TRADECRAFT

REVIEW

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IRREGULAR WARFARE OF THE NEAR FUTURE

Resume:

In the new millenia, cumulated effects of the larger environment of warfare have brought significant changes to the way armed conflicts are resolved. In a number of countries, thorough studies have been carried out to analyze and evaluate the effects of these changes, especially those related to irregular warfare, which has posed serious challanges to regular armies, and thus sparking a fiery debate among military theorists. Even though future can not be precisely forecasted, some so called megatrends can already be distinguished. Urbanization in the third world, dual-use technologies, worrying demographic patterns, and resource scarcity, combined with globalizations's interdependency cast a new kind of shadow on the near future, a part of which can already be seen in the new kind of intra-state, and transnational conflicts as shown in the study.

Keywords: Irregular, asymmetric, armed conflicts, near future, ideology

Introduction

As a cumulative effect of social, technological, ideological, economic and other factors warfare has undergone radical changes. In the age of globalization conventional warfare is getting more and more costly, and not only financially, but politically as well. Therefore, the significance of non-conventional solutions and means has been growing steadily, yet at the same time, regular armies and weapons of mass destruction have also retained their importance. So far the scientific community has been unable to come up with a precise definition of these phenomena, even though the evaluation of the crisis which ensued after the termination of high intensity operations in Iraq and Afghanistan has already been carried out. A number of new concepts and theories have grown out of this research, and "asymmetry" has become the most widely used term - even though

any good military leader strives to achieve asymmetry, of course to his own advantage, and not to fight on even terms.[1] In my opinion this new (or much rather rediscovered) wisdom is not a scientific breakthrough, even if it is marketed as such. Irregular troops, such as the Hungarian hussars or Turkish *akinji* have been used for centuries in small and big wars alike, not to mention those uneasy periods of neither peace nor war which characterize most centuries of human history.

According to the Global Trends 2030, published by the National Intelligence Council of the USA, we face such a period.[2] The authors of the above study have indentified a number of megatrends, which are going to shape the environment of warfare in the near future. Megatrends such as the continuous increase in the individual empowerment, power diffusion, such as the increasing importance of alliances and networks, demographic patterns, such as ageing and poverty stricken countries alongside urbanization and overcrowded cities in the third world, increase in migration, and finally food, water, and energy scarcity.[3]

Theoretical debates of recent years

In the middle of the past decade, when Operations Iraqi Freedom and Enduring Freedom were at their height, the likelihood of a conventional, high intensity war looked slim. In 2006 the Us Army's and US Marine Corps' common field manual on counterinsurgency was published after a 20-year hiatus[4] sparking a debate which has split the military theorists into two opposing sides. The so called COIN-tras have strongly opposed the notion that future warfare will consist of stability and peace support operations.[5] In their opinion, netwar, or the precision weapon-driven operations with high-tech sensors and weaponry will play a dominant role, no matter the type of war. This phenomenon called"technicization" by Colin S. Gray has even changed the approach to military history, since military technology came to be seen as a key driver in the development of military theory.[6] COIN-istas on the other hand have

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[1] "Consequently, the art of using troops is this: When ten to the enemy's one, surround him; When five times his strength, attack him; If double his strength, divide him." Sun Tzu: The Art of War, Oxford University Press, New York, 1963.
[2] Global Trends 2030, http://gt2030.com/ accessed February 3, 2013.
[3] Global trends 2030, p. II.
[4] FM3-24/MCWP3-335
[5] Colloquially known as Military Operations Other Than War (MOOTW)
[6] Colin S. Gray: Another Bloody Century, London, 2005, p. 153 and pp. 374-375.

argued that future war will be like the insurgencies in Iraq or Afghanistan calling it – vehemently yet somewhat imprecisely – asymmetrical. The supporters of counterinsurgency have argued that no modern military can neglect the experiences of the recent past.

Perhaps the most important military event of 2008 was the Russian-Georgian war, which abruptly ended the theoretical debate, proving that classical, conventional, high intensity warfare has not become extinct. The economic recession has spread worldwide in the very same year, forcing experts to reconsider, especially when comparing events to those leading to World War II. The debate has pitched two opposing sides with mutually exclusive theories against each other in a manner so typical of the modern western academic community, and by 2014 it has become less and less dialectic. It was obvious for anyone who has studied military history in depth that neither side had the philosophers' stone.

The high costs of regular warfare, western societies' rejection of military conflicts, and the restraining effects of international organizations all contribute to the fact that an international, industry-based high intensity military conflict is highly unlikely. Spreading of dual-use (military-civilian) technologies also contribute to the above. When small groups or even a single individual can carry out precision attacks, participate in cyber warfare, or can obtain biological weapons there is no need for costly, and easily recognizable regular armed forces.[7] On the other hand, just the above mentioned Russian-Georgian war has shown that short, intensive high intensity armed conflicts can and probably will take place on the peripheries, although they will not become everyday occurrences unless extreme changes significantly alter the international environment.[8]

Irregular warfare of the 21st century

Future irregular conflicts will be most likely fought within the borders of states, between certain groups of the population. Rupert Smith calls this

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[7] Global trends p. V.

[8] For example the unexpected and drastic reduction of access to natural resources due to natural disasters (drought, volcanic eruptions, or earthquake), or an economic or political crisis that reaches extreme proportions. The phenomena that accompany climate change (unexpected flooding, or other phenomena of global warming) are not included: their effects are manifested only slowly and in the long term.

phenomenon "war amongst the people."[9] As the attraction of the nation state weakens either through a deliberate political process or due to the activities of religious extremists, secondary identities thrive. Be it intentional eroding of the binding power of nation states in western countries or increasing unrest in the Middle-East, the very idea of the nation state is declining. In the Middle Ages the people owed loyalty irrespective of their faith or nationality to one ruler, with the notable exception of high ranking priests, or bishops. Multiethnic empires were formed under the rule of the king or emperor who ruled by the grace of God. In the Modern Age nation states came into being, basing their legitimacy on the idea of nationalism. Both versions of this idea are weakening. Due to historical causes Hungary, like most of the surrounding countries, is built upon the originally German notion of 'cultural nation:' common heritage, unique culture and community are the foundations of countries. In francophone areas the idea of 'state nation' is widespread: residents of a country, regardless of their national origin, ethnicity, or religion form a nation because of the common language. Since both of the above concepts are in decline (as recent events in France /2005/, Great Britain /2011/ or Sweden /2013/ have shown), secondary identities such as ethnicity, lifestyle, religion, or even political views have emerged to claim the people's allegiance. The above mentioned unrests can by repeated anytime, since they had no specific reason.

Having read this far, the reader may reasonably ask why on Earth is a basically military-related article is concerned so much with ideology? For the same reason why Martin van Creveld, the Israeli theorist wrote a whole book about this issue. In *Transformation of War,* published (surprisingly) as early as 1991, he asked and answered who will be fighting is fighting in the post Cold War era, and why.[10] Although contrary to van Creveld's prediction, nation states have not yet disappeared, the above mentioned secondary ideologies run amok, posing the most significant new aspect of irregular warfare in the 21st century. Since western powers have convincing superiority in conventional warfare, according to Max Boot, their adversaries will more and more turn to irregular means.[11] Especially when one considers that this type of warfare has proven to be effective in resisting even superpowers.

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[9] Smith, Rupert: The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World. London: Penguin Books, 2006.
[10] Martin Van Creveld: The transformation of war, The Free Press, New York, 1991
[11] Max Boot: The Evolution of Irregular War, Foreign Affairs, March/April 2013, pp. 75-99.

The second decidedly new aspect of future warfare will be the blurring of previously clear and precisely defined dividing lines, be they dual use off-the-shelf technologies, or new type of combatants. As the cost of conventional weaponry reaches an all time high, and as popular unrests take the form of an insurgency, military tasks also undergo significant changes.

With the appearance of new types of combatants the previously self-explanatory sides become misty, and blurry. As violent non-state belligerents become stronger, multi-polar conflicts emerge, in which other non-state actors also play significant roles. These actors care about nothing but their immediate issues and interests and leave all other aspects (security, long time interests etc.) out of consideration. Telling example for strategic spoilers is the so called non-governmental organizations (NGOs). Of course Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, or Greenpeace, no matter how vehemently or in some cases violently promote their causes, do not come even near those non-state belligerents who will play a major role in the struggles of the 21st century. These transnational or subnational groups can be as varied as international drug gangs,[12] terrorist organizations, violent ethnic minorities, religious groups or a combination of the above. Their common feature is that their activity encompasses a number of social aspects. They are active in the society, some even operate charity founds, schools, health services, or maintain a TV or radio channel. The threat posed by these groups is called a „hybrid challenge" coined by theorist Frank Hoffmann, and the conflict a hybrid conflict, since in many cases such organization, whose role model is Hezbollah, to be described later, possesses conventional military capabilities.[13]

Due to these changes the future battlefield will also be different. The armed clashes of the near future will most likely be fought in urban areas, especially in third world megapolises, since by 2030, 60% of the global population will live in cities.[14]

Ever since the printed press has existed, war correspondence has always played a major part. It is a less known fact that Winston Churchill himself has started his career as a war correspondent, but in the age of non-stop news channels and the internet clashes can be broadcasted live without any sort of

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[12] Such as the purportedly satantist Salva Maratrucha 13 (SM-13)
[13] Frank Hoffmann: Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, December, 2007, p. 35.
[14] Global Trends 2030, p. 27.

lumbering equipment or back office. Be it the Paris intifada mentioned earlier, or the 2011 London riots, drug raids by police and marines in the favellas of Rio de Janeiro, or any future conflict, it can be said for certain that a digital camera or a smartphone will be there to record everything.

Of course these effects do not leave the nation states' security forces unchanged. Wheeled APCs such as Stryker or BTR-80 replace tracked heavily armored all-terrain capable fighting vehicles; subsonic jet fighter-bombers are supplemented by prop driven counterinsurgency aircraft, like the Brazilian Tucano. Although artillery and heavy armor are still needed, they will play a more supportive role. A good example is Leopard 2 PSO (Peace Support Operations), equipped with a dozer blade, high angle remote controlled machine gun turret, and extra sensors to enhance situational awareness in urban combat.

Conventional future military operations will be likely to follow the pattern set by Operation Enduring Freedom in Afghanistan 2001. Special Forces, inserted secretly into the operational area, will support insurgents with target acquisition and training tasks. Using the western powers' air superiority, all opposing heavy equipment will be destroyed quickly enabling local forces to defeat opposing forces.

Another likely form of future warfare will be irregular war against state control, like the 2005 French intifada, the 2011 riots in the UK or those in Sweden in 2013.[15] Desperate, hopeless, or simply thrill-seeking youngsters can riot for no apparent reason, or for something they declare as intrusive. Social unrest created by an economic crisis means great opportunity for opposing sides. Such civil disturbances do not necessarily require the deployment of military forces, yet even in France greater forces were required to restore order than those of the police and gendarmerie. Even in Italy joint police-military patrols had to be organized to calm the population.[16]

One prototype of a future combatant is Hezbollah, in Lebanon. Its ability to resist sustained attack by the Israeli forces has proven a nasty surprise for most observers. The organization itself plays political, social and other roles in Lebanese life: it has a faction in the Lebanese parliament, it operates

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[15] Londoni lázongás, http://hvg.hu/vilag/20110810_guardian_london_lazongas, accessed 20 February, 2013.
[16] Italy begins military effort to quell crime, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/world/europe/05italy.html?r=0, downloaded 2013.12.12

kindergartens and social institutions. With significant Iranian support, Hezbollah has even crafted traditional military capabilities, with surprisingly highly trained light infantry forces. These decentralized small units with their modern equipment and well planned defensive fortifications in the densely built-up areas have proven a worthy adversary to Israeli land forces, for the first time in forty years. Even though they suffered heavy losses due to superior Israeli land and air firepower, they have proved to be more than just a nuisance, even damaging an Israeli warship in the struggle.[17]

Summary

It can be said with confidence that the age-old irregular warfare has adapted to the new millenium, and will be employed in the struggle to promote interests. Since the modern environment is not favorable for conventional military conflicts, not only emerging violent non-state actors, but the primary players of the international community have and will enjoy the possibilities created by irregular warfare. On top of it all, mass media coverage, migration, the ever increasing pace of urbanization, the blurring lines in waging war, dual use technologies and the decline of civic responsibility mean that we are seeing a renaissance of irregular warfare.

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4. Global Trends 2030, http://gt2030.com/ downloaded 2013.02.03
5. GRAY, Colin S. : Another Bloody Century, Phoenix Press London, 2005
6. HOFFMANN, Frank: Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington 2007
7. Italy begins military effort to quell crime, http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/05/world/europe/05italy.html?_r=0, downloaded 2013.12.12
8. SMITH, Rupert: The Utility of Force: The Art of War in the Modern World, Penguin, London, 2006
9. SUN TZU: The Art of War, http://suntzusaid.com, downloaded 2013.12.18
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[17] Frank Hoffmann: Conflict in the 21st Century: The Rise of Hybrid Wars, Center for Emerging Threats and Opportunities, Arlington, 2007 december, 37 o.

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THE NEW MEDIA DEVICES IN THE MIDDLE EAST

„We use Facebook to schedule the protests,
Twitter to coordinate, and YouTube to tell the world”
/unknown Egyptian activist/

Abstract:

In the 2010s, the social networking and YouTube play bigger role in the political events. Thanks to the penetration of the Internet usage, the new media devices reach more points of the world. Citizens and also international relations experts speak about "Facebook and Twitter revolution", the huge impact of YouTube videos. The traditional media platforms are overshadowed by the new channels. Besides this effect, these platforms also challenge the states' political leadership monopoly and legitimacy. The new media gives new possibilities to the opposition parties; it reaches out to large segments of the society. The alternative voices question the long-standing political regimes, give new framework to the politics and political events. The question may arise about the omnipotence of Facebook and Twitter. Are the appearance of the social networks, the widening information flow, and the plurality of the views and beliefs really the essential ingredients of the political change? This study tries to give an answer to these questions; it examines the Middle Eastern countries' political shifts towards the new media devices. The Turkish, Egyptian, Iranian and Syrian examples show the issue's different aspects and mechanisms. The effects of these platforms are not identical. The diverse circumstances, the political systems, the government's reactions, the degree of social consciousness and other factors influence the devices' role and effectiveness in politics.

Keywords: social media, Egypt, Iran, Syria, Turkey, political shifts, Arab Spring

1. The new media environment in the Middle East

Besides the economic, political, cultural and social change, also the globalization influenced the mass media. In the 21st century thanks to the continuous technological development and the decreased role of national borders, the information knows no limits, it flows rapidly and freely between the continents. With the appearance of the international news channels and the spread of Internet usage, the information reaches the homes 24 hours of the day, 7 days of the week. Thanks to the global and regional 24/7 news providers, we can follow the events in a live stream. This situation with Facebook, Twitter and

YouTube changed a little. With these devices the audience can also be an active participant of the information flow, everybody can become a news provider.

In the Middle East, contrary to the Western experiences of the new platforms, the role of satellite television channels also remained important. In this region the mediums are historically state-owned or state-influenced. At the end of the 20th century several local initiations tried to decrease the stability of the state media system. The most important ones are the Doha-based al-Jazeera and the Dubai-based al-Arabiyya. These channels filled the vacuum, but in less than a decade, lost the starting enthusiasm of the audience, lots of people started to question their credibility and objectivity, because the role they played in the so called 'Arab Spring'.

In the region nearly 30.2 million people are presented in the social network sites. This means 15 million Facebook users in the region. But the number of the active users is significantly growing. For example in 2010 the rate of Saudi Twitter users increased 240 percentage.[1] In addition, thanks to the penetration of smart phones more and more people use the possibilities of the new media devices.

	Percentage of Individuals using the Internet												
	2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
Egypt	0,64	0,84	2,72	4,04	11,92	12,75	13,66	16,03	18,01	25,69	31,42	39,83	44,07
Iran (I.R.)	0,93	1,48	4,63	6,93	7,49	8,10	8,76	9,47	10,24	11,07	14,70	21,00	26,00
Syria	0,18	0,35	2,09	3,40	4,32	5,65	7,83	11,50	14,00	17,30	20,70	22,50	24,30
Turkey	3,76	5,19	11,38	12,33	14,58	15,46	18,24	28,63	34,37	36,40	39,82	43,07	45,13
United Kingdom	26,82	33,48	56,48	64,82	65,61	70,00	68,82	75,09	78,39	83,56	85,00	86,84	87,02
United States	43,08	49,08	58,79	61,70	64,76	67,97	68,93	75,00	74,00	71,00	74,00	77,86	81,03

1.figure:
Percentage of individuals (per 100 individuals) using the Internet in the researched Middle Eastern countries and in the U.S., UK.[2]

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[1]International Quality & Productivity Centre http://www.socialbakers.com/blog/130-interesting-digital-marketing-trends-in-the-middle-east

[2] International Telecommunication Union (ITU) World Telecommunication/ICT Indicators Database http://www.itu.int/ITU-D/ict/statistics/

2.figure:

A map from February 2012 which shows the MENA and Middle Eastern countries' Facebook usage data.[3]

2. Turkey: between Europe and Asia

The link between Turkey and Europe was present throughout the history, the state's geographical location between Europe and Asia caused the mixture of the different continents' traditions, influences and characteristics. We can see the elements of capitalist economy, European ideologies like nationalism, liberalism and the secularism.[4] After the Treaty of Sèvres[5] Turkey stayed together thanks to the mobilizing policy of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk and the Turkish National Movement's war of independence. After the conflict, in 29th October 1923, the Turkish Republic was founded, and Atatürk became the first president. During the Atatürk state-building era, the state's characteristics contained the interpretation of the Western values like secularism, nationalism, republicanism, etatism, populism and reformism. After the first president's death, the instability and the strong military influence played the main role in the Turkish politics. Stability returned in 2002 with the election of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the Justice and Development Party (AKP). Erdoğan's conservative, center-right political position till today is associated with religious permissiveness, export-led economic development, liberal market policy, the need of the European Union membership and the growing interest in the Asian markets.[6] These are the reasons with which we can explain the duality of the Turkish media system, information policy and the government's relationship with the new media devices.

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[3] Discover Digital Arabia http://www.ddarabia.com/infograph/facebook-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-at-the-end-of-2012/

[4] Zürcher, Erik J.: *Turkey: A Modern History*. I. B. Tauris, 2004, London-New York, p. 2.

[5] The peace treaty which was signed on 10th August 1920 territorially carved up the Ottoman Empire. The Turkish National Movement under Kemal Atatürk succeeded in fighting for the Turkish independence and the former territory of the state.

[6] Zürcher, Erik J.: *Turkey: A Modern History*. I. B. Tauris, 2004, London-New York, p. 152-154.

Throughout Turkey's history, the Turkish media system consisted of state-operated radio and television platforms and some private mediums. These platforms aren't direct objects of censorship, but the 1983 press law indicates remarkable restrictions. The newest press law from 4th March 2011 indicated important changes in the Turkish media system. The fresh regulatory system of the No. 6112 law wanted to fit with the European Union's requirements.[7] But it also changed the penalties of the offenses and the offending contents. The single and multiple warnings can be followed by fines, temporary suspension, and the permanent revocation of the broadcasting license and even by prison sentence.

Thanks to the European Union adhesion need, the state softened the censorship and the state's influence in the media system. For example, the number of alternative voices is increased, the minority journalism gained more possibilities.[8] Nevertheless, the Turkish media system needs more reforms to fit the Western norms of the freedom of press and expression. A significant sphere of the censorship is focused on the Atatürk-related topics. Besides the Internet law, also the antiterrorism law and the penal code limit indirectly the freedom of expression.[9] Other problem is the limited access to the Internet, and the regional differences of the development.

2.1. The duality of the Turkish new media

In the year of 2012 from the 79-million country 45 percentage, 36 million people had Internet connection.[10] In the Turkish state more than 32 million people used daily the social network; and the rate is still growing.[11] After Facebook, YouTube is also really popular among the Turkish users. It generated 15.4 million individual attendances and 6.9 million video viewing.[12] Parallel to these platforms, the Turkish people also discovered Twitter. According to comScore's survey from 2011, Turkey has the 8th biggest Twitter-user community in the world.[13]

Despite the expansion of the social networks and the 2 years ago banned, but now newly legal usage of YouTube, the Turkish media system still suffers from the control and pressure of the state. For example, during the spring protest against the Erdoğan government in 2013, the state put pressure on the providers

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[7] Yücel, Taha: *Insight Into Turkish Broadcasting Sector And The New Media Law.* OSCE & Albany Associates, 2012, Istanbul

[8] Ibid.

[9] Elmas, Esra; Kurban, Dilek: *Media policies and regulatory practices in a selected set of European countries, the EU and the Council of Europe: The case of Turkey.* Mediadem, 2010

[10] Internet World Stats http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats4.htm#europe

[11] Social Bakers http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/turkey

[12] New Media Trend Watch http://www.newmediatrendwatch.com/markets-by-country/10-europe/87-turkey

[13] comScore http://www.comscore.com/Insights/Press_Releases/2011/4/ The_Netherlands_Ranks_number _one_Worldwide_in_Penetration_for_Twitter_and_LinkedIn

to limit the Internet connections in the big cities like Istanbul. Also the news of banning Facebook and Twitter were common, but these gossips never became real. The protesters organized themselves via the social networks, they posted there non state-controlled information about the events, and asked for the international communities for support. They also made online newspapers which stated the real happenings and the police's brutal reaction.

Turkey's new media environment is influenced by the European Union admission need, the requirements of liberalization; and by the significant controlling mechanisms. The historically continuous state control is also presented in new platforms. We can mention the example of YouTube. Due to ist anti-Atatürk contents, the state banned the site for months.

3.   Egypt: the positive example

After the revolution in 1952, president Gamal Abd al-Nasir (1954-70) modernised Egypt's economy and pressed for the idea of the Arab unity. The autocratic regime's main support was the national army. Following the socialization zeal, he also put the media under state control. The media channels became tools of propaganda, the propaganda channels of the socialist regime. After the Six-Day War in 1967, Abd al-Nasir's system weakened, and in 1970 Anwar as-Sādāt (1970-81) became the president of the country. The new president turned away from the Soviet Union, and tried to gain better relationships with the Western countries. In 1979, Egypt signed a peace treaty with Israel, which caused the Arab world's disapprobation. Al-Sadat made the Egyptian media system more open, some of the censorship's elements disappeared. Nevertheless, the mediums still stayed under the state's and the Supreme Press Council's influence.[14]

Muhammad Husni Mubarak (1981-2011) learnt from his predecessor's faults, he liquidated his political enemies and started to liberalize Egypt's political life. Egypt became one of the main allies of the US in the Middle East. The president continued to build up the liberty of press, he cancelled the censorship. The new leadership was more tolerant with the opposing views, but also put in prison the too loud journalists. The media was still mainly state-owned or state-influenced. During the Mubarak-government, the tension between the political leadership and the Muslim Brotherhood deepened. The government referring to the radical Islam threat against the constitution's Western norms, restricted the media contents.[15]

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[14] Amin, Hussein: *Report on the State of the Media in Egypt*. The Arab Center for the Development of the Rule of Law and Integrity

[15] Csicsmann, László: *Egyiptom: A Mubárak-rezsim liberalizációja és deliberalizációja*. Grotius, 2010.

In the spring of 2011, huge wave of protests scavenged through the region, and the so-called Arab Spring started to reach nearly all the Middle Eastern states. Mubarak left his power, and the army took over the control in February 2011.[16] At the election in November 2011, the fundamental Muslim Brotherhood gained a huge success, then the new president of the republic, Muhammad Mursi was elected.[17] The political shift wasn't complete; the army afraid of the fundamentalism intervened, and removed Mursī from the power on 3th July 2013.[18] The army announced new roadmap for the country's political future.[19] The state maintained its power, the interim head of state became Adlī Mansur, but the main political figure can be considered General ʿAbd al-Fattah al-Sisi.

3.1. Egypt's new media and the Arab Spring

From the 74 million Egyptian population more than 18 million people have Internet connection, and the Internet is significantly growing. In 2011, the Facebook user's number raised with 4 million, it gave 25 % of the Arabic word's users. The active user's number was 13 million in the beginning of 2013.[20] The statistics talk about 215,000 active Twitter user. Nevertheless, the usage of the new online platforms is still limited mainly in the countryside, and in the less developed areas.

The Egyptian new media had a great role during the Arab Spring, the effect of these new platforms showed during the protests and in the political shift. The social networks and the video portals played a significant part in the news coverage of the events and in the mobilization of the society. The platforms functioned as the channel of the critical voices. In January 2011, the Mubārak-regime fighting with the discontented crowds blocked the social networks, hardened the Internet access and the network usage of mobile phones. These measures raised the question of the return of the censorship and the potential power of the new media devices.[21]

The social networks and the YouTube had a big role in the events, but they were just one component of the whole story. The devices helped the flow of the information and the plurality of the views, linked the different groups, but

[16] Speigel: *Mubarak Steps Down.* 11 February 2011. http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/mubarak-steps-down-egyptian-president-leaves-office-hands-power-to-military-a-745080.html
[17] WRITENET: *Islamic Fundamentalism in the Middle East and Southwest Asia.* January 2011
[18] The Guardian: *Mohamed Morsi ousted in Egypt's second revolution in two years.* 4 July 2013. http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jul/03/mohamed-morsi-egypt-second-revolution
[19] Al Jazeera: *President Morsi overthronw in Egypt.* 4 July 2013. http://www.aljazeera.com/news/middleeast/2013/07/20137319828176718.html
[20] Social Bakers http://www.socialbakers.com/facebook-statistics/egypt
[21] Social Capital Blog: *Twitter, Facebook and YouTube's role in Arab Spring.* 26 January 2011.

weren't the main cause of the political shift.[22] Despite this fact, the news portals started to speak about Facebook and Twitter Revolution. At this point, I need to highlight that the historical revolutions happened without the Internet's effect. It would be wrong and misleading to say that the anti-regime movements started because of the new media. The social networks helped the 24/7 admission of the events and the coordination of the protests. They also helped to people to express criticism about the 30 year old regime.[23]

On the whole, we can say that the new media platforms helped the start of the democratical shift and contributed to the departure of Husnī Mubarak from presidency. We also need to highlight the fact that Facebook, Twitter and YouTube just helped the mobilization of the people, but weren't the main causes of the shift. In my view, people did not associate rightfully revolutionary role to these channels. The social networks and the video platforms in many cases failed to reach the political change. For this Iran's presidential elections followed protest in 2009 is a great example. The Egyptian events highlighted the possibilities of the new media devices, but Iran's example showed also the rather different aspects.

4. Iran: the negative example

In the history of IranMuhammad Reza Pahlavi's departure, the Islamic Revolution, and the foundation of the Islamic Republic meant a big political shift in 1979. The Western-allied shah modernized the state, but saved the power for his sycophants and formed an autocratic system. Reza Pahlavi focused on a secular regime, and put the religion out of the political life. During this era the state's control of the media loosened, and number of the newspapers and television channels grew.[24] In 1979 the intellectuals of the society in cooperation with the religious elite overthrew the shah's power, and with the leadership of Rohollah Mostafavi Musavī Khomeini ayatollah formed the Islamic Republic.[25] Iran's Supreme Leader, Khomeini ayatollah successively displaced his political rivals and the American influence. The constitution referring to the religious and moral values, the national security interests and the harms of libel, restricted the mass media's liberty. The media gained a pedagogical role, became the propaganda tool of the Shíia Islamic interpretation of religion and culture. The media contents were under the influence of the Ministry of Culture and Islamic Guidance and the Supreme Council of the Cultural Revolution.[26]

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[22] Kassim, Saleem: *Twitter Revolution: How the Arab Spring Was Helped By Social Media*. PolicyMic, 2012.

[23] Bhuiyan, Serajul I.: *Social Media and Its Effectiveness in the Political Reform Movement in Egypt*. Middle East Media Educator, 2011. 1 (1), p. 14-20.

[24] Michaelsen, Marcus: *Iran: Media System*. University of Erfurt, 2008.

[25] Ablaka, Gergely: *Hol tart a Khomeini ajatollah által meghirdetett iszlám forradalom?* Kül-Világ, 2009. 7(1)

[26] OpenNet Initiative: *Internet Filtering in Iran* 2004-2005.

The internet in Iran was introduced in 1992. The political power extended immediately its influence to these platforms, and tried to influence one of the world's biggest Internet user community, the third biggest blogosphere worldwide. In parallel with the growing number of the active users', the Iranian politics introduced the world's most significant Internet censorship, the *Smartfilter*.[27] The state-operated filtering system mainly blocks the non-Islamic, or sexual contents, and the Farsi language blogs.[28] The system developed and attenuated continually, in the 2010s mainly focuses on the local sites.

In total, we could say that the Iranian media system is under the political leadership's control and influence. Because of the filtering system and the media contents' continuous monitoring, the freedom of expression and press can't prevail. This censorship influences also the new media devices. Handling of the protests after the presidential elections in 2009 verifies the oppressive nature of the state.

4.1. The Iranian new media after the presidential election in 2009

The re-election of Ahmadīnezad made the impression of cheating in many Iranian citizens which ended up in mass street protests in June 2009. The new media devices became the events' main coordinators. The tweets and posts gave space to the alternative and critical voices posing challenges to the Iranian leadership. The mobilizing power of these platforms challenged the existence of the political regime, which answered to this threat with aggression and with limiting the Internet connection and the mobile phone systems.[29]

The traditional international media platforms were slow to respond to the Iranian conflict, the new media became the main resource of information in Iran's case. CNN talked about the new media's victory over the traditional platforms, and the tweets used more and more the cnnfail hashtag.[30] The big role of the new media devices during this conflict was also indirectly recognized by the U.S. when the American government's agency monitored the social networks' impact on political events.[31] Most of the protesters thought that with the social networks people can change easily the current regime. Besides the

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[27] Kamalipour, Yahya (ed.): *Media, power and politics in the digital age: the 2009 presidential election uprising in Iran*. Rowman & Littlefield, Plymouth, 2010, p. 162.
[28] OpenNet Initiative: *Internet Filtering in Iran* 2004-2005.
[29] Burns, Alex ; Eltham, Ben: *Twitter Free Iran: An Evaluation of Twitter's Role in Public Diplomacy and Information Operations in Iran's 2009 Election Crisis*. In Papandrea, Franco; Armstrong, Mark (ed.): *Record of the Communications Policy & Research Forum 2009*. Network Insight Institute, 2009, Sydney
[30] Kamalipour, Yahya (ed.): *Media, power and politics in the digital age: the 2009 presidential election uprising in Iran*. Rowman & Littlefield, Plymouth, 2010, p. 99
[31] Burns, Alex ; Eltham, Ben: *Twitter Free Iran: An Evaluation of Twitter's Role in Public Diplomacy and Information Operations in Iran's 2009 Election Crisis*. In Papandrea, Franco; Armstrong, Mark (ed.): *Record of the Communications Policy & Research Forum 2009*. Network Insight Institute, 2009, Sydney

connecting role, these channels informed the international community. Thanks to the YouTube videos, tweets and posted pictures, everybody could follow the most significant moments of the conflict.

Nevertheless, the social network's role was overrated in the conflict. People didn't take into consideration the fact that state actors can also use the possibilities of the new media. Via Twitter and Facebook the regime could identify and punish some of the protesters.[32] The aggressive reaction shows that the new media devices cannot cause political shift on their own. The platforms have big role in the mobilization of the citizens, but in itself have limited power. Putting next to each other the Egyptian and the Iranian example marks the new media's different effects. In Egypt, the political shift's other conditions were presented, the regime change could start. Contrarily, in Iran the state influence was extended, the opposition parties and the protesters couldn't reach a significant result.

Hasan Ruhani's presidency, started in the summer of 2013 could cause a change in the Iranian state's media policy. The conservative, but also reformist politician has already started the nuclear détente and Iran's reintegration to the international community.[33] The new president uses the new media platforms, tends to improve the women's rights and the Iranian economy. There are signs of improvement, but the strong state influence and the primacy of religious views are still big part of the Islamic country's every-days.

5. Syria: war in the media platforms

After liberation from the French colonial mandate, the Syrian Arab Republic gained full independency in April 1946. The first years of the independent state were ruled by political instability and insecurity. After numerous coups d'états, in the March Revolution of 1963 the Ba'at Party seized power. The still continuous putsches ended up in 1970 with the Corrective Revolution and the presidency of Hafiz al-Asad (1970-2000).[34] Al-Asad during his 30 year long leadership, gave power to the 'Alawite and Christian minority and started to eliminate his political opposition. The Syrian media system became the tool of the government's interests. The Baath Party put the radio and television broadcasting system under state control. The government gained power to eliminate the publications which were dangerous to the national security. The media became the tool of Hafiz al-Asad's cult of personality. Besides the anti-regime and anti-al-Asad contents, also questioning the

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[32] Ibid.

[33] CNN: *Hassan Rouhani is Iran's next president after appealing to tradition, reform*. June 16 2013.
http://edition.cnn.com/2013/06/15/world/meast/iran-elections/

[34] *Brief History of Modern Syria*. Syrian Embassy, Washington, January 2005

legitimacy of the political system, the Baath Party's and the military's power were taboo topics.[35] Also the Internet connection was limited in the country.

After Hafiz al-Asad's death in 2000, his son, Bashshar became Syria's president. He continued his father's measures, displaced the opposition but reduced the influence of the military. Bashsar al-Asad eased on the one-party system and widened the National Progressive Front. The new president reorganized the secret police services and started an economic shift. The media system also faced some positive changes. The détente of the Syrian media was interrupted by the Arab Spring, however the political reforms continued. The political sphere became more plural; numerous new political formations like the Syrian National Council appeared, however their existence isn't legally recognized in the country.[36] The Council was recognized the Syrian nation's legitimate representative by the Friends of Syria Group in 2012. However their legitimacy has not been accepted by the Syrian society. In the anti-government fights and the coordination of the civil initiatives the Syrian Revolution General Commission (SRGC) and the National Coalition for Syrian Revolutionary and Opposition Forces played a key role.[37] Nevertheless the numerous attempts, none of the oppositional initiatives were able to join the anti-regime forces to form a way of the political shift. The conflict between the government and the Free Syrian Army (FSA) continued till today. The guerrilla fighters gained control of many Syrian towns, the UN peace talks reached dead ends couple of times.[38] At the end of November 2013, the government forces gained advanced positions, but the clashes are continuous. The international community wants to solve the situation in a peaceful way; and the Geneva II Middle East Peace Conferences started in 22th of January, 2014.

After the start of the mass protests, the Syrian media regulation became stricter. The new media law became effective in September 2011. The law talks about press freedom, but it has also built numerous restrictions into the system, prioritizing the Syrian national aims. The National Council of Media has a significant role controlling the whole system; it has influence on the media freedom and the freedom of expression.[39] The Syrian state-channel, the Suriya became the main supporter of the government's reforms. The channels close to the government ad-Dunyāaand Ikhbariyya Suriyya also tried to give different edge to the importance of the events.[40] From the main outer supporters sources we can highlight Russia Today, and the Iranian Press TV.

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[35] Baiazy, Amjad: *Syria's Cyber Wars*. Media Policy, 2012.
[36] Sógor, Dániel: *Annantól Al-Abhdarig*. Tradecraft Review, 2013/1
[37]Csiki, Tamás; Gazdik, Gyula: *Stratégiai törekvések a szíriai válság kapcsán I.* NKE Stratégiai Védelmi Kutatóközpont elemzések, 2012/17.
[38] Sógor, Dániel: *Annantól Al-Abhdarig.* Tradecraft Review, 2013/1
[39] *Syrian Arabic Republic's media law* 2011. http://sana.sy/ara/360/2011/08/29/366489.htm
[40] Sógor, Dániel: Annantól Al-Ahdarig. Tradecraft Review, 2013/1

5.1. Syria's virtual war

The new media devices played a big role in the Syrian war. These platforms had a greater liberty than the traditional media. The new channels helped to disseminate the citizens' views, to create independent sources of news, to challenge the state media monopoly, to mobilize the Syrian people, and to strengthen the citizens' awareness.[41]

The penetration of these new platforms grows significantly. The Facebook users' number in 2012 was 1.4 million, and the social site every month reaches 10 000 new person. The Twitter had around 8,600 registered users in 2012.[42] Despite the government restrictions, the YouTube videos also reach broad social strata. The 2011-started conflict, the fight of the government and opposition forces decentralized the Syrian media. Next to the government influenced traditional mediums, more and more critical sites, platforms were founded. The blogosphere, the social networking and the video-sharing sites became one of the main battlefields of the conflict. The anti-government forces' brutal acts in many cases helped the government to show the immorality of the opposition. That's the reason why they permited a relatively liberated media platform with lots of alternative voices. However, the Syrian government like the Iranian regime bought Western internet filtering software at the end of 2011.[43] That's why the protesters, learning from the 2009 Iranian example, informed each other via social sites just at the last moment, using false user accounts.

The al-Assad government fought successively against the social portals alternative initiatives; it changed also the media and the cyberspace to battlefield. The falsified home-made videos overwhelmed the new media platforms, which's quality and reality were highly questionable. The anti-government forces tried to show the moments of the aggression, while the government highlighted the pro-government protests and the terrorist acts' dangers. Both parties aimed the quantity effacement, they tried to suppress each other with the video flow. Overall, we can say that the government's tactic against the critical voices' new communication platform was successful.

Other great example of the Syrian "cyber war" was the foundation of the Syrian Electronic Army (SEA) in 2011. The Syrian Electronic Soldiers were a group of computer hackers who wanted to support al-Asad's regime by hacking important anti-government and Western sites. The SEA leaked several secret documents, files and emails of the "enemies of Syria". They attacked the sites of Harvard University, Al Arabiyya, Ministry of Transport of Israel, Turkish

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[41] Baiazy, Amjad: *Syria's Cyber Wars*. Media Policy, 2012.
[42] Discover Digital Arabia http://www.ddarabia.com/infograph/facebook-users-in-arab-countries/
[43] Media Policy: *Syria's Cyber Wars*. June 2012

Ministry of Information and Human Right's Watch. The group also targeted the Twitter account of Al Jazeera, France24 and AP, the Facebook page of Sky News Arabia, and the US Marine Corps.[44] The SEA denied the direct link with the Syrian president, they said that "their goal is an initiative of protecting the homeland and supporting the reforms of the president, who is the right option for the aspirations of the youth."[45]

Neither have we seen the end of the civil war nor the winner of Syria's virtual war. The clashes continued and the outcome of the conflict cannot be predicted yet.

6. Conclusion

In the 21th century the new media can gain more and more important role. The huge penetration of the social networks has a significant effect on the society's mobilization. Besides this, the information flow widened also, informing the international community became easier and faster. With the social site's pictures and short stories, and the YouTube's videos, the world can follow better the domestic events, the state-influenced Middle Eastern traditional mediums are challenged.

In the Middle Eastern media systems the mediums were influenced and controlled for decades by authoritarian regimes. The state-owned platforms faced the new media's critical voices during the democratic shifts. In these countries, only in rare cases appeared the new media device before the political change. That's the reason why these channels played a key role in the events of the Arab Spring and the mass protests. Despite this fact, the devices weren't the main causes of the democratic change, they just straightened and widened the plurality of the views.

We could highlight similarities in the examined countries, but their political changes were influenced by different elements. In *Turkey,* the closeness of Europe and the European Union membership was the main driving force. Despite the Western aspirations, the Turkish state's influence is remarkable in the local media system. The system claims to meet the Western standards of the freedom of press, but in reality, it has still significant controlling and monitoring authority. In *Egypt*, the new mediums showed their influencing power during the Arab Spring. The events of the spring 2011 proved the effect of the social networks and video-sharing portals in helping the democratic political change. Contrarily the Egyptian positive example, *Iran*'s case showed the restraint of

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[44] The Guardian: *Syrian Electronis Army's war on the web.*
   http://www.theguardian.com/world/interactive/2013/sep/03/syrian-electronic-army-war-web-timeline
[45] Syrian Electronic Army's webpage. http://sea.sy/index/en

these new channels. The Islamic republic's new media failed to help in 2009 when people questioned the legitimacy of the presidential election's result and went to the streets to claim changes in the political system. The mobilized citizens were punished and silenced by the political leadership's aggression. *Syria*'s example shows a different result. The government and pro-government parties controlled and monitored successively the Internet during the conflict. With the foundation of the Syrian Electronic Army – after the Pazdaran's cyber-related behavior of Iran – the Middle East's biggest electronic army was born, and the Syrian new media became a virtual battlefield.

The new media devices' influence on the democratization process became a hot topic after the Arab Spring, people attributed big power to them. Despite the naive and idealistic articles, we need to highlight the limitations of these platforms. The Turkish and the Iranian example showed that the 21th century's most popular channels can't guarantee on their own democracy. Social networks are really influent elements in the society's mobilization, but they can't constitute the stabile foundation of the new political system. The evolving Egyptian events supported this statement; the army interrupted the Islamist Mursī's presidency. The different Middle Eastern examples showed how the new media devices' effect can alter in the diverse political events, ambiances and conditions.

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CURRENT ISSUES

Balázs KOHÁN[1],assistant lecturer – Gábor TIMÁR, PhD[2], associate professor – Márton DEÁK[3], assistant lecturer

A REVIEW OF THE SRTM[4] DIGITAL ELEVATION MODEL AND ITS APPLICATION IN GPS TECHNOLOGY

Abstract:

The modern space technology, SRTM[5] is a global digital elevation model which is used by many countries and is independent by their geodetic institutes, methods and projection systems. The boundaries of radar technology have to be considered of course: elevation data may contain buildings, trees, dams, etc. In mountain areas this is typically less bothersome, but in areas with small elevation difference the correction of these effects might be necessary – depending on the goal of application. There are other errors however which are more frequent in high areas with rapid elevation changes, for example lack of data due to radar shadow, which was corrected using different interpolation methods.

The database is open and free to access; therefore it's an excellent and cheap option for defense applications requiring elevation data.

This database can be used by Magellan GPS receivers, which are today in use by the Hungarian Military and Hungarian peacekeepers in various missions.

Keywords: DEM, DSM, RADAR, SRTM, GPS, interpolation, map, remote sensing, elevation

Making elevation models

Throughout the Mars and Venus missions, one of the main tasks of space probes was mapping the elevation of the planets, obtained through radar technology – although our most precise DEM about Mars is made by a laser

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[4] Shuttle Radar Topography Mission

altimeter, the MOLA. Throughout the measurement the space probe, with a well-known location, in a certain moment blips towards the surface of the planet that is situated right under the space probe. The elevation of the surface can be obtained from the time difference of the reflected signal. Radar technology in Hungary in space research was first used to measure the distance between the Moon and the Earth, which team was led by Zoltán Bay in 1946 – who was just a month late to do so, after the American John H. DeWitt Jr. With this technology the digital elevation models of Mars and Venus were obtained relatively soon. This was a database having a fixed resolution and comprising data that return the elevation of the surface.

While the relief of the Earth is well-known, a unifying model depicting the surface of the Earth or a big part of it (DEM) was not available for a long time. Developing DEM-s was the task of national geodetic or topographic institutes. In Hungary, the first institute that made a model was the "Posta Kísérleti Intézet", than the "Honvéd Térképészeti Intézet" and the FÖMI developed models with an improved resolution. These, however, only comprised the territory of Hungary and its surroundings. Obtaining a DEM that overlapped political barriers was difficult as different countries had different accuracy and made DEMs in a different way. Moreover making DEMs is labor-intensive, thus the price of these data is relatively high.

In 1999, the USA developed the GLOBE (Global Land One-kilometer Base Elevation model), an elevation model that covers all the dry lands of the Earth having a 30-arc-second grid (1-kilometer grid on a nominal scale). The GLOBE intends to unify the existing database, but as the available data was obtained with different methods, the unification could not be perfect. However, it was very popular as it was free of charge and available online. It was built in different PC applications (like the Flight Simulator) and it was the basis of many world-map databases for GPS-s.

Today SRTM is – without doubt – the most popular DEM in use. It is not only free, but has relatively high accuracy compared to other public elevation sources – like ASTER GDEM (VIMAL ET AL. 2012). Today, probably its most used application is connected to Google Earth, where the source of the elevation data is mostly the SRTM database (WINKLER ET AL 2006). However there are many other applications of it ranging from karst geomorphology (TELBISZ 2011)

through volcanology (Karátson et al. 2010) to hydrology (ROSETTI AND VALERIANO 2006).

Elevation data from the Space

Figure 1.
The SRTM system flew on board of the Endeavour Space Shuttle during an 11 day mission in February 2000. On the right you can see the 60 meter long support of the radar.

The NASA (National Aeronautic and Space Administration) released the SRTM (Shuttle Radar Topography Mission) program in 1996, the purpose of which was to generate the most complete high-resolution digital topographic database of Earth, comprising 80% of the planet. The Endeavour was launched on the 11th February 2000, on board with the equipment necessary for the measurement (*Figure 1.*). The whole survey campaign lasted 11 days. The space measurements were completed and supported by extent surface GPS-measurements as well as placing many (around 70 thousands) artificial radar reflectors at pre-set positions, to provide geo-reference (RABUS ET AL. 2003). The data processing took 18 months, led by the NIMA (National Imagery and Mapping Agency) of the US Ministry of Defense. According to the agreement between the NASA and the NIMA, with the permission of the NASA, the dataset is archived and published by the USGS (United States Geological Survey). The data processing and accuracy refinement was started in the middle of 2004, which hasn't been finished yet.

The measurement was based radar interferometry, the study of interference patterns created by combining two sets of radar signals. The

interference is created by two antennas that were placed 60 meters apart. The main antenna was situated on the shuttle, while the outboard antenna was deployed at the end of the 60 meter retractable mast during data collection. As the Space Shuttle Endeavour was launched at an orbit inclination of 57 degrees, this orbit permitted data collection between latitudes of 60° north and 56° south, thus the database does not comprise Finland and the Polar Regions (FARR AND KOBRICK 2000).

In the frame of the project, the digital elevation model of the mapped area was completed in two different resolutions: the pixel size of the better version is one arc second (available publicly only for the territory of the United States), while the general version has the pixel size of 3 arc seconds (cca. 90-100 meters is mid-latitudes). Thus, such a public database was created, whose existence and use should be known for any specialists, working with geo-information technology. The resulted 3-arcdegree resolution data are available for everybody on the Internet. The latitude-longitude grid follows the parallels and meridians; the horizontal datum is the WGS84. The elevations are interpreted above the level of the EGM96 global geoid model. The detailed data are ordered by continents and the 1 arc-second resolution data can be found in sub-directories. While using the dataset, we shall keep in mind that it was constructed with radar technology. We have uncertain signals from water surfaces (because of the unavoidable waves), so at the seas, lakes and rivers, false data were collected. Majority of them was filtered out during the data processing, and these pixels got NULL cell values in the first version. Similar NULL value has been arranged for many mountainous pixels, mainly in deep valleys, which were in radar shadow, according to the survey geometry, and we don't have radar backscatter signal from. This kind of data absence is more frequent in the high mountains. However in the most recent data version (SRTM 2.1), these voids were filled using spline interpolation and a 3x3 pixel median filter was applied to sort out the noise-like data errors (GROHMAN ET AL. 2006; REUTER ET AL. 2007).

In case of areas with extremely high number of NoData values, one might consider using variograms (KOVÁCS ET AL. 2011 AND KOVÁCS ET AL. 2012) and applying these for kriging interpolation to calculate the missing values (BATA ET AL. 2012). Another solution to the problem at hand could be spatial forecasting using the trendsurface (MOLNÁR ET AL. 2010). However that is the easiest way if

the missing data are completed from other, lower resolution models (e.g. GTOPO 30). The 5.6 centimeter wavelength radio signals are not penetrating the dense or even the medium foliage and, of course, scattered back from the solid roofs or walls of the buildings. Thus, the elevation values of the model represent the geoid height of the layer that is the reflector for the 5.6 centimeter wavelength electromagnetic signal. In the regions of cities or forests, the effect of the buildings and the trees is in our data – thus sometimes we have a digital surface model rather than a digital elevation model.

The data are still undergoing many accuracy assessments (RODRÍGUEZ ET AL. 2006; BAUGH ET AL. 2013; AO ET AL. 2013) even using Hungarian sample areas (SZABÓ AND SZABÓ 2010). Many different, sometimes not DEM-related methods can be used for this task.

Figure 2.
The digital elevation model of Chad

Since this database is global, its extent and accuracy are not altered by artificial boundaries. The DEM showing Chad is to demonstrate this (*Figure 2.*). Respectively many different secondary data can be derived using the SRTM – even for national defense reasons. On *Figure 3.* we can see a radar-shadow map, centered the Hungarian 3D NATO Radar on Tubes.

Figure 3
Radar-shadow map of the Tubes 3D NATO Radar

Derived from this map we can gain additional, secondary maps showing other defense-related data. For example, on *Figure 4.*, a map of minimum value above ground level (AGL) raster was calculated. It shows on each previously non-visible cell the minimum value where it would be visible on (in relative height values above the physical surface) – which is basically the lower boundary of the radar on each cell: objects below this elevation value are invisible for the

radar, while the ones above it would appear on the screen. Adding together the values of this raster and the original surface would show the maximum flight height in values above medium sea level.

Figure 4
Minimum value above ground level (AGL) – the minimum flight value of an airplane visible for the radar

The SRTM elevation model applied in GPSes

Elevation models can be applied in GPS technology in two different ways. First, the data measured by GPS (*Figure 5.*) can be compared to the SRTM data and analyses can be carried out using the elevation data from different sources. While this is a GIS project, more and more GPS softwares can overlay the two databases at the same time (eg. OziExplorer). The other GPS application is that

SRTM elevation data can be built into maps made for GPSes, thus the elevation data can be used any time in a form of a contour map on the GPS. Usually the Hungarian peacekeepers are doing this in various missions, for example in Western Sahara (BESENYŐ 2013)

Figure 5.
The view of the mountains made from SRTM elevation models and Landsat TM space image
(The yellow line shows a GPS track)

The relief is included into maps made for Magellan GPSes, especially tourist maps. The elevation data can be coded for GPS receiver in two ways:
1. In the form of a digital model coded into the map;
2. In the form of digitalized contours.

Figure 6.
The 20 meter intervals generated by the GPS on the screen of a MobileMapper

The second solution is much easier for the map maker, but the database that has to be stored is much more extended than in the case of the first one. In

the first case, the elevation is given in the form of a grid and the GPS finds the grid that fits the zoom chosen by the user. As the elevation is well-known in each point of the area, the eventual changes in the relief can be predicted by the GPS. This is especially important when one plans a track, as the shortest way is not always the fastest way. One possible application for that can be built in a bicycle navigation system, where together with other factors (e.g. road rank) the elevation-difference in the planned path is extremely important regarding the travel time (PRETZ 2012).

The base-interval and details of the relief of the contour map showed by the GPS depends on the zoom chosen by the user at a certain time. However, it is important to note that the horizontal cell size of the SRTM elevation grid is of 90 meters, thus the map would not always show the actual relief if the user zooms in too much. It is possible to upload maps made by users to the memory of Magellan GPSes.

Figure 6. is showing the contour map generated by the GPS, based on the SRTM elevation model uploaded to the device. If the device, or the contour map generated by the MobileMapper, it can be created with the help of the contour-map vectorized from topographic maps (*Figure 7.*).

Figure 7.
On the screen of the MobileMapper Office the background is the contour map of the central part of the Börzsöny Mountains. The intervals are of 10 meters. They are generated from the SRTM elevation model by an external software.

Sixth generation tourist maps made for Magellan GPSes comprise the relief in both of the above mentioned ways. They include the intervals digitalized from topographic maps in 35 and 80 meter resolutions and the digital elevation model is included in the map as well (*Figure 8.*).

Figure 8.
Sümeg and its surroundings on the tourist map of the Kesztelyi mountains (GeoX Kft.). The upper-right angle of the screen of the MobileMapper Office shows the intervals generated from the SRTM model (in feet), while the lower left part of the screen shows the DTA-50 vector type intervals (with the base interval of 10 meters)

The simultaneous application of the two data sources was necessary, as this way the relief prediction and the user defined path profile functions of the GPS can be used at the same time (*Figure 9.*), but intervals depicted are of vectorized form.

The intervals interpolated from the elevation model (which are too thick for this map) are hidden by background poligons.

35

Figure 9.

Indication of changes in elevation on the tourist map of the Keszthelyi Mountains (GeoX Kft.). The digitized path can be displayed using the "Patch Check" menu item

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CONSULTATION

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THE UNITED STATES AND THE UAV TECHNOLOGY. EVALUATION OF THE UAV STRIKES IN PAKISTAN

Abstract:

In his essay, after introducing the Pakistani situation and unmanned aerial vehicle systems (UAV systems), the author examines the UAV strikes executed by the USA in the region, building upon studies of experts and research institutes, as well as press sources.

Keywords: USA, Pakistan, UAV, drone, war on terror

The fight against international terrorism – especially the one linked to Islamic fundamentalists – as a security threat became one of the main priorities of the American foreign and security policy, after the dissolution of the bipolar international order. The terror attack on 11 September 2001 is a pivotal point, after which the United States launched the „War on Terror", the main battlefield of which became Afghanistan that degraded into a failed state during the conflicts of the past decades.[1]

The main problem is presented by the activities of the United States in the northwestern areas of Pakistan, the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The American leadership urged Pakistan since the 2001 invasion of Afghanistan „*to do more to stop the Afghan Taliban and al-Qaida from seeking sanctuary in FATA*"[2]. The U.S. – in response to the deteriorating situation along the Afghan-Pakistani border, and due to its diminishing confidence in the counter-insurgency capabilities of the Pakistani forces – deploys UAVs in the FATA in increasing numbers. The targets of these attacks are the various Taliban and other armed insurgent groups. It is typical of the situation that 95 percent of the strikes outside the battlefields of Libya, Afghanistan and Iraq were executed in Pakistan.[3]

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[1] The conflict in Afghanistan that could be classified as a „preventive war" is itself rife with controversies, but it is discussed only peripherally by the author.
[2] Shuja Nawaz: „The Pakistani Army and its role in FATA." CTC Sentinel 2, no. 1., 2009, 1.
[3] Micah Zenko: „10 Things You Didn't Know About Drones." Foreign Policy, March/April 2012, 4.

The UAVs and their application possibilities

UAVs are „fixed or rotary winged aircraft or lighter-than-air vehicles, capable of flying without an onboard crew."[4] In the press, besides the official acronym, the term „drone" is often used to describe unmanned aerial systems. But a UAV is more than the aircraft itself with the onboard systems. Besides the mission-specific payloads, the human factor is also decisive; thus, the denomination „unmanned" is misleading, we cannot speak of „aerial robots" at all. Each unmanned aerial system requires its own command center, communication architecture, as well as maintenance and operating personnel. The operation of unmanned aerial systems generally needs more people than in the case of conventional aircraft. The full servicing of a Predator UAV requires 168 people, a Reaper system requires 180, compared to the about 100 people needed for the operation of an F-16 fighter jet.[5]

Unmanned aerial systems have their own advantages compared to manned aircraft. The production of UAVs is usually less expensive than that of manned aircraft.[6] It is another issue that due to the higher risk involved – this will be discussed in detail later – the number of losses is also higher. The fact that there is no pilot on the board of a UAV highly broadens their applicability. One of the greatest advantages originating from the lack of a pilot is that a UAV can remain aloft for far longer periods than conventional aircraft. No life is at risk during UAV missions that is exceedingly useful in situations where the chance of the loss of a UAV is high, or when the diplomatic repercussions of the capture of a pilot are severe enough to deter the use of conventional aircraft even if the likelihood of the capture is low.[7]

Unmanned aerial systems can be used widely. The earliest and conventional application of UAVs is reconnaissance. Within this, conventional optical reconnaissance can be distinguished, as well as non-conventional reconnaissance, where a UAV can detect the presence of chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear and high-explosive threats in the surveyed area, minimizing the exposure of friendly personnel.[8] Besides this, UAVs can be helpful to battlefield commanders by broadening the communication network or by supporting surface troops in combat identification. Armed use of UAVs is also prevalent, like the provision of air support to surface troops, as well as the identification and designation of targets, however, significant shortfalls can be experienced in case of the latter, for the time being.[9] However, the most relevant

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[4] „U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010-2035." 8.
[5] Zenko, 3.
[6] Bernard Kempinski: Policy Options for Unmanned Aircraft Systems. Diane Publishing, 2011, 31.
[7] Kempinski, 30.
[8] „U.S. Army Unmanned Aircraft Systems Roadmap 2010-2035." 3.
[9] Ibid. 4.

armed applications to the present topic are strike missions, that became well-known since 2002 by the strikes of the American Predator drones, and since 2007 by the deployment of Reaper UAVs.

The United States and the UAVs

The history of the United States and unmanned aerial systems are closely intertwined. The first idea of using UAVs is linked to the engineer Nikola Tesla, who proposed the use of an armed, unmanned aircraft to defend the United States already in 1915.[10] The U.S. development programme of unmanned aerial systems started already in 1953, but the first reconnaissance UAV, the Pioneer went into service only in 1985. The Pioneer participated in more than 300 missions during the Gulf War, in the framework of Operation Desert Shield and Operation Desert Storm, hunting for Scud missiles and other high value targets.[11]

Regarding armed UAVs, the United States has requested the armed forces already in the 1970s to develop their capabilities for combating terrorism.[12] These aspirations were further inspired by failures like the operation aimed at liberating the American captives in Tehran.

In the hunt for Osama bin Laden, cruise missiles had initially a great role. But in 1998, this method failed, partly due to the insufficient intelligence on the targets.[13] The Clinton government concluded that a more accurate and more efficient strike capability is needed.[14] In the end, the choice was the Predator UAV that determined the 2000s as much as the Tomahawk cruise missiles the Gulf War. The RQ-1 Predator was initially designed for reconnaissance purposes. It was developed in 2002 into the armed MQ-1 Predator, equipped with two AGM-114 Hellfire missiles.[15]

The Predator was already deployed in the 1990s in Bosnia and Kosovo[16], still as a reconnaissance drone. It was then used in Afghanistan in 2000 in an attempt to locate Osama bin Laden.[17] The idea to arm a Predator UAV with missiles emerged during the fall of 2000.[18] The successful Predator strike was

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[10] Ibid. 4.
[11] Ibid. 3.
[12] 9-11 Commission. Staff Statement No. 6: The Military. 2004, 1.
[13] Ibid. 2-3.
[14] Ibid. 4.
[15] U.S. Air Force. Factsheets: MQ-1B Predator. 2012.
[16] IISS. „The Drones of War." IISS Strategic Comments 15, no. 4., 2009.
[17] 9-11 Commission: Staff Statement No. 7: Intelligence Policy. 24 March 2004, 5.
[18] Ibid. 6.

executed in November 2001, the victim of which was one of al-Qaeda's top military commanders in Afghanistan.[19]

Besides the Predator, another UAV model, the MQ-9 Reaper has joined the American covert operations as the first UAV designed specifically for armed use. Compared to the lighter equipment of the Predator, a Reaper can carry four Hellfire missiles as well as two laser-guided GBU-12 or GBU-38 bombs, thus it is able to destroy even fortified targets.[20]

While strike missions get a larger media coverage, they constitute only a fragment of the missions of American UAVs. In the last two years, weapons were fired only during 2.5% of the UAV missions in Pakistan, in the remaining 97.5% of missions, U.S. drones were tasked with reconnaissance.[21]

Two parties supervise American UAV missions. In official combat zones (like Iraq or Afghanistan), the U.S. Department of Defense is responsible for the missions, while outside the battlefields (like also in Pakistan), the CIA directs the missions. Implicitly, the operations headed by the CIA are far less transparent than those of the Army.

The FATA of Pakistan: „the land of the drones"

At the same time of the launch of the war in Afghanistan, the cooperation between Pakistan and the United States became more important. For the first time after gaining its independence in 1947, Pakistani troops marched into the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA), in response to the U.S. pressing Pakistan to assume a greater role in its territories bordering Afghanistan. Furthermore, the United States has provided more than 10 billion USD financial assistance to Pakistan since 2001 to offset the expenses of the troop movements to the region.[22]

The strategic importance of Pakistan was increased by the fact that, in the first years after the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan, the numbers of attacks committed by the insurgents in the region increased. This can be attributed to the fact that along the part of the border along the Durand Line, hard to control due to the mountainous terrain, the Pakistani Taliban could easily support the activities of the Afghan Talibans. The activities of the Pakistani Taliban should not be mistaken for the activities of the government, though, since after the occupation of Afghanistan in 2001, the insurgent movement there has also

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[19] Zenko, 1.
[20] U.S. Air Force. Factsheets: MQ-7 Reaper. 2012.
[21] IISS. „The Drones of War." IISS Strategic Comments 15, no. 4., 2009.
[22] Nawaz, 1.; and: Greg Bruno: US Drone Activities in Pakistan. Council on Foreign Relations. 2010.

spread to Pakistan: the local Taliban movement executes attacks against military targets, as well as in the capital city of Islamabad.[23]

A conflict emerged between the U.S. and Pakistan about what could be defined as adequate counter-insurgency measures. The United States, deeming Pakistan's efforts as insufficient, began to deploy UAVs in the FATA, primarily against Taliban and other militant targets. The CIA initiated its activities in 2004, but the number of strikes soared after the inauguration of President Obama. As comparison: under the Bush government until 2008, 45 UAV strikes took place in four years, while the Obama administration approved almost 300 of such strikes from 2008 through 2012.[24]

In the last years, the relationship of the Pakistani government and the U.S. has deteriorated. This could be attributed to the intensification of American UAV strikes, as well as to the daring operation of American special forces in 2011, when they were able to enter the territory of Pakistan undetected, hitting the headquarters of Osama bin Laden in the city of Abbottabad, close to the Pakistani capital, during which they managed to kill the then leader of al-Qaeda. While the death of the al-Qaeda leader has affected the Pakistani leadership primarily well, they still protested against the operation since it evidently violated the sovereignty of the country.[25]

The ISI (the Pakistani intelligence service) and the CIA have cooperated in the combat against al-Qaeda through the years. Pakistan officially condemns the activities of the terror organization, but Pakistan's actual stand in the issue is queried by the fact that Osama bin Laden has been hiding in Abbottabad in circumstances that suggested a certain degree of government support.[26] The CIA has also targeted such organizations in the Taliban tribal areas like the Haqqani network or the various *lashkar*[27] groups, with whom the ISI and the Pakistani army maintain strong connections.[28]

The rapidly aggravating relationship of the U.S. and Pakistan also affected the UAV strikes executed in the FATA, when, in November 2011, a Pakistani border patrol was attacked by American and Afghan troops, the fight resulted in

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[23] Ibid.

[24] Micah Zenko: Reforming US Drone Strike Policies. Council on Foreign Relations. 2013, 13.

[25] IISS. „US and Pakistan – a troubled relationship." IISS Strategic Comments 18, no. 1., 2012.

[26] Ibid.

[27]The *lashkar*s are tribal militias in the FATA, whose relationship with the official leadership has a serious history. These groups have often assisted the administration in maintaining peace and order. In the current war against militants, lashkars have taken on special importance since they represent the discontent with the activities of the militants. These groups are supported also financially by the official leadership. Nevertheless, as Shuja Nawat notes it, there is a latent danger in training and arming local warlords, as they may become „future challengers of the government's writ or a conduit of arms or information for the militants." Source: Nawaz, 2.

[28] Nawaz, 2., and: IISS. „US and Pakistan – a troubled relationship." IISS Strategic Comments 18, no. 1. 2012.

the death of 24 Pakistani soldiers. Pakistan responded by closing two border crossings through which the majority of supplies for the U.S. operation in Afghanistan was routed, and also called for the CIA to vacate the Pakistani Shamsi airbase, which was the base of the agency's UAV operations.[29]

The latter detail shows that Pakistan did not entirely object to the attacks committed by the United States on its territory, since Pakistan provided an airbase for their execution. However, following the fiasco in November, the Pakistani government wanted to shut down[30], or at least limit the UAV strikes of the U.S., especially their number and scope.[31]

The United States put a temporary hold on UAV strikes after November 2011; there were no reports of any such strikes in December.[32] In 2012, however, the attacks continued with such intensity as the last year, 46 attacks were reported.[33] Responding to the renewed attacks, the leadership of Pakistan summoned the local U.S. ambassador in June 2012, whom they expressed their formal protest against the UAV strikes executed in the FATA.[34] Besides this, the Pakistani parliament stated emphatically in April 2012 that drone strikes were unacceptable.[35]

The UAV strikes in the FATA were not commented on only by the Pakistani side. In May 2012, John Brennan, the then counterterrorism advisor of American President Barack Obama, stated: while they could cause civilian casualties, UAV strikes are „legal, ethical, necessary and proportional"[36], furthermore, these operations are usually executed with the consent of the host government, „in full accordance with the law."[37]

Effectiveness of UAV operations

Regarding the effectiveness of the strikes, it is a question whether they reach their narrower objective, the elimination of the officially articulated targets. The American UAV strategy so far cannot be considered a total failure, numerous Taliban and al-Qaeda leaders were neutralized by UAV operations. By December 2011, 22 of the 30 main leaders of al-Qaeda were eliminated, of them, only Osama bin Laden was not a victim of a UAV strike.[38] It would be

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[29] Ibid.
[30] BBC. White House in first detailed comments on drone strikes. BBC News. 1 May 2012.
[31] IISS. „US and Pakistan – a troubled relationship." IISS Strategic Comments 18, no. 1. 2012.
[32] „The National Security Studies Program. Analysis."
[33] Micah Zenko: Reforming US Drone Strike Policies. Council on Foreign Relations. 2013, 13.
[34] The Nation. Pakistan summons U.S. envoy over drone strikes. The Nation. 5 June 2012.
[35] Ibid.
[36] BBC. White House in first detailed comments on drone strikes. BBC News. 1 May 2012.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Zenko, 9.

dangerous, however, to draw such conclusions from that like Leon Panetta, a former head of the CIA did in 2009, saying that UAVs are „the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the al Qaeda leadership"[39].

Since 2004, only a small percentage of these operations launched an attack against targets of such kind. Under the presidency of Bush, 33 percent of strikes targeted al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders, while in the term of Obama the same ratio are only 13 percent.[40] The majority of targets are in fact low-level, *suspected* militants, who, quoting the thoughts of Zenko, „are not terrorist leaders and who do not pose a direct threat to the United States or its allies, but are predominantly fighting insurgent operations".[41]

Until 2008, President Bush approved only targeted strikes against certain people, but afterwards he announced the so-called practice of „signature strikes" against the aforementioned *suspected* militants.[42] The main idea is that any presumed Taliban or al-Qaeda fighter consitutes a target that bear the characteristics of al-Qaeda or Taliban leaders on the run".[43]

It is questionable that to what extent the strikes against the latter, low-significance targets contribute to the counterterrorism strategy of the United States. The situation is definitely problematic from two aspects, though. Firstly, as I emphasized above, we are talking about *suspected* militants. The identification of such targets requires excellent intelligence sources and that is not available in all cases. The victims that are posthomously identified as civilians can undermine American interests in the region both from a moral and a foreign policy aspect. Besides this, these low-magnitude operations constitute a significant waste of resources, since there are negligible results opposed to the expenses of the strikes.

Secondly, and this is linked to the issue of civilian casualties, the erroneous strikes originating from inaccurate target designation corrode significantly the international standing of the United States, but more importantly they provide a basis of recruitment for al-Qaeda in the countries it is based in (besides Pakistan, Yemen and Somalia are such countries).[44]

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[39] CNN. U.S. airstrikes in Pakistan called 'very effective'. CNN. 18 May 2009.
[40] „The National Security Studies Program. Analysis."
[41] Zenko, 10.
[42] Zenko, 12.
[43] Eric Schmitt and David E. Sanger: „Pakistan Shift Could Curtail Drone Strikes." New York Times, 22 February 2008.
[44] Zenko, 10.

Civilian casualties in Pakistan

Another controversial issue of American drone operations is the issue of civilian casualties. In the case of the „War on Terror", two issues are especially problematic. Firstly, how many is the actual number of civilian victims in Pakistan? The U.S. military – and also the CIA, according to former leading CIA officials – reckons with a certain degree of civilian losses in the case of UAV strikes[45], however, these can be considered rather low compared to the statistics of independent news organizations. It presents another problem at the collection of such data that the mountainous regions of the FATA, where the majority of these actions are executed, are difficult to access for those conducting an investigation: besides geographic factors, the resistance of the government and local actors also presents an obstacle, hindering accurate data collection.

Another significant issue is the exact definition of where the group of civilian casualties ends and where the group of insurgents and terrorists begins. In the first four years of the Obama government, the circle of potential targets of UAV operations was extended to „all military-age males in a strike zone"[46], unless „there is explicit intelligence posthumously proving them innocent"[47]. According to this theory, the number of casualties that can be regarded as civilians diminishes significantly, thus the difference between military/intelligence statistics and those of journalists can also be attributed to this.

Examining the strikes another issue emerges within the problem discussed above: can children, individuals attempting to rescue drone strike victims, and the funeral processions of deceased militants be regarded as legitimate targets? Micah Zenko refers to several cases in his analysis where such targets were attacked allegedly.[48]

The issue has been noticed also on an international level. Christof Heyns, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions has harshly criticized the stand supported up to this day by the United States on the issue of the armed use of UAVs, in one of the addendums of his 2012 report[49]. He drew attention to the shortcomings in the legal background of target

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[45] Zenko, 12.
[46] Ibid.
[47] Ibid.
[48] Zenko, 14.
[49] UN Human Rights Council. Report of the Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, Christof Heyns. Addendum: Follow-up to country recommendations – United States of America. UN Human Rights Council, 2012.

designations, as well as to the lack of transparency at the records of UAV strikes, that renders the tracking of civilian casualties more difficult.[50]

Side effects on foreign and security policy

The issues of efficiency and civilian victims are not the only problems to remedy in the recent UAV policy of the United States, as such operations fundamentally hinder also the American foreign policy. On one hand, by launching strikes against local insurgents, the U.S. risks being dragged into these internal conflicts.[51] On the other hand, poorly timed attacks can undermine the international credibility of the United States. Zenko quotes a case in Somalia, where Hillary Clinton, then Secretary of State of the U.S., made the following statement in February 2012: „*I know enough to say airstrikes would not be a good idea. And we have absolutely no reason to believe anyone – certainly not the United States – is considering that.*"[52]

Within hours, an airstrike hit a convoy in Somalia, the attack killed several insurgents. According to anonymous U.S. government sources, a UAV of the U.S. Army has carried out the operation.[53] No further commentary is needed on how this affected the message the Secretary of State wanted to convey.

Of course, in the case of drone strikes conducted by the U.S. Army (Afghanistan, Somalia, Yemen) there is a certain level of coordination between the local Army commander and the U.S. ambassador serving in the given country. The issue is more serious in the case of the CIA, where, during operations, there is no sign of such coordination between intelligence services and foreign policy.[54] This often leads to the unpleasant foreign and security policy „side effects" of drone attacks.

Regarding foreign policy fiascos, the aforementioned interlude between the United States and the Pakistani government should be highlighted, when Pakistan, reacting to repeated violations of its sovereignity, imposed severe sanctions against the United States, and demanded the immediate cessation of UAV strikes in April 2012.

The attacks also lead to a considerable negative feedback on the part of the international and domestic public opinion: in the United States, 62 percent of the population supports such operations, while there is strong disapproval of

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[50] UN Human Rights Council, 22.
[51] Zenko, 10.
[52] Zenko, 11.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Zenko, 9.

UAV strikes in the other countries observed: 83 percent of the populace in Pakistan, 90 percent in Greece, 89 percent in Egypt, 81 percent in Turkey, 76 percent in Spain and Brazil and 75 percent in Japan oppose drone strikes as a tool of American security policy.[55]

This also constitutes a significant problem from a strategic aspect: as the Pakistani example above shows that the United States is not capable by itself to conduct drone operations; it needs the support of its allies in the target region. In the case of a hostile attitude on the part of its allies, the U.S. could confront the fact that it cannot access the logistical networks and intelligence sources of its allies that are crucial to the success of UAV operations.[56]

From a security policy aspect, there are three fundamental risks in American drone strikes. The first follows from the aforementioned negative reputation. Micah Zenko compares the current UAV policy of the Obama presidency to the interrogation methods of the Bush-era counterterrorism: in both cases, the repercussions of the American activites limited considerably its elbow-room. The United States, if it does not reform its current drone strategy, could face another „Vietnam syndrome", where the dubious limitary successes would be overshadowed by the political defeat. As Cameron Munter, the former U.S. ambassador to Pakistan said: „*The problem is the political fallout... Do you want to win a few battles and lose the war?*"[57]

The second such risk comes from the nature of the current UAV technology. Numerous UAVs crash during operations, and unless there are allied forces that help in the recovery of the wreckage (in Pakistan, the military fought the Taliban several times for a crashed drone[58]), there is the risk that actors undesirable for the U.S. get hold of the technology.

The third could be considered as the most dangerous risk. Christof Heyns, the UN Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions, drew attention to the fact that the current UAV strategy of the United States could create a dangerous precedent: „*Like his predecessor, the Special Rapporteur is seriously concerned that the practice of targeted killing could set a dangerous precedent, in that any government could, under the cover of counter-terrorism imperatives, decide to target and kill an individual on the territory of any state if it considers that the said individual constitutes a threat.*"[59]

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[55] Zenko, 23.
[56] Ibid.
[57] Zenko, 11.
[58] Zenko, 7.
[59] UN Human Rights Council, 23.

Conclusion

The U.S. has long traditions in the development and application of unmanned aerial systems; it could be regarded as a pioneer power in the field of UAV technology. However, its current drone strategy is rife with problems. The practice of target designation has become significantly unconsidered in the last decade, and the strikes executed by the Predator and later the Reaper UAVs, instead of being a tool of U.S. foreign policy, sometimes actually undermine the superpower's long-term foreign policy ambitions. The case of Pakistan must be highlighted: the UAV strikes executed here by the CIA have weakened the relationship of the United States with one of its important regional partners, and the attacks outside an effective combat zone also raise other controversies.

The most severe problem may be presented by the future international practice, though. Besides the United States, more and more countries possess their own unmanned aerial systems; some of them are already engaged in developing armed versions, similar to the ones of the U.S. However, as the armed use of unmanned aerial vehicles is a relatively new technology, there is no unified regulation in this area of international law, even though the need for urgent regulation emerges in the case of more and more issues (protection of civilians, the limits of use).

The issue will definitely be regulated; it is another question though whether the U.S. is willing to act by itself, in greater latitude, or due to a strong international and domestic pressure that could result in a set of rules less favorable for the United States. As Micah Zenko puts it: „*The choice the United States faces is not between unfettered drone use and sacrificing freedom of action, but between drone policy reforms by design or drone policy reforms by default.*"[60]

There is great responsibility on the shoulders of the U.S, regarding its current drone strategy, if it is not changed radically, could provide a dangerous precedent for the future users of the technology. Thus the United States faces also another choice.

It could decide to maintain its current UAV strategy. In that case, the countries that develop UAV capabilities in the future would use UAVs for combat purposes with minimal restrictions and transparency, following in the footsteps of the current example provided by the U.S. This would undermine fundamental American interests such as the prevention of armed conflicts and the protection of human rights and international legal regimes.[61]

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[60] Zenko, 23.
[61] Zenko, 25.

However, it could also decide to actively form the international rules of the armed use of UAVs by spearheading the movement, providing transparency in the case of its operations; and by exercising self-restraint both in the scope of targets and the number of missions, it could strive to set an example and lay down norms for later users of UAV technology.[62] However the United States decides, it will definitely influence the warfare of the future.

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Maj. FERENC LESS, **Anti-Riot Police**

THE EXPERIENCES OF THE MOBIL TRAINING TEAM PROGRAM IN IVORY COAST

Abstract:

The United Nations had deployed Formed Police Units in crisis areas supporting its missions since 1999. Some years ago, the organization realized that the deployed police units had lacked of adequate preparedness and applicability to achieve their aims and fulfill their missions. The UN assigned work teams made a serious effort to work out a long-term and multiple-stage training program to resolve the problems.

In my study I would give my insights into the process from my personal experiences I had with the UN Mobil Training Team as a police trainer in the Ivory Coast.

Keywords: police training, Ivory Coast, Africa, formed police unit, DPKO, UN

In December of 2008, I sent my curriculum vitae to the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO), a branch of The Organization of the United Nations (UN). Then, I did not know anything about what I had applied for; I did not have any information about what kind of UN project I wanted to join. The only thing I knew was that, a training program was being organized by the UN; and they needed experienced police trainers. Until the end of April 2009, I did not get any answer to my CV; thus, I forgot about it. Out of the blue, I was informed that I was the only Hungarian police officer selected, among those who were selected from 180 applicants. Because of the short notice, I had only 4 weeks to arrange everything, and prepare for the mission. I had to be in the Russian police training center in Domodedovo City, Russia by 23 of May. The four weeks passed very quickly, but in the end, everything that was required happened as scheduled. I arrived in Russia in time.

I had not participated in any "real" mission before, as other police officers had previously in Africa.[1] However, as one of the leaders of the units of the

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[1] Besenyő János: *Magyar Békefenntartók Afrikában*, p. 7-19.

Készenléti Rendőrség (Hungarian Anti-Riot Command); I obtained significant experience on joint training courses with police officers of Northern Ireland, France, Spain and Germany. Furthermore, I worked as an adviser and trainer, for the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe in Baku, Azerbaidjan. In Baku, I trained with police officers from Northern Ireland, the members of the internal-security forces of Baku, showing them how to manage public assemblies and riot control.

The first time as I entered the classroom, I realized that I had joined an extraordinarily international team. In the training program, the UN DPKO had 40 police officers from 30 countries and from five continents. We learned that the program had already been in operation for three years, and is still going on today.

Insufficient capabilities and skills of the members serving at the Formed Police Units

The UN approved the new Peacekeeping Training Strategy[2] on 1 may, 2008, which sets out the direction of peacekeeping training of the police and military personnel participating in the DPKO- and the Department of Field Support-led missions, for the coming three years. In the next phase, the Strategic Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment program was developed by the UN to determine the gaps in the skills and the knowledge required for peacekeepers to be proficient at their jobs and to assess whether current training activities have been effective in meeting identified needs. Almost 6,000 respondents (64% were civilian personnel, 11% were military and 25% were police) from 17 peacekeeping operations and headquarters participated in the training needs assessment survey. According to the survey, none all of the UN peacekeepers participated in pre-deployement trainings, prior to their missions:[3]

Survey results on predeployment training

Did you receive predep-loyment training?	Civilian	Military	Police
	19%	76%	67%

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[2] Peacekeeping Resource Hub: *Peacekeeping Training Strategy, 2012.*
[3] Department of Peacekeeping Operations: *Report On The Strategic Peacekeeping Training Needs Assessment Integrated Training Service Policy, Evaluation and Training Division*, The United Nations, 2008, 3-6.p.

The aim of the training project declared by DPKO was to improve the capability of Formed Police Units (FPU) to be deployed in the areas of responsibility of the UN missions worldwide. The FPU, is a „company" with 140 police officers, according to the website[4] of UN, which is deployed as a group and undertakes crowd control; protects UN staff and material; and escort UN personnel, when they must visit insecure regions of a mission area.

The first FPUs were deployed in Kosovo (UNMIK), and in the United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) in 1999, where the UN had full responsibility for enforcing the law and dealing with threats to public order. The number of deployments of Formed Police Units had increased from two units in 2000, to more than 60 in 2010; comprising more than 6,000 police officers.

FPUs are self-sufficient, able to operate in "high-risk" environments, and are deployed, to accomplish policing duties, such as crowd control rather than to respond to military threats.[5]

In recent years, the DPKO had doubts about the capabilities of the FPUs deployed in UN missions worldwide.[6] The leadership of the department decided that they would assess the professional skills all of the police officers in service of the UN, and the capabilities of all of the units in the mission areas. They wanted to assess them according to benchmarks that were established previously by an international team. The team established what were the most important professional skills for police personal to fulfill their duties as:

- Knowledge of basic police tactics (handcuffing, body and vehicle search, self-defence)
- Weapon handling, tactical and shooting skills
- Riot control skills and capabilities
- Command and control skills
- Defence and protection of buildings
- Operation of check points
- Complex police operations (e.g. VIP protection, convoy operations, etc.)

[3] UNPOL honlap: Formed Police Units, 2012.
[4] United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations Department of Field Support: *Formed Police Units in United Nations Peacekeeping Operations*, Ref.2009.32, 4.p.
[6] This was proved for example in MINURSO (Western Sahara) as well – more information about: János Besenyö: *Western Sahara*, pp. 157-159.

In the first phase, the assessment teams were sent to East-Timor, Liberia, Ivory Coast, Congo Democratic Republic, Haiti, and the Sudan; where the teams assessed the above-mentioned skills and standard of capabilities of the Formed Police Units, deployed in the UN missions in these countries.

The field studies revealed disappointing results because of the low level capabilities of the FPUs; the weak police skills of officers sent mostly by the African and Asian states. Some of the assessed units could hardly perform their tasks. Futhermore, there are so many gaps between the professional, tactical and technical toolboxes of FPUs from different nations which caused serious problems on their joint operations which hampered them working together efficiently. The assessment teams graded some FPUs as incompetent and inefficient.

There was an urgent need to alleviate the problem and prepare the police units in the crises areas in order to accomplish their mission. In the second phase, the DPKO worked on a project to solve the problem which challenged the success of the UN missions. The department wanted to provide a quick solution to help the FPUs on missions. Workshops were established to develop a coherent curriculum of basic police tactics based on the French police/gendarmerie model in order to train the members of the FPUs in crises management all around the world.

In the first half of the phase, several experienced police trainers were invited from different countries to attend in workshops in Pennsylvania, USA. The police trainers were prepared on the issues mentioned above; six of them as a pilot team, went to Liberia[7] to train the FPUs deployed there. Some months later, the rest of the trainers flew to Domodedovo, Russia, to start the next session of the project. They trained us, based on the feedback from the pilot team gained in Liberia. I joined the ongoing process at this point participating in the Train the Trainer program after the first reports were sent by the pilot team to DPKO. The aim of the program was to train more new trainers, who would be sent into five UN crisis management missions, in pursuance of the goals mentioned above.

Train the Trainer program

After the opening ceremony on the first day, the future trainers started the selection process and exams; which resulted in five not being allowed to

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[7] At the time, there was a police-woman-unit-only in Liberia.

continue the training program; they were sent back to their respective countries. The entrance examination consisted of verbal and written English tests, as wellas of examination of practical and theoretical knowledge of police skills of applicants. The evaluated skills covered all of the topics mentioned above. We were told to implement the test exercises in our national way. We had to show how to make a body search on a suspect; how to handcuff him or her; how to lead a unit in riot situation, etc.

After the successful entrance exam, we started the training program which demanded a major effort for the trainees and the trainers as well. In many cases, a training day took 13 hours, five days a week, with minimal breathing space. Every week, the trainers evaluated how the trainees could lecture on different topics, and assessed the tutoring skills of them. According to the results, the trainees were ranked and appointed to the teams, which were then deployed to the different missions. The main part of the training exercises were led and conducted by the French trainers who were assisted by a large, international staff from the UN headquarter, New York, US.

There were considerable differences in the performance in police skills of the trainees from different countries and different continents. Unfortunately, in some countries the leadership missed the point of the requirements of DPKO, they sent high ranking police officers who worked in high position in their home organizations. Those officers often struggled with the basic tactics of handcuffing, proper body search, on how to handle a weapon in a safe way. The DPKO staff disappointingly realized that most of them wanted to be administrators rather than trainers.

The topics of the curriculum of the training program:

- Basic procedures of the police activities (safety rules, how to make a safety triangulation), vehicle search & check.
- How to approach a building in a safe way, safe movement and use of coercive force and use of equipment in buildings, and to avert emergency situations?
- Safety rules of firearms, weapon handling, shooting capabilities and knowledge of ballistics.
- Post traumatic stress management.

    - Process of decision making and operational planning.

    - Procedures in case of emergency situations, and attacks from opposite forces. How to prevent and avert such situations? How to protect UN personnel and compounds?

    - How to organize and conduct a patrol?

    - Tactics relating to the tasks of the FPUs: operating check-points in hostile areas, escorting convoys, intervention in penal institutions (e.g. riot in prisons).

Knowledge and skills of public assembly management and riot control played an important role in the curriculum of the training course. The participants studied and practiced the employable tactics and technics of riot control which prepared them for future assignments to the UN mission areas. After the training course, the UN staff appointed the new trainers to the Mobil Training Teams; deployed these teams into missions in the Congo Democratic Republic (MONUSCO), the Sudan (UNMIS), the Ivory Coast (ONUCI), to Haiti (MINUSTAH) and East Timor (UNMIT).

Mobil Training Team in Ivory Coast

After our training course, our team arrived in Abidjan; where the UN headquarters operated. The city is not the capital of the state, but the largest and most important developed city. The country was once the richest and most developed country in Africa during the colonial period; when the French controlled the territory. Thanks to that era, the surface of main roads of the country and certain streets of the cities are made of bitumen and tarmac. The different groups of the population speak approximately 60 languages, but many of them also speak the Lingua Franca, a local dialect of French language.[8] The official language of ONUCI is French as well. There is considerable French presence, which is still perceptible in the country but is independent of the UN. We often bumped into French military or gendarmerie forces travelling on the roads country wide. At the same time, France is the most important commercial partner of the Ivory Coast.

Between 2002 and 2007, there was a major civil war in the country, in which the French army unofficially intervened on the side of governmental

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[8] Central Intelligence Agency honlap: *The World Factbook – Cote D'Ivore,* 2012.

forces. After the war, the UN peacekeeping forces stabilized the situation, bringing peace to the war-torn country, which was divided into two parts. There is a demarcation line cutting the country into north and southern parts. The governmental forces rule the South, and the rebels control the territory and the people in the North.

The diversification is not perceptible, when one travels across the country, but we met check-points along all the roads outside and inside the cities country-wide. It was very difficult to identify which party of the people loitering in military uniforms at the check points belonged to which groups. They might have represented and served in government, or they were rebels, warlords or simple bandits, or highwaymen. They had one thing in common; everybody held an AK-47 and systematically sacked the civilians passing the makeshift check-points.

During the time of our mission, the upcoming presidential election was often discussed, which should have happened in the autumn of 2009, when we worked in the country. My personal experience was that everybody was afraid of the unwanted consequences and trouble of the forthcoming elections. The UN staff and the local people expected riots, looting and fighting among the citizens of the country, and between the paramilitaries and the UN forces. The leadership of the UN mission definitely supported our training program, but in the shadow of fear, since they were fully aware of the level of efficiency and readiness of the FPUs; the units that had the responsibility of guaranteeing the security of the UN staff against violent actions. The election was held in the next year, on 28 November 2010. The events justified the prior fears, because of the former president Laurent Gbagbo lost the election, but did not intend to give over the power to his successor, Alassane Quattara, the candidate of the opposition party, who won the election. As a consequence, rioting and fighting broke out countrywide causing several hundred victims, mostly in Abidjan. The UN staff and forces also were under fire or attack.[9] The stalemate was solved by the French military intervention and the pressure of the UN Security Council.

The UN headquarters had six FPUs, as parts of the civilian crises management branch of the UN mission. A Bangladeshi unit located in Bouake city in the rebel area, two Jordanian units in de facto capital city of Abidjan, the

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[9] Tóth Miklós: *Félelem és rettegés Elefántcsontparton*, Kitekintő.hu, 2010.

other Jordanian unit in Daloa; a Pakistani FPU in Guiglo; and a Bangladeshi unit deployed in Yamassoukro, the official capital of the Ivory Coast. The mission of our Mobil Training Team was to train the members of the FPUs, to improve their skills and level of their capabilities. In this way, our task related to the third phase of the training program of the DPKO.

The leader of the six-member Mobil Training Team was a Canadian police officer, who commanded me and my Finnish, French, Jordanian and Swedish colleagues.

After the check-in, at the UN mission, we started to train the members of the first FPU; which was a Pakistani unit, in Guiglo. During the time, our mission was to train approximately 500 police officers of six FPUs, but they actually were eight police units, because two of the six were rotated as the members of the leaving units and the incoming units participated in the training courses.

In order to improve the skills of the police officers, we conducted three-week training courses for each FPU. Our team developed own training curriculum in which we focused greatly on the issues of riot control and public order. In the next table, the topics of the lessons and their timeframes are shown:

Main Topic	Title of Lesson	Time of the lesson
Basic police tactics	Bodysearch in different position (standing, kneeling, lying position)	4 hour
	Self-defence technics	4 hours
	Handcuffing a suspect in different position	4 hours
	How to use a baton	4 hours
Firearm exercises	Safety rules (how to make a weapon safe)	2 hour
	How to use a weapon (load a weapon, aiming procedure, basic ballistic training etc.)	2 hours
	Movements with weapon	4 hours
	Firearm exercises in teams	8 hours
	Shooting range exercises	8 hours

Riot control exercises	Basic foot technics (how to form units and subunits, shield and baton exercises, etc.)	16 hours
	Special foot technics	8 hours
	Riot control exercises with vehicle support	8 hours
	Tactical course (check-points, escort of convoys, protection of UN staff and compounds, etc.)	32 hours
Specialized training for command staff	Operational Planning Process	8 hours
	Command and control exercises	8 hours

Curriculum of the Mobile Training Program in ONUCE mission, Ivory Coast[10]

Generally speaking, the FPUs functioned at the very low level compared to the standard of the European police standards. The police officers of FPUs struggled with the most elementary tasks; they were not able to implement basic police tactics and technics. They were not able to handle their weapon in a safe way; and they could not take a proper shot without paying particular attention to operate their pistols or carbines. For example, the Jordanian units were equipped with modern Beretta pistols, but the 80% of the members of the FPU had not used their weapons prior to the shooting exercises which were organized and conducted by our training team. It was evident that many of them dreaded to use of their weapons.

We evaluated the shooting skills of police officers involved in the training course. They got very poor results in the beginning. The target was a simple A4 paper sheet and the aim was to hit any part of the entire sheet. The shooters had to take 5 shots in prone position from 50 meters and 5 shots in a kneeling position from 25 meters. The rate of the success hit was less than 50%. Half of the shooters were not able to hit A4 paper from fairly close distance. The leaders of the police officers and the subunits had to take shots with their pistols in a standing and a kneeling position from 5 meters and 10 meters. The results were disappointingly low. It was clear that most of the police officers in high ranking positions, and the squad leaders of the units had very rarely fired their pistols or similar weapons. They could not hit the paper even from 5 meters.

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[10] Curriculum of the Mobile Training Program in ONUCE mission, Ivory Coast, 2009, composed by Mobile Training Team of ONUCE

There was another reason that played a main role in getting miserable results. The carbines and pistols were defective as well. They were obsolete and of poor quality. The maintenance of the weapons was below professional standards. Of course, they were cleaned, but almost nobody had any idea how to adjust and tune up the equipment or how the mechanism worked and operated. In many cases, we experienced that the sights of the weapons were off-set. When we warned the leaders of the units; we saw they did not know how to solve the problems. Our general observation was that the commissioned officers, the leaders of the units and subunits; who were selected to carry out tasks of maintaining order and riot control were not up to these tasks. One of the commanders of a riot police platoon had worked as undercover police officer before his deployment. It was very hard to imagine that he had been well-prepared and trained for the mission.

Discipline of the FPUs was very high; most of the police officers were enthusiastic and were keen on participating in the training courses; they wanted to learn new things and they were interested in this comprehensive approach to these novel methods. It was obvious that the police tactics and technics we taught – even if they were very basic – were entirely new to them. Many of them wanted to use the new methods and materials at home; to improve the police skills of the subordinates and colleagues. Especially when we trained the Pakistani colleagues, they showed a great interest. It was a pleasure to work with them as a trainer.

Unfortunately, the situation was the opposite regarding the Jordanians. Most of them were not interested in the training course; neither the commanders nor the subordinates. The work ethics were extremely low. We felt that they considered the training, as a needless burden, although, they had very few daily police tasks; except for the tasks of the maintaining their camp. Besides some unarmed patrols in the area of their base; they were held in reserve or stand-by.

The quality of the equipment of the FPUs was significantly lower than the Hungarian standard, regarding the weapons and the protection of the persons and the riot gear. All of the members of the Mobil Training Team shared the opinion that the equipment was inappropriate for the tasks to which the police officers of the FPUs were appointed. The police officers with such equipment in such poor quality were not able to respond to the demands for modern and safe

policing. The repeating rifles looked like a 50-year-old rifle, although, they were manufactured in the XXI century. The Chinese-made pistols were without a safety system; the motorbike helmets were actually riot helmets; the batons were made of bamboo. All of them represented a very low standard for police equipment.

The skills and professionalism of riot control differed greatly among the FPUs, depending on which country they came from; and on the needs back in their home countries. Each country's cultural, political, legal, and historical backgrounds had a significant effect on the way their police officers behaved and their approach to the human rights issues. In many cases, these issues significantly differed from the professional-legal requirements of the UN or the police organizations of the member states of the EU.

The standardization process of the pre-deployment training of the members of the FPUs

In March of 2010, I participated in the preparatory workshop of the 4th phase of the ongoing project in Dhaka, Bangladesh. One of the main topics on the agenda of the workshop was the evaluation of the Mobil Training Team project. The DPKO intended to establish a curriculum for the pre-deployment training program; to enhance the knowledge and professionalism of the members of the FPUs still in their home countries.

In the workshop, experts represented from 36 UN member states and other political and law enforcement organizations and institutions (i.e. African Union, European Union, European Gendarmerie Force, etc.) discussed the details of a new training session with a different approach. The Mobil Training Team program was aimid at training the FPUs in the mission area represented only a quick help solution; since they had to be ready for the full engagement, well before their deployment. Unfortunately, in many cases this effort failed as the evaluation had revealed.

The solution would be that the members of the FPUs would be trained and tested in the in their country before their deployment. This solution needed that the sending countries should have their own national trainers accredited by the UN; who had been trained on the same curriculum by UN trainers. In favor of

this goal were the participants of the workshops; they got the draft of a new "Train the Trainers" program; they discussed all of the elements of it. The final draft was to send to the UN authorities for their approval.

After the approval of the curriculum of the training program, the countries which regularly sent FPUs to the UN missions, had to send police officers to the training courses organized by the DPKO.

The curriculum of the new training courses, which would be conducted in the future, was established in our workshop. After these training courses, the national trainers from different countries will have to train their own police officers, at home; according to the identical DPKO curriculum, before the deployment of the FPUs. After the preparatory training courses, every FPU, as a whole, and all of the members of the units individually, have to pass tests on the topics of the police professional requirements, and command and control procedures. The aim of the pre-deployment training is a generic, specialized activity based on UN standards and takes places before the deployment of FPU's to a mission conducted by DPKO.[11] Thus, all of the police officers under the UN flag will be able to fulfill their duties, with the help of the same police tactics, technics and procedures. In this manner, the FPUs from different countries will be able to co-operate, with each other, and fulfill the professional requirements of the UN.

The new "Train the Trainers" program for national trainers, kicked off in the autumn of 2011 in India, and continued in the spring of 2012 in Botswana. In these training courses, the former members of the Mobil Training Teams, trained the new national trainers from the member states of the UN. I was asked to join this phase of the training project, but unfortunately, because of previous commitments, I had to refuse the invitation.

What was missing of the training program and its curriculum?

In the course of the workshop, I noticed that the human rights issues were not addressed in the curriculum that was focused only on the police techniques and tactics. It did not emphasize the importance of the human rights, and the

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[11] Department of Peacekeeping Operations: *Support to Military and Police Pre-deployement Training for UN Peacekeeping Operations,* United Nations, Department of Field Support, Ref.2009.21, 2009, p.8.

fundamental freedoms; and did not contain the studies connected to this issue. I personally experienced a significant deficiency of knowledge on the part of the police officers of the FPUs regarding this issue. It was no surprise, if we take a look at the data concerning the national engagements. On the Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations[12] issued by the UN in 2012, the first five positions were to such countries as Bangladesh (10,245 personnel), Pakistan (9,526 personnel), India (8,110 personnel), Ethiopia (6,220 personnel), Nigeria (5,726 personnel) [13]. No doubt, these countries are not the most enthusiastic supporters of democracy and human rights. We do not suppose that the police officers get the proper education regarding human rights and fundamental freedoms, in their police education curriculum. Because of this, we cannot expect them to have the proper knowledge, about the issues, and to do their job of respecting the human rights and the fundamental freedoms in their home countries. We have to highlight and stress the connection between their police wor, and the importance of the above mentioned rights during the training and the educational process. It is not enough to tell the police officer how to search a building or a flat, but we must also teach them to respect the rights of the private citizen, as well as, the protection of private property. It is not enough, to train how to control or disperse a demonstrating crowd, we must also stress the obligation to avoid the abuse, and stress the importance of the rights to public assembly and to unionize.

The problem becomes worse, if the members of the intervention forces do not understand the society, the culture, the religion, and the traditions of the target country. Thus, they will not fulfill their mission, or reach their goals. Intervention forces have to take into consideration, the issues and the problems of different cultures or religions. For example, when a Muslim father is subjected to a body search, or required to take off his clothes, in front of his younger or female family members, it is considered as a major abuse.

The individual responsibility of the members of the armed forces has grown in the recent years, since the police or military operations always happen in the presence of mass media or outsiders; who take videos or photos of what the police or military personals are doing. Nothing is hidden from the cameras of the press or the people. The consequences of a wrong decision, an action

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[12] Az ENSZ honlapja: *Ranking of Military and Police Contributions to UN Operations, 2012.*
[13] The first European contributor country is French in the position of 18th (1398 personnels).

showing anger or temper go immediately to the Internet exposing the event to a large public. The public opinion per se can define the operations, i.e. generating large foreign support to the insurgency or having an effect on the policy of the alliance, and abusing the authority of such international organizations such as the UN.

Finally, we can declare that the DPKO should carry a long-term educational program to keep its objectives or goals viable; and to pay closer attention to them. As a result of this process, the training program can be a key factor to guarantee a significant improvement in the capabilities of the FPUs. The issue of human rights and fundamental freedoms should be incorporated into the curriculum of the training courses, as well as into the pure police tactics-technics and procedures. We expect from the police units operating under the umbrella of the UN to carry out their tasks and missions in a professional and legal way, relieving the suffering and pain of the people living in the crises areas.

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FORUM of PhD CANDIDATES

Lt. ZSUZSA DÓRA KŐSZEGVÁRI, PhD aspirant

THE ELEMENTS OF STRATEGIC RECONNAISSANCE APPEARING IN IRREGULAR WARFARE

Abstract

The military operations recently in progress (e.g.: in Afghanistan and Iraq) are fundamentally different from those theoretical principles and details, strategical and operational ideas that were created in the final years of the 20th century about the would-be wars and military conflicts of the 21st century. Having gathered the experiences of ongoing military operations from several parts of the world, it is possible to state that for some time the military force and commanders of the United States and its allies has had to face an enemy that is engaged in an irregular warfare, which is entirely different form the traditional one.

Keywords: Reconnaissance military operations, irregular warfare, strategy

In operations against forces engaged in irregular warfare, military force assumes an increasingly important role. Against these, not regular challenges, only coordinated and efficient military and secret service operations can be successful. The main aim of military operations is to prevent successful completion of enemy actions. To this end, defensive and offensive actions are carried out by the forces appointed to take on these operations. Reconnaissance is an essential part of successful offensive and also defensive military operations.

Reconnaissance is the basis for efficient planning, protection and deception. Reconnaissance is an activity set up by the commander, which aims to collect and analyse information about the enemy from the area of operation. It is vital to gather and analise information before starting the operations. In order to get a more accurate picture of the operation, a central leadership and coordinated activities are needed at all levels of headquarters, moreover

information has to be shared in time with the headquarters. To carry out reconnaissance, all available forces and devices of reconnaissance can be utilised, including the forces in contact, reconnaissance units, patrols, air defence instruments, military reconnaissance and cartographer units, radars of the field artillery and the liaison officers.[1]

The most important purpose of reconnaissance is to provide reliable and precise data on the time, forces, instruments and target objects of the forthcoming operation. Reconnaissance data has to help the commanders controlling the operations to be able to take a decision (determination) in time, in order to prevent the enemy operations. In all reconnaissance activities, it is a permanent and uninterrupted task of the reconnaissance body and its personnel (i.e. reconnaissance officers) - besides the usual information gathering operations - to gather, analyse and evaluate relevant information.

Planning military operation in irregular warfare and the phases of reconnaissance:

1. The first phase of reconnaissance is planning. In this phase, all activities aimed at gathering the information are planned. Tasks are divided, available forces and instruments are appointed. The main aim of reconnaissance in irregular warfare is to predict the forthcoming events and to be precise.

2. In the second phase the data is gathered, during this, the activity is continuously organised utilising the available instruments. This procedure can be carried out by different groups of reconnaissance bodies depending on the available technical and other methods (HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT.) Single reconnaissance methods are never enough on their own, thus they are employed to supplement and be built up on each other in gathering precise information.

3. Analysing and evaluating information is the process in which the previously gathered information is analysed and evaluated. Raw data are processed, so they can become reconnaissance information, which can be valuable to solve the emerging problems. Analysis is one of the most valuable jobs, during which the essence of the raw data has to be selected, the

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[1] Kőszegvári Zsuzsa Dóra – HUMINT and SIGINT Reconnaissance Methods the Challenges of Defence in the 21st Century in the Fight Against International Terrorism. Thesis, ZMNE, 2007. p. 19.

unimportant pieces of information have to be cast away and further on only the important and most usable elements should be used.

4. Forwarding reports is the last phase of reconnaissance activities. In this phase, the reports completed by analysts are received by the proper users. Data mostly are forwarded and utilised on digital media.

In case of irregular warfare, strategic reconnaissance has to be conducted to achieve successful operations. The aim of strategic reconnaissance is to gather, process and forward information needed for political leadership, planning military operations, taking government decision, and to forward it to the competent bodies. The task of strategic reconnaissance is to describe, report on, explain, predict and evaluate risks in order to carry out successful operations against irregular warfare.

The components of strategic reconnaissance, which has to be studied during the operations against irregular warfare are:[2]
- biographical;
- economic;
- social;
- connected to transportation and telecommunication;
- military geographical;
- military force;
-political;
- scientific and technical;

With biographic reconnaissance such information can be gathered that are related to and are needed to evaluate the life, lifestyle, social and societal status, career, commitments, motivations, skills, relationships and personality of the persons of interest. This is one of the most important elements of reconnaissance activity for example from the point of view of analysing terrorism.

In case of Afghanistan, it can be very important in the reconnaissance procedure to get acquainted with the sources as deeply as possible. It is important to learn about their background, what kind of of contacts and

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[2] Dr. Kis-Benedek József – The Theories and Practices of Strategic Reconnaissance. "The Elements of Strategic Reconnaissance" ppt lecture. 2012.

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influence they have, and what is their social status. Their personalities have to be examined too, to see if they are reliable or unpredictable. Learning about their education and profession can help us to evaluate what type of information we can get from the source. This information can be extremely important for international intelligence cells and for bodies carrying out HUMINT actions. Anybody can be a source who may have valuable information. It is worth taking into account political or other leaders, warlords, local chiefs of police, religious leaders, teachers and even shop assistants.

In the area of economy, we can gain important information on the amount and quality of natural resources, human resources (like work) and the economic potential of a country, including its financial status, industrial production (agriculture) and its war economy, as well. The aim of economic reconnaissance is to measure the abilities of the target country as there is a strong relationship between the economy and the military power. A region with a strong economy has an accordingly strong military potential. It is important to learn about the production of the military industry from the point of view of evaluating the vulnerability of the forces, as it is also possible to make deduction on a given country's advancement in military technology and its military force based on this information.

It is important to know the financial status of the area and that of the banks, in case of a possible introduction of sanctions or stepping up against them. Taking Afghanistan into consideration, the situation is somewhat complicated, since the country has no financial system that could be accepted by the western world. It has a rather poor economic state, its main industrial product is opium. Transfers of money within the country cannot be traced, warlords hold most of the wealth. This wealth originates mostly from drug trading, illegal activities, weapon trading and terrorism.

The social element of strategic reconnaissance is strongly connected to its economic element, however, it needs a separate analysis. To evaluate a region, it is highly important to know the given country's social makeup, bodies, aims, activities, institutions and social relations.

The main elements of examining society are population, cultural specialities, culture, religion, public healthcare and social status. In order to

receive information valuable for us, even to reach people, it is important that we previously obtain sufficient knowledge on the given country's social conditions. If we do not know culture and religion in advance, if we cannot give respect in the proper way – this is especially important in Afghanistan – we will not be able to reach information. Respecting religion and culture can be a crucial aspect during the process of reconnaissance, especially in an area where everything is determined by these two factors. In case of Afghanistan, the international and allied forces have committed many mistakes in this field. It also makes reconnaissance more difficult that the operations take place in an area far from Europe, in different language and cultural circumstances, due to its ethnic composition (there are many dialects and differences.) Understanding and mapping this impacts represent an extremely heavy burden on reconnaissance. Language problems derive from the 60 different tribal dialects in Afghanistan, for which it is impossible to prepare the professionals.

It is necessary for the forthcoming tasks to reconnoitre and study the infrastructure of transportation and telecommunication before the operation starts, as during the operations, we have to make use of the railway system, the motorways and roads, the ports and air transportation possibilities. The knowledge on these factors can seriously make the planning process easier, moreover, it gives an opportunity to consider what restrictions to use against the hostile warring party. Planning the telecommunication infrastructure, i.e.: internet, computer networks, television, radio and telephone as channels of communications may help during reconnaissance; knowledge on telecommunication infrastructure can highly promote a successful outcome of an operation, and it is a determining element when retrieving information.

By reconnoitring military geographical features we mean discovering the terrain features situated in different areas, the varied relief and areas above sea level (e.g.: rocky and hilly areas of Afghanistan.) The heavy terrain makes the precise execution of operations extremely difficult. It follows, naturally, that the local people know the special features of their territories, so they can hide rather easily, they can take cover in certain mountain ranges, in hideouts of caves, at places covered by forests. These features make the reconnaissance harder.

Reconnoitring the military force means measuring up the military force, the land, the aviation and naval forces, the space and electronic capabilities of

the enemy. Concerning the military forces, the following has to be taken into consideration: the number of military personnel, its fragmentation, the structure of the organization, the state of the military technology, its level of development, the dislocations, preparedness and fighting ability of the enemy forces, the rules of combat and the doctrines regulating the enemy operations. If we do not know the enemy, we cannot step up against it.[3] In case of Afghanistan it is especially difficult, as the Taliban have no regular military force, the international and allied forces could gather very little information on its military forces, since the irregular combat operations of the Taliban forces were unknown.

The political element deals with the given country's political views, applied national and governmental foreign politics, the governmental system (structure of the parties), the parties, the composition of political organisations, public policy and public safety and the information on intelligence and national security services. In Afghanistan, it is difficult to see clearly, as its political system is entirely immature.

In the area of strategic intelligence, Afghanistan is a unique place. The chance for a successful reconnoitring is very low, however, experts gaining experience on the inadequacies can efficiently help intelligence to reach a better result. Gained experiences must be utilised and used in reconnoitring operations.

Conclusion

In the 21st century, the fact that in some regions the forces are increasingly engaged in irregular warfare has become a threatening source of danger. The counter action should be at least of the same proportion, or possibly even more serious. Thus, carrying out effectively the tasks of reconnaissance forces is the base for successful operations. Reconnaissance is a highly special task, which is carried out by specially trained and instructed people and organizations. Well organised and uninterrupted reconnaissance operations constitute a basic requirement for successfully fighting against the forces parsuing irregular warfare.

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MELINDA ZSOLT, PhD Student

THE YOM KIPPUR WAR AND THE FAILURE OF THE ISRAELI INTELLIGENCE

Abstract

From the 1948 Independence War until the 1967 Six-Day War Israel fought its wars with confident military superiority against the different allies of the Arab countries. However, in 1973, Egypt and Syria carried out a combined surprise attack on Israel. The author of this paper examines why the intelligence agencies did not warned the army earlier to make it possible for the troops to prepare for an attack, and who were the key players in the process. The paper analyses how the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) finally received the information on the attack, only hours before it took place. It also gives an overview on how the pride of the military and of the society of the participating countries influenced their attitudes to the war.

Key words: Israel, Egypt, Syria, Yom Kippur War, Six-Day War, intelligence

Introduction

On the afternoon on October 6, 1973 Egypt and Syria attacked Israel. The combined and simultaneous attack was a surprise for Israel which came during the holiest Jewish holiday, Yom Kippur. The study aims to examine what led to the situation in which the Israeli intelligence agencies and the IDF were not prepared for the attack and there was not enough time for the mobilization of the army's reservists.

For the proper understanding of the subject it is indispensable to overview some of the details leading to the war, especially in light of the recent disclosure of some previously classified data.

Another important element of the study is the examination of the motivations of those involved, as it can explain how the alliance formed by Egypt and Syria succeeded to hide the attack plans until the last moment.

After the Six-Day War in 1967, the IDF seemed invincible for 25 years, since the State of Israel had gained disproportional victories in the three Arab-Israeli Wars. Therefore, the Israeli intelligence community was confident that

the Arab countries would not attack. The dominant approach in the security of Israel was that the Arabs need time to reorganize their forces, thus the Israeli intelligence community did not take the issue of a possible attack seriously. At least this was the base of the conception, as it is called in Hebrew term, the "conceptzia", at the end of 1960s and the beginning of the 1970s.

Disproportional victory

Israel had its reason for not worrying about a possible attack after its most successful war in the history of the modern Israel. For Israel, as it is for all states, one of the basic national security interests is the defense of its territorial integrity. In order to protect this interest, states employ a variety of means. One of them is the building of an army according to the evaluated threats. For Israel, from the very beginning of its existence, the main security concern is the fact, valid even today, that the Arab World is hostile towards the Zionist ideology and Israel. Most of the Arab World's approach defines Israel as such a country that does not belong to the Middle East region, and there is no reason for Israel to be there, the difference is not just ideological but can be expressed by numbers, since there are fundamental asymmetries between the two sides. The lack of balance appears for instance in the number of the populations, in the geographic size of the different states or in the natural resources.

Thus, efficiency of manpower was one of the main strategic pillars in Israel's national security. Because of the significantly smaller population, the focus had to be on the quality of the soldiers over the quantity. Since a full scale war threatened the very existence of the Jewish state even in peace time, the army was on a constant alert. This also meant that the reservist soldiers had to be ready to be mobilized, organized and deployed quickly and smoothly to the battlefield – a pattern that helped the survival of Israel in the Yom Kippur War. Israel's geographic characteristics always influenced its security strategy heavily: quite long and largely flat territories with a narrow strip of land which is only 14 kilometers wide, leaving the country without strategic depth. The major populated areas, military and industrial assets were always within the easy reach of the Arab armies. Then came the Six-Day War in 1967 with a fundamental change when Israel won a decisive land war; the army took control over territory more than triple the size of the territory Israel had controlled before 1967.

From Egypt Israel conquered the Gaza Strip and the Sinai Peninsula, from Jordan the West Bank which included East Jerusalem as well, so Israel was able to unify Jerusalem, and from Syria the Golan Heights. The territorial status quo in the Arab-Israeli conflict was changed radically as an aftermath of the war. Beside the large territory captures from Egypt, Jordan and Syria, Israel pulverized the armies of these three countries, which brought a new security approach for Israel. For the first time in its modern history the territorial acquisitions provided a strategic depth, so the major population centers, military and industrial assets were no longer within the easy reach neither of the Arab armies nor of the terrorist organizations. The significant territorial changes drew new borders which brought different positive outcomes for Israel: they were easier to defend because they overlapped with topographical obstacles such as the Suez Canal and the Jordan River, incorporated militarily significant high ground such as the Judean and Samarian highlands on the West Bank area, and finally the total length of the borders become shorter. The altered terms did not mean any changes regarding the Israeli army operational or tactical principles, but the national security doctrine was affected. The acquisition of shorter and more defensible borders – together with the strategic depth – Israel's willingness to engage in a preemptive or a preventive war decreased to a certain extent. The calmness Israel gained because of the newly captured territories has been proven in 1973, at the beginning of the Yom Kippur War when the defensibility and the depth provided by the Sinai Peninsula and the Golan Heights as buffer zones gave the IDF the territory and the time it needed to recover from its early surprise and setbacks. On this base, later the IDF has launched counterattacks on both fronts bringing Israel eventual victory in the war.[1]

Returning to the consequences of the Six-Day War, the Khartoum Summit of the Arab League on 1 September, 1967 has to be mentioned since it strongly reflected the mood and the moral of the countries in the region. The resolution issued in the capital of Sudan demanded the withdrawal of the Israeli troops back to the 1967 borders and called for a struggle against Israel. The participants adopted the "Three No's": no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel and no negotiations with Israel.

The famous United Nations Resolution 242 was adopted a few months later, on 22 November, 1967 with the support of all five members of the

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[1] David Rodman: „Israel's national security doctrine: An appraisal of the past and a vision of the future". *Israel Affairs*, Volume 9, Issue 4, 2003. pp. 115-140.

Security Council. Although there was a great debate regarding the French and the English version of the text, since they can be understood differently, this document represents one of the principles of the different attempts of peace negotiations – that was the start of the concept of territories for peace. Israel was fully aware of its position: the Jewish state had a strong base for negotiation because of the occupied territories.

A little bit more than a week after the end of the Six-Day War, the Israeli cabinet approved a resolution in foreclosing a United States or an international pressure of withdrawing immediately, in which they expressed their intent to peace negotiations with Egypt and Syria. The resolution was neither announced, nor had any political effect at the time, but it shapes the understanding of the behavior of the Israeli decision makers in the government and in the army as well.[2]

Israel, after its successful occupations, built a strong defense line on the Sinai Peninsula. The Bar Lev Line fortification was its own Maginot Line along the East bank of the Suez Canal which reminds the similar French constructions on its border with Germany in the 1930s. Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt wanted to force Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, and since the "Three No's" of the Khartoum Resolution only the military option remained open to him. In March, 1969,Egypt launched the almost one and a half-year long War of Attrition. In 1970, Anwar Sadat came to power in Egypt and started his historic 11 years of presidency until he was assassinated by fundamentalists from the Egyptian Islamic Jihad. Sadat from the very beginning started to make preparation for the war, between 1970 and 1973. Both sides Israel and the other Arab countries have increased their preparations to war as well. The supply of modern arms for the Arab countries arrived from Soviet Union, as well as military advisors for the armies' officers.

Meanwhile in the Arab countries the defeat from Israel caused shock and shame. "When we came back from 1967 you could feel the way people looked at you .... as if to say 'you don't deserve our respect'. Even our families were saying that our country deserved better, so we thought we have no other way of correcting this impression than getting the Sinai Peninsula back" – quoted the

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[2] Deciding the Fate of the Territories Occupied During the Six Day War: An Ongoing Debate – The Government Discusses Israel's Peace Plan, 18 - 19 June 1967. Israel State Archives. http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/exeres/03B6E62C-17B4-421C-98C7-C9BA925D8EF4,frameless.htm Visited: 20.10.2013.

BBC Sameh Elyazal Egyptian general how he described the public's mood in Cairo in 1973.[3] "It was our dignity in front of our people in Egypt, because we lost their trust as an army at the time after the 1967 war."

"The Yom Kippur War was, in many ways, Israel's punishment for its post-1967 arrogance – hubris always begets nemesis. Egypt had been so resoundingly defeated in the Six-Day War of June 1967 that Israel's leaders dismissed the need to be proactive in the search for peace. They encouraged a national mood of strategic complacency that percolated into the military as much as it was influenced by the military, paving the way for the success of Egypt's exercise in tactical deceit" – wrote Shlomo Ben-Ami former Israeli Foreign Minister in an Op-Ed.[4]

Ben-Ami argues that the blunder of the Israeli intelligence was more political than military and more strategic than tactical, because a robust Israeli peace policy should have been a central pillar of the security doctrine. The aftermath of the Six-Day War brought a moral and political decay transforming the national mood in a way that made the peace impossible. "Israel and its leaders lost touch with reality."

Those, Who Knew about the Attack

Egypt has managed to maneuver for a long time, so the Israelis did not expect the attack so early, although they were aware of the preparation process which otherwise seemed to be a comprehensive military exercise. President Sadat repeated frequently to public that Egypt intended to go to war against Israel, but for years nothing happened, the attack had not taken place. Thus, besides the military maneuver there was a political, rhetorical diversion by the Egyptians which decreased significantly the alertness of Israelis. Egypt in fact prepared for war, troops were deployed at the Eastern borders, but there were reports by Egyptian media outlets that reservists were demobilized from the army and others were sent to pilgrimage to Mecca. The Israeli Military Intelligence still did not consider the circumstances suspicious. Even the Soviet Union was not informed in advance about the secretly planned attack.

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[3] Kevin Connolly: Legacy of 1973 Arab-Israeli war reverberates 40 years on. BBC News, 5 October 2013. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-24402464 Visited: 25.10.2013.

[4] Shlomo Ben-Ami: The Yom Kippur War Today. Project Syndicate, 2 October 2013. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/shlomo-ben-amithe-lessons-of-the-1973-yom-kippur-war Visited: 20.10.2013.

Egypt and Syria were very cautious with the information regarding the attack, as only few people knew about it. From the Egyptian side there were only President Sadat and the Minister of War, Ismail Ali, who knew about the war plans before the 1 October, 1973. In Syria there were less than 10 people informed about the impending assault on Israel that included President Assad, the Minister of War and Commander-in Chief, the Director of Operations, the Director of Military Intelligence, the Commander of the Air Force and the Commander of the Anti-Aircraft Defense Networks, namely those who had to be involved inevitably such as the most influential decision makers and high ranking military commanders.[5]

On 01 October, there were two meetings, one in Cairo, one in Damascus, at this round of the preparation for the war the divisional commanders and the equivalent General Staff officers were told of the war in both armies. Brigade and battalion commanders were informed about the imminent attack only on 05 October or the following morning, which was actually the day of the attack, and all the remaining troops and officers heard about the war just one or two hours before the attack.

The leaders of the two countries also decided not to communicate by using telephone, cables or similar tools since, as a consequence of the Six-Day War, Israel had built sophisticated observation posts on the Golan Heights and started to use modern early warning systems. According to the expectations of the Egyptians, Israel should have issued a warning regarding the preparations from three to fifteen days prior to the attack. They also expected a counter attack within six or eight hours from the moment of the first strike, the best-case scenario was 24 hours. As it turned out in the end, Egypt had very high expectations, the Israeli Army was much slower, it took them two full days to organize the counter attack.

The Timeline of the Events prior to the War

July 1972

President Sadat decided to stand off from the Communist Block and he called the Soviet contingent stationed in Egypt to leave the country, it concerned mainly Soviet military advisers.

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[5] Doron Geller: Israel Military Intelligence. Jewish Virtual Library.
  http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/intel73.html Visited: 25.10.2013.

February 1973

Egypt prepared a proposal for a peace agreement with Israel in an attempt to avoid another Arab-Israeli war. Neither the United States nor Israel took it seriously despite three different warning signs: besides the obvious warnings of Hussein, the King of Jordan and Leonid Brezhnev Soviet Secretary-General, Sadat public displays also showed the intent to start a war if the military option is the only remaining solution.

April – May 1973

Military Intelligence Chief Eli Zeira was most confident in the view that the probability of war was low. Mossad Chief Zvi Zamir was less dismissive of Arab intentions, as were Chief of Staff David Elazar and Defense Minister Moshe Dayan.

June – July 1973

The Israeli Military Intelligence was aware of the details of the Egyptian and Syrian war plans, for instance regarding the crossing of the Suez Canal or the capture of Sharm el-Sheikh.

A few months before the war, Israel backed by the United States with detailed intelligence, still believed that because of the military balance Egypt and Syria would not attack Israel, but they would wait until their chance to win is higher. So, the above mentioned "conceptzia" still holds its position within the intelligence community.

August 1973

The Syrian Army carried out a large scale deployment along the Golan Heights which was considered by the Israeli Military Intelligence as a defense measure against Israeli air strikes. Their prognosis said that the war would not break out in the fall. Parallel with the Syrian deployment, the Syrians cancelled the leaves, called up reservists and announced state of alert. These developments were worrying for the Israeli Northern Command, but the "conceptzia" still held: Syria would not attack without Egypt and Egypt had no plans to go to war.

September – October 1973

Egypt strongly prepared for war, but because of the sophisticated political and military deception and the several false alarms in the previous years, it was believed that the preparation was not real.

In late September, the United States had intelligence about a possible combined Egyptian-Syrian attack, but Israel in its response did not evaluate it

worrying. Despite this evaluation, Israel found the Syrian deployment worrying so sent more troops to the Golan Heights.

12 September – 1-2 October, 1973

The date of the surprise attack was chosen in this period.

25 September, 1973

Hussein, King of Jordan in their more than an hour long meeting in Tel Aviv warned personally Golda Meir Prime Minister of the impending Egyptian-Syrian assault. During the war, although Jordan had a small troop at the Golan front to show concern for Arab solidarity, it kept its border with Israel completely quiet.

30 September, 1973

Prime Minister Golda Meir set off for Strasbourg to address the Council of Europe, at the airport she was informed about the strengthened fronts from both directions, Egypt and Syria.

3 October, 1973

The decision about the exact hour of the attack was made only a few days previously. The Syrians preferred to launch in dawn when the sun is behind them, while the Egyptians preferred exactly the opposite, the sunset for the same reason. The middle between them was 2 p.m.

Mossad Chief Zamir continued to express his concern over the Syrian deployment in contradistinction to Military Intelligence Chief Eli Zeira. Zamir tried to alert Prime Minister Golda Meir, but she sent him to Defense Minister Moshe Dayan. Dayan had his own optimistic assessments as well as those of Military Intelligence, and was slow to call up reservists.

One of the heroes of the war was a researcher, Lieutenant Binyamin Siman-Tov, a junior Military Intelligence officer who understood that the Egyptians' preparations were not aimed at conducting a military exercise, but at organizing a real war. His assessments were ignored, and the hierarchy of the army did not let him going further to influence the upper level decision makers.

4 October, 1973

As a deception, Egyptian media reported that 20 thousands reservists had been demobilized. The Israeli Military Intelligence received the message and believed it. The Syrians also used deception, but to much less extent, it was

announced in the radio that President Assad would begin a nine-day tour in the Eastern provinces of Syria on 10 October.

Mossad Chief Zamir started worrying seriously.
Soviet advisers and their families left both Egypt and Syria – Golda Meir found this development worrying.

Intelligence photographs revealed that Egyptian and Syrian concentrations of tanks, infantry, and SAMs were at an unprecedented high level.

5 October, 1973

Transport aircraft filled with military hardware landed in Damascus.
At 2:30 a.m. Mossad Chief Zamir received a cable from a trusted source expressing that war was certain. Zamir did not tell Prime Minister Golda Meir, Defense Minister Moshe Dayan or Chief of Staff David Elazar about the message. He did inform Military Intelligence Chief Eli Zeira and expressed his certainty that war was imminent. Zamir went to Europe to personally meet the source at midnight.

6 October, 1973

At 3:45 a.m. Zamir informed Zeira that the war would come the same day at sunset as a combined and simultaneous attack of Egyptian and Syrian forces. The attack began at 1:55 p.m.[6]

The advances of the Egyptian and Syrian forces were reversed by Israel, the war ended after three weeks with a ceasefire. Egypt and Syria lost an estimated 8,500 soldiers, while Israel lost more than 2,500 troops.

The Agranat Commission

A few weeks after the Yom Kippur War, on 21 November, 1973 a national inquiry commission was established in Israel to investigate three main issues: the intelligence available before the war on the intentions of Syria and Egypt, the analysis of the intelligence by the authorized civilian and military units, and the general preparedness of the Israeli Army to fight especially the day prior to the outbreak of the war. The chairman of the five-member Commission was Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Dr. Shimon Agranat. The

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[6] Doron Geller: Israel Military Intelligence. Jewish Virtual Library.
  http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/intel73.html Visited: 25.10.2013.

Commission reviewed 90 direct and 188 written testimonies; a part of them was released to the public only decades after the war.[7]

The Commission decided that its full reports would be available for the public only after 30 years, in 2004. However, 20 years later, the Israeli Ma'ariv newspaper petitioned to the Supreme Court and asked the immediate publication of the reports. The government was aware that its argument that publicizing the reports is a security risk will not stand in court. Yitzhak Rabin, the Prime and Defense Minister gave his consent and the report was published on 1 January 1995, except for 48 pages disapproved by the censorship. The withheld parts included for instance the testimony of Prime Minister Golda Meir that was made public only 40 years after the war, on 12 September 2013.

Regarding the events of the morning on 6 October 1973, the day of the surprise attack, Golda Meir told the Commission that her heart was very much drawn to a preemptive strike, but she was scared. "1973 is not 1967, and this time we will not be forgiven, and we will not receive assistance when we have the need for it" – argued the former Prime Minister in her testimony. Meir also mentioned that during the war, Israel received 26,000 tons of crucial supplies including 40 Phantom and 53 Skyhawk fighter jets.[8]

The core of the issue of the very existence of the Jewish state was included in the question raised by Golda Meir. "Certain points should raise questions whether the assessment and decision making process is enough of a warning system if we miss so much."[9]

In a testimony it was also revealed that the credible secret source in Europe, who warned the intelligence about the imminent war, was actually an Egyptian agent, the son of an Egyptian general. His name was Ashraf Marwan who was married to the daughter of Gamal Abdel Nasser former President, and he was the head of Sadat's Presidential Information Bureau, thus he had access to Egypt's most sensitive secrets. In the case of the Yom Kippur War, the

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[7] Agranat Commission. The Knesset. http://www.knesset.gov.il/lexicon/eng/agranat_eng.htm
Visited: 22.10.2013.

[8] Golda Meir: 'My heart was drawn to a preemptive strike, but I was scared'. The Times of Israel, 12 September 2103. http://www.timesofisrael.com/golda-meir-my-heart-was-drawn-to-a-preemptive-strike-but-i-was-scared/
Visited: 22.10.2013.

[9] Roi Mandel: Golda Meir protocols from Agranat Commission released. Ynet News, 13 September 2013.
http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4429179,00.html Visited: 22.10.2013.

information gained from Marwan was not passed directly to the Prime Minister's Office to let her make a decision.

"Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results" – wrote Sun Tzu the famous ancient military general. [10]

Conclusion

At the end of October 1973, the stage was set for the United States to make great efforts at the Arab-Israeli peacemaking, the process finally led to the signing of a peace treaty between Israel and Egypt in 1979.

For Israel the stage was set to face the consequences of the war and the events prior to it. Israel had to consider that with the Six-Day War in 1967 a fundamental change had taken place, when Israel won a decisive land war, and the army took control over territories more than triple of the territory Israel had controlled before 1967. In the Arab countries the defeat from Israel caused shock and shame, while Israel and its leaders lost touch with the reality.
Gamal Abdel Nasser, the President of Egypt wanted to force Israel to withdraw from the Sinai Peninsula, because from the "Three No's" of the Khartoum Resolution only the military option remained open to him. Then President Sadat came to power and started – from the very beginning of his presidency – to make preparations for the war. The supply of modern arms for the Arab countries arrived from the Soviet Union, as well as military advisors for the armies' officers

Egypt and Syria were very cautious with the information regarding the attack, as only few people knew about it. They had prepared secretly for years, and because of their successful deception campaign, the Israeli Military Intelligence did not expect an imminent attack. Simultaneously with the war plans, Egypt had the intention to start peace negotiations with Israel, but Israel and the United States did not take it seriously.

The heads of the Israeli intelligence agencies had different views regarding the possibility of war, but the information in their possession and in the possession of the political leaders such as Prime Minister Golda Meir and

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[10] Sun Tzu: The Art Of War. Filiquarian, 2007. p. 27.

Defense Minister Moshe Dayan was not shared properly, and the "conceptzia" until the last moment held its position. There was a junior researcher at the Military Intelligence, who understood the behavior of Egypt, but because of his low rank, he was a Lieutenant, his assessment was ignored.

From the testimonies of the Agranat Commission it has been concluded that Prime Minister Golda Meir considered the opportunity of a preemptive strike seriously, but she was scared to lose the confidence of the United States, the most important ally of Israel. Meir defined the assessment and decision making processes in use at that time as fundamental failures.

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3. Deciding the Fate of the Territories Occupied During the Six Day War: An Ongoing Debate – The Government Discusses Israel's Peace Plan, 18 - 19 June 1967. Israel State Archives. http://www.archives.gov.il/NR/exeres/03B6E62C-17B4-421C-98C7-C9BA925D8EF4,frameless.htm Visited: 20.10.2013.
4. Doron Geller: Israel Military Intelligence. Jewish Virtual Library. http://www.jewishvirtuallibrary.org/jsource/History/intel73.html Visited: 25.10.2013.
5. Golda Meir: 'My heart was drawn to a preemptive strike, but I was scared'. The Times of Israel, 12 September 2103. http://www.timesofisrael.com/golda-meir-my-heart-was-drawn-to-a-preemptive-strike-but-i-was-scared/ Visited: 22.10.2013.
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7. Roi Mandel: Golda Meir protocols from Agranat Commission released. Ynet News, 13 September 2013. http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-4429179,00.html Visited: 22.10.2013.
8. Shlomo Ben-Ami: The Yom Kippur War Today. Project Syndicate, 2 October 2013. http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/shlomo-ben-amithe-lessons-of-the-1973-yom-kippur-war Visited: 20.10.2013.
9. Sun Tzu: The Art Of War. Filiquarian, 2007. p. 27.

DAVID GOTTESMAN, PhD aspirant

GUINEA-BISSAU - A PROBLEM NOT FAR AWAY ENOUGH

Abstract:

At the beginning of my study, I am briefly going to introduce Guinea-Bissau and the situation that is developing there. By merely observing the country's history, it is clear that the army holds an important position in everyday life. Consequently, the next part shall deal with the relations of politics and armed forces. For the final chapter, I am going to look at the European Union's role in the country, in the light of the EU Security Sector Reform initiative. In this text, I wish to show how the over-empowerment of the military leads to anomalies in this small West-African country. Furthermore, I would also like to show what effects these have on the EU member states. At the same time, the EU is not capable of providing adequate answers to the ever so differentiating crises, which immediately raises questions about its foreign policy in the region.

Keywords: Guinea-Bissau, military, West-Africa, coup d'état, tribalism, cocaine, SSR, CFSP

General Overview of Guinea-Bissau

The country is one of the smallest in the West-African region, with its population of 1,6 million and the total area of 36 square meters, it remains marginalized even at a regional level. Despite this, Guinea-Bissau is the only country in the region where no religion is able to possess greater political influence. Muslim, Christians and tribal beliefs are all present.[1] It is a paradoxical state, since regardless of its small dimensions, in an ethnic context it is even more diverse. The largest group is comprised of the Balanta tribes, yet they are only 30% of the population, in the meantime Fulas encompass 20%, Manjacas 14%, the Mandingas 13%, but also the Papels are noteworthy with 7%.[2] The capital is Bissau, other important cities are Bafata, Gabu and Cacheu. Given that it was a Portuguese colony, this is the official language, nevertheless it is only spoken by merely one-tenth of the population. However, the Creole version of Portuguese is the preferred *lingua franca* between the various tribal languages.[3]

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[1] Markus, Minow, Schweder: *Engaging Cultural Differences.* Russel Sage Foundation, 2004. p 423
[2] Embaló et Embaló, Klute: *Local Strategies of Conflict Resolution in Guinea-Bissau* A Project Proposal in Legal Anthropology in: Recht in Afrika 2: 253-272. p 8
[3] *Guinea-Bissau Mineral & Mining Sector Investment and Business Guide*. International Business Publications, 2007. p 18

Guinea-Bissau attained independence in 1974, and considers itself to be a republic. Since 1991, a multi-party system is officially in place, although the African Party for the Independence of Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde (PAIGC) remains as a dominant force from the beginning. Furthermore, a one-party system was institutionalized for many decades, leaving the development towards democracy more as a formality.[4] The president has unique powers and his office is the executive branch of the government, which has hitherto proven to be an obstacle to democratization.[5] Politics are substantially influenced by external forces (mainly the military), but tribal traditions also continue to be important. Due to this, politicians fabricate a paternalistic relationship with their voters, thus ensuring long-term power.[6] Consequently, corruption is wide-ranging, and in this sense the government and military become one.[7] In such a system one party prevails, through which one person could seize power with the compulsory backing of the military.

In economic terms, Guinea-Bissau is one of the least developed countries in the world. In addition to this, there are very few natural resources, which leaves the country with the average of $710 for the GDP per capita, and on the 164. place in the HDI rankings. Logging and fishing play an important role, just as the mining of bauxite and phosphate. Cashew nuts are the main crops, and its export comprises a large portion of the country's profits. Despite only having 11% of arable land, the population is mainly employed in the agricultural sector.[8] Therefore, in addition to its geographic endowment, politics and economy also represent disadvantageous factors, even in the relative regional context. In a cultural sense, being one of the few former Portuguese colonies in a predominantly francophone area appends to its isolation.

Historical Overview

The Senegambian tribes were the first to arrive to the territories we now call Guinea-Bissau. However, they were supplanted towards the coastline by the Fula and Mandinga. Afterwards the Gabu Kingdom came to be the mostly predominant power in the region, as a liege-kingdom to the Mali Empire. The Portuguese had arrived very early, in 1446. Nonetheless, this cannot be considered as colonization, as they have only established outposts in the coastal areas and were powerless inland. They tried to profit from tribal hostilities by

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[4]Adebajo, Adekeye: Building *Peace in West Africa: Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea-Bissau*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002. p 113

[5] op.cit. *Guinea-Bissau Mineral & Mining Sector Investment and Business Guide.* p 18

[6] Boubacar-Sid, Barry: *Conflict, Livelihoods and Poverty in Guinea-Bissau*. World Bank Publication, 2007. p 25

[7] Brownfiel, William R.: *International Narcotics Control Strategy Report: Volume I: Drug and Chemical Control*. DIANE Publishing, 2007. p 313

[8] op.cit. *Guinea-Bissau Mineral & Mining Sector Investment and Business Guide.* p 19

buying prisoners of war.[9] Thus there was no systematic occupation, yet the Portuguese attempted to exploit the territory as if it were a colony.

They could not pierce into the mainland, where chaotic tribal tensions prevailed. Hence, Guinea-Bissau's colonial history commences with the Congress of Berlin, after which the Portuguese leave their secure fortresses to extend their rule throughout the whole country by the beginning of the XX. century. From the start, and upon till independence, Bissau was the least developed of all Portuguese territories.[10] Concurring to colonizing logic, the Portuguese chose a ruling tribe- the Fula- who were preferred in all aspects of life.[11]

The struggle for independence begins in 1963 and quickly escalates into an armed conflict. The decade-long war was ultimately ended by the democratic transitions in Portugal. In this fight for freedom Amilcar Cablar became the leading figure, who gained a great deal of support from neighboring countries, and could use Conakry as a base area. Mobilization was mainly successful in the rural areas, thus the core of the military came from such backgrounds.[12] This had great impact on Cabral and the whole of PAIGC as well. Cabral envisioned an agrarian-socialist state with strong democratic foundations. Due to this, elections were held in 1972. Uniquely they tried to legitimize their power before gaining complete independence.[13]

Amilcar Cablar did not live to see the fulfillment of his dream, as there was a successful assassination attempt on him, in 1973. His brother, Luis took his place, and when the country gained independence in 1974 other adjustments were on their way as well. Notably, the PAIGC had to transfer itself from a military organization to a political one.[14] At this point, the main problems that devastate Guinea-Bissau ever since are visible. Assassinations and the actions of the over-powered military have been present at all major political changes.

Luis Cabral established a one-party system, which he attained with imprisonment, torture and outright executions. Meanwhile, rebuilding and reintegration was postponed after the long years of ravaging war, which concluded in starvation for the majority of the population.[15] These developments amounted in a coup d'état by former Prime Minister Joao Bernardo Vieira in 1980.

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[9] Vigh, Henrik: *Navigating Through Terrains of War.* Berghahn Books, 2006. p 40-41
[10] ibid. 43
[11] op.cit. Adebajo. p 115
[12] ibid. p 113
[13] Chabal, Patrik: Political Domination in Africa. CUP Archive, 1986. p 87
[14] ibid. p 84
[15] ibid. p 91

The new president reigned in a similar fashion as his predecessor upon till the first democratic elections in 1994. However, the elections did not mean change, as Vieira had multiple advantages, due to holding the office for many years. The first turning point was 1998, when Vieira accused one of his most important officers for treason. Despite having stopped many alleged coup d'états in this manner, this one proved to be different.[16] The accused officer was Asumane Mane, who was suspected to be selling weapons to the hostile Casamance forces, in Senegal. It was an unusual situation, for Mane and Vieira served side-by-side in the war of independence. Furthermore, the majority thought of Mane as being subservient and lacking political ambition. This emerged into a bloody civil war, throughout which the majority of the armed forces deserted Vieira in favor of Mane. Finally, in 1999 Vieira left the country, and after the new elections Kumba Yala became president.[17] It was the first instance when someone from the opposition held the office (Party of Social Renewal). However, in 2003 the military displaced Yala with another coup, as they considered him to be incompetent in solving the main issues of the country.[18] In the following years, inner conflicts broke out in the military, therefore the next elections were held in 2005, and were won by the ousted former president - Vieira. The results were disputed by the opposition, yet observers found the elections to be free and fair. The long-ruling president could not hold onto his power this time, as he was assassinated in 2009. Afterwards the runner up to the previous elections, Malam Bacai Sanha became president.[19]

The Regional Context

These worrying circumstances are not at all unusual in the region. Moreover, in neighboring countries like Sierra Leone or Liberia, there have been even more devastating civil wars, that lasted longer and claimed more lives.[20] These conflicts are unaware of borders, one hub usually influences all its neighbors.[21] One of the most relevant instances of this, is the "recycling" of arms in the region: when countries and militant groups provide each other with arms, if necessary, thus they transfer them from one conflict to another.[22] This way business connections, and even alliances are established, yet the black market and smugglers are the main beneficiaries. An uncanny mixture develops as the

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[16] op.cit. Adebajo. p 114

[17] ibid. 115

[18] Agbu, Osita: *West Africa's Trouble Spots and the Imperative for Peace-building.* African Books Collective, 2006. p 57

[19] op.cit. Adebajo. p 115

[20] Adebajo, Adekeze és Rashid, Ismail: *West Africa's Security Challenges: Building Peace in a Troubled Region.* Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004. p 266

[21] Besenyő János: Új trend az afrikai békefenntartásban - Sereg Szemle, VII. évfolyam, 2. szám, 2009. április-június 54-62. oldal

[22] Andrés, Amaddo: *WEST AFRICA UNDER ATTACK: DRUGS, ORGANIZED CRIME AND TERRORISM AS THE NEW THREATS TO GLOBAL SECURITY.* UNISCI, 2008. p 209

illicit trade becomes the main instrument for foreign policy, which can also have a grave effect on internal politics, as seen in Guinea-Bissau.

It is not surprising that Guinea-Bissau is not capable of monitoring its own borders, just as many neighboring countries.[23] Alongside the illicit trade of arms, human trafficking is also present to a greater extent and drug-smuggling is emerging at a higher pace than ever. Consequently, all illicit traders use the same routes, while many armed militia, but also some governments profit from this. This provides an adequate source of income, in a rather underprivileged region. Furthermore, coup d'états and civil wars occur in waves,[24] thus the chaotic conditions and demand for illicit merchandise is omnipresent.

Among the tiny countries there is no leader, a void of power transpires. The closest contender for the leading role is Nigeria, a country that for now has been unable to overcome geographic distances. Thus, the colonial era left many weak countries, none of which were able to obtain regional supremacy.[25] This void was to be fulfilled by the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), that has been established in 1975 and encompassed all countries of the region.[26] Yet the organization was founded on economic bases, and since then has not been able to overcome this and become a key political figure.

The Military as the Leading Political Power

The entanglement of the armed forces and politics was evident even in the brief historical overview. However, research concerning this question is almost non-existent due to lack of data.[27] Despite the fact that numerous governments were overthrown by soldiers, they strive to maintain a pretense of democracy. The military is the greatest obstacle for democracy, whilst trying to legitimize itself with elections.[28] Therefore a duality develops, that has its roots in the lack of acceptance of democratic institutions among the populace, and the reigning elite's interest in sustaining this.

Regardless of its unique position, the armed forces of Guinea-Bissau cannot be considered as professional. Despite having a strong hierarchy and mercenary forces, just as in many African countries, they lack loyalty towards their own state.[29] The causes of this can be traced to the weakly functioning

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[23] Addo, Prosper: Cross Border Criminal Activities in West Africa. **KAIPTC** Paper No.2, 2006. http://dspace.cigilibrary.org/jspui/bitstream/123456789/31677/1/no_12.pdf?1. p 2

[24] op.cit. Adebajo et Rashid. p 145

[25] op.cit. Adebajo. p 111

[26] http://www.ecowas.int/ (letöltés ideje: 2013.08.29.)

[27] op.cit. Embaló. p 12

[28] Villalón, Leonardo Alfonso et Von Doepp The Fate of Africa's Democratic Experiments: Elites and Institutions. Indiana University Press, 2005. p 243

[29] Howe, Herbert M.: *Ambiguous Order: Military Forces in African States*. Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001. p 16

state, yet in the end, it is to be concluded, that politics and military remain undivided, the later should not be considered as different entity, a sub-system. Moreover, by supporting a leader, they provide the necessary political stability in the country, thus democracy is ensured by the military, an absurd situation in itself.[30] Oddly, the international community de facto recognized this, when in 2012 a Security Council Resolution called on the armed forces to re-establish democracy and withdraw from politics.[31] In the light of the above mentioned this is an understandable move, yet it remains peculiar to assume that the cause of the problem is going to solve it.

It is clear that since gaining independence, unsettled issues remain a bone of contention. The PAIGC's transfer from military to political organization has not transpired, leaving an ambivalent structure of power, where juntas and assassinations are more important than elections. The military built a "hand-made" state on a democratic skeleton. A failed state to be precise, in which security is anticipated from the armed forces, the same ones that from time-to-time demolish it. However, under such circumstances, the military remains as the only grouping that is capable of leadership, thus achieving a sort of stability amidst chaos. Politics is merely an offshoot of all this, by no means an alternative.

The Military as the Political Arena

Instead of democratic institutions, this unique military-political structure became the conduit for pressing political interest,. Power is concentrated in the hands of the military, therefore the key influencing factors are to be observed through it. However, the army itself is not unitary and its leaders tend to have great dissimilarities. Thus, the institution that is the most important political determinant, developed into the arena of clashes of political interest. In the following, the different interests of groups are going to be presented in this deformed system, while showing how they reflect the true balance of power.

Firstly, it is to be noted that the PAIGC strived to repress all forms of tribalism, which can be considered as the local ethno-politics.[32] This was essential to achieve a uniform country, hence they tried to merge a diverse population due to what tribal traditions turned into a taboo. However, this was only possible in a superficial manner, as even Amilcar Cabral and his soldiers wore a *gris gris*, which is a defensive amulet that represents the belief in syncretism muslim traditions, or at least a fundamental respect towards them. [33]

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[30] op.cit. Villalón. p 252-264
[31] 2048 Határozat (2012) http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/GB%20SRES%202048.pdf (letöltés ideje: 2013. 08. 27)
[32] op.cit. Vigh. p 54
[33] op.cit. Chabal. p 50

During the struggle for independence more social gaps became apparent. The first of these offsets to emerge was between the rural and urban population. The independence movement's basis, the rural population, had growing conflicts of interest with Bissau inhabitants.[34] Yet the PAIGC did not seek to overcome these differences, moreover it wanted to exploit this division. Other sources of contention were the conflicts between different generations, which had a direct effect on the party itself.[35] Thus all demographic differences signify a root cause for conflict, which proved to be an adequate basis for ethnic tension. Before gaining independence, many argued that it is better to stay united under the rule of a colonizer than to witness the chaos after it is gone.[36]

The above mentioned can be clearly observed in the 1998-99 civil war, which also highlights the effects of ethnic clashes. To this point the Muslims, who were mainly comprised of the Fula tribe, remained a marginalized group since gaining independence. When the PAIGC government was overthrown this all changed. For the first time Muslim forces, representing one-third of the population, were able to influence politics. This sudden growth in power gave them a momentum due to what Islamist soldiers gathered a group of young people, whom they considered not to be dressed properly, meaning that they were wearing shorter skirts or modern clothing. They were publicly humiliated and threatened, which amounted to a great outcry from all segments of society. It was a signal that the public is ready to defend diversity unanimously. The soldiers had to apologize, which shows how even the largest groups of Guinea-Bissau have restricted power, as they can only comprise a relative majority.[37]

Kumba Yala was elected president after the civil war, who was the first Balanta to hold such a high position.[38] Therefore, the largest ethnic group seized political power only at this point, meaning that the PAIGC successfully hibernated ethnic tensions, but with the ousting of Vieira this diminished. However, this makes the coup d'état against Yala even more interesting, as the army has a Balanta-like structure.[39] In spite of tribal associations being very important, all smaller groups are interested in repressing the dominant religions or ethnicities, which is a perfect equation for instability.

Throughout the fights of the civil war a militant group called *augentas* emerged, raising the question of child soldiers. It was an army of few thousand, mostly from the Papel tribe. Its aim was to combat the 1999 junta, and was made up of rural child soldiers to a certain extent. Due to the lack of proper

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[34] ibid. p 98
[35] ibid. 51
[36] op.cit. Markus. p 423
[37] ibid. p 417
[38] op.cit. Embaló. p 7
[39] op.cit. Markus. p 423

documentation of enlistment these allegations are not easily proven or falsified. Yet it is to be noted that the youngest prisoner of war was 17 years old.[40] Thus one might say that these are young people, not children, who could be soldiers in the majority of Western countries as well. However, when life expectancy is barely above 50, it is to be assumed that young people comprise a great deal of all armed forces. The allegations concerning the *augentas* cannot be confirmed by looking at the literature, yet they show how in young societies the perpetrators of aggressive actions are hardly adults. Another side-effect that can be observed is how in times of peace some groups are able to marginalize their previous enemies. For instance, the majority of the youth of the Papel tribe is not able to find jobs, making them unable to attain an adequate standard of living, which leads to a deformation in ethno-politics.

It can be stated that amid these deeply delving social gaps, no uniform national identity was able to develop.[41] Despite the fact that none of the groups is capable of overcoming the others, marginalization still occurs. When observing the civil war, it is obvious that the numerous ethnic and religious groups do not use the parliament or the media in their struggle for power. As the depositor of political power, the army and other armed forces are the true instruments of political action not just an ultima ratio.

The Army and Cocaine

The deformed balance of power and the omnipresence of informal channels lead Guinea-Bissau to a state where many from the Western media declare it to be the world's first "narco-state".[42] Now, the ever growing illicit drug trade is a symptom military governance, while at the same time narcotics and the armed forces entangle in a vicious circle. Corruption and the elite sustaining it established a permissive environment, since domestic criminals, and those from abroad enjoy impunity.[43]

To understand the problem, one must consider the global context, as failing governance and corruption do not necessarily conclude in the rise of such a black market. On the other side of the Atlantic Ocean, the USA wages a battle with great effort in Latin-America to stop the production, transport and trade of illicit drugs - whilst being its main market for consumption. Due to these developments it became more and more difficult and expensive to get the

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[40] op.cit. Vigh. p 54

[41] op.cit. Chabal. p 51

[42] Ferret, Grant: *How a tiny West African country became the world's first narco state* http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2008/mar/09/drugstrade. (letöltés ideje: 2013. 08. 29)

[43] Kohnert, Dirk: *Democratization Via Elections in an African 'Narco-State'? The Case of Guinea-Bissau* (February 15, 2010). GIGA Working Paper No 123. http://ssrn.com/abstract=1553138 orhttp://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1553138, p 3. (letöltés ideje: 2013. 08. 29)

narcotics to its destination, which ultimately shifted the attention of drug cartels towards Europe, where more profit awaited on an untapped market.[44] Meanwhile West-Africa proved to be an attractive route, as in addition to the geographic proximity, Nigerian criminals have already established transit-systems during the 1990's. They smuggled heroin to the West, consequently having experience in penetrating Fortress Europe. These phenomena had a cultural reflection in Guinea-Bissau as it constitutes a lingual community with two key areas for smuggling, namely Brazil and Portugal.[45]

In 2007 alone, 635 kg of cocaine was seized in Guine-Bissau. However, the 350 km long diffused coastline, with numerous fishing ships remains uncontrollable, therefore it can be assumed that larger quantities enter the country without major disruptions.[46] From here cocaine is transported via ships or with the intercession of the Tuareg via Mali to Europe.[47] Also, it is to be noted that for the nouveau riche of West-Africa, who derive their wealth from the shadow economy, the trade of cocaine is becoming chic. Thus the elite of Bissau follows its counterparts in Ghana and Nigeria. [48]

Aside from weak institutions and the ineptitude of the police, poverty creates a relatively cheap way of corruption for the well-established Latin-American, mainly Colombian traders.[49] This can be credited to the army, which itself is gravely involved in the drug trade. Portuguese media reported that Vieira's return in 2005 was due to an agreement with the top-ranking military officers, which included the dismissal of the army's involvement in the illicit trade and the lack of persecution for the traders.[50] Evidence exists, which proves that Chief of Staff, General Antonai Injai participated in arms and drugs smuggling on a larger scale.[51] Therefore the involvement of the army is not just verified, it is clear that these dealings are perpetrated under its auspices.

Guinea-Bissau is an ideal transit-country not just because of its location but also the corrupted and weak institutions of government. It is hard to verify if

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[44] UNODC(2007),COCAINE TRAFFICKING IN WEST AFRICA- The threat to stability and development (with special reference to Guinea-Bissau),p 3. Available at: http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-andanalysis/west_africa_cocaine_report_2007-12_en.pdf. (letöltés ideje: 2013. 08. 28)

[45] op.cit. UNODC. p 12

[46] EU-SSR-GUINEA-BISSAU http://consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/missionPress/files/100930%20FACTSHEET%20EU%20SSR%20Guinea-Bissau%20-%20version%2012_EN.pdf. p 1 (letöltés ideje: 2013. 08. 29)

[47] Besenyő János: Háború Európa előterében: a Mali krízis - Sereg Szemle, XI. évfolyam, 1. szám, 2013. január-március 105-134. oldal

[48] Akyeampong, E. (2005) *Diaspora and drug trafficking in West Africa: A case study of Ghana.* African Affairs 104, Nr. 416 (1. July).p 429–447

[49] op.cit. Babyee. p 4

[50] ibid. p 11

[51] http://www.nytimes.com/2013/04/19/world/africa/us-indicts-guinea-bissaus-military-leader-on-drug-charges.html?_r=0 (letöltés ideje: 2013. 08. 27)

drug kingpins rule the country with the help of the army, yet it is clear that this phenomenon signals grave dangers. the growing illicit drug trade indicates that the military is over-powered, whilst undermining democracy and causing economic downfall. Through the informal channels, high-ranking leaders are involved, from politics and the army alike. This ensures the continuation of illicit trading on a broad-spectrum basis. Also, demand is a key ingredient in all of this, which makes EU member states being directly connected to the problem. Therefore, the devastated country presents a problem for the EU, while the high-end narcotics consumers of the West manifest in the same manner for Guinea-Bissau.

The Aim of the EU Mission and its Structure

Guinea-Bissau poses as threat to security not only in the region but for Europe as well, with the illicit drug trade. To tackle the problem, the EU launched a Security Sector Reform (SSR) mission in 2008 under the framework of the Common Foreign and Security Policy.[52]They strived to achieve long-term political stability, restructure the army and reduce its power. From this, it is clear that EU experts were able to locate the source of the problem and were thinking in a long-lasting and sustainable solution. The task was to implement the national SSR strategy, which included the reduction of personnel in armed forces and police while rebuilding them.[53] With decision 2008/112/CFSP the Council commenced the mission as a joint action, which was late prolonged in 2010.[54]

The EU SSR mission was present as an advisory body, that helped Guinea-Bissau's authorities and legislature to adopt a comprehensive set of acts to reform the army, the police and jurisdiction.[55] Still it lacked any executive power, thus the success of the mission depended greatly on the receiving country's institutions. Taking into account that the armed forces and the police were involved in the drug trade such accomplishments were jeopardized at an early stage.[56] Thus despite tracing the problem properly, those on the ground were not empowered to an adequate level and the mission could only achieve modest results. The European Development Fund also appeared as a political instrument, with which they supported the reintegration of former soldiers and the rebuilding of infrastructure.[57] The EDF also co-financed areas that were

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[52] Bloching, Sebastian: *EU SSR Guinea-Bissau: Lessons* Identified in European Security Review, No. 52, November 2010. p 1
[53] Bello, Ola: *The EU's approach to fragility in Guinea Bissau: Between Ambition and Coherence*. http://www.fride.org/download/PB_113_Guinea_Bissau.pdf. p 1 (letöltés ideje: 2013. 08. 29)
[54] http://www.eeas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eu-ssr-guinea-bissau/ (letöltés ideje: 2013. 08. 29)
[55] op.cit. Bello. p 2
[56] op.cit. Bloching. p 2
[57] ibid. p 3

connected to the EU SSR mission. However, the aid faced a similar problem to the SSR mission: the EU could not influence directly how it is spent.

Cooperation Between Member States and with Others

From an operational point of view, the EU mission was successful. The Council, the Commission and member states worked together under the aegis of CFSP. Yet satisfying intra-EU coordination and even the attained legal entity of the organization was no insurance for a larger scale realization of goals.[58] However, it can be observed that member states and EU institutions established a form of collaboration that was truly a joint action against a common threat. Although, one must bear in mind that Guinea-Bissau does not represent a major area of interest for any member state, therefore consensus was achieved more easily.

For the EU, as a supra-national organization, all other similar groupings could be considered as natural allies. Despite good inner cooperation, this cannot be stated in the case of the EU SSR mission. The UN and EU have very similar goals in the region, conversely they lacked mutual effort, in addition to which they did not even mention the work of the other. Tension grew between the organizations in the instance of General Na Tchuto, who played a dubious role in the latest coup d'etat and received asylum on UN premises.[59] On the other hand, the leader of the EU mission questioned the work of UNODC and many other, when he stated that illicit drugs do not represent a greater problem in Guinea-Bissau.[60] Thus these two were working in a parallel manner and despite not undermining each others work, it can be acknowledged with certainty that they missed out on numerous chances of cooperation. By this, the main disadvantages were that of Guinea-Bissau.

To further add to the chaos amongst the international community, when the EU postponed its mission due to dismay concerning democracy, the IMF and World Bank continued to finance the governments.[61] Such uncoordinated action damaged the reputation and effectiveness of all present organizations, not to mention their credibility. Further detrimental to the situation, the only regional organization, the already mentioned ECOWAS, was unable to produce any positive results. Its peacekeeping mission in Guinea-Bissau was the first ever on lusophone territory. However, it also faced great financial difficulties and could

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[58] op.cit. Bloching. p 4
[59] ibid. p 4
[60] op.cit. Bello. p 2
[61] ibid. p 3

only sponsor one-third of the needed staff.[62] For the ECOWAS, crisis like this poses as an unsolvable issue, since nearly all member states experience similar difficulties.[63] Eventually, no organization is able to deal with the issues of security, nor are they capable of establishing a coherent cooperation. Thus, the EU successfully overcame the boundaries of its member states, but has failed to do so with strategic allies.

The End of the Mission

The EU SSR mission was not capable of becoming a key factor in security policy, which can be attributed to the lack of interest of member states, aside from the previous colonizer, Portugal.[64] When in 2010 the army perpetrated another coup d'etat, the EU had insufficient political background to intimidate by threatening to withdraw its CFSP mission, if democratic order was not restored. The ultimatum was disregarded to full extent by the receiving country, therefore the EU had to leave, if it were to maintain its credibility. With this more then 120 million euros of aid was frozen, only humanitarian aid was left to continue.[65] In addition to this, in 2012 the EU resigned from a fisheries agreement, as it did not see its citizens' security assured.[66] Henceforth, the EU has completely withdrawn from the country, without leaving any possible point of reconnection. Guinea-Bissau appears to be of little importance, thus member states lean towards such effortless solutions.

A scrutiny commission was established from the side of the British House of Commons concerning the mission. It was concluded that the EU criteria were rather unrealistic many times, and whilst setting deadlines, disregarded numerous factors. Furthermore the mission ignored the entanglement of the army and government, and implored demands from civilian authorities, when they clearly lacked power.[67] With the acceptance of cooperation from the side of local authorities, no major steps were taken forward. Member states which sent the military and policing personnel were not truthfully interested in solving the issues, while the only properly functioning level, the EU, lacked political empowerment. These tendencies were enhanced by the gap between EU and other organizations. Thus the mission was a good source of experience, yet it did not succeed in achieving any of its aims for it lacked a more pragmatic and realistic approach. This was all proven by the successful coup of 2010, which

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[62] Kabia, John M.: *Humanitarian Intervention and Conflict Resolution in West Africa: From ECOMOG to ECOMIL.* Ashgate Publishing, 2009. p 137-139
[63] op.cit. Bello. p 6
[64] op.cit. Bloching. p 6
[65] op.cit. Bello. p 2
[66] http://www.e-ir.info/2012/10/01/realigning-interests-the-lukewarm-response-from-the-international-community-to-the-crises-in-guinea-bissau/ (letöltés ideje: 2013. 08. 29)
[67] op.cit. Bello. p 3

transpired despite the presence of the international community. Since then, the country remains unstable and drug trade continues to rise.

Conclusions

Guinea-Bissau is a failed state, leaving voids of power on multiple levels. The country lingers in constant uncertainty, while no regional or global power is capable or interested in establishing stability. Its under-developed economy and the lack of natural resources marginalize the country. The only force able to achieve a point of certainty is the army, that traditionally holds on to its ruling position. Therefore, an unclear system of informal channels emerged, where groups try to put forward their interest, and tend to solve issues with arms. It serves as a good indicator, that the Balanta tribe vowed recently to support the democratic institutions, while they have been dominant in the army since the beginning. Thus generals are the important figures and not the members of parliament.

Lately, even the EU recognized that Guinea-Bissau cannot be dismissed as merely a failed state. The Security Sector Reform of the EU mission targeted the main obstacles to the rule of law, yet it awaited changes from those causing the problem, with the addition of reducing its numbers and payment as well. However, it failed to succeed in substantial lobbying, which first lead to stagnation and later disbandment. Despite the accomplishments of intra-EU relations, it was not extended to a larger scale. This could be considered as a luxury from the side of international missions, which were not present in great numbers and nearly all of them lacked the needed financial background. Coordinated cooperation would have had significant effects and should have been statutory as in theory the IMF, the ECOWAS, the UN and the EU strive to achieve the same goals. However, international players rivaled each other, further aggravating the chaos.

Africa is a continent of great importance for the EU, yet if it is to act successfully in the region, European analogies (Kosovo or the West-Balkans) should not be used, and functioning democratic institutions are not to be expected. This concludes into a moral dilemma, as the EU is founded on the principles of rule of law and democracy. However, for a pragmatic approach, it is necessary to acknowledge these facts. In the cases of numerous African countries a question emerges: what is to be done until they achieve democracy? Therefore, political rationality dictates that the EU should adhere to its principles and not always „allowing" to all countries to democratize themselves. The emergence of drug cartels shows how time and means are scarce for self-reliantly establishing a democracy. Those global powers that are not interested in the types of government connect to the corrupt states more easily. Thus, the

EU reached a crossroads: it must decide if it is going to consider Africa as its own "backyard" (as does the USA with the southern part of the continent) or is willing to use dubious instruments to contend with China and other aspirant countries or remains on the current path, awaiting the benevolence of those currently holding power. Meanwhile, if the problem of illicit drug trade stays unsolved, Europe is going to get more directly involved in the crisis.

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Lt. MÁRK MATUSZ

POTENTIAL APPLIACATION OF THE HUMAN RESOURCE MANAGEMENT APPROACH IN THE HUNGARIAN DEFENSE FORCES

Abstract:

In the past decades, the value of manpower, more specifically the human factor has been revalued. The basic task of the human resource management is to create the right balance, to harmonize the employee's ability, knowledge and motivation with the requirements of the job. To keep this balance, it requires efforts from the employee and the employer as well.
The structure of the Hungarian Defense Forces significantly differs from the organizations functioning in the private sector. According to this, the human strategic issues are also different. The human strategy defines the basic rules and actions, which ensures that there are such available committed personnel who are able to adapt to the different circumstances, are properly trained and qualified to do the needed tasks in the Hungarian Defense Forces.

Key words: - Human resource management, Employee, Balance, Hungarian Defence Forces, Human strategy, Job requirements, Manpower

The Hungarian Defense Forces (HDF) with its 29[1] thousand employees is constantly facing more and more challenges on the labor market. On the one hand, it has to retain its staff from the appealing offers of other employers on the market and on the other hand, it has to make itself attractive for the people who are imagining their future in the military.

In my dissertation, first I will present the human resource management, then, I will examine the HR strategy of the Hungarian Defense Forces. After these, I will introduce three HR theories and analyze the possibility of using them in the Ministry of Defense. At the end, I will draw conclusions.

The human resource management

In the past decades, the value of manpower, more specifically the human factor has been revalued. "The key to success is the personal element according to Bakacsi (1996). Because of the special nature and characteristic, the manpower can not be compared to any other kind of production resources like money, production equipment, energy or information. The manpower plays a

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[1] The maximum headcount of the HDF is 29 700 - 35/2013 (V.16.) regulation of the parilament

significant role also for the reason that all the other resources can not be used and run efficiently without humans. It is useless to have any resource without the participation of man, because it remains inactive, not capable of working, so the planning and the execution of operations without it are impossible.[2]"

Human resource management means all the activities and leadership methods which – in any organization – deal with the selection of manpower, the development and measurement of human performance, as well as with career management. So the human resource is reasonably and efficiently used to achieve the personal and organization goals.[3]

The basic task of human resource management

The basic task of the human resource management is to create the right balance, to harmonize the employee's ability, knowledge, and motivation with the requirements of the job. The most beneficial situation arises when the employee's abilities or the job requirements are the same, which means that the condition of the productive work is provided, and both sides are pleased. To keep this balance requires efforts from the employee and form the employer as well.[4]

The goals of human resource management

The long-term goal of every organization, business is to ensure its subsistence and growth. Goals of the human resource management are (among others) the following[5]:
- to help to achieve the goals of the organization,
- to use efficiently the manpower's ability,
- to preserve the employees' satisfaction,
- to transmit the policy of human resource management,
- to keep an appropriate manpower in order to improve the quality of work.

Achievements of human resource management

In case the balance between the person and the job is successfully ensured, a circle of the efficient employment can be established.

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[2] http://miau.gau.hu/avir/intranet/debrecen_hallgatoi/tananyagok/jegyzet/06-Emberi_eroforras_gazdalkodas.pdf p. 7.
[3] Hajós László Berde Csaba - EMBERI ERŐFORRÁS GAZDÁLKODÁS, p. 8-9.
[4] Dr. Gyökér Irén - Dr. Finna Henrietta - Krajcsák Zoltán - EMBERI ERŐFORRÁS MENEDZSMENT
[5] http://miau.gau.hu/avir/intranet/debrecen_hallgatoi/tananyagok/jegyzet/06-Emberi_eroforras_gazdalkodas.pdf

It is a basic requirement for any organization to have the right quantity and quality of manpower to assure a resultful functioning.

In case the proper manpower is available, the performance will be the most important aspect. The performance of the manpower is directly proportional to the success of the business.

The basic requirement for an efficient work is to keep in any position the right manpower. The presence of motivated manpower is beneficial for the organization, because the pleased employee stays loyal to the company and does his job well and with enthusiasm.

The integration and coordination of the above factors constitute an important task for the human resource management in supporting the activity of the organization.

The importance of human resource management

The harmonization of the individual goals of the employee and the goals of the organization is necessary, because only in this case can the strategic mission of the organization come true. The human resource has a significant importance for the organization, since there is no significant activity that can be accomplished without manpower. Its special nature comes from the fact that – dislike other resources – it can control its own activity. This feature distinguishes the HR from the other sources of the company. The human resource management has to be in harmony with the structure of the organization.

The activities of the HR management[6]

- *Human resources planning:* It means the predestination of the quality and the quantity of employees and the determination of those actions that guarantee the appropriate manpower.
- *Job analyzes*: It ensures the definition of the needed requirements for the successful work (this contains the circumstances of the work and also the needed requirements).
- *Recruitment and selection*: The goal of this task is to find the most appropriate employee for the given job. There are two methods to do so: the rearrangement of the inner resources or the external enrolment. The former has the advantage for both the organization and the

[6]Dr. Gyökér Irén - Dr. Finna Henrietta - Krajcsák Zoltán - EMBERI ERŐFORRÁS MENEDZSMENT

employee, considering that on the one hand it fills the given position with an experienced man, who already knows the organization and on the other hand, it generally ensures also his promotion, so it motivates the "old" employee.

In the case of the external enrolment, it is needed for the company to develop a convenient method for selecting the most suitable employees.

Performance assessment: It represents a determined periodical account, in which the achievements are assessed from more aspects, which can serve as a base for ensuring future development or the necessary changes.

- *Manpower development and career planning:* In the framework of this, the employee has to be well-prepared for his work. During the career planning, the employee's mobility within the organization shall be predicted.

- *Salary, bonus*: The development of an appropriate inspirational system is one of the most difficult tasks. It is almost impossible to find the best balance between the salary that motivates the person and the financial burden of the organization.

- *Discipline and leaving the company:* At a workplace, there can be many conflicts. If we cannot reconcile the persons taking part in the conflict, we have to dismiss them.

- *Labor relations:* For setting the disputes between the employer and the employee a negotiation forum has to be set up, where there is a possibility to form some regulations for the everyday life. These regulations later can serve as a base for the parties' future behavior.

The Hungarian Defense Forces as an employer

The HDF is an armed governmental organization under civil control that works in a system of subordination. In peace time, it is based on voluntary service. In preventive defensive and emergency status, it is based on voluntary and compulsory military service. [7]

The HDF structure depends on several external factors, such as the expectations set by the country's leading organizations, economics, or by the actual security policy issues. In accordance with the regulation of the Hungarian Constitution, the Defense Law defines the construction of the organization.

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[7] A Magyar Honvédség – www.kormany.hu/hu/hovedelmi-miniszterium/honved-vezerkar/magyar-honvedseg

According to this, the several parts of the Hungarian Defense Forces can be classified in three categories: organizations being in subordinational relationship; organizations belonging to the HDF, but not subordinated to it; and the ones that are subordinated to the Ministry of Defense. These organizations differ from each other in their tasks within the HDF. The leading and managing tasks are carried out by the General Staff and the Ministry of Defense. It is the troops that are responsible for the military functions, while the leading organization executes the administrative work.

Considering the above mentioned distribution of work, it is visible that the structure of the Hungarian Defense Forces significantly differs from the organizations functioning in the private sector. According to this, the human strategic issues are also different. Besides, it has to be other issues like the national military strategy that must be taken into accout, when defining the human matters.

The human strategy of the Hungarian Defense Forces[8]

The human strategy defines the basic rules and actions, which ensures that the HDF has at its disposal committed personnel that are motivated, able to adapt to the different circumstances, properly trained and qualified to do the needed tasks.

The new human strategy is based on the HDF's actual situation and on its guidance for defense planning, the main pillars of which are the following:
- Predictable and attractive military career
- Job requirements
- Personal development
- Compensation system

Between the above mentioned points the connection is the human resource management and the integrated information system.

The new human resource strategy ensures for the professional military staff a secure life, while for the contracted staff it provides a predictable career, which contains also a system that ensures that – after the expiration of the contract – the the soldiers will be integrated into the civil labor market.

Both the classical and the special military career paths have been defined. The latter refers to to such special knowledges that can be only obtained outside the military training. These careers are likely to require a contracted relationship.

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8 79/2011. (VII.29.) HM utasítás – A Magyar Honvédség humánstratégiája a 2012-2021. közötti időszakra, p. 3.

The new human resource strategy determines the measurement of performance, so the regular assessment of the soldier's performance has become a fundamental element of the career path. Its goal is to increase the performance, improve the selection of the right person, ensure the merited promotion and support the development.

The HDF's human strategy cointains the following tasks that partially are similar to the human activities pursued in the private sector:

- *Planning of the human resources:* A good example for this is the "Military School" program (Katonasuli program). The Military School program has two compulsory subjects: defense fundamental knowledges and basic military knowledges. The students can make maturity examination from these subjects, which means plus points during their later studies. The Military School plays an important role in and constitutes an integral part of the HR strategy of the HDF. The school program may be considered as a base for further military studies. Thus, if someone sympathizes with the military profession, he can choose the professional military career.

- *Job analysis, job descriptions*: The definition of the job requirements contributes to the efficient function of the organization. In case the requirements for the job are defined accurately in details, there is a bigger chance to choose the appropriate person. Considering the hierarchy of military positions, certain jobs can be built upon each other. The organization's requirements for the several positions constitute the base of the human resource management In order to determine or describe precisely the job, it is necessary to introduce the job analysis and the job assessment. The former defines the tasks, requirements, expectations and specifications for the given job, while the latter defines the job's importance within the organization, and it helps to set up the hierarchy among the positions.

- *Recruitment and selection:* Tendering an application to the HDF across the recruiter office usually takes 2-6 months. This slow administration in certain cases deters the applicant and he withdraws his application.

- *Performance assessment, qualification*: The measurement of performance is based on the yearly achievement estimation and on the soldier's personal record. The former must be done yearly, and in case of a convenient result, it can entitle the soldier to ask for his

qualification. The qualification contains the estimation of his general military knowledge and expertise, the measurement of his compliance with the requirements for his job. The qualification happens on the initiative of the soldier, and his promotion and selection for participation in development programs – which is connected with his career path – depend on the record prepared about him.

- *Manpower development, career planning*: The staff development covers the complete military career model, and it extends from the entry till the service leaving period. Its basis is the objective assessment on the soldier's personality and the plan for his efficient training and the implementation of this plan.

It is important for the HDS to launch trainings only for military professions, considering that in case of other professions; it is much more economical and simpler to employ those, who have already participated in some civil education.

In favor of the harmonization of the several civil service careers and in order to ensure the passage through these careers, the public administration has to be a part of the sondiers' education.

- *Salary, bonus*: The compensation and bonus system of the Hungarian Defense Forces is multiple; it contains the salary-like allowance, the other allowances, financial supports, certain elements of the rewarding system and the organization's bonuses.

The rewarding system has to grant the preservation of the staff's motivation. Therefore, there is a need for developing such a motivation system for the contracted staff that appreciates the accomplished service period and motivates the soldier to sign a new contract. It is necessary to mention in this circle also the non-financial rewards, which can be given for outstanding persistence and for high level service.

There is also another fringe benefit, the housing allocation system which supports the HDF's interests.

- *Discipline, leaving the HDF*: The member of the staff who has to leave because of dispensation from service can participate – if certain conditions can be applicable to the soldier – in the special manpower transfer program and he will get a job in the civil service sphere.

In case of not meeting the required conditions or if he has been dismissed for his inaptitude, his further employment is not possible. It is necessary to underline in this connection that a disposability and an easy-service system have been introduced before the retirement of a number of soldiers.

Hopeful HR strategies and the possibility of its application in the Hungarian Defense Forces

Viral Change[TM 9]

This is a special, new method in the world of human resource management. Its essence is that it gives an alternative way to the slow, painful and unsuccessful organizational changes. Its creator is a psychiatrist, Leonardo Herrero.

As its name shows, the essence of the Viral Change[TM,] is that certain behaviors can spread only amongst a few number of people, who later on "infects" the whole organization with the new behavior across their social connections. By contrast, the ordinary management of changes follows a linear model aimed at reaching significant changes, which method needs numerous, vertical communication campaigns.

The basis of the new method is that the organization and the individual act on several levels in the same time. The behavior constitutes the basis of these levels. The real change can be materialized only if it appears first at the level of behavior and after that, it can affect or "infact" also deeper levels. Since the 80% of organizational connections belongs to the 20% of the employees, the changes occur in the same time but in several places and start from the bottom and go to up, exercizing a much bigger impact than the centralized, hierarchical procedures. Thus, the nexus between the employees, the informal leaders, or the benchmark-persons can play much bigger role than the formal leaders.

In this case, the employees will percive the change as their own and not as a one that was achieved by the order of the leadership.

All the above mentioned ideas are contained in the Hungarian Defense Forces' human resource strategy: the red tape in the HR management must be reduced by the decentralization of the tasks that don't require a high-level decision and by the delegation of the administrative tasks based on those decisions that have been taken by the leadership.

Within the Hungarian Defense Forces, the method of the Viral Change[TM] could be used for introducing new ideas, or for helping the flow of information, for measuring the effect of some new initiations and actions. This process could contain also the monitoring of employees, which could provide an orientation point for some decisions that call for sharp changes in some units or in the

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9 www.hrblog.hu/krauthammer/2013/02/04/viral-change-tamad-virosos-valtozas/

whole organization.

In the Hungarian Defense Forces, the introduction of the rank of Chief Master Sergeant System is effectively working. The commanders should think over this method, thus after of their eventual divisive decisions, all the employees could side with them not only in their actions, but in their way of thinking, thanks to the effectiveness of the chief master sergeants.

Coaching approach

This method's goal is to develop a proactive, co operational culture within the organization, instead of the momentary or ad hoc solutions. Thus, it highlights the leaders' skills that focus on the motivation of the given employees. Its goal is to strengthen the inner motivation of the employees. In such a positive environment, the employees take it for granted to accept and execute the orders.

The coacher will leave it to the employees to take those decisions that need only lower levels, and the experience of the employees is sufficient for doing so. It assumes that the leader won't hang on by the skin on his teeth that he knows everything better. It means that all the questions, problems have to be handled at a proportional level, not necessarily by the highest leader.

It is important to know that only those employees can be coached who have already reached a certain level. In the case of the newly engaged colleagues, this method cannot be used.

Since the HDF's organizational construction is an authoritive system, the coaching approach could be used maximum at the level of heads of department, or battalion commanders. Within the framework of the HDF, it is is typical that the HR problems – because of the special regulations imposed on the employees – can not be easily handled. It means that after the employees have joined the HDF – be them soldiers or civilians – the HDF cannot offer them a concrete motivation system, thus the employees perform their duties by their own inner motivations. The organization doesn't draw a distinction between those who fulfill their tasks at the highest level or those who do only a very modest work. The Hungarian Defense Forces' HR strategy has two methods to eliminate this symptom: first of all in the framework of the achievement estimation, it defines that the number of the objective elements in the assessment of employees should be increased, thus making the achievements in the same and one position really comparable. The other one is the system of rewards and recompenses. I am of the opinion that if we wish to implement efficiently both objectives, we need to achive morale changes inside the organization.

"Fight for the talented"

Those employees, who are said also by the employers to be gifted, highly prepared and motivated, sometimes face their own urge to start their career as a desire. This is such a fact that a long-term and human orientated HR strategy has to take into consideration.

The Deloite Consulting ltd. introduced an individual career planning program for its different-status employees. The novelty in this very adventurous initiation is that it compels the employee to express his own opinion in the framework of target-setting conversations. The employees have the chance to undertake more duties (dial up), if they wanted to concentrate on their own career. But if they have some symptoms of burn-out, they can decide to have much more free time at the expense of their duties (dial down).

In the year, when this method was introduced, the satisfaction among the employees rose by 25%. It is worth paying great attention to the person, because it returns with interest, since the employee, who has been disencumbered from the too heavy work, can relax and recover in his comfort zone. By this way, after the bilaterally defined relaxing period, the organization can gain a newly re-energized person.

To introduce this method within the Hungarian Defense Forces, it is only a matter of will, because after creating an appropriate background law, it could be used also in the case of those specialists, who are in key positions and could not be easily replaced.

Conclusion

What would the Hungarian Defense Forces gain with the application of the abovementioned three HR strategies?

The concrete benefit would be reflected in the reduction of the burn out processes of the key senior leaders.

The application of the Viral Change^{TM} could stimulate the soldiers to voluntarily accept and understand even the less popular commander's orders, and it would make it possible for the commander to monitor the junior staff's opinion. The commander could get support from his subordinated soldiers to convincing his direct leaders about those matters that had already been understood and accepted by his personnel. Thus, the changes in the attitude and the implementation of some tasks could be started with the support of the medium-level leaders as well. This persuasion and argument circle could be

reduced by the given leader, so the involved stress and time could be saved.

With the application of the coaching approach, those commanders who are willing and able to give over some aspects of their decision authority – to their prepared and competent deputies – can gain time and energy. This positive outcome could immediately be very profitable for the commanders, since they could use their working hours more efficiently, and could dedicate more time to the important tasks. This strategy of the commander would motivate also the deputy commander staff, because the partial transfer of his authority would foster trust and mediate the will of awarding those soldiers who decently perform their duties.

The application of the "Fight for the talented" method could be initiated only by the highest leaders, in the case of the Hungarian Defense Forces, by the Minister, with the support of the Chief of the General Staff. For the method to be successful, it is necessary to define and select the key positions within the HDF and the important soldiers suitable to be the subject to this method. If this initiative proves to be functional in the long term, the method could be introduced also at lower military levels. This way of thinking can be already felt in the HDF, but the method has not been named and officially introduced yet. For example, in some cases the superior commander sends the exhausted soldier to fill a NATO or other missions' post, under "the pretext" to have some fresh air and gain new experiences.

All the above mentioned three methods can be inserted into the human resource management. The achievement of the collective implementation of these three methods could be that the military leadership could easily convince the medium-level and the higher leaders, or the junior personnel that they are important and the Hungarian Defense Forces rely on them.

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JEWISH MILITARY CHAPLAINS IN THE AUSTRO-HUNGARIAN ARMED FORCES DURING WORLD WAR I.

Abstract:

Most armed forces of the world do employ military chaplains to increase the willingness of the troops, and to provide the necessary spiritual support on the battlefield or even during the peacetime service. Austria-Hungary acted likewise by setting up its own system, which had been proven to be extremely useful during World War I. It is not commonly known, but a large number of Jewish soldiers were enlisted in the different armed forces of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, and they were supported by field rabbis from the very beginning of the conflict. In my study I would like to provide a resume of this structure and offer an insight into the very important work conducted by military chaplains – rabbis, in this particular case – during the wars.

Keywords: military chaplaincy, rabbi, World War I. Jewish soldiers, spiritual support, Austria-Hungary

There is an old saying; in the middle of a battle, everybody finds his own way to God, no matter which religion he belongs to. In this regard, there is no difference between János Kovács, who is asking the Lord to forgive his sins, and Salamon Schwartz, who is praying for *Adonai Tzevaot*[1]. They were equal in the trenches, and in the end, they both believed in one god as well.

Field-Marshall Archduke Joseph August[2] wrote to Miksa Szabolcsi, editor of the Jewish-Hungarian periodical *Egyenlőség*[3]: *"I have seen myself that many*

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[1] Adonai Tzevaot (hebrew) is one of the many name the Bible uses when it refers to God; literally it means *Lord of the Armies.*

[2] Joseph August Viktor Klemens Maria von Habsburg-Lothringen, Archduke of Austria, Royal Prince of Hungary and Bohemia (9 August 1872 – 6 July 1962) was one of most acknowledged commanders of the austro-hungarian armed forces for during the war; he was a short period head of state of Hungary. He was the eldest son of Archduke Joseph Karl of Austria (1833–1905) and his wife Princess Clotilde of Saxe-Coburg-Gotha (1846–1927). Joseph August's grandfather had been Palatine Joseph of Hungary (1776–1847), Palatine and Viceroy of Hungary, a younger son of Emperor Leopold II.

[3] Egyenlőség (*Equality*) was a hungarian weekly launched on 5. November 1882 by Mór Bogdányi. It was

of the finest heroes are Hungarian Jews..[4]." Hungarian Jewry definitely took part in the Great War, and they were enlisted en masse into the units of the Imperial and Royal Armed Forces, as well as the Royal Hungarian Honvéd Army. Just as any other Christian or Muslim soldier, they too, needed spiritual assistance while serving. During peacetime, no military rabbis were officially employed by the armed forces of Austria-Hungary, but each garrison kept in contact with the local rabbis, and whatever support was necessary was provided by the nearby Jewish communities. When the war broke out, this comfortable solution was no longer adequate, as the army needed to provide spiritual leadership for their Jewish soldiers on the frontlines.

The presence of rabbis in Austria-Hungary's military dates back to the 1848-1849 War of Independence. Around eighteen-thousand Jews fought in the Hungarian Honvéd Army, and were looked after by local rabbis, who also volunteered to join the army, as none was officially commissioned. Rabbi Leopold Löw is generally considered to be the first field rabbi, but he never received an official appointment[5]; the one and only officially commissioned field-rabbi was Ignác Einhorn, who was appointed by General György Klapka, Commander of the Fortress of Komárom, on the 11th of September, 1849[6]. After the fall of that uprising, Hungarian Jews were enlisted to the Imperial Army, and their needs were once again supported by local civilian rabbis.

This system remained so until the beginning of the First World War, although serious changes were implemented in the structure of the military chaplaincy after 1867. The territory of Austria-Hungary was divided into seventeen military districts, each district being one army corps. Later, the military districts of Upper Austria and Pétervárad were abolished, and the dual-monarchy consisted of only fifteen military districts, until an additional one was added, after the occupation of Bosnia and Herzegovina. A military chaplain was appointed to each district, or to each army corps, and the sixteen military

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edited from 1884 by Miksa Szabolcsi (1857-1915) and acquired by him in 1886. Two decades afterwards (1915) he will be succeeded by his son Lajos. It began publication in midst of the Tiszaeszlár ritual murder trial in response to the wave of antisemitism that swept Hungary and quickly became the most influential and longest lasting Jewish periodical in Hungary, appearing until 1938. By and large Egyenlőség reflected the assimilationist views of Neologue Jews who advocated mild religious reforms, although at times it could be critical of Neologue establishment. In any case it supported the jews to remain jews and follow the traditions, but be faithful and loyal hungarians at the same time.

4 Egyenlőség, 24/01/1915, p. 2.
5 Borovi, J.: A tábori lelkészet Magyarországon, p. 64.
6 Zakar, P.: A magyar hadsereg tábori lelkészei 1848-49-ben, p. 65.

chaplains and one full-time field-mufti were headed by an apostolic field-vicar[7]. At the time of war, he was the leader of the chaplains of the national armies as well, however, a separate chaplaincy (*Magyar Királyi Honvédlelkészet*) was created for the Royal Hungarian *Honvéd* Army, and another one for the Austrian *k. k. Landwehr* as well. The Roman Catholic apostolic field-vicar – practically a bishop – was the commander-in-chief of the whole structure, and commanded the protestant chaplains, the field-muftis, and the field-rabbis as well. After 1849, until 1914, there were no officially appointed field-rabbis in the active service at all, except for the short period during the wars in 1866, when, as to the orders of the Emperor, two rabbis were nominated as *Feldprediger* - field-preachers to the Northern and Southern fronts[8].

In case of Hungary, according to the *Law of the Armed Forces*[9], every rabbi, graduating from the rabbinical seminary of Budapest or Pozsony, was allowed to apply for field-rabbi in reserve status, if they met the following qualifications:

· Possessed an at least *cum laude* level degree
· Were younger than forty years of age
· Led a morally unquestionable life
· Had Hungarian citizenship and good command of Hungarian language
· Were physically fit
· Served at least three years of active duty as a civilian rabbi

In July 1914, there were eleven field-rabbis in reserve within the Royal Hungarian Honvédség, and were called to active duty immediately at the beginning of the war. The number later increased, and during the 1914–1918 conflict, a total of eighteen rabbis served within the Honvédség (although there were never more than thirteen serving at one time[10]).

The Imperial and Royal Army was a much bigger than the Honvéd Army, so the *KuK Israelitische Militaerseelsorge* (Imperial and Royal Israelite Military

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7 Borovi, J.: *op. cit.* p. 82.

8 Melichár, K.: A katonai lelkészet az Osztrák-Magyar Monarchia közös hadseregében és a honvédségnél, p.51.

9 1889. VI. tc. /Véderőtörvény/, §. 29, section 2.

10 The best source to follow up the changes and the actual rabbis in service is the yearbook /*Schematismus*/ of Royal Hungarian Honvéd Army and the *K. u. K. Heer* and the *Kriegsmarine*; these were regularly issued during the war in1914-1918 as well.

Chaplaincy) naturally needed more rabbis. At the beginning of the WW I., there were only nine field-rabbis in reserve belonging to the army, but this number was later increased. The army also needed so-called assistant field-rabbis (enlisted civilian rabbis without previous field-rabbi in reserve status), and finally in 1918 there were twenty appointed field-rabbis, and 57 + 1[11] assistant field-rabbis in the Imperial and Royal Army, making a total of ninety-six field-rabbis serving with the Austro-Hungarian armed forces during the war. All of them received 9th grade officer status[12], making them equivalent to captains, however, the rank insignia was not worn on their collars in the form of three golden stars, but rather on their sleeves in the form of three golden stripes[13].

Field-rabbis provided spiritual support to soldiers during times of war, assisting them with religious services on high holidays, wherever and whenever they were called upon to do so. They held funeral speeches, supported the officer corps in keeping up the soldiers' morale, and also supported the families of the fallen heroes. They had a number of administrative duties as well – issuing death, and sometimes marriage certificates, and assisting the censors of the field postal services in case of letters and postcards written in Yiddish, or occasionally Hebrew.

One of the most important holidays of Judaism is the *Shabbat*. During wartime, especially on the frontline, the religious prohibition of work and usage of fire was understandably abolished, as the rabbis all agreed that in that case the rule of *pikuach nefesh*[14] precedes the taboos of *Shabbat*. Considering the relatively small number of rabbis in both the Imperial and Royal Army and the Hungarian Royal Honvéd Army, it was virtually impossible to ensure the presence of a rabbi on every welcoming of *Shabbat* on Friday evenings, however, that was not necessarily required. The Jewish custom allowed, and still allows, capable and wise men to lead the prayers, along with ten or more Jewish soldiers present.

The rabbis regularly visited the troops on the high holidays, and behind the lines, services were held in the synagogues of the occupied territories, or if

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11 László Saager as an active field rabbi is mentioned only the memoires of *Feldsuperior* Géza Váradi, as a military chaplain who was under process of the officer's council of honour; his name is not appearing in any Schematismus or other document so far. His service must have been very short due to the above mentioned trial process.

12 Borovi, *op. cit.* p. 93.

13 Szolgálati Szabályzat a magyar királyi Honvédség számára, p. 424.

14 The commandment of „*saving a soul*", which out rules any other commandment.

stone-built holy places were not available, the soldiers themselves created wooden synagogues, especially on the Italian and the Balkan fronts. On the Northern front, where Jewish presence was notable everywhere in the occupied lands, this was not necessary, and it is well-documented that the local Jewish communities were pleased to assist and support the Austro-Hungarian forces in Galicia and the occupied parts of Russia, and were very keen to welcome Jewish soldiers and officers in their synagogues.

Another important pillar of Judaism is the *kashrut* – the Jewish dietary laws. Needless to say, the complex rules and rituals were very difficult to follow in the trenches, although it was common that most orthodox soldiers would rather go hungry than eat *treif* (non-kosher) food. The field-rabbis helped as much as possible to provide kosher food, but generally these rituals were also abolished during the time of war. In certain cases, a Jewish *shakter,* a ritual butcher, was pressed into service with regiments that had considerable numbers of Jewish soldiers, such as the 11th (Munkács) and the 12th (Szatmárnémeti / Máramarossziget) Honvéd Infantry Regiments. On the feast of *Pesach,* the jewish Passover, when Jews may not own, eat or benefit from *chometz*[15] during the whole period of the feast, and they required regular supplies of *matzo* (unleavened bread), for ritual and everyday meal purposes as well. The rabbis were allowed to organise the production or the purchase of *matzo* for those soldiers who needed it.

Field-rabbis were also responsible for the spiritual assistance of captured Jews of enemy nations. Large numbers of Jewish soldiers became POWs in Austria-Hungary, most of them from the Russian Army. As per the reports of *Egyenlőség*[16], Jewish-Russian POWs celebrated the birthday of the king of Hungary in the POW Camp near Esztergom-Kenyérmező, and prayed for King and Fatherland from the Hungarian/Hebrew bilingual prayer book, which was distributed among them by the field-rabbis.

As most of the field-rabbis held civilian positions somewhere in Austria-Hungary, they corresponded with their communities, families, and with local notables, including editors of newspapers, etc. Many of them published articles,

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15*Chometz* is made from one of five types of grain, and combined with water is left to stand for longer than eighteen minutes. Regular bread, or any similar product, which were staple foods for soldiers, are not allowed to be eaten or even touched for the eight days of Passover.

16Egyenlőség, 25/02/1916. p. 5.

sometimes on a regular basis, in several periodicals, writing about the horrors of war, and the heroism of their Jewish comrades. These rabbis in uniform became famous, and considerable articles were published about the most popular ones, such as Dr. Samuel Lemberger, who served in the frontline during the bloodiest battles in Galicia, and was also present at the breakthrough near Gorlice. Let us introduce him, as one of the finest example of a brave soldier and a devoted servant of God.

Dr. Lemberger was a civilian rabbi in Pozsony-Szentgyörgy[17], and he became one of the most decorated field-rabbis of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd Army. He applied for a field-rabbi in reserve position after graduating from the rabbinical seminar of Pozsony, and his request was accepted, leading to Lemberger's appointment to the 39th Honvéd Infantry Division on May 1st, 1910. Commanders of this famous division were Lieutenant-General Imre Hadffy de Livno, and from 1916, Major-General Balázs Dáni de Gyarmata. Dr. Lemberger went to the Northern front with the division on August 1st, 1914, according to his files in the Hungarian military archives, and he took part in several battles in Galicia in 1914, 1915, and 1916; while in 1917 he was sent to Transylvania. His supreme commanders described him in his personal file[18] as follows:

"He has a self-determined, strong personality. Very well educated, fine-mannered chaplain. He can work easily by himself, absolutely indefatigable and tireless. He supported his fellows with spiritual services in the middle of strong enemy fire, and has proven calmness and personal bravery under these circumstances. As a field-rabbi, he has outstandingly qualified himself in every possible way, the soldiers have great trust in him. Among the officer corps, he is a very popular comrade."

The above was written and signed by Colonel Béla Balassa, divisional chief-of-staff. Dr. Lemberger was awarded with the following orders and medals during his service: Knight's Cross of the Order of Franz Joseph on the ribbon of the Military Merit Cross with Swords, Golden Merit Cross with Crown on the ribbon of the Military Merit Cross, Military Jubilee Cross 1908, Officer's 2nd

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17 Now *Svätý Jur pri Bratislave*, Slovakia.
18Előjegyzési lap a minősítési leíráshoz, HL. Akvi. 14.257. (Military Archives of Hungary)

Class Badge of Honour of the Red Cross with War Decoration, and the Charles Troop Cross.

Dr. Lemberger was only one of the brave rabbis who served as true successors of the Maccabees, and embodied genuine Hungarian virtue and excellence combined with jewish faithfulness and devotion to the Creator of the Universe.

Database of the jewish military chaplains of the *K. u. K. Heer*

Name:	Date of conscription	Civilian residence:	Conscripted in:	Awards:
Günsberger Maximilian	*1906.04.01*	*Herincse*	*Máramarossziget*	-
Frankfurter Arnold	1909.02.01.	Bécs	Bécs	GMCwC
Adler Lorenz	*1909.11.01.*	*Szelőcze*	*Komárom*	*GMCwC*
Lőwy Ignaz	1910.02.01.	Kaaden	Komotau	KCFJO, GMCwC
Mieses Josef	1910.04.01.	Przemysl	Przemysl	-
Klein Sámuel	*1911.06.01.*	*Érsekújvár*	*Pozsony*	*GMCwC*
Steiner Wilhelm	*1913.01.01.*	*Hátszeg*	*Szászváros*	-
Golinski Ludwig	1913.09.01.	Pilsen	Pilsen	-
Deutsch Ernst	*1913.12.01.*	*Karánsebes*	*Karánsebes*	*GMCwC*
Halberstam Michael	1914.01.01.	Schaffa	Znaim	GMCwC
Ferda Rudolf	1914.11.01.	Znaim	Znaim	-
Grünsfeld Josef	*1915.02.01.*	*Pozsony*	*Pozsony*	-
Hirschberger Árpád	*1915.04.01.*	*Neuern*	*Písek*	*GMCwC*
Fisch Desiderius	*1915.05.01.*	*Kiskunfélegyháza*	*Kecskemét*	-
Lebovics Hirsch	1915.06.01.	Čepin	Osijek	-
Grünsfeld David	*1916.02.01.*	*Moson*	*Sopron*	-
Fürst Leo	*1916.04.01.*	*Csúz*	*Komárom*	-
Kellner Hermann	*1916.06.01.*	*Tenke*	*Nagyvárad*	-
Ehrmann Samuel	*1917.11.01.*	*Komárom*	*Komárom*	-
Krausz Leopold	*1918.01.01.*	*Debrecen*	*Debrecen*	-
Adler Elias	-	*Budapest*	*Budapest*	-

Altmann Adolf	-	Meran	Brixen	-
Balaban Mayer Samuel	-	Lemberg	Lemberg	-
Bertisch Leo	-	Deutschbrod	Caslau	-
Deutsch Adolf	-	Kostel	Kremsier	-
Deutsch Aron	-	*Pincehely*	*Kaposvár*	*KCFJO*
Diamant Béla	-	*Misslitz*	*Znaim*	*GMCwC*
Duschinszky Michael	-	*Rákospalota*	*Budapest*	-
Eisler Matthias	-	*Kolozsvár*	*Kolozsvár*	-
Faerber Rubin	-	Ostrau	Teschen	-
Fischer Géza	-	*Balassagyar-mat*	*Losonc*	*GMCwC, MJC*
Fischer Leopold	-	*Zenta*	*Szabadka*	*KCFJO*
Fischer Wilhelm	-	*Budapest*	*Budapest*	*GMCwC*
Frankfurter Jakob	-	Tepplitz-Schönau	Komotau	*GMCwC*
Freudiger David	-	*Budapest*	*Budapest*	*BMMM, GMCwC*
Freund Levi	-	Lemberg	Lemberg	-
Friediger Moses	-	Oderberg	Teschen	-
Fuchs Salomon	-	*Nagyvárad*	*Nagyvárad*	-
Funk Samuel	-	*Pozsony*	*Pozsony*	-
Gerstl Ignác	-	*Nagyszent-miklós*	*Szeged*	-
Glück Ludwig	-	*Kassa*	*Kassa*	-
Günwald Elias	-	*Csáktornya*	*Nagykanizsa*	-
Hausner Bernhard	-	Lemberg	Lemberg	*GMCwC*
Havas Emanuel	-	*Budapest*	*Budapest*	-
Saager László	*vacat*	*vacat*	*vacat*	*vacat*
Herschkovics Berie	-	*Alsóbereck*	*Kassa*	-
Hirsch Salamon	-	*Budapest*	*Budapest*	-
Hoffmann Jakob	-	Bécs	Bécs	-
Jungreisz Izrael	-	*Nádudvar*	*Debrecen*	-
Kandel Samuel	-	*Budapest*	*Budapest*	*GMCwC*
Kiss Heinrich	-	*Muraszombat*	*Szombathely*	-

Kohn Isidor	-	Gewitsch	Maehr. Schönberg	-
Kohn Saul Israel	-	Jamnitz	Znaim	-
Krakauer Emil	-	Komotau	Komotau	-
Krauszmann Josef	-	*Kassa*	*Kassa*	-
Kun Ludwig	-	*Budapest*	*Budapest*	-
Lebowics Israel	-	*Nagykövesd*	*Munkács*	-
Link Samuel	-	Pilsen	Pilsen	GMCwC
Mandl Simon	-	Neutitschein	Teschen	-
Margel Moyshe	-	Požega	Osijek	GMCwC
Maestro-Peric Isaak	-	Mostar	Mostar	-
Morgenstern Abraham	-	Leitmeritz	Leitmeritz	-
Nagelberg Samuel	-	Bécs	Bécs	GMCwC
Nürnberger Kálmán	-	*Ung. Brod.*	*Kremsier*	-
Ochser Schulim	-	Bécs	Bécs	-
Pap Ludwig	-	*Brassó*	*Brassó*	-
Péner Nikolaus	-	*Budapest*	*Budapest*	-
Polák Joel	-	Bécs	Bécs	-
Raitzer Josef	-	*Huszt*	*Máramarossziget*	-
Schap Ludwig	-	Tobitschau	Olmütz	-
Schreiber David	-	*Kassa*	*Kassa*	*GMCwC*
Schwartz Moritz	-	*Budapest*	*Budapest*	-
Schwartz Moses	-	*Mezőlaborc*	*Ungvár*	*GMCwC*
Singer Leo	-	*Várpalota*	*Győr*	-
Sonnenschein Elias	-	*Gyöngyös*	*Eger*	-
Weiss Friedrich	-	Iglau	Iglau	-
Weisz Heinrich	-	*Pozsony*	*Pozsony*	-
Zafir Ignatz zcl.	-	*Kassa*	*Kassa*	-

The rabbis of Hungarian origin are indicated in italic letters; sometimes there is confusion, as for instance Árpád Hirschberger and Béla Diamant are clearly of Hungarian origin, still they are employed in Austria. I list the first names in their original forms, as they appear in the Schematismus, however, this

may lead to further confusion again, as dr. Ernst Deutsch of the VII. Army Corps is really dr. Deutsch Ernő, a well known Hungarian rabbi from Karánsebes.

Abbreviations:

- KCFJO.: Knights Cross of the Order of Franz Joseph (on war ribbon)
- BMMM.: Bronze Military Merit Medal (Signum Laudis) on war ribbon with swords
- GMCwC.: Golden Merit Cross with Crown (of the Order of Franz Joseph) (on war ribbon)
- RC2.: Officer's Honour Badge 2nd Class of the Red Cross with war decoration
- MJC.: Military Jubilee Cross (1908)

Database of the Jewish military chaplains of the Royal Hungarian Honvéd Army

Name:	Date of conscription:	Conscripted in:	Awards:
Dr. Kelemen Adolf	1889	*vacat*	MJC
Klein József	1891	*vacat*	-
Dr. Drobinszky Jakab	1898	Zágráb (Zagreb, HR)	-
Goldstein Lipót	1903	Pozsony	-
Lőwinger Márton	1904	Kolozsvár	-
Deutsch Gábor	1904	*vacat*	-
Grosszmann Zsigmond	1906	*Vacat*	-
Frankfurter Mór	1909	Eszék (Osijek, HR)	-
Friedmann Ernő	1909	Gyula	-
Hirsch Leó	1910	Kolozsvár	-
Lemberger Samu	1910	Pozsony	KCFJO, GMCwC., RC2
Feldmann Áron	1912	Budapest	-
Schlesinger Sámuel	1913	Budapest	-
Dr. Kálmán Ödön	1913	Jászberény	-
Schück D. József	1914	Kassa	-
Dr. Bande Zoltán	1914	Budapest	-
Müller Lajos	1915	Kassa	-
Sonnenschein Éliás	1917	Arad	-

Abbreviations:

- KCFJO.: Knights Cross of the Order of Franz Joseph (on war ribbon)
- BMMM.: Bronze Military Merit Medal (Signum Laudis) on war ribbon with swords
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- RC2.: Officer's Honour Badge 2nd Class of the Red Cross with war decoration
- MJC.: Military Jubilee Cross (1908)

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4. Fuchs Salamon personal files (Akvi. 19.441)
5. Schwarz Mózes personal files (Akvi. 115.15)
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- Schematismus und Rangliste des K.u.K. Heeres und der Kriegsmarine 1914.; (1915 vacat); 1916.; 1917.; 1918 évekből
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- *Gebetbuch für israelitische Soldaten im Kriege*, Wien, 1914
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NEWS, EVENTS, INFORMATION

RACS MARIANNA KATALIN

RECENSION: Besenyő, János – Búr, Gábor – Horváth, Sándor Kobolka, István (ed.): „*Magyar katonák és rendőrök az ENSZ angolai békeműveletekben[1]"(Hungarian soldiers and police officers to UN peacekeeping operations in Angola)*

Much has been written about UN peacekeeping as one of the most visible symbols of the UN role in international peace and security. However, understanding foreign, security and defence policy issues in the post-transition period in Hungary is still in its infancy. The Literature on Hungarian Defence Forces mostly deals with the period before 1945 and focuses on certain events (such as the war of independence in 1848/49 or the two World Wars). Hungary dates its first peacekeeping mission back to the end of the 19th century (1896), when Hungarian troops separated Greeks and Turkish enemy units in the Island of Crete. Since then, Hungary has provided peacekeepers to different crises areas of the world. Approximately 600 Hungarian officers have served or are serving with international peacekeeping missions as military observers, civilian police officers or peacekeeping troops.

Hungary's participation in the various international missions only in the last days of the Cold War gained a conceptual basis in order to support the country's foreign policy. The Balkan wars that erupted in the early 1990's brought conflict right up to Hungarian borders, highlighting the importance of peacekeeping and compelling Hungary to play an increasing role in peacekeeping missions around the world. Memoirs of Hungarian soldiers, civil servants and diplomats involved in the first international missions before Hungary's accession to NATO are badly missing. Over the years, wealth of experience and knowledge has remained largely unknown for the public, but often also for professionals. The book entitled "*Hungarian soldiers and police officers to UN peacekeeping operations in Angola*" offers new discovery and knowledge.

The volume by János Besenyő, Gábor Búr and Sándor Horváth shifts the focus towards the involvement of Hungarian actors and explores the experiences of Hungarian soldiers and police officers in United Nations efforts at

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[1] Budapest: Katonai Nemzetbiztonsági Szolgálat, 2013. *188 p.* (ISBN:978-963-08-8044-2

peacekeeping in Angola, particularly in the 1990s. The Hungarian reader is faced with a less-explored topic divided into three major parts. The authors are relevant experts in African Studies and Security Policy with long scientific activities and publication lists.

The first part of the book takes stock of geographical and historical features of Angola. The country profile is a profound and detailed work that reflects a new approach and indicates Hungarian references and parallels. The first 69 pages describe Angola's geographical and demographical conditions, religions and economy – outlining separately relevant subtopics such as ethnic composition, agriculture, diamond mining and oil production. The historical introduction is structured on the basis of Portuguese (de) colonization and the Angolan Civil War. The reader is familiarized with the Angolan public administration, armed forces and the current geopolitical situation.
The Angolan Civil War began some months after the war of independence against the Portuguese colonial rule. The war for power between UNITA and MPLA – the two liberation movements became a struggle between the two cold war blocs and intensified in the 1980s claiming millions of Angolan lives. The second part of the book outlines the challenges, difficulties and results of UN peacekeeping missions in Angola: the three UN Angola Verification Missions and the following Observer Mission until 1999.

Between 1991 and 1999, 86 Hungarian soldiers, policemen and State Department specialists provided services in the UN Missions in Angola. This fact remained mainly unknown and unpublished to the Hungarian public. The last, third part of the book sheds light on the Hungarian Operation Experience drawing heavily on personal accounts. Hungarian participants with field experience share their specific experiences through ten personalized narratives based on interviews. The in-person interviews were taken between November 2011 and February 2013. Thanks to this information collection, the reader can get access to new interesting perspectives, small details and fascinating anecdotes. However, the interviewing method and the questioners remain unknown. In some cases, there is confusing interference between the interviewees' narrative and the authors' commentaries that could be easily avoided.

Some maps, diagrams and bulleted lists facilitate the comprehension, and exciting episodes make fascinating the informative and subjective nonfiction text. The book is far more than a description or data processing. The authors synthesize and analyze in the historical context and use accurate and consistent terminology. Repetitions do not disturb the argument. The volume works with an extensive bibliography, but lacks a table of contents that would significantly

help reader orientation. Photos and illustrations in the third part may enrich the personal stories turning them more authentic.

This is a carefully researched and very readable book that fills an important gap in Hungarian military memorial literature. A recommended reading for everyone interested in the history of Angola and Hungarian UN peacekeeping missions.

Dr. FERENC KAISER, associate professor

REVIEW OF István, Resperger– Péter A. Kis– Bálint Somkuti:
Asymmetric Warfare in the Modern Age: Small Wars with Big Impact

The authors of this volume – published at the end of 2013, as part of the *Soldiers in Peace and on Mission* series of Zrínyi Publishers – address an exceptionally interesting and exciting subject. There cannot be any question about the timeliness of the subject: guerrilla wars, or asymmetric conflicts, or – as some American military scholars call them – fourth generation conflicts have always been a part of human history, but they play a far more significant role today than ever before. Starting with Caesar's Gallic Wars, historiography offers countless examples of the more or less successful application of this way of waging war. It would obviously be a mistake to claim that guerrillas (partisans, insurgents, etc) have always and everywhere employed the same tactics. However, it is beyond question that time and again they "invented" and deployed the same warfighting concepts – primarily ambushes, raids – against the overwhelming military power of the state, and they will do so again in future conflicts as well.

The authors take as their point of departure the strategic shift that had taken place in the recent past and had been recognized by many scholars: for a very long time – as late as the 1990s – the asymmetric belligerents (guerrilla, insurgent, rebel, terrorist, etc) had played a subordinate role and had always had a state sponsor, and the decision had usually been made by the great rival countries or coalitions. In the period following the Cold War (i.e. in the period of globalization) the decisive form of conflict – instead of interstate war – has been fought within the state by asymmetric means, usually without easily identifiable and direct external state sponsorship for the weaker side. And these conflicts – due to the weakening authority of the state as an international actor – are becoming more and more difficult to handle.

In the course of peace support operations, Hungarian Defense Force personnel have been deployed in areas of the world (Iraq, Kosovo, Afghanistan) where asymmetric conflicts had just been concluded, or clashes were still ongoing. If we observe current trends, the operational environment of future deployments is also likely to be similar. The events in France in 2005, in England in 2011, in Sweden in 2013, or those reaching their culmination in early 2014 in Ukraine and Bosnia serve as a warning that such clashes can occur in Europe also. The disturbances in 2006 in Budapest have given us a taste of what we can expect in such a conflict. There can be no doubt, therefore, that asymmetric warfare deserves to be studied in its full depth and full complexity by Hungarian military scholars. Although the Hungarian-language literature of the subject is quite extensive, the works published so far have covered particular subject areas. A synthesizing, comprehensive work analyzing the experiences of the recent conflicts has not been published. This volume by István Resperger, Peter A. Kiss and Bálint Somkuti is filling this gap. (It does not detract in the least from the value of this book that due to the breadth of the subject, and to the fact that new conflicts break out constantly, it is impossible to create a truly comprehensive, all-encompassing work.)

The reader who picks up the three authors' work will find a book with a unique structure. The thick volume is actually a sort of anthology of essays that are linked into a logically constructed train of thought. The introductory essays establish a framework, a scheme of analysis, which can subsequently be followed in the case studies. The analyses of the revolution in Budapest in 1956, the insurgency in the Punjab between 1980 and 1994, the Russian failure in Grozny in 1995, or the events in Israel and the occupied territories, Iraq and Afghanistan would be valuable studies on their own. However, the true value of this volume is that the authors identify those common features that characterize these counterinsurgency operations in spite of their entirely different geographic, historical and political settings. Through further historical examples, the essays gathered in the part on principles and procedures further reinforce the lessons that were drawn hitherto. Rather than serving as a capstone of the volume, the final essay (on the future of asymmetric warfare) is really a window onto a number of problems and questions that still need to be answered, and thus shows that there is still a great deal to be studied in the area of asymmetric warfare.

The authors relied on an extensive list of up-to-date sources – primarily in English and German, but also a few works in Italian, Russian and Spanish. The bibliography of nearly 200 titles leads to the conclusion that the book was prepared on the basis of a thorough and comprehensive familiarity with Hungarian and international professional literature. The treatment of the sources satisfies the requirements levied on scholarly works. (The original sources can be identified from the notes.) The language of the essays conforms to the rules of Hungarian grammar and composition. The authors' style is good – they set forth their subject not only clearly and succinctly, but also enjoyably, and they use the professional terminology correctly and consistently. An integral part of the volume is the generous collection of carefully prepared tables, maps and figures, which provide visual reinforcement and make it easier to understand the text. (In addition to the logically constructed train of thought running through the book, this effort to support the written material with visuals shows that the authors had a dual purpose in mind: in addition to publishing a scholarly monograph, they also wanted to provide a textbook both to the narrowly defined professionals and to a broader reading audience.)

The author of such a review is in a difficult position, when he also served as the peer reviewer of the work: he critiques not only the book, but his own performance as well. If he identifies any shortcomings, the reader will reasonably ask why these were not noted (and corrected) before publication. If he is too fulsome in his praise, he is obviously praising himself as well. In any case, the virtues of this book cannot be denied – it was created with professional skill, on the basis of a sufficiently broad selection of the relevant Hungarian and international professional literature; it covers the subject of asymmetric warfare from several aspects and with adequate thoroughness, and it fills a gap in Hungarian military scholarship. Due to the novel and comprehensive approach, the book promises to be interesting both for the professional audience and the general public, and it can decidedly be useful to Hungarian Defense Force personnel on peace support missions, both during training and while deployed in their operational areas. No doubt, a better – and above all, even more comprehensive – book could have been written about asymmetric warfare, and certain subjects could have been analyzed from different perspectives. We can only hope that someone will do it, because every new work enriches Hungarian military scholarship – this is an essential process in the case of a subject that changes quickly and produces novelties almost daily. (Based on my personal

acquaintance with the authors, I can safely say that they would be happiest if their favorite area of research received greater attention as a result of their work.) Anyway, this book is already finished and available. Through this simple fact, it has placed itself above theoretical arguments. At the same time it also serves as a point of reference for every author who wants to publish on the subject in the future.

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Examples:

1. Jenő KOVÁCS: Roots of the Hungarian Military Science, ideological problems of its development. p. 6.
2. Tibor ÁCS: Military culture in the reform era. p. 34.
3. Lajos BEREK: Basic elements of research work in Military Science. p. 33.
4. www. globalsecurity.org/army/iraq (downloading time: 19 04 2012)

List of biographical references (biography):

We have to fill the list by arranging the authors' name in alphabetical order.

Examples:

1. Tibor ÁCS: Military culture in the reform era. Budapest, 2005, Zrinyi Publishing House. ISBN 963 9276 45 6
2. Lajos BEREK: Basic elements of research work in Military Science. In: Tivadar SZILÁGYI (editor): Excerptions. Budapest, 1944 Zrinyi Miklos Military Academy. p. 31-50.
3. Jenő KOVÁCS: Roots of the Hungarian Military Science, ideological problems of its development. In: New Defense Review, 2993. 47. vol. no. 6. p. 1-7, ISSN 1216-7436
4. www. Globalsecurity.org/army/iraq (downloading time: 19 04 2012)

Requirements for pictures, sketches, illustrations, diagrams and other appendixes:

- title of the picture or illustration;
- source of the picture or illustration (or its drafter);
- serial number of the picture or illustration, (e.g. 1. picture);
- if it is possible, a Hungarian legend should be provided when the caption of the picture or illustration is given in a foreign language.

Requirements for abbreviations and foreign terms:
- foreignisms and abbreviations should be explained – at their first appearance – in the footnote, in Hungarian and in the original foreign language;
- e. g. WFP – World Food Program – ENSZ Világélelmezési Programja.

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