emphasized, that dealing with the media can be learnt by training, exercises and it belongs to efficient staff work preparation whether for mission in NATO or EU. To incorporate media training into the HDF training program is basically not a financial question, but an attitude towards professionalism, NATO integration.

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Lieutenant-Colonel László Farkas*

**FORMATION OF SCRIPT GEOGRAPHY
THE INFLUENCE OF ETHNICAL, SUBCULTURAL, NATURAL AND
GEOGRAPHICAL DISPOSITION ON THE HUNGARIAN
POPULATIONS'OPHTALMOLOGICAL CONDITION.**

(Research supported by GrafOphtalmology® method)

Research executed with **GrafOphtalmology® method** has been started in 2002 in primary schools located different places in the country.

The **goal** of the research is to find an academic explanation and substantiation for the connection between the script and the optalmological condition. WE want to prove the exist of those specialities which are ophtalmology-specified?

Among its **theoretical questions** I have to mention the research done in different counties' primary schools in order to detect the elements of grafo-specialities.

One of the direct results was that we could analyze specialities and their appearances in the script in case of long sight and myopia. I had presented these results in my former publications.

We tried to place our research in the system of geo-studies. The technical examination of this question is on the field of script psychology and graphology.

During the surveys there were given those sociocultural specialities which could have an effect on the birth of the script. These specialities can be the age of the population, family-status, ethnic groups, township, respectabilities. Cultural geography and health geography can answer some parts of these questions.

Neither the script psychology nor the well-known and accepted social geography tendencies can give absolute, univocal and academic answer for the variances.

* PTE TTK FI FDI PhD student

These thoughts were the basis of the formation of the **script geography**, which can be the only discipline being able to give complex and academic answers for my questions. We can examine whether the subcultural and geographical dispositions could have an effect or not on ophthalmological condition of the Hungarian population (primary school students). This thought helped find the recognition, that the script could have both social geographical projections and investigative spatiality.

Why script geography?

Script Geography is not an independent discipline yet, but in some part has close connection with certain social geography tendencies.

Its function is dual:

- the constant change of the script marks the certain age,
- because of the standardised script elements it become individual and through it can be possible to learn the personality.

Its place in the structure of sciences

The **script geography** is a part of the social geography, its basis are closely connected with the cultural geography and health geography. Because of its structural elements script belongs to the script psychology. It could appear together with palaeographic and cultural geographical researches' statements.

In my opinion the most important fellow discipline of the **script geography** is *the cultural geography*. The cultural geography examines the human culture's influence on the geographically neighbourhood and nature. (TRÓCSÁNYI A. -2002.a.) If we accept, that the script represents the culture, than we have to allow, that the script is a part of a lifestyle as well as the culture.


Similarities in the speech, language, behaviour, life style, manners, ideology and technology can unite individuals into one group in a culture. Cultural geography's field is examining these criteria' diversities, specialities and geographical appearance. It becomes more and more important to analyse the culture's effect on the geographical surroundings. (TRÓCSÁNYI A. -2002.b.)

All of these are projected by the script for the human brain.

Palaeographic is an important reference science for the script geography, because the research of scripts' history can determine its geographical placement.

From the fellow disciplines of **script geography** we have to mention the script psychology, which contains the script identification and the graphology.


As seen these above we can find the place and the directions of the connections of script geography in the geography science. See *1.illustration*:



1. illustration. The place and directions of the connections of Script Geography in the Geography science
(After TÓTH J. edited by L. Farkas)

The **script geography** is a single area of the Geography science, but its inside structure is distributed, among its multiple tendencies we can find cultural, medical, script historical and script psychological projects. This point of view helps us to see, that the **script geography** has multidisciplinary and interdisciplinary character. The functional and content disposition of script makes it more clear.

The 2. illustration shows those tendencies and areas which are competent with questions examined by **script geography**.



2. illustration. Inside structure of Script Geography (edited by Farkas L.)

From this specification I define the *resonometria*, which can be used as a method in order to compare scripts from different ages and geographical places in an objective way. Elements of script are compared in a standardised way, according to points of view of information-theory.

An other important project could be the evolutionary psychology, which says, that the human biological inherit must be shown in the script and influenced by the certain age and geographical surrounding.

As a kind of interdiscipline I have to mention the analysis and synthesis of the script, which is connected with the Graphology.

It is necessary to take a look, and show some curiosity and re-define the concept of **script geography**.

I remind you, that the topic is new-like, till up this date nobody was brave enough to explain the theory and method of Graphology from a very new point of view. There are many theoretical explanations as well as in Hungary and all over the world. The psychological system dominates, but there are some extremes like mythological type and astrographology. They also could be science based, maybe used by some professional people, but the society thinks they are oracular.

According to this theory the script and the manifested script could be influenced by the geographical surrounding, the ethnic and the ethnic's subculture. The direction of this project can be the typical dialect and clothing for the given area. It is just a theory...

Its exploration, academic explanation and substantiation should be done in the future.

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EDUCATIO

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NATIONAL SECURITY BACHELOR'S PROGRAMM IN HUNGARIAN MILITARY EDUCATION

The usage of special national security devices and methods, respectively the peculiar requirements of intelligence and counter-intelligence activities mean that the personnel employed by national security services needs a special professional knowledge that can be separated from other fields and vocations. The national security bachelor's programm on MZNDU provides the opportunity to acquire the essential expertise, the theoretical grounds needed for successful activities, and the practical knowledge that is essential in general and special situations. Except of the special elements of the subject-matter, the professional training of security officers doesn't differ substantially from the general exercise of adult education in the field of vocational training, higher education, and military- and law enforcement education.

Introduction

As a consequence of the political shift of the regime, and the social and economic transformation in 1989 - 1990, the former state security authority, the III. Main Directorate of the Ministry of Interior was altered within a short period. During the transformation of the political institutions and the power structure of the government of laws, newly emerged priorities appeared concerning the main goals, the tasks and the structure of intelligence and counter-intelligence. As a result of the changes in the legislative structure, the training of state security officers in the Department of State Security of the Police Academy ended.

Recognizing the essential national interest for the uninterrupted functioning of special (intel and CI) services, the Parliament of the Republic of Hungary – fulfilling its constitutional obligation – legislated the Act N^o CXXV of 1995 on the National Security Services and regulated the national security tasks, the system of procedures, the structure, the authority of command and control, and the legal and political guarantees.[1]

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The Hungarian security services are divided according to the two classical branches: the intelligence and the counter-intelligence, respectively they function according to the separation of the civil and the military sphere. The national security services – as state organizations with special functions (designations) – deal with preventing, detecting and eliminating activities jeopardizing our national security interests.

The national security services carry out their core missions within the legislative framework determined by the Parliament, and they function with a special national security status meeting the requirements of a democratic and constitutional state.

The Act on the National Security Services lays down the groundwork of the training and the professional preparation of the personnel. Section 9 specifies: “the national security services shall carry out the procurement, research and development of the technical systems and devices required for the accomplishment of their duties, as well as shall provide professional training for the application of the said devices; in the interest of the foregoing, they may cooperate with one another and other organisations” and „shall provide for the training of their professional staff members and public servants”.

The usage of special national security devices and methods, respectively the peculiar requirements of intelligence and counter-intelligence activities mean that the personnel employed by national security services needs a special professional knowledge that can be separated from other fields and vocations. Efficient national security activities are based on the highly educated personnel who can speak on numerous foreign languages and has the proper moral, physical and psychical bearing capacity. Furthermore, it shouldn't be neglected that the officers dealing with special national security tasks need a continuous and professional training. It should be emphasized because of the lack of the opportunities to contract the properly trained personnel from the labor market. Taking the security requirements into consideration, the national security services provide the necessary training just after contracting the newly arrived officers.

Aims of the training

It is worthwhile to analyze the requirements of the training from the essential aspect of the professional activity. Examining the social status and the fundamental elements of the national security tasks, it can be determined that this vocation meets the essential requirements of the professional and intellectual activities.

Its of stable value and creating value function is verifiable. The ultimate matter of this activity is the secure environment of our country. Security is a special value that guarantees the consolidated living conditions of the population, the stabilization and development of the state and the political sphere, the national economy, the national defense and other substantial fields of the society. Security is the vital root of the financial, intellectual and cultural growth and its existence and preservation is an apparent value for the society and for the individual. Security can be determined as a constitutional right, as well.

The nature of professionalism our co-workers characterized with are highly intellectual. The members of the national security services – like other intellectual professionals – use their mental capacities in order to fulfill their duties consequently they are under an intensive and continuous mental pressure. They deal with activities that differ from the function of other leaders and important employees holding a position in the field of state- and economic sphere. The members of the services use their influence in an informal and indirect way without using the direct and overt means and methods of a leader or a commander. Because of understandable reasons, the approachable description of this kind of influence is missing from the special literature. In spite of that, the national security tasks can be solved without accessing to the abovementioned descriptions. Being derived from the nature of the duty of national security services, our co-workers take part in difficult and covert operational activities against well-prepared enemy. [2]

The psychological pressure, the regular overwork and the persistent readiness is a common part of this vocation. Besides meeting the daily requirements, the mental pressure is continuously increased by the regulations of conspiracy, the role-playing, the steady presence of foresight, and the continuous readiness. In the common knowledge, the members of intelligence and counter-intelligence services are compared to chess-players.

The national security tasks are creative activities being carried out under continuously changing and uncertain circumstances. The creative usage of the specialized knowledge is a basic requirement. In their daily routine and in problematic situations, the members of the national security services need special abilities like the fast and precise recognition of certain situations, flexible thinking, imagination, intuition, adaptability and the ability to take action in a proper and adequate way. One of the basic rules of our vocation is that there are no identical situations, therefore there are no identical solutions.

Working as an expert is a daily routine for security officers. The specialized knowledge and the information gathered by overt and covert means and methods are utilized by the leaders and decision-makers according to the

operative legislative provisions. By revealing, formulating and enforcing the service and national security interests, the security officer uses his specialized knowledge as a tool.

In order to carry out their essential tasks on a high level in the future, the national security services of the Republic of Hungary should emphasize the importance of the selection of personnel and the development of the system of continuing professional education. The proper supply, training and advance of security officers should be achieved by tough selection, exercised-based and ability-developing training, regular extension courses, principle of efficiency and the spirit of competition.

Except of the special elements of the subject-matter, the professional training of security officers doesn't differ substantially from the general exercise of adult education in the field of vocational training, higher education, and military- and law enforcement education.

The special knowledge and the performance of the special activity- and behavior forms decisively influence the goal, content and methodology of the national security professional training, therefore the training is based on the science and knowledge connected to the vocation, and on the other hand on the rules, requirements and logic of the vocation. The training builds upon the traditional values of vocation and military life, respectively on the learning, knowledge and motivation coming from the students' former studies.

It's evident that the general and special claims made on the members of national security services, respectively the professional training should be formulated according to the essential elements of the near future. On determining the goals of the training, the services should take notice of the influences and requirements of social modernization and Euro-Atlantic integration, the goal and future vision of the development of society, respectively the challenges coming from the international obligations.

On laying down the pedagogical objectives, the social goals don't prevail but the professional interests and expectations become conspicuous.

The elements of the specialized knowledge (as part of the content of training) are the appearances of the system of national security and the expertise of the services. They are coming from the internal characteristics of intelligence and CI. All members of national security services should possess the permanent details of the specialized knowledge.

It's essential to validate the conceptual requirement of building the training on extensive theoretical roots. This element is quite important to

strengthen the career and to make the ground of their trainings, career courses, and professional conversion connected to specialization. The system of professional training should be multistage and built in a hierarchical way, respectively it should integrate different objectives.

There are cognitive abilities of high account like gathering, analyzing and presenting information that should dominate within the framework of professional training.

Integrating the specialized knowledge into a system can prove that it contains a wide range of knowledge, skills, abilities and routines that cannot be learned in the educational system or in a single course. It means that the professional requirements of the vocation become the ultimate priorities in the institutional and other forms of education. Because of the difficult nature of our qualified expertise, the learning for life has an advantaged significance in the professional training. Although the training is exercise-based, a number of the procedures and methods can be acquired just during the day-to-day activities. After the entrance into the vocation, it's quite important to treat the entrants in order to develop their expertise. The professional training is a structured process covering the whole career and it has two decisive and alternate stages: the acquiring of knowledge and the work as the acquiring of experience.[3]

Because of the complex nature of the professional exercise and the requirements coming from national security activities, it's reasonable to organize the professional training in a separate department.

The national security training on MZNDU

The new system of military higher education has the fundamental conditions to carry out the national security training that has been accredited at the Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University (MZNDU).[4] The training suits the newly created and cyclical educational structure and it meets the requirements of the Bolognese process. The first training started in the fall of 2005.

Hungarian military higher education has a socially legitimated mission, its role and responsibility in creating and propagating the military culture cannot be transmitted to other institutions. MZNDU has respectable traditions and achievements in training military officers and experts of the defense sphere. It's quite important to emphasize the irreplaceable integrating function of the university in the field of scientific research. Present military higher education has proved its viability.

There is a close connection between the transformation of military higher education and the long-term developmental conception based on the strategic review of Hungarian defense forces. In recent years, it has become clear that the only chance is reacting in a proper way to the new challenges: change, development and modernization. The initiation of real abilities to defend our country and the involvements in NATO tasks need the rebuild of the army. The possible future military tasks and the fulfillment of traditional and new missions lead to the broadening of action repertoire of the army. It was inevitable to introduce the professional army in order to reach the efficient functioning of the army. The main objective of the long-term developmental project was a smaller but more modern and capable army. The forthcoming changes cover parts of the defense sphere. The future of the military higher education is determined by the requirement of having well-trained, professional, motivated and socially appreciated personnel of officers and experts in order to build the future Hungarian army and fulfill our NATO obligations.

It's generally accepted that the most significant tool of the modernization is manpower. Because of the importance of human resources, the educational structure, institutional system and financing of military higher education cannot avoid the transformation and modernization. The reform and development of military higher education are closely connected to the general modernization process of the defense sphere and the program of introducing a modern and ability-based army.

The reform is needful and possible, the situation is prosperous for a radical transformation, and the internal and external conditions are all set.

In the last two years during the transformation of educational structure, the military higher education got the right to run an integrated national security and military training. The mentioned educational field and the adherent (military and defense) training branches make clear that MZNDU has got the opportunity to consummate the national security character of its education.

The initiation of national security training is the evident result of a long, purposeful and intellectual building with real and stable grounds: the beginning of a new era.

The national security bachelor's program on MZNDU provides the opportunity to acquire the essential expertise, the theoretical grounds needed for successful activities, and the practical knowledge that is essential in general and special situations.

The training isn't without antecedents; from 1990 a certain part of the personnel was trained in different university branches in the MZNDU (respec-

tively on the former Miklós Zrínyi Military Academy). The curriculums of national security trainings and courses are matured, legitimated by the services and proved by the exercise. The training of professional subjects is carried out in an effective way, the curriculums and the special tools and conditions are available. The teachers of the university have taught subjects of erudition, social sciences, science of war, respectively scientific knowledge connected to professional learning. It means that the teachers have information on the characters of national security training, and they can meet the requirements of the services. In order to harmonize the educational and scientific projects in the field of national security, the university and the services have entered into a co-operative agreement.

The defense of the safe environment, sovereignty, and constitutional order of the Republic of Hungary, respectively the vindicating of the national security interests are carried out by the separate national security services that co-operate with each other. The services are separated by function and character having special internal relations, nature of function and special permissions (overt and covert means of gathering information) in order to fulfill their national security tasks. Because of the usage of the means and methods determined in the act on national security services, they hold a special role in the system of state institutions. The services have the opportunity to settle the higher professional basic training of the personnel holding special positions. The training of national security experts is a prime state interest, because it is an essential requirement for them to possess professional specialized knowledge.

It's quite an important element of the future of the department that the national security expert (with the essential knowledge and criteria requirements) gets into the national register of higher qualifications and vocational skills. It means that national security qualification will be legitimated by the state.

The new national security training educates experts for the national security services of the Republic of Hungary. The students graduated from the department can be employed at organizations and special services having juridical permission to use overt and covert means of gathering information (Police, Border Guard, Customs and Finance Guard, Protective Service of Law Enforcement Agencies).

Conclusions

The department of national security training has run from September of 2005 within the framework of defense training branch and it suits the new cyclic educational system of MZNDU. Following the directives of the services, the separateness of the department provides the fulfillment of the special requirements and the acquisition of specialized knowledge. Within the framework of the new department taking shape in the new training structure of

military education, the special educational objectives can be reached. The separate training department provides the expected theoretical and practical learning, the general and special knowledge needed for this vocation and the direct development of these skills.

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GOVERNMENT COMMUNICATION AS A FIELD OF ADULT EDUCATION

Key words: value of learning, the system of lifelong learning, communication, citizen, government communication

Introduction

I can imagine that the choosing of this theme ‘Government communication as a field of adult education’ is wondering. What is the relationship between government communication and adult education? The easiest way to give answer the question would be to refer to the Lifelong Learning definition: "all learning activity undertaken throughout life, with the aim of improving knowledge, skills and competence, within a personal, civic, social and/or employment-related perspective" (European Commission, 2001).

Lifelong learning represents a new approach as compared to the previous schools of education policy thinking. Lifelong learning implies not only more learning or adult learning but the transformation of the education system. In addition to the acquisition of new knowledge/skills, a different way of thinking and different human interaction patterns have to be acquired. “Thinking in terms of lifelong learning” includes the specification of new education alternatives, the acquisition/further development of qualifications, skills and knowledge, the perfection of learning and adaptation skills, problem solution, and the development, exploration and adoption of suitable forms of teaching and learning. Although learning is interpreted here primarily in its formal context, lifelong learning is more about a novel relationship between **culture and human life** than about formal learning. Culture today goes beyond the simple preservation of values in the traditional sense: it implies the possibility of continuous socialisation in adult age in order to cope in everyday life. The concept of lifelong learning presumes that the acquisition of the necessary amount of knowledge does not come to an end with one’s exit from the formal education structure - the acquisition of relevant knowledge continues, in various informal settings, throughout one’s life. Lifelong learning has two equally important and interacting goals, namely training for active citizenship and the promotion of employability. Both depend on commanding adequate, up-to-date

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knowledge and competencies allowing the individual to take an active part in economic and social life alike.

The **citizens** of today's Europe live in a complex social and political world. There has never been such an acute demand for the individual to plan his/her own life, to contribute actively to social development and to accept cultural, ethnic and linguistic diversity. The essence of the notion of **active citizenship** is that people should take part in the shaping of social and economic life; they should feel that they belong to the society in which they live, and that they have a say in its development.

The appreciation of learning in the policy of the European Union

The value of lifelong learning has increased in the policy of the European Union not only in education, but in other areas as well. The process has been triggered by changes taking place outside the education sector. Given the close interaction of the various economic and social sub-systems, a process emerging in one policy area implies, of necessity, changes in the developments of other policy areas. This is partly due to the underlying **global processes**, pointing beyond the European Union. The first among the global developments to be mentioned here is economic growth and competitiveness becoming knowledge-dependent – that is, the emergence, gradual evolution and spread of knowledge-based economies. In this context, knowledge is one of the most important products as well as the main source of growth. In the context of global developments, learning is assigned a decisive role in combating unemployment and social exclusion, too. Hence learning is a key instrument of both employment policy and social policy. The third global process conducive to the appreciation of learning is the general social appreciation of adaptability and adaptation skills in governance. Adaptability and knowledge have acquired outstanding significance in the management and governance of the highly complex, sophisticated systems of modern and post-modern societies. The learning capacity of social systems and organisations has become a precondition of successful governance (Halász, 2004:14).

The common **policy of governance** development is an important area and learning is a priority factor in that context, too. The alignment of the national policies, education policies included, is an important element of the on-going governance reform of the European Union, involving a review of the entire management/governance system of the Community. At the same time, the instruments of common governance relying on such symbolic elements as mutual learning, getting to know each other, the sharing of knowledge, instead of legal regulation or financial interests, are becoming increasingly significant.

The main instrument of the reform of Union governance is the Open Method of Co-ordination⁷⁵.

Government communication: functions and developments

Communication is an important link between government and the public, but certainly not the only one. A citizen is playing various roles. He is a costumer, he is a voter. He must have access to information that enables him to exercise his democratic rights. The government is there for its citizens. Nowadays people are better educated and more independent than ever. Since the political transition in 1989 modernisation of government communication in Hungary has been an important issue. In practice government communication can take a number of functions, ranging from simply informing about the government policy and explaining that policy, through rendering services to the public to information designed to change the behaviour or views of specific groups of people. Communication is also employed to support public participation processes and in projects where policy is prepared in close interaction with the organisations and citizens concerned (Keltai-Vági-Volmer, 2006:18).

I can understand that many people do not consider government communication as a field of adult education. However, government communication has important **learning dimension** related to individual and collective problem solving as well as in view of autonomous citizenship. **If governments get into the business of organizing everything, people become dependent on it and lose their spontaneous ability to co-operate, to find together responsible solution for their problems** (Katus, 2005a).

The economical transition brought a basically new challenge for the able-bodied members of the Hungarian society. The challenge is to respond to the new and fast changing demands of the market economy with their labour power, professional knowledge and their ability to learn. Not only do the persistent presence of mass unemployment and the difficulty to find a new workplace present the individual with a difficulty but also the problem of keeping one's workplace. It is becoming more and more evident that knowledge and skills determine the social advance, but the members of the society do not have the

⁷⁵ At Lisbon, the heads of states/governments identified as the priority instrument of the achievement of the strategic objective set in order to accelerate the process leading to the establishment of knowledge-based society in Europe the Open Method of Coordination. This new technique includes 4 main elements:

- Fixing guidelines for achieving the goals
- Establishing qualitative and quantitative indicators and benchmarks
- Translating European guidelines into national and regional policies
- Community evaluation of national strategies and measurements

same access to these. This discrepancy alienates people and may result in a persistent layering of the society: one class will be able to acquire the necessary knowledge and to continuously adapt, which is necessary for developing, while the other class will be able to learn and keep up with the age only with help or not even with help. This undesirable layering of classes can be prevented and lessened with the extension of education and training, and with an increase in its efficiency. To this it is indispensable for the people to take part actively and learn throughout a lifetime.

In March 2000, the Heads of States and Governments of the EU agreed to make the EU the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-driven economy by 2010, capable of sustainable economic growth. In the course of the historical process of transition from Communist dictatorship to democracy and free market economy in Hungary democratic institutions and a free market economy have been established whereas the country has joined the European Union. Accession to the European Union has only increased Hungary's attention to the development of human resources, as intellectual capital is known to be the almost exclusive resources reserve the country has. Past achievements to a decisive extent can be attributed to the already working "knowledge-based economy", therefore meeting future challenges also depends to a large extent on the ability of potential human resources to adapt themselves to economic and social changes. **Hungarian government is fully committed to created more and better jobs and greater social cohesion, reducing the risk of poverty and social exclusion. Implementation of lifelong learning is not a political issue but public affair, key factor of the economic growth and social inclusion.** It is important to make people committed to achieve their full potential, their being employed, and to live a successful and effective life and to become active citizens. The government recognizes that fighting against poverty and social exclusion is a multifaceted issue calling for a comprehensive approach that requires implementing the mainstreaming principle to reduce gender inequalities, improve the social inclusion of the Roma, and provide equal opportunities for the disabled. A key issue in this context concerns the involvement and strengthening of civil society in the fight against social exclusion. It is important to make its participation in policy-making more effective by enhancing the co-operation between central and local government bodies and NGOs. Instruments in this category include the development of institutions for **social dialogue**, the strengthening of rights and public awareness of these rights, and the fight against discriminatory and social prejudices.

In view of the realization of its above mentioned aims, the Hungarian government uses juridical, financial and communicative policy instruments. Compared with older democracies like The Netherlands the latter is still underdeveloped. This is partly due to the fact that the development of a sophisticated system of government communication is time consuming and

presupposes the availability of skilled professionals whose job is to make it sure that the communication between democratic governments on central and local levels is effective and efficient.

As I mentioned before, from among the legal, financial and communication tools of governance, those in the last category are rather underdeveloped in Hungary. Therefore, it is a key task of governance development to raise government communication to a **professional level**. Government communication is meant to ensure complete and objective information provision to society on the policy programmes and services of the government, and to encourage the government itself to take into consideration the interests, expectations and information-related needs of society and of the various groups of the population in its decisions and operation. Government communication includes the provision of information needed to enable citizens to find their way in society. In response to the rise of an autonomous citizenship the nature of the communication between government and citizens has changed. Government communication has become an instrument of democratic policymaking through the furtherance of the openness of decision-making processes and, at the same time, by enabling citizens to acquire the information and knowledge needed to understand and influence those processes (Katus, 2005b:59).

Government communication curriculum: Dutch-Hungarian project

The curriculum of Government communication and social inclusion was developed in the framework of Dutch-Hungarian co-operation. After the preparatory meetings the co-operating partners signed a Letter of Intent concerning the development, funding and launch of a training course ‘Government Communication and Social Inclusion’ and the modalities of cooperation. The Letter of Intent was signed on May 6, 2005 by Hungarian Ministry of Youth, Social, Family Affairs and Equal Opportunities; Government Information Service, Ministry of General Affairs, the Netherlands; and Faculty of Adult Education and Human Resources Management, Pécs University, Hungary. The curriculum was a very important mile stone, because it was be organised in September, 2005 for the first time in Hungary at Pécs University.

General aims of the cooperation

The Government Communication and Social Inclusion Curriculum aims at the acquisition and development of the competencies, necessary to help everyday work of government organizations and NGO’s dealing with communication towards the public. The curriculum aims on the one hand forming an approach and on the other hand helping acquiring theoretical and practical knowledge.

The Government Communication and Social Inclusion Curriculum is based on the experience acquired by the co-operating partners during many years. In the field of Government Communication the Netherlands Government Information Service has gathered more than half a century of experience. The Netherlands Government Information Service supports the exchange of professional experience in the following areas: organized special study tours, methodological help for the Hungarian experts. Also, it participates in working out and using of curriculum content in Hungary, including Hungarian teachers' training and providing Dutch teachers/experts.

Target group and training goals

The target group of the first edition of the course was specified as follows: public servants from various ministries and government institutions, who participate in the planning and implementation of communication activities and/or social inclusion policies.

Training goals: upon completion of the training course the participants will be capable of acting as communication consultants for ministries and government institutions. Furthermore, they will also be capable of contributing to the improvement of efficient and effective communication processes between the government and the public concerning government policy in general and social inclusion in particular.

The course consisted of two-day sessions to be given each month from September 2005 until June 2006. Competences to be acquired during the training course:

- Knowledge concerning the functions and principles of government communication;
- The relation between information communication technique and government communication in mass media;
- Crisis communication; techniques for crisis prevention and crisis management;
- Skills for planning and implementing government communication;
- Techniques for influencing and convincing people;
- Effective communication as a tool in social inclusion policy;
- Skills for co-operating with target groups, non-governmental and minority organisations;
- Inter-personal communication competences.

The topics of the presentations were built on each other, and contained both theoretical and practical elements. Specific issues, like media relations, crisis communication and social inclusion, were presented as well. Besides the

communication theory many practical aspects of the government communication work (like research, campaign planning and media relations) have also been covered in this course. The programme offered was consistent and relevant for professionals working at the central government level. The maximum number of public servants who could participate in the training course was set at 50. 24 participants represented various government ministries, while 26 persons came from central governmental organisations such as the Consumers' Protection Organisation, the Disaster Management, the National Police, the Health Insurance Directorate, the National Development Office, etc. The participants were required to participate actively in the training sessions and to provide feedback in each subject according to the subject characteristics. The participants were also expected to complete the course by participating in the final exam. Prior to the final exam, the participants were required to complete a final thesis. The topic of the final thesis was a complex one in compliance with the professional experience and area of the participants. The outcomes were surprisingly good, as the participants were heterogeneous groups, which posed a difficult task and challenge for both the faculty and the organisers. In addition, the high qualification level of participants constituted another challenge, since expectations had to be met in the different disciplines. Another significant achievement was that the learning process turned into one of a transcultural nature, rather than being an intercultural one (teams of two countries finally succeeding in reaching one goal). The participants received a course certificate. This document certifies that the participant is now a qualified communication expert. The certificates were issued in English and in Hungarian language by the University of Pécs. A second edition of the course was organised for public servants at central government institutions in March 2007.

Conclusion

Effective government communication is remarkably important from the point of view of **social cohesion**, mutual understanding, intercultural dialogue, and solidarity. It supports equal opportunities, makes people forming a harmonious and peaceful connection and helps the development of democratic society.

The Hungarian-Dutch cooperation has resulted in the establishment of the first professional training in the field of government communication in Hungary and probably in the wider region. The organizers see this as an important contribution to the further professionalisation of government communication in Hungary. The organizers intend to continue and to broaden the training possibilities in this area.

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