



PERIODICAL OF THE MILITARY NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICE

CURRENT ISSUES

The First Anniversary of the “Arab Spring”
The European Union and the ”Arab Spring”
The Achilles’ Heel of the Chinese Oil Consumption
Past, Present and Future of the NCO Corps
Intendment of the North Atlantic Treaty
Psychological Questions in Rehabilitation - Aspects
of Military Health Care
Alternatives for Crisis Management
Role and Importance of Reconnaissance in the Fight
against Irregular Warfare

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CONTENTS

	Page
<i>EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES</i>	
Maj. JÁNOS BESENYŐ, PhD – VIKTOR MARSAI The First Anniversary of the "Arab Spring" – what kind of changes have taken place since then?.....	5
ISTVAN LASZLO GAL, PhD and JAMES PARK TAYLOR Financing Terrorism: Afghanistan and the Haqqani	16
ÉVA REMEK, PhD The European Union and the „Arab Spring” – What has changed one year after?.....	27
<i>CURRENT ISSUES</i>	
ZOLTÁN VÖRÖS political scientist The Achilles' Heel of the Chinese Oil Consumption.....	38
SFC. RÓBERT ZSÁKAI Tsunami in Japan	48
<i>CONSULTATION</i>	
Col. ZOLTÁN SZALAY Past, Present and Future of the NCO Corps	56
GYÖRGY VASS Intendment of the North Atlantic Treaty /The Evolution of NATO through its Official Texts/	63
Dr. JUDIT WEINHOFFER Psychological Questions in Rehabilitation – Aspects of Military Health Care	70

FORUM of PhD CANDIDATES**Maj. Eng. PÁL BÁRKÁNYI, PhD aspirant**

The Mean Time to First Failure (MTTFF) Calculates in
Afghanistan or Calculates of Military Power Supply Systems 83

ATTILA BUGYAKI, PhD aspirant

Money Laundering in the Shade of the Underground Banking
System 89

Lt. ZSUZSA DÓRA KŐSZEGVÁRI, PhD aspirant

Role and Importance of Reconnaissance in the Fight against
Irregular Warfare, Effect of the Experiences Learnt on the
Planning and the Conduct of Reconnaissance 97

**CHARLES NGWABWANYI KUNDA - ILDIKÓ HERMINA
SZILASI, PhD aspirant**

Pili-pili in the Milk - some Thoughts on the Election Propaganda
in DRC 104

PETRA SZALAI, PhD aspirant

Alternatives for Crisis Management..... 110

Sc. Lt. BALÁZS LÓDERER PhD aspirant

Extremist Groups and Questions that arise in connection
with them 118

NOÉMI ZALAI, PhD aspirant

The Adaptability of Competence Based Selecting Methods
especially at the National Security Services 129

NEWS, EVENTS, INFORMATION**ANDRÁS HETTYEY, PhD**

Recension: Besenyő János: Nyugat-Szahara..... 134

EVALUATIONS, ANALYSES, STUDIES

Maj. János BESENYŐ, PhD – Viktor MARSAI

THE FIRST ANNIVERSARY OF THE "ARAB SPRING" – WHAT KIND OF CHANGES HAVE TAKEN PLACE SINCE THEN?

Abstract

The wave of „Arab Spring” has generated an atmosphere of hope and enthusiasm within and beyond the borders of the Arab World. The journalists termed the process as the „Arab revolution”¹, and it was expected that the downfall of old dictators would bring about basic changes in North Africa and the Middle East. Nevertheless, the results have remained limited yet. Although some authoritarian leaders have left the scene, this does not automatically mean a regime change. The structures and the reliable persons of the former dictators are still in power, as it is obvious in the case of the key country of the region, Egypt. If the protesters of the „Arab Spring” would like to reach a real breakthrough, which the scientists can call „revolution”, they must continue the efforts to transform the political and economic system of their countries into a modern one, which is able to give adequate answers to the internal and external challenges of the 21st century. Although there is no silver path for the success in this transformation, and each country should find her own way, it is likely that the halfway measures will not bring the hoped better life for the Arabs, and these insufficient solutions will only increase the gap between the different parts of the society – and between the Muslim world and the West.

Introduction

According to the famous writer Hannah Arendt, we can speak about revolution only if the use of violence leads to the creation of a totally new political structure, which breaks with the structures of the past, and it determines itself as a new beginning.² The overthrowing of a dictator does not mean per se a „revolution”, because the structure of an authoritarian regime is more stable, and there is no leader who can maintain his power alone. In most cases, an authoritarian regime forms its client-system, which, through the security services and the army, serves as the basis of its power. But if the society can no longer bear the rule of the dictator, and it becomes evident that he must go, some

¹ <http://www.budde.com.au/Presentations/Content/Social-Networks-and-Revolutions.pdf>.

Downloaded: 13-12-2011

² Hannah Arendt: A forradalom (The Revolution), Európa, 1991. 45.

key persons of the regime can join the demonstrations. It happened so in Egypt: after the first days of the rebellion, the army decided to support the changes and no longer supported Mubarak. But the leaders of the armed forces and the police, who served as the main basis of the Mubarak regime, did not lose their power, and they are playing a crucial role in the current politics of the „new” Egypt, too.

The classic examples of revolution were in 1789 or in 1917, when the figures of the „ancient regime” were expelled or executed, and not only the persons of the leadership changed, but also the whole structure of the political and economic life. 1789 or 1917 really meant a „new beginning”, and the revolutionists radically tried to break away from the elements of the former regime.

„Revolution” is a fashionable term. But not every demonstration is a revolution. In the Arab World we can mostly see demonstrations, not revolutions. Now it seems that perhaps some demonstrations can be called “revolution” – e.g. in the case of Tunisia –, but the definition is unsure, because we can recognize a revolution by its effects and results – not by the words of the participants. And this will need much more time.

The dynamics of the unrests


The reasons behind unrest can be numerous: they can have roots in social, religious or ethnic tensions, political suppression or economic crisis. Sometimes they feed upon only the political sphere of the society, and the protesters demand more freedom and human rights, but in other cases we find that the insufficient living conditions are the main motives under the surface. The beginning of riotings is often spontaneous, and a peaceful demonstration transforms into a more violent protest. It happened in Western Sahara, where the funeral of Saharavi activist Hamdi Lembarki – killed by the Moroccan police – became a huge mass demonstration.³ These riots often serve for channelling tensions, and if the authorities are careful, and do not try to immediately suppress the rioting, after some days the protestations can lose their power. We can see this scenario realized in most of the Arab countries: the authoritarian leadership agreed and made some limited reforms, which were enough to calm the protesters. But in some states, the regime was not so wise: the Power does not show any willingness for changes and even uses brutal violence against the demonstrators. This gave impetus to the fragmented and disorganized opposition to come together into one platform and become stronger than ever. If the strength and the support of the opposition is big enough, it can very easily lead to a civil war, like in Greece after WWII or in Spain in the ‘30s. In addition, a

³ Stephen Zunes and Jacob Mundy: *Western Sahara. War, Nationalism and Conflict Irresolution*. Syracuse University Press, Syracuse, 2010 p. 154-161

civil war usually does not remain only an inner policy issue; in both of the aforementioned conflicts, it could be observed that the external actors played a crucial role in the war.

The revolutionists can seize the power if they have small, but organized elite which is capable of driving the processes, giving direction to the events and obtaining the support of the people. If the unrest cannot produce such a group, the protests can lead to anarchy and chaos, which finally results in legitimating the rule of the former regime.

Till the end of 2010, North Africa was considered as a relatively stable part of the world. The nationalist, authoritarian leaders of the region came to power in the '60s and '70s, and it seemed that their rule would never end. They survived the Cold War, the Arab-Israel wars, the collapse of the CCCP and the „War on Terror” campaign. The regional status quo was more or less acceptable for the dictators, the West and the „rest of the world” – e.g. the BRICS countries –, too, and because of this consensus the analysts considered that the status quo is sustainable.⁴ Therefore, the unexpected events in Tunisia, and then in Egypt, shocked the international system, and the great powers needed weeks to react to the unrests.



Data: BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2010

The Egyptian oil production. The decline of the exports cut the endowment of the main consumer's goods, which undermined the social and economic security in the country.⁵

⁴ http://konzervatorium.blog.hu/2011/03/10/kerdesek_az_arab_tavaszi_mozgalmairol. Downloaded: 12-12-2011

⁵ <http://www.transitionedinburghsouth.org.uk/blog/egyptian-oil-and-natural-gas>. Downloaded: 12-12-2011. See also: Egypt – the convergence of oil decline, political and socio-economic crisis. <http://crudeoilpeak.info/egypt-the-convergence-of-oil-decline-political-and-socio-economic-crisis>. Downloaded: 12-12-2011.

The Arab dictators of the Cold War era usually came to power by revolutions. But these new leaders – Gaddafi, Mubarak, Ben Ali, Saleh – did not provide a new way of ruling for their people. They often based their power on the newly revealed oil-fields, which allowed moderate welfare for their citizens without the broadening of their political rights, and this compromise worked well until recently.

But the depletion of the natural resources undermined the power of the regimes. The social investments and the endowments declined, and the living standard decreased. The middleclass – which was the leading force of the demonstrations – started to come down, and it was evident that with the exception of a very small group (the close adherents of the dictators), the whole society only lost under the rule of the dictatorial regimes. The corruption, the nepotism, the lack of freedom and other human rights only strengthened the dissatisfaction. The traditional problems of the region as the demographic boom, the desertification, the lack of drinking water, and the current economic crisis also contributed to the blast. The unemployment rate among the youth was critical, and these people could be easily won for the demonstrations. In this environment, the last years' moderate economic reforms could not raise the living standards on the contrary, they increased the gap between the different social classes.⁶ As a result of the crisis in Europe, many Arab immigrants working in Europe lost their job, and they could no longer send money home to their families.

Besides the economic reasons, several other factors also contributed to the birth of the „Arab Spring“. One of the main causes of the problems in many countries is the tribalism: the dictators always preferred their own tribesmen to hold the key positions in government. As in general in Africa, the principle of the „winner takes all“ was true in the Maghreb, too. The structure and the basis of the power were not political, but familiar and tribal. This is the reason why the Libyan protesters are trying to arrest everybody from the Gaddafi family, and why they launched a war against the Gaddafi tribe instead of trying to negotiate.

As already mentioned, the interests of external actors also play a crucial role in the conflicts. In the multipolar world, the USA, the EU, the BRICS countries or Iran all try to utilize the situation according to their own interests, which leads to conflict between these actors. This can be clearly seen in the case of Iraq, Bahrain and Oman. Iran gives serious support to the protesters from the background in order to strengthen the Shiite groups, which would increase Iran's power in the Gulf and the Middle East.⁷ This is, however, unacceptable for the

⁶ http://pages.eiu.com/rs/eiu2/images/Arab_Spring_Tide_Whitepaper_Jun2011.pdf. Downloaded: 14-12-2011.

⁷ <http://www.eurasiareview.com/06072011-the-arab-uprising-of-2011-ibn-khaldun-encounters-civil-society-analysis/> Downloaded: 14-12-2011.

USA. The loss of the US RQ-170 Sentinel drone shows that there is an ongoing secret war between the two countries.⁸

The situation is similar in Libya, where the biggest loser of the fall of Gaddafi is Italy, while the positions of France and the UK seem to be strengthened. The NATO air strikes also underlined the importance of the region for Europe, which can be a strong message for Russia and China.

Last but not least, we should explore the role of the Islamists in the unrests. At the beginning, it seemed that the fears of the West would not be confirmed: the demonstrators had no links with the radical Islam groups, and the ideology and the catchwords of the protesters were not dominated by anti-Israel or anti-West feelings. Furthermore, the al-Qaida needed – similarly to the Western politicians – long weeks to react to the events, but nobody dealt with it. The main ideological framework of the unrests was not Islamism, but the demand of the Western rights for freedom and equality.⁹ Nevertheless, it did not mean that the Islamist remained passive. In the anarchy and chaos, some Islamist organizations significantly increased its power. Although most of them are officially moderate, and in their declarations the winner Ennahda Islamist Party in Tunisia¹⁰ and the Justice and Development Party in Morocco promised¹¹ an open society, the rule of law and the respect for human rights, it is unquestionable that some radical Islamist groups became stronger in the region. The murder of a Polish catholic priest in Tunisia¹² and the attacks against the Coptic churches in Egypt¹³ show their increasing power and influence. Some former mujahideen got leading power in the new political structure, like Abdel Hakim Belhaj in Libya, who earlier had fought against the Allies in Afghanistan.¹⁴ Although none of them is openly against the Western values and relations, it is hard to determine how strong their commitment is in the field of human rights and some Arab type of democratization. Later we will examine this problem in more detail.

After the general exploration of the „Arab Spring”’s circumstances, we will try to arrange in groups the events of the different countries and determine whether we can call them „revolutions” or not. In most cases we will see that

⁸ <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2011-12-12/iran-shows-downed-spy-drone-as-u-s-assesses-technology-loss.html>. Downloaded: 14-12-2011.

⁹ Elham Fakhro – Emile Hokayem: Waking the Arabs. *Survival*, 53:2, 2011, 23–24., 26.

¹⁰ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/10/tunisia-ennahda-islamist-party_n_1087006.html. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

¹¹ <http://www.lonelyplanet.com/travelblogs/235/140392/No+Islamic+Dress+Code+for+Moroccan+Women?destId=355491>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

¹² <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2011/02/18/uk-tunisia-priest-murder-idUKTRE71H5RR20110218>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

¹³ <http://www.asianews.it/news-en/Attacks-against-Coptic-churches,-part-of-a-plan-to-expel-Egypt%E2%80%99s-Christians-22828.html>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

¹⁴ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-14786753>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

they were not revolutions, and the power systems of the old regimes are still strong.

Moderate reforms without breakthrough

After the first wave of the „Arab Spring”, most of the leaders of the Arab States had to implement moderate reforms. These changes did not affect the basic principles of the political system or the rule of the countries: the main aim of them was to calm the protesters and prevent further demonstrations. In some cases it was enough that the monarch or the president appointed new government officials, promised economic reforms and new workplaces. This happened in Oman, Morocco, Algeria, Jordan and Iraq. The opposition has become legal, like in Morocco the currently winner Islamist party. The state of emergency, which was in place for decades, was suspended as in Algeria by Abdelaziz Bouteflika. It seems that these steps were enough until now. But it is only the surface. The main question is whether the leaders of these countries are able to cope with the challenges of the new environment. Most of the economic problems remained, and they can be solved only through structural reform and a new distribution of the goods of the State, which will be likely delayed by the corrupt elite. Therefore, on the one hand it is not impossible that the lack of basic changes will bring about in these countries a new wave of demonstrations, similar to those currently going on in Egypt, and the „Arab Spring” will be followed by another „Arab Season”. On the other hand, the chaos and instability – which we can see in Libya, Egypt or Yemen, and which contribute to the serious decline of economy and incomes – can also become a retarding force. According to some economists, the direct „price” of the „Arab Spring” reached the 56 billion USD only in Libya, Bahrain, Egypt, Tunisia and Syria until October, which means that the total loss of the region is hundreds of billions of dollars.¹⁵ The Arab population can see that the willingness and the opportunities of the international community to donate billions of dollars for the recovery and the rebuilding of the region are limited. Libya is lucky because Gaddafi’s unimaginable amount of savings – at least 100 billion USD, but the real amount can be the double¹⁶ – can give a great impetus to the economy. But it is questionable whether who will finance the necessary structural reforms of Egypt, Tunisia and the other Arab states. Therefore, the citizens of the Maghreb states will consider twice whether they want a real revolution or they are satisfied with moderate reforms, with a little bit more money without more political freedom.

¹⁵ The piquancy of the whole case is that some Arab countries, like Saudi Arabia or Kuwait have huge profits from the increasing oil prices. <http://www.arabianbusiness.com/cost-of-arab-spring-close--56bn-says-study-425412.html>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011

¹⁶ <http://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/politics/nation/muammar-gaddafi-spirited-over-200-billion-out-of-libya-report/articleshow/10450416.cms>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

The resistants – Syria and Bahrain

At first sight, we cannot see too much similarity in the events in Syria and Bahrain. But the basic political answers of the regimes and the power relations in the two countries are the same: both regimes declared that they will not contribute to the structural changes, and according to the current situation, it is not too likely that the protesters can reach serious successes here.

The reasons, of course, are different. Bahrain is one of the main scenes of the Shiite-Sunni – and Saudi-Iranian¹⁷ – conflict in the Middle East. Furthermore, the base of the 5th US Fleet can be found here, so the geopolitical importance of Bahrain for Washington is unquestionable. The Shiite majority of Bahrain would have been probably strong enough to overthrow the monarch, Hamad bin Isa Al Khalifa. However, this was unacceptable for both the USA and Saudi Arabia. Thus, the Saudi army – officially in the framework of GCC and on the request of King Hamad – marched in the country and suppressed the riot. The events in Bahrain demonstrated well that besides – and if it is necessary, in contrast to – the catchwords of democracy and freedom, the Western powers defend their geopolitical interests in the region.

In Syria the circumstances are different, but the results are the same. Although the demonstrations have been going on since March, the protesters were not able to force President Asad to leave his position. The EU sanctions and the decision of the Arab League to suspend the membership of Damascus in the organization do not seem enough to enforce the changes in Syria.¹⁸ In contrast to Libya, most of the population does not want a regime change, and the intensity of the fighting is low. The opposition is divided and there is no such kind of central and recognized authority as the Libyan NTC. The fact that demonstrators were not able to form a united platform against the regime proves that their opportunities are limited. Asad tries to be careful and he does not use as brutal and open violence against the protesters as Gaddafi did. The international community is also divided. It is almost sure that the UN Security Council will not accept sanctions against Syria, and the demonstrators cannot expect such robust foreign support as the NTC in Libya. A huge part of the society supports the regime and condemns the riots and some analyses state that the fall of Asad could lead to an endless civil war between the different religious groups (Sunni, Shiite, Druze, Christian, Alawite) similarly to Iraq.¹⁹

To sum up the situation, the leadership has a stable power in both countries. In Bahrain, the Saudi and US presence is a guarantee for the survival of the Kingship. In Syria the opposition is divided and unorganized. The overthrowing of Asad would be possible only by an increased external pressure,

¹⁷ <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/mideast/95-1013.pdf>. Downloaded 15-12-2011.

¹⁸ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-15901360>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

¹⁹ A pokol tornácán. HVG, 3. December 2011, 27–29

but currently there is no state really insisting on the fall of the President – mainly, because nobody sees what could come after the rule of the Alawites.

Egypt and Yemen – leader change instead of regime change

The dynamics of the „Arab Spring” can be very well followed by the events in Egypt, one of the key – if not *the* key – countries of the region. Egypt was the second scene of the Arab unrest, and the demonstrators reached the overthrow of Mubarak relatively quickly. The Egyptian President was an emblematic figure of the Arab World. He received serious Israeli and American support and had good relations both with the EU and the Arab nations. The fall of Mubarak symbolized the strength of the protesters, who were capable of overthrowing a dictator in contrast to the willing of the great powers.

But the symbol remained only a symbol. The failure of Mubarak did not bring radical transformation in the political life of Egypt. The army remained the most powerful actor in the internal policy and any change can happen only with the agreement of the Military Council. The attempts to put the army under the rule of the civil administration have failed. The economy stagnated, and millions of Egyptian citizens remained poor and dissatisfied. The structure of the economic and the political system of the Mubarak era was untouched. The death of hundreds of protestors contributed to the fall of the dictator, but it was not enough to break the power of the military and the economic elite. The prominent figures of the „new” regime – Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, Kamal Ganzouri or Sami Hafez Anan – were the key persons of the former dictatorship. The Military Council has the support of the US and Israel. This support is likely to be increased after the success of Muslim Brotherhood and the Salafist Nour Party.²⁰

The citizens recognized this tendency, which led to a new wave of demonstrations in mid-November. In the „free” Egypt, dozens of people died during the unrests.²¹ Although the Military Council appointed a new government, it was only a tactical step. The key question is how the balance of forces will change between the military leadership and the ever stronger Islamist groups in the next month during the elections. Unfortunately it seems that the liberal opposition in Egypt is too weak and divided to provide a realistic alternative between the Islamists and the army.

The situation is worse in Yemen. In the deeply fragmented society, President Saleh was the symbol of unity: he was the only person who was capable of holding together the North and the South, the Shiites and the Sunnis.

²⁰ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/11/28/egypt-elections-2011-salafis_n_1117463.html.
Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

²¹ <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/dozens-die-the-cabinet-teeters--and-chaos-rules-6265837.html> Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

The centrifugal power of the inner policy was already strong in the '90s, but after the al-Qaeda and the Salafist groups had more and more influence in „Felix Arabia”, the position of the central government became critical. What we can see in Yemen was not an uprising against a dictator, but a civil war against the unified Yemen. The current processes will not bring peace and welfare for the country, but rather a further disintegration of the state. Yemen is the second most important base of the al-Qaeda and the global Jihad (after the AfPak mountains) and the anarchy will only support the operations of the terror organization.²²

Furthermore, the situation of the political leaders is the same as in Egypt. The current acting president, who serves until the January elections, is Abd Rabbuh Mansur al-Hadi, the former Vice-President of Saleh. The ministers of defense, oil and foreign affairs also could retain their posts.²³ What happened in Yemen was not a „revolution”, but a new chapter of a prolonged, low intensity civil war, which is obviously the success of the separatist, the Jihadist, the Salafist, and the al-Qaeda.

Regime change in Libya

The death of Gaddafi in October meant a big relief both for the NTC and the external actors. But the future of Libya remained questionable. What went off in the country was not a revolution, but a civil war. Although the media tried to show the events as a national uprising against the dictator, it was in fact a civil war between the different tribes of Libya. Fortunately, the leaders of the western tribes recognized soon that – because of the international pressure and the NATO air campaign – there was no way back to the former regime and Gaddafi had to go. But it is unsure how long this peace can be sustained. The support of the NTC is limited, and the fragmentation among the different opposition groups – the fighters of the western mountains, who occupied Tripoli or the militias of Misrata, which suffered the most serious casualties – is strong. As we could see – besides the liberal politicians who came home from emigration – we can find mujahideens among the leaders of the militias. In addition, there are serious tensions between the civil administration and the military commanders. The circumstances of the death of Gaddafi showed that the NTC was not able to regulate the armed groups; and in contrast to its promises it could not capture the dictator alive.²⁴ When Minister of Interior Mahmoud Jibril tried to extend his authority to the militias, he faced serious

²² Shaol Shay: *The Red Sea Terror Triangle. Sudan, Somalia, Yemen, and Islamic Terror.* Transaction Publishers, Piscataway, 2005.

²³ <http://english.ahram.org.eg/NewsContent/2/8/28941/World/Region/Yemen-unity-government-sworn-in.aspx>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

²⁴ Béke poraira? Líbia Kadhafi után. HVG, 29 October 2011, 20.

resistance.²⁵ The lack of effective central power is proved by the torture and execution of the captured pro-Gaddafi troops.²⁶

Other important condition for a successful transition would be the state-building, but it is being delayed. The lack of civil society means that the main driving forces of the changes are the tribes, which queries the perspectives of the structural reforms. The current aims of the NTC and the external actors – the creation of a democratic, open Libya – are unrealistic because of the lack of necessary conditions. Gaddafi was very careful and he did not leave place for any resistance or organized opposition, including the creation of civil society. Egypt and Tunisia have strong middle classes and opposition, civil organizations, as well as influential emigrant groups abroad. All of these are lacking in Libya. Chairman of the NTC, Abdul Jalil and the first Prime Minister, Mahmoud Jibril were prominent members of the Gaddafi regime. The difference between Egypt and Libya is that Libya has no alternative leaders, while Egypt could have. Libya has a huge amount of money from the assets of the Gaddafi-family. But there are no assurance that the 100 billion USD will really serve the rebuilding and welfare of the country. The transition is too slow and the citizens are dissatisfied. The centrifugal powers are strong and the lack of effective central government can jeopardize the creation of a new state-system. The worst case scenario is that the different factions will not be able to find a compromise, and the civil war will continue. We can only hope that after the bloody war against the pro-Gaddafi forces, all actors want to avoid further fighting.

Tunisia – what kind of revolution?

At the end of our exploration we find only one country in the Arab World where the buds of real changes have appeared. This is Tunisia. After the long months of insecurity and instability, the victory of the Ennahda Party seems to give new direction to the political system of the country. But it is a big question what will be this direction. Although the Ennahda promised that they would practice moderate governance, it is very hard to say what this actually means. The organization has good relations with the Hamas, and the two groups had a common rally on 13 November 2011. The voice of the Ennahda at the meeting was in sharp contrast to the official statements the party communicated to the West. The Ennahda's general secretary Hammadi Jebali – who has been recently proposed by the party to be the new Prime Minister of Tunisia – said that the event was „*a divine moment in a new state and ,hopefully, in a 6th caliphate*”,

²⁵ <http://articles.latimes.com/2011/sep/12/world/la-fg-libya-fighting-20110912>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

²⁶ <http://abcnews.go.com/International/wireStory/libya-leaders-acknowledge-abuse-prisoners-15046063>. Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

and „*the liberation of Tunisia will, God willing, bring about the liberation of Jerusalem.*”²⁷

As we stated, the Islamists played a marginal role in the outbreak of the unrests. But the situation has changed in the recent months. The liberal opposition was divided and faint. Their ideas have no deep roots in the tradition of the Arab states and they have limited support at home. Although the Western states try to back them, the citizens of the region do not trust in the external actors, because they had made it possible for the dictators to have a stable rule for decades. The problems of the region need organized leadership which is capable and willing to face the challenges and is brave enough to use radical, unorthodox solutions if necessary; currently the Islamists can meet these demands.

And not only the moderate Islamists can meet them. As we could see in Egypt, the Salafist received serious support, too. In Egypt the moderate Islamist party, the Freedom and Justice Party – the Party of the Brotherhood – has good relations with the Salafists, and there is no doubt that if it needs, the Brotherhood will choose the other Islamist party for a coalition, not the liberal ones.

It seems that the downfall of the dictators can be followed only by the rule of Islamists in most countries of the region. The basic question is which way of governance will there be. One of the two options is the strengthening of radical elements, which we have already known from Afghanistan or Iran. The other is a new, hybrid way of political system with the unification of the sharia, the Islamic and local traditions and the experiences of the Western governance. It is sure that the European model of liberal democratic political system cannot work in North Africa. But elements of the Turkish system can be useful for the new governments. The complete copy of this model is not possible, but the way ahead for the Arabs can be similar.

There are many examples for the unlimited rule of sharia, but there are only few examples for the creation of new type of governance which unifies the advantages of the Islamic and the Western legacy. Furthermore, in the Maghreb we need a model containing the local political and cultural traditions, too, which is different in each country. It is not a simple task, but there is no other acceptable alternative for the state-building in the region.

Conclusion

The „Arab Spring” brought about the downfall of dictators who had been ruling for decades. But the overthrow of the tyrant does not automatically mean freedom. Most of the unrests in the Arab World did not lead to revolution. The structures of the political and economic system have not changed yet, and the

²⁷ <http://www.tunisia-live.net/2011/11/15/hamas-representative-addresses-tunisian-political-rally/>.
Downloaded: 15-12-2011.

roots of the conflicts have sustained. The external actors could not provide adequate answers to the challenges of the region, and the movements of the North African countries went back to their traditions. In the first anniversary of the beginning of the „Arab Spring”, it seems that the main ideological background of the transformation is Islamism. The question is whether the successful Islamist political parties of the region will choose the moderate, hybrid way of political system or they will give in to the pressure of the radicals.

Finally, we can see the second wave of the „Arab Spring”, e.g. in Egypt, where the population is fed up with the rule of the key persons of the former dictator. In addition, if the situation becomes worse in Syria and Yemen, it can cause a further escalation of the local conflicts. All of these phenomena show that the unrests of the „Arab Spring” have not yet finished, and the consolidation needs much more time.

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FINANCING TERRORISM: AFGHANISTAN AND THE HAQQANI

Abstract:

Terrorism is evolving in the new millennium, and so are the ways that terrorists finance their activities. While large attacks can be accomplished with relatively small amounts of money, terrorists continue to diversify their sources of funding. Terrorism in Afghanistan is funded by a variety of sources including donations, drug trafficking, kidnapping, and corruption. The Haqqani network is one of the most dangerous terrorist networks in Afghanistan, and has strong ties to many financial sources. Efforts are underway to enhance the Afghan government's ability to interdict terrorist financing, but due to the weak government structure and the ubiquitous nature of corruption in the country, the future of those efforts is uncertain.

Keywords: *Terrorism, terrorist financing, money laundering, Afghanistan, Haqqani*

Introduction

In this article we introduce the reader to some basic concepts about the financing of terrorism. The first part of the article – written by Prof. Istvan Laszlo Gal of the University of Pecs – provides a general overview of terrorist

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financing. The second part – written by Prof. James Park Taylor of University of Montana – provides a summary of terrorist financing in Afghanistan, with an emphasis on the financing of the Haqqani network, a prominent terrorist network in Afghanistan. We hope that you find the article to be of interest.

Part 1: Terrorist Financing – a General Overview

Terrorist financing is a topic that catapulted into the limelight after the tragic events of September 11, 2001. Terrorism has grown significantly since the Second World War. Terrorism now takes many new forms, including nuclear terrorism, eco-terrorism, biological terrorism, and cyber-terrorism. All of these types of terrorist activity require financial resources, and all have financial consequences.

Recent terrorist attacks affected both national and global economies. The economic consequences can be largely broken down into short-term direct effects; medium-term confidence effects and longer-term productivity effects. The direct economic costs of terrorism, including the destruction of life and property, emergency responses, restoration of systems and effected infrastructure, and the provision of temporary living assistance, are most pronounced in the immediate aftermath of attacks and thus matter more in the short run. Direct economic costs are likely to be proportionate to the intensity of the attacks and the size as well as the characteristics of the economy affected. The indirect costs of terrorism can be significant and have the potential to affect economies in the medium term by undermining consumer and investor confidence. Finally, over the longer term, there is a question of whether the attacks can have a negative impact on productivity by raising the costs of transactions through increased security measures, higher insurance premiums, and the increased costs of financial and other counterterrorism regulations.³

Since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, in New York and March 11, 2004, in Madrid, and the creation of international laws which started as the consequence of the attacks, terrorist financing has become a question frequently discussed together with money laundering.⁴ So the “financing of terrorism” is a rather new phenomenon that has the following characteristics compared to money laundering:⁵

³ R. Barry Johnston and Oana M. Nedelescu: The impact of terrorism on financial markets (Journal of Financial Crime Vol 13. No 1. 2006. pp 8-9.)

⁴ The weight of the problem is indicated also by the American report that was published some years ago; according to which the total cost of the terrorist attacks of September 11 2001 was approximately 500.000 dollars. *Rachel Ehrenfeld*, Funding Evil. How Terrorism Is Financed – and How to Stop It. Chicago and Los Angeles 2005. 1. p.

⁵ *Steven Mark Levy*, Federal Money Laundering Regulation (Banking, Corporate, and Securities Compliance) New York, 2003. 18-20. pp.

– The primary motive is violence (intimidation) rather than financial (profit-realizing). The goal of the terrorists is mainly to constrain state organs or international organizations (or convince them to take some particular action), to intimidate the population, or to change or disturb the constitutional, social or economic order of a state. These aims that have been named in international documents are contained also in the Hungarian Criminal Code in section 216 about terrorist acts. Thus, the profit motive for terrorists is secondary, while money launderers are clearly “profit-oriented.”

– For the financing of terrorism, money of legal origin is used the same as money of illegal origin. The terrorists also receive financial support from legal sources, such as organizations of charity, beneficial donors and firms operating legally.

– The third distinguishing characteristic is the amount of money. Even very large terrorist attacks can be organized with smaller sums. For example, the 2004 Madrid bombings were reported to have only involved expenditures of just over 46,000 USD,⁶ and the 2005 London bombings were reported to have only cost “a few hundred pounds.”⁷

Sources and techniques of terrorist financing

1. Committing crimes

Terrorism itself is a crime, one of the most serious and dangerous crimes. Criminal activity related to terrorist financings usually includes those types of crime that result higher incomes in a shorter timeframe.

Probably the crimes most often used for terrorist financing are *drug-related crimes*. The drug trade gives 60-90% of the income of the Columbian paramilitary and guerrilla organizations.⁸ Islamic terrorist organizations are especially authorized by some fatwas to use drug-trade as a means in the fight against the decadent West.⁹

Kidnapping is also an important income resource for terrorists. The Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan received 5 million USD for letting free four Japanese geologists after kidnapping them in Kyrgyzstan in 1999.¹⁰

Smuggling people is also a profitable activity for terrorists. Economic and political migration is engendered by the difference of the quality of life between

⁶ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/nov/01/spain.international>

⁷ http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/4576346.stm

⁸ Berry LV, Curtis GE, Hudson RA, Kollars NA: A Global Overview of Narcotics-Funded Terrorist and Other Extremist Groups Library of Congress 2002. 52. p.

⁹ Beers R, Taylors FX: Narco-Terror: The Worldwide Connection Between Drugs and Terror (In: Terrorism and Government Information 2002. 322. p.

¹⁰ Napoleoni L: Modern Jihad: Tracing the Dollars Behind the Terror Networks Pluto Press, London, 2003. 89. p.

the undeveloped and developed regions of the world, and by the desire for security afforded by democratic states. A citizen from Bangladesh or China might need to sacrifice 20-25,000 US dollars to get to Western Europe.¹¹

Money laundering on the one hand is a profitable activity for the terrorists; and it is also a means for terrorist financing. On the other hand terrorist financing is closely related to money laundering.

Besides these, there are also *other* profitable types of crime that the terrorists can use for obtaining money. The itemized enumeration of these is impossible. In 2002 the IRA is said to have had an income of 11 million USD by committing different kinds of crimes. The major part of their income originated from the tobacco-smuggling from Eastern Europe to England.¹² A big part of the European financial income of al-Qaeda comes from credit-card fraud; according to Secret Service estimations this sum reaches 1 million USD monthly (!)¹³.

2. *Donations*

Donation is the free transmittal of cash, stock, gold or silver, gemstones or other assets of value to terrorists or terrorist organizations. This is a typical form of financial support. Terrorists for the most part prefer keeping the form of wealth with the highest liquidity degree, that is, cash.

Terrorists can be supported by individuals, organizations (including other terrorist organizations) and states. "Donation" in a wider sense can be considered as the financing of terrorism in the sense of criminal law, while in an economic sense the committing of crimes and legal business activity can also be considered as the part of this activity.

In a narrower sense the regulation of criminal law against terrorist financing focuses primarily on the donations of individuals: criminal law is not designed to deal with the problem of state sponsors of terrorism.

3. *Legal business activity*

Osama bin Laden founded 30 companies in Sudan between 1991-1996, these altogether had 3,000 employees. In 1994-1995 Western and Israeli secret service sources mentioned bin Laden as the key moneylender of terrorism.

Legal business activity is playing an increasingly more important part in terrorist financing. European jihadist cells lean more and more on their legal incomes, for example, on what they earn with their jobs. The attack of September 11 was the last one that was completely financed by al-Qaeda; global financing by al-Qaeda ended in 2002. Terrorist activity today is often financed

¹¹ Korinek László: A terrorizmus (=Kriminológia-Szakkriminológia Szerk: Gönczöl Katalin – Kerezi Klára – Korinek László – Lévy Miklós CompLex kiadó, Budapest, 2006. 456. p.

¹² Clarke L, Leppard D: Photos link more IRA Men to Colombia Sunday Times 2002. 04. 28.

¹³ Gunaratna R: Inside Al Qaeda: Global Network of Terror Hurst &Company London, 2002. 65. p.

by the actions of self-supporting cells. So the process called *privatization of terrorist financing* has started.¹⁴

In a wider sense it also can be considered as part of legal business activity if terrorists use part of their legal income as employees for terrorist purposes. On that basis, according to the experiments of last years' terrorist attacks, 8-10,000 USD can be enough to carry out serious actions. Our fears can be realized that in practice, a terrorist cell consisting of a 4-5 person-group in a developed or a middle-developed country can save the above sum with legal jobs and can strike without any additional funding source.

Part 2: The Haqqani Network

One of the most dangerous elements operating in the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan is the Haqqani terrorist network.¹⁵ The Haqqani network was originally formed under the leadership of Jalaluddin Haqqani, once a mujahideen fighter against the Soviet occupation. Backed at that time by United States,¹⁶ the Haqqani are now one of NATO's deadliest enemies in Afghanistan. Based in Miramshaw, North Waziristan, Pakistan,¹⁷ and comprised of various elements under the leadership of Jalaluddin Haqqani, and his son Sirajuddin, the Haqqani network¹⁸ is separate from, but related to, both the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Jalaluddin Haqqani was born in Afghanistan, and educated in a madrassa in Pakistan. After the forcing out of the Soviet troops in Afghanistan, Jalaluddin Haqqani became a part of the Taliban government, serving as Minister of Borders and Tribal Affairs, and also as governor of Paktia Province. After the United States forces entered Afghanistan in 2001, the Haqqanis fled across the border to North Waziristan, forming an organization that has collaborated extensively with the Taliban and al-Qaeda, and operating in both Pakistan and Afghanistan.¹⁹ The Haqqanis are also believed to have significant contacts with the Pakistani intelligence service, ISI.²⁰

¹⁴ Sean S. Costigan – David Gold: *Terronomics ASHGATE*, Printed in Great Britain, 2007. 14. p.

¹⁵ For a detailed discussion of the Haqqani Network, see: *Jeffrey Dressler, "The Haqqani Network: A Strategic Threat,"* Institute for the Study of War Afghanistan Report No. 9, March 2012, http://understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_StrategicThreatweb_29MAR_0.pdf

¹⁶ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2011/10/07/haqqani-network-afghanistan_n_987762.html (last visited May 10, 2012)

¹⁷ Part of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas of Pakistan, an area where the central Pakistani government is able to exert little control.

¹⁸ http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/Haqqani_FamilyTree_Update.pdf (last visited May 10, 2012)

¹⁹ Don Ressler and Vahid Brown, *The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa'ida*, The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2011, http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/07/CTC-Haqqani-Report_Ressler-Brown-Final_Web.pdf

²⁰ <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/taliban/militants/haqqani.html> (last visited May 14, 2012).

The Haqqani network has grown in strength and numbers. In 2011, Sirajuddin Haqqani claimed that the Haqqani had 15,000 fighters.²¹ The Haqqani network has been identified as a participant of many of the recent attacks in Afghanistan, especially ones in Kabul, including:

- the June 28, 2011, attack on the Intercontinental Hotel²²
- the August 19, 2011, attack on the British Consul²³
- the September 13, 2011, attack on the United States Embassy²⁴
- the assassination of Burhanuddin Rabbani, the head of the Afghan High Peace Council and former President of Afghanistan, on September 20, 2011²⁵
- the multiple coordinated attacks of April 16, 2012²⁶
- the attack on a Jalalabad Road housing compound for international workers on May 2, 2012²⁷

This part of the article offers a short summary of how terrorist activity is financed in Afghanistan, with a special focus on the publicly available information about how the Haqqani network is financed, and finally a summary of the legal structure in place in Afghanistan to combat terrorist financing.

Terrorist Financing in Afghanistan

Afghanistan produces more opium than any other country in the world,²⁸ and it is no secret that there is a direct connection between opium and terrorism. In 2011, for the first time in three years, opium production in Afghanistan increased. Opium production is currently equal to at least 15 % of Afghanistan's GDP.²⁹ In 2011 the number of Afghan provinces involved in opium production

²¹ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2011/09/23/us-pakistan-usa-haqqani-idUSTRE78M1T420110923> (last visited May 14, 2012)

²² <http://www.foxnews.com/world/2011/06/29/death-toll-in-brazen-afghan-hotel-raid-rises-to-10/> (last visited May 8, 2012)

²³ <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/aug/19/taliban-hits-british-council-kabul> (last visited May 8, 2012)

²⁴ <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/14/world/asia/14afghanistan.html?pagewanted=all> (last visited May 8, 2012)

²⁵ Rabbani was assassinated by a "turban bomber" (a suicide bomber with explosives concealed in his turban). <http://www.economist.com/node/21531042> (last visited May 8, 2012)

²⁶ <http://www.npr.org/2012/04/16/150706631/haqqani-network-blamed-for-afghan-attacks> (last visited May 8, 2012). There were 5 separate attacks launched at the same time in Kabul, with one of the largest attacks ever since the war began in 2001.

²⁷ <http://www.charlotteobserver.com/2012/05/02/3212895/taliban-bombers-attack-kabul-hours.html> (last visited May 8, 2012)

²⁸ In 2011 Afghanistan produced 82 % of the world's opium. UNODC Afghanistan Opium Survey 2011, at page 3 <http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/ORASreport2011.pdf>,

²⁹ Id at page 77

also increased, from 14 to 17.³⁰ According to the UNODC, “Ninety-five percent of the Afghanistan cultivation took place in nine provinces in the Southern and Western regions – the most insecure provinces in the country.”³¹ The lack of security in areas where insurgents are active, coupled with a sharp rise in the price of opium,³² has substantially increased the sums available to terrorist and insurgent groups involved in the Afghan drug trade. Money is made from the cultivation, sale, transportation, and “taxing” of drug operations by insurgent groups.

Terrorists and insurgents are not only funded by the drug trade, however. According to the United States Treasury Department, a significant portion of the funding for Afghan terrorist activities comes from donors, primarily located in the Gulf of Arabia.³³

Other sources funding terrorist activity in Afghanistan include smuggling of goods and cash, kidnapping, fraud, money laundering, and corruption.³⁴

Financing the Haqqani

The Haqqani have been fundraising and recruiting fighters in the Gulf of Arabia since the late 1970’s to support insurgency in the region.³⁵ Some of the

³⁰ Id at page 6

³¹ Id at page 6

³² In 2010 the opium crop in Afghanistan was significantly reduced due to a fungus that attacked the opium poppies. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8679203.stm>(last visited May 8, 2012). Because of the decrease in supply, by the end of 2010 the price of opium rose by 164 % over the 2009 price. In 2011, the price rose 43% over the 2010 price. http://www.unodc.org/documents/crop-monitoring/Afghanistan/ORAS_report_2011.pdf, at page 5

³³ “If you look at the Taliban, I think we recognize that the Taliban is funded really from two principal sources, in part, from donations that come from outside of Afghanistan, largely from the Gulf but not exclusively from the Gulf. And then there's another significant portion of the Taliban's funding that comes from a sort of working off of the drug trade, whether extorting the moving of the drugs or the farmers. So, you know, we -- and I think we're working on both of those problems, right, so within Afghanistan on the drug, it's not so much the Treasury Department's, although we do the kingpin designations which has some affect. But there's also through the ATFC [*Afghan Threat Finance Cell, a “fusion” center operated by the United States Departments of Treasury and Defense, in combination with the US Drug Enforcement Administration*], in particular, a lot of focus on attacking the drug trade within Afghanistan and in that way trying to reduce the funding that the Taliban gets and then from external sources as we tighten our grip on these funding sources from the Gulf, it has a positive effect, both on the funding that the Taliban gets, as well as the funding for groups in the border region, whether it's al Qaeda there or the Haqqani Network or the other groups that are operating there”. Interview of David Cohen, Assistant Secretary For Terrorist Financing, U.S. Department Of The Treasury, at the Council of Foreign Relations, January 28, 2010. <http://www.cfr.org/money-laundering/tackling-terrorist-financing/p21339>(last visited May 8, 2012)

³⁴ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, November 2011, IMF Country Report No. 11/317, at pg 15, <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2011/cr11317.pdf>

³⁵ Don Rassler and Vahid Brown, *The Haqqani Nexus and the Evolution of al-Qa’ida*, The Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, 2011, at pg 19

public information about how the Haqqani network is financed comes from the Wikileaks cables. According to published reports of a United States Embassy cable dated January 7, 2010 (a cable related to information obtained from the United Arab Emirates), the Haqqani and related Taliban interests are involved in fundraising in the Gulf region, drug trafficking, extortion, and operating businesses in the United Arab Emirates.³⁶ The cable also indicated that the Taliban were receiving direct support with drug smuggling from the government of Iran.³⁷ Other sources indicate that the Haqqani also raise money directly from mosques in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and from kidnappings for ransom.³⁸ A recent report of the Congressional Research Service concluded that there is reason to believe US foreign aid has also been channelled from contractors in Afghanistan to the insurgency.³⁹

Several members of the Haqqani network who have been identified as high level fundraisers and financial managers have recently been captured, including Mali Khan⁴⁰ (a senior commander and business manager) and Nasiruddin Haqqani, the son of Jalaluddin Haqqani, and an important fundraiser for the Haqqani.⁴¹ Members of the Haqqani Network, including Jalaluddin, Sirajuddin, and Nasiruddin Haqqani, have been placed by the United States on the Specially Designated Nationals List (SDNL), one of many terrorism-related lists maintained by the United States.⁴² Once listed on the SDNL, any assets held by them in the United States are frozen, and their ability to act through Western global financial networks is curtailed or terminated. This does not, however,

³⁶ “He stated that the Taliban receives significant money from narcotics trafficking and extortion, but noted that the U.S. believes that the group also receives significant funds from the Gulf, particularly from donors in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. He further stated that the Taliban and Haqqani Network are believed to earn money from UAE-based business interests... SSD [United Arab Emirates State Security Department] officials discussed the Taliban and Haqqani Network's suspected use of front companies to raise and movemoney.”<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/242756> (last visited May 9, 2012)

³⁷ “Officials from SSD added that Iran supports the Taliban with money and weapons, helps the Taliban smuggle drugs, and facilitates the movement of Taliban and al-Qaida members. SSD officials stated that Iran's IRGC and navy are involved with these activities.”<http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/us-embassy-cables-documents/242756> (last visited May 8, 2012)

³⁸ http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2010/06/03/inside_the_haqqani_network_0 (last visited May 14, 2012)

³⁹ Wartime Contracting in Afghanistan: Analysis and Issues for Congress, Congressional Research Service, November 14, 2011, at pg 5-6, <http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/R42084.pdf>(last visited May 14, 2012)

⁴⁰ http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/10/10/the_capture_of_mali_khan

⁴¹ <http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2010/12/23/pakistan-arrests-nasiruddin-haqqani-key-taliban-leader.html>(last visited May 14, 2012)

⁴² <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/sanctions/SDN-List/Pages/default.aspx>(last visited May 8, 2012)

necessarily interfere with an individual's ability to obtain or transfer funds through traditional hawala networks.⁴³

While individual members of the Haqqani network are listed on the SDNL, and despite their involvement in continued attacks in Afghanistan noted above, the Haqqani network itself has not been designated as a foreign terrorist organization⁴⁴ by the United States State Department.⁴⁵ Pressure for such a designation is mounting in the United States.⁴⁶ The State Department continues to review the prospect of designating the Haqqani network as a foreign terrorist organization.⁴⁷ If the Haqqani were designated as such, the United States would have additional civil and criminal jurisdiction to pursue Haqqani interests.⁴⁸ The exact reason for refusing to designate the Haqqani network is not publicly available at this time. It is possible that the United States does not believe it can broker a peace process in Afghanistan without including the Haqqani, and designating them as a terrorist organization would proscribe their inclusion. It is also possible that designating the Haqqani network as a terrorist organization would further complicate relationships with Pakistan, given the connections that are believed to exist between the Haqqani and the ISI.⁴⁹

Afghan Legal Framework to Interdict Terrorist Financing

Afghanistan has a number of legal instruments enacted to help prevent terrorism:

- the Law on the Campaign against Financing Terrorism (2004).⁵⁰ Article 3 of the Terrorism Finance Law criminalizes certain activities related to funding terrorism;⁵¹

⁴³ For a discussion of hawala banking, see: <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/FinCEN-Hawala-rpt.pdf>

⁴⁴ <http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/other/des/123085.htm> (last visited May 14, 2012)

⁴⁵ <http://www.mcclatchydc.com/2011/09/26/125323/pressure-grows-for-listing-haqqanis.html>

⁴⁶ <http://www.businessweek.com/news/2012-05-11/terrorist-label-sought-for-pakistan-based-haqqani-network>(last visited May 14, 2012)

⁴⁷ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/dpb/2012/05/189753.htm#PAKISTAN> (last visited May 14, 2012)

⁴⁸ <http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/09/146554.htm> (last visited May 14, 2012)

⁴⁹ For a discussion of one perspective why the Haqqani network is not on the foreign terrorist organization list, see <http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/136974/audrey-kurth-cronin/why-the-haqqani-network-is-not-on-the-foreign-terrorist-organiza?page=show> (last visited May 14, 2012)

⁵⁰ An Introduction to the Law of Afghanistan, Third Edition (2012), at pg 207, <http://alep.stanford.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/02/Intro-Book-3d-Edition.pdf> . This publication is one of the most authoritative discussions of the current state of the law in Afghanistan, and was produced by the Afghanistan Legal Education Program at Stanford Law School.

⁵¹ “Article 3: Any person commits the offense of the financing of terrorism who by any means, directly or indirectly, unlawfully and wilfully, provides or collects funds and property, or tries to provide or collect funds and property, or provides or tries to provide financial or other services with the intention that they should be used or in the knowledge that they are to be used, in full or in part, in order to carry out. . . any act intended to cause death or serious bodily injury to a civilian, or to any other person not taking an active part in the hostilities in a situation of armed

- the Law on the Campaign against Bribery and Administrative Corruption (2004);⁵²
- the Law on the Campaign against Money Laundering and Its Proceeds (2004);⁵³
- the Counter-Narcotics Law (adopted in 2003, replaced by an amended version in 2006).⁵⁴

Both Afghanistan and the United States have agencies involved in the interdiction and prevention of terrorist financing in Afghanistan. One of the groups in the forefront of this effort is the Afghan Threat Finance Cell (ATFC), an interagency task force comprised of the elements of many United States agencies; the composition of the task force varies from time to time. Currently the Drug Enforcement Administration, the Department of Homeland Security, the Internal Revenue Service, the Department of the Treasury and the Department of Defense are part of the ATFC.⁵⁵ The ATFC works with Afghan counterparts, like the Sensitive Investigations Unit and the Financial Reports and Analysis Centre of Afghanistan (FinTRACA) to investigate and interdict terrorist financing.⁵⁶ The ATFC has been recognized as an exceptionally effective unit in finding and disrupting terrorist financing in Afghanistan.⁵⁷

In 2011, a comprehensive report about Afghanistan's anti-money laundering and counter-terrorist financing measures (AML/CFT) was produced by the International Monetary Fund.⁵⁸ This report (IMF Report) identifies twenty-seven major deficiencies in Afghanistan's efforts to combat AML/CFT. However, a concise summary of those deficiencies is beyond the scope of this article. Some of the major findings of the IMF Report include:

- the Law on the Campaign against Financing Terrorism and the Law on the Campaign against Money Laundering and Its Proceeds, adopted by Presidential Decree in 2004, have yet to be formally approved by the Afghan Parliament;
- the Law on the Campaign against Financing Terrorism "criminalizes the provision and collection of funds for the commission of a terrorist

conflict, when the purpose of such act, by its nature or context, is to intimidate a population, or to compel a government or an international organization to do or abstain from doing any act."

⁵² An Introduction to the Law of Afghanistan, Third Edition (2012), at pg 207

⁵³ An Introduction to the Law of Afghanistan, Third Edition (2012), at pg 208

⁵⁴ Id

⁵⁵ The ATFC was involved in investigating the Kabul Bank scandal, uncovering bank fraud of over \$900,000,000.00. http://www.newyorker.com/reporting/2011/02/14/110214fa_fact_filkins (last visited May 14, 2012)

⁵⁶ Id. See also http://kabul.usembassy.gov/st_040110.html (last visited May 14, 2012)

⁵⁷ <http://www.ketknbc.com/news/dea-afghanistan-unit-receives-prestigious-joint-chiefs-of-staff-award> (last visited May 14, 2012)

⁵⁸ Islamic Republic of Afghanistan: Detailed Assessment Report on Anti-Money Laundering and Combating the Financing of Terrorism, November 2011, IMF Country Report No. 11/317

act. It does not, however, criminalize the collection of funds and their provision to terrorist individuals or terrorist organizations”;⁵⁹

- the legal framework in place in Afghanistan to freeze terrorist assets is insufficient;
- FINTRACA, Afghanistan’s AML/CFT unit, has structural and logistical issues that prevent it from effectively carrying out its functions;
- hawaladars are effectively unregulated in several of the provinces where the insurgency is the strongest. This allows persons in those provinces to bypass financial controls on financial transactions imposed by the central government;
- there is insufficient transparency of the control and ownership of corporations and other businesses;
- there is little or no effective control over non-profit organizations, many of which are being used to fund terrorist activities;
- Afghanistan offers very little mutual legal assistance to other countries that are trying to investigate AML/CFT in Afghanistan.

Afghanistan is faced with many challenges in dealing with terrorist financing in general, and even more when dealing with the finances of the Haqqani network. For Afghanistan to be in a position to effectively interdict the finances of the Haqqani, it will (at a least) have to significantly improve its criminal justice system to address the factors identified in the IMF Report, and it will have to do so soon, while the International Security Assistance Force – in which both Hungary and the United States participate – is still available to help provide security.

⁵⁹ Id at pg 8

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE „ARAB SPRING” – WHAT HAS CHANGED ONE YEAR AFTER?

„If there is trouble in Africa,
there is trouble in the world.”¹

Abstract

One year after the „Arab Spring” the southern areas of the Mediterranean remain unstable and fragile. The essay explores the European Union’ response to the events of the „Arab Spring” and its renewed policy toward the Southern-Mediterranean region to deliver support for transition to democracy and work closely with partner governments. The problem increasingly affects the security in the European continent. The „Arab Spring” literally presented a big opportunity, but at the same time, a challenge to the new common security and defense policy of the EU, too. The „Arab Spring” and events in the Southern Mediterranean in 2011 further highlight the need for a coherent and comprehensive EU migration policy. So it lists the goals and names the tools and measures required for it; at the same time watching the synergies between the Union, the Mediterranean region and other regional initiatives. The European Union has given a promise, and some kind of change has started in the affected countries...

Keywords: The European Union, the „Arab Spring”, the Lisbon Treaty: security, defence, migration and neighbourhood policy

“I often read the above quote in writings dealing with Africa.² This is thought-provoking quote... How true is the above statement while examining, for example, the events in the European Union (hereinafter the EU, Union or Community) and the „Arab Spring”, or in the period afterwards? Did truly revolutionary changes happen in the affected countries? How did the events test the Union’s common foreign, security and defense policies that came into effect after the Treaty of Lisbon? Did fundamental changes happen to the plans affecting the area of the Community? Anyway, one thing is true after examining the uncertain questions about the consequences of the events, namely that what happened in this region came unexpectedly to the Europeans.”

A little bit of the distant past...

In the literature dealing with Africa, the number of attributives which the authors apply to the continent is innumerable. It is the “forgotten,” the “lost,” the

¹ Said by Gábor Búr, a historian, security policy and Africa-expert, editor of the journal *Africa Studies*.

² The present writing is based on a former study of the author: *Európa és Afrika*. In.: *Európai Tükör* 2010. február pp. 78-88.

“sick,” the “black”, the “undervalued” continent of the “extremes,” just to mention a few. Which of them fits the best? I think that the content behind these attributives (events, people, occurrences) shows that Africa is a continent of diversity, and because of this, the African ways and directions of historical development and the differences in “orientation” hold the answer in themselves.

The first such direction is the “chance given by history” itself, meaning the trade between the two “sides.” The continent used to be valuable to the Europeans in the past as well, and it increased its worth until today, even though the reasons are different.³ According to the security policy expert György Nógrádi, Africa is important today because all interested parties want to seize the rich mineral resources that can be found there or sell their own unneeded export goods.⁴ From among the raw materials, oil and gas stand out, but practically every mineral that can be found in its earth is important.⁵ Europe, especially the European Communities (the predecessor of the European Union) had particular connections with Africa since the beginning. The tasks it undertook were also particular: economic and trade cooperation, as well as aid programs, in which it took the role of organizer and the moderator as well.⁶

The second direction is relatively “new,” this is the hard-to-interpret, but very important field of humanitarian intervention. Without being exhaustive, I would like to refer to the aid work of the European Commission to substantiate the “orientation,” for example that it handles the “forgotten crises” with priority. What does this mean? These are crises where the fundamental needs were not addressed because of the lack of attention from donors. For example, the situation of the Saharan refugees in Algeria is a “forgotten crisis,” as well as the conflict in Chechnya; the separatist conflict in India between Jammu and Kashmir; the conflicts in Nepal, Myanmar (Burma) and Colombia.⁷ In these cases the support reached 59 million Euros. The parts that were regionally set apart from humanitarian aid in 2007 reach 13%. One of the fundamentally important political steps was the Declaration, based on the the communiqué titled “Towards an European consensus concerning humanitarian aid,” that was adopted in 2007 about and European consensus on humanitarian aid. Here the

³ For further details, see: Búr Gábor: *Miért szegény Afrika?* http://www.publikon.com/applicatin/essay/168_1.pdf (Downloaded: 2010. 01.10.)

⁴ Interview with György Nógrádi on 2009.05.02.; *Afrika, az elfelejtett kontinens.* <http://www.honvedelem.hu> (Downloaded: 2010. 01.05.)

⁵ I highlight the use of just one mined mineral that is important to my topic and returns on page 5: coltan. In Congo, mining of coltan (columbite-tantalite, used in cellphones) lead not only to bloody fighting, but also the decrease in numbers of the gorillas, who are threatened with extinction, because the open-pit mining physically destroyed important living areas. http://bankwatch.org/documents/extractives_mining_HU.pdf (Downloaded: 2010. 01.10.)

⁶ In more detail about this see Benkes Mihály: *Az afrikai biztonság a 20-21. század fordulóján.* In.: *Biztonságpolitikai kézikönyv.* Edited by Péter Deák. Osiris Kézikönyvek, Budapest, 2007. pp. 440-441.

⁷ Ibid.

Commission used the experiences acquired from former crises, as well as from its wide-reaching consultations conducted with the affected and the member states.

This “orientation” has a strategic importance to my topic, because the European Union – in parallel with the growth of its economic weight – has shaped its own foreign and security policy. Thus, it can comment – and respond – on the stage of world politics in a unified way. In the 1990’s, the regional conflicts that arose in Europe and other parts of the world and the advance of terrorism urged the leaders of the Union to come to the conclusion that they had to create tools for official diplomacy⁸ and intervention⁹ for the Union.

I consider the third form a constant “orientation,” the management of poverty and migration. The Union provides this help in multiple forms: it cooperates directly with governments, it conducts individual programs (often not through governmental organizations), it distributes humanitarian aid, and it helps to prevent crises and supports civil society. It contributes to the general and sectoral budgets of partner states, with an increased proportion of the aid to support the local owners.¹⁰ It also uses the developmental cooperation to facilitate the observation of human rights and gender equality, and what is important to my topic, to prevent conflicts.

It is interesting to see that today, one year after the beginning of the „Arab Spring”, the European Union spends 2.3 billion Euros within the framework of the European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument for maintaining the region of peace, stability and welfare.¹¹ In 2012, the sums to help the democratic change in the countries affected by the „Arab Spring” come from these funds.¹²

I think that this “orientation” can be changed, like those mentioned before, by globalization itself and the factor of interdependence. Good examples for this are the areas of environmental protection and energy. The latter hit the Union hard because of the changes in North Africa. From this follows that the interest of the European Union is to lower its dependency on a few suppliers,

⁸ Its basis is „soft power,” helping conflict-solving and mutual understanding between the parties with various tools. For more details see: *Speaking with one voice*. http://europa.eu/pol/cfsp/index_en.htm (Downloaded: 2010.01.05.)

⁹ These tools are the “visible tools”: The person of the High Representative, the realization of the battle group-concept.

¹⁰ Through the years, the European Union financed many thousand development projects in the third world. Many cases prove that even a low amount of money is often good for many things. Here are a few successful actions from the recent past. For example, farmers received funds to expand production in the central region of Cameroon; or in Uganda, agricultural small producers were trained to share the costs of the use of basic business support.

¹¹ For details see: http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/2012/budget_folder/print/186978_2011_4429_EU_BUDGET_2012_HU.pdf (Downloaded: 2012.03.23.)

¹² The Union contributes 2.6 billion Dollars to the alleviation of poverty and the building of democracies from the Development Cooperation Instrument. For more details see: <http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid> (Downloaded: 2012.03.23.)

and needs to deepen its relationships with those that are also dependent on the EU as partners in trade and cooperate on the basis of mutual benefit. The strategy of the Union is extended to countries such as Russia, which is an important source of fossil fuel and (potentially) electricity, as well as to North-Africa, the Persian Gulf region and the oil and gas producers of Central Asia, for ensuring cooperation in investment, transfer of technology, mutual access to markets, and predictability of trade relationships.¹³

“The Treaty of Lisbon clearly states that the reduction and the eradication of poverty is the primary objective of the Union’s development cooperation policy. This goal must be respected when the Union implements policies likely to affect developing countries. This implies also that development policy is a policy in its own right, and not an accessory of common foreign and security policy. In case of urgent financial aid, the Council will act by qualified majority upon a proposal from the Commission. This should mean quicker financial aid in the future. The Treaty of Lisbon classifies development cooperation and humanitarian aid as “shared parallel competences”: this means that the Union conducts an autonomous policy, which neither prevents the Member States from exercising their competences nor makes the Union’s policy merely “complementary” to those of the Member States.”¹⁴

The main partner of the Union in the management of African conflicts, especially in the 21st century, remains the African Union, but there are “signs that cast a shadow on the Euro-African cooperation.”¹⁵ According to Mihály Benkes, the Union leaves no doubt that this happens to further its own interests and to extend its values, as well as to help reach a durable solution. However, the African crises should be solved by the Africans themselves. “Many things need to change on the continent so that the 21st century can be Africa’s century, meaning that its lag behind the world does not grow, but decreases.” – thinks Gábor Búr. According to him, the most important out of all the mentioned factors is by far the prevalence of the theory of good governance: without this, the amount of aid could grow exponentially (it won’t), and nothing would happen at all, everything would stay the same. Africa would stay the poorest continent, without any hope of catching up.¹⁶

So the question rightly arises: what theories should prevail after the „revolutionary” events of the „Arab Spring” so that real revolutionary changes can happen in Africa?

¹³ From *The EU’s role in the world*. <http://ec.europa.eu/publications/booklets/move/67/hu.doc> (Downloaded: 2010.01.05.)

¹⁴ http://europa.eu/lisbon_treaty/faq/index_en.htm#12 (Downloaded: 2011.01.09.)

¹⁵ Benkes Mihály: *Az afrikai biztonság a 20-21. század fordulóján*, In.: *Biztonságpolitikai kézikönyv*. Edited by Deák Péter, Osiris Kézikönyvek, Budapest, 2007, p. 458.

¹⁶ Búr Gábor i.m.

... and of the recent past

The series of uprisings started in December of 2010 and February 2011¹⁷ in Tunisia and spread to, just to mention a few examples, Egypt, Libya, Yemen, Bahrain and Syria, while creating great waves in the international relations.¹⁸ The speed of the events and the accompanying developments – as I said before – came as a surprise to the European countries and to the institutions of the European Union.

In this unusual situation, everyone was insecure: the High Representative herself¹⁹ was insecure, but a unified response from the Union was missing too. Of course the Community, as an organization, and the member states individually involved themselves in the management of the conflicts. We saw exceptionally strong commitment from France and the United Kingdom.

We can consider Catherine Ashton's lecture in Washington in 2011 as an analytic summary of the events, from which it became clear that the revolts did not happen consecutively, but almost simultaneously. Furthermore it is clear that while examining the events, we come across three distinctive groups of countries.²⁰

The goal of my writing is not to describe the events mentioned above or justify the classification in detail; I only want to show the complexity of the problem. According to this, one of the groups consists, for example, of Tunisia and Egypt, because the most serious changes happened there. The people faced their own political system, the corruption; they understood the importance of economic reforms. These changes may seem slow at first, but the cause of this lies in the complexity of the special political systems of the Arab states.²¹ "A psychological wall fell down in the Arab world that can only be compared to the

¹⁷ The goal of the analysis is not to present the whole series of uprisings; only those events, actors, and documents that are relevant to the topic will be mentioned. A few of the expert writers on the issue: Erzsébet N. Rózsa, László Csicsman, Gyula Gazdik, László Tüske, János Besenyő, Gábor Búr.

¹⁸ Gazdag Ferenc: *Mérlegen a 2011-es magyar EU-elnökség*. In.: Nemzet és Biztonság, 2011. December, p. 82

¹⁹ Catherine Ashton's visit in Tunisia in 2011. February remains ineffective. For more details see: Christian Platzer: *Az EU biztonsági stratégiája és Észak-Afrika*, In.: Nemzet és Biztonság 2011. December, p. 15.

²⁰ Multiple experts talk about the grouping of the countries, most of the time the justifications for the divisions are around the same at the base. For more details see: Besenyő János: "Arab Tavasz"-politikai rendszerváltás az észak-afrikai arab államokban. <http://www.kul-vilag.hu/2011/04/besenyoy.pdf> 9-10.. (Downloaded: 2012.03.21.) Another resource: N. Rózsa Erzsébet: *Az arab tavasz tüntetesei sikeres katonai puccsok voltak*. MTI, <http://m.mno.hu/belfold/az-arab-tavasz-tuntetesei-siker-es-katonai-puccsok-voltak-1032170> (Downloaded: 20.03.23.)

²¹ For more details see: Tüske László-N. Rózsa Erzsébet: *Jázmin forradalom avagy egy új korszak kezdete a Közel-Keleten?* MKI-elemzések, 2011/2. p. 5

collapse of the colonial system of the sixties.” – wrote a Qatari political scientist.²²

The membership of the second group consists of for example Syria and Libya, where the violence brought radical change and chaos. In Libya, overthrow of Gaddafi was only really possible through a war. This led to thousands of refugees and ten thousands in prisons. The fact that the Union opened a liaison office in Benghazi, the city thought to be the fortress of the insurgents, shows the severity of the situation.

Morocco and Jordan may belong to the third group, where we don't know much about the reforms.

The reaction of the European Union

The hardest critique on the EU reaction to the events of the „Arab Spring” was formulated by its member states themselves. More exactly, in the end of 2011, 12 member states of the EU wrote a polite, but critical letter to Lady Catherine Ashton. They strongly criticized the work of the organizations responsible for the foreign and security policy matters, which they deemed to be too bureaucratic, and to have a bad leadership. C. Ashton's tasks according to the Treaty of Lisbon: “The High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, who shall chair the Foreign Affairs Council, shall contribute through his proposals towards the preparation of the common foreign and security policy and shall ensure implementation of the decisions adopted by the European Council and the Council.”²³ The office of the high representative is responsible for the communication with countries outside of the Union. The External Action Service has no own budget though, the work abroad is financed by the European Commission. The working structure of the External Action Service was developed by May 2011, said Pierre Vimont,²⁴ and 3,700 people were employed by the Service, 1,700 among them in the center in Brussels. He also said that the financing of the External Action Service is a separate item in the EU budget; the Service disposed over 480 million Euro in 2011, from which 180 million went to the center.²⁵ The critique of the foreign ministers also applied to the High Representative herself, in a personal tone. Independently from that, Ashton denied the truth of the critical comments about her office in a 14-page compilation. According to her, no systematic error was made in the

²² Seres Attila: *Jázminos forradalom*. http://www.nol.hu/velemeney/20110118-jazminos_forradalom (Downloaded: 2011.12.12.)

²³ Treaty of Lisbon amending the Treaty on European Union and the Treaty establishing the European Community, signed at Lisbon, 13 December 2007. Article 30/a. <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/JOHtml.do?uri=OJ:C:2007:306:SOM:EN:HTML> (Downloaded: 2012.03.28)

²⁴ Secretary General of the External Action Service.

²⁵ MTI: A tagországok bíralták Ashtont. <http://www.galamus.hu/index.php?option=comcontent&view=article&id=67925> (Downloaded: 2012. 03.23.)

line-up.²⁶ In all cases, it is a fact that the work of the new office was significantly made more difficult by the financial crisis and the events of the „Arab Spring”.

Why? The answer is not easy, but it is in the now existing foreign and security policy that is ”common” only in its name. The EU, reacting to the changes of the 1990’s, adopted measures to deepen the integration. The Treaty of Maastricht is definitely a milestone in this respect. The security policy theories brought tangible results practically at the same time as the first steps taken in the practice, for example, the European Security Strategy adopted in 2003. If we think back to the first pages of my writing, the orientations shown there can be exactly followed through in this Strategy. Namely, the economic relationships, the solidarity, the energy sector; moreover the dependency of Europe is continuously growing in this area. The social, poverty problems that cause political instability – not to mention bad governance – lead straight to the breakdown of the affected country, to internal conflicts, and even to the failure of the state. Moreover, these problems are in the neighbourhood of Europe, and therefore mean direct danger to the security of the Union. The Strategy states that “...weak states where organized crime flourishes, dysfunctional societies or exploding population growth on its borders all pose problems for Europe.”²⁷ The goals for the Mediterranean region are worth of a separate mention: “The European Union's interests require a continued engagement with Mediterranean partners, through more effective economic, security and cultural cooperation in the framework of the Barcelona Process. A broader engagement with the Arab World should also be considered.”²⁸ Reference is made to the new challenges emerging in our quickly changing world, and if we want to “...build a secure Europe in a better world; we must do more to shape events.

And we must do it now.”²⁹ The time was exactly the „Arab Spring”.

How did the events influence the security and defense policy (from now on: CSDP) already valid after the Treaty of Lisbon?

The CSDP and its possibilities

The „Arab Spring” literally presented a big opportunity, but at the same time, a challenge to the new common security and defense policy, too. Without describing the whole chronology of the events, we can state that after the events started on the 16th of February 2011, on the 21st of March the Council on Foreign Relations announced that the European Union was ready for

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ European Security Strategy, p 35. <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf> (Downloaded: 2012. 01.10.)

²⁸ Ibid. p. 36.

²⁹ Ibid. p. 28.

humanitarian aid, if the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs gave a request for it. The UN Secretary General was informed of this by the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. “Ashton’s letter was a kind of encouragement so that the UN would require the help of the Union.” – said an EU diplomat back then in Brussels.³⁰ The truth is that the one year that has passed is not enough to draw long-term consequences, but it is enough to ascertain whether something has moved ahead in the Common Security and Foreign Policy of the EU. Let’s see it thematically.

One of the most important challenges to the foreign and security policy – which became obvious at the beginning of the events – is the question of refugees.³¹ The European Commission’s renewed „Global Approach to Migration and Mobility” (GAMM) material from the November of 2011 starts with the following statement: “...migration is now firmly at the top of the European Union’s political agenda. The „Arab Spring” and events in the southern Mediterranean in 2011 further highlight the need for a coherent and comprehensive migration policy for the EU.”³²

In conclusion, I highlight only the part relevant to our topic: “Firstly, Mobility Partnerships will be offered to the EU’s immediate Neighbourhood and to Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt in the first instance. Mobility partnerships offer a concrete framework for dialogue and cooperation between the EU and non-EU countries. These partnerships are focused on facilitating and organizing legal migration, effective and humane measures to address irregular migration, and concrete steps towards reinforcing the development outcomes of migration. Concluding visa facilitation and readmission agreements are to be part of these partnerships.”³³

The other equally important field is the management of the problem of poverty. It has been the basis of the EU’s global role in all times, and also in the future, the aid and development policy will be its unchanged, important segments. The EU seeks to address and find solutions to challenges of climate change, terrorism, drugs, energy policy, etc. In this area, the actions of the External Action Service, the Union delegations in many parts of the world and

³⁰ MTI: *Az EU kész hadműveletekre Líbiában.*
http://zipp.hu/kulfold/2011/04/09/az_eu_kesz_hadmuveletekre_libiaban (Downloaded: 2012.03.21.)

³¹ Nick Vaughan-Williams: *European Border Security after the „Arab Spring”.* p.4 One fact among many: Between the February and March of 2011, 25,000 illegal immigrants arrived on the island of Lampedusa (Italy.) http://www.eugrasp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/EU-GRASP_workingpaper24.pdf(Downloaded: 2012.03.30.)

³² Nick Vaughan-Williams: *European Border Security after the „Arab Spring”.* p.4
<http://www.eugrasp.eu/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/EU-GRASPworkingpaper24.pdf>
(Downloaded: 2012.03.20.)

³³ *Stronger cooperation and mobility at the center of the renewed EU migration strategy.*
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/1369&type=HTML> (Downloaded: 2012.03.22.)

the European Commission itself meant a serious contribution to the strengthening of the image of an authentic “global player.”

The new and ambitious European Neighbourhood Policy is built on the above. The policy itself exists since 2004, but taking the events of the „Arab Spring” into consideration, C. Ashton and the European Commission accepted the new document on the 24th of May 2011. The further deepening of the relationships was recorded in the document, as well as the monetary aid and the increasing of accountability.³⁴ C. Ashton summed up in this: „With so much of our Neighbourhood in a process of democratic change, this review is more important than ever. It is vital that we in the EU make a comprehensive offer to our neighbours and build with them lasting partnerships to reinforce deep and lasting democracy and promote economic prosperity”.³⁵

The EU is committed in both the short and long term to help its partners address two main challenges in particular:

Firstly, to build “deep democracy”: not only writing democratic constitutions but creating and sustaining an independent judiciary, a thriving free press, etc. Secondly, to ensure sustainable economic growth and development, without which democracy will not take root. To sum up, the EU will support each country on a differentiated basis, thus ensuring that individual needs and priorities are taken into consideration.

„EU support focuses on the "3 Ms": Money, Mobility and Markets.”³⁶

In conclusion, it is worth to take a look at how the European Union itself evaluated the past year, or what particular steps they have taken to assure the stability of the North-African region, which will have a big effect on the close and far neighbourhoods.

Štefan Füle, Commissioner for Enlargement and Neighbourhood Policy held a speech at the “The „Arab Spring” – one year on“ conference on the 3rd of March 2012 in Munich.³⁷ In his words he addressed the dramatic events of last year, emphasizing its truly “revolutionary” changes (Tunisia); the good direction, but the multitude of tasks left (Algeria); and he also mentioned the unacceptable direction of changes (Syria). These examples show that the countries still have much to do, but the European Union can offer help.

³⁴ For more details see: http://www.eeas.europa.eu/top_stories/2011/250511_en.htm (Downloaded: 2012.03.24.)

³⁵ Ibid.

³⁶ *The EU's response to the '„Arab Spring”*.
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/11/918&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (Downloaded: 2012.03.24.)

³⁷ The full speech is available on the following website:
<http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/12/66&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en> (Downloaded: 2012.03. 23.)

He emphasized that „there can be no return to complacency towards authoritarian regimes. The European Union stands behind the forces of change and modernization.”³⁸ He reaffirmed the "3M's"³⁹, but now the EU is able to help in other areas as well (such as transport, energy and information technologies, in addition, the EU is a key partner for in organizing and monitoring elections.)

But what will the future be?

First, the commitment of the Union in the region doesn't last only until the first elections.

Second, the Community cooperates with the new leaders, supports them in implementing the already started reforms. And last, because no democratic change can be imagined without the necessary changes in the civil society, the strengthening of this area is also a task. The governments have to cooperate with the civil society, furthermore with the parliament, the business sector, and the media. Only the existence of these guarantees further positive changes.

Conclusion

The European Council – on 2nd March, 2012 – set the European Union's priorities for the forthcoming G20 meeting (April, 2012) and UNRio+20 Conference, with particular emphasis on growth-enhancing measures and reform. It took stock of the developments concerning the „Arab Spring” and set guidance for the future EU actions to support that process.⁴⁰

“The EU is promoting and supporting the democratic transformation in its southern neighbourhood and across the wider Middle East and Gulf region. It remains committed to developing partnerships with the southern neighbourhood countries, based on differentiation, mutual accountability and the adherence to universal values, including the protection of religious minorities (including Christians).”⁴¹

And what does this concretely mean?

In this regard, the European Commission and the High Representative received a request to work out a schedule until the end of the year, which will include the EU policy in connection with the South-Mediterranean partners: it

³⁸ In the same place.

³⁹ Money: Between 2011 and 2013 € billion extra will be given for the Neighbourhood as a whole on top of the €5.7 billion that are already programmed. Mobility: ...there are over 740 additional Erasmus Mundus mobility grants for academic exchange with Southern Mediterranean countries this academic year. Markets: "Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreements" with Egypt, Tunisia, Morocco and Jordan, (and then Tunisia?). Read more in the same place.

⁴⁰ *Conclusions of the European Council*. p. 2. (Downloaded: 2012. 03.25.)

<http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/en/12/st00/st00004.en12.pdf>

⁴¹ *Ibid* p. 11.

lists the goals and names the tools and measures required for it; at the same time watching the synergies between the Union, the Mediterranean region and other regional initiatives. The European Union gave a promise, and some kind of change has started in the affected countries...

To sum up, the question is, what way those who are affected and standing before further reforms (not only in social, but also economic and political sense), will turn, in front of the sign showing the possibilities?



⁴² The picture can be found on: http://ec.europa.eu/europeaid/infopoint/documents6presentations/presentation_07-12-2011_en.pdf (Downloaded: 2012.03.23.)

CURRENT ISSUES

Zoltán VÖRÖS political scientist

THE ACHILLES' HEEL OF THE CHINESE OIL CONSUMPTION

Abstract

China's oil consumption constantly rises since the economic reforms and the growth is seemingly unstoppable, the country's oil consumption grows by 7.5% per year, and the ability to provide its own needs is limited. To fuel its economy China imports from various oil exporters of the world, among the biggest are Saudi-Arabia, Angola, Iran, Oman, Iraq, Sudan and Russia. Although Beijing imports oil via pipelines from Russia and Central Asia, approximately the 80% of the imports arrive on China's most important trade route on the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. The paper focuses on this Sea Line of Communication (SLOC), describes the challenges Beijing's trade has to face on the sea routes from the African Coast or from the Middle East until the shipment can reach the Chinese ports.

Keywords: *China, South China Sea, Oil, Economy, Strait of Malacca, Strait of Hormuz, Indian Ocean, String of Pearls Project, Piracy, Geopolitics, Horn of Africa*

Introduction

China's demand for oil is around 9.7 million barrels per day (bpd) in the first quarter of 2012, of which 6 million bpd need to be imported. The country's oil consumption constantly rises since the economic reforms of Deng Xiaoping and reached alarming levels in the past few years: since 1993 China is unable to cover its needs from its own resources and became an oil exporter country and since the first years of the 21st century the share of imported oil exceeded 50% of the oil demand.

Chinese growth is seemingly unstoppable, the country's oil consumption grows by 7.5 % per year, seven times faster than that of the US and the ability to provide its own needs is limited by the fact that its proven oil reserves are immensely tiny in relation to its consumption and future needs. (Vörös, 2011a)

To fuel its economy and the terribly growing number of cars, China imports from various oil exporters of the world, among the biggest are Saudi-Arabia, Angola, Iran, Oman, Iraq, Sudan and Russia. Although Beijing imports oil via pipelines from Russia and Central Asia, approximately the 80% of the

imports arrive on China's most important trade route on the Indian Ocean via the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea. The paper focuses on this Sea Line of Communication (SLOC), describes the challenges Beijing's trade has to face on the sea from the African Coast or from the Middle East until the shipment can reach the Chinese ports.

Challenges on Water

Beijing has several national and international objectives with regard to its maritime trade routes. First of all, it is elemental to secure these waterways to feed the economy to maintain the supremacy of the Communist Party. To reach this, Beijing supports the principle of the free waterways, but its main sea line of communication is vulnerable. This 12,000-km-long trade route starts from the African coasts and from Middle East ports via the Indian Ocean through the Malacca Strait (or other Straits in the region) and the South China Sea and is threatened by several actors. The South China Sea is important for China as a gate to raw materials and also as a potential oil and gas producer area, while the shipping is endangered by the different claims of the countries in the region. The Malacca Strait as a narrow route is dangerous because of the pirates and the eventual closing of the Strait would add expensive extra kilometers to the route. Beijing fears that its objectives will be jeopardised by the emerging India on the Indian Ocean, and the trade route is also under threat at the Strait of Hormuz and at the Horn of Africa where piracy is more 'critical' than ever.

Recently China's ability to defend and secure its SLOC is limited, the Chinese Navy is still limited in size, scope and equipment and Beijing is unable to maintain its presence far from its borders, especially on international waters. To solve its weaknesses, China cooperates with regional countries to secure the routes, develops additional alternative trade routes and builds up international ports and bases that could be used for Chinese vessels to dock and control the waters and routes.

At this time China does not threaten others' security (except for the situation at the South China Sea), actually, it is Beijing that feels threatened in ensuring access to energy markets and raw materials and in securing maritime transport corridors.

The South China Sea

The South China Sea was labelled as a potential hot-spot in the 1970s, and the disputes over the waters and islands caused several hot days in the past. The long debate is about the supposedly resource-rich international waters and two groups of islands, the Paracel Islands and Spratly Islands. China claims the whole area for itself while the concerned countries also would like to have their own territories, as Graph 1. shows.

Graph 1. The South China Sea Dispute

Contested claims in the South China Sea



Source: AFP

After the China–Association of South-East Asian Nations (ASEAN) Free-Trade Agreement was signed, by which the world’s largest free-trade area (considering the combined population) came into effect in 2010, it seemed that the problem would be easily solved between the economic partners. The agreement between China and the ten-country ASEAN covers nearly 1.9 billion people and China emerged as ASEAN’s largest trading partner – and thanks to the agreement – the trade between the two partners grows by 55 %. But in 2011 tensions gathered again as Chinese vessels stopped and halted Vietnamese and Philippines research and fishing boats. Even several demonstrations were organized in Vietnam against Beijing causing diplomatic friction. Why are these islands so important for Beijing? Because China regards the area as its ”South Gate” through which its crude oil imports are shipped and “fears” “the actions of the [...] other claimant states, whose ties with external powers such as the United States and Japan place the security of China’s southern gate at risk” (Buszynski, 2010). Moreover, the hopes of exploiting the possible oil and gas reserves of the South China Sea also makes the waters and islands very attractive for Beijing.

So, the South China Sea is still a potential hot-spot, and is not just essential because of its gate role, but also important for the “hungry” economy “eating” raw materials.

The Strait of Malacca

“The Malacca Strait is a narrow and congested waterway separating Indonesia and Malaysia, with Singapore located at its southern tip. As the

shortest route between the Indian and Pacific oceans, the strait is one of the world's most important waterways.” (Storey, 2006) More than 50,000 merchant ships transit the strait each year, carrying approximately 40 % of global trade¹. For China, the free permeability of the Strait is inevitable for trade and the Chinese leaders, as well as specialists know well that the energy supply of Beijing is really vulnerable, especially at the Strait. A Chinese newspaper, the China Youth Daily noted in 2004: “It is no exaggeration to say that whoever controls the Strait of Malacca will also have a stranglehold on the energy route of China”²


For a few years now the area has been also witnessing an upsurge in pirate attacks. The lack of security and the number of attacks caused the serious concern that terrorist groups might build up connection with pirates to disrupt maritime traffic, effecting global trade crisis. This concern led the affected states – Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore, which are benefiting from the traffic – to guarantee strait security. Thanks to the established patrols in the Strait, the number of attacks declined, but the Strait remained a threat. In 2010 news of a possible terrorist attack emerged and as Bill Tarrant noted, “the ability of Singapore, Indonesia and Malaysia to ensure security in a waterway of such geopolitical importance has been complicated by their own competing territorial claims and rivalries. All three countries, for instance, have had territorial disputes over islands and waters that have wound up in court or in naval confrontations”. (Tarrant, 2010) To resolve security issues, besides the United States, Japan and India, China also offered to maintain military presence in the Strait, but the role of external powers in the Strait is not welcomed, neither by the neighbouring states nor the regional powers.

To reduce the vulnerability, Beijing tries to diversify not only its energy imports, but the energy routes as well. Therefore, they considered creating an alternative transit route and Burma just fits for this role, to bypass the Malacca Strait. After arrangements made with the Burmese leaders, China agreed to build a gas and a parallel oil pipeline in the summer of 2009. The 771-km-long pipelines will start near Kyaukphyu, run through Mandalay, Lashio, and Muse in Burma before entering China, Yunnan province, with an estimated cost around \$2.5 billion. Eventually, the Burma-China pipeline is a jackpot for Beijing: it not only allows for apprx. 250,000 bpd to bypass the Malacca Straits, but through the gas pipeline, China is also able to import gas from the Burmese Shwe oil fields.

¹ Malacca Strait is a strategic 'chokepoint'. Reuters. <http://in.reuters.com/article/2010/03/04/idINIndia-46652220100304>

² China Youth Daily, June 15, 2004

Graph 2. The Pipelines in Burma



Source: www.earthrights.org

The pipelines are already under construction and will be operational by 2014 or 2015, but the project has also its security risks. First of all, the construction is endangered by the fighting between the Myanmar forces and the rebels, although according to Chinese officials, the construction has been proceeding smoothly. But in the recent days, several protests were held worldwide to postpone the project because of serious concerns over human rights abuses, as well as the social, economic and environmental impacts of the project. As the protesters noted: “The Shwe Gas will be exported to China while around 75 % of the population is not receiving electricity from the national grid”.³

The Indian Ocean

Beijings feels that its trade through the Indian Ocean is vulnerable and would be in danger during a global crisis. The country also faces with the emerging India looking for the same sources, with Delhi developing and upgrading its navy. India’s situation and aspirations are similar to Beijing’s. India also has a rapidly developing economy and also relies heavily on imported oil – and as estimates suggests – Delhi would need to import more than 90 % of its oil demand in two decades. China has growing influence on shipping lanes


³ Protests against destructive Chinese pipelines in Burma. Aliran.com. <http://aliran.com/8523.html>

throughout the Indian ocean, convincing several countries to express their unease about the safety of oil and supply shipments in the region. Beijing wants to ensure the security of its maritime lanes and to reach this aim, started to create several naval bases and trade ports, called the String of Pearls.

This strategic move involves the establishment of a series of “bases” throughout a region. Each base is a “pearl” in the string, enhancing China’s ability to control its routes. But the strategy not only helps Beijing to control the route, but also to raise its influence in the region, gaining more partnerships. As a strategy, the String of Pearls includes several possibilities: “the first is an increased access to airfields and ports. This may be accomplished by building new facilities or through establishing cordial relations with other nations to ensure access to their ports. In some cases, the strategy involves heavily subsidizing construction of new port and airfield facilities in other countries, with the understanding that these facilities will be made readily available as needed. Developing better diplomatic relations is also a crucial step in a string of pearls strategy. Partly, this is undertaken to ensure that shipping lanes and airspace remain free and clear. It may also be used to soothe concerns about a rapidly expanding string of pearls, and to establish solid trade and export agreements which may ultimately benefit both nations.”⁴

China’s pearls consist of a container shipping facility in Chittagong (Bangladesh), a construction of a deep water port in Sittwe (Myanmar), the construction of a navy base in Gwadar (Pakistan) and the Hambantota port (Sri Lanka).

Graph 3. The String of Pearls



Source: Edited by the Author

⁴ <http://www.wisegeek.com/what-is-a-string-of-pearls-strategy.htm>

To be successful, China not only needs to establish naval bases but also needs a strong Navy which is capable of maintaining positions and implementing actions in case of a crisis. The Chinese strategy and modernized military and its growing presence through the Indian Ocean worry the states of the region, especially worry India. These ports could be upgraded to permanent naval bases at any time, and China could also use these bases to threaten India's security or the United States' pivotal role in the region. But the the Chinese steps are not threaten until now, because Beijing's ambitions are defensive in nature – the bases are created to decrease sea-lane vulnerabilities. The objectives of the strategy are to develop capabilities to deter any state that would interdict in China's strategic trade, to secure and protect the country's energy interests and to establish dominion in the region. "The 'String of Pearls' thus provides China an integrated defence strategy that would enhance its maritime presence reinforcing its trade and security strategy. The 'String of Pearls' provides China with a reinforced access in every region where its maritime trade plies. It serves as a reminder to its rivals and adversaries a stark reminder that China would use ruthless methods to capture access." (Prabhakar, 2009)

The Strait of Hormuz

The Strait is simply the most important chokepoint of the world, offers a maritime link between the oil-rich Persian Gulf countries and the oil importer countries. Huge oil tankers from all over the globe carry approximately 15-17 million barrels of oil⁵ every day (20 % of the total oil supply) through the Strait. It is vital not only for the importer countries but also for five of the biggest oil producers: Iran, Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates transport almost all of their energy exports through the Strait.

The security of the Strait has been a priority for the West for long years now and since the economic growth of Eastern countries (China, India) it is substantial for these emerging countries as well. The shut of the waterway would cause serious economic problems and – with the recent relations between Iran and the West – the possibility of this happening has become real. Tehran last tried to sabotage the trade in the 1980s during the conflict with the Saddam Hussein led Iraq. The Iranian army targeted Iraqi vessels and started to plant mines in the shipping lanes. An American frigate almost sank due to a mine. This event made the Americans to start Operation Praying Mantis and destroyed several frigates and even oil platforms, damaging the economy of Iran. Today, the Iranian Navy is much more equipped.

The implementation of the American and European oil embargo against Tehran in response to its nuclear program would snap its economy, so the mining of the Strait is an option again. As the Reuters cited Iran's top naval

⁵ 'Bypassing Strait of Hormuz, impossible'. Presstv.ir, <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/225644.html>

commander, Habibollah Sayyari, “Closing the Strait of Hormuz for Iran’s armed forces is really easy... or as Iranians say it will be easier than drinking a glass of water”.⁶

The possibility of blocking the routes is huge, the modern garbage-can-size mines can be easily planted and even if no big disaster happens, it would take some day for the American Navy to clear the Strait closing the trade routes. But analysts think, blocking the route with mines is not going to happen (unless an attack against nuclear facilities happens). Tehran will certainly find other solutions to avoid sanction, probably selling more oil for the emerging Asian economies, which would like to ignore the embargo of the West. However regarding the conflict between Tehran and Washington (and the Western world) this can be only a short-term solution.

As for China, the free shipping through the Strait is of most importance, but their potential to react on events is limited, due to the fact that the security of the waterway is controlled by the US Navy. To change this situation, China designed the last part of its String of Pearls strategy, a naval base and port at Gwadar, Pakistan. The role of this Base is to station Chinese Navy vessels as a naval outpost close to the Strait and to transit oil in pipelines through Pakistan to China. These are mid-term goals, but the construction of the port has already finished and Beijing financed nearly 80% of the works. Beijing can obtain more than just a naval port close to the Strait: it is also a port fitting best to reach Central Asia and their raw materials. The geopolitical importance of Pakistan and Gwadar is growing: “Despite having vast amounts of gas, oil reserves and other resources, the former Soviet states that now constitute Central Asia are largely underdeveloped due to their landlocked locations. The emergence of Gwadar promises to open up the Arabian sea to every landlocked nation in Central Asia, as well as giving China a much shorter route to the Arabian sea. In other words the very heart of the Asian continent will open up to the world.”⁷

Piracy at Africa’s Horn

An increase in piracy off the coast of Somalia has made these waters the most dangerous in the world for cargo ships. Political and social crisis in Somalia led to the rise of violent events: some of the pirates are unemployed people or former fishermen, “who say they have been put out of business by trawlers from around the world taking advantage of the lack of government in Somalia to scoop up all the fish in its territorial waters” (BBC, 2011). The scale of piracy is enormous: there were 151 attacks on ships in 2011, compared to 127 in 2010 and (in 2011) pirates earned 146 million USD. Recently 10 vessels and

⁶ Hafezi, Parisa (2011): Shutting down oil exports ‘easier than drinking a glass of water’: Iran navy chief. National Post. <http://news.nationalpost.com/2011/12/28/shutting-down-oil-exports-easier-than-drinking-a-glass-of-water-iran-navy-chief/>

⁷ Geostrategic Gwadar. <http://gwadarcity.info/geostrategic-gwadar/>

159 hostages are being held. As for the number of the pirates, an estimated 3,000 to 5,000 operate in the area (Gardner, 2012).

The uncertainty affects not only the Chinese trade, but the global trade as well: a serious rise in the prices could happen, the insurance prices have already manifolded and a trend in the Somali piracy is alarming. Pirates are getting more and more ransom for the ship and the crew, therefore they are escalating their attacks (Besenyő-Kiss, 2009). The aims of Somali pirates are very clear: ransom for hostages (and ships) only. “They are not interested in stealing the cargo and/or reusing the ship for other purposes” (International Expert Group on Piracy off the Somali Coast, 2008), as it happens in Asia in several cases.

“The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) is advising ship owners to adopt measures such as having lookouts or travelling at speeds which would allow them to outrun the pirates. However, the pirates move extremely quickly and often at night and so it is sometimes too late before the crew has realised what has happened. Once the pirates have taken control of a ship, military intervention is complicated because of the hostages on board” (BBC, 2011). Because of the global effects of the piracy, a multinational coalition task force was formed and established a Maritime Security Patrol Area (MSPA) in the area. This response has brought a rare unity by countries, a cooperation that has never been seen before. The peace and stability in the region is in vital interest of the international community and China as well (Tarrósy, 2011). Thus almost 30 countries have contributed to the Coalition since its formation for various lengths of time. The most personnel were sent by the United States, China and the United Kingdom. The task force was able to step up against the pirates and even to prevent some ships from being captured during pirate-attacks and thanks to this activating, around 1,000 pirates have been arrested and most of them are going through legal processes abroad, inhibiting them from rejoining pirate groups. But the Coalition was unable to settle the situation, the pirates are more equipped and are not afraid of attacking huge tankers as well, further from the coast than in the past. The Coalition’s task is not easy: patrolling approximately 8.3m km² of ocean, an area about the size of Western Europe (Gardner, 2012).

For China the situation is interesting: the country’s foreign policy, the principle of non-alignment, the respect for national sovereignty might change. As Chen Bingde, the chief of General Staff of China’s People’s Liberation Army noted: “For counter-piracy campaigns to be effective, we should probably move beyond the ocean and crash their bases on the land’. It is not the kind of statement we are used to hear from China with regard to interventions (Lybia, Syria). This new attitude show that the rising China is becoming more responsible, acting like a superpower, in order to secure the trade routes and also to help increasing trust towards Beijing.

Conclusions

The Chinese government depends on preventing energy routes to keep its legitimacy and pursue the great power ambitions. At present, China lacks the naval power necessary to protect its sea lanes of communication which has its weak points at several locations. It fears that during an international security crisis maritime routes and the ships carrying energy resources could be in danger, and a disruption in the flow of energy could endanger their economic growth. To decrease the effect of possible lockdowns, Beijing tries to diversify its routes at all points and – as we could see with the String of Pearls strategy – tries to develop an army that can maintain presence at important chokepoints.

These projects and plans will be effective in the mid-term and what underpins the successfulness of the Chinese international relations is the fact that the facilities and ports will not only serve as naval bases but also as strategic trade ports, through which Beijing will be able to import raw materials – not only from the recent exporters, but also from the countries and regions the pipelines affect (Myanmar, Central Asia).

Until these projects are still unfinished, Beijing's sea lanes of communication are vulnerable and dangerous.

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SFC. Róbert ZSÁKAI

TSUNAMI IN JAPAN

Abstract

On 11th March 2011, a powerful earthquake shook the north-eastern coast of Japan. The tremor of 8.9 strong by the Richter scale caused a tsunami near the epicentre. The huge tsunami destroyed not only settlements and huge farmlands, but also killed a lot of people. After the demolishing tragedy of water, fire and earthquake, the outcome of the disaster was worsened by the severe problems in the nuclear plants, as a result of the devastating power of the nature.

Keywords: *Japan, Tsunami, earthquake, vibration, magnitude, nuclear power plant, Fukushima*

Japan, a group of islands that is situated near the Asian coast of the Pacific Ocean, consists of 6,852 islands. Its floor area is four times, its population is thirteen times bigger than those of Hungary. Following the USA and China, Japan is the third biggest economic power of the world. In the last twenty years, Japanese investors have invested more than \$ 10 billion in the Hungarian economy, creating thousands of jobs. Many thought that a developed, rich country well-prepared for natural disasters did not need help.

What is a tsunami?

Japanese word "tsunami" means "coastal wave" or "wave of the port". The most dangerous earthquakes are the sea quakes that can cause huge tsunamis. When the tsunami moves towards the shore, the sea first withdraws then floods the coast with a series of enormous waves. Though its amplitude is only between 0.4 and 2 ms, its wave length ranges from 100 to 300 km and its

velocity is 500-1,000 km per hour. These waves can emerge up to 20 ms and can sweep everything out of their way. The Hungarian word "leaping flood" is also very expressive of the disastrous nature of the tsunamis.

japan-earthquake-tsunami-nuclear-unforgettable-pictures-wave_33291_600x450.jpg
news.nationalgeographic.com



Geological background

Much is known about the mechanisms leading to earthquakes, but we are not able to predict the time of their occurrence. An earthquake arises when the rocks on the fracture lines bend under the pressure caused by the plates crashing. The biggest earthquakes occur in areas where a plate crashing into another ducks under (subduction), and its material getting into the depth melts into the earth's mantle, causing extended volcanic activity above itself.⁸ Crash zones like this – around deep-sea trenches – are the most dangerous; the Japanese tsunami quake took place in an area like this. Observations show that pre-quakes do not always occur, but the main quakes are sometimes followed by aftershocks, as a result of fragmented rocks taking their new, stable position. Awareness of the danger of earthquakes in advance can allow preparations in order to reduce the damage and casualties significantly. Japan is the world's most earthquake-stricken area.⁹ On the 9th of March 2011., nearby the Japanese Trench, a powerful earthquake burst out. But probably no one yet guessed then that within two days its aftershock would be of an even higher grade.¹⁰ The earthquake of 9th March 2011. was an extraordinarily big earthquake, a rare disaster. Its measure outstripped the biggest ones ever recorded in the history of instrumental seismology. During the enormous earthquake the power of 20,000 Hiroshima atomic bombs broke out. The space agencies and satellite operators of the world provided images taken from space and the quick analyses based on them were forwarded free of charge and without delay, so as to assist rescue operations.

The great Tohoku quake

In the north-eastern part of Japan, residents of Taro decided to build the greatest wall-system of the world; X-shaped, 10 meters high. According to current knowledge, it would have protected the small, coastal town from even

⁸ Zsákai Róbert: A 2004.évi Sri Lankai katasztrófa tanulsága a veszélyhelyzet-kezelés szempontjából. ZMNE.2011

⁹ <http://www.origo.hu/tudomany/20110311-a-richterskala-szerinti-89es-foldrenges-razta-meg-japant.html>

¹⁰ Tóth László: Japán, a földrengés és szökőár országa, *História*, 2011/4 XXXIII.évf.4. p. 20-21.

the biggest tsunami. As for a tsunami, there is about half an hour after the earthquake until the waves reach even the nearest coasts. On 11th March the tsunami came with waves of at least 14 meters high, thus they easily got over the wall and completely washed Taro away, by that time built together with the town of Miyako.¹¹ After the evaluation of satellite images, the US Geological Institute modified the original value of 8.9 magnitude of the earthquake to 9.0, which was the largest in Japan's history. The epicentre of the quake was 125 km away from the Japanese coasts, while its hypocenter was at a depth of 24 km. Today the realistic goal is to provide a more accurate and quicker prediction of the tsunami and alarm the population affected. Developments in this direction have been taking place since 1946, primarily in the USA and Japan. The system called PTWC had been completed by 1965.

The formation and propagation of tsunamis can be modelled well. The pressure-gauges moored to the sea-bed send accurate data to the surface buoys. The information from the buoys gets to satellites and from there to the tsunami warning center of the given country.

The Pacific Tsunami Warning Center ordered an alarm on 11th March for several regions as well. The disaster seemed to affect the whole region of the Pacific Ocean and to be able to cause devastation of the size like that of the South-Asian tsunami in 2004. A tsunami alarm was ordered in 53 countries including almost all countries of the Pacific region, and from Russia through Australia to Mexico. The waves reached the Californian shore at 9 o'clock CET but did not cause major damage anywhere. Alarms and evacuations took place in Japan and in another 20 countries, including North and South America's west coast as well. Smaller waves reached other countries, Chile also suffered serious damage due to the tsunami. According to the Japanese meteorological agency and the U.S. United States Geological Survey (USGS) data, it was the most powerful earthquake in Japan, and the fourth largest earthquake in the world, since measurements are carried out. The quake pushed Honsú island, which is Japan's largest island, 2.4 m further east.¹²

What caused the vibrations?

As for plate tectonics, the region Japan is situated in is a convergent zone, where large tectonic plates meet and converge toward each other. In the north the North American plate and Pacific plate, in the south the Eurasian plate and Philippine plate converge toward each other. The place of the earthquake that burst near the north-east coast of Japan is one of the most diverse place of the

¹¹ Palanovics Norbert: Tájékp cunami után, Figyelő, 12. szám. 2011. márc. 24. p. -10-15.

¹² Tóhoku-földrengés, Japán, 2011. március 11. Historia: 2011/4 XXXIII. évf. 4. p. 22.

earth, from the tectonic point of view. A number of large earthquakes are connected to the subduction area surrounding the Japanese Trench. Moreover, the Pacific coast tends to magnify the waves of the tsunami, making the lower coastal areas unprotected from them. No matter Japan is a developed country, yet the same problems arise as in the case of a backward country.

The consequences of the disaster

According to data provided by the Japanese authorities, 14,416 people died, 5,314 were injured and 11,889 were missing. Tens of thousands were made homeless, waiting in gyms, schools for the evolution of their fate, without clothes and personal belongings. Many moved temporarily to relatives, others rented an apartment elsewhere. The material damage was enormous, too. 125 thousand buildings were damaged, roads were destroyed. Fire broke out in several places, dams were broken through. In northern Japan 4.4 million households were left without electricity and 1.4 million without water. There was no protection against broken water pipes and the damaged water supply. The water supply of Tokyo was threatened because a value of radioactivity over the threshold limit was measured in it. Infants and nursing mothers are still to consume only bottled water. In the northern part of the country and in Tokyo, the railway network that is used by nearly 10 million people daily, was damaged in several sections, thus trains stopped and passengers got trapped in different stations. Food supply was hindered, too. Super-expresses were also stopped, the possibility to move around became limited in several places. Narita airport was shut down, Tokyo underground as well. Some nearby refineries were damaged, making fuel supply hard to solve. In a lot of places there was no heating at all, which was a major threat to the displaced. Tchiba refinery near Tokyo caught fire. The cooling-system of the nuclear power plant in the city of Onohama was broken, so the entire population was evacuated. A Mijagi county nuclear power plant turbine caught fire which was later extinguished. Two other nuclear power plants reported to be problematic but they stopped automatically. In Fukushima, the plant could also shut down automatically, however the level of radioactivity was 8 times higher and in the central part of the plant 1.000 times higher than usually.

Three strikes...

And as if the two had not been enough of a natural disaster, in the course of them Fukushima No. 1 nuclear power plant was damaged, so Japan had to face not only a nuclear emergency but power failures as well. The cooling system of the plant was ruined, ceasing electric power supply, thus threatening with a nuclear disaster. The worst came on Sunday; two further blasts – already four reactors broken. 200,000 people were evacuated from the 20 km radius of the reactors. The explosions and the fire took radioactivity into the air. This

affected agricultural areas and the crops grown there as well as the natural drinking water resources of the surrounding cities including Tokyo. Japanese experts were constantly working on staving off a nuclear disaster similar to the one in Tchernobyl. Authorities tried to reduce the pressure by releasing radioactive steam and to restore the power supply with portable diesel generators. According to the company Tepco operating the power plant, some radioactivity might have escaped by then, so Prime Minister Naoto Kan ordered to evacuate the area surrounding the plant within 10 kms.¹³ The quake affected four power plants in Japan, but apart from Fukushima only the nearby Onagawa plant, which caught fire, was severely damaged, but this could be put out within 8 hours. The government drew public attention to the fact that those not leaving the affected area (approx. 100,000 people) were to stay in their homes, not to air their apartments, not to drink tap water or eat locally grown plants. Later, they also managed to restore power in the damaged reactor and start the cooling system again.



Japan-nuclear-threat-smok-006.jpg
guardian. co.uk 460 × 276 - Japan tsunami
and nuclear alert Monday 14 March 2011

The media constantly advised on, trying to help people to make decisions, and experts, scholars explained their risks. They mostly relied on the Chernobyl experience.

Was unpreparedness that caused the Fukushima tragedy?

On behalf of the Tokyo government, authorities tried to take stock of the emergency response deficiencies. The inadequate preparation and the disorganization also contributed to the fact that, after the earthquake, the situation was tragic near the nuclear plant in Fukushima area. The report will be completed in full this year but the consequences drawn from previous studies suggest that the tsunami following the earthquake severely damaged the three reactors of the power plant, in which nuclear fusion has occurred. As a result, huge quantities of radioactive pollution got into the air and the sea water, and over a hundred thousand people had to leave their homes. The expert reported that the nuclear power plant operator Tokyo Electric Power (Tepco) had not been prepared for all eventualities and did not have wide disaster scenarios. Did the company underestimate a potential tsunami with its devastating effects, even

¹³ <http://www.eco-business.com/news/radiation-spike-halts-work-at-japan-nuclear-plant/>

if it tries to defend itself with the fact that the waves of the flood proved to be up to an unexpected level?

Tepco did not seem to have an adequately trained expert team to handle severe situations like this. It was also observed that – due to fuel melting in reactors 1 and 3 – the rejection of radioactive material could have been much lower if technicians had injected water into the damaged equipment in time. The fact that a power plant can lose its energy supply due to a devastating disaster like this had not been taken into account either. Communication gaps between rescue units and their superiors or between professionals working on the spot and the central crisis staff only worsened the situation. Smaller units often acted at their own discretion without informing the staff in charge of directing them. This all led to serious inefficiencies concerning rescue work. Several reports also discuss that the evacuation of the population living around the plant did not go smoothly. Many people were moved to a place that had previously been affected by the harmful radioactive material. The question arises: Tepco really was not prepared for the unexpected threat?¹⁴

The boom

When there will be a boom again, is very doubtful. It must be understood that the Japanese economy is heavily trade-dependent; the engine of growth has always been the huge export. If the high level of export were seriously declined, it would clearly prevent economic growth. Difficulties involve a number of large plants. Some factories shut down because of their own earthquake damage, others because of the difficulties in the supply chain, which had already affected production.

In plants, the damage is not negligible, but the real crisis in the sector is triggered by the fact that due to the interruptions in power supply or to the failure of the communication and the logistic system, the country's major vehicle manufacturers had to partially or fully cease production for shorter or longer periods.¹⁵ It became clear after the disaster that the earthquake and tsunami did not only demand thousand of human lives, caused horrible destruction in settlements, roads and homes, but also distressed Japan's economy, including automove industry. A serious trouble is the supply of industrial raw materials, ores, hydrocarbons, as they are virtually all fully imported. London analysts say it is unlikely that the Japanese earthquake disaster will have severe or prolonged impacts on Japan's real economic performance, but the fiscal burden of the recovery imposed on the state is likely to cause troubles in the Japanese public finances.¹⁶

¹⁴ <http://www.infoplease.com/science/weather/japan-tsunami-2011.html>

¹⁵ http://www3.nhk.or.jp/daily/english/11_53.html

¹⁶ http://index.hu/kulfold/2011/12/26/felkeszuletlenseg_ okozta_a_fukusimai_tragediat/

Fukushima today

For the time being, we can only guess what long-term consequences the complex disaster may have. However, according to the World Bank, losses may reach 235 billion dollars, and reconstruction may take more than 5 years. When we can expect full recovery or when things will return to all the old business is hard to tell. Over 1,000 people are registered missing and more than a million houses are damaged. Streets in many places are still deserted, the public have already been warned of the dangers of radioactive rain. Around Fukushima the situation is getting back to normal. The levels of pollution though still fluctuate over the normal limit, in addition, packages, spinach and milk also showed traces of radioactive contamination. Tokyo's water supply is contaminated by radioactivity, but fortunately, it falls short of the statutory limit value. Drinking water in some areas is radioactive; its consumption is only recommended after boiling. According to experts, too, it is the start of a difficult period, as after the Kobe quake of 7.2 magnitude in 1995, reconstruction took 5 years. The damage is about \$ 180 billion currently, which is already 3 per cent of the Japanese GDP. Before the accident in Fukushima, Japanese government planned to increase the proportion of nuclear energy by 50 per cent by 2030, which would have been an energy security issue, as Japan wanted to increase its energy self-sufficiency. After this, however, it is most likely that the Fukushima nuclear power plant will not be restarted even if problems will be managed. This tragedy forced Japan and several European countries to reconsider their nuclear power program.¹⁷

A positive consequence of the disaster may be a boom in building industry and the associated new jobs. But how reconstruction after the tragedy will affect Japanese psyche and soul, yet it is difficult to predict. The country has always had the ability to renew after huge disasters. Reconstruction may bring dynamism and may result in the emergence of new industries. This, however, is less likely to comfort the mourning family members of the victims.

Conclusion

Although the final balance of a natural disaster is far from being seen, the above data have shown that in a developed, rich country more prepared for earthquakes the human toll is not even one-tenth of that of a similar disaster in a less prepared, poor country (like Sumatra in 2004). Alerting people is the responsibility of the local authorities, which requires a strong organization and constant readiness. In Japan, earthquake preparedness, earthquake-resistant construction have continuously been going on for decades. In critical facilities, equipment seismic sensors and switches are installed which are automatically activated and can shut down nuclear plans, turn off gas pipelines and halt

¹⁷ http://totalcar.hu/magazin/kozelet/2011/03/30/foldrenge_s_az_autoiparban/

express trains. As a result, in recent decades, major earthquakes have caused relatively small damages. Tens or hundreds of thousands of victims are more characteristic in the less developed parts of the world. Although a 9-magnitude earthquake can not stay without consequences, the fact is that the significant part of the disasters was not directly caused by the earthquakes, but by the subsequent tsunamis.¹⁸

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¹⁸ http://totalcar.hu/magazin/kozelet/2011/03/30/foldrenges_az_autoiparban/

CONSULTATION

Col. Zoltán SZALAY

PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE OF THE NCO CORPS

Abstract:

The author introduces the past and present of the training of non-commissioned officers (NCO) of the Hungarian Defence Forces, and the career of the contracted enlisted NCOs, in the context of the state-approved military vocational training and adult education. It is also presented the modification of the military vocational training system as a part of the reform for 2011-12.

Keywords: *coach, education, training, promotion, NCO training*

Introduction

The knowledge of the past is necessary to shape the future. The NCOs are the backbone of the army, the training system of this category fundamentally determines the military capabilities and applicability.

The state-approved vocational and the internal training of the Hungarian Defence Forces follow the non-commissioned officers through their entire career. The progress of the career is provided since 1995, by a state-approved school-based vocational training and adult education system in the form of secondary and advanced level vocational training and internal training system.

The final formation of the current training system – according to the principles of the adult education training – took ten years. The state-approved NCO school-based correspondent training started with the contracted enlisted NCO promotion course, which was an internal sergeant training followed by the adult education under the laws on vocational training in September 2008.

A Historical Overview of the Hungarian Sub-Officer or NCO Training

Sub-Officer or NCO: these two names are applied for the same category. Until 1941, it was called sub-officer and later on non-commissioned officer, and again from 2012 sub-officer is the term applied by laws.

The story of the sub-officer training schools¹ goes back until the age of the Compromise in 1869. In that very year, it was necessary to take the measures in order to establish a recruit drill sergeant's corps.

Sub-officer training schools were set up, at the beginning for each division, later on regional-basis, and from 1875 for each regiment. The sub-officers were not forgotten after being placed in reserve forces. In 1873 already actions were taken to appoint them into jobs in the state offices, making their career more attractive.

In 1924 an independent training school was established in Veszprém-Jutas, named as Kinizsi Pál Royal Hungarian Army Troop Sub-officer Training School, which trained sub-officers/NCOs until the end of the 2nd World War.²

After the Second World War there was no NCO corps at all in the Hungarian Army. This category was re-founded in 1957. In Szentendre, the Hungarian People's Army NCO School was established. From the middle of the 60's the NCO training was conducted in the Training Centres. After two-year-long training, the NCOs deserved a qualification, which was recognised and useful just within the Army. From the 70's however the educational leaders of the Army recognised the social expectation to open the NCO training system to the civil society. Based on this recognition, the new 3+1-year-long, school-based, vocational training based specialist NCO training was commenced in 1975, in a particular area at Szabadszállás. In the training, the content (1 year) was integrated demanded by the Army into the Vocational Training (3 years) under the rule of the National Vocational Qualifications Register. The graduates passed their final military exam along with the state vocational exams.³

The new phase of the development started in 1984 with the beginning of the 4- year-long secondary school training on eight different specialities in eight garrisons. This training entailed state maturity exam and NCO qualification test. The two year long training courses of the commanders continued to be conducted in Training Centres not being bounded to the state examination system. After the graduation each branch and service organised a 3-6-month-long complementary training in order to help the junior NCOs to prepare for their first position and to start their career.

¹ The Military history of Hungary 2nd part, Zrínyi Press Bp. 1985.

² József Eszenyi: The Royal Hungarian Army Sub-officer cops 1920-1944, Bp., Püski Press, 1994
Imre Barna: The formation of the institute sub-officer training in the Royal Hungarian Army 1924-1954, New Military Review 1992/4

³ István Major: The four year long NCO training has future, Home Defense 1980/5. pp. 12-21.

The NCO Education System in the state-certified Vocational Training System

After the system changes several steps have been made to commence the reorganisation of the Hungarian Army. In doing so, the NCOs and warrant officers got more important role, their duties expanded, their area of responsibilities widened. They received an essential role in training, in the management of the daily routine of the subunits, and in the operation of weapons and equipment.

In 1991, the Training Centres had been abolished and the 2-year-long commander courses were moved to the Military Colleges. However, the prerequisite of the NCO training was a maturity exam, but state-recognised qualification was not given. The four plus one training system initiated in the Military Secondary School (4-year technical secondary school and a successive one-year technicians and NCO training). In the 90's, a unified management and entrance examination system⁴ was developed.

The transformation of the NCO training had some social, economic and military needs. Among these the process in the education was predominant. The public education act pushed the overall education time to the 10th grade, so the vocational training, like NCO training, only on completion of the secondary school was allowed to start.

The new National Qualification Register (Országos Képzési Jegyzék, OKJ) allowed to record professions, after professional and administrative check-ups and that were published in the law. In 1993, based on the decision made by the Hungarian Ministry of Defence and the military needs, 21 military qualifications were recorded into the National Qualification Register. After this, the military vocational training became entirely part of the state vocational training.

In 1995, the medium-term plan for the transformation of the Hungarian Army⁵ was developed. Decision was made in March 1996 about the renewal of the NCO training system. The number of the NCO training institutions was radically reduced; the content and the length of the training was transformed. Due to the service laws, adopted in 1996, favourable changes occurred in the internal life of the military.⁶

According to these decisions, the Minister of Defence established with the concentration of the former NCO training centres and institutions, as their legal successor - new NCO Vocational Schools in Budapest, Szolnok, and

⁴ Dr. László Závodny: The situation of our NCO training and the tasks of its development, Vocational education 1998/4. pp. 14-19

⁵ 88/1995. (VII. 6.) Parliamentary Resolution "about the direction of the long and medium term transformation and number of the Hungarian Army"

⁶ 1996. XLIII (Hszt.) Act on the service state of the professional members of the armed forces

Szentendre in 1996. In these institutions took place military vocational training – recognised by the state – on 15 specialities with 400 people.⁷ The training based on the maturity examination released within a short period of time, technically and military properly prepared, professional NCOs. These institutes took part ,in addition to the NCO training, in the courses based training of the non-military NCO graduates (attended non-military training institutes), in the coaching for the maturity examination, in the training of the reserve commanders and in the language training.

The NCO training was fully integrated into the national vocational training system and adopted and applied its every statute.

The one institutional NCO training

The attendant Army reform followed the NATO join, the shift towards the full professional Army had huge impact on the NCO training as well. In 1999, decision was made about the establishment of the concentrated NCO Vocational Training School that was able to provide effective and advanced training.⁸ The transformation of the institute took nearly two years and – as a legal successor of the three previous NCO Vocational Schools – with the effect of 1st of August, the primary condition of the stand-alone NCO training school was established in Szentendre (at the same location were founded the first Centralised NCO Training School on 1st of June 1957.). The institute was called Hungarian Army Centralised NCO Training School adopted the name of Pál Kinizsi in 2003 (MH KPTSZI. Magyar Honvédség Kinizsi Pál Tiszthelyettes Szakképző Iskola).

In 2004, the review of the NCO training system and the development of the requirements for the 21st. century Army, was an essential part of the transition to a voluntary (full professional) military force. The one-year-long basic education of the NCOs and the additional training, namely the warrant officer training went on as part of the national vocational training, in modular system on three specialities (within these on different branches).

In summary, from 1995 the NCOs received military vocational training which, based on the quality and content of it, was recognised by the state itself. This was a very positive aspect, since the qualifications issued by the NCO Vocational Schools were legally recognised by the society as well. The quality of the training was strengthened by the maturity examination as an input prerequisite. The content of the training was determined by the officials of the military speciality – the so called delegated chamber authority – meanwhile the

⁷ The 1/1997. (I.9.) MoD regulation about the release of the examination requirements for the military professional qualification.

⁸ Dr. János Tompa - Zoltán Kovács: The past, present and future of the NCO corps SVKI Defense Studies No 29. Budapest, 1999. ISSN 1216-4704 p. 66-74

educational experts determined the framework of the training in order to meet the requirements of the national vocational training.

In the development process of the training content it was also an expectation that beside the military knowledge the qualification should be sufficient to fulfil further related jobs and occupations. For instance, the military qualification for military instructor with the ISCO number 3419 equals with training technician, this way the qualification was applicable in the civil life as well. The problem was that from 2003, the military qualifications were no more equal just related to further civil jobs. Like the Army NCO I. logistical branch, NBC technicians, the related job were gas station operator, seller

From 1997 to 2002 the number of the military vocational qualifications was dropped from 41 to 23 and then it was further reduced in 2003 to four and in 2005 to three.⁹

The NCO career of enlisted individuals

The NATO membership, the transformation of the MoD and the redundancies¹⁰ regenerated the demand to alter the „traditional” full time NCO training. The transformation of the Army imposes new requirement for the NCO corps, new career structure in order to accomplish the voluntary full professional Army. These changes had obviously huge effect on the NCO training. In the new Table of Organisation (ToO) there appeared new NCO positions in growing number: section commander, gunner, operators, drivers, storekeeper, registrar, etc., from the rank of sergeant up to chief master warrant officer. The increasing number of the contracted enlisted soldier, their excellent professional performance made it urgent to open predictable NCO career for them.

In 1999, the 6-month long contracted NCO training programme (sergeant school) was worked out, which was just an interior training, giving military knowledge and an opening to ensure the promotion to the rank of sergeant. The target audience of the training was soldiers with all the experience, motivation, physical, psychological, and communication skills necessary to be appointed to NCO positions, which does not require secondary school qualification. This interior training entitled only the soldier to fill up such NCO positions which do not require secondary school qualification. For the chosen NCOs with a minimum of two year practical experience, a six week long military leadership course was ordered from 2004.¹¹

⁹ The 37/2003. (XII. 27.) Ministry of Education regulation „about the National Qualification Register” determined three different military vocational qualifications: „Army NCO I.”, „Army NCO II.” and „Army WO” and it was not changed significantly in the new 1/2006. (II. 17.) Ministry of Education regulation neither.

¹⁰ In 1999 the ToO of the Army contained 10710 NCO, this number in 2009 was 8220.

¹¹ No 128/1999. and, 11/2003. Chief of Defense Staff command

From the 2002/2003 academic year, for the contracted enlisted soldiers with maturity exam – in the framework of NCO basic training system – there was organised correspondent career training.

The human resource directives of the MoD declared since „the basis of the recruitment of the NCO corps is in the first place the internal (enlisted personnel) recruitment, it is based throughout the selection process on the performance, professional knowledge and the experience.”

In addition to the training for the candidate with maturity exam, from September 2009, in the Hungarian Army Pál Kinizsi NCO Vocational Training School, there started the training for the candidate who had some civil vocational qualification but without maturity exam. This training is not just based on the working experience, but recognises it also and with-eight-week-long additional training ensured the effective bringing up to the full strength of the NCO position, according to the expectation of the commanders.

The transformation of the NCO training system

The restructuring of NCO training is still in the centre of attention. According to the human resources strategy: „The soldiers are providing a special public service and the military career is a part of the public service. The Hungarian Army ensures career for the professional soldiers and takes care of them after their retirement. For the contracted soldiers the Army provides a career containing the support to a successful reintegration into the labour market.”... „In the classic military career model ... The dominant base of the reinforcement of the sub-officers are the enlisted men with experiences, underwent organisational socialization with maturity exam, with the minimum rank of corporal. The other base is the candidates at least with maturity exam, passing the full-time NCO training for that speciality is not fillable from enlisted soldiers or their expertise is not obtainable from civilian training institute.”¹²

Two different systems were elaborated in 2011 for the transformation of the training:

- I. Course - type interior sub-officer training
- II. New State-approved military vocational training

In the Army, as part of the career model of the contracted enlisted soldiers, the training for the enlisted soldiers with maturity exam is already realised in two parts from September 2011: in the first three months there is a basic training and in the second there is a 3-6-month-long specialised vocational course. The preparation for the specialised position is based on the knowledge of

¹² No 79/2001. (VII. 29., HK. 12) Hungarian Army regulation for the human resource strategy 2012-2021. page 4, and 6-8.

the basic course. After the successful completion of the two courses, the soldier might be appointed to the position.

An intense three-month-long course type specialized training provides the promotion for the master sergeant to warrant officer.

In the state-approved vocational training system, the training of the youth – who choose the sub-officer career – can be realized in the frame of a two-year long, school-type, full-time training. This training form must be reserved mainly for the specialist working in electronics, and specialised technical areas. The high-quality, high-tech devices need well-trained professionals, especially in the position where no more a professional reinforcements from enlisted category can be obtained.

Summary

The transformation of the civil vocational and adult training had a huge impact on the military vocational training system and on the NCO training system of the Hungarian Army. The tendency is further strengthened that enlisted soldiers with proper motivation and precondition for the NCO career will be good NCOs. The Army will gain experienced, motivated soldiers – through cost-effective and efficient training – by promoting these soldiers.

The knowledge of the past/ancient time is essential for forming the future. The NCOs are the backbone of the Army, and the training system of this category determines the aptitude and adaptability of the army.

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György VASS

INTENDMENT OF THE NORTH ATLANTIC TREATY

/The evolution of NATO through its Official Texts/

Abstract

The Heads of State and Government of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) nations have adopted a New Strategic Concept at their Lisbon Summit – 19-20 November 2010. The role of the Strategic Concept is to highlight the main issues which the Organization has to deal with in the next decade.

For those who regard NATO as a military organization some areas – like cyber-defense or energy security – mentioned in the Concept might sound strange. They might ask the question: Why does NATO want/have to deal with these types of issues?

In my view, NATO is not only a military organization but an interest-defending alliance in a much wider sense. And interests can be found in the cyber-space or in the field of energy as well. In this article I will give an overview about the evolution of NATO as an interest defending alliance through its Official Texts.

Key words: NATO, official text, defense, interests, wider sense,

Objectives of the North Atlantic Treaty

If the North Atlantic Treaty¹ is regarded as a memorandum of a military block, the approach is wrong. It is a fact that NATO had been militarized during the Cold War. However, considering the historical context and what is more important the text of the Treaty itself, we have to realize that this organization has not remained only in the military dimension, but has entered the interest-defending sphere as well.

¹ NATO – Official text: The North Atlantic Treaty, 04 April 1949 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm - 07 January 2011

The North Atlantic Treaty was signed on the 4th of April in 1949 as a foundation of a general interest-defending alliance. The objectives of the signing parties are stated in Article 2 of the Treaty:

The Parties will contribute toward the further development of peaceful and friendly international relations by strengthening their free institutions, by bringing about a better understanding of the principles upon which these institutions are founded, and by promoting conditions of stability and well-being. They will seek to eliminate conflict in their international economic policies and will encourage economic collaboration between any or all of them.

As it is written, the main objectives of NATO are: promoting conditions of stability and well-being and encouraging economic collaboration between any or all of the members of the Treaty.

Some deduces objectives from Article 5. In Article 5 we can find the main threats that pose a risk to the main objectives of NATO and we can find also the measures that have to be taken by participating parties upon such threats occur. But reason must not be confused with objectives. Article 5:

The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area. Any such armed attack and all measures taken as a result thereof shall immediately be reported to the Security Council. Such measures shall be terminated when the Security Council has taken the measures necessary to restore and maintain international peace and security.

NATO built up its primary role as a military organization, because – legally – this opportunity had been given by the text of the Treaty (stated by Article 3) and – practically – the military power was/is the more effective mean of assuring interests. Article 3:

In order more effectively to achieve the objectives of this Treaty, the Parties, separately and jointly, by means of continuous and effective self-help and mutual aid, will maintain and develop their individual and collective capacity to resist armed attack.

This Article suggests that developing capacity to resist armed attack is the way to achieve more effectively the objectives (stated in Article 2). This suggestion delivers that capacity building equals stability and well-being. That is true when capacity building means industrial development to meet the real needs

of the market. In defense sector it is hard to define the real needs of market because of the effects of fear and deterrence (Security dilemma²). These effects can generate an armaments race. In this kind of race – that could end up in war or cold war – original reasons, basic objectives can be forgotten after a while.

Evolution of NATO through its Official Texts

It is stated in the Final Communiqué³ of the first Session⁴ of the North Atlantic Council that: “The organization established under the North Atlantic Treaty should be operated with as much flexibility as possible and be subject to review from time to time.”

In 1950, one year after its establishment, NATO started to show the face of a military block. Showing only a face of a militarized organization was unlikeable for the establishing parties. This dissatisfaction had been indicated in the NATO Council Resolution of 15-18 May 1950⁵:

“A year's experience has shown that on the political side the meetings of the Council have been too infrequent to permit a sufficient exchange of views on matters of common interest within the scope of the Treaty. On the military side the strategic concept of the Treaty has been adopted and a defence plan drawn up, and the corresponding estimate of the necessary forces is being established.”

In view of that situation, the Council had undertaken the following tasks:

- a) study the inter-relationship of the various programs to support the plans for the defence of the North Atlantic area and ensure co-ordination of the work of the Defence Committee, the Defence Financial and Economic Committee, and all other bodies established under the North Atlantic Treaty Organization;
- b) recommend to governments the steps necessary to ensure that effect is given to the co-ordinated plans prepared for the defence of the North Atlantic area;
- c) exchange views on political matters of common interest within the scope of the Treaty;
- d) promote and co-ordinate public information in furtherance of the objectives of the Treaty while leaving responsibility for national programs to each country;

² More information on security dilemma: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security_dilemma - 07 January 2011

³ NATO - Official text: Final Communiqué of the first session of the North Atlantic Council, 17 September 1949 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17117.htm - 08 January 2011

⁴ The Council established by Article 9 of the North Atlantic Treaty held its first session in Washington on the 17th of September in 1949.

⁵ NATO - Official text: Resolution, 15-18 May 1950 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17208.htm - 08 January 2011

- e) consider what further action should be taken under Article 2 of the Treaty, taking into account the work of existing agencies in this field.

This resolution indicates that NATO nations believed that problems with Council for Mutual Economic Assistance (CMEA)⁶ countries can be solved by other means than building military capabilities.

In 1955 the Warsaw Treaty (Warsaw Pact)⁷ was signed and the unchanged attitude of the Eastern Block determined that NATO had to predominate its military side – rather than its political or economic sides – as armaments race gave no other way of defending interests. The process of changing the original tendency of the signing parties had been summarized in The Harmel Report⁸ of 1967:

“Since the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, the international situation has changed significantly and the political tasks of the Alliance have assumed a new dimension. Amongst other developments, the Alliance has played a major part in stopping Communist expansion in Europe;”

During the period of the Cold War⁹ other possible way than militarizing to defend interest had been forgotten. 1990 – after the declaration of the end of the Cold War¹⁰ – opened a new era.

NATO’s first unclassified Strategic Concept (adopted in 1991) set out that the political division of Europe that was the source of the military confrontation of the Cold War period has thus been overcome.¹¹ The security challenges and risks which NATO had to face were different in nature from what they had been in the past. Risks to Allied security were less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that might arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which were faced by many countries in Central and Eastern Europe.

From that time NATO started to open for the role of a global player. The Strategic Concept of 1991 stated that the Alliance security must also take account of the global context. Alliance security interests could be affected by

⁶ CMEA was established in Moscow on the 25th of January in 1949. More information: <http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Comecon> - 09 January 2011

⁷ More information on the Warsaw Treaty: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Warsaw_Pact - 09 January 2011

⁸ NATO - Official text: Report of the Council – „The Harmel Report”, 13-14 December 1967 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26700.htm - 09 January 2011

⁹ More information on the Cold War: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cold_War - 14 January 2011

¹⁰ The end of Cold War had been declared by U.S. President George H. W. Bush and U.S.S.R. leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the Malta Summit, 2-3 December 1989: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malta_Summit - 14 January 2011

¹¹ NATO - Official text: The Alliance’s New Strategic Concept, 07-08 November 1991 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_23847.htm - 14 January 2011

other risks of a wider nature, including proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, disruption of the flow of vital resources and actions of terrorism and sabotage. As it has been underlined in 1991: “the changed environment offers new opportunities for the Alliance to frame its strategy within a broad approach to security”.

It was new that, with the radical changes in the security situation, the opportunities for achieving Alliance objectives through political means were greater than ever before. It became possible to draw all the consequences from the fact that security and stability have political, economic, social, and environmental elements, as well as the indispensable defence dimension.

In 1991 it had been recognized among Alliance members that the persistence of new political, economic or social divisions across the continent could lead to future instability, and such divisions must thus be diminished.

The process of strengthening the economic character of NATO cooperation had been broken by the events of 9/11 in 2001. At the same time its civil crisis managing side started to grow stronger. In 2002 NATO Heads of State and Government declared that the Alliance was committed, in cooperation with its partners, to fully implement the Civil Emergency Planning (CEP) Action Plan for the improvement of civil preparedness against possible attacks against the civilian population with chemical, biological or radiological (CBR) agents.¹² NATO should enhance its ability to provide support, when requested, to help national authorities to deal with the consequences of terrorist attacks, including attacks with CBRN (chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear) against critical infrastructure, as foreseen in the CEP Action Plan.

By that time the cyber dimension of threat had already appeared. Therefore, the Alliance decided to strengthen its capabilities to defend against cyber attacks. This indicated that the adjective of “armed” attack of Article 5 could be overtaken by time.

In 2004 the Istanbul Declaration had stated that Collective defence remained the core purpose of the Alliance. But the threats that NATO faced had changed substantially. Heads of State and Government remained committed to address vigorously the threats facing the Alliance, taking into account that they emanate from a far wider area than in the past.¹³

In the new Strategic Concept adopted at Lisbon Summit in 19-20 November 2010, the threat of Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty has been a bit modified. While Article 5 mentioned “armed attack”, the new Strategic Concept has left the adjective of “armed”: “It reconfirms the bond between our

¹² NATO - Official text: Prague Summit Declaration, 21 November 2002 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_19552.htm - 15 January 2011

¹³ NATO - Official text: The Istanbul Declaration, 28 June 2004 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_21026.htm - 16 January 2011

nations to defence one another against attack, including against new threats to the safety of our citizens.”¹⁴

*The environment of NATO in our days*¹⁵

As NATO describes the security environment in which it has to play its defending role, it is understood that the Alliance is not only a military organization but an interest defending one.

Today, the possibility of conventional attack against NATO territory considered to be low. However, mostly for the reason of proliferation of ballistic missiles and the phenomenon of terrorism – certain threats still exist. Due to the development of modern technology, the possibility of nuclear, chemical, biological or radiological attacks can not be ignored neither.

At the same time cyber attacks are becoming more frequent, more organised and more costly in the damage that they inflict on government administrations, businesses, economies and potentially also transportation and supply networks and other critical infrastructure; they can reach a threshold that threatens national and Euro-Atlantic prosperity, security and stability.

Regarding the environment of our days, all countries are increasingly reliant on the vital communication, transport and transit routes, on which international trade, energy security and prosperity depend. They require greater international efforts to ensure their resistance against attack or disruption. Some NATO countries will become ever more dependent on foreign energy suppliers and in some cases, on foreign energy supply and distribution networks for their energy needs. As an increasing share of world consumption is transported across the globe, energy supplies are increasingly exposed to disruption.

Key environmental and resource constraints, including health risks, climate change, water scarcity and increasing energy needs will further shape the future security environment in areas of concern to NATO and have the potential to significantly affect NATO planning and operations.

The above mentioned challenges – collected by the New Strategic Concept – predict that NATO will coordinate its national defending capabilities beyond the military dimension and indicates that the Alliance is determined to

¹⁴ NATO - Official text: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adapted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/officialtexts_68580.htm - 21 January 2011

¹⁵ NATO - Official text: Strategic Concept for the Defence and Security of the Members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization adapted by Heads of State and Government at the NATO Summit in Lisbon, 19-20 November 2010 http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/officialtexts_68580.htm - 21 January 2011

step over its Euro-Atlantic dimension defined in the North Atlantic Treaty to become a declared global player for good.

(Earlier participations of NATO beyond its Euro-Atlantic dimension were induced by several events – 9/11 was the reason for starting operation in Afghanistan and Iraq; as well as the pirate attacks at the Horn of Africa – but the right of its participations has been questioned. Now – by the legal step of adopting the New Strategic Concept – the way for defence cooperation has been opened even towards the Far East with regard to the cyber-threat or towards South America if we consider the security of energy supply.)

Summary

In 1949, the North Atlantic Treaty was signed with the intent of defending the interests of the participant nations. During the period of the Cold War the most effective way of defending interests was to develop military capabilities. For now, the world has changed and the Alliance has to face with other threats besides the conventional one. In my opinion the new issues given for NATO by its New Strategic Concept to do deal with – like energy or cyber security – absolutely meet the objectives of the Treaty, given the fact that the main objectives of the Alliance are promoting conditions of stability and well-being and encouraging economic collaboration, as well as opening toward new dimensions in tasks or in geographical areas. The new concept is definitely understandable and essential because of the broad approach of security, affected by the general development and globalization.

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Dr. Judit WEINHOFFER

PSYCHOLOGICAL QUESTIONS IN REHABILITATION – ASPECTS OF MILITARY HEALTH CARE

Abstract

Man is the unity of body and mind. Convalescence depends on the state of mind and physique. It is the same in rehabilitation as well, therefore besides the healing of the body, the means of psychology (and psychiatry) are indispensable for a successful rehabilitation. The most frequent mental problems that occur in the course of rehabilitation are crisis, handling crisis, loss, the mourning of loss, depression and PTSD. At the beginning of a disease or injury, the state of psychological crisis, recording and mourning the loss often occur. This crisis is especially serious if the person is young and if a sound body is indispensable for his work as in the case of soldiers. The patient can get stuck in one of the phases of the state of crisis, it is not sure that he can get over the crisis and – as a result – he can develop depression, PTDS or other psychological diseases. The aim of the whole rehabilitation process is to reach an optimal life quality in the altered situation. It is necessary that the patient should perceive the possibilities of new chances and to act actively to reach them in this crisis caused by the health damage and its consequences. The psychotherapeutic methods applied in time and correctly can help this process and they are indispensable in a complex rehabilitation.

Keywords: *crisis, loss, PTSD, rehabilitation, psychology, therapies*

Introduction

Working as a doctor in the field of rehabilitation, I face the fact day by day that the change of the state of the patients does not only depend on their physical state. Two different patients of the same age, similar disease – who are given the same opportunities of rehabilitation – leave our ward in different physical state. A person with a well-balanced background can reach a significantly better life quality even in a worse physical state than an unbalanced

personality in a better physical state. Therefore, the psychological aspect of rehabilitation has had increasing emphasis in my work over the past years.

Rehabilitation is necessary for people who cannot recover fully after the acute phase of an illness or injury, they still suffer from a kind of health problem and their recovery would not be complete without rehabilitation or the rehabilitation can shorten the process of healing. They experienced such a physical and/or mental trauma that results in suffering temporary or terminal negative physical and/or mental changes. It can be an accident with the injury of the spine or the loss of a limb, a circulatory disorder of the brain or the spinal marrow, a tumour, a degenerative disease of the joints, an autoimmune disease or a psychological trauma etc. Rehabilitation, therefore, purports to help the disabled (according to the new definition of WHO, people restricted in their activities and human functions) and the handicapped (people restricted in their social activities). Complex rehabilitation includes medical, occupational, pedagogic and social parts that help complete integration back to society by complementing each other. [1]

The point of the whole rehabilitation is to help the handicapped person with his remained abilities, to reach the best possible position both in the family and society. The aim is to attain maximum independence and optimal quality of life. In the process of rehabilitation, we try to find the remained abilities and we support and develop them. In this way we help the patient to have the best possible quality of life. From the side of the patient it is not a passive acceptance, but an active work. With the help of the team members who take part in his rehabilitation, he has to discover the remains of his previous abilities or his unknown abilities which have not been used so far and he has to develop them. Nobody can do this for him, his role is the most important. He is the only one to know how he can live his life and how can give quality for the years to come. The team of rehabilitation can only support him in this, or they might give him directions carefully.

In military health care rehabilitation treatment is given to young or middle aged patients, who had accidents or psychological load in peace or in the past few years they have taken part in missions and were injured in action. Elderly patients mainly need rehabilitation to treat their chronic internal or locomotor diseases. [2.3]

My aim is to consider some psychological aspects that can influence the result of rehabilitation and – being aware of them – might help the daily work for specialists dealing with rehabilitation.

Loss and crisis

The primary trauma can be either physical or psychological. When a psychological crisis is developed, it is generally due to physical or psychological

losses. The word crisis has of Greek origin, which means distress, change. The notion crisis in psychology was created by Caplan in the early 70s of the last century. According to this, the individual is forced to face a situation that endangers his mental balance that cannot be solved or prevented with the usual means of problem solving. [4]

According to Caplan, the criteria of the crisis situation are as follows:

- the individual is forced to face a problem that is dangerous for him;
- its threatening proximity is the most important for him;
- a situation cannot be solved or prevented with the usual means of problem solving.

The cause of the crisis and the way to the crisis can be very different, but the root of the matter is the shaken sense of safety, the complete loss of psychosocial balance. The person loses his previous points of direction in life and cannot see new ones. The severity of the crisis is not determined by the size of the trauma but by the current state of mind, the development of the personality and his problem solving skills. Generally it can be stated that unexpected, uncontrollable, unknown events are the most likely to create crisis. [5]

Crises can be grouped in several ways. They are usually in connection with health conditions, work or the place of work, and human relationships. The cause of crisis can be the loss of an object, the inner conflict of the personality (e.g. between the desire and the demands or expectations). The crisis can be accidental or a developmental (normative) crisis (Erik H. Erikson). Accidental crisis develops suddenly, it occurs after losing an important person or object therefore it is the so-called loss of an object. In fact the main part of all crises is the loss, even in the case of developmental crises. However, it does not mean the loss of an object in the strictest sense of the word. Because it is also a loss when we lose our plans for life, the picture of our future, the picture of our body, (amputation, paralysis), our ability to move, run, jump or to do physical sports. Ageing and the death of the loved one are also a loss. In rehabilitation loss is complex. We can meet the sudden loss of health, the picture of body, independence, roles in the family and in the society, previous picture of future, place of work and relationships.

In peace, soldiers must face similar crisis situations to civilians. However, soldiers can experience crisis caused by the special work conditions (distance from the family, trainings etc.) and the hardships on the battlefield as well. The latter often occurs as a result of the strong fire of the enemy, long term defence, the injuries and deaths of the other soldiers, problems in the family, first action and physical exhaustion. In this case the soldier cannot fulfil his tasks in the battlefield. [5]

In everyday life the person in crisis cannot think of anything else but his problem and his thinking gets narrow. The intensity of routine activities

decreases, he becomes nervy, tense, who cannot control his emotions. He feels defenceless and lost. Their relationships to others change, he judges people on their ability to help him and his requirements for dependency increase significantly. He becomes pliant acutely. He does not have a picture of future.

Processing loss

The life of the person in crisis can only go on if he can process, “mourn” the losses which caused the crisis. Mourning the loss is always individual, however there are different models to describe it. The term of mourning is usually used to describe a situation after the death of a person, but we can mourn other losses as well. The loss of a beloved person can create a more intensive reaction of course, but it is similar to the actual loss of an object and the process of our other losses. “Similarly, we can mourn the end of a marriage or friendship, the person we used to be, or the one we hoped to be.” [6]

Accepting and processing the loss has its own way. The early models distinguished three phases: the shock, making the loss conscious and convalescence (Engel 1964, Averill 1968), but there are four- or five-phase models as well. The two best-known models were made by Elizabeth Kübler-Ross (1988) and János Pilling (2001). They described the mourning of the beloved person, but we can observe almost the same phases in the case of other losses.

The model of Kübler-Ross [7]:

1. denial 2. anger 3. haggling 4. depression 5. acquiescence

In the first phase the individual ignores the reality, and tries to be unaware of what has happened. Then he becomes angry, looks for someone responsible, taunts people living and working around him, the medical staff and family members. This phase is important in rehabilitation because it can turn helping people against him, although it is their subconscious process. The next step is haggling. He makes offers what he would do if he could get rid of this situation. This phase is followed by apathy. Everything is the same. A lot of people stick in this phase. If they manage to get over it, the next step is acquiescence, which is the basis of facing the facts and fight. [8]

According to János Pilling [4]:

1. shock 2. controlled phase 3. acquiescence 4. reconstruction
5. adaptation

Of course, not everybody goes through the above mentioned phases and not in the case of all losses, there are big individual differences. It depends on the object of the loss, the individual, life standards, and previous experiences. If the “object” of the loss is a beloved person, the crisis is more serious and it requires a classical mourning process. “Mourning is one of or maybe the most

serious crisis provoking factors especially if we use the term in the wider sense of the word, in connection with other events (divorce, disappointment in the other person) besides the death of the person. Accidental crisis is almost always the same as the loss if we do not lose a person we can lose an idea, identity or the place of work and in any of the cases the process must or should be very similar to mourning.” [4]

However, futile events can also create a serious crisis, in this case previous life events, losses of objects can explain the unduly serious reaction. This latter one is the so-called timed crisis. [4]

The result of crises:

Solution, compromise, ineffective solution and collapse.

1. The solution of the crisis gives the experience of success, develops the problem solving ability of the personality, enhances personal development and makes the soul stronger. This is the creative crisis.
2. In the case of compromise the personality gets into the spiral of crisis situations and faces the problem again and again.
3. Drug addiction, alcoholism, and other addictions are ineffective solutions.
4. In the case of collapse neurosis, depression, PTSD, psychosis and suicide can occur.

In technical literature the usage of the expression “coping” spread in the second half of the last century. It means problem solving, a form or style to cope with the hardships of life. Those who fight can face the problem, those who try to avoid deny, and surrenders are waiting for guidance. The final results of crisis situations can be influenced significantly by the problem solving style the individual learnt or chose earlier in his life. It is decisive whether he can see the point of his life and the quality of his closer (family) and more distant social relationships.

“If somebody can solve the difficult, crucial situations by getting over them powerfully and with a greater freedom, he becomes more stable and will not panic from the next storm.”[4]

The crisis means a turning point for the individual allowing the possibility of both positive and negative changes. As Béla Buda defined it: “on the one hand, the crisis is a danger, which can cause the breaking-up of mental balance, on the other hand however, it is an opportunity to develop and to mature the personality.”[9] Crisis is always a chance – says László Mérő. [10] Crisis is both danger and chance – writes János Pilling. [4] It is very difficult to make a desperate person in crisis understood that this is the first step to get over the crisis and the psychologist can have the greatest role in this.

At the beginning of their career, soldiers are usually in a much better physical and psychic condition than the other members of the population of the same age and they are proud of this. These people find it much harder to accept health problems; they often ignore them before themselves and their surroundings. If their physical condition changes for good – for example – after amputation or paralysis, it is very hard for them to accept their new condition, the picture of their body and losses, but it is even more difficult to accept the psychological harm. The decay of soldiers' health condition can often accompany the loss of their position and the eventual change of their position in the family and in the society.

PTSD

PTSD (posttraumatic stress disorder) must be mentioned separately because of its significance in military-health care. Although the term had been described several times earlier it was first generally used in the 80s of the last century. It describes a clinical picture of distress, which occurs several weeks or months after a physical or mental trauma and lasts for more than a month. It hits the otherwise healthy people as an influence of traumatic events or extreme circumstances.

The main symptoms of the posttraumatic stress disorder:

- the returning, unintended, visualization of the survived trauma;
- the visualization of “nightmares” by day or at night;
- depression (its existence can turn PTSD into a chronic condition);
- loss of interest;
- sense of guilt (it is called as the sense of guilt of the survivor);
- feelings that are difficult or unsuccessful to control: tension, anger, fear, restlessness, constant preparedness, etc. [11, 12, 13]

These people are frightened after the end of the danger, they have a feeling of helplessness and defencelessness, they feel that the traumatic experience can happen again and the world is not a safe place for them anymore. They relive the traumatic events again and again, but at the same time they want to avoid the situations that remind them of the trauma. However, the bad memories return again and again when they are awake or asleep. It is not the seriousness and the type of the trauma, but the unprocessed experiences, which play a great part in the development of the disease. Not everybody survived similar events, develops the disease. PTSD is more probable if the stress is continuous and occurs day by day, if there is a psychiatric disease in the anamnesis or in the family or after the stress without a supporting connection. It is improbable if coping is efficient, if the personality is flexible or the sociability is good. [11,13,14]

Diagnosis is set up on the basis of the following three groups of symptoms:

- reliving the event again, follow-up reliving
- long standing avoidance of similar situations, escape
long standing acute condition of preparedness, over-irritableness [12, 13, 14]

The development of PTSD, therefore, does not only depend on the traumatic event, but also on the “previous and following circumstances, on the qualities and life experiences of the traumatic person, on the opinion and behaviour of the relatives and the broader social community, the special help (treatment) and other factors.” [12]

It occurs more often with women than with men and during war the number of diseases obviously grows. Civilians are more susceptible to PTSD after surviving the injury of an accident or a violent event, soldiers are imperilled after an injury in action or in a mission and after being taken prisoners. In peaceful conditions earlier 0.5 % of men and 1.3 % of women suffered from PTSD [15]. New research has found higher rates: 6.8 %. [16] 18-54 % of the soldiers of the Vietnam war suffered from it. This high number resulted in the special position of the American soldiers. Besides the stress of the war they were shattered by the negative reception at home. Therefore the “Vietnam syndrome” is considered to be a special form of PTSD. In the South Slav war 14-31 % of the Croatian veterans suffered from PTSD. [12]

The result of the first Hungarian research showed an occurrence of 4.2 % among the soldiers who served in the Balkan war. [17] The occurrence of PTSD was 6.4 % among the Hungarian soldiers in the mission of Iraq. [13] PTSD was caused by the risk of explosions, armed attacks, taking part in action or other events resulting in a high level of stress. The survey – which was prepared with the participation of 280 soldiers who served in the mission in Iraq – showed there is not significant difference between the time spent in the mission, and the number of missions when we examine the occurrence of PTSD. [13]

Reactions to the stress are always subjective and individual. For some people minor stress can cause serious distress because of his previous positions in life and experiences. The occurrence of PTSD depends on the interaction between the traumatic event, previous life experience and the personal qualities of the individual. The most serious cases of stress are caused by traumas made deliberately by other people. [12] The development of PTSD does not only depend on the traumatic event, but also “on the previous and following circumstances, on the life qualities and life experiences of the traumatic person, on the opinion and behaviour of the relatives and the wider social community, on the professional help (treatment) and other factors”. [12]

Setting up the diagnosis is difficult because of the high number of the accompanied diseases (psychiatric and somatic diseases). "The co-morbidity of the disease is 80-90% in the case of chronic course. " [14] It often occurs with depression, alcohol and drug addiction, suicide, cardiovascular, gastrointestinal and immune diseases. [14, 18]

In civilian life women are affected more by PTSD [11], but research has not been done regarding woman soldiers. The position of woman soldiers is special because comparing them to average women they are in especially good physical and psychic condition partly because the principal of equal treatment does not prevail in the army. Woman soldiers do not always get dangerous tasks. It can happen because of the benevolence of the commander or the commander believes that women can solve tasks worse than men. [19]

The possibilities of therapies

One of the members of the rehabilitation team is a psychologist. In the case of harmed and handicapped people it is often obvious that they need psychological help. Nobody can get over the loss of a limb, paralysis or the loss of his self-sufficiency and independence from any case. In order to prevent more serious psychical complaints the patient is often sent to a psychologist – or in a more serious case – to a psychiatrist even in the ward providing acute treatment. In other cases a member of the rehabilitation team can suggest a proposal during the team meetings. It is advisable to involve the family into the psychological treatment together with the patient, or individually.

The groups of psychotherapies:

I. Individual psychotherapy

II. Family therapy

III. Group therapy

IV. Medicinal therapy

A part of the psychical problems that occur in the rehabilitation department could be decreased by giving suitable information to the patients. Another part of them could be reduced by creating good connection with the team members. The steady family and social background is also a significant protective factor. Therapies that develop coping strategies, decrease stress and help adaptation can help a lot in order to get rid of the crisis. In the case of people who survived a serious trauma, the preventive psychotherapy can decrease the aggravation of the problems and the possibility of becoming chronic if it is started as soon as possible.

Dr Klára Öry created the following table while she was dealing with the psychological treatment of the prevention and rehabilitation of cardiologic diseases. This therapeutic review can efficiently be applied in other fields of rehabilitation, as well.

Non pharmacological therapies in the primary and secondary prevention and rehabilitation:

1. Therapeutic methods built on relaxation
 - 1.1. Autogenous training
 - 1.2. Progressive relaxation
 - 1.3. Diaphragm and abdominal breathing as non-pharmacological therapy
 - 1.4. Creating short encouraging and self-informing models
 - 1.5. Redirection as non-pharmacological method
2. Stress management as non-pharmacological method
3. Behavioural therapy as non-pharmacological method
4. Cognitive therapy as non-pharmacological method [20]

In the case of soldiers the selection applied at admission then the methods after stressful events (e.g. debriefing), early, acute psychological interventions, group cohesion, psychical preparation can highly decrease the development of psychical impairment. [5, 21] Psychological first aid must be started as soon and as near to the battle field as possible, where it is already safe. During the training it is started by fellow soldiers and commanders who have been trained in advance then the special Stress Care Group continues it. After Hungary joined NATO, new principles were created for the organization of psychiatric care. The so-called Stress Care Group the operation of which can be characterized by proximity, immediacy, hope and simplicity can be positioned at ROLE 1,2,3 level as well. It has a significant role in the prevention of PTSD. (22) Its members can be psychiatrists, psychologists and special assistants. "...in the case of adequate psychological first aid a significant rate of soldiers, who show stress reaction, can be reactivated quickly." [21]

The Mitchell model, the model of the Stress handling of Critical Events, was developed in the 80s. Its most important part is the psychological debriefing, the immediate ventilation of emotions and feelings. Since the middle of the 90s its usefulness has been questioned and researchers found the development of flexible resistance, the resilience and the support of fight more efficient in psychological first aid. After the terrorist attack of 11 September 2001 experiences backed the significance of the development of resilience. [24]

In 90 % of the cases the acute, early care is successful, if it is not, the soldier's depletion is necessary. A stress care base can be established at ROLE 1,2,3 level and if it is necessary the patient can be sent to the suitable department of a special hospital or a rehabilitation institute. Separating physical and psychical casualties further improved the results of the treatment of battlefield stress. Namely, the experience of the physical injury can make the symptoms of the psychical casualty worse and the psychical conditions of the physical casualty can not only worsen from the consciousness of the somatic conditions but also from the patient's psychical reactions. Therefore the soldier who is hurt

both psychically and physically requires a ‘complex’ treatment. As soon as it is possible to make contact with the injured soldier his psychical treatment starts together with the other mainly surgical treatment. The acute stress usually passes off quickly without any remains but the treatment of the more complicated chronic conditions takes a longer time and provides fewer results. 40-70 % of the chronic cases can be put back to service. [21,23, 24]

It is necessary to emphasize the therapy of PTSD as the efficiency of these treatment methods is backed by a significant number of evidence-based examinations. First of all prevention would be the most important, that is, an immediate, preventive psycho-diagnosis and therapy. In the course of psycho-therapy, at the beginning the aim is to establish confidence and mitigate the most serious symptoms. The next step is to process the traumatic experience, to relive it, to accept it mentally, finally we must rebuild family and social connections. [12]

In the treatment of developed PTSD, the following psycho-therapeutic methods proved to be evidence-based on the basis of efficiency examinations:

- Cognitive behavioural therapy
- Stress inoculation training
- Eye movement desensitization and reliving
- Imaginational therapy
- Psycho-dynamic therapies

During the examinations the last two were found to be less efficient, but the effects of the other therapies also showed big individual differences. [23]

It is the psychiatrist’s task to prescribe medicinal treatments besides the above therapies or if they are unsuccessful.

Other factors to determine healing

Burnout

There is a strong connection between the way the patient and healthcare workers feel. I must speak about the psychically overburdened staff and consequently about the burnout syndrome. The burnout syndrome is a physical-emotional-mental exhaustion developed by long-term overburden mainly among people who deal with people day by day. Rehabilitation can often last for months or years. The emotional atmosphere in which it takes place is very important. According to the very important statement by Ágnes Riskó “this emotional climate often has a bigger role in the success of rehabilitation than the applied method or the professional knowledge of the specialist.” [11]

The emotional atmosphere that the members of the team create in a rehabilitation department is not quite conscious it mostly consists of unconscious elements. Therefore, it would be very important to protect staff’s

psychical health, to ward off burnout. The supervision with outside specialists, e.g. the Bálint group, is a definitely good method against burnout. The team members' connections with the patients are more efficient, human and open in the long run as well.

“...struggling with a serious chronic illness requires the same qualities from the patient, the relatives and the health care workers as well: empathy, attention, the ability to fight, persistence, flexibility, creativity, continuous positive personality development, sociability fit for the individual.” [11]

Family

My daily experience is that the role and significance of the family, which is regarded a natural environment, changes in trouble. The patient and his family members get into crisis again and it would be easier to get out of it together. In crisis family problems turn up. In general, families who worked together well earlier can increase their cohesion, but unfortunately the case is not always like this. In the course of rehabilitation the steady family background – which waits for the patient at home – has an extremely big importance. No matter how good the health care system is that the patient uses, how many friends he has, he can expect real help from the family for his future life. The one who is not awaited at home does not want to be rehabilitated. However, the family itself can also require significant psychical-social help to process the events. The model of the military family support, which was created during the Croatian war, can set an example. [25]

Social relationships outside the family

Self-supporting groups are organized by patients suffering from the same disease the role of which is setting example, encouragement, giving information and support. In Hungary one of these self-supporting groups is the Révész service, which has been organizing excellent counselling for people living in wheel chairs. Its members are all people living in wheel chairs. Patients can believe and trust the advice of only those people who live the same life, who can show the way and the real possibility of the future. Several smaller and bigger problems can occur that can be understood by only a fellow sufferer who could experience the ways of solutions, as well.

Religion

The active exercise of religion, regular visits to church and participation in religious events cause lower morbidity and mortality in a lot of illnesses. Patients who exercise their religion spend less than half as much time in hospital as the non-religious control group. Religion helps the coping abilities. Psychical disorders, distress and depression are less frequent among those who exercise their religion actively, their life expectancy is longer and they have a wider range of coping repertoire than others. Their social relationships are wider.

“According to the analysis and studies of those dealing with prayers, praying is like an oxygen tent for people’s personality and nervous system. Many people think that the devoted, active faith has the same role and effect as non-pharmacological methods.” [20]

Social effects

The efficiency of the life quality and the rehabilitation of handicapped people are significantly determined by the tolerance and empathy of the closer and wider environment (society). The rate of financial, material and legal support and the system of social relationships and work opportunities are a direct consequence of it. Education and the mass media have a decisive role to form the social opinion-tolerance, support.

The Vietnam syndrome indicated the special position of soldiers. In their case the society’s negative or positive judgement and the difference between taking part in an offensive or defensive war was even more significant. Besides, physical injuries arouse the empathy of the society, but psychical trauma causes prejudice and it is stigmatized. The American Vet-centres – rehabilitation centres established for veterans after the Vietnam war – and the Croatian model had a complex psycho-social care system which could be used successfully in other countries, as well. [12]

Conclusion

The majority of patients in rehabilitation are in crisis and they have losses. They have lost their health, their old body, their work, and their previous social relationships have changed. Processing the loss and leaving the crisis behind cannot be successful alone or it takes too much time. During this time they can develop depression, apathy, PTSD, different kinds of neurosis, psychosis and addictions. Therefore, if we want to achieve successful rehabilitation – to ensure optimum life quality with the remained possibilities – it is necessary to support the patient psychologically besides the improvement of the physical conditions. Different non-pharmacological therapies applied by psychologists – or in more serious cases – non-pharmacological and pharmacological treatments applied by psychiatrists can help this. Besides the patient, it is important to support also the family psychologically (if it is necessary), because the steady family and social background is a great support for the patient in rehabilitation. Without the means and methods of psychology and their proper application we cannot speak about successful and complex rehabilitation.

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FORUM of PhD CANDIDATES

Maj. Eng. Pál Bárkányi, PhD aspirant

THE MTTFF (MEAN TIME TO FIRST FAILURE) CALCULATES IN AFGHANISTAN OR CALCULATES OF MILITARY POWER SUPPLY SYSTEMS

Abstract

This study describes the examination method for evaluating reliability in military power supply systems, which can be used for example in ISAF (Afghanistan). I made a model that can be adopted to the MTTFF calculates of complex military equipment. In planning the systems, it is fundamental to develop a complex electric architecture which can guarantee a reliable, trouble-proof and continuous operation.

Keywords

power supply systems; inspection rate; repair rate; math model; maintenance; extended time; reliability; complex;

Introduction

Predictive maintenance is performed to extend the equipment's lifetime, not only that of civilian equipment, but the military special equipment, as well. A probabilistic model of the effect of maintenance on reliability was first introduced in "Military equipment in the field". The field is a military activity area, for example ISAF (in Afghanistan). Based on this general model, power supply of Mil HQ and maintenance model is proposed to utilize the concept of discrete stages. Model parameters in the proposed model are assumed to be known from the collected data. The parameters include the inspection rate of each stage, the mean time in each stage; and this study investigates the effect of model parameters on reliability. The analysis covers the mean time to the first failure; and the simulation results of the proposed model are corroborated by mathematical equations of the used equivalent model.

Transformer maintenance model of power supply systems

A general model of the effect of maintenance on reliability is described in this article; the model represents the descent process of a device by discrete stages. In Fig. 1, the deterioration process of a transformer is approximated by three discrete stages: S1, S2, and S3. At each stage, the current/voltage is

inspected to determine the condition of it. After the inspection, the current/voltage condition is determined by the indicated criteria. The criteria categorize the current/voltage condition into three groups ranging from normal (C1) to adverse condition (C3).

Discrete stages:

1. Central Power Supply /S1/;
2. Aggregators /S2/;
3. Accumulators /S3/.




Fig. 1. Transformer maintenance model

These current/voltage conditions are categorized:

1. Good working condition /C1/
2. Required reconditioning before use /C2/
3. Adverse condition (disconnect) /C3/

Maintenance accomplishment is measured by the current/voltage condition. If the current/voltage condition is C1, it is not necessary to do anything. If the current/voltage condition is C2, C3, two ways are available: power reconditioning or disconnecting. For example, if the actual stage is S2, with the current/voltage condition C2, the probability of reconditioning the current/voltage parameters will be higher than disconnecting (and no power). In turn, if the actual stage is S2, with the current/voltage condition C3, the probability of power disconnection will be higher. After maintenance, the device will have to go to stage S1, S2, or S3. The probability of transferring to other stages is conditioned by the actual stage and maintenance practice. [1]

Analysis

The corresponding models have three discrete stages, which represent the deterioration processes. Assuming that the maintenance is implemented at every inspection, the maintenance and inspection rate of each stage is considered to be an equivalent repair rate.

Let,

y_1 = mean time in S1 (year),

y_2 = mean time in S2 (year),

y_3 = mean time in S3 (year),

μ_{21} = repair rate from S2 to S1 (/year),

μ_{32} = repair rate from S3 to S2 (/year),

μ_{31} = repair rate from S3 to S1 (/year).




Fig. 2. Maintenance mode (MTTFF)

Transition rate from stage S1 to S3 is introduced (λ_{13}) to explain an imperfect inspection of stage 1. This model accounts for the probability that the inspection of stage 1 might cause the system to transit to stage 3. This model is an equivalent model for transformer maintenance model in Fig. 1, since it accounts for a transition of stages 1–3 (Fig. 2). The equivalent models will be adopted in analyses and calculate the MTTFF [2][3].

MTTFF equations are derived from using the methodology of first passage time calculation. The equations in Fig. 2. inspection model describe the simulation results in Fig 1. The analysis is based on equivalent math models, perfect maintenance model and imperfect maintenance model [4][5].

Let,

T_0 = life time without maintenance,

T_E = extended life time with maintenance,

$\lambda_{12} = 1/y_1$ transition rate from S1 to S2,

$\lambda_{23} = 1/y_2$ transition rate from S2 to S3,

$\lambda_{3f} = 1/y_3$ transition rate from S3 to F.

$$T_0 = y_1 + y_2 + y_3$$

$$T_E = \frac{\mu_{21}}{\lambda_{12}\lambda_{23}} + \frac{\mu_{32}}{\lambda_{23}\lambda_{3f}} + \frac{\mu_{21}\mu_{32}}{\lambda_{12}\lambda_{23}\lambda_{3f}}$$

$$MTTFF = T_0 + T_E = y_1 + y_2 + y_3 + \mu_{21} y_1 y_2 + \mu_{32} y_2 y_3 + \mu_{21}\mu_{32}y_1y_2y_3$$

The extended time of without negative feedback model is a sum total of all combinations of ratios between the maintenance rate of the actual stage and the failure rate of the actual and previous stage. Inspection and maintenance will always extend the equipment life time, because T_E can be only positive. If the repair rate of each stage is highly relative to the transition rate of that stage and the previous stage ($\mu_{21} \gg \lambda_{12}\lambda_{23}$, $\mu_{32} \gg \lambda_{23}\lambda_{3f}$), the lifetime before failure of the device will be high [6].

The analysis with negative feedback model:

Truncated transitional probability matrix Q is constructed

$$Q_n = \begin{bmatrix} 1 - \left(\lambda_{13} + \frac{1}{y_1} \right) & \frac{1}{y_1} & \lambda_{13} \\ \mu_{21} & 1 - \left(\mu_{21} + \frac{1}{y_2} \right) & \frac{1}{y_2} \\ \mu_{31} & \mu_{32} & 1 - \left(\mu_{31} + \mu_{32} + \frac{1}{y_1} \right) \end{bmatrix}$$

The expected number of time intervals matrix is calculated from $N = [I - Q_n]^{-1}$

$$\det(N) = \frac{1}{y_1 y_2 y_3} + \frac{\lambda_{13}}{y_2 y_3} + \frac{\lambda_{13} \mu_{21}}{y_3}$$

Entering from stage 1, MTTF is the summation of matrix $N(1)$.

MTTF =

$$\frac{1}{\det(N)} \left(\frac{1}{y_2 y_3} + \frac{1}{y_1 y_3} + \frac{1}{y_1 y_2} + \mu_{21} (\mu_{31} + \mu_{32}) + \frac{\mu_{21}}{y_3} + \frac{\mu_{21}}{y_2} + \lambda_{13} \mu_{32} + \frac{\mu_{31}}{y_1} + \frac{\mu_{32}}{y_1} + \frac{\mu_{13}}{y_2} + \lambda_{13} \mu_{21} \right)$$

$$MTTF = \frac{T_0 + T_E}{1 + \frac{\lambda_{13} + \lambda_{13} \mu_{21}}{\lambda_{12} \lambda_{12} \mu_{32}}}$$

According to Table 1 and Table 2, the different MTTFs can be calculated.

λ_{12} [1/h]	λ_{23} [1/h]	λ_{13} [1/h]	λ_{3f} [1/h]	μ_{21} [1/h]	μ_{32} [1/h]	μ_{31} [1/h]	MTTF [h]
4,00E-04	2,00E-04	3,00E-05	1,00E-06	0,1	0,01	0,001	5,02E+07
4,00E-04	2,00E-04	3,00E-05	1,00E-05	0,1	0,01	0,001	5,56E+06
4,00E-04	2,00E-04	3,00E-05	1,00E-04	0,1	0,01	0,001	5,67E+05
4,00E-04	2,00E-04	3,00E-05	1,00E-03	0,1	0,01	0,001	6,17E+04
4,00E-04	2,00E-04	3,00E-05	1,00E-02	0,1	0,01	0,001	1,11E+04

Table 1. λ_{3f} represented




Diagram 1.

λ_{12} [1/h]	λ_{23} [1/h]	λ_{13} [1/h]	λ_{3f} [1/h]	μ_{21} [1/h]	μ_{32} [1/h]	μ_{31} [1/h]	MTTFF [h]
1,00E-04	1,00E-04	1,00E-06	1,00E-04	0,1	0,01	0,001	1,12E+06
1,00E-04	1,00E-04	1,00E-05	1,00E-04	0,1	0,01	0,001	1,12E+06
1,00E-04	1,00E-04	1,00E-04	1,00E-04	0,1	0,01	0,001	1,12E+06
1,00E-04	1,00E-04	1,00E-03	1,00E-04	0,1	0,01	0,001	1,10E+06
1,00E-04	1,00E-04	1,00E-02	1,00E-04	0,1	0,01	0,001	9,46E+05

Table 1. λ_{13} represented




Diagram 2.

The connections of the inspection rate of each stage and the MTTF are listed in the following [7].

Inspection rate of stage S1

It is probable that inspection and maintenance will decrease MTTF at the top of inspection rate of stage 1 (recall that high inspection in stage S1 will raise λ_{13} ; thus, denominator possible large). This will increase the failure rate from stage S1 to S3; therefore, MTTF may reduce.

Inspection rate of stage S2

High inspection rate of stage S2 will raise the repair rate from stage S2 to S1 (μ_{21}).

Hypothesizing that this repair rate is very high,

$$\text{MTTF} \approx \frac{1 + \gamma_3 (\mu_{31} + \mu_{32} + \lambda_{13})}{\lambda_{13}}$$

Inspection rate of stage S3

High inspection rate of S3 will increase the repair rate from stage S3 to S2 (μ_{32}) and also the repair rate of stage 3 to 1 (μ_{31}). These rates are linearly related to MTTF; therefore, the lifetime will increase linearly with the inspection rate of stage 3.

Conclusion

I tried to present this study to show how we can simulate the MTTF in the military field of NIC. I made the mathematical equations of the equivalent model, which suggests the criteria of implementing maintenance of military equipment by failure. The proposed model represents probable failures, so we can plan the repair and inspection time. The time is an important variable, because distance between Afghanistan and Hungary is long, and expert engineers can only infrequently repair and inspect the systems.

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Attila BUGYAKI, PhD aspirant

MONEY LAUNDERING IN THE SHADE OF THE UNDERGROUND BANKING SYSTEM

Abstract

Underground banking system is one of the oldest procedures that is able to transport service and cash in a secret and safe way from one place to another, without moving the “value” itself. Of course, this method is far from being a part of honest merchant procedures. In our times, this method is used by tax evaders, organized criminals, organizations financed by some governments, intelligence services and terrorists, besides money launderers, while governments and anti-criminal authorities are powerless against it.

Key expressions: – underground banking system – hawala – informal value transfer system – money laundering – terrorism

Introduction

The act of money laundering can be carried out in numerous ways. Inventive villains always find out newer and newer methods, but still there are some typical acts and techniques that have been generally and successfully utilized and are hard to track. For this reason they are preferred by criminals. This is a self-sustaining and self-generating process, in which there is no start and no end, since the cycle is constant.

Prostitution, trade of weapons and drugs and also terrorism are the acts that are mainly involved in money laundering. The criminals’ aim is – besides keeping themselves being anonymous – to prevent the origin of the dirty money from being detected. They continuously develop their methods while mitigating the chance to be caught, and in the meanwhile they search for new, yet not utilized business opportunities. They are well educated and quick, and they find occasional or constant allies – based on mutual services – in order to reach their goals.

The introduction of stricter rules in the banking sector in the last decade resulted in the fact that criminals search for new methods, which anti-money laundering regulations do not apply to.¹ Money launderers' main objective is to provide that the dirty money go through as many systems as possible, thus making harder – or even impossible – to detect or unveil the way of money. However, the regulation of the banking sector became stricter and this led to the fact that criminals wishing to legalize their money are “forced” to search for new potential channels outside the banking system. One of these commonly utilized solutions is using secret underground banking systems.²

Underground banking system

A few days after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, Senator John Kerry said in an article (US Forbes bin Laden's Finances) in the daily paper Newsday the following: “US efforts to track bin Laden's finances may be complicated by his network's use of the 'Hawala' system, an underground money system that in part lets people in different countries swap cash, eliminating the need for cross-border transfers and avoiding exchange laws” [1]. Detecting the events proved that terrorists had utilized informal money and value transfer services besides formal financial sector to carry out the destruction [2]. As terrorist actions against the USA and then against Europe are under any circumstances considered as attacks against the western world, we may conclude that the working of the underground banking systems means a global problem, as they exceed regional levels, so the world has to deal with the topic on an international level.³

The activity itself is of Asian origin, but nowadays it can be found on all of the continents in a specific way. Underground banking system was originally established to make interregional trade easier and safer.⁴ Later on, immigrants and foreigner employees developed the system by transferring their salaries to their relatives. The system was basically formed by the wish to offer indirect and

¹ In countries, where the banking sector is underdeveloped or its services are not available for some reasons, the simplest way for criminals is to take the control of a given bank or to establish one to carry out their deals.

² Transfer of „values” can happen – besides traditional banks – by: a non-banking financial service provider, that is money transfer operators (MTOs), like Western Union or MoneyGram; post offices; currency bureaus; businessmen (export and import traders) and money couriers.

³ The first steps were made by the USA following the terrorist acts. On 24-25th of September 2001, financial resources of terrorists were frozen and anti-money laundering acts were introduced. The Department of Homeland Security was established, then the Congress passed and anti-terrorist act (the Patriotic Act) within one and a half month. Recognizing the significance of the problem, international organizations established special institutions and working groups to unveil the phenomenon and to effectively fight against it. The most significant anti-money laundering international organizations are Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering (FATF), Moneyval and Egmont Group.

⁴ Shipping money and values was very unsafe those times owing to the frequent robbery attacks.

informal credit services to help family members, friends and people belonging to the same trust community or place. The method was converting and developing through the last centuries, but the traditional meaning remained the same, and nowadays the trade is carried out as a routine.

Underground banking system is an informal banking agreement that is partly parallel and supplementary to the formal banking system, but is totally independent from that. In other words, it is a cross-border money swap without any banking transfers. So this system offers an excellent alternative or substitute method, besides the traditional financial system.

According to a 2010 estimate of the International Monetary Fund, money laundering reaches 2-5% of the global GDP, which means thousands of billions of dollars every year [3]. However, there are no exact data on how much of this amount is transferred through underground banking system, only estimates are available.⁵ But one thing is sure: underground banking system – as a favourable opportunity – is utilized more and more transferring bigger and bigger sums because of the strict regulations introduced in the formal banking system during the last years.

Globalization bursting also into the financial sector helped the development of the shadow economy as well. This led to an increase of opportunities of transnational money laundering by criminals. Underground banking system may be used for both legal and illegal aims. This method is a virtual way of money transfer, which had been existed even before the traditional banking system was established [4].

Criminal and terrorist groups all around the world may differ from each other in many ways, but one thing is indispensable for all of them: financial sources to support their illegal and harmful objectives. To elaborate on this, they need to establish well working and special financial infrastructure and utilize formal and informal channels – alternately or parallel – to carry out their actions.

Money laundering as an act is present mainly on an international basis, sharply decreasing the risk of getting unveiled. Villains utilize several techniques either in a combined way or separately during their acts, just to minimize the possibility of getting discovered. The higher is the number of channels the dirty money goes through, the less is the risk. However, proportionate to the number of channels, additional cost may increase, making this process more expensive.

Illegal financial sources are the most vulnerable in the period of the so called “setting”, as it is demanding and risky to handle the sources in the form of cash in this phase. That is why the primary aim of criminals is to get the gained

⁵ The exact amount of money streaming through underground banking system cannot be stated, as there are no exact data owing to the lack of registries.

dirty money safe as soon as possible, or to send it as far as possible from the scene of the criminal act. Among the many and various solutions to handle this challenge, one of the most appropriate ways is to utilize the channels of the underground banking system.

These days the services of the underground banking system are not only based on persons, or communities of ethnics, religion or culture, but they work expressively on business basis.

According to a report of the Australian Institute of Criminology, the use of underground banking system may mean an exceptionally viable alternative to the official banking sector, when the financial, political or social surroundings of a country change dramatically [5]. An evident example for this is a war-stricken area, where there is no real possibility to establish a formal financial system. Countries with underdeveloped financial systems and rural areas with no connection to the services of the formal financial sector are further opportunities. In such cases, underground banking system might be very prosperous.

It is important to note that the system is viable only when the countries concerned are in a close and mutual relationship (e.g. in trade), so that the operations can get into an equilibrium.⁶

For the expression “underground banking system”, FATF uses “Alternative Remittance Systems” (ARS), the US uses “Informal Value Transfer Systems” (IVTS), while Hong Kong uses „Unregulated Remittance Centers” (URC) [6]. Sometimes the expressions “parallel”, “relationship”, “informal”, “unregulated”, “intermediary” or “secret” banking system are also used.

However, in the western world and media, the expression underground or alternative banking system is used mainly, although – because an exact definition for the former is hard to be given – the expression “Informal Value Transfer Systems” is more and more widely used. By the way, the expression “underground banking system” is not exact, as: 1.) the system is not always underground (illegal), it can legally work in many countries (e.g. India, Pakistan), 2.) no bank is involved into the process, so this is an act entirely out of the formal sector, 3.) this is not a single system, as various settlements and ethnic groups may do it in different ways [7]. It cannot be really called “alternative banking system” neither, as the system had worked well before the appearance of the first traditional banks.⁷

⁶ Physical transportation of bigger amounts of money means no problem within the EU owing to the 500 euro notes.

⁷ Within the expression “underground/alternative banking system” the words “banking system” do not really cover reality, as operators of the system do not carry out classic banking acts, such as collecting debits and handling credits.

The grouping of the Informal Value Transfer Systems – the Hawala

Informal Value Transfer Systems can be divided into three groups based on traditions (the geographical locations and ethnical groupings of users). These groups are: Hundi or Hawala,⁸ Chop Shop or Chitti Banking and the Black Market Peso Exchange. Besides these, there is the Chinese Fei ch'ien (flying money); thai Phoe Kuan; mandarin Chinese Hui k'uan (remittance of money) and Ch'iao Hui (overseas remittance); South-American Stash house (for Casa de Cambio); for Tae Chew and Cantonese-speaking peoples there is Nging sing kek (money letter shop); for Vietnamese living in Australia there is Hui or Hui Kuan (association), and in the Philippines there is Padala [7].

Among these, Hawala is worth a deeper analysis. This phenomenon originates from the Indian subcontinent and has been a well-functioning system for centuries now.⁹ First Indians, then Arabs used it to make trade settlements less complicated. Mules and camels were used to transport messages, values and money, but later – parallel to the development of technology – postal services, telephones and fax were the means. Nowadays, they mainly use e-mail and internet. The word Hawala originates from the Arab word “hwl” meaning “to change” or “to transform” [7]. Sometimes it is used as a synonym for “trust” when it is about personal relationships or carrying out official deals. Hawala means giving money or information between two people by using a third one as a means of transforming [8]. In non-Arabic Muslim countries the word is written as “Hawallah”. This network is an underground banking system making it possible to transport thousands of dollars either regionally or globally from one place to another without any physical movement of the value (that might be cash or service as well) or without any paper-based receipts, contracts or bank accounts. Its main advantage is that it is simple, effective, fast, discrete, reliable and anonymous (both the sender and the addressee are anonymous),¹⁰ there are no banking costs, international foreign exchange rules might be avoided, money can be sent to a place where there is no official banking system, and the deals can be carried out with no trace and risk anytime without any track records. Moreover, in many countries – e.g. in Dubai – Hawala works as supplementary method in the local economy, so the authorities do not have any interests to

⁸ For this phenomenon, the expression “hawala” is used in India, while “hundi” is used in Pakistan.

⁹ There are various opinions even today concerning the origin and establishment of hawala. In Islamic law we can meet this expression even in the 8th century, though the system was used to finance far-distance trading in the early middle ages. According to some of the authors, like Patrick Jost and Harjit Singh Sandhu, hawala has been in operation for at least three centuries, being pioneer to “traditional” and “western” banks. The first of the “western banks” was established in Calcutta, India around 1770 under the name Bank of Hindustan [9].

¹⁰ The original aim of being anonymous was to protect the illegal immigrants using the system to transfer their money home from penalties.

hinder its functioning. All this is based on trust, some trustworthy people, a well-built international network and a safe means of communication. The client can get his money at the place of destination and in the currency he wishes by using a code. Members of the system settle with each other regularly – usually monthly – to ensure two-way traffic and that there was enough cash to serve clients in all the regions. Besides international trade, this system is utilized by money launderers, drug and weapon dealers, organized criminals and terrorists. Hawala traders are not always interested in the origin of the money; they only seek a previously bargained fee.¹¹ “Hawala triangle” with most of the secret remittances consists of Pakistan, India and Dubai [10].

Some shades of the underground banking system

Utilization of the underground banking system has appeared and spread in the western world during the last decade; and this brought and raised problems concerning money laundering and terrorism, as well.

However, it must be seen that the main problem is not the movement of the dirty money within the legal and illegal banking system, but the criminal organizations and terrorist groups controlling the transport of these financial sources and using them to reach their harmful aims.

The main risk of the underground banking system is that it is not regulated and hard to control, since there is no personal contact (face-to-face or “get known to your client” are not valid this time). Relating to this, increasing transparency and track recording of money are basic goals for the future.

Although traditional banks and financial institutions try to hinder the entrance of criminals into the financial system by continuous and strict regulation, but this force criminals to use less regulated banking systems.

Underground banking system cannot be abolished – and this is not a goal either – as Hawala continues to be one of the most evident and sometimes the only available opportunity for most of the immigrants and honest users. Because of this fact, it is extremely important for governments to make attempts to decrease flows towards illegal channels, but also to provide legal users with the opportunity of using this system as a lawful and alternative remittance system. This is of course very hard to carry out in practice, but it is required to keep criminals out with the help of regulations¹² – similarly to the practices that have been followed so far.

¹¹ The remittance fee is usually 0.25-1.25 percent of the remitted sum and/or the profit gained on remittance. If the money to be transferred is of questionable origin, the price of the service might reach 15-20% [11].

¹² A permission and a registry could be required for all who carries out financial operations, and the regulations and recommendations of international organizations should be compulsory.

Although it seems that there is a shortage of regulations, these underground banks work along strict, unwritten rules, where trustworthiness and discipline are even more important, as even a small mistake may cause deadly consequences for the organized criminals. It is also important to note that while a complete banking system may be stopped by a technical problem, this is not the case when it is about simple underground banking systems, as there are no computer servers to stream and store data.

Criminals and terrorist organisations are most vulnerable in two points. One of them is communications, the other is funding. Fight against these groups can only be effective if authorities make steps against them even in the starter phase, utilizing their weak points. Those fighting against dishonest underground banking system must be flexible enough to react to the changing international financial infrastructure in due time. Moreover, international accounting standards and agreed recommendations of international organizations must be taken into consideration during the “fight”. However, differences in legal systems, cultures and languages are the main obstacles when unveiling underground banking systems.

Summary

To sum up we can state that while usual people naively think they only can locally or internationally move or remit their money via banks and financial service providers, there are also other legal – and, of course, illegal – methods and techniques to complete financial transactions besides formal banking channels, as it turns out from the above mentioned facts. To launder money of dirty origin, criminals used traditional systems at the beginning, however, parallel to the spread of regulations, a part of these financial sources leaked into the uncontrolled niches of the underground banking systems.

Money laundering – adapting to the challenges – went through a kind of development procedure, and – by the beginning of the 21st century – organized crime actors and terrorists do not use financial transactions via classic banks only. On the contrary, alternative solutions, including the use of informal banking systems are gaining ground. While underground banking system was previously used by criminals to legalize dirty money (besides legal trading), nowadays it is more and more frequently used to finance terrorism.

Criminals and those wishing to launder money are dynamic and determined to reach their goals, and they are also overtaking legal system by one step – or rather two steps. By creating and elaborating newer and newer techniques, they frequently conquer unutilized financial and economic opportunities, thus causing several billion dollar damages to the world economy and also enhancing the financing of terrorism.

I am of the opinion that real achievements in the fight against illegal users can be reached only if we continue and increase regional and global cooperation and establish an international and regulated law system. Owing to the global spread of terrorism, increasing attention must be paid to controlling and unveiling informal international banking networks of terrorists, besides hindering money laundering. Furthermore, efforts must be taken to reduce the volume of uncontrolled and illegal financial sources channelled via underground banking system, but the paradoxical situation that the method must be kept as an alternative remittance system to legal actors must be solved.

Finally, it must be realized that the stricter the banking regulations are the bigger is the need for new alternative methods, among others, to maintain a paperless banking system. And as long as this need is present, underground banking system cannot be eliminated, but efforts must be taken to minimize their negative utilization.

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ROLE AND IMPORTANCE OF RECONNAISSANCE IN THE FIGHT AGAINST IRREGULAR WARFARE, EFFECT OF THE EXPERIENCES LEARNT ON THE PLANNING AND THE CONDUCT OF RECONNAISSANCE

Abstract

Nowadays, wars – in the traditional meaning of the word – do not represent a threat to our society any more. At the same time, current asymmetric challenges require more effective counter-measures by the armed forces. Reconnaissance is the basis of paramount importance for the military to counter new challenges, dangers and threats. Reconnaissance is a process, when full spectre of intelligence is being applied. This activity can be best identified as a series of actions where every phase and component serves one and the same goal, only the applied techniques and possibilities are different. The outcome must help the military leadership in answering the questions and planning the operations with the use of the collected information.

Keywords: Reconnaissance, irregular warfare, insurgents, Afghanistan

Major military operations in the first decade of the 21st century (e.g. in Afghanistan since 2001, in Iraq since 2003) fundamentally differ from the theoretical principles and plans, strategic and operational concepts developed in the last decade of the 20th century related to ongoing and future wars and military conflicts of the 21st century.

This essay – chiefly based on US experience – has been written in an effort to provide readers with conclusions of universal character. Based on US experience the author intends to prove the importance of reconnaissance in fighting against a multitude of risk factors threatening our present security. A primary factor is the experience gained during the military operations started in October 2001, in Afghanistan, which radically changed the principles of

planning, preparations and the carrying out of operations, including also the modifications and improvement in the mentioned principles and procedures. Military experts of the United States – based on their several-decade-long observations – have introduced the expression "Unconventional Warfare"¹³. Guerrilla-warfare is identified as an example for the unconventional warfare, first emphasising its importance.¹⁴ Summing up the recent experience gained from military operations throughout the earth, we can state that the US armed forces and their allies – including also the military commanders have to reckon with an enemy pursuing irregular warfare, which is completely different from traditional warfare patterns of the past.

In operations against forces pursuing irregular warfare, military power has still a dominant role. Only joint well-coordinated and effective military and intelligence operations can guarantee success in the fighting against these kinds of unconventional challenges. The main goal of the military operations is to prevent the enemy from resorting to unconventional methods. In order to achieve this objective, mission-tailored military units carry out a full spectre of defensive and offensive operations.

Reconnaissance is the token of success in both defensive and offensive operations. Reconnaissance is an activity organized by the commander to collect properly analysed and as completely assessed as possible information on both the operational area and the enemy forces. It is of paramount importance to obtain and digest the information in the pre-operation phase. In order to have a clearer picture of the operation, central control and coordinated activity is needed at each level of headquarters with a real-time exchange of information. Any available capabilities should be utilized for an efficient and effective reconnaissance, including forces in the line of contact, reconnaissance platoons, patrols, air defence reconnaissance, military special reconnaissance and map-maker units, artillery locators and liaison officers.¹⁵

Planning anti-insurgent operations, various phases of reconnaissance:¹⁶

1. The first phase of reconnaissance is planning. In this phase, operations are planned with the aim to collect relevant information. Priority plans are drawn up to rank the many various tasks (which are subsequently assigned to the available forces) and to detach appropriate tools for the different reconnaissance

¹³ FM 31-21 Guerrilla Warfare and Special Forces Operations, Department of the Army, Washington D. C. 1961.

¹⁴ Kőszegvári Zsuzsa Dóra - The necessary intelligence information's acquisition and processing for the decision of commander in the unconventional warfare. In: Felderítő Szemle X. year No. 1-2. pp. 210-216. oldal, 2011.

¹⁵ FM 100-5 Operations, Field Manual Handbook, The Hungarian Army Chief of Defence, Budapest, 1997.

¹⁶ Schreier Fred R. – Combating Terrorism and its Implications for Intelligence. In.: Combating Terrorism and its Implications for the Security Sector. Swedish National Defence College, Stockholm, 2005.

missions. Reconnaissance data must be clear, brief, factual and up-to-date to support the commander's decision-making. It is a key prerequisite for the reconnaissance in war, especially in the battlefield to anticipate potential events, as accurately as possible. Reconnaissance system should strengthen and coordinate the support to commanders while decreasing the risks shouldered by the commander in the decision-making process.

The main function of reconnaissance is to provide the military leader with reliable and accurate information on the time-frame, the force and equipment requirements as well as the full-range of targets of the given military operation. Reconnaissance data support commanders in conducting defensive and offensive operations to make decisions on time to prevent enemy operations. In the context of traditional data collection, characteristic of every reconnaissance activity, permanent collection, analysis and assessment of the acquired data constitute a continuous and quasi-permanent duty of reconnaissance organs and experts.

2. While collecting reconnaissance information, the activity itself is organized and pursued by resorting to all the available means, comprising several reconnaissance techniques (HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT). These methods furnish a large-scale of data of different quality, with the largest quantity of information deriving from open source intelligence, and the most reliable information furnished by human intelligence. There is not a single method for reconnaissance; therefore a complex mix of various methods should be applied in order to obtain really relevant and accurate information.

Since anti-insurgent operations differ remarkably from the traditional principles and methods applied in military operations and actions conducted – among others – in the I and II World Wars, they are worth being analysed in a detailed manner, by thoroughly examining one after the other, by the experts of reconnaissance organizations.

The features to be assessed are as follows:

a) The strength, composition, armament, applied methods, political objectives and experiences gained on the previous combat activities of the guerrilla forces.

b) The religious and ideological views, tribal structure (dividedness) and traditions of insurgents/guerrilla forces.

c) Foreign organizations, groups or states supporting insurgents (guerrilla forces).

d) Topography and climate features of the theatre of operations requiring special equipment and training (or even specially trained troops) from the allied forces participating in the operations.

e) Influence of the various media sources (TV and radio channels as well as written media) – broadcasting or disseminating information in the vicinity of the theatre of war – on the credibility of the collected information and its evaluation. (The main goal of these organizations is to publish and disseminate front-page news differing from reality or deliberately falsified). It is well-known that insurgents (guerrilla forces) have media sources and news agencies at their disposal to disseminate false information. The primary purpose of these actions is to deceive people and the public opinion throughout the world, but also the intelligence services and their officers.

f) Many enterprises employing a large number of workers might be located in or close to the theatre of war. Their activity might also complicate or even clearly disturb battlefield military operations, especially in carrying out reconnaissance and in rapidly and successfully processing the obtained information. These companies often employ their own armed security guards in protection of their facilities. The security staff might get into gunfight with insurgents (guerrilla forces) trying to attack the facilities, the consignments and the top-managers of the company;

3. Analysis and assessment of the information is a process, in the course of which experts are tasked with examining and evaluating the already obtained rough data. In the framework of this procedure, rough data are being processed and converted into factual reconnaissance information of essential importance furnished to help commanders in solving the problem in question. Assessment is one of the most important tasks, since the essence must be distilled from rough data, which must be cross-checked and properly selected so that only the important and useful facts should remain available. This process requires special expertise, accuracy and attention, as any failure may seriously mislead the commander in the decision-making and a wrong decision might have fatal consequences.

4. Getting the reports to the end-user is the last phase of reconnaissance. Data are processed and forwarded via digital medium. Concerted execution of different intelligence phases works well in theory. Nevertheless; we have several examples learnt from the 21st century proving that theory cannot always be fully put into practice. Hereby, it is enough to mention merely one example learnt from the Afghan combat experiences.

The American National Defence Strategy issued in March 2005¹⁷ defined the key capabilities necessary for the successful military operations. In the new strategy, the strengthening of intelligence capabilities is emphasised in the first place, outlining that further improvement in the efficiency of reaction capability to irregular challenges is also an important prerequisite.

¹⁷ The National Defence Strategy of the United States of America, Washington D.C., March 2005.

Early warning, distribution and forward of accurate reconnaissance data, further coordination of reconnaissance activities between supreme headquarters and combat units are of particular importance in strengthening reconnaissance.

In the Editor's Foreword¹⁸ of the 2010 Military Balance, a special emphasis is attributed to intensifying the pace of military operations in fighting against insurgents, which is justified even by an increase in the number of ISAF forces, in full compliance with President Obama's resolution taken on the extension of US military force deployed in Afghanistan by 30 thousand people, and on the relief of field commanders.

The experiences learnt in Afghanistan and Iraq led the specialists elaborating the principles of military operations to revise the applied doctrines of anti-insurgent and stabilization operations as well as to propose several modifications.

In Afghanistan, the US and allied forces conducted a number of different offensive operations throughout the period of military activity. Although the operations carried out by the allied troops failed to achieve the expected outcome as they could not expel the enemy from their shelters, yet they managed to weaken enemy forces to a certain extent. Military units participating in the operation had to face several difficulties, such as:

- The terrain of Afghanistan is hardly passable, its complicated climate features, the high mountains, the extremely variable temperature (-5, -10 Celsius from time to time) render the movement of troops very difficult.
- Afghan insurgents and terrorists take advantage of these difficult and extreme circumstances as a rule, thanks to their familiarity with the local conditions, and the fact that they are in possession of accurate information on the adequate fire positions, shelters in caves and the available covers.
- Allied intelligence information frequently proved to be inaccurate as for the factual condition of the enemy (including its strength, armament and actual location). Allies have seriously underestimated the enemy strength.
- A further obstacle to successful operations is the unsatisfactory contact maintained with the Afghan allied forces due to lack of proper language knowledge (a multitude of local languages and dialects). The structure and hierarchy of Afghan tribes are fairly loose; rivalry between leaders represents an everyday problem.

¹⁸ James Hackett, Editor. The Military Balance 2010. pp. 5-6.

During the first period of occupation, several similar offensive operations were carried out on the territory of Afghanistan; nevertheless detailed information is not available about them.

Although theoreticians still believe in the importance of principles and technologies like Information Dominance and high tech network command systems – elaborated in the course of the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA) in the last decade of the 20th century – military operations of our time are characterized rather by narrow place combats (often in houses) than by large-scale operations. Besides, other tasks giving a better and more complex understanding of the geographic and social environment of the operations have come to the limelight, such as linguistic, historical, cultural and political studies integrated into the training program of soldiers.

A decentralised conduct of military activity allows subordinate commanders to be better informed about the specific situation and mission requirements and to have a greater freedom of decision. The American military leadership uses the lesson-learned combat experience when planning military operations. These experiences require changes in the structure, activity and equipment of military forces. Troops must be capable of carrying out irregular warfare and averting asymmetric threats.

Future activities of other contributing nations taking part in ongoing military activities are determined by their economic difficulties, and the governments might opt for making selected decisions about when and which military operation they intend to contribute to.

Successful military activities are based on efficient carrying out of intelligence operations. Reconnaissance is a special operation performed by specially trained and prepared persons and organizations. Well-organized, continuous reconnaissance is a precondition for successful war fighting. Military intelligence is a key element of international cooperation in surmounting the threats of the 21st century. Efficient intelligence operations can be carried out only in the framework of international cooperation.

Conclusions:

1. Commander conducting the armed troops detached to a given operation needs detailed and accurate information on enemy forces, their armament, combat principles and techniques, war fighting methods, as well as the terrain and climate conditions of the battlefield. Only a complex set of reconnaissance activities can furnish relevant, reliable and real-time information to the commander and his staff.

2. Experiences drawn from the 21st century military operations fought and being fought in Afghanistan and Iraq imply that successful implement-

tation of operations demands – beside the above mentioned requirements – further information on the composition, culture, language, religion and other characteristics of the local population, including also their relations maintained with insurgents (guerrilla groups), as well as about the armament, combat principles and techniques, the behaviour of the enemy forces, furthermore about the terrain and climatic conditions. Collection and assessment of the necessary information require the participation of highly qualified expert staff.

3. Apart from collecting and assessing information on local enemy forces, terrain and climatic conditions as well as on local population, there is a multitude of factors seriously complicating and sometimes fatally hindering the successful fighting of a given military operation.

The factors to be enumerated are first of all the civilian media broadcasting in the area of the military operations and in its close environment, the activity of economic ventures and organisations. Here should be noted that radio and television channels, press and information agencies focus primarily on publishing front-page news, frequently from sources intending to disseminate false or deceptive sources, therefore it is very difficult and time consuming to assess their authenticity and credibility.

It should be added, that the insurgents (guerrilla groups) and the media and the economic organizations sometimes deliberately disseminate false or falsified information in order to deceive the commander and his staff in charge of planning and conducting allied military operations.

In the 21st century, the gaining ground of irregular warfare has become a major threat to the security in certain regions of the world. Applied counter-measures should be far exceeding the efficiency and available force structure of the enemy forces. For this reason efficient reconnaissance and intelligence activity is the token of successful military operations. Reconnaissance and intelligence are special operations requiring special skills and expertise from both the individuals and the organisations. It comes from the above described facts and factors that a basic condition of a successful anti-insurgent activity is the thoroughly planned, well-organised, mission-tailored and professionally pursued, round the clock reconnaissance and intelligence activity.

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PILI-PILI¹⁹ IN THE MILK - SOME THOUGHTS ON THE ELECTION PROPAGANDA IN DRC

Abstract: Pili-pili in the milk

The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) underwent its second democratic, presidential elections on November 26th, 2011. Authors Ildikó Szilasi, anthropologist, member of the European Union's Observation Mission to the DRC (EU- EOM DRC) and Charles Ngwabwanyi Kunda anthropologist (IMNC) have focused on some aspects of the political attitude of presidential candidates, the attitude of Congolese citizens towards politics as well as on some characteristics of the political campaigning.

Keywords: elections, electoral campaigning, politics, Democratic Republic of Congo, DRC

On the 28th, November, 2011, the second democratic presidential and legislative elections were held in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). There were 11 candidates running for the presidency and nearly 19,000 candidates aspiring for the 500 parliamentary seats in a country 80 times larger than the ex-colonizer, Belgium. The National Independent Electoral Commission (CENI) did not have an easy task in organizing such a complex election. In addition to 32,000,000 registered voters, the DRC is a vast country with extremely poor infrastructure, unpredictable heavy tropical rains. Because the weak state institutions, the United Nations and the European Union

¹⁹ Pili-pili mean hot paprika, the most popular spice used for dishes in the DRC. Pili-pili in the milk express something wrong in the system, a disturbing element or an error. This phrase was used by Tshisekedi's supporters in Mbuji-Mayi and was to raise concerns about President Joseph Kabila.

organized various peacekeeping missions in Congo DRC, where some Hungarian officers are still serving.²⁰

Creativity and the Electoral Campaign

The Democratic Republic of Congo is as big as Western-Europe with a population roughly estimated around 70 million. The GDP per capita is as low as 300 USD/ year²¹. The Human Development Index (HDI) aggregately measures three basic dimensions: health, education and income. DRC's HDI is 0,286, ranks last out of the 187 countries with comparable data²². In the DRC, people are desperate to reduce poverty, desperate for change, and are attempting to develop various survival strategies and creative life styles. This creativity of the general populous can also be found in the political arena. Every available tool for communication was used for propaganda via popular art; T-shirts, musical instruments, feasts, and political debates. Pop-songs were created to support political leaders and were sung by celebrities. Choreography, new gestures, and folk phrases were created to reflect these common themes. In addition, cartoons and advertisements were shown on television. This paper focuses on the electoral campaign of the re-elected President, Joseph Kabila, and his strongest opposition for the presidential seat, Etienne Tshisekedi.

Kabila vs. Thisekedi

Kabila Kabange Joseph was born on the 4th, June, 1971, in the town of Hewa Bora, in Fizi region, South-Kivu Province. He has been the President of the DRC since the murder of his father, Laurent-Desire Kabila, on the 16th January, 2001. He is also the founder of the People's Party for Reconstruction and Democracy (PPRD) established in 2002. He won the presidential elections of 2006 with 58, 5 % against his opposition, Jean-Pierre Bemba, and became the first democratically elected leader of the DRC. Although opposition leaders demanded annulment over fraud allegations on the 16th, December, 2011, Kabila Kabange Joseph was declared victorious by the supreme court with 48, 95 % of the votes. Etienne Tshisekedi also declared himself as winner.

Tshisekedi wa Mulumba Étienne, called Tshitshi by supporters, was born in 1932, in the town Kananga, Kasai Oriental Province. He served in Mobutu's government in various positions in the late 1960s and 1970s, but protested its descent into dictatorship and corruption starting in the late 1970s. In 1980 he was removed from government and has since spent time in and out of prison. In the early 1980s he co-founded the Union for Democracy and Social Progress

²⁰ Besenyő János: Beszámoló a kongói EUSEC misszióról, Sereg Szemle, VII. évfolyam, 1. szám, 2009. január-március, 45-52.

²¹ <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/cg.html>

²² <http://hdrstats.undp.org/en/countries/profiles/COD.html>

(UDPS) based on democracy and non-violence. Known as strongholds of opposition, Tshisekedi has continuously had strong support in Kinshasa, Kananga, and Mbuji-Mayi.

Political Message of Kabila and Tshisekedi

Printed or hand painted posters were hung everywhere with colourful letters in major cities during the four-week electoral campaign period. From black and white A4 photocopies to modern illuminated city-light posters. All visible spaces were used in the capital, Kinshasa and other major Congolese towns to disperse the messages of candidates. Major squares and roads in cities were like a forest of printed canvas. Thousands of legislative and presidential candidates were promoted all over the country.

In 2006, Joseph Kabila ran on an ambitious five-pillar (*cinq chantiers*) program, in which he promised significant development in education, health, infrastructure, water, electricity, and employment. The propaganda of Kabila was built around the idea of this 5-pillar program, which focused on material and economic development while increasing the quality of life. These posters compared three ideas of the past, present, and future, showing examples of infrastructure, agriculture, and accommodations. For example, one poster illustrated a comparison of homes. A hand-constructed tiny hut represented the past. A modest brick-house with aluminium roof represents the present. And the future was illustrated by a luxurious villa. On a similar poster, there was shown an old rusty robbed train, representing the past, a clean train representing the present, and a bright white luxurious yacht illustrating the future. This propaganda shows globalization, modernization as well as material wealth and capitalism as core values.

On the contrary, Etienne Tshisekedi propaganda illustrated the social and human-centric ideologies. Thisekedi central campaign slogan was, ‘People first!’, which became so popular with his supporters that people started to use this phrase while greeting and shaking hands. This powerful slogan’s hidden analogy could be understood by all Congolese people whom are tired of observing politicians working for own interests and, not for the people. Corruption is extremely common for people in power. They in turn attempt to maintain power, but are always vulnerable of losing it. Besides, the African mind-set, of not having long-distance future plans, is also deeply present in the political elite. Therefore, people in power try to rob and collect as much money as possible during their reign of power. It is nearly impossible to predict what will happen to on any given day. Tshisekedi's, “People first!”, slogan well exemplifies the social and economic needs of people.

During the electoral campaign both parties used positive elements to highlight their strengths. Tshisekedi was shown as an old and wise protector of people as well as a symbol of dedication and change. Kabila was the dynamic, young charismatic president leading the DRC to capitalism and developing living circumstances to a luxurious status.

Political Culture in the Congo- a Congolese Interpretation

“The electoral campaign depends on the political culture of each country. It consists of citizens' attitudes towards politics, their views, criteria and means on good governance, campaigning, and candidature. The level of education of the population affects the understanding of individuals on politics and the electoral campaign. The culture and management of the electoral campaign is not by fortune. It does not only reflect on the natural environment, but on the cultural sensibility of the people concerned, and their different cultural aspects.” (Mabiala Mantuba – Ngoma, 2004: 68-69)

Political scene during the electoral campaign – 28 October- 26 November 2011 – had its shady sides. Congolese politicians were fighting for the people without consulting them on their visions, opinions or ideas. Politicians do not serve public but personal interests. “Political elite works against those people that they pretend to work for. Besides, they do not ask them what they need or what they want.” (Loka-ne-Kongo, 2000: 103)

In the general age of uncertainty in the DRC, unhealthy political alliances are established. “This cooperation does not have either ideology or unity. Moreover, hidden interests are concealed behind these pacts.” (Gilva Van La Pina, 2011: 13)

Loka-ne-Kongo also states that the Congolese elite, referred to as political class, cheated people in a shameful manner throughout the political negotiations. “The political class gave up its role to serve people. Politicians are motivated by money and ministerial positions.” (Loka-ne-Kongo, 2000: 103) Campaigns were financed by the State and public money. “This was the only occasion that the population profited from public money”, said Senghor SEDA from Cité des Anciens Combattants, Ngaliema, and Kinshasa, from Lukunga electoral district. “All candidates in Lukunga district were welcomed warmly by the population, regardless their political background because people knew that their promises are empty. But at the same time, they needed their money – mike-mike lokotro, mbongo as they say in Lingala – that was distributed by candidates among their supporters. By the end of the day, everyone is alone in the polling booth voting for the desired candidate. Unfortunately, the 2011 electoral campaign was very modest compared to the one in 2006 because of more limited financial possibilities,” summarized Seda.

Financial difficulties forced some candidates to turn to their tribes and churches to ask for votes. As Africa News Journal wrote : “ Antoine Kumuna, bishop of the The *Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints* and national deputy candidate from the Social Movement for the Renewal Party(MSR) in Lukunga electoral district of Kinshasa asked religious leaders of his church to convince their followers to vote for him,” (Olitho Kahungu, 2011 : 6). During the last days of the electoral campaign candidates utilized trumpets, drums and loudspeakers to communicate. In suburbs of Kinshasa people woke up every morning and listened to the loudspeakers. Posters and printed photos were able to be seen everywhere. Events were organized by candidates in each electoral site. At the end of these occasions, money, T-shirts showing the number and photo of the candidate, and other gifts were distributed among voters who previously had signed their name on a list. The only criterion to join the list was to hold a valid voter card. Some candidates went even further; they sponsored marriages, funerals in their districts, or financed projects to improve electricity, sanitation and infrastructure in the locality to gain the trust of their voters.

Electoral Campaign and Political Tension

During the 2011 election period, clashes broke out among militants of the opposition and the ruling party as well as among the supporters of the different presidential candidates in various sites of the country, including Kindu in Maniema Province; Mbuji-Mayi in Kasai Oriental Province; Lubumbashi in Katanga Province; Kikwit in Bandundu Province; Matadi in Bas-Congo Province and in Kinshasa.

At a press conference on the 10th, November, 2011, Cardinal Laurent Mosengwo Pasinya, archbishop of Kinshasa, described the general climate as fearful, nervous, and insecure, if not panicked. “We frequently witnessed incidents. People provoked, got armed with machetes or guns, destroyed and burnt. People behaved as war-enemies, as the aim of the elections was not to build but to destroy, not to protect but to kill,” (Charles Tsimba Mbungu, 2011:2).

The population raised concerns and expressed dissatisfaction at seeing the violence that has emerged at the beginning of the electoral campaign. Therefore, they could not push too far. A few weeks before the presidential and legislative elections, policemen started behaving irresponsibly by fuelling the opposition. Some armed the “Kulunas or Pombas”, some young marginal people to make troubles in the name of their political oppositions. “People can distinguish good and bad. Congolese are aware of the possible danger that can occur if some politicians do not change their ways of behaviour and talking. Their wives and children are already gone to abroad. Why do they want to put other people's children into danger for their own interest?”- pointed out Rose Mesa from Kinshasa, Tshange district. “This time we said no to the political leadership. Congolese people understood politics and took their destiny in their hands by

deciding to go voting in peace. Those politicians who choose violence will end up in the International Criminal Court”- concluded Mesa.

For Leon Kalenda from Kinshasa, Mont-Amba, elections in Africa in general as well as in Congo are just a show. In reality, decisions are preliminary made in line with the interest of international actors, not the national ones. “I do not see the importance of neither the electoral campaign nor the elections anymore, as we are not having our destiny in our hands. People should reject national and international manipulations. The west imposes democracy on us. But if democracy was really about the political power coming from people to serve the people, the democratic political leaders should respect the desire of the African people and should not manipulate them”- expressed Kalenda.

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ALTERNATIVES FOR CRISIS MANAGEMENT

Abstract:

For several years we have been living in an age of crises. The crisis impacts the whole world, including our own country. The crisis holds a prominent economic character, affecting virtually all areas of life (e.g. public administration, national economy, economy of defence, financial sector, debt servicing etc.). Highly acknowledged economists have been engaged in debates about the modes, efficiency or inefficiency of crisis management both within and outside of our borders. It is a fact that we are struggling with severe problems: on the one hand, we are helpless facing the crisis with an open economy, on the other, our ad-hoc type, short-term crisis management is less efficient, since the only option it considers is fiscal belt-tightening.

Nevertheless, we do have unexploited potentials. Such an alternative could be the consistent implementation of the reform of the state budget. By now the term 'reform' has completely lost its credibility, as the public has come to identify the notion exclusively with fiscal austerity. However, the notion of reform can carry real content if it creates new tools and better conditions in crisis management through planning and the practical measurement of efficiency.

Keywords: *crisis, crisis management, reform, reform of the state budget, public tasks, planning, task-financing, resources, efficiency, budgetary sub-functions.*

We are living in an age of crises. The turn of the millennium saw the emergence, abating and fading, or including the reviviscence of different crises. The crisis impacts the whole world, and our own country. It affects politics, societies and economy. It affects alliances, countries, social groups and different layers of society.

The roots of the crisis are predominantly economic. The economic crisis has an impact on everything and everybody in general: on the national economy and on all its sectors, investors and entrepreneurs, employers and employees, the rich and the poor alike. All stakeholders are making efforts to tackle it, with more or less success. Some are more successful than others. Some are facing it backed by a developed, well-prepared, closed and more independent economy, while in other cases the onset is a more open and helpless economy. Some are fighting against it consciously, making even mid- or long-term-plans, while others react in an ad-hoc manner, concentrating on survival through immediate fire-fighting and feeling grateful whenever an upcoming obstacle is overcome. Some fall victim to it and are forced to file for bankruptcy. At such times some who have followed the mainstream may obtain support and assistance, whereas

those who had proved more problematic may be less favoured. Some are pondering the implementation of reforms besides the conscious austerity measures, while others interpret the conscious austerity measures directly as reforms. Some are drifting with the stream of events due to the merely symptomatic treatment, and despite the scarcity of resources may even waste. Some are known to be making sacrifices through hard-core, consistent economic policy. Others are making sacrifices – using up their last reserves – through less efficient economic policy. Some have foresight and some luck, while others have less insight and even less luck. Some search for efficient solution in joint efforts and alliances, while others may be more solitary players protecting their interests from the public.

In recent years, both the countries of the world and our own country experience an age of continuous crises, primarily in the field of economy. The waves of the meltdown of 2008 have not even completely abated yet, and we can already see signs of a renewed, possibly even more severe economic depression on the horizon. Highly acknowledged economists argue about the modes, efficiency or inefficiency of crisis management. The crisis affects all. The stakeholders mostly differ both in their characteristics and their means available for tackling the crisis. No panacea exists that could equally efficiently heal everybody's problems. Yet, there are experiences and opportunities to be utilised while also taking into account the differing features.

These statements are extremely topical and apply also to our own country. The crisis trickles down into our everyday life (e.g. through the national economy, defence economics, the financial sector, the credit crunch etc.). Unfortunately, the efficiency of our crisis management is a favourite topic of our economists. In Hungary crises are usually managed on a fiscal basis, which in our country means layoffs, terminations, the cutting off of resources and, of course, the consistent implementation of the principle of indiscriminate cuts. Nowadays the public identifies the term 'reform' exclusively with the aforementioned actions. Yet the notion has also real content. Reform and efficiency are tightly linked notions; they pre-suppose each other's existence. The more efficiently a state (i.e. its public administration, national economy) operates the reforms feel all the more convincing and realistic in the eyes of its citizens.

The most important criterion for the ensuring and improvement of efficiency is that it should be measurable. We cannot improve, influence or develop things unless they are concrete, measurable and traceable. The measurability of efficiency, in turn, clearly depends on the methodology of planning. In Hungary the planning methodology of the state budget targets the existence and operation of institutions only, even in cases where besides the budget proposal also task-oriented versions are elaborated, based on budget sub-function categories. Both the planning – along with the budget proposal

negotiations or the structure of the planning itself – and the implementation of the budget cuts in the course of the operation lack the principle of real competence- or task-centred financing, or in other words, task-oriented resource planning and thinking. Nevertheless, with the elaboration of a new planning methodology, through competence- and task-centric planning (and within this, the creation of the practical opportunities of efficiency-measuring) we could obtain new instruments for tackling crises, which would serve the fundamental interest of our national economy. On the one hand, if we can measure efficiency, we can also influence, improve and enhance it. On the other hand, ensuring the accountability and transparency of operation and management is a fundamental interest of national economy. Thirdly, the application of the methodology is most beneficial when the availability of resources is limited. In this way the problem of under-financing would become much more manageable both on the national-economic and institutional level.

In the following section let us examine whether the aforementioned alternative aimed at the implementation of practical reforms could actually prove to be helpful for a more efficient tackling of crises.

Reforms, planning and efficiency

Let us return to the notion of state reform. The concept that has more or less disappeared from everyday usage by now carries highly remarkable and meaningful content.

PhD Péter Pete writes in his study titled “*Az államháztartás feladatfinanszírozáson alapuló modellje*” [*The Task-financing Based Model of the State Budget*] published in 1997 that the re-definition of the role and obligations of the State has only been partially completed since the Democratic Turn : “...[R]eform of the state budget by far does not simply mean ‘saving on public expenditure’, or a mere reduction of the size of the state, although in the light of its present size it does includes also these. The purpose of reform is to make the functioning of the state efficient, that is, to make sure that the resources withdrawn from the members of society are transformed into state services considered ‘worthy’ of the taxes paid by the average taxpayer... The severe tensions arising from the re-definition of the role of the State are often experienced even by the apparatuses preparing the decisions related to reforms as a problem of the adjustment of tasks to the limited resources.” (1, pp. 151–152)

These thoughts that were formulated fifteen years ago are incredibly topical even today. Public services provided by the state are typically delivered through the public sector. The individual services are provided by separate institutions, some of which may even have a monopolistic position. They may not be forced at all to operate economically, nor to struggle for customers,

therefore it may be difficult to realistically compare their services. *“The tasks of the institutions at the different levels of budgetary hierarchy are rather loosely defined, thus the budget delegates resources not to the tasks themselves, but to the institutions set to carry out those tasks”*—concludes the author in a statement that has retained its validity for today (1, p. 154). Therefore, under the current system it is impossible to estimate the costs for particular tasks. In order to make decisions on whether a need should be satisfied from a particular resource or whether collecting less taxes the satisfying of the need should be left up to the individual we would need to be aware of the rate of return on investment. So the question is; whether the given service is worth the resources invested. This can be established only in the case when public expenditure is linked to tasks taken on by the state.

Based on the negative consequences of the institution-financing system (3, p. 27):

- institutions have special interests (self-preservation, maximisation of their support from the central budget);
- the financing entity has no opportunity to compare the return on investment of the institution with other institutions or fields (quite on the contrary, this is against the interest of the institutions);
- rarely does it happen that an institution would allocate fixed sums of money to the implementation of its tasks. Support from the central budget is as a rule provided to ensure their operation. Their own sources of revenue are not kept as separated assets, either, but usually blended into the general operational costs;
- the cheap and efficient satisfaction of public needs cannot be clearly measured;
- the institution carrying out any particular sub-function cannot and should not establish how valuable the respective sub-function is to the public. This can only be defined by a higher financing institution (through comparison of the return on investment of other fields), yet financing is linked to the institution and not to the task;
- the revenues and expenditure of the institutions can be monitored through their books, unlike the management of resources financed through their expenditure (e.g. labour, purchased and fixed assets etc.);
- the data provided by the information systems are suitable to the description of macro-economic processes only up to a limited extent (the summary of budgets at the level of the institutions provides only for a limited overview of comprehensive macro-economic analyses). When changes in the institutional obligations occur, their effect on the central budget cannot be established;

- regarding the fiscal pressure, at times of austerity measures, only the principle of indiscriminate cuts can be applied, which mostly means general deprivation from all.

Compared to the foregoing, the task-centric financing system of the state budget has several advantages (3, based on p. 28):

- support from the central budget would not be linked to institutions, but to their activities. Negotiation on the draft budget would not target the modification of the basis, but the approval of particular tasks, with a task-financing system of arguments in place;
- the institutional management would become more goal-oriented, institutional operation (with the help of so-called operational, accountancy and IT systems) and thus also the use of public funds would become more transparent. The operational results of the institutions could clearly signal the efficiency of the management of the institution (as opposed to institutional financing, in which case it cannot be concluded with certainty whether a surplus results from unaccomplished tasks or indeed from efficient operation);
- the level and quality of control over institutions would improve, as these would become accountable for the implementation of tasks, instead of merely their operation;
- the monitoring of resource-management would become possible;
- cost-benefit as well as comprehensive macro-economic analyses could be carried out, which is of fundamental significance for decision-making processes linked to the role of the state;
- under fiscal pressure, there would be no need to apply the principle of indiscriminate cuts, instead retrenchment could be implemented in a task-oriented manner.

On the whole, we can conclude that the implementation of task-financing would bring along several beneficial consequences, such as:

- transparency, accountability, feasibility;
- mid- and long-term predictability, as opposed to ad-hoc style operation and planning. For instance, mid-term developments would base on realistic and sound programmes, and guarantees on their implementation;
- feasibility of the high-level expectation that decisions should be made within an integrated system, supported by a standard planning process and a unified decision-making mechanism. Internal operational efficiency would improve, which would positively affect international co-operation and the image of the country.

In Hungary, in the second half of the 90's, and later on also in our decade, the need for an overhaul of planning shifted ever increasingly into the

foreground also in the state administration. The basis-centric mid- and long-term planning applied in the era prior to the Democratic Turn, which provided for some grade of predictability, was abandoned.

This system, which in practice was meant for the short run, was replaced by a more and more delegating-imposing type of planning that contained lots of uncertainty and was primarily budget-based. Among its negative consequences, planners' job became much more difficult both on the level of ministries and that of the institutions. Ad-hoc type of decision-making became increasingly typical. The uncertainty of resources hindered the efficient implementation of mid-term development programmes. In the lack of draft budget negotiations the value and weight of planning were attenuated. Financing the existence and operation of the institutions triggered special institutional interests (e.g. self-perpetuation, maximisation of support from the central budget). Neither efficient control of the institutions nor the monitoring of their activities or the implementation of their tasks was possible. Actual implementation of the often-announced reforms at the macro-level, that is, at the level of the state budget, was impossible due to the constraints of the measurability of efficiency. Negative impacts increased during times of fiscal tightening and budgetary austerity measures, since in most cases these were implemented according to the principle of indiscriminate cuts, which resulted in serious professional problems in many fields.

On the basis of the above described grounds, primarily theoretical research on new planning methodology began in the mid-90's (at universities, in the Ministries of Finance, Defence and Internal Affairs and in the National Development Agency). More and more attention was paid to task-financing, which had proved successful in market economies, and had been applied in the US army (under the name PPBS, that is Planning, Programming and Budgeting System) during the War of Vietnam as a method for resource and cost planning used in competence and task-planning.

Compared to the above described models, *task-financing* has several advantages. Support from the central budget is not linked to the existence of institutions, but to their activities, which enables real negotiation on the draft budget, raising the stakes of planning. Institutional management (supported by the establishment of operational management, accountancy and IT systems) becomes more goal-oriented. The operational results of the institutions signal more clearly the efficiency of their management. This efficiency can be measured well both on the micro and macro-level, facilitating macro-economic analyses, thus also the decision-making at the state level. Due to the programme-centric planning, mid- and long-term predictability and the guarantees of implementation improve significantly, the ad-hoc style, the often subjective decision-making is replaced or at least reduced remarkably by a more unified planning process and decision-making mechanism. This ensures an accurate

outlining of tasks, the transparency of institutional operation and asset management, accountability, as well as the monitoring of the use and utilisation of public funds. Additionally, at times of fiscal tightening, budgetary cuts follow a certain reasonable order based on the priority of the tasks.

The above statements are not only true in institutional terms, but also at the level of state administration and of the state budget. It can be declared that – despite binding EU-requirements – nowadays, the state budget is not even half-way through with these developments. Although following the definition of the sub-functions of the state, a task-oriented version and interpretation of the budget is elaborated, this is done only retrospectively. The planning process itself and the structure lack an actual traditional, task-oriented draft budget negotiation. In the course of the operation of the state budget, the application of the principle of indiscriminate cuts can be spotted frequently. An example of this was the surplus provision (earlier called balance provision) imposed upon the ministries, which was clearly deemed to be cut in a later phase. In our country retrenchment of public expenditure has been regularly carried out also in the form of layoffs, when it is announced that a certain sum will be saved by firing a given number of civil servants and officials. These facts are a clear indication of the absence of task-based planning, the lack of the requirement of efficiency and transparency, as well as the problems of the decision-making system, and the daily pressure of short-term operation and survival. Therefore, the introduction of competence- and task-based planning should be seriously taken into consideration at state level, as this could remarkably improve our chances and capabilities in crisis management. It would not offer us panacea for all our problems, but it could significantly increase our competence in crisis management during times of depression.

Nowadays, the state budget is struggling with severe financing difficulties. Due to well-known reasons, keeping the budget deficit below 3 % has an absolute priority. The state can achieve this goal in two ways: by increasing its revenues and by cutting its expenditure. We are frequently faced with the direct consequences of belt-tightening: retrenchment at the ministries and organisations supported by the central budget results in a state of under-financing that is even more severe than before. This situation needs to be managed professionally. Just like in the case of the central budget, the solution could be the same also for its institutions: namely, the sensible cut of expenditure, on the one hand, and the increase of revenues, on the other.

Austerity is a possible method for the reduction of costs. Yet, it can turn out that long-lasting under-financing has already exhausted or at least substantially limited the saving capacity. In such situations structural reform is inevitable, which may actually lead to a more modern professional overhaul and a more up-to-date institutional organisational structure. Reduction on the expenditure side is not quite identical with the boosting of efficiency, yet both

are closely interlinked requirements. Planning methodology (outlined above) through its focus on the tasks and the related resources would promote exactly this potential for renewal. Boosting revenues through the overhaul of the taxation system and the introduction of new types of taxes are higher on the agenda, yet social approval of the methods is rather limited.

That the conception is not merely theoretical can be underpinned by the fact that – following five years of own research and development, as well as benefitting from different theories, the results of other research and the experiences of the American PPBS – in 2005 the Ministry of Defence introduced its own new planning system (Defence Planning System). The system experiment had been successful as early as 2004, when the NATO voiced its disapproval over the extremely low level of the Hungarian defence budget, nevertheless, it is a great result that the Hungarian players are aware of the stakes. The establishment of the new planning system constituted a significant and promising step forward, which is underpinned also by the telling newspaper articles attached to the present study. It is also noteworthy that according to the opinion of the American group CUBIC, which at the time of the system development was working at the Ministry of Defence, the establishment of the new Defence Planning System had been the most significant event in the history of the Hungarian Army ever since the Democratic Turn.

Summary

Based on the foregoing, we can conclude that during times of crises, a well-operated state administration and economy as well as a good public atmosphere where citizens experience real reforms are of outstanding significance. However this is not a panacea that could protect against the negative effects of the crisis, but a basic requirement for the establishment of a realistic overview of the situation as well as for the efficient implementation of measures and for a more efficient crisis management than the present one.

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EXTREMIST GROUPS AND QUESTIONS THAT ARISE IN CONNECTION WITH THEM

Abstract

The aim of this study is to give an insight for the reader into the inner motives driving the organisations which behave in an extremist way. Examining these groups is a very interesting and also a very provocative activity because the one who deals with this problem will probably face strong criticism, however much he or she aims at objectivity. Although the topic is too extensive to highlight its every aspect from a scientific point of view, I hope that I will manage to show a coherent view for the reader.

Keywords: extremist groups, stereotype, nationalism, anarchists, green movements, organisations of extreme right, and extreme left

The bases of the social existence of humans

In order to understand the reason for the inclination of human beings to create communities and groups, we have to get to know certain motives behind human coexistence itself. Man is a “zoon politicon”, which means a social being²³; this is why the nearness of our mates is a basic biological and psychological need for us. The need for social coexistence stays with us in all our lives. In Maslow’s hierarchy of needs, the physiological need is followed by the need for safety and protection, then love and togetherness, and on the top of the pyramid there are self-esteem and self-realisation.²⁴ If these needs are just partly or not at all satisfied, the life expectancy of the given person decreases.

In an optimal case, children are born into a stable family background. At first, the family means the small society to protect them, take care of them and bring them up. The child acquires the rules and norms in the family which are going to be essential for them in social coexistence. This is why deformations in the family “system” have a negative effect on the development of the child later on. In Hungary, the number of single-parent and deformed families is very high because of divorces, becoming widows, “single” lifestyle, unemployment and violence in the family.

²³ ARISZTOTELÉSZ: *Politika*, I. könyv, in: <http://mek.oszk.hu/04900/04966/04966.htm#1>, 08-05-2012

²⁴ *Pszichológia*: szerk.: R. L. Atkinson et al.: Osiris kiadó, 2. javított kiadás, Budapest, 2001., p. 295.

It is not only the family which deals with socialization and bring the children up, but also different educational institutes, and with more and more significance, the media and the online world as well. Educational institutes in our present society have a big role since children spend a lot of time at school. Teachers have a significant responsibility because in addition to the family, mostly they are the ones who guide the community in which the child becomes an adult. Beside teachers, classmates and friends also have a significant effect on the development of the person. An unsuitable socialization process, a deformed or a single-parent family, a school which is not carefully chosen or the truancy can all result in such deformations in the child's psychological development which can also have an effect on their life later on. According to the "similis simile gaudet" principle, which is, like delights in the like, or in other words, like attracts the like; in most cases, people who are psychologically affected gather similar friends and mates. Children, who are psychologically affected, can wolfpack, and in this way create a new environment for them. The people who do not have a family or live in a deformed or single-parent family often search for an "additional" family which means safety for them. For example, this is one of the reasons why children who are kidnapped from their families are easy to be brought up to be children soldiers, since for them the army is going to be the family, therefore they are going to be strongly attached to it later on. In order to be able to define the group, first of all we have to examine the definition of the mass, which is a set bigger than the group.

The definition of the mass goes like this: "The unstructured set of people is usually called a mass. It would be difficult to tell in what the case based on, how large a human group is, can we mention mass effect. By all means, usually it manifests itself when there are too many people to get into direct contact with each other."²⁵

By contrast, "the respect in which a group is different from a mass is that it has a structure; the participants are in contact with each other. This contact can be of many sorts. For example, a company which has more departments or a school in which the classes or the teaching staff create independent groups has group characteristics as well."²⁶ Groups are created because of human needs, which can be the sense of belonging to somewhere, avoiding boredom, the need for safety, the need for society, or capitalizing on our connections.

When someone gets in a group, he or she has to meet certain requirements. There are groups which are easier to get into and also, there are ones which are especially difficult. We can say that the more difficult it is to get into a group, the more merit the members of the group consider to be part of it.

²⁵ VAJDA Zsuzsanna: *Lélektankönyv, A személyiségről, a tudatról, az érzelmekről és más pszichológiai kérdésekről*, Műszaki Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2001., p. 242.

²⁶ VAJDA Zsuzsanna: *Lélektankönyv, A személyiségről, a tudatról, az érzelmekről és más pszichológiai kérdésekről*, Műszaki Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2001., p. 245.

When getting into a group, new members usually have to go through some kind of an initialization process and they have to meet different requirements, this is changing in every culture and group. In different tribes, the initialization process of becoming mature can manifest in a big tattoo for example, or in the first hunting on your own. If someone joins a motor band, it is almost 100% sure that he or she is going to need a motorbike later on. The prerequisites of entering professional corporations are different qualifications and specialist examinations. Joining a band might require different body features for example, depending on whether the band organises itself based on race or not. The prerequisite of joining criminal groups can be for example the liquidation of a band member of the enemy or a theft in a given area. The prerequisite of entering groups based on race can be an assault against a man with another colour of skin or taking part in an extremist mass movement.

Stereotype

When different publicists and researchers put pen to paper and express their views, it is difficult for them to leave their emotions out of the topic of stereotypes. In its entirety, it can be said that in this case it is difficult to be objective. There are publicists who do not even want to hide their emotions, due to the character of the media represented by them, and they express them proudly. As for researchers, this is not allowed, since emotions lead to the inexactness of the research.

“A stereotype is a set of conclusions which refers to a whole group of people based on personal and physical distinctive features. We can have a stereotype of a typical German for example (intelligent, fastidious and serious) or of a typical Italian (artistic, carefree and cheerful).”²⁷ Stereotypes have been made by humankind during history because in this way we can accelerate our way of thinking, or we can leave out certain parts of brain activity and we cross them by stereotypes. We do not have to wonder what the person coming in the opposite direction is like because we know (and usually we know it badly) what our community thinks of people of the same colour of skin, and in this way spare the time that we would spend with getting to know this person.

Nationalism

Similarly to stereotypes, nationalism is another term which is often misunderstood by many people. To an appropriate extent, nationalism in itself is a useful phenomenon. Of course, the exaggeration of any beliefs can cause problems. For me, the most accepted definition of nationalism is like this: It is

²⁷ *Pszichológia*, szerk.: R. L. Atkinson et al.: Osiris kiadó, 2. javított kiadás, Budapest, 2001., pp. 249-250.

the system of beliefs or symbols expressing identification with a given national community.²⁸ The alternatives of it can be the following: nationalist – national, patriotic, loving one’s country.²⁹

Taking this definition as a starting point, all soldiers should be nationalists, or if not, they can be considered simply as mercenaries. This should also be true for police forces and secret services as well, because nobody can serve his or her country if he or she cannot identify with it. However, aggressive nationalism is already dangerous, because it means considering that our nation is above other nations.

Anarchists

The expression “anarchist” derives from the Greek word “anarchy”, which means that the system of state institutes has to be eliminated. The anarchists make an effort to create a community without rule; this manifests itself in putting democracy into practice according to their 21th century goals. Most of the people who nowadays declare this view are usually utopians, half-educated, uneducated or are named by certain political segments. By the elimination of the political system, a state ends up in chaos, and the recovering from an anomaly which has already become a reality can only be manifested by establishing a structure. Usually, we only meet anarchists in states where most of the people are in a socially good position. Of course, anarchists feel that they are exploited by the majority population and this is why they should rebel. In some cases their followers identify themselves with the heroes of communism, although the two systems of concepts are not the same since in communism there is structure. Practically, there are not a considerable number of anarchists in Hungary. Young people have a propensity to wear some of their symbols because of style, but most of them do not know the real background of them. Since the anarchist way of thinking can be considered as some kind of fashion or craze originating from being uneducated as a youth, therefore if someone is an anarchist also in his or her older age, then in these cases it should be considered whether that person is a dreamer or he or she is not aware of the world around him or her. In the activity of anarchists, there are certain social dangers because their members are easy to influence and can be persuaded to do activities which can be dangerous for the whole society.

Green movements

We can speak about the existence of green movements since the 20th century. Their appearance is an answer to the effect caused by man to nature.

²⁸ Anthony GIDDENS: *Szociológia*, Osiris Kiadó, Budapest, 2000., p. 708.

²⁹ *Magyar szókincstár*, Tinta Könyvkiadó, Budapest, 2001., p. 627.

They deal with the protection of nature; this means the protection of the Earth itself, which among others involves the protection of air, water, and the flora and fauna from pollution caused by mankind. Their activity is very useful for the Earth in the long run. Therefore, the question might arise in the reader why I mention them here. Green movements, similarly to the groups established in order to protect women's rights, followed this way: at first, most people were not engaged with them, and then more people agreed with their views, but they were not engaged with them later on, either. So, in some cases, these movements turned to more radical methods under the aegis of a good goal, for example the hindrance of the ships of whalers or the limitation of the moving of atomic trains. However, the end does not justify the means.

Organisations of extreme right and extreme left

Before the First and the Second World War, there were groups of extreme left in Hungary. As far as I know, there are no radical organisations of extreme left at present, or if yes, they do not voice their opinion in the media. The reason for this is probably that the previous system had not come to an end so long ago, and some members of the organisations that are considered to be of extreme left had been in power in the previous system. These members did not popularise their previous party affiliation after the change of system.

It is difficult to specify the exact date when organisations of extreme right first appeared. The name "extreme right" goes back to the French Revolution and it expresses the separation from the left. National Socialism and fascism spread in Eastern Europe and in Hungary between the two world wars. The two terms have a different meaning, although neither most of the ones who acknowledge these tendencies as their own, nor the majority of those who form an opinion of these trends are not any more aware of their meanings. This is why the two terms have practically become one by now for the common knowledge thanks to the media. These extremist tendencies have completely disappeared because the left was "in bad odour with its followers". These tendencies have appeared again after the change of system, similarly to the phenomena experienced in Western and Eastern countries. It is an interesting phenomenon nowadays that the membership of extreme right organisations shows overlaps in many cases with the radicals who appear among football supporters.

Why is the foundation of a radical organisation dangerous?

Movements, groups and organisations can be used in order to pressure with it for the sake of an aim. When the members of the group take steps together, let it be a non-governmental organisation, a political party or even a movement, force can be represented in the given society. The intentions of most of these groups are peaceful; however, sometimes groups behaving in extremist

ways also appear. A person who is charismatic can take over control of groups and can influence the people to such an extent that these people might do things which they would not do otherwise. What is more, undesirable outer elements which might follow a subversive activity or push the otherwise peaceful mass in an extremist direction can also become part of a group. If we give it some thought, when a ringleader appears among the peaceful demonstrators, he or she can transform the peaceful demonstration into a commotion or a riot in the long run very much.

The peaceful masses can also mean a force which exerts very much influence in the long run; let us just think of the peace movements in the United States during the cold war, which did not represent aggression in most cases, but still, together with other factors, they had a role in the withdrawal of troops from Vietnam. According to some authors, the Soviets who had opposing interests also helped these movements since they were aware of their effects.³⁰ The organisations which behave in an aggressive way right from their establishment are harmful for the whole society. Of course, there are some functionalist social theorists who think that deviant behaviour forms also have a place in society because they are the ones who improve the system itself. In my opinion, the problem with this theory is that in this way it legalizes harmful or dictatorial systems and tendencies in a society.

Possible solutions to the liquidation of radical groups

Before taking any steps to liquidate radical groups, first of all we have to consider whether they mean a direct risk for national security. If yes, we have to act according to this. Depending on the political system and the constitution, the police or military forces or the forces of national security have to be mobilized. In this case, it is worth thinking similarly to military operations, “where the protection of forces and devices is based not on the exclusion of risks but on the appropriate handling of them”³¹. If they do not mean a direct danger, we have to reveal the reasons behind their coming into being, then model them and integrate them into the society, possibly in a peaceful way. When examining groups, it is not enough to have a look at only the extremists themselves, but also their background has to be examined in which these groups were established, created. However, we should not make a mistake by projecting our own views, socialization and moral norms on them, we have to view each of them in the given situation and cultural context.

³⁰ *Soviet influence on the peace movement*, in:

http://www.enotes.com/topic/Soviet_influence_on_the_peace_movement#Wider_Soviet_influence, 05-05-2012

³¹ DR. PADÁNYI József: *A katonai műveletek terrorvédelme*, Nemzetvédelmi egyetemi közlemények: a Zrínyi Miklós Nemzetvédelmi Egyetem tudományos lapja, 10. évfolyam 3. szám, 2006., p. 200.

In the case of Hungary for example, usurious loans have spread among the poor population in the past few years, which has mined the life of a certain group which has lived on the periphery of society anyway. Getting out of usurious loans is very difficult since they have a very high interest. Those who get a loan are afraid of their creditors because they are not controlled by the state, and in order to recover the debts, they are ready to resort even to the use of violence. The ones who got a loan often also did illegal things in order to solve the problem like prostitution or appropriation of wealth. Because of this, criminal groups have been formed from them, and the fear of them has induced the appearance of radical self-defenders. Since this is a problem in the whole society, the answer to this can be only to eliminate the cause itself which has brought this situation about. On a legal level, the severe penalization of the usury system has significantly forced back the “self-defender” groups established against the criminals. The difficulty is “to specify how inner processes can be supported by outer participation in a way that the locals do not experience it as a compulsion”³².

At international level, it is a general problem that in the schools where the children – whose parents live on the periphery of society – go to; in many cases, neither the teachers, nor the students have an appropriate defence against local bands or the atrocities of parents. One of the optimal ways of working one’s way up in the society is learning itself; this is why the people who take part in this process both as teachers and students have to be protected. The applying of the police, the militia or a security man in the vicinity of these educational institutes improves the possibility of the rising of these students in the long run very much and protects them from the temptation of joining bands or other groups like racist organisations. In order to force back similar events, the police and non-governmental organisations (the militia) started the “Safe School”³³ program, with the help of which the forcing back of crimes near schools is expected.

Among the young, the suspension of compulsory military service has started an unforeseen social change. In the case of women, becoming mature has its visible biological signs; however, in the case of men, this is much less striking and it takes place much slower. Earlier in the life of men, in more cases the compulsory military service had meant the psychological change after which they regarded themselves as adults. In our present society, this is indicated by starting to work. Due to the lack of military service some men have come under the magic spell of organisations showing military characteristics. The

³² BESENYŐ János: *A nemzetközi terrorizmus veszélye Észak-Afrikában*, in: Új honvédségi szemle: a Magyar Honvédség központi folyóirata, LXI. évfolyam 12. szám 2007. december, p. 50.

³³ VARGA Csilla: „Önökért, Önként – Óbudáért”, in: <http://www.nonprofit-tanacsadas.hu/onkentesseg/>, 05-05-2012

establishment of a reserve system can be a perfect alternative to solve this, where the emphasis is on the volunteer and not on the reservist.³⁴

It is well-known, that the relationship between terrorism and Islam is widely analysed, so I deliberately have not written about it. But as we know: „The extreme interpretation of Islam, the Jihad and the terrorism against the Western countries, which are increasingly more effective and its new expressions raise important questions about religion and terrorism.”³⁵

Analysing extremist groups

When we examine an organisation or group, the following viewpoints should be considered (without attempting to be comprehensive):

Structure:

- Is it institutionalised or not?
- In what organizational form is it registered officially?

Financial background:

- Does it have a financial basis?
- From where do they have a financial basis?
- Do they get support from the state?
- Do they apply for supports?
- On what do they spend their income?

Communication:

- Do they have inner and outer communication?
- What type of communication channel do they use?
- How much are they in the focus of the media?

Uniformity and symbols:

- Do they have symbols?
- What do the symbols that they use mean?
- Do they have a uniform?
- Do they have a consistent inner system of signs?

Membership:

- Are they attached to another country or minority?

³⁴ UJHÁZY László: *A magyar tartalékosok szövetsége*, in: Sereg szemle, A Magyar Honvédség Összhaderőnemi Parancsnokság Szakmai-Tudományos Folyóirata, IX. évfolyam , 3-4 szám, 2011., p. 193.

³⁵ BESENYŐ János: *Női terroristák a radikális iszlámban, új biztonsági kihívások a 21. században*, in: Szakmai Szemle, A Katonai Biztonsági Hivatal Tudományos Tanácsának Kiadványa, 2009., 4.szám, p.195.

- Of what kind of people do the members consist of (for example age, gender, qualifications, employment)?
- What is the relationship between the members like?
- What is the hierarchy like?
- Are there any extremist elements among them?
- What is the way of recruitment?
- Is there an initialization process? If yes, what kind?

The reasons for their establishment, aims:

- Why has it been established?
- For what or against what do they organise themselves?
- Do they have some kind of ideology?
- Are they attached to political parties?
- Do they have religious views?
- Do they do converting of spiritual nature?

Activity:

- What kind of activity does the group do?
- Is their activity legal?

Stock of devices:

- Do they have any means of transportation? If yes, it is of the organisation or a private one?
- Do its members or the organisation have guns? (legally or illegally)

Summary

When dealing with radical organisations, we have to understand them in order to give an appropriate approach to their activities. However, getting to know the other one does not mean identifying ourselves with them or agreeing with their deeds. Basically, what we have to examine is in what the behaviour of its members is manifested, where they started and in which way are they going. To quote the words of Prof. PhD Colonel György Szternák, “in the process of handling danger, prevention in this case means that an extremist organisation must not reach a stage when it does violent deeds. In all circumstances, the extremist, violent organisations have to be prevented from this, possibly by using democratic tools”³⁶. It is sure that the appearance and spread of extremists, which is in every case a sign or a reaction to a given social situation, have to be at least supervised by the forces established in order to handle these problems,

³⁶ PROF DR. SZTERNÁK György: *Szélsőséges, erőszakos szervezetek mint a demokratikus társadalmak egyik fő veszélyforrása*, in: Felderítő szemle, Magyar Köztársaság Katonai Felderítő Hivatal, VII. évfolyam Különszám, Budapest, 2008. január, pp. 111-112.

and the problems causing the creation of extremist groups have to be solved either at a political decision making level or by law enforcement troops.

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THE ADAPTABILITY OF COMPETENCE BASED SELECTING METHODS ESPECIALLY AT THE NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES

Abstract

The process of selection has become the central element of the modern HR management, its efficiency and validity may determine the success of a certain organization. It is especially true to that kind of organizations which have lengthy selection process and their future employees are expected to possess special skills. National security services are one of them and the author of this article is going to examine their different ways of selecting expectants.

Keywords: selection, competency, national security services, Assesment Center/Development Center

Introduction

Carrier planning is held to be one of the most efficient way of supporting job commitment. The governmental organs, public services and law enforcement organizations usually share similar principles in their way of interpreting HR methods. It is a generally noticeable trend that these organizations have a couple of years of disadvantage compared to the actual trends applied by the civil companies. The possible reason for it is that they are not profit-orientated, therefore they are not forced to follow the market-led developments and trends. Thanks to that approach, the same methods may be prevailed for years. However, it seems that the modern HR ideas and theories slowly do appear at these organizations as well. Due to their special functions they require customized methods even in the personnel field. Nevertheless some HR methods may be very well adapted to the special demands which would increase efficiency on many areas. This article is going to examine only one element of the whole HRM system from the point of view how the different ways of selection may support such special organizations as the national security services.

The theory of selecting applicants

The idea of selection derives from the platonic age. Since then numerous theories were born, especially for that question how can the appropriate person be found for a certain task. The purpose of selecting process is “to find the right

man to the right position”. For this reason the applicants will be tested, measured and examined in many different ways.

There are different theories and methods concerning the evaluation of eligibility of the applicants. Due to the certain ideas of experts in the recent decades, the often used “aptitude test” expression has been slowly replaced by the “selection procedure” term, which has a more flexible meaning.

Although it is also important to define the meaning of eligibility which may help to develop the appropriate requirement system.

János Csirszka (1985) wrote the followings about that: “Though the idea of eligibility is generally spread and widely used,... eligibility and adequacy don’t have the same meaning, they are not synonyms. Eligibility means a onesided attitude: with the help of appropriate criteria it adjudges the person eligibility, of course from the job’s point of view.”

In the recent decades the often used “apptitude test” expression has been slowly replaced by the “selection procedure” term, which has a more flexible meaning.

PhD Márta Juhász (2002,2007) has defined the so called predictors, which can also be useful for compiling an appropriate selection method. According to her, predictors are able to show the applicants’ actual state which means that with the help of that the abilities, personal skills, competencies of the applicants can be measured and examined.

One way of grouping the predictors is connected to the certain type of jobs. In this case 2 types of job can be differentiated: the so called “knowing” and the “doing” ones.

The “knowing” type of jobs require certain skills and knowledge. Using ability- and personality tests is the best way of examining appropriate applicants for that kind of jobs.

The „doing” types of jobs – like labour work, field work – require more practical skills, therefore more situational- and pilot job tests should be applied during the selection process.

There are many methods which can be used for selecting. The categorization of these methods depends on the different approach of the experts.

János Csirszka (1985) used 2 big groups:

I. The informational content of the method:

1. Knowledge- and cognition evaluation method
2. Achievement evaluation method:
 - Device for examining the sensomotoric achievement

- Device for examining skills
 - Pilot job
 - Examining mental abilities
 - General intelligence tests
3. Personality evaluation method:
- Method for examining personality and functions
 - Method for examining personality structure and central functions

II. The form of the method:

1. Written tests:
 - Questionnaires
 - Paper-pencil tests
 - Drawing tests
2. Manipulation tests:
 - Instruments, devices
 - Pilot jobs
3. Verbal tests:
 - Reproductions
 - Associations
 - Definitions
4. Evaluation of action:
 - Games
 - Decision-, organization- and role games

Sándor Klein (2001) defined 5 groups of aptitude tests:

1. Ability tests: intelligence test, examining the verbal and movement skills and the sensory organs
2. Objective personality questionnaires
3. Projective personality tests: less structured than the objective personality tests eg.: Rorschach, TAT
4. Objective autobiography data: main stages of the applicants' life, degrees, qualifications etc.
5. Conversations, interviews: appropriate for observing non-verbal signs, and certain cognitive competencies such as communicative competence

In the past decade the idea of competence-based selection became quite popular. This is based on the cross-matching of personal and job competencies. According to many experts the index of job fitting can be remarkably improved by using competence-based selection methods. However these methods can be more expensive than the traditional ones and require longer arrangements.

These are the basic steps of introducing a new competence-based selection system:

- Job analyses process
- Compiling the map of competencies, defining the job requirement standards and the priorities
- Choosing the appropriate methods for evaluating the defined competencies
- Selecting and preparing the participants of the evaluation process
- Testing the selection method

Not only the members of the psychological and HR divisions should be involved in this procedure, but other participants as well such as leaders and deputed experts.

The practice of selection and adaptability of competence based selection methods at the national security services

The activities of the national security services are determined by the law and internal regulations. The ever changing social and security circumstances have resulted in new challenges for the services. Due to this there have been many reforms, contractions and developments taken place at the security services in the recent years. The changes have affected not only the staff but the selection, preparing and training methods as well.

In general, all national security services have a multi-staged selection procedure; their applicants are tested in many different ways depending on the general and special requirements.

Applicants generally should fit the following requirements:

- Qualifications, degrees
- Biodata (CV, personal and family data etc.)
- Clean record
- Steady lifestyle
- Psychological suitability
- Medical suitability
- Physical suitability (especially at the military service)
- Interviews (motivation etc.)

For admission, the applicants must fulfill all the requirements, which may last for months. After admission there are no specific evaluations regarding the

job fitting indicators. At the end of the probationary period, there are certain evaluations but these are not able to determine the actual job fitting factors. Since the measurement of competencies correlates to the job fitting indicators, therefore it is essential to apply competence-based selection methods as well.

As it was mentioned before, the selection procedures of the national security services are quite long – even 4-6 months -, so it is a crucial interest that the admitted ones actually fit the certain jobs. This also helps to increase work commitment. This is another reason for having not only traditional selection methods but competency-based ones such as simulations, pilot jobs and Assessment Centers.

In one of her studies PhD Zsuzsanna Barta (2009) – using the SHL Hungary Ltd.’s data – introduces the fitting rate of different selection methods:

1	Perfect fitting
0,65	Assessment Centers
0,45	Simulations, ability tests
0,40	Group works, competency measurements
0,35	Structured interviews
0,30	Biography data
0,15	Typical job interviews
0,10	Qualifications, grafology, frenology
0	Random fitting

Seemingly those methods which make it possible to evaluate and observe the behaviour of the applicants in “real life situations” are more reliable in consideration with the job fitting factors.

The national security services’ activities often require special skills and abilities which can be evaluated difficulty. It is especially true to the operational jobs. It means further difficulties that during the selection procedure it is not possible to create an actual “working situation”. However, with involving experts it may be useful to compile a book of “exercises” which includes similar situations. With that the measurement of certain job competencies becomes easier without breaking the rules of secrecy.

I agree with those experts who consider the AC to be one of the most effective and versatile method. AC is held to be an excellent way of selecting leaders, though I assume that it is also appropriate for selecting applicants as well. Nevertheless it can be customized to many purposes even training, development, carrier-planning etc. In the AC there are many chances to observe applicants in “action” e.g. when doing group works etc, hence it is exceedingly suitable for those organizations which have extraordinary jobs. With a well-developed situational exercise list, many special competencies can be measured this way. Together with the traditional methods that kind of complex selection procedure ensures higher job fitting rates.

Creating an AC is rather expensive and time-consuming, but regarding its job fitting index and usefulness it's worth working on it. Before that it is necessary to make thorough job analyses and to compile the map of competencies for each job, because these are the basis of this method. The national security services may even create an Assessment Center together which would decrease the expenses.

Besides the selection, AC/DC is able to assist other human resource management purposes as well. On the whole it is a very effective tool for improving the job fitting rates and for supporting the different demands of the special services.

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NEWS, EVENTS, INFORMATION

András Hettyey, PhD

RECENSION: Besenyő János: Nyugat-Szahara (Western Sahara)



Writing a „groundbreaking” book on Africa is an easy thing to do for a Hungarian Africanist, for there are woefully few Hungarian works on this topic. This is not to diminish the accomplishment of János Besenyő, who wrote an indeed “groundbreaking” monograph on a quasi-forgotten conflict region of the world, namely Western-Sahara. To anticipate: the book is excellent, readable and of good quality. Besenyő was helped in his undertaking by the fact, that, while serving in the MINURSO mission of the United Nations, he spent some time in...where exactly? In the independent Western Sahara, officially named the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic? Or rather in Southern Morocco?

It is precisely this question which lends importance to the topic, and to the work of Besenyő. But before we reach the fateful events of 1975/76, there is a lot to read about. Following the methodology of classic country profiles, the author first describes Western Sahara’s (we will stick with this term) geography, economy and society, and then begins to sketch the history of the region since ancient times. The first chapters are enlivened by the personal, firsthand stories of the author, which occasionally and pleasantly punctuate the book. (For example the story about the viper, or the ones which shed some light on the inherent cultural differences within the multinational peacekeeping forces.) “Scientific purists” may find fault with these short stories, but – in our experience – it is exactly these little additions which more often than not stick in the memory of the casual reader.

Beginning with the fifth chapter, the author narrates the history of the region, especially the events of 1975, when, after the Spanish colonialists left, Morocco and Mauritania, took over (according to the UN, illegally) Western Sahara. (Morocco occupied the Northern part, Mauritania the Southern part.) In response, the population of the region formed the Polisario (Frente Popular de Liberación de Saguía el Hamra y Río de Oro) and began its fight against the invaders. The Polisario was successful against Mauritania, because Nouakchott, in light of the growing casualties, withdrew its troops from Western Sahara. Their place was taken by the Moroccan army, which was there to stay.

The situation is more or less the same ever since, although numerous UN and other peace initiatives have been launched. Morocco is dragging its heels and sabotaged the agreed referendum on the region's future. At the same time, a huge part of the population of Western Sahara live in a refugee camp in Tindouf, Algeria, hoping for the resolution of the conflict.

In the last chapters, the author describes the history and the structure of the MINURSO (Mission des Nations Unies pour l'Organisation d'un Référendum au Sahara Occidental) peacekeeping mission of the UN. It was under the umbrella of MINURSO that Hungarian soldiers and policemen served in the region. Laudably, the last chapter deals with the difficult life in the refugee camps, presenting a full picture of this intractable conflict.

The book convincingly argues that the main obstacle to the solution of the conflict is Morocco, which does not want to cede the region which it occupied illegally. In this, Rabat is greatly helped by the fact that it is a longstanding and staunch ally of the USA and France (120, 141, 181-183). Paris is supporting the Moroccans in order to counterbalance the hostile Algeria. Algiers, in turn, supports the Polisario. This illustrates, that the regional dynamics of this particular conflict – as so often – play a great role in shaping the situation. It is the strength of this work that the author presents the reader with the regional background.

According to the book, there is some scientific argument as to why Morocco invaded the country in the first place. “Although most analysts think that Morocco invaded Western Sahara for its phosphate deposits, this is not true. By 1975, Morocco was already one of the biggest phosphate producers and exporters in the world, and had reserves for several decades of this agriculturally important commodity. The phosphate in Western Sahara was therefore not the main reason for the occupation, even though it is much more purer than the Moroccan variety. What is more, the control of the mines was more expensive than the revenues gained from it.” (24) According to Besenyő, the occupation had political reasons, and was not undertaken for economical benefits. The Moroccan sultan simply wanted to boost his legitimacy with this action. This reasoning is somehow weakened by the admission of the author a couple of pages later, that „Morocco gained valuable economic opportunities from the occupation, and partly for this reason, partly for political – nationalism, Berber separatism – reasons does not want to cede control to the natives.” (33) What is more, Besenyő writes that „one of the best quality phosphate of the world can be found in Western Sahara. Its mining brings huge benefits to Morocco.” (23) The question therefore arises, how well the Moroccans were informed by the riches waiting for them (perhaps quite well). Is it therefore not possible that the invasion had economical, *as well as* political reasons? A more detailed cost-benefit analysis might have answered this question, but the lack of data and the

secrecy of Rabat have made a thorough investigation almost impossible. Nevertheless, it seems certain that Morocco did not make a bad deal.

The quality of the book, as we have already stressed, is laudably good. There are only few typos (although on page 158, 1998 should be 1988). The bibliography is ample, the illustrations are useful. Importantly, the book is not biased. Although it is clear that the author's sympathy lies with the Sahrawis, he also points out that the Polisario made mistakes, for example hindering the resettlement of the refugees to Western Sahara (249). Thanks to the work of Besenyő, Hungary has another reliable and readable monograph on Africa. This book might serve as a reference for further Hungarian monographs on Africa.