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LT. COL. JÁNOS BESENYŐ, PHD

HUNGARIAN SOLDIERS IN EUTM MALI

Abstract

One of the most discussed events of 2013 was the conflict in Mali, followed by the French military intervention against the Islamist's radicals. After the successful French-Malian joint operation, the European Union began a training mission in Mali, tasked with restructuring and reconstructing the poorly trained and equipped Malian military. In this article, I'll share the experiences of the Hungarian officers and NCO's in EUTM Mali.

Keywords: EUTM Mali, Islamist's radicals, European Union, Hungary, Mali, sniper, training,

It became obvious by the beginning of 2013 that – while Hungary has regarded its participation in operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the Balkans as its main priority – an increased presence in the African operations of the EU will be necessary. When the need for the establishment of an EU training mission in Mali arose, the Hungarian leadership indicated its willingness to provide at least 5-10 military instructors for the mission. The final numbers were determined at the informal meeting of the EU ministers of defence in Dublin, on 12-13 February 2013.

By then it was decided that a liaison officer, a 3-man medical team and 6 sniper instructors will be sent to Mali.¹ Not all of the soldiers designated to be instructors were snipers, most of them lacked experience in military instruction, and their overall language skills were not perfect, either. As it turned out later, the soldiers of other countries also had a meagre knowledge of French, so the

¹ Of the 10-man Hungarian contingent, the liaison officer started his service at the mission headquarters already in March 2013, the 3-man medical team followed on 18 March, while the 6 sniper instructors on 13 April. The Hungarian medical experts serve at the German field hospital, along with German and Austrian experts. The members of the Hungarian sniper instructor group participated in the training of two Malian battalions, then their tasks were taken over by the Portuguese.

mission provided for a special French course (Besenyő 2013a, 74). The only problem was that the course was run by a high school teacher from Bamako, who spoke French perfectly, but could not speak English. Thus the course was less effective.² The leadership of the mission has employed English-speaking French, Bambara and Tuareg interpreters to support the instructors, but this took double the time than in the case the instructors had actually spoken French.

The marksmen travelled to Mali knowing only little about what circumstances would await them in the country, where would be their accommodation, their exact tasks, etc., so they had to improvise a lot in the first days. The Portuguese who replaced the Hungarians avoided this problem by sending a preparatory team one month before the replacement's arrival, the members of which gathered any available information and also visited the Hungarian instructors in order to get information about the training activities. Thus, the arriving Portuguese group could begin almost instantly the overtaking of training activities from the Hungarian soldiers.

At the end of the preparation, the instructors received their uniforms, medical and other equipment. During the operation it was realized that the breathability of the newer model of desert fatigue dress provided for them was not suitable for the Malian conditions, thus when they left the air-conditioned rooms, they started to sweat heavily.

As it turned out, they did not need a lot of equipment – e.g. bedroll, chemical protection equipment, goretex jacket, polar sweaters, goretex gloves, etc. On the contrary, the inflatable raft could be utilised quite effectively during the marksmanship training. They did not have problems with the other equipment that provided adequate safety and comfort for the soldiers, and the

² As a researcher focusing on peacekeeping in Africa, I have indicated for years on several forums that it would be important to provide for French language courses – besides English – for those who are to be deployed on the African continent. Since the major part of conflict zones can be found on the territories of former French colonies, where the official language of the country remained that of the former colonizers. This is also true for Mali, where the populace belongs to more than 30 ethnic groups. During the training it became conspicuous that a significant part of the troops to be trained could communicate with both the members of other ethnic groups and the instructors only in French. Only a negligible amount of them speaks English. Not only the sniper instructors had problems with the French language in Mali: none of the medical team sent to Mali spoke French, while they could communicate in English, German and Danish. There were opinions that since they served in the German field hospital, they did not need to speak French. However, this is hardly maintainable in the case of a mission where more than 50 percent of the participants used French as its native language, and most of the soldiers in training also speak this language.

clothing also met the requirements.³ The IFAK medical kit⁴ issued to them proved to be extraordinarily useful. Besides this, they brought substantial supplies of several types of medicine, like Lariam, used against malaria. Lieutenant Zámboři was relentless; he demanded that everyone took the anti-malaria medicine on time. Thus, there was no malaria infection amongst the Hungarians, even though almost every one of them got hit time by time by viral diarrhoea.

In the end, the members of the Hungarian sniper instructor team travelled to Mali on 13 April 2013, and arrived already at about 20,00 hrs to Bamako, being greeted by the Hungarian ranking officer. The next day they received their briefing about the workings of the mission and the different rules and regulations at the mission headquarters; then travelled to Koulikoro Training Camp (KTC), located northeast from the Malian capital. After their arrival, they were shown around the camp, and then attended various military, professional and medical trainings for days.

The supplying of the instructors was provided by the European Defence Agency (EDA) with the inclusion of international and local sub-contractors, from the financial framework of ATHENA. It included sustenance, provision of drinking water, cleaning, and later also the operation of the canteen, also with the inclusion of different sub-contractors.⁵ It was recognized by the health service that they could not provide meals of adequate nutritional value and vitamin content at all times, due to the limited local possibilities of procurement. The alimentation could not be improved initially, as in the camp there was no shop or store other than the kitchen, where the soldiers could have bought food. The provision of drinking water was unlimited and continuous. There is a spring in Mali, the water of which is a European-quality mineral water that is bottled by the locals under the name Diago. The water was also tested by the German

³ As it is more and more probable that Hungarian soldiers will participate in more African operations, it would be worthwhile to look up the missionary developments of the 1990s, as the Hungarian soldiers who served in Angola, Rwanda and Mozambique have mentioned on several occasions that they received such experimental clothes that were exceptionally suitable for tropical work. Possibly, it would also be worthwhile to continue exchanging peacekeeping experiences with the French and Austrians, started a few years ago, including the issue of the appropriate uniform. Read more about the experiences gained during earlier African operations at Besenyő (2013b).

⁴ The personal first aid kit provided to the Hungarians (IFAK – Individual First Aid Kit) is also used in the American forces.

⁵ Regardless, there are nations – like the Germans – who created their own national supply group, thus they are capable of operating independently from the mission's supply system in many areas.

lab, and approved for consumption⁶. The bottled water was also checked continuously, as the locals tended to collect the discarded empty bottles, wash them, and fill them with tap water, which led to different infections among the European soldiers. The Hungarian soldiers prevented this by cutting up the empty bottles, evading such risks. Besides this, the mission has provided bottled drinking water indefinitely at the distribution point in the training center that was open in the morning and the evening for a one-hour period. The medical service – due to the German field hospital⁷ – operated among far better circumstances, but luckily, other than frequent intestinal infections, diarrhoea, a dental issue and an insect bite, the Hungarian soldiers did not confront serious medical issues.

While the instructors received laptops from the Hungarian Defence Forces, it was realized only in Mali that – due to security reasons – internet access was restricted by the French, thus the laptops could be used only limitedly. In the camp, the more than 500 instructors could use only two computers with internet access. The computer use was monitored, of course,⁸ thus when the commander of the instructor group has reported in an e-mail to the Hungarian liaison officer in Bamako that the members of the “Waraba” battalion were rioting, he was warned not to do so in the future. Thus, when he had something of importance to report, he rather reported via phone. While the Hungarian soldiers conducted quite an intensive activity during the training, they managed to get to Bamako a few times, where they could regenerate. There were not a lot of such opportunities in the camp, as there were no internet cafés, gyms, or canteens then. The importance of stress handling and relaxation was recognised only by the end of the mission, when they strived to organise smaller-larger events for the instructors, where they could disengage from the daily hustle.

It is important to know in order to understand the workings of the mission that, while the command of the mission was in Bamako, they did not intervene in the professional work at the training camp. Those serving at the command were the ones who communicated with the Malian government, the United

⁶ For details see: University of Utrecht, 2006.

⁷ A Role II-level institute.

⁸ Besides this, the use of pendrives was also limited, only data carriers provided and approved by the mission could be used. Thus the soldiers were forced to write their mails on the computer themselves, these contained only the most necessary informations due to the introduced time limitations.

Nations, the commander of “Operation Serval”⁹, and other governmental and non-governmental organizations. The commander in Koulikoro was a colonel, responsible for the operation of the training camp, and the activities of those serving there. The actual work was conducted by his deputies though, as he had to participate at political-military talks, and welcome delegations and visitors. One of his two lieutenant-colonel ranked deputies was an Irish officer operating the camp, responsible for the defense and supplying of the camp and the work of the interpreters and other auxiliary personnel. The other deputy, a French lieutenant-colonel, was responsible solely for training duties. Thus, if the commander of the Hungarian instructor group had any questions, he did not wait for the commander’s briefing, but could directly turn to the lieutenant-colonel responsible for training.

It must be known about the training that the leaders of the European Union have undertaken that they would prepare 4 combined arms tactical groups¹⁰, designated by the Malian army, in 10-week intervals¹¹ during their 15-month mandate (Besenyő 2013d, 27). The Hungarian team conducted its actual instructing activity between the 4th and the 7th training week, when the elements receiving special training (engineering, TACP, INTEL, BTR, sniper) were separated from the companies. Since the Hungarian soldiers arrived in the 2nd training week of the first battalion, they had the opportunity to observe the end of the initial training, as well as participate as a counterforce in the forging of the battalion after the 4 weeks of their own training. Their task was to have the taught knowledge applied both by the snipers and the company commanders. This was necessary since the knowledge of the commanding personnel was meagre, thus every special instructor group also had to occupy itself with the theoretical training of the commanders (Binnie 2013).

The EUTM Mali mission, starting on 18 February 2013, included 200 instructors, a 150-man logistical, medical and administrative group and another 150-man group tasked with force protection (Besenyő 2013a, 70). The European

⁹ See more about „Operation Serval” at Besenyő (2013c).

¹⁰ Combined Tactical Arms Groups (GTIA): a group means in this case an extended-number battalion.

¹¹ In one of my earlier articles (Besenyő 2013a), I mentioned that I find this time period insufficient for the training of a battalion, since it generally requires 27 weeks. The main problem is not presented by the individual abilities of the soldiers, but by the issue whether they would be able to operate as a coherent, cooperating group after a 10-week training, to consolidate the authority of the government in the northern territories, as well as winning the hearts and minds of the often hostile civilian (Arab and Tuareg) population. Since, if this does not work and there are no radical changes in Mali, then the leadership of the country can expect another Tuareg rebellion.

instructing personnel consists currently of 565 persons (Duijn 2013). So far, three battalions have finished their training, the preparation of the fourth will be ready by May 2014.¹² The Hungarian instructors took part in the training of the “Waraba” and “Elou” battalions. In spite of the optimistic official reports, the prolongation of the mission’s mandate was mentioned several times, because the European instructors faced some unforeseen difficulties during the training, which in many cases influenced negatively the results of their work.

Such a problem could be the attitude of Malian soldiers towards the issue of human rights, and their negative relations with the Tuareg and Arab populace in the northern territories. A good example is when the members of the “Waraba” battalion received tasks in the northern territories after the training, where they had to work together with the French soldiers assigned to them from “Operation Serval”.¹³ There, Islamist militiamen have attacked the soldiers of the battalion. They could not exploit the element of surprise though, and were pursued by the Malian soldiers. After the unsuccessful pursuit, the government soldiers have plundered a smaller settlement and a gas station on their way back to the barracks. While the case did not get much media attention, the hunt for a scapegoat started instantly, since there were so high expectations towards the first battalion trained by the EU. Sadly, the Europeans can hardly comprehend that while they taught the African soldiers for 10 weeks about Western practices, democracy and the observation of human rights (Delafortrie 2013), when they got into combat, they acted again according to the African practices that have been employed for several hundred years. These practices are inappropriate from the perspective of Western democratic notions. There was a similar case with the soldiers of the “Elou” battalion, at whom the civilians of a northern settlement threw rocks. When in response a soldier shot in the crowd, several civilians got injured. Besides these cases, there were several lesser encounters between the northern civilian populace and the Malian government forces, even though the media coverage of these events is limited. The report by the Spanish

¹² The Malian army currently consists of 8 battalions, their training, equipment and personnel is inadequate, as well as the abilities of the officers. The EU undertook the training of half of the Malian army (four battalions) in the framework of EUTM MALI. However, the equipping of the battalions advances only difficultly, this also hinders their training. Thus more and more European countries have offered the Malian army uniforms, firearms and other equipment. The experiences of the training of the first two battalions made it necessary to train the officers of the third and fourth battalion beforehand, since the professional knowledge and leadership experiences of the majority of Malian officers are abysmal. More information: <http://www.eutmmali.eu/>

¹³ This could be attributed to the fact that the European instructors cannot follow the Malian soldiers trained by them to the North in order to check how they apply the acquired knowledge in practice. Thus, follow-up is conducted by the French, who mentor the Malian units trained by the EU afterwards.

lieutenant-colonel serving in the Brussels group supporting the operation EUTM MALI also states that the soldiers deployed in the north still have to learn a lot about the upholding of human rights and the cooperation with civilian authorities and organisations (Barea 2013). A similar statement was made by the UN Secretary-General in his report S/2013/582 (UNSC 2013), as well as in the 2013 November report of Amnesty International about Mali, where they specifically asked the decision-makers of the EU to put even greater emphasis at the trainings of EUTM MALI on the issue of human rights and make the Malian soldiers understand that the torture or ill-treatment of the civilian populace is forbidden (Amnesty International 2013).

As mentioned before, the training could be begun by the Hungarians only on the second week after their arrival, when the ammunition and firearms required for the training arrived via the German air lift.¹⁴ By then it was also realized, though, that the Hungarian soldiers will not have to conduct sniper training, but scoped rifle training. As it turned out, a part of Malian soldiers did not have any kind of military expertise or combat experience, and without these, it is highly improbable to train professional snipers in the time of several weeks. The Hungarian instructors received only 4 weeks for the freshly invented scoped rifle module training, thus they had to design a totally new training plan, in accordance with the totally different conditions. According to the requirements of the Malian army, 27 soldiers per battalion – 9 per company, 3 per platoon, 1 per squad – had to be trained.

As the first step, the Hungarian instructors conducted maintenance on the weapons brought with them, and ranged them at the firing range of the base. Then they had the opportunity to meet with the personnel to train. It was realized within hours that the soldiers did not have military experience, they did not know the weapon types assigned to them; they could not read a map, make a field sketch, use a compass or determine the northern direction¹⁵. Thus the Hungarian instructors had to organise such a training that taught those basic skills to the Malian soldiers, which they should have already possessed by the beginning of the training. As the soldiers did not possess maps or compasses, these also had to be requisitioned by the Hungarians, then, after teaching the

¹⁴ The firearms and the corresponding ammunition were provided by the Hungarian Defence Forces.

¹⁵ Francois Ducrotté and Elena Marda (2013) made similar statements in the June 2013 volume of the European Security Review, referring to an EU instructor, but the targets of their criticism were not the aforementioned skills of the soldiers, but those of the officers. How could we expect the Malian soldiers to be able to read a map when neither can their officers?

basic skills, the practical, scoped-rifle training has started. Here, the instructors faced another problem. The firing range created at the training base was not ready on time, and was not built in the way as requested¹⁶. The instructors were also limited in the use of the firing range due to the busy schedule, thus they had to take this into account when combining the theoretical and practical courses, and balance it in order to have also time for field training exercises, orientation exercises, and night operations exercises (marching, area security, patrol, etc.). Due to the decision of the mission commander, both instructors and trainees had to spend one night a week in the open air, in order to practice night operations. The practical training consisted of compass use, urban operations, target reconnaissance, etc. At these exercises the groups were often divided, thus tasks were better allotted, and it was easier to attend to the Malian soldiers individually. For instance, Malian soldiers did not know their personal weapons so much, thus these were initially maintained by the Hungarian instructors, and afterwards was maintenance taught to the Malians. Despite this, until the end of the mission, firearms maintenance was conducted under the close watch of the instructors. This is was also necessary due to security reasons.¹⁷ At the end of the training module, the Hungarian soldiers have double-checked and maintained every weapon before placing them in the firearms cabinets.

Other problems presented themselves, too. For example, the Hungarian instructors were not really satisfied with the marksmanship skills of the Malian soldiers, as they ranged the assault rifles to 25 metres instead of 100, according to French practice. In spite of this, they could not hit the targets even from this range. They started shooting from 100 metres, then they advanced to first 200, then 300 metres, but at that range there were almost no substantive hits. In the end, they became really effective at a 100-metre range. There were of course some – mostly Tuaregs – who were “natural” marksmen, and the training improved their skills, but this was not common. There were also problems with the discipline of the Malian soldiers, but the instructors attributed this to the

¹⁶ The Hungarian instructors proposed the building of a 600-metre-long firing range, but in the end only a 300-metre-long one was constructed.

¹⁷ The Malian soldiers kept their weapons with them at all times, but the ammunition was locked away in the arms depot. In spite of this, when a company was inspected, more than 200 pieces of live ammunition were found at the soldiers. These, however, did not originate from the storage of the EUTM. Since the military was divided by many bloody conflicts in the past period, and not all are pleased about the EU presence in Mali, the command of the mission reacted strongly regarding this issue, too. The very idea is unbearable to think about what could have happened if any Malian soldier would have used his weapon against one of his peers or an instructor. Unfortunately, such cases happened frequently in Afghanistan, where the allied Afghan military and policing forces, trained by NATO troops, opened fire upon their Western colleagues. The possibility of this cannot be totally excluded in Mali, either.

differences in mentality between trainees and instructors. The uniforms of the Malian soldiers were quite mixed at the beginning of the training, but equipment and uniforms arrived continuously due to the various donors. The head of the Polish logistics group, a lieutenant-colonel, was constantly reporting to the commander about the arrival of new equipment. By the end, all Malian soldiers were in the possession of two replacements of brand new uniforms.¹⁸ However, in the case of weaponry, the situation was not satisfactory. Weapons also arrived to the mission but their quality was far from adequate. On one occasion, the head of training asked the Hungarian instructors to visit one of the Malian companies, where they would have had to range a few AK assault rifles. Lieutenant Zámboři did not undertake this task, however, because the material quality of the rifles and assault rifles was so low sometimes that it endangered the operator of the weapon. The quality of their ammunition was even worse. The lieutenant could recall only a few cases when the ammunition by the Hungarian Defence Forces misfired, compared to every fifth of the ammunition provided by the Malian military. Their ammunition cases were not even made of steel, but of copper. It was such a low-grade design that the cartridge case was sometimes damaged even by being dropped.

During the training, the Hungarians could get to know better the Malian soldiers, their habits, culture, and differing mentality, which was not an easy task. The soldiers of the African militaries had a different attitude towards the more unpopular tasks than the Europeans: many soldiers were absent from the trainings. The Hungarians were lucky, since the soldiers assigned to the scoped rifle training were very motivated, thus the instructors had to face the absence of only a few soldiers. Similarly, they did not experience serious ethnic tensions among the trainees, either. There were only relatively few Tuareg soldiers serving in the “Waraba” battalion; their numbers were much higher in the “Elou” battalion.¹⁹ A significant part of them served formerly in the northern territories, they also possessed a certain level of battle experience. The oft-mentioned tension between the different ethnic groups could not be observed here, they could work together well during the exercises. One of the greater problems for them was that, by the end of the training, their salary was reduced

¹⁸ The Polish were not only assuming a role in counseling and training, but as a donor state they provided substantial material support for the Malian military. See Pietrzak, 2013. In spite of that, the equipment of the Malian army is lacking and inadequate, which, besides other factors, limits greatly the applicability of the military.

¹⁹ In the first battalion, less than 4 percent of the personnel (30-40 persons), while in the second battalion about 15 percent (150-160 persons) was the ratio of Tuareg soldiers.

as they did not receive their combat subsidies of about 100 USD, that everyone received who served more than 25 days in the northern territories (Thiénot 2013). Still, the greatest issue was not this, but the non-existent sum that the participants of the training expected from the EU. The cause was that the United States formerly operated the “Pan Sahel Initiative” and then the Trans Sahara Counter-Terrorism Partnership (TSCTP) counter-terrorism programmes (Lecocq and Schrijver 2007, 143-145; Diarra 2012, 20) in cooperation with the Malian government, and trained special forces for the fight against the AQIM. During the training, the soldiers of the unit received extra salary and subsidies from the Americans.²⁰ While nobody told that the EU would give any kind of extra allowances at the end of the training, some of the Malian soldiers in EUTM Mali still thought so. They completed the training in a disciplined way, and waited for the pay-day. After they did not receive the expected rewards, they rioted one day before the planned ending ceremony, because someone spread false news according to which the generals of the Malian army “stole” it. Regrettably, as corruption is so widespread in Mali, nobody questioned the trustworthiness of the statement. At first, they grumbled only among themselves, and then they gathered in their camp and demanded the “premium” louder and louder. Since the camp of the Malian soldiers was not in the training centre, at first only a few instructors – among them Hungarians – noticed the problem, and after the mass became less and less manageable, and their own battalion commander could not restore order, the then commander of the training centre, Colonel Christophe Paczka was summoned there. The soldiers told the colonel that they do not have any problems either with him or the instructors, but they demand the extra allowances for the training. As the colonel saw that he cannot pacify the rioting masses, he notified the deputy of the chief of general staff of the Malian military, who visited the training camp personally. In the end, it was him, who convinced the soldiers to return to their barracks. Due to this commotion, the ending ceremony was not held at the originally planned time, even though many guests were invited. Taking this into account, it is understandable why General Francois Lecointre, the commander of the mission has declared after the end of the training of the first battalion that “although their capabilities have improved, they still have room to enhance their discipline, cohesion and trust in the Army chain of command.” The general also stated that the reconstruction of the Malian military still requires a lot of time, since it could still collapse at any time (Barea 2013).

²⁰ During the lessons of policing forces, the EUPOL used a similar motivation in Afghanistan.

This problem was not present at the training of the second battalion, as it was made clear to the soldiers that they cannot expect any kind of reward or additional allowances during the period of the training. As the personnel of this battalion was selected more carefully – there were more soldiers who possessed preliminary military training and combat experience – there were less issues with them than with the personnel of the Waraba battalion.²¹ Of course, neither the “Elou” battalion could finish the training without issues. The joint final exercise of the battalion took place following the 10-week training, where it turned out that they did not receive sufficient sustenance. It turned out at this time that during the training period the Malian military provided so inadequate sustenance that it threatened the success of the training, but the soldiers did not complain. Then, when they returned to the camp after the battalion exercise, they did not get food, but they still did not complain. However, they got to know the next day that they would get 10 days of leave so that they could visit their families. It turned out then that the soldiers would not receive the subsistence allowance which they received during the training period, and the personnel started to grumble. Colonel Philippe Testart, then commander of the training centre, ordered instantly the distribution of 400 MREs to them, moreover, he purchased them a cow that they could slaughter for the ending ceremony. The colonel called the Malian general staff afterwards, and arranged that one of the generals would visit and speak with the soldiers, as well as arranged for the payment of 3 days of subsistence allowance to the Malian soldiers. A more serious uprising was prevented this way.

According to the opinion of the Hungarian instructors, the first battalion was more motivated and had a far better attitude towards the training, but they were less trained than the personnel of the second battalion. Probably this is why

²¹ The European instructors gained also other important experiences, as it presented a serious problem that the battlegroups, set up according to French standards, as well as the continuous planning and management tasks expected accomplished staff and commanders from the Malian army, even though it was lacking such capabilities. Exactly due to this, after the training of the first battalion – when the issue was recognized by the leadership of the mission – the specific training of the battalion staff and commanders appeared as a separate element. This however led to a new issue, as the commanders participating in the aforementioned training joined their own subdivisions only in the 4th and 5th week of the training, where the soldiers could hardly accept them. It caused problems at multiple times that the young, 20-30-year-old lieutenants and first lieutenants (platoon commanders, deputy company commanders, etc.), returning from the commander training and equipped with the knowledge acquired there, went about to lead the subdivisions confidently, but the personnel – while it executed their commands – did not recognize them as their commanders. Moreover, they presented constant problems (regular latencies, absencies, the loss of equipment, lack of concentration and attention, etc.) Thus the mission adjusted the training programme a little more. The training of commanders was not conducted during the 10-week training period, but beforehand, in a 3-week period. Thus they could execute the tasks along with their subdivisions, after their preparation. This strengthened the cohesion of the units, moreover, the personnel respected more their officers who were better prepared than the usual Malian officers.

the training of the personnel of the second battalion went better, as they already had “military records”. The firing range was also completed by then, thus the trainees had far more opportunities for shooting. On the whole, the morale was good, the Malian soldiers were willing and enjoyed to participate in the training, and got along well with the European – including Hungarian – instructors, too.²² So, the objective the Hungarian soldiers were tasked with was completed successfully. By the end of the mission, Lieutenant Zámbari prepared an English-language instruction material that included the experiences of the training of the first battalion, and which was rated so well by the French commander that the Portuguese replacing the Hungarians continued the training according to this material.

The military leadership should elaborate more in detail on the experiences of the soldiers who served in Mali and incorporate them into the preparation of the personnel to be assigned to future African operations, focusing especially on the teaching of French and on the provision of proper equipment,²³ as well as on the cultural differences and the current infectologic and hygienic challenges. It is important to organise the deployment of our soldiers to missions more carefully²⁴, as well as the support of the families of those serving abroad on missions.

We have to prepare for the African operations, as it seems that the EU wants to participate mostly not in peace enforcement, but in peacekeeping operations – mainly in the field of training and counseling – on the African continent, thus more and more Hungarian soldiers will have the opportunity to serve in African operations.

²² The acceptance and respect of the Malian soldiers towards the European instructors was high. Despite this, a few instructors behaved especially arrogantly with the trainees. They were not willing to understand what differences the low level of education and the socialization differing from Western norms could cause between the way of training of European and Malian soldiers. Based on my own experiences in Africa, I could definitely state that already due to the different cultural background, more patience and compassion should be shown towards African soldiers. In the case of adequate treatment, sustenance and training, they can perform equally well as any European soldiers.

²³ It is advised to take into consideration at the supplying of personnel the experiences and advices of those who served in earlier African operations.

²⁴ Even when it requires the deployment of a 2-3-man preparatory group, since these funds will offer returns by all means, if only even that the delegated Hungarian soldiers would face far less issues, thus they could dedicate all their time and energy to the execution of the objective they were deployed to complete. This includes that the mission personnel would know already before the deployment what is expected of them, and what conditions they would be facing – salary, sustenance, etc.

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SOME THOUGHTS ON THE DEVELOPMENT AND ANALYSIS OF JIHADI SUICIDE OPERATIONS

Abstract

This article aims to deepen the understanding on the complex phenomenon of suicide operations. The article can be divided into two parts: the first considers the problem of definitions from different aspects, and the second part deals with the practical matters, by analyzing the strategy and the conduct of two Jihadi groups. I will argue that the analysis of suicide operations needs a more elaborate categorization, in order to make the concept more usable and I will introduce new terms for this purpose.

Keywords: Al Qaeda, Iraq, Suicide Bombing, Propaganda, Insurgency, Terrorism

What is a suicide operation?

The importance and “fame” of suicide operations is quite recent in international affairs, and suicide operations by non-state actors were unheard of until the 1980s. The Lebanon war saw the first major use of suicide bombings, both against Israeli Defense Forces and international peacekeepers. The very first use of this tactic showed that how effective it can be: by conducting multiple devastating suicide attacks, a non-state armed group was able to force the United States and France to pull out their peacekeeping forces from Lebanon. Since then, this tactic proliferated around the world, and in the course of the Iraq and the Afghanistan wars, became a very frequent occurrence.

Usually suicide bombings are the main form of suicide operations, but this is only one major form, which according to the method of attack, the perpetrator, the location and character of the target can be more refined. The other major form of suicide operations is the commando style suicide attack, whereby an attacking group’s aim is to die in the course of their armed action, causing as much damage and casualties, as they can, with conventional (usually small)

arms. There are many examples for the latter. Kashmiri groups¹ were famous for staging such attacks, most famous of which is the Mumbai attack.² Also groups in Afghanistan used this method to attack ISAF bases, embassies etc., the most famous attack probably is the one against Camp Bastion in Afghanistan,³ where the attackers (thought to be Haqqani network members) were able to infiltrate the perimeter of the base, causing great damage. Commando style suicide attacks and suicide bombings also can be combined, as we have seen in the theatre attack in Russia⁴ and also some Afghan cases, but this type of attack is rare.

The difficulty in making clear cut observations is made more difficult by the fact that a very large range of actors have adopted suicide actions as a way of operations, and nowadays not only terrorist groups, but also many insurgent groups are using this tactic. That's why we will handle these two groups of actors separately. (Also, there were examples of state sponsored suicide missions, but the article will not treat this topic, due to its rareness and very different context.)

Suicide bombings can be sorted by method, by which the bomb is delivered (human or vehicle delivered, the latter can be subdivided into many categories, from boats, to motor vehicles, to airplanes). Suicide bombings also can be sorted by the target type:

Type of operation	
military	civilian
assassination	
	mass casualty attacks
symbolic attacks	
anti-infrastructure	

¹ Groups such as Laskar-e-Taiba (LeT) have used this tactic often. For more on LeT: Tellis, Ashley J. [2012]: The Menace That Is Lashkar-e-Taiba, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 14-15. http://carnegieendowment.org/files/LeT_menace.pdf

² Mumbai rocked by deadly attacks, BBC News, 27 November 2008 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/7751160.stm

³ Camp Bastion assault: Two US marines die in 'Taliban revenge', BBC News, 15 September 2012 <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-19608561>

⁴ How special forces ended siege, BBC News, 29 October, 2002 <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/2363601.stm>

There are many examples for the first category. The former Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi was assassinated by a female suicide bomber in 1991⁵ and the leader of the Northern Alliance, Ahmed Shah Masoud was assassinated by two suicide bombers posing as journalists.⁶ More recently, in 2009, the anti-Iranian Sunni group Jundallah assassinated several top commanders of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps in a suicide operation.⁷

Mass casualty attacks are the most widely known and used method of suicide operation. They usually are conducted against civilian target, with the intention to cause massive casualties and build political pressure, and at the same time, they represent effective methods to sow discontent between the affected community and the central government, which failed its basic task to provide the necessary security. Also mass casualty attacks are a great way for terrorist and insurgent groups to instill fear into the affected communities, thus achieving more operational freedom in theory.

Symbolic attacks are actions designed to appeal for or shock a strategic audience or audiences. Attacks against high profile politicians, symbolic buildings can be fitted into this category. A good example would be the suicide attack against the al-Askari mosque in Samarra, Iraq, which was a direct attack on the Shia community in Iraq. Many commentators of the conflict cite this attack as the beginning of the bloodiest sectarian fighting before the surge.⁸

Anti-infrastructure operations are a form insurgent combined warfare in this context, and are conducted against heavily guarded critical infrastructure in order to deny critical resources from the enemies.

Also, we need to distinguish insurgent combined warfare and expeditionary operation, when describing suicide attacks. Insurgent combined warfare is a term coined by the author to describe how suicide operations are integrated into conventional tactics in order to enhance the effectiveness of insurgent attacks. This also leads us to turn on to the question of insurgent and terrorist use of suicide operations. In Western military terms, two expressions are used to

⁵ Pape, Robert A. [2006]: *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, Random House pp. 226-227.

⁶ Coll, Steve [2004]: *Ghost Wars: The Secret History of the CIA, Afghanistan, and Bin Laden, from the Soviet Invasion to September 10*, Penguin Books, p. 582.

⁷ Iranian commanders assassinated, BBC News, 18 October 2009

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/8312964.stm

⁸ Kagan, Kimberly [2009]: *The Surge: A Military History*, Encounter Books pp. 8-11.

describe this phenomenon, but are not exclusively used for suicide attacks. These are: complex attack and coordinated attack. An ISAF statement defines these as follows:

- coordinated attack: *“an attack that exhibits deliberate planning conducted by multiple hostile elements, against one or more targets from multiple locations. A coordinated attack may involve any number of weapon systems.”*
- complex attack: *“an attack conducted by multiple hostile elements which employ at least two distinct classes of weapon systems (i.e. indirect fire and direct fire, IED and surface to air fire) against one or more targets. Complex attacks differ from coordinated attacks due to the lack of any indication of a long term planning process or prior preparation.”⁹*

The term ‘expeditionary operations’ is coined by the author, to describe operations that are conducted on terrain (probably in a foreign country), where terrorist/insurgent groups do not have political and logistical or any other kind of natural backing and have to build it on their own, in order to conduct an operation. More on this category will follow later in the article.

Finally, the author has to note that the categories above are not mutually exclusive, they give a better understanding of the attacks, and with what intention they were conducted. For example a symbolic attack can also be a mass casualty attack and expeditionary high value operation. An example would be for this the September 11, 2001 attacks in the United States.

Terrorism and insurgency

We must differentiate between suicide missions conducted by terrorist and insurgent groups, because the objective of these missions are markedly different. Yet, the main driver behind the growing number of suicide bombings is the adaptation of suicide missions by insurgents groups. We need to define these activities in order to differentiate between the two.

There are many ongoing discussions regarding the definition terrorism and insurgency, and it is not the objective of the article to participate in these. I will

⁹ Jacobson, Carsten [2011]: ISAF Violence Statistics and Analysis Media Brief, Sept. 29, 2011, ISAF News <http://www.isaf.nato.int/article/isaf-releases/isaf-violence-statistics-and-analysis-media-brief-sept.-29-2011.html>

use the current definitions of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization as available in the Allied Administrative Publication No 6: NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-6). AAP-6 considers both activities to be irregular activities. Irregular activity is *“The use or threat of force by irregular forces, groups or individuals, frequently ideologically or criminally motivated, to effect or prevent change as a challenge to governance and authority.”*¹⁰ This implies, that both terrorist and insurgent groups are relying on an ideology, which is seeking a policy change in one or more countries, using violent methods.

Accordingly, AAP-6 defines terrorism as: *“The unlawful use or threatened use of force or violence against individuals or property in an attempt to coerce or intimidate governments or societies to achieve political, religious or ideological objectives.”*¹¹ Insurgency is defined in AAP-6 as: *“Actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change or to overthrow a governing authority within a country or a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion.”*¹²

The two definitions clearly show important differences between the two activities: while terrorism usually seeks to alter some standing policy or policies, insurgency is a concentrated effort to force important political changes, such as replacement a government by the insurgent, seeking the secession of a territory etc. Thanks to the different magnitudes of their objectives, there are important differences in the organizational structures. While terrorist groups tend to be small, and seeking to mobilize political support through (sometimes symbolic) violence, insurgent groups need to have a clear cut military strategy and violence serves a better defined purpose (although symbolism can have great importance for insurgent groups).

What is the Jihadi movement?

There are many different definitions on what constitutes the Jihadi movement. We will use Abu Mus’ab al-Suri’s definition, which is quoted by Brynjar Lia: *“It comprises organizations, groups, assemblies, scholars,*

¹⁰ AAP-6 [2013]: NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Standardization Agency (NSA) p. 2-I-9
<http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/zPublic/ap/aap6/AAP-6.pdf>

¹¹ AAP-6 [2013] p. 2-T-5

¹² AAP-6 [2013] p. 2-I-5

intellectuals, symbolic figures, and the individuals who have adopted the ideology of armed Jihad against the existing regimes in the Arab - Islamic world on the basis that these are apostate regimes ruling by not what Allah said (...), by legislating without Allah, and by giving their loyalty and assistance to the various infidel enemies of the Islamic Nation. The jihadi current has also adopted the program of armed jihad against the colonialist forces which attack Muslim lands on the basis that those regimes are allies fighting Islam and Muslims.”¹³

As the definition makes it clear that the Jihadi movement consists of many different segments, which are often hostile to each other. Fawaz Gerges has introduced a feasible way of differentiating between jihadi groups through their different goals. Gerges differentiates between doctrinaire and irredentist groups in the first place. Irredentist groups are fighting for lands they consider to be part of the Islamic world and are now in the hands of non-Islamic countries. Doctrinaire jihadis can also be divided into subgroups, according to Gerges: the internal and global jihadis. Internal jihadis are fighting against the government of their respective countries, limiting the violence. Global jihadis are subscribing to the ‘far enemy’ theory, which was made popular by Al-Qaeda Central with their attacks. Essentially, this means that foreign powers, such as the United States and allied countries are made central targets of attacks, because of the support they are providing to the regimes jihadi groups are fighting.¹⁴

The appeal of the internationalist agenda grew during the 1990s, as the nationalist movements suffered defeats in Algeria and Egypt.¹⁵ The embassy attacks in 1998 and the September 11, 2001 attacks were part of the far enemy agenda. However, the Western answer to these attacks initiated great changes in jihadi movement during the last decade. Al-Qaeda Central has lost its preeminence on conducting anti-Western attacks, and increasingly associated groups, such as al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) or al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) became the prominent face of the movement. However, there also has been a further split, and AQIM for example had to

¹³ Lia, Brynjar [2010]: Jihadi Strategists and Doctrinarians, p. 103. in Editors: Assaf Moghadam, Brian Fishman: Self-Inflicted Wounds Debates and Divisions within al-Qa’ida and its Periphery, Harmony Project Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, pp. 100-131. <http://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2011/05/Self-Inflicted-Wounds.pdf>

¹⁴ Gerges, Fawaz A. [2009]: The Far Enemy: Why Jihad Went Global, Cambridge University Press pp. 1-2.

¹⁵ Besenyő János: A nemzetközi terrorizmus veszélye Észak-Afrikában, Új Honvédségi Szemle LXI. Évfolyam, 2007/12, 41-50. oldal

contend with part of the group becoming independent.¹⁶ These trends also brought back an old problem for the movement: Al-Qaeda Central had the ‘far enemy’ principle in mind, but the wider movement consists of groups engaging in violent conflict with the ‘near enemy’, refocusing at the near enemy, and by causing Muslim civilian casualties undermining the original idea and establishing the associated groups firmly in the fight against the near enemy, and marginally harboring expeditionary tendencies.

A brief history of suicide bombings

Robert Pape in his book, *Dying to Win: The Strategic Logic of Suicide Terrorism*, argues that suicide bombings originally were conceived as part of a national liberation strategies against foreign occupying forces. The first such attack after World War 2 was conducted on 11 November 1982, by Hezbollah against an Israeli Defense Force command and control and intelligence facility, killing 75 Israelis and dozens of prisoners.¹⁷ Soon, other attacks followed, the most famous of which are the attack against the US embassy (killing 36) and the US Marine and French Foreign Legion barracks (killing 241 and 58 respectively).¹⁸ The group also proved to be able of operating abroad: Hezbollah is suspected of having executed two suicide attacks in Argentina in 1992 and 1994.

The other major user of suicide attacks was the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Elam (LTTE), popularly known as the Tamil Tigers. Bruce Hoffman points out, that suicide operations were essential to the organizations identity, and used suicide attacks both as a military and a political tactic to further their aims. The LTTE also widened the use of these tactics, establishing for example a rudimentary sea guerrilla force, which also conducted suicide operations. The LTTE was also pioneering in the use of female suicide attackers. The use of these tactics had many benefits for the group: it could use the publicity to

¹⁶ For a quick overview of the question, see: Lebovich, Andrew: AQIM and Its Allies in Mali, The Washington Institute, February 5, 2013 <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/view/aqim-and-its-allies-in-mali> and Janos Besenyő: The European Union mission in Mali - Hungary's involvement in the mission, *Contemporary Military Challenges/Sodobni Vojaski Izzivi*, November 2013: pp. 25-37. http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/svi_15_3.pdf

¹⁷ Byman, Daniel [2011]: *A High Price: The Triumphs and Failures of Israeli Counterterrorism*, Oxford University Press pp. 209-210.

¹⁸ Byman [2011] p. 217.

differentiate itself from other Tamil groups; it could intimidate its enemies and present itself as a determined, professional organization.¹⁹

Palestinian groups also adopted this tactic. According to Bruce Hoffman, Hamas and Islamic Jihad operatives, while they were exiled to Lebanon by the Israelis, built relations with Hezbollah, which proved to be a crucial step to adopt suicide attacks.²⁰ The first attempted attacks took place in 1993, but all failed, it was only in 1994 that Hamas was able to conduct its first 'successful' suicide attack.²¹ Islamic Jihad soon followed the example. After that, suicide attacks became a common feature of the conflict, and the tactic was adopted by other groups. The attacks escalated after the beginning of the second intifada in 2000.²² The Palestinian case is interesting, because the adaptation of suicide tactics became widespread among Palestinian groups: the secular leaning al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade and the Marxist oriented Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) conducted suicide operations on Israeli territory (none of the groups conducted attacks against foreign targets or outside of Israel).²³

Effectiveness of anti-Western terrorist expeditionary suicide operations 1998-2001²⁴

As mentioned earlier, al Qaeda subscribes to an internationalist approach in its fight. This meant that instead of attacking the Arab regimes, it focused on the United States, which in its view was supporting or propping up these regimes and only then turn on the Arab regimes. To achieve this, AQ leadership attacked the symbols of American power in the region and beyond. Early on, two lines of teaching emerged: AQ wanted to demystify American power and destroy the public perceptions about it, and by attacking the American economy, it wanted to drain American resources. Later on, also provoking the United States emerged as a strategy. This thinking was based on a biased reading of American military capabilities and political intentions, and at least for a while, became a

¹⁹ Hoffman, Bruce [2006]: Terrorismus: der unerklärte Krieg, Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, pp. 225-230.

²⁰ Hoffman [2006] pp. 234-235.

²¹ Byman [2011] pp. 83-84.

²² Besenyő János: Női terroristák a radikális iszlámban, új biztonsági kihívások a 21. században, Szakmai Szemle, 2009. 4. szám, 195-205. oldal, <http://www.scribd.com/doc/132830221/Szakmai-Szemle-2009-4>

²³ Pape [2006] pp. 50-51.

²⁴ I've chosen this timeframe, because this could be called the classical period of the group, where it was at the top of its capabilities, and could plan more freely. Later on, because of the American and allied actions, its operational freedom decreased significantly, which was a major factor in limiting future planning.

popular line of teaching in internationalist circles, because it promised to link the other two lines.²⁵

AQ also had to confront the fact that for its wide strategy to be successful, it needed wide ranging popular support, thus, it had to find a viable mobilization strategy. AQ, like other jihadi organizations, built on an old phenomenon called the ‘propaganda of the deed’. The term was invented by Carlo Pisacane, an Italian republican radical, who fought against the monarchy. This approach was already used by anti-tsarist groups in Russia (such as Narodnaya Volya), who, by committing attacks against key individuals in the tsarist regime, wanted to mobilize the Russian society.²⁶ AQ leadership had something similar in mind.

Suicide attacks offered a good way of overcoming some of the hurdles. First, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, which merged with AQ at the end of the 1990s, had operational experience conducting such attacks.²⁷ It also promised to help AQ make its goals widely known, as media coverage was easy to come by with such attacks. However, the early attacks showed, that the leadership went one step further, and by conducting simultaneous attacks, AQ created its signature attack style with the 1998 embassy attacks.

The first step of the formulization of the strategy took place with the famous fatwa of 1998, in which Osama bin Laden declared war on the US and its allies, both civilian and military, and in any country, where this is possible.²⁸ However, the actual attacks it conducted in this period, are indicating, that the group’s main target was the United States.

To show the potential of the group, the coordinated suicide attacks were conducted in an expeditionary way (in this case meaning, that the attacks were conducted in countries, where the number of Muslims was small, and so the ‘natural’ base for potential support was limited and the hostile activity and reaction of the authorities was to be expected in case of a major terrorist operation). The two major suicide operations, attributed to al-Qaeda at the time, were the 1998 embassy bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, and of course the

²⁵ Stout, Mark. E. Huckabey, Jessica M., Schindler, John R., with Lacey, Jim [2008]: The Terrorist Perspectives Project, Naval Institute Press pp. 142-143.

²⁶ Hoffman [2006] pp. 26-29.

²⁷ Gerges [2009] pp. 142-143.

²⁸ World Islamic Front Statement [1998]: Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders, Federation of American Scientists <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/980223-fatwa.htm>

attacks in New York and Washington on September 11, 2001.²⁹ These attacks (and also the attack against the U.S.S. Cole) had in common, that the intended targets were symbols of American power, both political and military. These attacks also tried to limit collateral damage to Muslims, though not to the practitioners of other faiths, as the 1998 attacks claimed many local lives. So one can argue that al-Qaeda at this time was targeting the US, and only later came the allies of the US into the picture.

On the question of targeting foreigners, Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin,³⁰ a leader of the al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula, offers the following “target list” for his readers. Although his work is concerned with foreigners in the context of an insurgency, the prioritization of human targets is important to note.

Human targets according to Muqrin³¹	
based on faith	1. Jewish
	2. Christian
based on nationality	1. American
	2. British
	3. Spanish
	4. Australian
	5. Canadian
	6. Italian
based on occupation	1. economic, financial, business
	2. diplomat, statesman, analyst, etc.
	3. scientist, manager, other expert
	4. military personnel
	5. tourists and other people warned not to come

The effectiveness of the 1998 operations is arguably mixed. On the one hand, al-Qaeda could attack both targets, almost simultaneously and the ensuing media coverage (and the retaliatory strikes conducted by the US which were deemed to be ineffective) popularized the organization with the intended

²⁹ The suicide attack against the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen was not quite an expeditionary attack, as described above, but an ‘intermediate’ attack, because Al Qaeda had a larger contingent of Yemenis in its ranks. Also, the September 9, 2001 suicide attack, which killed Ahmad Shah Masoud is often attributed to Al Qaeda.

³⁰ Abd al-Aziz al-Muqrin was a Saudi born al Qaeda operative. He travelled to Afghanistan, where he received training. Later he went to Algeria and Bosnia-Herzegovina, and also other hotspots. He acquired great operational expertise, and became a leader of the al Qaeda organization in Saudi Arabia, where he was killed in 2004. Cigar, Norman [2009]: *Al-Qa’ida’s Doctrine for Insurgency: ‘Abd al’Aziz al-Muqrin’s A Practical Course for Guerrilla War*, Potomac Books, pp. 6-7.

³¹ Cigar [2009] pp. 129-130

audiences. The organization on the other hand was only able to kill only a few Americans, and the majority of the killed and wounded was local people, which showed that the attack was far from flawless. 12 Americans were killed in the Nairobi attack along with 201 other people, mostly Kenyans, while in Tanzania 11 people died, none of them was American.³² (The organization's success is also doubtful considering, that Mohamed Rashed Daoud al-'Owhali, one of the intended suicide attackers was captured alive and later sentenced).³³

Much of the same can be said of the September 11, 2001 attacks. It was shocking in its magnitude and the way it was executed. This attack, in hindsight also was fitting in two strategic goals: provoking the US and hurting its economy. The attack due to its brutality and indiscriminate nature was widely condemned also in Muslim countries, undermining AQ strategy.³⁴

The success of the attacks however compelled the United States to a swift response and this undercut the ability of AQ to follow its original strategy, and in the later years was forced more and more to rely on regional groups, which allied itself with AQ. Also, because of the diminished operational capabilities, AQ was forced to widen its targeting, presenting strategic problems for the group. This however, doomed the far enemy strategy, because the regional groups were locked in bitter fights Arab regimes, and their attacks invariably caused Muslim casualties, decreasing the appeal of AQ. A good example of this strategic problem, and the use of suicide attacks in this context, is presented by case of Al-Qaeda in Iraq (AQI).

Effectiveness of insurgent suicide operations against military and civilian targets in Iraq 2003-2009

Insurgent organizations have an inherent organizational advantage in planning and conducting operations. An insurgent organization, which was able to survive the initial stages of government crackdown and was able to mount some effective military resistance, needs to have at least a mediocre intelligence capability, relations to the population and some sort of logistical background (and ideally a safe heaven, where it can safely operate). From an operational

³² The 9/11 Commission Report [2004], National Commission on Terrorist Attacks Upon the United States, <http://www.9-11commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf> p. 70.

³³ Goldman, John J.: African Embassy Bomber Gets Life Sentence With No Parole, The Los Angeles Times, June 13, 2001 <http://articles.latimes.com/2001/jun/13/news/mn-9842>

³⁴ For more information, see: Gerges [2009] pp. 284-286.

viewpoint, an insurgent group has more capacity for planning, conducting target surveillance and is more flexible in the conduct of operations. AQI, later ISI³⁵ was able to establish itself despite its foreign origins in Iraq and had some of the above mentioned capabilities.

AQI had a markedly different task and objective compared to the AQ Central. Its task was to garner support in a civil conflict, while establishing itself as an indigenous fighting group, and its objective was to create a safe territory under the group's control, which can be used in the future for political purposes (this was a major difference compared to the more nationalistic groups, which were considering the future inside Iraq's official boundaries). In the opinion of the group's founder, Abu Musab Zarqawi, this was to be achieved by escalating violence, in order to fragment the country by sectarian lines. As he wrote in a letter intercepted and published by the United States: "*As for the Shi'a, we will hurt them, God willing, through martyrdom operations and car bombs.*"³⁶ In the same letter Zarqawi points out, that the path to success for his group is uniting the Sunni community by attacking the Shia community: "*If we succeed in dragging them into the arena of sectarian war, it will become possible to awaken the inattentive Sunnis as they feel imminent danger and annihilating death (...).*"³⁷ There were questions about the authenticity of the quoted document, however the later stages of the war show that this thinking was a base for the strategy the group adopted. The 'signature weapon', which AQI adopted for this end, was the suicide car bomb, in the use of which it gained great experience.

However, the tactics used by AQI weren't popular with AQ Central. In 2005 Ayman al-Zawahiri wrote a letter to the leader of AQI, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, regarding the strategy of the group. An old problem, for which Al-Qaeda Central tried to use suicide bombings, was the establishing and securing of support for the movement. Zarqawi, as already outlined, used to this and other tactics to ferment strife. Zawahiri wrote: "*In the absence of this popular*

³⁵ The name Islamic State in Iraq itself is also the product of a long development. Zarqawi's group was originally called Tawhid wal Jihad, which in 2004 allied itself with AQ Central, and was commonly referred to thereafter as al Qaeda in Iraq. In 2006 there was another change in name: AQI became the Mujahedeen Shura Council (MSC). The explanation was, that AQI became part of an indigenous insurgent movement, which adopted this name. A short time later, in October 2006 MSC came the Islamic State in Iraq (ISI), which was intended to show a more far reaching alliance. After the beginning of the civil war in Syria ISI became (depending on the source) ISIS (Islamic State in Iraq and Syria) or ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant).

³⁶ Zarqawi, Abu Musab [undated]: Zarqawi Letter: February 2004 Coalition Provisional Authority English translation of terrorist Musab al Zarqawi letter obtained by United States Government in Iraq, Department of State <http://2001-2009.state.gov/p/nea/rls/31694.htm>

³⁷ Zarqawi [undated]

*support, the Islamic Mujahed movement would be crushed in the shadows, far from the masses who are distracted or fearful, and the struggle between the Jihadist elite and the arrogant authorities would be confined to prison dungeons far from the public and the light of day. (...) Therefore, our planning must strive to involve the Muslim masses in the battle, and to bring the mujahed movement to the masses and not conduct the struggle far from them. (...) As for the sectarian and chauvinistic factor, it is secondary in importance to outside aggression, and is much weaker than it.”*³⁸ This shows the strategic disunity between ISI and AQ Central and by extension, the use of suicide attacks.

From the tactical perspective, AQI used all types of operations mentioned earlier in this article to some extent.³⁹ For the sake of clarity, I will split the discussion on effectiveness into military effectiveness against Coalition Forces and civilian targets. The Iraqi state and its security forces were of an increasing importance during the given timeframe, however data on the attacks against them is problematic, and a deeper analysis is outside the boundaries of the current article.

Against western military targets in Iraq, the effectiveness in causing casualties is not as good as the impression might be from media accounts. According to the Iraq Coalition Casualty Count,⁴⁰ of the 3780 Coalition servicemen and women, who died in Iraq during Operation Iraqi Freedom, only approximately 115 died⁴¹ in different forms of suicide attacks. (These included attacks conducted by suicide bombers, suicide car bombers, suicide truck bombs and even a suicide boat bomb.) Compared to IEDs, suicide missions proved to be far less effective in causing casualties. It can also be said, that the military effectiveness of suicide operations also decreased with time, as appropriate countermeasures were adopted in theatre to reduce casualties.

The effectiveness on the civilian population is much more difficult to judge. There are many factors, which are difficult to measure. Col. Derek J. Harvey in a conference paper stated great question about this topic: “*What is the*

³⁸ Zawahiri’s Letter to Zarqawi (English Translation) [2013], Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, pp. 4-5. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Zawahiris-Letter-to-Zarqawi-Translation.pdf>

³⁹ It even conducted expeditionary operations in Jordan, which was an attempt to widen the conflict. This however proved to be a great mishap on the part of the group, and it was widely condemned.

⁴⁰ Iraq Coalition Casualties: Military Fatalities, Iraq Coalition Casualty Count
<http://icasualties.org/Iraq/Fatalities.aspx>

⁴¹ The information supplied by the US Marine Corps doesn’t always include the cause of death, so this number only includes the KIAs where the cause of death is provided.

*effect on the local police? What’s the effect on the psychology and atmospherics in the community? How does that effect enable coercion or infiltration? How does that effect expand the insurgents’ freedom of manoeuvre or movement? How does that effect undermine investment? How does that effect undermine the activity of NGOs?”*⁴² These are some of the fundamental questions one needs to ask in order to assess the political effectiveness of suicide and other armed insurgent operations. However, I only can make general observations from the viewpoint of the insurgent group.

There are major differences about the approximate number of Iraqi civilians who have died in the course of the conflict,⁴³ which was made more difficult by the lack of tracking of violence against civilians from official sources. This is also true about the tracking of incidents.

Total number of suicide bombings in Iraq according to different sources (2003-2009)	
Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism Suicide Attack Database ⁴⁴	1202
Iraq Body Count ⁴⁵	978
RAND Database of Worldwide Terrorism Incidents ⁴⁶	969

It is uncertain, how many of these were conducted by AQI, because attributing attacks in an environment like Iraq is a very difficult process. The Chicago Project attributes 111 attacks to AQI, while the other databases don’t provide information on AQI specifically.⁴⁷

By any measure, it is a difficult task for any group, to keep up this kind of operational tempo. There is only very limited data on how ISI was able to get

⁴² Harvey, Derek J. [2005]: A Red Team Perspective on the Insurgency in Iraq, in: McGrath, John (ed.) An Army at War: Change in the Midst of Conflict, Combat Studies Institute Press, p. 213.

http://www.cgsc.edu/carl/download/csipubs/AnArmyAtWar_ChangeInTheMidstOfConflict.pdf

⁴³ One can cite the Lancet study (Roberts, Les, Lafta, Riyadh, Gafiield, Richard, Khudhairi, Jamal, Burnham, Gilbert [2004]: Mortality before and after the 2003 invasion of Iraq: cluster sample survey, The Lancet <http://www.cs.princeton.edu/~chazelle/politics/bib/lancet.pdf>), from 2004, which stated at the time, that more than 100 000 people died at that point in time. The Iraq Body Count project, which tracks fatalities in Iraq using press reports, local hospital records and other methods, has an estimate at the time of writing, which puts the total death toll including combatants, at 193 000. See: <https://www.iraqbodycount.org/>

⁴⁴ <http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/download.php?searchId=6758&file=summaryList>

⁴⁵ [https://www.iraqbodycount.org/components/multigraph/multicsv.php?sy=2003&ey=2009&type=ni&res=month&loc\[\]=0&wea\[\]=5&for\[\]=0&siz\[\]=0](https://www.iraqbodycount.org/components/multigraph/multicsv.php?sy=2003&ey=2009&type=ni&res=month&loc[]=0&wea[]=5&for[]=0&siz[]=0)

⁴⁶ The webpage doesn’t make direct linking possible to the results.

⁴⁷ Also, the majority of attacks recorded in the database are not attributed to any group (of the listed 1202 attacks, 970 are not attributed to any particular group). Also it is important to note, that more secular insurgent groups, such as the 1920 Revolution Brigade or the Islamic Army of Iraq, also conducted such operations, although in smaller numbers.

the human dimension in place. The so called Sinjar records offer an interesting glimpse into how the group was able to conduct its attacks. The Sinjar records are a collection of documents, which were captured by coalition forces near the Iraqi town of Sinjar in 2007.⁴⁸ Many of the documents are data sheets about incoming volunteers who are registered with the group. The data was published by Counterterrorism Center at West Point. After translating and analyzing the documents, Joseph Felter and Brian Fishman, authors of the first report on the topic for the Center, distilled 606 records of foreign fighters. Many of these records also had an ‘occupation’ part, in which the future work of the volunteer was listed (it is unclear whether this was added by the volunteer himself or by the administrator finalizing the record). However, of the 389 records, 217 had a designation in this field as suicide bombers, and 166 as fighters. According to the Sinjar records, the plurality of the suicide bombers were of Saudi origin (between August 2006 and August 2007), with the majority of incoming Libyan and Moroccan volunteers ending up as suicide bombers.⁴⁹

This latter dimension highlights the importance of foreign volunteers in conducting suicide operations. Indigenous personnel are often too valuable for insurgent organizations to use in such operations, so the role of foreign volunteers (except those, who have some valuable knowledge or experience) is limited, as the above mentioned statistics suggest. (Also, there is the fear that surviving foreign volunteers could bring the war back to their home countries, as has happened with Islamic countries after the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.)

The increasing role of women in suicide operations

The role of women in conducting suicide attacks is an increasingly visible one. Until the 1990s, there was no real discussion about the possible role of women as fighters. One of the first groups was the Hamas that made it possible for a woman to conduct a suicide attack.⁵⁰ Later, other groups in the wider Jihadi movement followed the example, most notably in Chechnya, but there were examples from Iraq and other conflict zones as well. Jihadi intellectuals followed the trend, and as David Cook points out that during the 1990s the cause

⁴⁸ Felter, Joseph and Fishman, Brian [2007]: Al-Qa’ida’s Foreign Fighters in Iraq: A First Look at the Sinjar, Combating Terrorism Center, p. 3.

⁴⁹ Felter and Fishman [2007] pp. 18-19.

⁵⁰ Besenyő [2009] pp. 196-198.

was taken up and promoted by them and largely they backed the forming trend, but not without confusion regarding the religious background.⁵¹

Also it is important to note that the use of female suicide bombers is much more widespread in nationalist Jihadi groups than the internationalist movements. The Chicago Project on Security and Terrorism Suicide Attack Database contains 148 attacks, which were perpetrated by women.

Attacks perpetrated by female suicide bombers according to country⁵²	
Afghanistan	4
Russia	26
Lebanon	9
Iraq	51
India	2
Sri Lanka	26
Pakistan	7
Israel and the Occupied Territories	10
Turkey	8
Somalia	3
Uzbekistan	2

Many of the groups, which conducted these attacks, do not harbor an internationalist agenda. For example, the LTTE was pioneering in the use of female attackers, but it limited its attacks only to Sri Lanka.

In 2003, the leader of Al-Qaeda in Saudi Arabia issued a pamphlet, in which he argued for the participation of women in armed struggle as fighters, and in 2004 an on-line journal was launched specifically for women. In 2009, a letter – said to be from the wife of Ayman al-Zawahiri – made the rounds on Jihadi forums, in which she encouraged women to volunteer for fighting and also for suicide operations.⁵³ However, until now these appeals haven't been translated into operations by Al-Qaeda Central.

⁵¹ Cook, David [2005]: Women Fighting in Jihad? Studies in Conflict & Terrorism, Volume 28, Issue 5, pp. 378-382.

⁵² <http://cpostdata.uchicago.edu/download.php?searchId=5870&file=summaryList>

⁵³ Ahmed, Houriya [2010]: The Growing Threat of Female Suicide Attacks in Western Countries, CTC Sentinel, Volume 3, Issue 7, <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/the-growing-threat-of-female-suicide-attacks-in-western-countries>

The first Jihadi female suicide bomber was Hawa Barayev, who committed her attack with a truck bomb in Chechnya against a Russian military target.⁵⁴ Although it was extraordinary considering the previous views on the role of women, other groups in the Jihadi movement followed the example. Hamas conducted its first suicide attack employing a woman in 2002, when Wafa Idris made a successful suicide attack.^{55 56}

Al Qaeda in Iraq proved to be an ardent follower of the new trend, conducting attacks not just in Iraq, but also in neighbouring countries, employing women suicide bombers. According to the Institute for the Study of War, this had a very simple reason: after losing the sanctuaries, which were needed to produce suicide car bombs, AQI switched to suicide bombers, and women had a higher chance of getting through the security measures.⁵⁷ AQI also used European volunteers, the first of whom was Muriel Degauque, a Belgian citizen, who carried out an attack against an American patrol on November 9, 2005, killing herself, and wounding a soldier.⁵⁸

Conclusion

Suicide attacks are considered an appalling form of tactics by a wide variety of people across the globe. However, for some non-state groups engaging in some forms of armed conflict, it is an appealing tactic, because it can bring tactical and strategic benefits, such as achieving a standing in a core community, providing new volunteers, financial backing etc. Suicide attacks also have a cost-benefit consideration, because, as Robert Pape argues, much wider publicity, and so more potential political achievement is possible through them than through other kinds of attacks.⁵⁹ Suicide attacks can produce heavy casualties, and most terrorist and insurgent groups view suicide tactics as their own brand of smart weapon. These groups also value the deep psychological impact the suicide attack has, and the media coverage it produces, enhancing its

⁵⁴ Ahmed [2010]

⁵⁵ Bennet, James [2002]: Arab Woman's Path to Unlikely 'Martyrdom', The New York Times, January 31, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/01/31/world/arab-woman-s-path-to-unlikely-martyrdom.html?pagewanted=print>

⁵⁶ Female bomber's mother speaks out, BC News, 30 January, 2002, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/1791800.stm

⁵⁷ Hamilton, Eric [2008]: Targeting the Diyala Suicide Bombing Network, Institute for the Study of War, pp. 2-3. <http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports>

[/Targeting%20the%20Diyala%20Suicide%20Bombing%20Network.pdf](http://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/reports/Targeting%20the%20Diyala%20Suicide%20Bombing%20Network.pdf)

⁵⁸ Belgian paper IDs 'suicide bomber', CNN, December 1, 2005

<http://edition.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/12/01/belgium.iraq/>

⁵⁹ Pape p. 62.

own impact. The further tactical benefits are also clear: it is a rather cost effective method; the planning is simplified by the fact that the attacker is supposed to die. As regards its utility from the insurgent or terrorist viewpoint, one only needs to quote Naim Qassem, a leading member of the Lebanese group Hezbollah: *“Despite the fact, that only twelve such operations were recorded, those dangerous resistance undertakings where the possibility of martyrdom was high are of incalculable value. Many mujahideen were martyred through atypical operations where death was an expected result. Martyrdom renders the military power threatening death ineffective, for such a menace acts only on those who fear it, and is powerless in front of those, who seek it.”*⁶⁰ The use of suicide attacks is also attractive, because it is a way for a group to shine out of a crowded field of other militant groups, and it can also strengthen the institutional identity of a group. As shown on the examples of AQ and AQI, the strategic effectiveness of suicide attacks is a more complicated problem and needs to be examined in its own context.

Suicide attacks can be stopped by adequate intelligence operations. This is especially the case with expeditionary operations, where at least some of the logistics or the experienced operatives have to come from abroad in order to prepare and carry out the attack. Good cooperation with intelligence services from other nations, which are at the forefront in the fight against these groups, is also very important. It is also important to keep in mind that groups which intend to conduct attacks will do everything to evade detection. For example, Daniel Byman cites a Shin Bet study, which states that there is no psychological or sociological or any other profile for an attacker.⁶¹

Hungary’s security risk is minimal in this regard. Until now, the AQ Central and the associated movements have concentrated on the United States and later on major Western European countries, because they consider them primary targets. Also, it seems that concentrating resources on planning is only deemed worthy when the success of earlier attacks can at least be replicated. Planning attacks, which seem less sophisticated and are against a country which isn’t among the primary targets, could be perceived by followers and other constituents as weakness and a step backwards. In the past few years, AQ Central’s capabilities in planning and conducting expeditionary operations have

⁶⁰ Qassem, Naim [2007]: Hizbullah: The Story from Within, Saqi p. 149.

⁶¹ Byman [2011] p. 101.

not been displayed, which may suggest, that these are either weak, or local priorities are proving more important. It is also important to note that only Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) tried to take up the internationalist role from AQ Central and displayed interest only in attacking the United States. The technological burden of logistics, targeting, planning is considerable, so it is of very low probability that new groups or individuals, without any backing from more formal groups, would be able to conduct symbolic, anti-infrastructure or mass casualty attacks by themselves.

This doesn't mean however, that there are no risks in the future. Vulnerable potential targets are a magnet for groups, which seek to organize such attacks. Thus, symbolic foreign targets are always at risk. Desperation could also lead to a widening of targeted countries and nationals, which could cause surprise. Finally, there are examples, where regionally oriented groups are experimenting with expeditionary operations, and these can cause surprises. A case in point is the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan, which under a previous leadership tried to attack American and European targets. In 2009, members of the group reportedly targeted the Barcelona metro system, and are said to have planned suicide attacks against it, before they were arrested by Spanish authorities, with the help of French authorities.⁶²

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⁶² Reinares, Fernando [2009]: A Case Study of the January 2008 Suicide Bomb Plot in Barcelona, CTC Sentinel, Vol 2. Issue 1. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/a-case-study-of-the-january-2008-suicide-bomb-plot-in-barcelona>

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TERRORIST CHALLENGES IN THE SINAI PENINSULA

Abstract

After the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, public order collapsed in the Sinai Peninsula and a potential danger zone developed. The existing terror-organizations became more radical in their ideology as well as in their methods (e.g. Jaysh al-Islam or Tawhid Wa-Jihad). These groups are similar to some extent, because they are in a loose or close relationship with the al-Qaeda's global organization and fight Jihad for the establishment of an Islamic State. They regularly commit attempts to weaken Israel, the Egyptian economy and security forces, and undermine the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement in general.

Keywords: Egyptian Revolution, Army of Islam, *Tawhid wal-Jihad*, danger zone

Nowadays, the main objective of the Egyptian security policy is to solve the crisis emerged in the Sinai Peninsula. The Twahid val-Jiad's name has got publicity due to three bloody attempts in the middle of 2000s, when the Egyptian security forces drove on them and deactivated them for a short time. The Army of Islam – established in the same year – attacked Israeli targets several times and it was connected with kidnappings, bombings in Cairo and Heliopolis and the assassinating against Coptic Christians in 2011.¹ Both terror-organizations maximally exploited the crisis evolved after the Arab Spring. According to assumptions, the Tawhid wal-Jihad re-organized its forces and the Army of Islam fought armed clashes with Egyptian armed forces several times.

The Profile of the Army of Islam

The Army of Islam (Jaysh al-Islam –Jaish al-Islam – AOI) came to existence in late 2005 in the Gaza Strip bordered by Egypt and Israel. In its ideology it unifies the extremist Salafist view of global jihad with the traditional Palestinian armed resistance.² Its proclaimed aim is to fight global jihad in the

¹ <http://www.ict.org.il/LinkClick.aspx?fileticket=5m1IqFJOa44%3d&tabid=66>

² It considers everyone infidel, who follows nationalist, patriotic, socialist, secular or democratic views, for example.

Palestinian Territories and outside of them against the apostates, hypocrites, Jews, Shi'a and the West apostrophizing crusaders. It judges and condemns Christians according to their conduct towards Islamic morals. Its long-range plan is to liberate Palestine and the holy places of the Islam as well as to create a global Islamic State based on the Sharia.³

Its base located near Tzabra. The size of the terror-group is estimated in the low hundreds.⁴ The membership is at the age of twenties and mainly comes from the Dughmush clan, one of the most powerful clan in the Gaza Strip. Actually, it is led by Mumtaz Dughmush (or Abu Muhammad al-Ansari) who seceded from the Popular Resistance Committee with his supporters in 2006. His exclusive right is to speak in advocacy of the terror-organization and its official statements are released on the internet by the Global Islamic Media Front.⁵ The leader conducts a group with complex organizational structure, where the activists – who are mainly under the age of thirty years – operate with dozens of intellectuals. At the same time, the hierarchical structure of the organization can be regarded immature and the contexture of the commandership is little transparent on upper levels.⁶ It receives its funding chiefly from a variety of criminal activities. Its clear indication is to create a state of chaos and to force out law of emergency. For the sake of this cause – beside kidnappings and assassinations – it exploded bombs against civil targets several times.⁷

The terrorist-organization had previously worked with the Hamas and it had been financed by Muhammad Dahlan, the security chief of Gaza according to unsubstantiated news.⁸ The relationships deteriorated in a short time after the political movement sized the power. The alliance turned into tense rivalry which resulted skirmish between them in 2007. It seemed that they managed to solve the conflicts favourably after the release of the abduct journalist, Alan Johnston.

³ McCants, Will: The Army of Islam Moves to Unify Palestinian Jihadi Organizations. <http://www.jihadica.com/the-army-of-islam-moves-to-unify-palestinian-jihadi-organizations/>, September 1, 2008.

⁴ According to the report of the Israeli Intelligence the terror-organization includes about 200 fighters, most of them are operating in the Gaza Strip. (Fishman, Alex: Tracking Sources of Sinai Terror, All Roads Lead to Gaza. In: Al-Monitor, August, 13, 2012.)

⁵ McCants, Will: The Army of Islam Moves to Unify Palestinian Jihadi Organizations. <http://www.jihadica.com/the-army-of-islam-moves-to-unify-palestinian-jihadi-organizations/>, September 1, 2008.

⁶ Bisharat, Solomon: Local attempts to tame the Army of Islam in Gaza. In: Islam Online – Gaza, November 25, 2010. (<http://deobandi75.blogspot.hu/2010/11/local-attempts-to-tame-army-of-islam-in.html>)

⁷ Qanan, Ibraheem: Exclusive interview with Gaza's Salafi leader. In: The Ma'an News Agency, May 19, 2010.

⁸ Roggio, Bill: US designates Palestinian Salafist group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In: The Long War Journal, May 19, 2011.

Later the Hamas led a series of armed actions against the Army of Islam in order to keep public order. In the same time, the fight with Israel and the Hamas weakened the Army of Islam. It was considered that the solution is to build closer ties with other terror-organizations. Thus, the other Palestinian jihadi organizations were called to unify under only one banner in August 28, 2008.⁹

Currently it is one of the four Salafist terror groups that seek and keep on closer ties to al-Qaeda from 2006.¹⁰ In an exclusive interview to Ma'an News Agency in May 2010, Jaysh al-Islam senior leader Omar al-Ansari represented the AOI as a group which had got independent organization and method. He said that it had its own imagination to reach its goals that are similar to al-Qaeda. Accordingly, the Army of Islam supports carrying out Jihad against enemy of Islam in Israel, Chechnya, Iraq, Afghanistan or Somalia together with particular Palestinian interests.¹¹

The group, which was also named as The Organization of al-Qaeda in Palestine by this time, is closely linked to extremist spiritual leader, Sheikh Abu Qatada, who is currently under British custody. They demanded his release in exchange for Johnston in 2007. The U.S. Secretary of State designated the organization as a foreign terrorist organization in virtue of the section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act on May 19, 2011. They froze all of the properties of the organizations and prosecuted its members for terrorist activities under section 1(b) of Executive Order 13224.¹² The direction was extended to

⁹ McCants, Will: The Army of Islam Moves to Unify Palestinian Jihadi Organizations. <http://www.jihadica.com/the-army-of-islam-moves-to-unify-palestinian-jihadi-organizations/>, September 1, 2008.

¹⁰ Their intentions were good subscribed by the exchanged letters between the leadership of the organizations in 2006. The Army of Islam reported to his financial problems and it asked an al-Qaeda operative, Atiyatullah al-Libi's advice for the solution on three matters: is it permissible a.) accepting financial acceptance from other militant Palestinian groups (e.g. Fatah or Palestinian Islamic Jihad), b.) investing funds in the stock market in support for the jihad and c.) striking drug traffickers and selling the captured drugs to enemies to weaken them as well as they could be useful double agents of the Jaysh al-Islam. Atiyatullah wrote his answer between October 26, 2006 and November 22, 2006. In his cordial but distant message he responded to the questions but refraining from giving any strategic advice. Sheikh Abu Harith al-Ansari's statement in August 2008 also refers to the relationship between the two organizations. The senior AOI leader claimed Osama bin Laden would urge to increase the attacks against Jewish targets in his announcement. Another statement, released on May 7, 2011, also shows their attitude. They eulogize bin Laden and his foundation in their outgiving just five day after the al-Qaeda leader's death. (Jaysh al-Islam's Questions to `Atiyatullah Al-Libi. In: Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. <https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/jaysh-al-islams-questions-to-atiyatullah-al-libi-original-language-2>; Roggio, Bill: US designates Palestinian Salafist group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In: The Long War Journal, May 19, 2011.)

¹¹ Qanan, Ibraheem: Exclusive interview with Gaza's Salafi leader. In: The Ma'an News Agency, May 19, 2010.

¹² Designation of Army of Islam. In: US Department of State, May 19, 2011. (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/05/163838.htm>); Roggio, Bill: US designates Palestinian Salafist group as a Foreign Terrorist Organization. In: The Long War Journal, May 19, 2011.

the leader, Mumtaz Dughmush on 16 August.¹³ Nowadays, it became a dominant organization of the al-Qaeda network, which effectively helps the smaller local cells in their preparation and is cooperating with the other groups in the area.¹⁴ According to Israeli intelligence, Mumtaz Dughmush runs most of the terrorist instruction camps in the Gaza Strip, where they train the activists for weeks and send them to Yemen, Syria, or to the Sinai Peninsula.¹⁵

Their positions are facilitated by the fact that the Hamas closes its eyes on its operation in order to keep his authority and the internal stability of the Strip. There is no want of activists due to the wave of violence in Sinai after Mohamed Morsi's overthrow on July 3, 2013.¹⁶ Some inhabitants, who live under the subsistence level, are receptive to their extreme ideology despite the forceful outface of the Egyptian Army. The jihadist thoughts stressed by the militant groups find positive fallout in their circles and many of them join to the fight against the military government.¹⁷

Attacking Israeli and Egyptian targets

The attacks and the kidnappings of foreign journalists have brought notoriety to AOI. The first action of the terrorist group happened on June 25, 2006, when two AOI operatives – in cooperation with two other organizations – killed two Israeli soldiers and abducted Gilad Shalit, who got back his freedom after five years captivity. Livening up on its success, they kidnapped an American and a New Zealander colleague of the Fox News on August 14, 2006, who were held in an abandoned garage for 13 days.¹⁸ Alan Johnston, a BBC correspondent, was dragged away by four armed men, led by Khattab al-

¹³ Designation of Army of Islam Leader Mumtaz Dughmush. In: US Department of State, August 16, 2011. (<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2011/08/170593.htm>)

¹⁴ For example the Army of Islam communicated with Ramzi Mahmoud al-Mowafi, the leader of the Al-Qaeda in the Sinai Peninsula in el-Arish in 2011, after he escaped from his prison due to the disturbances according to a high-ranking general of the Egyptian intelligence. (Profile of The Army of Islam, a Salafist organization affiliated with the global jihad operating in the Gaza Strip. in: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, August 21, 2012. – <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20385>; Fahmy, Mohamed Fadel: Osama bin Laden's doctor resurfaces. In: CNN, August 17, 2011.)

¹⁵ This was admitted by a statement released on July 28, 2012. In the pronouncement they report an AOI member, Nidal al-Ashi's death, who was killed in Aleppo, Syria. (Israel Security Agency forms new unit to counter Sinai Islamists. In: Diplomacy & defense, August 20, 2013. (<http://www.i24news.tv/en/news/israel/diplomacy-defense/130820-israel-security-agency-forms-new-unit-to-counter-sinai-islamists>); Roggio, Bill: Army of Islam fighter from Gaza killed in Syria. In: The Long War Journal, July 28, 2012.)

¹⁶ Besenyő János, Miletics Péter: Országismertető - Egyiptom (második, bővített kiadás), pp. 241-242

¹⁷ Dyer, Emily – Kessler, Oren: Terror in the Sinai. The Henry Jackson Society, London, 2014. 40-41. o.; Shay, Shaul: Egypt is Threatened by Islamic Terror. in: Arutz Sheva, January 3, 2014. (<http://www.israelnationalnews.com/Articles/Article.aspx/14339#.U44m7nZNrvs>)

¹⁸ Erlanger, Steven: 2 Kidnapped Journalists in Gaza Freed Unharmful. In: The New York Times, August 27, 2006.

Maqdasi. Finally the AOI delivered Johnston to Hamas officials after 114 days captivity due to the air of determination by Palestinian security forces and the pressure of Popular Resistance Committees.¹⁹ Despite of the failure, Hamas and Army of Islam established a joint committee, and Hamas recognized it as legitimate armed movement in the area under his jurisdiction.²⁰

Beside kidnappings, the organization made attempts mainly in the Gaza Strip and in the Palestinian jurisdiction area. It carried out many rocket attacks on Israeli targets and bombed Internet cafes, pharmacies, music stores and other recreational centers in the Gaza Strip, which were contradictory to Islam traditions. About a dozen masked activists attacked the American International School in Beit Lahiya, north of Gaza City.²¹

In addition to attacking Israeli targets, AOI has not refrained from striking on prominent Western statesmen, if they get in its vision. It planned to attack Tony Blair, the EU envoy to the Middle East, during his visit to the Gaza Strip on July 15, 2008. Finally the attempt failed, because the Israeli Security Agency got information about the preparations and the British ex-prime minister cancelled his travel after Defense Minister Ehud Barak's recommendation.²²

The network became sensibly radical after the Israel-Hamas truce on January 18, 2009, and targeted the Egyptian tourism like the other pre-existed terror-organizations. According the later investigations it was responsible for the Khan el-Khalili bombing in Cairo on February 22, 2009.²³ This was followed by another bombing in Heliopolis within a short time.

¹⁹ Staff writer: BBC's Alan Johnston is released. In: BBC News. July 4, 2007., Urquhart, Conal: Hamas increases pressure on Johnston's kidnappers. In: The Guardian. July 4, 2007.

²⁰ Halevi, Jonathan D.: Al-Qaeda Affiliate – Jaish al-Islam – Receives Formal Sanctuary in Hamas-Ruled Gaza. In: Jerusalem Centre of Public Affairs, August 20, 2008. (<http://jcpa.org/article/al-qaeda-affiliate-jaish-al-islam-receives-formal-sanctuary-in-hamas-ruled-gaz/>)

²¹ The action occurred on Saturday afternoon, so the school was close fortunately. The attack caused extensive damage, but no injuries and the two tied security guard left the place unharmed. (Kershner, Isabel: Bombing at U.S.-backed school in Gaza. In: The New York Times, April 21, 2007.)

²² Profile of The Army of Islam, a Salafist organization affiliated with the global jihad operating in the Gaza Strip. in: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, August 21, 2012. p. 10. (<http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20385>)

²³ The bomb, which weighed 1,5 kilograms and contained nails and metal fragments, was hided under a bench in the garden of the square, neighboring a café according to security officials. The explosion took place at 6.30 p.m., when the guests were watching a televised football match in the crowded place. 24 persons – 17 French, 1 German, 3 Saudi and 3 Egyptians – were wounded in the attack and a 17 years old French schoolgirl was killed. The number of the casualties could be higher, because another bomb was placed nearby. Fortunately it failed to detonate. (Reports: Cairo bombing not from known groups. In: CNN, February, 23, 2009; Suspects detained in

Cairo and Tel Aviv established still closer links in the fight against terrorism as a consequence of these actions. Omar Suleiman, the leader of the Egyptian General Intelligence Directorate, kept discussions several occasion with Israeli prominent higher-up persons. They decided to build a joint border-lock against leaking terrorist as well as smuggling weapons and drugs in 2007. The Israeli and Egyptian security forces took sanctions several times against the group's operatives beyond the preventing instructions. They arrested many activists and killed key persons of the terror-organization.²⁴

The effective actions could not demolish the Army of Islam and it was connected to the bloodiest bombing, which occurred in Alexandria on January 01, 2011.²⁵ AOI denied its participation in the planning and the execution, at the same time, it ensured perpetrators of his morale support.²⁶

The terror-organization made the best of internal instability as a consequence of Egyptian disturbances after January 25, and made several attempts in the Sinai Peninsula.²⁷ It launched rocket and mortal attacks several times against Israel from north part of the Gaza Strip in December. The Israeli

Cairo blast. In: BBC, February, 23, 2009; 'Small cell' behind Cairo blast. In: BBC News, February, 24, 2009; Rasmussen, Will: French tourist killed, 20 wounded in Egypt attack. In: Reuters, February 22, 2009.)

²⁴ The senior AOI leader Mohammad Namnam was killed daylight in his car in Gaza City by a missile fired from an Israeli helicopter on November 3, 2010. He prepared a terrorist attack aimed the American northern base, called el-Gorah, nearby the Palestinian enclave, according to Egyptian intelligence report. Arrests followed this action in the Sinai Peninsula and the Israeli Security Agency executed another air strike against AOI members in the centre of Gaza City on November 17. The Shin Bet killed two brothers, Mohammad and Islam Yassin, with one missile launched from an unmanned drone in the crowded al-Wihda Street. (Bannoura, Saed: Two Brothers, Members of the Army of Islam, Killed by Army Airstrike in Gaza. In: International Middle East Media Centre, November 18, 2010.; Sobelman, Batsheva: ISRAEL, GAZA: Security forces target Army of Islam operatives, again. In: Los Angeles Times, November 17, 2010.; Vick, Karl: Behind an Israeli Strike in Gaza, Help for Egypt. In: Time, November 10, 2010.)

²⁵ The warning of the attack may have been the announcement of Al-Qaeda in Iraq in November which pronounced "legitimate targets" all Christian in the Middle East. A suicide assassin detonated his homemade explosive device that contained nails and ball-bearings in front of the Coptic Orthodox Church according to the Egyptian Interior Ministry. 23 people died and 97 injured in the attempt. (Alaa Shahine, Alaa -Kassem, Mahmoud: Bomb Kills 21, Injures 79 at Coptic New Year's Mass in Alexandria, Egypt. In: Bloomberg News, January 1, 2011 - <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2011-01-01/church-bomb-kills-21-wounds-79-in-alexandria-egypt-update1-.html>; Wire Staff: Security tightened after deadly church blast in Egypt. In: CNN, January 2, 2011; Egypt church blast death toll rises to 23. In: Reuters, January 4, 2011.)

²⁶ Staff writer: Egypt blames Gaza group for bombing. In: Al Jazeera. January 23, 2011.

²⁷ It demolished a building of the Egyptian Security Service near el-Arish on February 04, damaged the Egyptian-Israeli-Jordanian pipeline on February 05, and blew up a church in Rafah on February 06. (Profile of The Army of Islam, a Salafist organization affiliated with the global jihad operating in the Gaza Strip. in: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, August 21, 2012. - <http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20385>)

Air Force smote several occasion on the identified units as revenge and the AOI leadership suffered a considerable loss.²⁸

AOI's name came up again when Egyptian soldiers prevented a Salafist jihad group leaking to Israeli soil in the Sinai Peninsula on August 05, 2012. The attack, which happened near Rafah during the Ramadan term, killed 16 Egyptian soldiers and caused a storm of public outrage throughout the countryside. The Army immediately led a broad military campaign against local jihad stronghold in revenge. One of the gunned terrorist on August 05 was AOI member, according the later investigations. The terror-organization was also mentioned by training and arming the offenders. The Egyptian authorities requested the extradition of three AOI leaders – among them Mumtaz Dughmush – from Hamas on the beginning of August.²⁹ Finally, the impeachment of the commander and his inferiors failed and AOI had carried out joint rocket attacks against Israel with Mujahideen Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem on November 19–21.³⁰

Tawhid wal-Jihad in the Sinai Peninsula

The Tawhid wal-Jihad (Monotheism and Jihad) is an extreme armed group operating in the northern part of the Sinai Peninsula. According to reports it was founded by Khaled Massaad Salem, a dentist from the prominent Sawarka tribe, known for his religious orthodoxy with his Palestinian friend, Nasser al-Mallali in the beginning of 2000. The network was established by the sample of a group in Gaza with the similar name and the two organizations built up close contacts. The first volunteers were Palestinian, Egyptian and Sudanese coming from mosques near al-Arish and Ismailia. Local Bedouins also joined in considerable number due to Salem's tribal and familiar connections. Recent years it managed to have a presence in Rafah where it established close cooperation with Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, whose leaders were also thought to be there. In 2006, the Egyptian authorities stated in an announcement that two Tawhid wal-Jihad terrorists suspected of involvement in 2006 Dahab bombing,

²⁸ The Israeli Air Force killed Abdallah Telbani on December 27, Rami Daoud Jabar Khafarna and Hazam Mahmad Sa'adi Al Shagr on the next day, and liquidated Muaman Abu Daf, a leader of the Army of Islam on December 30. (Roggio, Bill: Israel kills leader of al Qaeda-linked Army of Islam in Gaza airstrike. In: The Long War Journal, December 30, 2011.)

²⁹ Profile of The Army of Islam, a Salafist organization affiliated with the global jihad operating in the Gaza Strip. in: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Centre, August 21, 2012. (<http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/en/article/20385>)

³⁰ Barnett, David: Gaza-based Salafi jihadists conduct joint rocket attacks, Sinai jihadists suppressed. In: The Long War Journal, November 22, 2012.

had received weapons and explosive training from Popular Resistance Committees in Gaza Strip.³¹

There is no doubt that the salafist doctrines, proliferated among the Bedouins since the late 1980s, were very important in the emergence of Tawhid wal-Jihad. These ideas were imported to the Sinai by students returning from the universities as well as tribesmen, who had worked for years in Saudi Arabia. The growing religious idea could be noticed in several areas (e.g. changing their traditional clothes, young men were growing beards, boycotting the Egyptian authorities, asking the supremacy of sheikh, or demanding Islamist education and preaching).³² The terror-organization completely identified itself with al-Qaeda ideas and its global Jihad. Like the other Jihad network in the region, it cannot be clearly judged how important the actual cooperation is between them and how seriously they take into consideration the orders getting from Ayman al-Zawahiri.

The network had matured operationally in 2003, after the United States invaded Iraq. Initially, they stole vehicles and electric equipment from the Egyptian administration to finance the procurement of the necessary resources. Their weapon-supplies were smuggled from Sudan, with the help of operatives from global Jihad in Ismailia, under the direction of Salem al-Shanoub, who also coordinated the armed actions of the organization.³³

Targeting the Egyptian tourism

Tawhid wal-Jihad is one of the most active Salafist armed organization in the Sinai Peninsula.³⁴ Originally the organization wanted to train operatives and send them to Afghanistan and Iraq to fight against the United States and its

³¹ The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli civilian was killed. The attack emphasized the threat to Israel from the Sinai Peninsula and Egypt's difficulty in governing the region. In: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, August 2012 (http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20381/E_155_12_582238727.pdf)

³² Yaari, Ehud: Sinai: A New Front. In: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, No. 9. January 2012. pp. 5–6. (<http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/uploads/Documents/pubs/PolicyNote09.pdf>)

³³ The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli civilian was killed. The attack emphasized the threat to Israel from the Sinai Peninsula and Egypt's difficulty in governing the region. In: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, August 2012 (http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20381/E_155_12_582238727.pdf)

³⁴ Egyptian army kills military commander of Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad in Sinai. In: Ahram Online, January 19, 2014.

allies. However, the founders soon had to abandon this idea because of the many risks and great expenses. Khaled Massad Salem decided to focus their attacks on Egyptian tourist places alongside the Red Sea favoured by foreigners. Under his direction, the network bombed Taba and Ras al-Shita on October 07, 2004,³⁵ activated two car bombs and an explosive hidden in a suitcase in Sharm el-Sheikh on July 23, 2005³⁶, and exploded three remote control devices during the celebration of Spring Festival in Dahab on April 24, 2006.³⁷ The Egyptian Security forces launched a manhunt against the group-members as a consequence of these actions. They killed Khaled Massaad Salem on August 28, 2005 and Nasser Khamis, who replaced him as top leader, on April, 26, 2006. In November the Supreme State Security Court in Ismailia sentenced three men to death and ten others to prison after convicting them of taking part in the Taba attacks.³⁸ There is no doubt that the cruel campaign against the network tumbled its structure and disabled it for a short time, but could not eliminate it entirely.³⁹

³⁵ The bombing killed 34 persons, including 12 Israeli citizens, and injured 171. According to the Egyptian Government's announcement the attackers were Palestinian led by Iyad Saleh. The preparations have been ready for the action from the beginning of March. The terrorists built their bombs using explosives (TNT and old mines found in the Sinai and collected by Bedouins), washing machine timers, mobile phones, and modified gas cylinders. The assassins split into three groups on October 07, and Iyad Saleh with his aides drove into the lobby of Hilton Taba with his car bomb. Some 50 kilometers south, near Nuweiba another car bomb detonated in front of a restaurant, at the Moon Island. The third detonation, occurred in no time, hurt no one, because the guard of the Baddiyah camp thwarted the entering of the perpetrator. Iyad Saled also died with his aide in the bombing. The authorities arrested more than 2,400 persons during the investigation and sentenced to death three men in November 2006. (Sinai attackers failed to enter Israel. In: Ynet, February 4, 2005; Spiller, Penny: Taba attacks shatter Sinai tourism. In: BBC News, October 11, 2004; Staff Writer: Death toll rises in Egypt blasts. In: BBC News, October 9, 2004, Staff Writer: Mass arrests' after Sinai bombs. In: BBC News, February 23, 2005; Sweillam, Ashraf: Egyptian Court Condemns 3 Militants. In: The Washington Post, November 30, 2006.)

³⁶ The series of explosions killed 88 persons, mostly local Egyptians, and injured more than 200. The execution was similar to the 2004 Taba-case. The first bomb, hidden in a truck, blew up in the early morning hours at the Old Market bazaar. The second one, packed in a suitcase, exploded in front of the Hotel Moevenpick. The third truck bomb blew up in the lobby of Hotel Gazala Garden. (Death toll from Egypt blasts rises to 59. In: News.xinhuanet.com, July 23, 2005; Williams, Daniel: Egypt Gets Tough in Sinai In Wake of Resort Attacks. In: The Washington Post, October 2, 2005.)

³⁷ The perpetrators also detonated three bombs, hidden different places, in this case. The first one blew up in front of the Al Capone restaurant, the second bomb detonated near the Gazala Shopping Centre and the third one targeted a bridge favored by walking couples in the evening. The casualties also were mostly local Egyptians. The size of the destruction neared the Taba attacks: approximately 150 people injured and 30 died, including one Hungarian citizen. (Egypt: Dahab Bomb Explosions. In: DREF Operational Final Report, DREF operation n° MDREG003, January 2, 2008.)

³⁸ Nasser Khamis al-Mallahi. In: Global Jihad, the 21st century's phenomenon, http://www.globaljihad.net/view_page.asp?id=1261, Staff Writer: Sinai prisoners stage hunger strike over trial-free detention. In: Egypt Independent, February 17, 2011.

³⁹ The Gazan-based Salafist jihadi network Tawhid wal-Jihad carried out the terrorist attack on the Israeli-Egyptian border on June 18, 2012, in which an Israeli civilian was killed. The attack emphasized the threat to Israel from the Sinai Peninsula and Egypt's difficulty in governing the region. In: The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, August 2012 (http://www.terrorism-info.org.il/Data/articles/Art_20381/E_155_12_582238727.pdf)

The group started its activity again after the 2011 Revolution due to the declination of public order and the release of its operatives sentenced to prison for taking part in previous attempts. However, it changed its methods and targets. Nowadays it seems that the terror-group prefers attacking Egyptian officials, who are considered as infidels by them. However, it is very difficult to localize its activity and see its importance, because some groups are misusing its name many times: unaffiliated Bedouin armed men and independent groups using Tawhid wal-Jihad, when claiming responsibility for an attack. It is assumable – at the same time – that the operatives of the Islamist organization attacked a searchpoint in front of the Alexandria Bank in al-Arish on June 22, 2011.⁴⁰ One month later, they swooped down upon a police station again in el-Arish and killed five policemen, according to the charges. The Ismailia Criminal Court found guilty the arrested members of the network in the two attacks on September 24, 2012. It sentenced 14 people to death, eight convicted in absentia, and four condemned to life imprisonments.⁴¹ Their comrades tried to rescue the six members waiting for their execution and in May 2012. They demanded their release in exchange for seven security men, who were kidnapped in Rafah.⁴²

The campaign of the Egyptian Army in the Sinai also seriously affected the terror-organization. The soldiers killed the military leader of Tawhid wal-Jihad, Ahmad Hamdan Harb Malki, known as Abu Mariam, in an exchange of fire on January 19, 2014.⁴³ It is thoughtful at the same time that the group did not claim responsibility for the terror attacks of recent years. This may confirm the unofficial news, according to which, the terror-organization merged into Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis in the meantime.⁴⁴

Conclusion

After the 2011 Egyptian Revolution, the Tawhid al-Jihad became active again and the Army of Islam became more radical in its ideology as well as in its

⁴⁰ The four perpetrators arrived at the place by motorcycles and a 4x4 car, where they shot down the guards in front of the Alexandria Bank. Two police officers were killed and two others injured in the clash. (The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights denounces attacking a police search point in Aresh. In: The Egyptian Organization for Human Rights, June 23, 2011. – <http://en.eohr.org/2011/06/23/the-egyptian-organization-for-human-rights-denounces-attacking-a-police-search-point-in-aresh>)

⁴¹ Mohamed, Yusri: Egypt sentences 14 to death for 2011 Sinai attacks. In: Reuters, September 24, 2012.

⁴² The six Egyptian police officers and the army border guard released unharmed after Egyptian Army sent reinforcements to the area. (Militants Release Seven Egyptians Kidnapped In Sinai. In: The Nigerian Voice, May 22, 2013.)

⁴³ Egyptian army kills military commander of Al-Tawhid Wal-Jihad in Sinai. In: Ahram Online, January 19, 2014.

⁴⁴ Gold, Zack: Security in the Sinai: Present and Future. ICCT Research Paper, March 2014. p. 9. (<http://www.icct.nl/download/file/ICCT-Gold-Security-In-The-Sinai-March-2014.pdf>)

methods. It is necessary to emphasize that this change cannot be considered as a result of the direct involvement of al-Qaeda. Despite the connections with the terrorist network and their oath of loyalty, it can be stated that the two groups are committed mainly to their selfish interests rather than to the common ideology. However, there is no doubt that they have common long-term idea. The local groups use their al-Qaeda connections mainly to gain worldwide reputation, to recruit voluntaries and to get financial aids from jihadist communities. It is assumable after all that these terror groups will support the Salafist elements in the area and regularly commit attempts to weaken the Egyptian economy and security forces, and undermine the Egyptian-Israeli Peace Agreement in general.

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LÁSZLÓ BÉKESI, PHD

**ANALYSIS OF SECURITY ISSUES IN FRENCH GUIANA BY THE EYES
OF A RECCE**

Abstract

This study shows a geopolitical, security and risk analysis of French Guiana concerning its location, neighbours, borders, population and natural resources. Key field of the research was the analysis of Guiana's isolated location as a source of several risks. The next key risk-group can be found in the fact that the territory, language etc. of French Guiana is far from the neighbours, but far also from Europe as a supply source. Although the topic seems to be marginal, it was pointed out that every conflict here in Amasonia could have a painful and direct effect on the European Union.

Keywords: EU-South American relations, cross-border crime, border and frontier risk analysis, geopolitical dimensions, migration, security dimensions, Foreign Legion, distant theories, distance as punishment, colonial/imperial prison and labour camp structure of France and Russia

A land of periphery with the ruins of former labour camps and prisons closed in the early fifties, built originally for both criminals and political prisoners, a land with barbed wire-secured Soyuz rocket launcher base and many many Russian speaking soldiers in camo uniforms. A land with gold and many rare natural resources. A land of criminals, illegal guns, migrants and smugglers.

We are not in Kazakhstan or in one of the other former Soviet Republics. We are far from the GULAGS. The Russian speaking soldiers are working in the French Foreign Legion, the migrants are from Brazil and Suriname (and from China and former Indo-China as tribes loyal to France in the Indo-China war moved here by the French government). We are in the European Amasonia or as it called officially in Guyana Francoise or French Guiana, in South America. We are on the land of the EU, we are on the land of France far away from the European Continent.

I would like to summarise some of the risks of this territory. All of these possible problems could influence the entire security structure of the European Union.

Border Security

As we will describe in the chapter of distances, French Guiana is totally isolated for several reasons. It is an exclave of the European Union and France, out of the main body of the continental French territories. It is also isolated from the neighbouring Brasilia and Suriname, because both borders are marked with wild rivers without working/opened bridges. The isolation is strengthened by different language, culture and economic statuses as well.

Isolation means also some safety on the one hand. As several authors emphasized seashore, rivers, mountains and impenetrable forests are natural limits to certain „harmful” human activities, including the spread of diseases, migration, illegal and criminal activities (for example BÉKÉSI, 2004)¹,but on the other hand, also to the spread of benign innovations and trade.

Isolation entail also risks in various dimensions. Especially this isolation limits the access to resources, limits the supplies, for example in the case of gasoline shortages or a possible health crisis situation.



Picture 1.

'The bridge is too far.' It is the only road connection to the neighbouring countries from French Guiana. We can see the bridge to Brazil at the Oyapoque River at St. Georges. Although the bridge is ready, it is not opened due to security reasons. Also the roads are only under construction basically on both the Brazilian side (since the 1940's) and on the French Guiana side. The picture was taken from a smuggler boat which booked the author to Brazil from French Guiana for 6 Euro 25 Cents. **Source:** Author's photograph

Borders here could be understood rather frontier than border. Border is a clear line dividing two powers, administrative, military, governmental units, states etc. Borders are easy to find or spot since they are clearly marked by signs, wires, and walls and controlled by regular (border customs, police etc.) troops.

Frontier is rather a zone dividing two different powers (BÉKÉSI, 2004). There is a huge zone with uncertain power and control conditions. In one moment the 'zone' could be controlled by a governmental power as police,

¹ BÉKÉSI, László (2004) A politika földrajza. Budapest, AULA.

army, customs, etc; but in the next moment the same area is under the control of rebels, criminals, terrorists, smugglers, gangs etc. In this case we can say that the entire Guiana is a frontier zone with mixture of power control dynamics. This holds true especially for the almost 200 kilometres uninhabited zone of French Guiana towards Brazil.

Internal Security

Here I just summarise some of the signs of possible risk factors based on my own experience.

In remote rural areas it is normal to see civilians, even local teenagers with handguns. Most of street signs, speed limit signs on jungle roads have dozens of bullet holes all around the country.

If you speak to local people, mostly French government workers, employees spending a shorter or longer working time in Guiana, they all advise you not to bring more than some 10 Euros with you when walking outside on the streets of major cities like Kourou or Cayenne.

When we wanted to take a short walk with a notebook in our hands, two people warned us immediately not to do it, because it is dangerous walking with the machine in our hands. There are two armed robberies per a day in Kourou. Gendarmerie personnel going for a lunch or dinner to restaurants still keep their bullet proof vests and weapons in their hands, ready for fast action. The emergency number contains only two digits. There is no time to dial three digits... In key areas, the gendarmerie deploys huge number of armed personnel and huge number of vehicles with protective gear in case of riots or criminal activities.



Picture 2.

A peaceful day in Kourou. Fast reaction mobile Gendarmerie troops transporting vehicles waiting for the next episode of crime or riot outside of the barracks (most of former tourist bungalows with swimming pools and tennis courts were transformed into gendarmerie and riot police garrisons to allow a huge number of armed forces personnel to stay in key/strategic areas close to densely populated city centres, but still hidden, to avoid direct provocations). **Source:** Author's photograph.

Streets were full with empty wallets and mobile phone pouches as sign of recently committed crimes/robberies.

Not only the Gendarmerie employ almost exclusively Frenchmen from Europe. Even the loyalty, reliability and professionalism of fire-fighters of the Space Center in Kourou is guaranteed in an unusual way. The fire brigade down in the rainforest in South America are subordinated to the Fire Brigade of the City of Paris, firemen are sent from the French capital for a short service period.

The area of Guiane is mentioned in the legends of Eldorado. Voltaire (1989)² even mentions French Guiana as Cayenne. The legend of Eldorado both back in the 18th century and today based on the fact of really existing natural resources. The entire territory of Guiana is a 'gold and precious stone mine'. Besides the official exploitation zones, there are unknown number of small scale illegal armed gold washers'. Their number could be some five thousand groups. They are fully armed gangs working hidden in the rainforest with small water pumps and engines. If one of these groups are unveiled, it does not hesitate to use its weapons. Once we saw one group of them waiting for their truck on a jungle road with their tools and water pump engines, some hundred kilometres away from the nearest settlement. The French Foreign Legion and troops of the customs made several huge scale operation against them, leaving behind fatal casualties on both sides. These illegal activities rises several questions: weapons, drugs and gold, their trafficking, environment destruction and pollution, conflict with local citizens, or extreme situations like how to help an illegal, Portuguese speaking criminal without health insurance if bitten by a cayman, snake or spider.

One of the outcomes of the island situation (practically without roads to any neighbouring countries, surrounded by Atlantic Ocean, two rivers and jungle) is that it is difficult to have permanent supply of anything. As in the case of Guadeloupe and Martinique, it is too expensive to have the regular French products on the shelves.

The risk of supply is neither based only on far French centre in Europe, nor on ineffective transport possibilities with the nearest neighbours. French language has several words for strike. It is just one sign of this possible danger. French Guiane's infrastructure is very vulnerable. All inhabited areas, infrastructure, roads are mostly existing on the coastal areas and river deltas. The number and capacity of petrol stations are extremely limited. In a case of a petrol industry 'grève' (strike in French) roads became empty within hours as in late December 2013. Because of the isolation, extreme climate and lack of basic

² VOLTAIRE (AROUET, Francois-Marie) (1989) *Candide, vagy az optimizmus*. Budapest, Szépirodalmi Kiadó.

public transport within the cities or between the settlements etc. a long 'grève' can have deadly consequences. Food (and drink) cannot be distributed, people cannot reach their workplaces, health service can collapse, tourists cannot drive back to the airport, vehicles could break down in the middle of Amazonian jungle, 200 kilometres away from civilisation, far away from food and water, armed forces could be blocked from effective reactions etc.

French Foreign Legion units are not only responsible for security and fighting against crime, smugglers, drugs and illegal gold washers. They control roads in many ways. They regularly and firmly check vehicles and travellers together with Gendarmerie and customs units both in unexpected places or strengthened checkpoints. They check transport safety and repair roads and communication lines as well. Rains, storms are simply can wash away any roads or bridges within a rainy season or simply within one rainy night (DEBAY, 2003)³.

Distance Theories

French Guiana is considered as a periphery area of classic geopolitical thinking. It is far from core areas, far from classic powers, with small population and limited infrastructure.

However, there are several signs of rising importance and moving towards the core in various dimensions especially regarding geopolitics and geostrategy.

The closeness of Brazil is a potential chance for trade and cooperation. Brazil is not only a possible future regional and maybe global actor, but a huge market for EU products and a source of natural resources badly needed for Europe. The cooperation with neighbouring countries is still limited since there is no functioning land border from French Guiana towards Suriname or Brazil. In both directions, there are border-rivers. The bridge over Oyapoque River is not officially opened but it is discussed in the chapter dealing with border security.

Space research Base in Kourou is another sign of moving towards centre of the world of sciences, services, research, communication and global cooperation. DOLMAN (1999)⁴ also mentions the fact that the close position to the equator, just 5° to the north gives 17% fuel efficiency to the Kourou launching zone comparing to Cape Canaveral in the United States.

³ DEBAY, Yves (2003) French Foreign Legion Operations 1990-2000. Ramsbury, Crowood Press.

⁴ DOLMAN, Everett C. (1999) Geography in the Space Age: An Astropolitical Analysis. In: GRAY, Colin S. and SLOAN, Geoffrey (eds.) Geopolitics, Geography and Strategy. London, Frank Cass Publishers. p. 83-106.

Concerning distances and borders, we can state that French Guiana could be better understood if we consider it as an island. It cannot be reached on roads. From the south it is blocked by the rainforests, mountains and muddy lakes. From Suriname (on the West) and Brazil on the East there are huge rivers. The only bridge on Oyapoque River towards Brazil is ready, but its opening day is uncertain. It is also an island by political status as a European Union territory. Island by the means of culture and language (see below in the Distance as Cultural Phenomenon chapter), since the only French speaking zone in South America with huge Spanish and Portuguese language hegemony neighbourhood. It is an island not only by the language of France, but by French culture, architecture, history or even French cuisine, with a special mixture of local food traditions. It is also an island of a kind of welfare and social security compared to its neighbouring countries.

Distance as Cost

On the one hand, the distance between mainland French territories and Guiana is huge both in kilometres and time. But on the other hand, France tries to „bring this overseas territory close to Paris” in the sense that it keeps all prices down which would be higher considering the distances, shortages, needs and market economy rules. As a part of their support policy in French Guiana someone can find French products from Martinique at a lower price than in Martinique itself. Telephone and mobile fares, postal services fees are exactly the same as between two French destinations within European based continental France. It means that the French government has sacrificed huge expenses to keep the products’ and services’ cost as low a possible. Even between Hungary and this South American territories Hungarian mobile companies are offering the same roaming fees as between Hungary and for example Vienna. Somehow, all this is rather artificial and not easily sustainable and these measures are rather some symbols of political integrity of the French territories.

Because of the expensive transport, trafficking has opportunities everywhere. Not always in a dangerous, criminally judged way, but could be that a restaurant can save money if they buy the Coca-Cola from a ship from Trinidad and Tobago.

Distance as Punishment

In our mental maps there is the simplest way to categorise areas, territories: good places and bad ones. It was in the same way in history. Empires divided their territories as good areas and bad areas, central places and periphery etc. As in the history of other huge empires, the French empire also needed ’bad places’ for not welcomed functions. This functions can simply described in location

theories as LU-LUs or NIMBYs, Locally Unwanted Land Use or necessary land use, but 'Not-In-My-Backyard' (BÉKÉSI, 1998)⁵.



Picture 3.
Locally Unwanted Land Use in French Colonies I.

19th century Asylum in the Caribbean, on the Island of Martinique. The Asylum was hidden in the northernmost area of the island in the rainforest, next to the functioning volcano of Mount Pelee. The complex place was built for 300 mentally disabled people, far more than locally needed. It suggests that the patients were transferred here from other French territories as well. Because of the risky location, in 1902 all 300 people were killed by the deadly hot gas eruption of the volcano. **Source:** author's photograph

Some earlier not wanted land use in case of empires: home for disabled and mentally disabled people, including leprosariums and prisons. Spanish Empire ran her leprosarium in the Mariana Islands showing that it was the worst peripheric area of the empire.

Today's Guam, one of the Mariana islands became one of the most strategic zone of the US armed forces, having huge traditional and nuclear weapon arsenal, inaccessible for possible rivalising states. The first nuclear bombs were sent from the neighbouring Saipan Island to Hiroshima, most of the island's surface was transformed into landing zones and other military and naval facilities. The Mariana Islands reached their strategic importance because they were very close to Japan. Later, in the Korean War and in the Vietnam War era they also served as logistic and air force bases. No wonder Japanese soldiers came out from the jungle still in the seventies because they believed the world

⁵ BÉKÉSI László (1998) Területi tervezés és a társadalom kapcsolata Hollandiában
In: Temesi József (szerk.) 50 éves a Budapesti Közgazdaságtudományi Egyetem: Jubileumi tudományos ülés, 1998. október 1-3.. 3092 p. Konferencia helye, ideje: Budapest, Magyarország, 1998.10.01-1998.10.03. Budapest: BKE, 1998. pp. 1042-1060. (ISBN:963-503-204-8)

war II is still on, they saw only endless number of bombing squadrons take off (not for Japanese but first Korean, later Vietnamese destinations...). (BÉKÉSI, 2004)

Back to Guiana. It became the location of France most feared prison system. Created by Napoleon III in the 1850's it became the home for both his political enemies and criminals. Dreyfuss spent his punishment here in this hidden corner of the French state. The secret prison system became world famous when Henry Charrière's book the Papillon (CHARRIÉRE, 1982)⁶, was published (in 1969 in France) more or less at the same time when Solzenyicin, wrote his famous memoirs about the GULAG system between 1973-1975 (SOLZENYICIN, 2009)⁷.

In both cases, distance was a part of the punishment. The distance means here both in South America and Siberia different, extreme climate conditions, distance from civilisation, lack of any place to escape, isolation by nature, distance from communication and information, risk of diseases as yellow fever, malaria etc. It is quite the same while Spanish government sent their Basque prisoners to the Islas Canarias: totally different culture and expensive cost for the relatives to visit from the Basque Country.



Picture 4.

Locally Unwanted Land Use in French Colonies II.

Prison established on Devil Island and on two neighbouring islands became one of the longest used colonial punishment zones that became infamous for its brutality, extreme conditions, the mortality rates etc. **Source:** Author's photograph

Leprosarium was also settled in French Guiana as another not wanted land use form.

⁶ CHARRIÉRE, Henry (1982) Pillangó. Budapest, Európa Könyvkiadó.

⁷ SZOLZSENYICIN, Alekszandr (2009) GULÁG szigetecsoprt. Budapest Európa Kiadó.

Distance as Cultural Phenomenon

This is another added fact to consider the area as an island rather than an embedded territory of South America.

This zone is belonging to and depending on a power outside the Americas. It is a mixture of local, Africa and European traditions. The French language is not spoken anywhere else as a major communication channel. The next Francophone area is the tiny Carribean islands of Guadeloupe and Martinique. Different language, history, political power, economic status and potential all makes all kinds of interaction difficult between locals and neighbours in economic, cultural and many other levels.

Even music and local food is a quite unique mixture of French, African and South American traditions, which cannot be found anywhere else.

Role of Armed Forces

It is most probably one of the most militarised areas of the European Union. There is no possible armed conflict with the neighbouring Suriname or Brazil.

So the presence of armed troops has other explanations:

- They are securing and guarding the Space Centre at Kourou and several other zones with telecommunication and other space research related functions.
- Armed forces have a function of controlling borders and the entire territory, keeping away illegal immigrants and especially gold washing gangs. In the border areas it is a well known explanation that criminals came from Brazil and Suriname, but we can hear the opposite, as well. Most of the criminal activities here – as all around the world – have cross border dimension. Here these activities encompass mostly gold and jewellery stone exploration and smuggling, drugs and weapons trade or crime against protected animals. We were several times stopped and checked by the Gendarmerie and the customs, both in our rented car and on the airport. The armed personnel had not only one specific aim to search. For example, if someone crossing the border from Serbia to Hungary, both police and customs officers will search only for cigarettes because it is the most common way to break the law. But in French Guiana customs, gendarmerie checkpoints, or a Foreign Legion patrol would never know what kind of crime they could be facing. If they check a car or a person, it could be a gold washer, (all kinds of) drug user or

(all kind of) drug dealer, spy, space station saboteur, snake or monkey or butterfly (!) hunter or trafficker, a weapon user or weapon dealer, a robber or whatever we can imagine. At the airport, our gift coffee was opened, our drinking water was chemically tested, our documents were seriously controlled, all cash were registered, questions were asked about drugs, protected animals, gold, diamonds, previous and next destinations, movements within Guiana, jobs etc twice, once on the road towards the airport and once inside the airport.

- There is one more reason for armed forces existence in Guiana. It is a training centre for European, NATO and 'friendly' troops, special forces, possible future peace keeping soldiers. The extreme conditions and history of the 3rd Regiment of the French Foreign Legion are the key element of the serious training in several camps. This regiment was serving in both world wars in unusual areas as it was the only French unit advanced as far as Austrian territories in the last days of World War II., they served in Indochina and Algeria as well. The writing about all this is far from romantic novels (SPALEK, 2005)⁸. The training is pure pressure on the limits, surviving techniques, mud, mosquitoes, and teamwork and energy concentration, with less and less fatal casualties than before.
- Because of the 3rd Regiment of the French Foreign Legion, which has several zones, barracks, camps and huge walled urban areas, you do not have to feel homesick. You could find many Hungarians (and Russians and Central Europeans) in the phone directory, mostly settled down as ex-Legionnaires.

Risk of the population

Here we have to mention some risks which could influence both the internal security and the security of the European Union.

One of the problem -as we mentioned before- is the migration which is difficult to be controlled by the norms of classical border control.

The migrations have two heavy flows. One is the migration from neighbours to French Guiana. And the most visible one is the migration of local population to Europe. The local people, as EU citizens can easily settle down in France. If you visit St. Denis, the district of north of Paris with the medieval cathedral comprising most of the French kings' tombs, you will be surprised to

⁸ SPALEK (2005) *Moderní Cizinecká Legie*. Praha, Nase Vojsko.

note that all the people on the streets came from Guiana or French Caribbean territories. They are proud of their origin, and they sign it in their clothes, jewellery etc. A young man wearing a t-shirt, earring, necklace or baseball cap with '972' on it in Paris, refer to his origin in a secret way: 972 is the code of 'Département' Martinique, code for car licence plates of the area into the Caribbean etc.

The entire area of French Guiana is not densely populated, but urban areas of Kourou and Cayenne are over packed, regular scene of gang fight, riots, crime often with ethnic dimension. Surprisingly also the empty areas can be the places for crime, robbery etc., hundred kilometres away from the next settlements.

Social security represents a serious issue too. It is hard to imagine that old members of local Indian tribes will ever get pension from Paris. People here have extreme structure of labour market positions. We find huge masses with low education and huge groups of unemployed people. On the other hand, workers and armed forces personnel should be 'imported' from Europe. We find super high qualified scientist working in the space industry as well. This labour market structure is unusual and unhealthy as well.

Also if we mention health issues: Malaria and Yellow Fever are still present in the area. Officially before boarding, your vaccination certificates will be checked in airports. But as we mentioned, you can cross the border between Suriname and Guiane or Brazil and Guiane without any (health) control, so it is a serious and underestimated risk if we just see the Ebola situation in Africa right now.

Conclusions

Most of the risks are based on social inequalities and illegal activities (as illegal gold washing or forestry, hunting and dealing with protected animals or endangering properties of companies or individuals by robbery). Crime is often related to drug use. Terrorism – based on political, ideological, religious theories or separatist ideas – has very small chance. It is because although the people are relatively poor; most of the inhabitants have advantages belonging to the European Union. Risks of any terrorist activities are also limited thanks to the French Armed Forces' clear and heavy presence on the side of the Army (French Foreign Legion 3rd Regiment), the Gendarmerie and the Customs. There are some riots, but mostly without clear political or religious aims. There are no groups with immediate separatist plans, since the economic possibilities and the jobs are directly or indirectly dependent upon the Space Centre and other French or European Union activities/supports, while the neighbouring

Suriname (Ex Dutch colony) and (former British) Guiana had bitter economic experiences following their independence.



Picture 5.

Hungarian Flag in the South American Amazonian Jungle: Kourou Space Centre, French Guiana.

Source: Author's photograph

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CURRENT ISSUES

ÉVA LADÁNYI- ISTVÁN KOBOLKA, PHD

ACTIVE TERRORIST GROUPS IN ALGERIA

Abstract:

Algeria is the richest country in the region of North Africa. The area has the world's 10th-largest reserves of natural gas, the 16th largest oil reserves, and is the world's 6th-largest gas exporter. Algeria's macroeconomic position is strong, due to the high global oil and gas prices, which have allowed it to amass large foreign reserves. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) has praised Algeria's macroeconomic stability. Algeria's political system is dominated by a strong presidency and an efficient security apparatus.

Keywords: AQIM, GIA, FIS, Al-Qaeda, terrorism, Islamism, Salafist, Osama bin-Laden,



Fig.1.: Map of Algeria¹

¹ <http://www.indoafrikan.org/algeria-map.gif>

Introduction

Algeria, a gateway between Africa and Europe, has been battered by violence over the past half century. The Sahara desert covers more than four-fifths of the land. The region has been affected by diverse cultures over the centuries. Algeria was inhabited by Berbers till the Arab Conquest. Nowadays they make up some 30% of the population settled mainly in the North region and most Algerians live along the northern coast, too.

Algeria's economy has been given a lift by frequent oil and gas finds. Oil and gas reserves were discovered there in the 1950s. The country supplies large amounts of natural gas to Europe, and energy exports are the backbone of the economy.² Algeria has the world's 10th-largest reserves of natural gas, the 16th largest oil reserves, and is the world's 6th-largest gas exporter. Its estimated oil reserves are nearly 12 billion barrels, attracting strong interest from foreign oil firms.

Algeria's macroeconomic position is strong, due to high global oil and gas prices, which have allowed it to amass large foreign reserves.

After the War of Independence

Algerians fought a protracted independence war between 1954 and 1962 against France. The Algerian War of Independence was long and brutal: the guerrilla National Liberation Front (FLN) carried out urban terrorist attacks and violent retaliation against competing factions, while French commanders oversaw torture, extrajudicial killings, and other abuses targeting the FLN and local civilians suspected of supporting it.³ After the war, the FLN became the ruling party in a single-party system.

In the 1990s, Algerian policy was dominated by the struggle involving the military and Islamist militants. Amid this political upheaval, the Islamic Salvation Front (Front Islamique du Salut/FIS⁴) was formed as a broad and fractious coalition of Islamist groups. The FIS emerged as a political party on

² <http://almanac.afpc.org/Algeria>

³ A Savage War of Peace: Algeria 1954-1962, New York Review Books Classics: 2006 [1977].

⁴ The FIS was illegal since 1992.

September 16, 1989. It was the first party to apply for legal recognition in the new multiparty system of Algeria. Its leader was a Western-educated professor of comparative literature at the University of Algiers, named Shayk Abbassi Madani. At this time, the FIS was a generally moderate party. The leaders of Algeria were shocked when FIS candidates won absolute majorities in 188 of 430 electoral districts, far ahead of the FLN's seats in the first round of elections in 1991. However, the army intervened in January 1992, forcing the president to resign and cancelling the election. This action coupled with political uncertainty and economic turmoil, led to a violent reaction by Islamists. A decade of conflict between security forces and Islamist insurgents ensued, resulting in as many as 200,000 deaths. The FIS was banned and its leaders imprisoned or exiled; thousands of FIS activists were detained, many of them at prison camps in the Sahara.

An amnesty in 1999 induced many rebels to lay down their arms.

Terrorism

The security situation has greatly improved since civil war, but terrorism has not been eliminated.

FIS was popular in large urban areas, and in the North Algeria. AIS⁵ the military group of FIS became involved in lots of actions against the governmental troops, but also in a conflict with more extreme Islamist groups, like GIA⁶.

AIS was the armed wing of FIS. Officially, the AIS did not kill foreigners, women, or children or innocent civilians. AIS declared to kill only Algerian governmental employees.

In 1997, AIS was said to have had 4000 men dispersed in small groups in the mountains of north Algeria. In 1999, their number was reduced about to 3,000.⁷ AIS finally disbanded in 2000.

⁵ Arme Islamique du Salut, in English: Islamic Salvation Front. It was a militant Islamist group.

⁶ Group Islamique Arme, in English: Armed Islamic Group

⁷ <http://looklex.com/e.o/ais.htm>

During the Civil War a number of terrorist organizations operated in Algeria, like GIA, GSPC (nowadays AQIM) or The Masked Brigade. The GIA aim was to exterminate the Christians, Jews and infidels from Algeria, as well as to overthrow the existing regime, in a “Holy War”. It wanted the regime to be replaced by a caliphate. It had always kept its distance from al-Qaeda and consistently defended its full sovereignty. From 1997, GIA implemented a takfir ideology, in which all Algerian Muslims were considered infidels unless they joined or aided GIA. The organization recruited members from the main cities of North Algeria, but the most important people in the group were those who had fought in Afghanistan. The Organization is present in France, Great Britain and Belgium and enjoying protection under European laws. It was able to organize and finance terrorist attacks. Number of people killed by GIA is not known exactly. In 1997 and 1998 GIA entered a stage of extreme brutality; its members killed pregnant women and young children, and they used the young women as sex slaves. GIA was in strong opposition to competing Islamist groups and never co-operating with FIS. It was a strong political divide between GIA and the armed wing of FIS, the AIS.

In 1998, one of the GIA commanders, Hassan Hattab launched his own fragment organization, the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). He pledged to refocus his military activity against the security forces and to respect the civilian population⁸. They stopped the random killings of whole hostile villages. The GSPC incorporated the GIA’s Saharan group, which kept its operational sovereignty but opened new windows of opportunity for the GSPC in bordering countries. The member of GSPC is only a matter of speculation (between 400-3,000), and number of killed approximately 1,000. The terrorist group is said to finance its activities from income of criminal activities, money laundering and smuggling.

After the GSPC officially merged with Al-Qaeda in 2006, the organization became known as al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). The practical meaning of AQIM’s union with Al-Qaeda is uncertain, and links between the two may be nominal, but mutually beneficial. Adopting the famous name may have enhanced AQIM’s legitimacy among extremist and facilitated recruitment, while enabling Al-Qaeda to burnish its international credentials and have access

⁸ Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb: Algerian Challenge or Global Threat?

to a region geographically close to Europe⁹. General Martin Dempsey, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has described the organization as “a syndicate of Groups who come together episodically, when it’s convenient to them, in order to advance their cause”.

Some senior members of AQIM were former GIA insurgents. The two main Islamic militant movements, operating in North Mali are Ansar al Din¹⁰ and Jama’at Tawhid¹¹ Wal Jihad fi Garbi Afriqqiya¹² (MUJWA/MUJAO). These groups consist of members who broke off from AQIM in 2011. Several of AQIM’s southern-based commanders have joined or founded new groups. Mokhtar bel Mokhtar¹³ subsequently founded Al- Murabitun,¹⁴ the result of a merger with MUJAWA, which is led by Mauritanian and Malian Arabs.

This new group appears to draw from a core of fighters from Belmokhtar’s cell under AQIM- the so-called “Masked Battalion”. His group allied with the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa, another Islamist group that has split from al-Qaeda. In 2013, the two groups held more than a dozen Western hostages. The same year, in the In Amenas hostage crisis, members of Belmokhtar’s new brigade attacked the Tiguentourine gas field near In Amenas and took more than 800 hostages. They allegedly “justified” their action as retaliation to the French occupation that had begun in Mali days before. Belmokhtar is killed by Chadian army in 2013, but this news is not confirmed.



Fig. 2.: Mokhtar Belmokhtar¹⁵

⁹ Algeria: Current Issues, Congressional Research Service

¹⁰ Defenders of the Faith

¹¹ Tawhid is a theological formula and usually refers to God’s absolute oneness.

¹² Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa

¹³ He had a lot of nickname like „One –Eye”, “The Prince” and „ the Uncatchable” or “Mr. Marlboro”, for his heavy involvement in cigarette smuggling in the Sahel.

¹⁴ Those Who Sign With Blood

¹⁵ <http://www.sahelopinie.nl/en/yahya-abu-el-hammam-mokhtar-belmokhtar-aqim-gspc-mouaguine-biddam-terrorism/>



Fig.3: Tiguentourine gas field¹⁶

Summary

As a regional economic and military power, Algeria has sought to lead a co-ordinated action in the Sahel region against the terrorist threats. It has sometimes dissonant relations and differing priorities from its neighbours. Algeria and the other targeted states have a long record of fighting against the terrorists without international co-operation.

“To address this threat, regional security organizations can enhance much-needed bilateral exchanges among law enforcement and intelligence agencies. Additionally, the countries implementing the UN global strategy against terrorism should focus considerable attention on North Africa and the Sahel, where the threat is on the rise, but not yet out of control.”¹⁷

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CONSULTATION

ISTVÁN TARRÓSY, PHD

THE RELATIVE IMPORTANCE OF THE VARIOUS FORMS OF 'UNCONVENTIONAL DIPLOMACY' IN A NEW ERA OF SUMMIT DIPLOMACY

Abstract:

'Unconventional diplomacy' suggests that international actors can communicate differently from conventional rules and methods, that is, they can use other means to negotiate and reach agreement. Whenever direct communication breaks down, or conventional diplomacy cannot produce the required result, unconventional methods are to be used to have a breakthrough or the enforcement of the common will. The paper draws a picture of present-day diplomacy with an emphasis on unconventional practices applied by diplomats and other representatives of international actors. Three unconventional forms: secret meetings, the use of special envoy and funeral diplomacy will be introduced and analyzed to such an extent that will allow us to conclude how useful and effective they are, and what their relative importance might be in a new era of summit diplomacy.

Keywords: Unconventional diplomacy, secret meeting, special envoy, funeral diplomacy, summit

Introduction

International Relations (IR) is the domain that holds and describes every movement and reaction within the international community. It is the framework for the compound system of behaviours, attitudes, co-operation and communication of all the actors of the international arena. As far as the question of communication is concerned, diplomacy must be taken a close look at as a tool of making international relations function – in particular, in the present-day era of globalization, with all its transnational linkages and connections.

Diplomacy is the 'performing art' of international politics, and it is an inevitable factor of any kind of communication among entities of a state-centred

international political scene. We obviously are aware of the fact that our ‘interpolar’ world contains a substantial (and increasing) number of non-state actors, which are also important (if not sometimes dominant) players of the ‘global game’. Diplomacy intermediates among all these various actors; it precedes actions or decisions, or prepares the ground for further actions. As White interprets, “diplomacy is central both to an understanding of a global system of world politics and to the foreign policies of states and other actors on the international stage” (White, 2005: 388). Sometimes diplomacy is decision making, but of course, in the form of representation; the representation of the units and actors of the international arena that possess the power of making decisions. It is a sophisticated art of communication without which international relations could not exist. According to Geoffrey R. Berridge, it is “the conduct of international relations by negotiation rather than by force, propaganda, or recourse to law, and by other peaceful means (such as gathering information or engendering goodwill) which are either directly or indirectly designed to promote negotiation” (Berridge, 1995: 1). Brian White brings forth two major perspectives labelled as ‘macro’ and ‘micro’: “From the ‘macro’ perspective of world politics, diplomacy refers to a process of communication that is central to the workings of the global system. [...] Diplomacy therefore is fundamentally related to attempts to create stability and order within a global system. [...] From the ‘micro’ perspective, [however,] and understanding of diplomacy provides revealing insights into the behaviour of the actors themselves [...] and can be identified as a policy instrument rather than a global process” (White, 2005: 388).

Despite the elements of style, methods of performance and rules of conduct, – as defined in the 1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) – diplomacy provides flexibility for the actors of the sometimes-rigid international system. Flexibility, “one of its vital features” (Berridge, 1995: 1) is easily recognizable, for instance, in the language used by diplomats. Although it might be argued that it is still valid to point out that the legal formalities based on the 1961 VCDR “acknowledge only the diplomacy of states,” since the end of World War II, “the practice of diplomacy has been broadened to include a distinctive government-to-people connection” (Siracusa, 2010: 106, 5). ‘Public diplomacy’ is closely connected to the new avenues in the conduct of diplomacy, in particular in “an entirely new global world of urgent

communications between states and NGOs (non-governmental organizations), between NGOs and IGOs, and amongst NGOs themselves” (Ibid: 107).

Flexibility is also seen, however, in the various forms of ‘unconventional diplomacy’. The definition itself suggests that international actors can communicate differently from conventional rules and methods, that is, they can use other means to negotiate and reach agreement. Berridge defines that unconventional diplomacy “is generally conducted in the absence [...] of the willingness of at least one party to a bilateral relationship to engage in direct communication through [...] conventional channels, typically those of the permanent embassy” (Berridge, 1994: 1). Whenever direct communication breaks down, or conventional diplomacy cannot produce the required result, unconventional methods are to be used to have a breakthrough or the enforcement of the common will.

The aim of the essay is to draw a picture of present-day diplomacy with an emphasis on unconventional practices applied by diplomats and other representatives of international actors. From among the widely used ‘methods’, three unconventional forms (secret meetings, the use of special envoy and funeral diplomacy) will be introduced and analysed to the extent that will allow us to conclude how useful and effective they are. In the end, a general conclusion will be given about why this type of diplomacy remains a relatively important tool of IR especially in a new era of summit diplomacy.

Present-Day ‘Unconventionality’ – Irregular Approaches to Conflict-Solving and the Question of Success

Diplomacy focuses on negotiation, or at least discussion to be established and conducted between the parties involved as regards certain questions, disputes and problems. Regulated diplomatic relations require both principles and practical steps of realisation agreed on by states in advance. They can meet, negotiate, agree or disagree on the basis of this ‘code of conduct’. However, they can also do so, if supposedly, this system of rules does not apply, using irregular ways to meet and “talk to the enemy,” (Berridge, 1994: xiii) and come up with the solution required.

As Alan James underlined: “Diplomacy has a fundamental significance for the very existence of international relations,” mainly because it is “the communication system of the international society” (James, 1993: 95). The formal way of cooperation, which is recognised by all actors involved in the actual cooperation is done by diplomatic tools. Diplomacy is responsible for maintaining the channels of communication, even if the two entities are enemy states. According to James, it is paradoxical that “when diplomatic relations are broken, [...] the two states concerned almost always find *other ways* of communicating on a sufficiently regular basis” (Ibid: 96, emphasis added by author).

Among the forms of unconventional communication negotiation is still of primary importance. Either sending a special envoy from a third country, or secretly meeting the parties in dispute, the spotlight is always on bargaining a deal in the form of a face-to-face discussion. Certainly, there are questions about the outcome of such negotiations, whether or not they are successful in terms of reaching an agreement. It is unquestionable, however, that these approaches are intended to contribute to the solution of problematic cases between different international political actors. Introducing the importance of secret meetings, the mission of the special envoy and – in a bit more depth – the funeral diplomacy, as well as some insights about the celebrity diplomacy, may lead to a better understanding of the significance of ‘unconventionality’. This is the objective of the following argumentation.

Secret Meetings

Secret meetings and other forms of unconventional diplomacy are designed and realised with the aim to get distant parties closer to an agreement which is feasible for both of them. This usually means secret private negotiations to settle disputes and achieve peace, or to take steps to agree on questions, which otherwise would not be achieved in the course of formal meetings organised according to the rules of diplomacy. Usually there are some respected diplomats who are responsible for such meetings. King Hussein of Jordan, for instance, as Scott MacLeod put, “played a pivotal role, often behind the scenes, in diplomacy [...] [for example, by] conducting secret negotiations with Israeli leaders for years” (MacLeod, 1999: 43). In his famous book entitled *Diplomacy*, Henry Kissinger explained the importance of the rebirth of Sino–American

relations at the beginning of the 1970s, and elaborated on his July 1971 secret trip to Beijing. “The initial stage of Chinese–American conversation” (Kissinger, 1996: 276) and the process to develop diplomatic relations were marked by the negotiations between Kissinger and the then Chinese Prime Minister Zhou En-lai. There had been some formal diplomatic relations existing decades before the secret meeting took place, which meant that the ambassadors of the two countries in Warsaw met on an irregular basis to mutually insult each other. However, as a result of the Cultural Revolution, all Chinese ambassadors had been called back to Beijing; therefore, the only forum to talk according to the rules of diplomacy had ceased to exist. Kissinger’s secret meeting, – which also produced the famous ‘Shanghai Communiqué’ signed by President Nixon and Chairman Mao Ze Dong – therefore, had a significant breakthrough in revitalising diplomatic relations between the two “enemy” states.

There is almost infinite number of such secret meetings, which could or could not, can or cannot result in favourable diplomatic solutions in the given crisis/conflict situation. Another example from the 1970s takes us to the North-western corner of Africa in the middle of the diplomatic game between the Spanish and the Moroccans over Western Sahara. As János Besenyő (2009) explained, “General Gomez de Salazar later on in 1978 felt aggrieved that before signing the Madrid agreement nobody had consulted him, in spite of the fact that he had started negotiations with the Polisario representatives about the peaceful handover of the territory [...] On 29 October [...] Moroccan Minister of Foreign Affairs Ahmed Laraki started secret negotiations with the members of the Spanish diplomacy [...] [and] on 11 November the negotiations between the Spanish, Moroccan and Mauritanian Governments was announced, and three days later the Madrid Accords were signed, which divided Western Sahara between Morocco and Mauritania and the Spanish announced their final retreat” (Besenyő, 2009: 92-93).

More recent examples can also prove how secret diplomacy – which, as David Ignatius (2013) mentioned, “a Henry Kissinger could appreciate” – can be efficient. The breakthrough nuclear deal with Iran in November 2013, as Ignatius revealed in *The Washington Post*, included a “classis magic trick”. “Obama began by authorizing carefully concealed meetings back in March [2013], through Oman, the most opaque and discreet nation in the Persian Gulf. The president sent as his personal emissaries two low-key, quintessentially grey

men, Bill Burns and Jake Sullivan, the deputy secretary of state and vice presidential adviser, respectively. [...] While the eye was distracted by the show of the P5+1 talks, the real work was done elsewhere – and presented to the foreign ministers of Russia, China, Britain, France and Germany in Geneva two weeks [before the deal was made] almost as a *fait accompli*” (Ignatius, 2013).

A secret meeting is a useful tool to prepare for an official diplomatic event, in particular when the (two) parties involved have been in dispute for a longer period of time. In the case of Japan and China, as *The Japan Times* reported – taking into account the escalated territorial disagreement over some islands in the East China Sea (the Japanese-controlled Senkaku Islands, called Diaoyu in China) and the Chinese frustration connected with the visit(s) of the Japanese Prime Minister(s) to the war-related Yasukuni Shrine in Tokyo, “a senior Japanese official responsible for Asian affairs secretly visited China in mid-July to explore the possibility of arranging a meeting between Prime Minister Shinzo Abe and President Xi Jinping later this year on the sidelines of a regional summit.” “The secret visit took place as contacts between officials of the two countries have become slightly more active in recent weeks, though China has been critical of the Abe government on historical issues” (*The Japan Times*, 2014).

The Special Envoy

The use of special envoy is closely linked with the concept of mediation, which “is particularly necessary in bitter disputes, especially those in which the parties have been engaged for long periods” (Berridge, 1995: 97). According to Wriston, two fundamentally different types of special envoys can be differentiated: “One group is composed of persons employed to perform duties which, for one reason or another, it is inappropriate or inconvenient for regular officers to perform. While they carry the designation ‘personal representative of the President,’ it is a technical credential rather than a vivid description of their status. The other group is much smaller; it consists of persons who not only in form, but in fact, represent the President personally. In some instances the relationship has been so intimate that the envoy was almost an alter ego” (Wriston, 1960).

Present-day international conflicts prove that the institution of the special envoy is a potential instrument to contribute to conflict-solving. It is not obvious, though, that the special delegate either of the President of the United States or that of the Russian Federation, for example, can effectively solve the given problem by negotiating with both of the parties and persuading them to accept the agreement proposed. Sometimes the mission fails, which can lead even to war. Two past examples can show the enormous responsibility of the envoys, which is attached to the faith the countries sending them have in these diplomats.

President Bill Clinton's special envoy had a lot of experience in conducting negotiations. Richard Holbrooke had been involved in the wars in former Yugoslavia for many years. He then was given the task to research the required breakthrough in the crisis in Kosovo. He visited President Slobodan Milosevic several times, but unfortunately, he could not convince him to accept the conditions of peace determined by Western powers. Former Secretary of State Madeline Albright simply put it: "Arriving in Belgrade, Holbrooke was unable to make progress, because we still lacked sufficient leverage" (Albright, 2003: 388). As *The Guardian* reporters explained, "his mandate from NATO was to demand an immediate ceasefire in Kosovo [...] [, but he] failed to make headway" (*The Guardian Weekly*, 1999: 1). As this case shows, the special envoy is entitled to represent the sending country, which can be either one of the 'quarrelling' parties or a third country, and to emphasise the alternative offered by his or her own country. In the Kosovo dispute, Holbrooke was asked to "bring back an agreement that meets the key requirement" (Ibid: 14) defined by NATO. His attempt was told to be the last chance for Milosevic to comply with the Western will. The NATO bombings began after he announced that he could not arrive at a decisive breakthrough.

In the meantime, President Boris Yeltsin also chose his special envoy to meet Mr Milosevic in Belgrade. After Russian Prime Minister Primakov also failed to have his suggestions accepted by both parties, President Yeltsin sent former Prime Minister Chernomyrdin to try to bargain a deal with the Yugoslav President (see Figure 1). As the Hungarian daily *Népszabadság* reported Chernomyrdin's own words, he "came with concrete suggestions" to bring the tragedy to an end in the country. Yeltsin's move proved to be a successful one, as by dispatching his special envoy to contribute to the ending of the Yugoslav

conflict, he “put Russia at the centre of international diplomacy, reviving relations with Washington and NATO,” and he could rebut his hard-line critics “who lamented Moscow’s dwindling influence,” while also had the chance to “settle a few scores with some of his political rivals [at home]” (Gordon, 1999).



Figure 1

Russian special envoy Viktor Chernomyrdin (left) meets with President Slobodan Milosevic (right)

The photo is from Népszabadság, Vol. 57, No. 94, 1999, p. 2., but originally is from Reuters.

Multilateral and international intergovernmental organisations such as the United Nations or the African Union (AU) have also been using special envoys in various crisis situations to mediate and negotiate a peace deal between the ‘warring’ parties. A recent example has shown how policy-oriented (and therefore debatable) a special envoy’s mandate can be: the Moroccan government rejected the AU’s decision to appoint former President of Mozambique, Joaquim Chissano as a special envoy for Western Sahara. As Reuters reported, Morocco’s foreign ministry said in a statement that: “The African Union has no legal basis, no political fundament, nor moral legitimacy to intervene in that issue which is the exclusive domain of the United Nations.” The report also mentioned, that “Morocco accused the AU of taking sides and called on the U.N. Security Council to ignore the decision” (Reuters, 2014).

When a special envoy is announced to represent a country or organisation, one traditional diplomatic reaction is to issue an official statement either in support or against the given person. This happened again recently when UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Staffan de Mistura as the new UN Special Envoy for Syria. U.S. Secretary of State John Kerry in a press statement

welcomed the decision and underlined that de Mistura is a “distinguished diplomat who brings a wealth of experience to this pressing crisis gained from his work on Afghanistan, Iraq, Lebanon, Somalia, Sudan, and the former Yugoslavia. [The U.S.A.] applaud[s] his readiness to continue the important mission of trying to bring an end to the suffering and brutal violence inside Syria and to forge a path toward a political transition consistent with the principles of the Geneva Communiqué that ultimately leads to an inclusive government and fulfils Syrians’ aspirations for freedom and dignity” (Kerry, 2014). With Special Envoy de Mistura on board, Secretary of State Kerry looks forward to “supporting [him] as he works to achieve a negotiated political solution, which [the U.S.] believes is the best way to address all dimensions of this crisis and to end the conflict in sustainable way.” (Ibid)

Special envoys in general can be useful in conveying “a message of [...] sensitivity that [...] [the government sending the envoy] does not want to deliver in its entirety in writing or does not want to be too vulnerable to electronic recording” (Berridge, 1995: 40). They can be the best tools of diplomatic activity in solving sensitive issues, especially, if they are highly respected politicians or statesmen. When a special envoy like Viktor Chernomyrdin is asked to act on behalf of his country to help the parties in dispute find the ideal way of agreeing on the end of the conflict, it is more likely that a negotiation is driven forward. However, people like the former Russian Prime Minister are not obvious guarantee for success, because, as again Berridge observes, they can “excite unwanted interest” (Ibid), which might negatively affect the situation. Negotiating with the U.S. administration about how to end the war, Chernomyrdin (and Yeltsin) could agree on involving a real “neutral” mediator. As former Secretary of State Madeline Albright revealed in her memoir: “We needed a third party involved. [...] We needed a different partner than Kofi Annan [meaning therefore the UN], so I suggested President Ahtisaari. Immediately Chernomyrdin rapped his hand on the table and smiled. »That is just the man.«” (Albright, 2003: 417). Russia’s special envoy in this case could make a successful diplomatic move.

Coffins and Diplomats

“More than 50 foreign leaders, many of them traditional rivals, filed past the flag-draped coffin. It was an extraordinary embassy.” (Sharrock, 1999: 1)

Funeral diplomacy is one of the ‘applied’ forms of unconventional diplomatic practice. Although it is connected to unfortunate and sad moments, namely the death of statesmen, it has its importance in offering the opportunity for world leaders and other statesmen to mingle in an informal way, maybe as marching near the coffin of the dead person. “Ceremonial occasions of exceptional national importance,” says Berridge, “are often important diplomatic events, and important in the relations between enemies as well as friends” (Berridge, 1994: 59). Funerals obviously possess such ceremonial significance, therefore, they are part of international political communication, especially, international diplomacy.

Several advantages of the “working funeral” (Ibid: 60) can be traced from the fundamental elements of diplomacy as such. Important political figures, presidents, heads of government can meet and get engaged in conversation with other important people. If, as a result of elections which happened prior to the funeral, a new government is in office and it has not introduced itself to other states, “the assembled visitors have probably their first opportunity to meet the new government” (Ibid: 69). Friends can continue their previous discussions and also add options, remarks ideas they would not do or could not have done while negotiating around the round-table at their previous formal meetings. Enemies can also meet, and while showing respect they can either confirm that they are enemies or indicate that there is the possibility to negotiate in the future about getting closer to each other. Despite funerals provide the unique chance for most of the world leaders to meet at the very same place and at the very same time and discuss various questions concerning their relations, as Berridge suggests, “they are unlikely to provide opportunities for serious negotiations” (Ibid: 59), because the whole ceremony usually lasts for a few hours, which does not allow visitors to spend sufficient time on the question concerned. This is the reason why disadvantages of funeral diplomacy need also to be taken into account when investigating the question of usefulness and success.

Taking a further look at advantages and disadvantages, the question of the involvement of the media can also produce several important observations. It is widely known that in a media-driven political communication, politicians and broadcasters “need” each other. Therefore, world leaders participating in the funeral ceremony of one of their former colleagues seek potential media coverage. As regards the funeral of King Hussein of Jordan in February 1999, – David Sharrock reported it as “one of the great gatherings of world leaders this century” – for instance, Russian President Boris Yeltsin was given the opportunity to “make his first public appearance in months,” (Sharrock, 1999: 1) thus, to prove the world that it was still him who was the highest dignitary in the Russian federation, no matter how ill he was anyway. With the help of the media politicians can send their messages to the public at large. In case of rivalling states, this can mean further enforcing the negative attitude towards the enemy, or approaching it in a different, probably more positive way, depending on what the politicians try to demonstrate and how this comes through the channels of the media.

Sharrock also pointed out that King Hussein’s funeral was “an occasion that combined pomp with high-grade funeral diplomacy” (Ibid). This idea can definitely be supported if thinking of the tight schedule of most of the participating leaders. One can wonder whether world leaders arriving at the funeral had known in advance whom they would meet and what they would talk about. For instance, as Sharrock was informing the readers of *The Guardian Weekly*, “[President] Clinton who had a private interview with Hussein’s son and successor, King Abdullah, also exchanged words with the Syrian president” (Ibid). However, before he met King Abdullah and Hafez al-Assad he had a brief conversation with President Yeltsin. This example which obviously is not giving full report of the meetings and chats President Clinton had on the day of the funeral can illustrate at least two important characteristics of funeral diplomacy. First, it gives an idea of the short period of time available for probably too many meetings, which further means and requires the practice of high-level time management in the administrations and also the personal physical strength of the politicians. Second, time is short not only for the actual discussions but the preparations that should happen before the meetings take place. Berridge connects this problem to “the short notice for funeral summits [, which] [...] means that there is very limited time available for information-gathering and preparation.” (Berridge, 1994: 67). This can further lead to

unwanted mistakes, which in turn, can influence relations between the countries of the leaders who met in private.

A more recent funeral also made the international community gather and mingle: former South African President Nelson Mandela died at the age of 95 on December 5, 2013. Apart from shaking hands with long-time Cold War-adversary, incumbent Cuban President, Raul Castro, President Obama took a “selfie” in a pose with British Prime Minister David Cameron and Danish Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt at the funeral service. Although the First Lady, Michelle Obama unanimously did not approve this (Figure 2), the President of the U.S.A. ultimately sent a message with these moves (and these heads of government) throughout the globe. In diplomacy – conventional and unconventional – all the moves mean something, and when a president, “the ultimate plenipotentiary” of the given country performs it, “there is no going back, except at the price of great humiliation” (Berridge, 1995: 80).



Figure 2

US President Barack Obama (right) and British Prime Minister David Cameron pose for a picture with Denmark’s Prime Minister Helle Thorning-Schmidt (centre) next to US First Lady Michelle Obama (right) during the memorial service of South African former president Nelson Mandela

The photo is from thewashingtontimes.com.

Summits Remain Decisive in the Global Era

The word ‘diplomacy’ has numerous – in many instances mistakenly used – synonyms ranging from ‘world politics’ to ‘foreign policy’ as a whole. We can find references, as White explains, to “great power diplomacy, summit diplomacy, or development diplomacy which – particularly in media reports – appear to describe a process that is much wider than a specific discussion of one facet of diplomacy” (White, 2005: 388). In an age of global uncertainties, it is not only the intention of others, but the nature of the global processes which overarch and intertwine all the various actors that contribute to even more uncertainties. Furthermore, it is not only the states that matter in terms of behaviour, action and intent, but the abundance of non-state entities and their complex interactions with others that challenge the state system in the international arena. The world has been changing as far as relations of its players are concerned, and still, realism and the ‘national interest’ matter.

In an interconnected transnational system, “globalization is transforming rather than superseding the state” (Lawson, 2012: 142). Although the ‘network state’ (Castells, 1997) differs from the nation-state of the Westphalian order as it needs to position itself in a setting with a multitude of various other types of power-holding entities (or those aspiring to gain power) – the international policy-making arena has become crowded –, its tasks “have not changed. [States] still have to manage, with respect to their domestic constituencies, the dual relationship between domination and legitimating, and between development and redistribution.” (Stalder, 2006: 122) If survival is still the greatest task – though not in a purely ‘self-help world’ as thought by the realists, but rather in a more complex and interdependent one – to be able to survive, states “have no choice but to compete for power” (Mearsheimer, 2006: 232). Is it, however, only competition and seeking “to gain advantage at each other’s expense” (Ibid), or is there any motivation to cooperate for the sake of the betterment of all parties involved in a ‘collaborative project’? As “globalization makes us more vulnerable because we are more interdependent with one another” (Li et al, 2012: 104), and as – in particular – “great powers are rational actors” (Lieber, 2002: 321), collaboration is encoded in the world. Simply because in certain issues and instances there is no other way but to cooperate so that states do not ‘get hurt’, which is their ultimate national goal at the same time. Having said

that, the national survival and the consequently national interest will determine state behaviour, strategy and action – both for cooperation and competition.

We can agree with Mearsheimer that “states seek to maximize their power” (Mearsheimer, 2006: 239), and we may argue that they do not only look for hard, but increasingly soft power strategies to become more sophisticated about how to behave more assertively in the system. “Summit diplomacy is irresistible” (Berridge, 1995: 83), and both in bilateral and multilateral diplomatic terms, summitry has stayed a substantial element of the international system. According to Berridge, there are “five functions the summit might usefully advance: promoting friendly relations, clarifying intentions, information gathering, consular work (principally export promotion [...]), and negotiation” (Ibid: 83-84). All are done in service of the national interest. As long as the global scene of *official* diplomatic behaviour and action has been influenced by public diplomacy as such, which is “transparent and widely disseminated [...] and transmitted by governments to wider, or in some cases selected, publics” (Siracusa, 2010: 5), summit diplomacy has also been keen on reaching out to publics at large. The recent U.S.–Africa Leaders Summit held early August in Washington, D.C., proved how much – to date – U.S. diplomacy has not extended to high-level summits to manage state-to-state relations with countries on the African continent (for instance). That has been in stark contrast to the approach China, for instance, has been taken, with its triennial Forum on China-African Cooperation (FOCAC). China has long maintained a very intensive dialogue with African states, managed basically on a daily basis. As a multilateral platform, FOCAC is not just a diplomatic talkfest; it is a major tool for fostering and developing Sino–African cooperation. FOCAC represents a Chinese model for cooperation that goes well beyond the summit itself, to include frequent exchanges and follow-up commitments. It can also be seen as a decisive soft power tool to help Beijing develop an attractive image across the African continent and even elsewhere. How the U.S. will catch up after its first-ever U.S.–Africa summit, especially when we talk about winning the ‘hearts and minds’ of the populations. The inevitable importance of high-level summits is still decisive in present-day IR.

Conclusion

Unconventional diplomacy has many aspects, which also proves that it is a significant factor in the conduct of international politics. Diplomacy as such is inevitable to exist between states, as well as between states and non-state actors, which want to cooperate at any level. The formal way of communication is assured by diplomatic rules. However, when the communication breaks down, the rules cannot help revitalise the connection as much as the methods and the practices of the unconventional approach. The forms analysed in the paper, namely the institution of secret meetings, the use of special envoy and the ‘working funeral’, can present a number of valid thoughts about the level of efficiency and the degree of usefulness they can provide. In respect of the relative importance of such forms and ‘unconventionality’ as such, it can be said that it is only the unconventional diplomacy that can contribute to any kind of breakthrough, if all other formal ways do not seem to be applicable. On the other hand, its importance seems relative because it cannot be judged easily whether it was the given unconventional method that had achieved the aim defined previously, or the result was due to a series of activities, which had been pursued in the past. However, it is hard to question that secrecy is a fundamental element of international politics, therefore, of any diplomatic practice as well. The reason is that there are certain issues which cannot be played with in front of the general public, because when doing so, they can cause additional and unnecessary worries, which can divert attention from the real issues at stake. In this sense, unconventional diplomacy – with all its secrecy and ‘out-of-sight habits’ – is an apparent element of communication among the nations and among the various actors of our transnational, interpolar world.

“Diplomacy is effective when the rules of the game have general agreement,” thinks Arthur Schlesinger (Schlesinger, 1994: 150). In other words, diplomacy contributes to success if the parties – engaged in a discussion, debate or negotiation – mutually obey the rules defined and agreed upon by nations of the world decades and centuries ago. If these rules are not respected and conventional approaches cannot be applied, the irregular rules need to be accepted in order to pursue an effective diplomacy. In conclusion, the last couple of lines from Berridge’s book should stand here, because it properly summarises the importance of ‘unconventionality’: “It was Maurice Keens-Soper, [...] who [...] described diplomacy, [...] as ‘the parliament of the states-

system'. If conventional diplomacy is indeed the parliament of states-system, the unconventional channels [...] are its lobby. In this vast labyrinthine antechamber, largely obscured from public view, unfriendly powers can at least subject to some control of the consequences of their hostility and at most prepare the way for its abatement." (Berridge, 1994: 133)

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ANALYSIS OF WRITING ANALYTICAL CHARACTERISTICS OF HUNGARIAN TWINS

Abstract

Writing analytics is a newly created complex system, which explores all the dimensions of created writing. In 2012 and 2013, a specific instrument, the Szidnai and Kiss-sort Grafometer was applied to collect writing samples of 32 pairs of twins (17 monozygotic, MZ and 15 dizygotic, DZ; of mean age 46.6 ± 14.7 years). MZ twins shared very similar spatial schema characteristics of writing. The firstborn twin dominated in 58% of MZ pairs, while the secondborn twin's dominance was present in DZ pairs. MZ twins were more harmonious and intuitive compared to the DZ twins. MZ twins were inquiring and receptive; usually saw the world through emotions. The social values were important to them; they were cooperative, flexible, despite the fact that they were basically introverted. MZ twins seemed to approach people with trust and established contacts with empathy but with strong desire for security. Based on the dominant placement of the writing, the blocks of the examined group have shown that MZ twins' life is determined by fixations, unprocessed experiences and their attachment to the past. Based on the method of space filling of MZ twins, their writing blocks were located on the left side of the given space and the lines tended downwards. MZ twins demonstrated inquiring, receptive, emotional, cooperative and flexible personality via their writing analytical characteristics.

Keywords: writing analytics, twin writing-studies, genetic characteristics, Grafometer

Introduction

The writing analytics is a complex concept, since it embraces all disciplines, which deal with writing and its analysis. The writing analytics focuses not only on the writer as a producer, but examines the writing, as a human product with all of its circumstances. The writing analytics deals with various independent and non-separable dimensions of writing. Examines the

emergence of writing era of connected timeliness, geographical space, the human history of culture, society-geographic processes, the writing surface, and specifics related to the author's psychological, anatomical, "genetic" projection characteristics.

Factors influencing writing analysis are shown in *Figure 1*.




Figure 1.

The writing analysis of the factors affecting the system (L. Farkas, 2012)

The graph demonstrates the clear distinction between the professional fields currently engaged in writing analysis, namely:

- graphology,
- writing identification and
- writing analytics.

Graphology basically deals with the writer's (duktor) properties of conscious and unconscious motivations, and forms of behaviours.

The basic task of writing identification is to specify the dominant hand (or typewriter) origin of writing.

During the assessment, writing analysis takes into account all currently known (person, genetics, Graphophtalmology, space, time, culture, writing instrument, writing surface and specific) factors that influence writing, searching for the complex opportunity.

Among conditions related to writing (*Figure 1*), genetic background of the writer can be also found. Genetics is a dimension of writing, which the people are not aware of and cannot be consciously controlled. (L. Farkas. (2012.)

Only very few studies have examined the writing of twins in order to investigate the underlying genetic mechanism, but these studies had several limitations, such as a diverse population was involved (Bradford RR, Bradford R. (1992.); Srihari S1, Huang C, Srinivasan H. (2008.)).

Subjects and Methods

This cross-sectional twin study included 32 adult same-sex twin pairs (17 MZ and 15 DZ) recruited from the Hungarian Twin Registry (Littvay et al. TRHG). Subjects were enrolled for a writing analysis in a large university hospital or investigated in their own homes upon request between 2012 and 2013.

Exclusion criteria included any foreseeable lack of compliance with test procedures, stroke with hemiplegia and pregnancy. Instead of genotyping for zygosity classification, we used a multiple-choice self-reported seven-part questionnaire which has an accuracy of over 99% (Heath, A.C., Nyholt, D.R., Neuman, R., et al. (2003.)

Age, height and weight were recorded for each patient. All participants gave informed consent.

The study was approved by the Ethical Committee of Semmelweis University and was conducted in full compliance with regulations of the Declaration of Helsinki.

Studies were carried out with the basic writing analytical instrument called Szidnai-Kiss Grafometer (KAI, Budapest, Hungary). While taking the writing samples, standard conditions were ensured (writing sample, copy time, body position) for all subjects. Both members of the twin pair were investigated in the same day after each other. Besides the important basic elements of writing analytical research that focuses on the writing on a paper, we also examined the subconscious writing in the air.

The psychological function of the Grafometer theory is that all influencing factors affecting the nervous system leave an "imprint" that can be seen during examination in the smallest muscles, and micromotorium aligned movement.

The basis for the development of the instrument is the thesis that the most optimal path of writing naturally follows the form of the fundamental unit of development, the logarithmic spiral.

According to the theory, writings transmitting the most information with minimum energy are built up with linked spiral curves. Accordingly, the shorter the sections are and more segments can be found, the more severe symptoms are observed.

The Grafometer is a multi-purpose instrument, which hardware includes a personal computer, a digitizing tablet and a special custom-developed pen and a special structure of software, installed on your computer (*Figure 2*) (L. Farkas, 2013.). The Grafometer hardware needs



Figure 2.

The board's useful surface is slightly larger than an A4 paper size with a 0.0125 mm resolution.

the x-y coordinates transmitted to the tablet with a frequency of 120 Hz, while the pen pressure value scanned by 600 Hz and transmitted to the computer. This means that five pressure items are measured to each x-y coordinates, thereby it is possible to determine the rate at which the pen on the board just "slams shut" or if just leaves the table.

Using the board and the pen makes it possible to monitor the movement of the pen above the board even in several mm heights; so we are able to follow the unconscious movements in the air. While operating the software with different

forward running and cueing speeds, the drawing point moves, so the digital format of writing is produced immediately.

Operating the software with different forward running, cueing speeds the drawing point moves, so the written produce is formulated in front of our eyes.

Between two designated points, 106 measured and calculated variables are registered on the pen's current speed, acceleration ratio, the pressure on the board, the length of writing between the points and the proportion of the route the pen stayed in the air. The most important data are displayed on the screen continuously, thus instant information can be obtained "online" from the measured data.

The most important advantage of Grafometer is that the unconscious movement in the air and the tremours, which cannot be controlled and conditioned, are also recorded. According to the psychology, the subconscious mind of the player operates independently from the will, characterizing the super ego, which can be detected and visualized by the instrument (L. Farkas, (2008.)

Different experience levels can be distinguished, which allows the instrument to be used as a polygraph, so the signs of lying can be examined in the different levels of experience (L Farkas again).

In writing analytics we also took into consideration the theoretical tenets of genetic medicine, and conducted the research according to

- the spatial schema,
- Jungian psychological types,
- temperament,
- impulsivity,
- collective and individual upbringing environment.

According to the theoretical system of writing analytics, the basic genetic characteristic of writing is the binding mode of the lines (ductus).

We examined the ductus between letters and within certain letters (such as h, m, n), and in those places where we can find shapes that are off standard. We distinguished four basic ductus: garland, arcade, angular and filamentous (*Figure 3*) (IGAS Department of Instruction (1964.))



Figure 3.
Binding modes

Tables 4, 5 and 6 show which special writing characteristics influence the spatial schema, temperament and impulsivity (L. Farkas- Zs. Szakállné, 2012.).

SPATIAL SCHEMA									
left	right	top	average	upper	middle	full	average	written	primary
margin	margin	margin	margin	zone	zone	character	zone	rows	width
size	size	size	size	size	size	size	(base)	number	

TABLE 4
Spatial schema characteristics of writing

The writer splits space on the basis of the margins on an A4 paper, the different zones and internal relations of the letters, and the distance from the lines.

TEMPERAMENT			
left	right	average	type
margin	margin	margin	
direction	direction	size	

TABLE 5
Temperament characteristics of writing

IMPULSIVITY		
starting	end	under
line	line	zone
shape	shape	size

TABLE 6
Impulsivity characteristics of writing

In terms of writing analytics examination, the ductor's (in our case twins) common (*Table 7*, L. Farkas-Zs. Szakállné 2013.) or individual environmental (*Table 8*, L. Farkas-Zs. Szakállné 2013.) influences (classified according to our assumptions) are important factors.

JOINT MILIEU

"a" letter	"a" letter	indention	spacebar	oval letter	under zone
leftist	rightist				potential
size	size	size	size	height	size

TABLE 7

The twins common environment related characteristics of writing

INDIVIDUAL MILIEU

left title	right	OAT	middle zone
margin	margin	axle	average
size	size		width

ABLE 8

The twin's invidual environment related characteristics of writing

Microsoft Excel (Microsoft'Excel 97) was used to perform the descriptive analysis. Significance levels were calculated with non-parametric t-tests.

Results

There were no significant differences between monozygotic and dizygotic twins in clinical characteristics (*Table 9*). Majority (84%) of all subjects were females.

	GENDER			AGE		
	MZ	DZ	Total	MZ	DZ	Total
female	32	22	54	44.6	48.9	46.7
male	2	8	10	29.0	52.8	40.9
TOTAL	34	30	64	43±13,7	50±15,1	46±16,6

TABLE 9

Basic characteristics of twins by gender and age

As known in other twin studies, women are usually in majority of participants. The age distribution provided an opportunity to explore the writings of writers aged 25-65. It provides well established correlation for summary of genetic aspects.

Writing analytics characteristics of twins are shown in *Table 10*. Based on data related to the spatial schema characteristics of writing analysis, MZ twins were more used to the space globally, whereas DZ twins had narrowed their vision of space. However, DZ twins formulated letters on a larger shape scale.

Both groups of twins incorporated choleric characteristics but MZ twins were more impulsive.

Humans with choleric temperament are in general irascible, quick-tempered, prepared, disciplined and full of ambition. They are sometimes impatient, too dominant; they do not tolerate mistakes, are manipulating others, and rarely asking for forgiveness. Their main feature is the strong susceptibility and high degree of impulsivity. Emotions are strong and durable, personality encourages action.

Especially in case of the examined parameters, of the 17 MZ twin pairs, in 10 cases (58%) the older sibling's dominance were detected. However, of the 15 DZ pairs, in 10 cases (66%), the younger sibling's dominance was present.

The dominance was taken into account when the courage, firmness, extroversion, writing characteristics suggestive manner of filling more space, such as the ductus shape, middle font size, angle of inclination of the stem, and the size of the existence of excessive egoism margins were determined.

The cumulative analysis should take into account the writing characteristics, which have already been detailed in *Table 10*.

The measured values have shown in relation to the spatial schema that writing of MZ twins were lower in case of the left margin (MZ: 13.24 mm, DZ: 15.54 mm, $p < 0.05$), the primary width (the character oval) (MZ: 2.46 mm, DZ: 2.64 mm, p : non significant), the secondary width (knitting line between letters) (MZ: 1.63 mm, DZ: 2.16 mm, $p < 0.05$), the row spacing (MZ: 9.6 mm, DZ: 10.47 mm, p : non significant), and the the full font size (MZ: 7.53 mm, DZ: 7.98 mm, p : non significant).

MZ twins were more harmonious and intuitive compared to the writing characteristics of DZ twins.

	SPATIAL SCHEMA												IMPULSIVITY
	left margin	right margin	top margin	average margin size	upper zone	middle zone	full character	average zone	written rows	primary	secondary	row spacing	under zone
	size	size	size	frame	size	size	size	(base)	number	width	width	size	size
MZ-34 fñ	450,11	536,67	447	0	70,53	76,36	256,07	85,21	1142	83,57	55,6	326,35	109,13
average	13,24	15,78	13,15	14,3	2,07	2,24	7,53	2,51	33,6	2,46	1,63	9,6	3,21
DZ-30 fñ	466,42	557,5	425	0	69,65	74,32	239,48	77,78	1009	79,12	64,8	314,14	95,51
average	15,55	18,59	14,16	17,15	2,32	2,48	7,98	2,59	33,63	2,64	2,16	10,47	3,18
total	916,53	1094,2	872	1000,59	140,18	150,68	495,55	162,99	2151	162,60	120,4	640,49	204,64
average	14,32	17,1	13,62	15,63	2,19	2,35	7,74	2,55	33,6	2,54	1,88	10,01	3,2
<i>p</i>	<i>0,0441</i>	<i>0,1916</i>	<i>0,1509</i>	<i>0,1736</i>	<i>0,1736</i>	<i>-0,0366</i>	<i>0,1418</i>	<i>0,1632</i>	<i>-0,014</i>	<i>-</i>	<i>0,0293</i>	<i>-0,0932</i>	<i>0,1816</i>

	JOINT MILIEU					
	"a" letter leftist	"a" letter rightist	indention	spacebar	oval letter	under zone potential
	size	size	size	size	height	size
MZ-34 fñ	214,34	229,83	349,13	191,9	3227,23	246,99
average	5,1	5,01	10,27	5,98	2,25	2,72

DZ-30 fñ	433,78	464,67	330,32	172,12	6456,71	496,7
average	4,95	4,94	11,01	5,74	2,46	2,73
total	321,79	318,85	679,45	364,02	150,2	174,74
average	5,03	4,98	10,62	5,69	2,35	2,73
p	-0,1154	-0,3818	-0,0368	-0,1845	-0,00224	0,1836

	INDIVIDUAL MILIEU			
	left title margin	right title margin	OAT axle	middle letter average
	size	size		width
MZ-34 fñ	15900	22340	7,15	76,65
average	467	657	0,27	2,25
DZ-30 fñ	12980	19080	5,36	72,32
average	432	636	0,18	2,41
total	28880	41420	12,51	148,97
average	450	647	0,22	2,33
p	-0,2459	-0,1611	-0,265	-0,2438

TABLE 10

Writing analytical characteristics of monozygotic and dizygotic twins

Summary

Our study is the first to investigate the writing analysis of twins. We demonstrated that spatial schema characteristics of writing were more similar in MZ twins, whereas DZ twins have narrowed their vision of space. MZ twins were more impulsive and more affected by common environmental impacts. The firstborn twins' dominance was detected in the majority of MZ twins, which was not true for DZ twins, where the younger sibling's dominance was present. MZ twins were more harmonious and intuitive, compared to the writing characteristics of DZ twins.

An American study investigated the handwriting of twins, however, completely different method and aim was applied in that study (Srihari S, Huang C, Srinivasan H. (2008.)).

Results of the verification tests demonstrated that the handwriting of twins is less discriminable than that of non-twins.

Based on the dominant characteristics, it can be stated that the examined handwritings of the MZ twins – from genetic point of view – show that they are inquiring, receptive, usually see the world through emotions. The social values are important to them; they are cooperative, flexible, despite the fact that they are basically introverts. They approach people with trust and establish contacts with empathy, but with strong desire for security. In their close surroundings, they do not need to initiate further connections other than their brother or sister.

Based on the dominant placement of the writing, the blocks of the examined MZ group have shown that their life is determined by fixations, unprocessed experiences and their attachment to the past. In general, MZ twins are failure-averse, sometimes uncertain; therefore, their development may be limited. By analysing the method of space filling of twins, the majority of MZ twins located their writing blocks on the left side of the given space and the lines tended downwards.

The reviews provide a basis for comparison between the properties of the MZ and DZ twin's writings, taking into account the possible existence of a genetic background.

MZ twins have shown signs in their writing (e.g. alternating inclination of the stems and font size) that they are very sensitive to external influences, their passions last for long, and they are persistent in doing their things with rational use of energy. They evaluate their position quickly and react spontaneously. MZ twins are many intuitive elements in their behaviour and often rely on their emotions. They are characterized by good sense of reality and high degree of impulsivity.

In terms of self-esteem, MZ twins' temperance was more typical, they pull themselves together better, and they are usually being unobserved for the environment. In their work they are straightforward avoiding formalities. Practical importance of this finding is that the analytical writing assessment will be cognizable as a result of the writer.

Basically the previously discussed findings were related to MZ twins, and conclusions on DZ twins, of course, can be drawn from the writings as well, which is opposite to that of MZ twins.

In conclusion, we reported that monozygotic twins share very similar spatial schema characteristics of writing. The firstborn twin dominated in the majority of MZ pairs, while the second born twin's dominance was present in DZ pairs mainly. MZ twins were more harmonious and intuitive compared to the DZ twins. MZ twins demonstrated inquiring, receptive, emotional, cooperative and flexible personality via their writing analytical characteristics.

Acknowledgments

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A legnagyobb karakés betűkkel

Konnyongon az utcai karakés a nyilvános karakés között sokkal nagyobb helyet jelentettek, mint más nagyrésztben. Ha valakinek sikerült megfellelnia a helyét az utcai karakésben, az első-utolsó más meg is változott 'tapsolgi igazsághoz' ebbe a tudatosabbra, mely a bizonyos minden fajtáját látsz a helyi iskolában és a nagyrésztben keltetése alapján.

Először csak a gyermekeknek volték az a Kézi Székely az utcai kintelést utálják, és ő jól kitanulta a nyelvüket.

E karakés megjelentek a fűt és a borsó, a borsó, a gorsó, és a rászó, és a rászó.

Kezdetekig még valami sokkal fontosabb, egy éppen sokkal : a felles is a sokkal semmit sem adott a Kézi Székely, csak a gorsó a borsó.

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FIGURE 11

Writing sample of an 30-year-old MZ twin pair

A legnagyobb kemény elhatározás

Houstonban az utcai harcok a rivalizáló bandák között sokkal nagyobb dolgok jelvények, mint más városokban. Ha valakinek sikerült megállnia a helyét ezekben az utcai veszedelmekben, az előbb-utóbb már meg is változhat "hagyományos igazságszolgáltatás" ebbe a kiforratos világra: hálószerű, amely a bűnösök minden fejtőjét őrzi a helyi ~~üzemelés~~ üzemelés és a nagyrabírási káritóssegességéig.

Elsőként ez a gyarmatbandák vezette és a kínos szándék az utcai küzdelmek világában, és ő jól ki-tanulta a nyelvet. E harcok meptanították a fiút az éberségre, a gyorsaságra és a ravaszságra.

Meptanították még valamit sokkal fontosabban, egy egyszerű szabályra: a stílus és a szabály semmit sem számít, csak a győzelem a lényeg.

A legnagyobb kemény elhatározás

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Elsőként ez a gyarmatbandák vezette és a kínos szándék az utcai küzdelmek világában, és ő jól ki-tanulta a nyelvet. E harcok

FIGURE 12

Writing sample of an 38-year-old DZ twin pair

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MARIANNA SEBŐK

COMMUTING AND EMPLOYEE MOBILITY IN THE LIGHT OF THE CHARACTERISTICS OF THE HUNGARIAN SOCIETY

Abstract

Geographical aspects of workforce mobility inside the country are very important for most of the employers settled down not in Budapest and facing low level of mobility. However, companies do not know any adaptable model offering a good solution to this social problem. In this short paper, I try to highlight some, but not all the aspects of readiness to mobility of employees and the opportunities of companies to this effect.

Keywords: workforce mobility, readiness for mobility, geographical mobility, commuting

The answer is simple to the question why both social researchers and economic experts discuss this issue eagerly. A demand has arisen for mobilization of employees (first of all, in geographic terms) both on the part of companies and the government in order to create internal equilibrium and satisfy demands internally. Businesses need trained workers at a specific geographic location and the Hungarian economic policy wants to attain workforce market equilibrium within the country.

Employee characteristics

First, the readiness for mobility within the borders of our country shall be reviewed. Researchers, historians and sociologists have diverging opinion concerning the reasons why exactly the Hungarians are soil-bound. However, all of them agree on the fact that the current extent of property ownership, being far above the European average, is decisive here. While real property ownership is about 60% on average in Europe, this figure exceeds 90% in Hungary. After 2008, at the time of changes in economic mechanisms (economic crisis), this figure is not expected to change as the real property market works on a different value level. This makes expectations concerning rearrangement of the ownership structure of the housing market even more complicated. As another important data in this respect, average value of a flat makes five or six times the income of a household. Why is this figure so important? While flat/income quotient was

5.9 in 1999, it rose to 6.5 by 2003. If a household makes a wrong decision (i.e. it misprizes its own flat by 20% and overestimates the one to be purchased by 20%), just even one-year income of a household may be jeopardized through this transaction. This fact necessarily impacts on mobility negatively. (Data of News Agency Közelkép)

Advancing in logical research of this issue, we have to disclose the roots of this kind of attitude to ownership. There is no consensus about this matter at present. Yet, having reviewed and interpreted all the opinions, I ask the question: Could the nationalization play its role in this attitude of the Hungarian society? The time horizon of its impacts is open for discussion; but surely, it has have long lasting consequences over several generations, determining attitude to ownership and status of the present Hungarian population.

About 4% of people move to a new flat in Hungary every year.

1. Highly educated persons have an over average readiness to move, however, the direction of their moves just even adds to inequalities, because they are taken by the industries of the developed regions.

As another important factor, we have to mention the gradualism in decision making. This means that a decision for move – implying the full geographic mobility – is always preceded by a stage of partial mobility, meaning – practically – commuting. These two levels have to be distinguished because the decision for the one or the other option is affected by different motivation factors for an individual (for an employee). While a decision for move is driven also by infrastructural peculiarities and property situation, a person opting for commuting is only motivated by the income offered.

What do the data show?

According to data of the Hungarian Central Statistical Office (KSH) 2011, time of employees¹ spent on daily commuting is as follows:

- Spending max. 15 minutes on transport 37.9 %
(1,496,225 persons);

¹ Based on data of KSH, number of employees in 2001 is 3,942,723.

▪ Spending 16 – 30 minutes on transport (1,159,395 persons);	29.4 %
▪ Spending 31 – 60 minutes on transport (839,806 persons);	21.3%
▪ Spending 60 – 90 minutes on transport (154,608 persons);	3.9%
▪ Spending 91 – 120 minutes on transport (58,207 persons);	1.5%
▪ Spending 121 – 180 minutes on transport (29,181 persons).	0.7%


I find important to mention that between 2001 and 2011, the number of employees ready to spend more than 90 minutes on transport for a "good job" rose by 70%. It reveals that employees are increasingly prepared to accept extreme conditions in exchange for an appropriate job.

It is well-known that when selecting a job, age and marital status are essential influencing factors. For young people under 30 and unmarried men and women, a short journey to work is not a decisive factor, they are ready to accept time loss and discomfort of lengthy travels more often than people of middle age or members of elderly generations and those with families.

There are noteworthy differences in length of journey to work in different types of settlements. Most people leaving in towns travel no more than half an hour and the rate of persons travelling more than one and a half hours is the smallest. Journey to work for people living in Budapest is the longest.

How much time do we spend commuting to work in a year? Time of *journey to work* is not considered as working time, it is *at the expense* of our rest period². Please find below a rough calculation with time inputs of 90 minutes and less.

² Based on Labour Code Section 86 par. (3)



Source: edited by author

It is a well-known fact that we change job more frequently now than 20 to 30 years ago. Consequently, our workplace is sometimes nearer and other times farther from our flat. Up to a particular tolerance limit, we are willing to commute every day rather than move – based on individual considerations.

Form of commuting depends again on the individual's decision and available options. On shorter distances or in areas with proper infrastructure, cycling becomes more and more popular. For preserving this trend of increase, the campaign "Cycle to Work!"³ was launched 2013.

The company side

When researching capital movement, i.e. companies' movement in Hungary, we should review what areas are deemed developed just because of specific developments made by an industry in an area or a company settled in a particular region. The best example for agglomeration is supplied by automotive industry at present. Prior to 1990, Hungary had no passenger car production; multinational companies started up this industry here. Automotive industry has become the decisive industry of the Hungarian economy during a decade. About

³ <http://kerekparosklub.hu/bam>.

150 companies of vehicle industry have settled down in small and large towns northwest in Hungary and in the Budapest agglomeration. The largest centres are in Győr, Budapest, Szentgotthárd, Székesfehérvár, Kecskemét and Esztergom, and there are additional 40–45 settlements of this region, where companies belonging to vehicle manufacturing are operating. (Also Miskolc is developing in this respect.)

Researching geographic mobility, also working companies' suitability for and ability to move shall be investigated. To put it in other words: How active is the capital movement within the country? How much is necessary for the companies to move and how much are they ready to settle down in undeveloped regions? Although the services expanding and supporting economy's operation and – maybe to just even at a higher extent – agriculture, engaging traditionally large masses and undergoing dramatic transformations, are extraordinarily important factors for the workforce, the industrial sector is in the focus of this part due to its role in growth and due to its actual mobility. For workforce, existence and structure of workforce demand are decisive, while for companies, presence of workforce and other businesses as well as their location are important factors.

We have perceived for a long time that Hungary is situated in the meeting point of East and West, exposed to impacts of both worlds. The western region has already been integrated in "circulation" of trained workforce, especially in the field of vehicle industry.

It is important to note that movement inside the country of businesses settled down in Hungary cannot be expected on the part of multinational companies that are essential when discussing our subject. Thus, we can state that theoretical business capital movement is important for workforce market mobility, but I will not discuss it in detail.

The government is striving to support and encourage companies to invest in Hungary. The respective measures are as follows:

Allowances and subsidies:

- Corporate tax relief;
- Vocational training contribution relief;

- Local tax reliefs (in different rates);
- Subsidy for SME investments creating workplaces;
- EU resources for development (for economy development as of 2014);
- Allowances within Workplace Protection Action Plan.

Supporting measures

Today, the government is determined to increase employment. It is a change in a wider sense than geographic mobility but, anyway, it is our baseline in this issue. Governmental measures rest on 3 pillars at present.

Encouraging and supporting employment within the open workforce market is the first pillar. This is most important for workers in disadvantageous situation because specific wage and contribution subsidies help them return to the primary workforce market.

The second pillar is the social economy organizing engagement of unemployed persons based on the local opportunities, partly from state subsidies and partly from own incomes. This is a temporary form of engagement aiming at employment by businesses in the long term.

The new system of public employment represents the third pillar, being in close relation with converting system of social aids into an arrangement encouraging work. Within this system, the government itself organizes temporary engagement of people not finding work within the opportunities provided by the first two pillars.

The main objective of these measures is creating jobs. This requires reduction of average taxes limiting employment. Nowadays, these burdens are the highest in Hungary among the OECD countries. Nevertheless, the single-rate income tax of 16% enhances workforce supply and encourages working. Creating further jobs calls for new incentives provided to employers in order to promote employment of persons in disadvantageous situation and to raise readiness for mobility.

We have to mention the Workplace Protection Action Plan implemented on 1 January 2013 supporting increase of employment roughly by 270 milliard HUF and additional contribution allowances. Employees working more than 100 km away from their permanent residence or whose journey time to work exceeds five hours can claim housing subsidy as of October 2012. Application for this housing subsidy can be submitted to the regional labour agency either prior to or within 30 days after start of employment. According to data of Ministry for National Economy (May 2013), more than 16 thousand persons have inquired about this subsidy; 1,000 applications have been submitted and more than 600 contracts have been concluded from the launching this program. Data clearly show that job seekers are open to mobility; however, no breakthrough has occurred yet.

The government makes efforts for creating workplaces by additional measures that may also support mobility. New workplaces can turn a region into an attractive location and a group of society into an attractive workforce.

What about readiness of employees for mobility?

Are employees prepared to commute for a good job?

There are pros and contras for commuting, and having considered all of them and pondered also the additional parameters, an employee makes her/his decision. Factors acting discouragingly for workforce geographic mobility⁴:

1. Missing information concerning real property market and costs of changing residence (move, taxes, dues, etc.);
2. Increase in costs of living;
3. Inflexibility of education system (4-, 6- and 8-class schools, etc.);
4. Individual and marital status, children or family related concerns (such as care for parents, etc.);
5. Non-adequate education or expertise, language and culture of work are not known to the necessary extent;
6. Main parameters (time, costs, etc.) of journey to work in a new location;

⁴Kulcsár, Gábor: A munkaerő területi mobilitását akadályozó tényezők, (Factors discouraging workforce's geographic mobility) Esély, 2006/3, pp. 61-84.

7. Strong emotional links to a location and community as well as challenges of integration;
8. Uncertain duration of the new job.

Employees and employers select location of their workplaces based on fundamentally diverging requirements. It can be mainly attributed to the fact that individuals are prevented from geographic change by numerous links, mainly social and mental ones, while companies – pursuing their business interests – select their locations based purely on expectable profit.

Persisting on their freehold flats and accustomed surroundings, employees opt rather for commuting, accepting all its inconveniences just even for a longer period instead of abandoning their familiar dwelling environment for a job for an unforeseeable period. This statement is best confirmed by intermigration data; and this data brought Dövényi (2008)⁵ to formulate his opinion: "Readiness for migration of the Hungarian population is rather low".

Summary

Employees and employers select location of their workplaces based on fundamentally diverging requirements. This can be mainly attributed to the fact that individuals are prevented from geographic change by numerous links, mainly social and mental ones, while companies – pursuing their business interests – select their sites based purely on the expected profit. Governmental subsidy for both groups by harmonizing their requirements can and shall be set as objective in order to balance workforce market disproportions within the country. Supporting workforce mobility works in this direction.

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⁵Dövényi, Zoltán: A belső vándormozgalom Magyarországon: folyamatok és struktúrák, (Intermigration in Hungary: processes and structures) Statisztikai Szemle, Volume 87, No. 7-8, KSH, pp.749

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FORUM OF PHD CANDIDATES

MARIANN VECSEY, PhD aspirant

THE EUTM MALI AND THE ROLE OF HUNGARY IN THE MISSION

Abstract

This article presents the birth of the EUTM Mali, and it wants to show the motivations of the European Union to create the mission. After this, the reader can get information of the structure and the operation of the mission, and learn more about the reasons for the elongation of the EUTM Mali. Hungary takes part in the mission. The article analyses this connection, the task system of the mission, and writes about the motivations of Hungary.

Keywords: European Union, Mali, Hungary, EUTM, France

I would like to introduce to the reader the EUTM Mali. It is an important mission from the view of the European Union. The EU has already a variety of operations in Africa, but the new training mission in Mali can be the opening of a different era. To help the understanding, I would like to write about the birth of the EUTM Mali, and the motivations of the EU to create a new mission.

After that I will write about the activity of the training mission, which is important, because the EU originally had planned to finish the trainings and withdraw its troops from the country by May 2014. It has not happened yet. It is important to learn more about the reasons for the elongation of the EUTM Mali.

This was not an opening for the EU only. Although Hungary has soldiers in EU missions all over Africa, joining the Mali intervention was different. I will introduce the probable motivations of Hungary to send troops in Mali. Besides this I would like to present the role of our country in the EUTM Mali.

The birth of a new mission

The EU talks about the launching of a new mission started in 2012, because of the ongoing events in Mali. On 17 March 2012, a group called MNLA¹

¹ National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad-Mouvement National pour la Libération de l'Azawad

executed its first action in the northern part of the country, and captured Menaka.² The MNLA recruits its members mainly from Tuareg tribes. This ethnic group lives in the northern part of Mali. During the history of the country Tuaregs have always been marginalised by the ruling government. Because of this they have started insurgencies for improving the social net in the Azawad³ area. All of the insurgencies ended with peace agreements, which included the improvement of the Tuareg area, but then all of them were violated by the government. The secessionist movements grew stronger, and the fighting started again, when the Touré government continued oppressive policy.⁴ Because of the Tuareg insurgency and the passivity of the government, Captain Armadou Haya Sanogo led a military coup against Amound Toumani Touré on 22 March 2012. This move aimed to restore peace in the country, but it just fuelled the northern secessionist movements. The coup also enabled the radical Islamist groups to gain power, and this was the call for the international community for intervention.⁵ Some critics say that it was again a late respond to the events, and the still operating missions are just strengthening these views.

Because of the ongoing events in Mali, European Union officials agreed about a possible training mission in a meeting on 17 October 2012. The conception of the new mission in Mali was accepted on 10 December. The mission was planned to support the reconciliation of the democratic government and the law and order in the country. On 17 January, in a EU foreign ministers' meeting, the representatives agreed about launching a training mission in Mali.⁶ This was the EUTM Mali. The claims of the mission were the UN Security Council resolution 2085, and an invitation from the President of Mali in December 2012.⁷ The agreement about the launching of the mission was signed in Bamako, on 4 April.⁸

² Tiemoko Diallo, David Lewis: Mali rebels push south to open third front-sources. <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/01/26/mali-fighting-town-idUSL5E8CQ40020120126>. Downloaded: 2013. September 11.

³ The name of the Tuareg state. It contains the northern part of Mali, the southern part of Algeria, the southern part of Libya, the eastern part of Niger and the northern part of Burkina Faso. The area is approximately 2 million km².

⁴ Besenyő János: Háború Európa előterében- A Mali krízis, in: Seregszemle, 2013/1. pp. 10-12.

⁵ Marsai, Viktor: Külföldi katonai beavatkozás Maliban-Az Operation Serval és háttere. (Foreign military intervention in Mali- The Operation Serval and its background) http://hvk.uni-nke.hu/downloads/kozpontok/svkk/Elemzesek/2013/SVKK_Elemzesek_2013_1.pdf. Downloaded: 2013. May 21. p. 4.

⁶ Besenyő, János: Az Európai Unió kiképző művelete Maliban és a magyar szerepvállalás. (The training mission of the European Union in Mali and the role of Hungary), in Honvédségi Szemle, 2013/5. pp. 68-76, p. 69.

⁷ Nyulász, Viktória: A mali válság kezelésének nemzetközi dimenziója. (The international dimension of the Malian crisis management) XIV. Euroatlanti Nyári Egyetem, előadás, Szolnok, 2013. July. 31.

⁸ [Agreement between the European Union and the Republic of Mali on the status in the Republic of Mali of the European Union military mission to contribute to the training of the Malian Armed Forces \(EUTM Mali\)](#).

The motivations of the EU in this situation were different from other missions. The first aspect is the French pressure on the European organisation. France started a new Africa policy, which in fact forced the European Union to make an effort in Mali. Later we could see the same pattern in the Central African Republic. However the EU did not want to send its soldiers to combat, so the establishment of a training mission was a perfect solution for the organisation this time.

Another motivating aspect was the migration. The illegal migrants from North-Africa are heading to Europe. The renewed fights and the activity of radical Islamist groups led to a new migration wave, which threatens Europe with thousands of illegal migrants and the security problems they cause. The third and most fearful motivation was the threat of a new safe heaven for radical Islamist groups in West-Africa.⁹

The mandate of the EUTM Mali was originally 15 months, from February 2013, to May 2014. The plan was to train 4 battle groups, 750 personnel in each, during this period of time. Even so the talks about the elongation of the mission started in the middle of 2013.

The objectives of the mission are to support the restore of constitutional and democratic order through the fulfilment of a road-map, which was accepted on 29 January by the Malian National Assembly, to help the Malian authorities to extend their power to the whole country, and put an end to organised crime and terrorism.

The aim of the EUTM Mali is the following: *"To support the rebuilding of the Malian armed forces and to meet their operational needs."*¹⁰ This includes mentoring in the fields of command and control, logistics, human resources, international humanitarian law, and training Malian units in Koulikoro.¹¹ It is important to note that the EUTM Mali is not a combat mission; the members can only use their weapons when their life is threatened.

<http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2013:106:0002:0006:EN:PDF>. Downloaded: 2013. October 17.

⁹ Nyulász, Viktória: A mali válság kezelésének nemzetközi dimenziója. 2013.

¹⁰ EU Training Mission in Mali. http://eas.europa.eu/csdp/missions-and-operations/eutm-mali/pdf/01092013_factsheet_eutm-mali_en.pdf. Downloaded: 2013. October 17.

¹¹ http://uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/aarms-vol-12_-issue-2_-2013.original.pdf Downloaded: 2014. June 17

The deployment of the EUTM Mali started on 13 February 2013, after a long preparation¹² and continued until April. The commander of the mission, Brigadier General Francois Lecointre went to survey the operational theatre in January. His experiences were rather distressing, and he was the first, who questioned the sufficiency of the planned 15 months.¹³

The operating EUTM Mali

It was decided that the Headquarters of the mission be in Bamako, the capital of Mali, but the training site in Koulikoro on the only military academy of the country, which is about 60 kms from Bamako.¹⁴

The personnel of the EUTM Mali were planned to be 250 instructors, and a 200-strong security and logistics unit, but the EU finally deployed 200 instructors, 150 troops in the security unit and 150 soldiers in the logistics element.¹⁵ These soldiers are from 23 EU member states: Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Great Britain, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Nederland, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Slovenia, Spain and Sweden.¹⁶ The biggest contingent is from France.

The mission deployed fully in April. In that month, soldiers from the ongoing French mission, the Operation Serval, led a training course for the newly established mission. The training was important for the instructors, because their trainees intended to work with them after their indoctrination. In parallel with this, the mission started the basic training for the 1st Battle Group. It lasted for three weeks, and then started the specialisation trainings in four weeks.

The Waraba (Lion) Battle Group finished its training on 21 June, and then headed to Sikasso, to conduct live operations with the Operation Serval, or the AFISMA.¹⁷ After some days break between the two battle groups, the Elou

¹² EU Training Mission in Mali.

¹³ Besenyő, János: Az Európai Unió kiképző művelete Maliban és a magyar szerepvállalás. (The training mission of the European Union in Mali and the role of Hungary) p. 69.

¹⁴ EU Training Mission in Mali.

¹⁵ http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojaska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/svi_15_3.pdf Downloaded: 2014. June 17.

¹⁶ EU Training Mission in Mali.

¹⁷ [Départ du bataillon Waraba](http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201306). <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201306>. Downloaded: 2013. October 18.

(Elephant) Battalion started its training. At this time the mission had the equipment to introduce the tactical air control patrols (TACP) to the trainees in order to support land operations.¹⁸ The training finished for the second battle group in September. The third battle group, named Sigi (Buffalo), started its training in October,¹⁹ after the rotation of the instructors, and finished it on 7 December. The fourth unit scheduled to start its training in Koulikoro by the end of December. The fourth battle group started its pre training period, and in Koulikoro a Train the Trainers (TTT) program set off. The TTT was formed to train Malian instructors, to introduce them the European methods, and to teach them how to use these techniques.

The pre training period is only for NCOs and officers, and it started after the Waraba and Elou battalions finished their 10 weeks long training in Koulikoro, so Sigi battalion was the first that got this training. During these three weeks, the mentioned group of soldiers learns different subjects, like topography, counter IED procedures, first aid in combat situations and safety measures when using weaponry. The training is mostly practical. The pre training period was needed because of the untrained NCOs and officers.²⁰

The fourth, Balanzan battle group started its basic training on 8 January. During their training a delegation of 8 people from Waraba Battalion went back to the Koulikoro base, after spending several months in northern Mali, to discuss the appropriateness of their training. This was initiated by the commander of the EUTM Mali.²¹

After the Balanzan finished its training on 18 March, Waraba Battalion started a supplementary training on 4 April before its redeployment to the north.²²

¹⁸ [Mieux connaître la mission : la formation «TACP»](http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201308). <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201308>. Downloaded: 2013. October 18.

¹⁹ [Formation spécialisée au camp d'entraînement de Koulikoro](http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201310). <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201310>. Downloaded: 2014. July 4.

²⁰ [L'entraînement continue au camp de Koulikoro](http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201312). <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201312>. Downloaded: 2014. July 4.

²¹ [WARABA de retour à EUTM-MALI](http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201401). <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201401>. Downloaded: 2014. July 4.

²² [Début des activités d'entraînement complémentaires pour Waraba](http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201404). <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201404>. Downloaded: 2014. July 5.

As a new mission, the EUTM Mali had problems in the beginning. For example they needed to build accommodation and offices to the instructors and the supporting elements in a short time. The instructors knew that they will have difficulties in the training because the Malian soldiers were so untrained. They had to learn first how to train these people, and after the first experiences the EUTM Mali started to change the training system and use the experiences in practice. The structure of the trainings remained the same, but it was completed with NCO and officer trainings. The EUTM Mali changed constantly in order to fulfil its aim. The instructors could see from the beginning of the trainings that the 10 weeks long periods are too short.²³ After the consultation with the Waraba Battle Group in January 2014, it became more obvious that the 15 months have to be elongated, and all of the battalions have to go back to Koulikoro to a second training.

To the suggestion of the commanders²⁴ of the mission, the EU decided to extend the mission. On 15 April 2014, the Council of the European Union extended the mission with two years, until 18 May, 2016. Besides this, the Council extended the range of activities of the mission. It had to establish two mobile training groups that will have to follow up the previously trained battalions, and the TTT program had to continue. In addition, the EUTM Mali is allowed to train the four remaining battalions of the Malian Armed Forces.²⁵

The second training of the Waraba battalion finished on 2 May. Between the battalion trainings it was a routine to do TTTs and other trainings for different units of the Malian Armed Forces. For example the EUTM Mali trained engineers, including a combat river crossing exercise in the Niger.²⁶ After the second training of the Waraba and an engineer training, the instructors had to get ready to welcome a new battalion in Koulikoro. The training of the fifth battalion started on 16 June.²⁷

²³ Interview with 1st Lieutenant Richárd Zámbari, the commander of the Hungarian sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali. Debrecen, 2013. October 25.

²⁴ On 1 April General Marc Rudkiewicz succeeded General Bruno Guibert.

²⁵ EU training mission in Mali extended. http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/EN/foraff/142237.pdf. Downloaded: 2014. July 5.

²⁶ [Entraînement au franchissement pour les militaires maliens](http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201403). <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201403>. Downloaded: 2014. July 5.

²⁷ [GTIA 5 – Ensemble pour l’avenir](http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201407). <http://www.eutmmali.eu/?m=201407>. Downloaded: 2014. July 5.

Hungary in the EUTM Mali

Hungary wanted to send soldiers to the EUTM Mali, despite the fact Africa is not in our sphere of interest. Our country planned to send 5 to 10 instructors in the mission. The figures finalised on 13 February 2013 in Dublin. Hungary maximalized the number of soldiers in 15. The preparation for the mission started in February, with a variety of classes about the operational theatre. The preparation included the sniper instructor training too. Besides this, the Hungarian contingent had French lessons. Hungary is not the only country that had problems with the Malian official language. The instructors from more European countries led the training in English, with interpreter's help.²⁸ This method was slow, and the non-military interpreters made the understanding even more difficult at the first time. During the training of the first battalion the interpreters improved a lot, and when the Elou battalion came, they worked with the instructors smoother.²⁹

The training system of the EUTM Mali follows the French methods. It means that the trainees have four days of theoretical training and one day out in the field per week. This schedule was modified because the trainees have to work with their companies at the weekends – given the fact that besides the specializations – there is a general training for everyone. The special trainings are the sniper, engineer, TACP, INTEL, BTR, artillery, logistics, special operations. These courses start after the three weeks basic training, and last for four weeks, and then the troops reintegrate into their original units for the last three weeks to do the company exercise, and then the battalion exercise.³⁰

The first Hungarian officer was deployed to Bamako on 27 February as a liaison officer. The medical team, included three people, started its mission on the 18 March. The six sniper instructors arrived to Mali on 13 April.³¹

The Hungarian instructor team was late from the three weeks long basic training of the Waraba Battalion, but they were there in time to start the

²⁸ Besenyő, János: Az Európai Unió kiképző művelete Maliban és a magyar szerepvállalás. (The training mission of the European Union in Mali and the role of Hungary) p. 74.

²⁹ Interview with 1st Lieutenant Richárd Zámbari, the commander of the Hungarian sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali.

³⁰ Besenyő, János: Magyar műveleti tapasztalatok Maliban. (Hungarian operational experiences in Mali) in Honvédségi Szemle, 2014/3. pp. 78-92. p.84.

³¹ Megkezdik szolgálatukat a magyar katonák Maliban. (Hungarian soldiers started their mission in Mali) <http://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/vedelempolitikaert-es-tervezesert-felelos-helyettes-allamtitkarsag/hirek/megkezdik-szolgalatukat-a-magyar-katonak-maliban>. Downloaded: 2013. September 8.

specialized training of its snipers. The team had to train 27 snipers for each battalion. For the Waraba, as they missed the basic training, they could not choose the most skilful shooters, because they did not have the chance to see the Malians on a live shooting exercise. Even so, the Hungarian instructor team described the trainees as enthusiastic students despite the difficulties caused by the cultural differences. They worked with an interpreter during the course. When Elou battalion arrived they could follow the basic training and they could select the troops for the specialization. When the training finished for Elou battalion, the mission ended to the Hungarian sniper instructor team and they withdrew from Mali on 16 September 2013.³²

After the Hungarian sniper instructor team, the Portuguese took over the training for the next two battalions, and for a long time there was no decision about a second Hungarian deployment to the EUTM Mali.

Before the European Union elongated the mandate of the mission, Hungary decided to prepare its next six personnel sniper team for deployment, and the training started on 1 April 2014, two weeks before the EU decision. The news about the extension of the Hungarian mission came on 15 May, so the country is intended to send soldiers to the western African country until 18 May, 2016.³³ On the training there was two weeks of general training including lessons about the operational theatre and the humanitarian law, but there were not French lessons, and the language was not mandatory to applying for a status. After the general training, a specialized course started including sniper instructor training, and learning the experiences of the first instructor team. The training finished on 5 May, and the second rotation of sniper instructors, now only with four Hungarian and two Portuguese members, deployed to Mali on 10 May. The sniper instructor teams will be joint Portuguese-Hungarian ones. This instructor team just started the training of the fifth Malian battalion, which would be 10-week long, as for the former four battalions, with the addition of a three-week long pre-training period for NCOs and officers. This rotation will train the sixth battalion too, before their returning to home at autumn, 2014.

³² Interview with 1st Lieutenant Richárd Zámboi, the commander of the Hungarian sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali.

³³ Még két évig maradhatnak a magyar katonák Maliban. (Hungarian soldiers could stay in Mali for two more years.) http://hvg.hu/vilag/20140515_Meg_ket_evig_maradhatnak_a_magyar_katonak. Downloaded: 2014. July 06.

A third rotation of instructors already prepared for the mission in April, they are planned to be sent to Mali in November, and that rotation will include two Hungarians and four Portuguese. This team will be responsible for the training of the last two Malian battalions. Their task will be the same as the first ones, including the follow-up training of the trainees and the mentoring of the platoon, and if it is needed, company commanders.³⁴

So Hungary reduced the number of its soldiers in EUTM Mali, but between the two rotations another EU mission started in Africa³⁵, and Hungary sent soldiers there too. Besides the fact Hungary denied its interests in Africa, the country trying to find new operational theatres. With the NATO missions closing in Afghanistan, Hungary has to take a look around the world to find places where to send its soldiers. Hungary needs to find new missions to fulfil its own pledge about keeping 1,000 soldiers in missions at a time.

Hungary has the potential to send small contingents to missions in Africa, but it is not prepared yet to send company strong contingent there. But joining the EU missions could be just to counterbalance the Hungarian policy towards the EU.

Summary

The European Union started the EUTM Mali mainly because of the rising of radical Islamist organisations, and the threat of a new al-Qaeda safe heaven, just at the southern borders of Europe. At the beginning, the EU just wanted to be in the country, but it did not want to spend a lot of money, or bear huge risk. Later, the Council of the European Union decided to extend the mandate of the mission, because the country still suffers from sporadic fights and inter ethnical violence. The mandate of the mission extended on the request of the mission commanders. Now the mandate lasts until May 2016.

The first 15 months of the EUTM Mali brought a lot of changes. The training system had to change to fit better to the Malian needs, and the mandate had to be elongated to let the contingent train the four remaining battalions of the Malian Armed Forces. The training of the fifth battalion started in June.

³⁴ Interview with a planned member of the third sniper instructor team in EUTM Mali. Tata, 2014. July 06.

³⁵ The EU mission in the Central African Republic started in early 2014, including Hungarian soldiers.

The Hungarian contingent provided the sniper instructors to the mission, and the second rotation has already been deployed to Mali, after a long period of negotiations about the mandate. The training schedule remained the same from the beginning, and the experiences of the first rotation will help the work of the second, and the already prepared rotations.

Hungary took part in the mission from the very beginning. Although Africa is not a direct sphere of interest to our country, but if it wants to keep up its 1,000 soldiers-in mission-at a time-ambition, it needs new operational theatres.

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**FINANCING TERRORISM WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE
INFORMAL REMITTANCE SYSTEM CALLED HAWALA**

Abstract

The nature of terrorism has been changed significantly at the beginning of the 21st century. Due to the globalisation tendencies, the wars in the Middle-East and the rapid development of mass communication and technology, as well as to the widening access to Internet, and because of the effects of the media, an accelerated spread of extremist ideologies has been witnessed with the use of new and more destructive methods, with not only military, but civilian population targets as well. A terrorist attack might happen anywhere, anytime. All these phenomena urge the need for liquidating terrorism.

The most effective way in fighting terrorism is to eliminate its pecuniary and economic background, together with hindering its finance. As a result of strict regulations on official cash flow, criminals and terrorists are forced to find such a way of transferring money from one part of the world to the other that remains invisible to authorities. Although hawala is flourishing, other anonymous ways of money transfer have also appeared on the Internet.

The aim of this study is to introduce hawala, revealing the risks it constitutes in financing terrorism, and to show other financial operations linked to illegal activity.

Keywords: Terrorism, financing terrorism, organized crime, hawala

Introduction

International terrorism and organized crime have grown into a size of unprecedented proportions. These two phenomena have become fully connected, mutually providing support to reach their goals. In general terms, terrorism intends to spread an ideology, to build up ethnic conditions favourable from its point of view, whereas organized crime is to acquire material assets to use them in obtaining political and legal economic power.

Both terrorism and organized crime make effective use of the opportunities the globalisation provides. The „shrinking” world and the professional use of high tech appliances and advanced electronic communication channels have led to new forms of crime. Terrorism itself has changed;

meanwhile anti-terrorist and law enforcement authorities around the world have acted in a more and more organized way against these two phenomena, which requires legal harmonization, military and law enforcement co-operation and coordination.

The primary intentions are to explore and eliminate the economic and financial basis of illegal activity (both terrorism and organized crime), to obstruct financing and to explore and cut money flow channels.

The funding and remittance systems of these terror and criminal organizations are adjusted to the technological standards of these days. Conventional methods are still in use; however, modern 21st century technologies have been introduced and applied. Besides crimes committed earlier – such as cheating and blackmailing on the Internet or raising funds – the tried and tested hawala is used to transfer funds.

The change in terrorism

Contemporary terrorism started at the end of the 1960's. During the political and economic changes, the welfare societies in Europe went under a wave of modern age revolution, which resulted in an extensive spread of extreme left revolutionary ideologies. The best known representatives, the Italian Red Brigades and the West-German Red Army Fraction (Rote Armee Fraction – RAF) are the products of this process. Besides arson, bomb attacks and homicide committed by firearms, their activity is mainly characterised by kidnapping and other forms of blackmail – all in order to collect ransom. Most of their operations are financed from such funds, while the rest is from common crimes, thefts and robberies. Imprisonment in many cases and the effective counter action have made terrorism a costly "profession", which at the same time has resulted in a more organized activity on the terrorists' side. Since the turn of the century, terrorism has changed. The terrorists of our times are faceless and with their focused bomb attacks their goal is to most unexpectedly and destructively eliminate the target. Their strategy of choosing targets has changed, too. Attacks in the 19-20th centuries were particularly carried out against rulers and church leaders. Today, in addition to typical military targets, civilian targets, objects, and events are attacked, in which potentially a large number of people take part. Terrorist attacks on markets, shopping centers, hospitals, sport events often result in significant civilian casualties.

Globalization, too, has had a significant effect on the change of terrorism. The flow of information, goods and capital has accelerated, and is realised intercontinentally, which brings the peoples of the world closer to each other both in time and space while mutual dependence develops among them, on the other hand the economic gap between modern and poor countries is becoming deeper. This did not lead only to the latest manifestation of terrorism, called eco-terrorism, but also boosted and helped the activity and cooperation of terror organizations. By taking advantage of the opportunities of contemporary communication, not only the structure of terrorist organizations will be re-interpreted, but new light has been thrown upon their training activity, the spread of information, ideologies and recruitment.

Globalization has obviously influenced the organized crime. The term *cross-border international organized crime* developed in the late 1980's, which meant that national law enforcement authorities had to face new challenges. Beside INTERPOL, which was established in 1923, the EU founded EUROPOL (European Police Office) in 1985 to set its goal as the harmonization of legal possibilities for effective action against crime, the creation of a common EU criminal database, the preparation of analyses together with the rapid transmission of information and the promotion of practical cooperation. Evidently, the degree of cooperation between terror and crime organizations nowadays has never been witnessed before.

The third, statistically detectable reason for the changes in terrorism lies in the Middle-East wars. The long-continued war in Afghanistan has led to national guerrilla war and asymmetric warfare, which is characteristically fought by terrorist groups, outlaw forces fighting for freedom using different methods. This kind of warfare is mainly used for suicide bombing, attacking convoys by home-made explosives. Media also has had and still has major influence on the transformation of terrorism. Live coverage on terror attacks enhances their psychological effect, thereby also helps achieving the goals of terrorist organizations. The radio and TV channels, the websites and the contents of the material uploaded to the internet contribute to spreading new ideologies and making possible rapid communication between organizational units.

The most effective tool in the fight against terrorism and criminal organizations is undermining their funding and economic background. As a result of stricter bank regulations, terror and crime organizations extensively use

hawala as their means of money transfer, at the same time, they use anonymous remittance systems (Bitcoin¹, Ukash, Paysafecard²) on the Internet to carry out payment and purchasing.

Hawala in work

Hawala is an informal remittance system based on the traditional religious values of the early middle ages, personal relationships and trust. Its point is to create between two people or businesses in different countries the transmission of funds in a few minutes. Since its operation is outside the bank system, it is practicable in countries where there is no bank system, or it is functioning in an unreliable manner. It is widespread at places where – for geographic reasons – building a bank is impossible or not worthwhile, or at places where people living in poverty cannot travel to the banks.

It may be best to review its operation through a practical example³:
A Pakistani migrant in London wants to transfer 2,000£ to his family in Karachi. One option is to choose the bank system, the other is hawala. The bank charges substantial referral fee for the transaction, in addition, it is costly to exchange to rupees - possibly even using intermediate currency. If he is to pick the second option, he looks up a hawala agent (hawaladar) in London and before he gets a password in return, he hands over the transaction fee and the money he would like to send. The password then is provided to the family who meets a hawala agent in Karachi, reveals the password and then receives the money in rupees. Unlike regular bank transaction fees and realised foreign exchange loss, the average transfer fee ranges between 0.25 and 1.25 percent.

The system is obviously a lot more complex than this only transfer. The direction of the cash flow might be the opposite – there is someone who wants to send money to London from Karachi.

The procedure is the same, but in reverse. The London hawala agent practically hands over the same money to a Pakistani student studying in

¹ Bitcoin: Unofficial, virtual money.

² Paysafecard, Ukash: Electronic money.

³ A longer version of the example can be found: The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering
<http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/FinCEN-Hawala-rpt.pdf>, pp. 5-7.
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London in pounds that he received from the other Pakistani. You can see that cash flow is not done; the money actually remains in London and Karachi.

The system is built up of thousands of such transactions.

There are only theories how settlement between brokers exactly works. Some experts say that at certain intervals all the brokers settle with each other. Other researchers assume that there must be some cash flow involved. It is most likely that a combination of these two operates the settlement system.

Approaching the process on a purely technical basis, of course we can see that merely the fact that *the money does not really leave the dispatch location* does not distinguish hawala from the banks and money sender remittance companies, since in the latter cases money is not moved from England to another country either. The advantages of hawala lie in all other "differences", and basically in its informality.

Using hawala has numerous advantages.

The first is a very reasonable price. There are no bank or exchange costs. The hawala agent's activity is non-bureaucratic, no office buildings and other infrastructure networks are needed or operated. In general, they have no offices, most of the time they are found in cafes or do their brokerage activities running their small investment legal business enterprises (such as gyros maker or other catering units, barber shop, diary shop, internet cafe). The tech devices they need are a (mobile) phone, a fax machine, or perhaps a computer.

Hawala transactions are organized very fast (usually within 24 to 48 hours, or even sooner); and bank holidays, weekend days, the different time zones do not have to be taken into account.

Occasionally, money might "disappear" in the banking systems, which they find later or while transferring money, an intermediary bank must be brought in, unrealistically slowing the processes down. In contrast, hawala agents know and trust each other, there are no obstacles; the money can even get to the recipient living in the most remote village of Somalia. Trust is an important component of the system, but it is based on traditional law. In some countries even today cutting off the hand is the punishment for stealing.

Consequently, the users of hawala are not „depressed” by the lack of cumbersome administrative background. *The system does not require opening a bank account*, the origin of money is not inquired and the user will remain invisible to any tax authorities.

Cultural factor is not negligible either. There are Asian and African colonies living in several European cities that cannot and do not want to visit western banks at all; often due to the lack of language knowledge or cultural differences. Women, wives living according to traditional religious values, have minimal relationship with their environment. It is an obvious choice for them to transfer money with hawala agents⁴.

The anonymity of hawala is not a primary concern to legal users of the system, but to those with criminal intent it is crucial. The correct operation of the system is ensured by its criminalized background.

The overall conclusion is that hawala is extremely user-friendly.

We do not even have estimates on the amount of money transferred through hawala. The volume might be inferred taking the growing number of migrants and foreign workers. However, based on contradictory estimates, it is likely that informal money transfer makes up about one-third of the global transfers. This one-third part in 2002, according to the U.S. Treasury Department, was approximately \$ 115 billion⁵.

The amount of money flowing through hawala and its diverse applications can be illustrated with three examples:

1./ According to estimates, for example, 40 percent of the national income of Somalia – lacking an operating bank system – is moving through hawala.

⁴ The World Bank And The International Monetary Fund: Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System (joint publication of The World Bank and The IMF, 21 March 2003) http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/05/03/000094946_03041904002082/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (Download: 4 September 2013)

⁵ Charles B. Bowers: Hawala, Money Laundering, And Terrorism Finance: Micro-Lending As An End To Illicit Remittance in Denver Journal of International Law And Policy, Volume 37 No 3, 2008-2009. p. 382 <http://djiip.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/Hawala-Money-Laundering-Terrorism-Finance-Micro-Lending-End-Illicit-Remittance-Charles-B-Bowers.pdf> (Download: 2 July 2013)

The Somali Telesom mobile phone company in its Zaad package has an application offering to its customers the use and constant status check of hawala over their mobile phones. (The mobile payment system was first introduced in Kenya by Safaricom Company, under the name M-Pesa. Its objective was to ensure an easy repayment method for public micro-credits. The mobile phone SIM card data serve as the user's "bank data." With the help of this application, the SIM card holder can carry out financial operations, transfers, purchases through the system. Meanwhile, this payment option has spread over to many countries. Using fraud data to hold SIM cards enables these holders to access in a literally uncontrollable way to the system with illegal purposes.)

2./ According to Shaukat Azziz, former Vice President of Citibank, and later Pakistan's Finance Minister and Prime Minister, the annual amount of money transferred through hawala is larger than the amount flowing into the country from abroad through trade banks⁶.

3./ In countries where the banking system does not work due to conflicts, international non-profit organizations (NGO⁷-s), instead of taking the risks of dangerous cash flow, use hawala to transfer money to the country. Humanitarian actions in Afghanistan were financed in this way, the amounts received generally ranged between one hundred thousand and one million dollars. Hawala agents in Kabul did not limit the amounts they paid to NGOs⁸.

Overall, among the tens of thousands of legal transfers, the money flow used for illegal purposes remains invisible.

Hawala for illegal purposes

The activity is basically legal. Originally it was invented not for crime but very practical reasons. It is no coincidence that a number of countries around the

⁶A nation challenged: The Financing;Ancient Secret System Moves Money Globally <http://www.nytimes.com/2001/10/03/world/a-nation-challenged-the-financing-ancient-secret-system-moves-money-globally.html> (Download: 4 July 2013)

⁷ NGO: Non-governmental Organisation

⁸Arya Hariharan: Hawala's Charm: What Banks Can Learn From Informal Funds Transfer Systems in William & Mary Business Law Review Volume 3 Issue 1 Article 8, p. 290. <http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1036&context=wmbldr> (Download: 4 October 2013)

world have used similar systems operating in the same manner⁹. However, in general, the original goal was that traders did not want to carry cash during the long journeys across dangerous areas; therefore they "sent" their own money that they took over when they arrived in another city.

Typical illegal forms of hawala:

- Terror Financing;
- Money-laundering¹⁰;
- Avoiding taxes;
- Paying for illegal activity or goods.

Another reason for the spread of hawala-like systems is that they can be used to pay for goods. In this case, the seller in Pakistan sends the goods to the Netherlands. The recipient of the goods hands its value to the Dutch hawala agent whose relationship in Pakistan then pays to the seller. Drug dealers still widely use this payment method today.

The Indian and Pakistani usage distinguishes "white hawala", which means the legitimate usage of hawala and "black hawala", covering the use for criminal purposes¹¹.

The reason for the flourishing use of hawala in the past decades is that stricte regulations on official cash flow forced criminals and terrorists to find ways of transferring money from one part of the world to the other which remains invisible to authorities. The illegal use of hawala is a very complex process. Hawala agents form a worldwide network including tens of thousands of people. Most clients transfer legal income. They numerically far outweigh the number of those with criminal purposes; however the amounts they send are usually very low. On the other hand, significant amount of money is transferred

⁹Hawala and similar systems in the world according to their geographical location:Hawala: India, UAE, Middle-East; Hundi: Pakistan, Bangladesh; Fei ch'ien ("flying money"):China; Phoe kuan: Thailand; Hui k'uan andCh'iao hui:Mandarin Chinese; Nging sing kek: Kantoni Chinese; Chop shop:foreigners use the term for the Cheneese method; Hui or hui kuan: Vietnamese in Australia; Door to door and padala: Philipinosuse; Black market currency exchange: South-America, Nigeria, Iran; Stash house. Source: Emiko Todoroki, Informal Funds Transfer Systems, PPT , The World Bank, 18 April 2006, http://www.fintraca.gov.af/assets/ppt/EmikoNewfiles/Todoroki,Emiko_IFTS_%20Apri_18_2006.ppt(Download: 10 October 2013)

¹⁰Patrick M. Jost, Harjit Singh Sandhu: The Hawala Alternative Remittance System and its Role in Money Laundering <http://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/terrorist-illicit-finance/Documents/FinCEN-Hawala-rpt.pdf> (Download: 6 September 2013)

through hawala by criminals, criminal organizations and terrorist groups; therefore, keeping the "bank secrets" in the sector is everyone's primary interest. The terrorist organizations and criminal networks are also connected, support each other in logistic services and financial / funding. Therefore, the hawala method merges legal with illegal, "money for money" and "money for goods," weapons and drugs; and the money laundering is usually associated with such activities.

Naresh Jain, captured in India in 2009, conducted hawala activity in all five continents of the world. Among his clients there were terrorists, drug dealers. Naresh's organization was capable of laundering approximately \$ two billion per year, according to authorities¹².

Illegal fields of hawala are mainly money laundering, financing terrorism, drug trafficking, for (organized) criminal gangs, dislocation of illegal money, smuggling and tax evasion¹³.

Hawala and financing terrorism

The issue of financing terrorism¹⁴ has been a very intensely researched topic over the past 10 years. The concept itself that the material bases of terrorism must be eliminated is not new. Based on international standards, financing terrorism does not merely mean an act of funding terror actions, but also includes the support of services to terrorist individuals or groups to help their daily livelihood¹⁵. The problem is further generalized since it is not possible within the framework of this study to discuss the different organizational structures of terrorist groups. It is clear that the financing system applied in military-type terrorist organizations operating in their homeland to ensure the smooth production and transport of drugs (drug terrorism), such as

¹²<http://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20091213-naresh-jain-hawala-drogbandak-es-terroristak-bankara.html>
(Download: 6 September 2013)

¹³ The World Bank And The International Monetary Fund: Informal Funds Transfer Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System (joint publication of The World Bank and The IMF, 21 March 2003) pp. 19-21.
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2003/05/03/000094946_03041904002082/Rendered/PDF/multi0page.pdf (Download: 4 September 2013)

¹⁴Financial activity of any kind to support terror actions, financial support of people promoting or participating in terrorist activities. It may be financial share, cash(bills), insurance(s), deposit(lockup). Source: Wesley J. L. Anderson: Disrupting Threat Finances: Utilisation of Financial Information to Disrupt Terrorist Organisations in the Twenty-First Century, School of Advanced Military Studies, Kansas, 2007. p. 8.
http://books.google.hu/books?id=7ROwy6z_tyMC&printsec=frontcover&num=100&hl=hu#v=onepage&q&f=false (Download: 4 October 2013)

¹⁵Act C 2012—Criminal Law of Hungary

the Colombian FARC¹⁶, is quite different from the supporting system of the globally active, cell-like structured terrorist groups, for example Islamic terrorist organizations.

Sources of financing terrorism include:

- State funding;
- Income from the legitimate business activities of a terrorist organization;
- Illegal income from cooperation with organized criminal groups (eg, kidnapping, human trafficking, production and distribution of drugs, trafficking, arms trafficking);
- Donations from associations, churches;
- Donations received from radicalized communities;
- Zakat¹⁷ and
- The internet fraud, blackmail.

All of these funds might be transferred through the informal systems of hawala.

Terrorist organizations apply asymmetric¹⁸ warfare in their operational activities. The most privileged among their tools are suicide and various other bombings, kidnappings and rocket attacks. These actions are very inexpensive, the costs compared to the number of injuries and the losses of lives caused are insignificant.

According to István László Gál, only 10 percent of the revenue of terrorist organizations is allocated to the costs of activities, the rest is "operational" costs and support¹⁹ paid to the family of terrorists, so the remaining ninety percent is to be forwarded to its destination through informal remittance channels.

¹⁶ FARC (Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo), Colombian terror organization

¹⁷ zakat: tax paid by Islamic religious believers

¹⁸ Party employing asymmetric: simple, often unusual means for a great result; leverages the power of the opposing party, as its main weakness, strives to maintain a minimum exertion on the maximum result, does not need a large military force, bureaucratic headquarters, the staff small forces enable rapid decision-making and successful action, does not fight face-to-face because it does not possess sufficient military capabilities. Source: Resperger István: Az aszimmetrikus hadviselés és a terrorizmus jellemzői, Hadtudomány, 2010/4 p. 72.

¹⁹ Source: Gál István László – Ki fizeti a terrortámadásokat? (100 dollár egy emberélet), 5 March 2010, http://www.hetek.hu/interju/201003/ki_fizeti_a_terrortamadasokat (Download: 5 October 2013)

Summary and conclusions

Hawala is a world-wide informal money transfer system. Due to its cost-effective nature and easy accessibility, its use will certainly not fade in the future. Besides its legal use, the associated criminal purposes constitute global security risks. Plans and strategies have been built up to regulate and control its operations. The legislation is not uniform. Some countries use the term for hawala as informal financial activities (outside the banking system). The legal system of other countries, on the other hand, treats it as *unauthorized financial activity*, which is to be prosecuted. The UAE Central Bank has been a pioneer in controlling hawala over years. The Abu Dhabi Initiative suggests free registration of hawala agents and the registration of users' data and transaction records.

The FATF²⁰ is currently treating hawala as a priority area requiring action and released a study in October 2013, which might harmonize international action against illegal hawala activity in the future.

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²⁰ FATF: Financial Action Task Force – an informal international organization against money laundering grown out of OECD

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THE NEW MIDDLE EASTERN BALANCE, BENEFITS AND DISADVANTAGES POSED BY EGYPT TO IRAN

Abstract

This article focuses on one of the possible results of the so called "Arab Spring". After years of crisis, the situation in Syria is still volatile, and there is a strong possibility that a new regional alliance is about to be formed. This article deals with this alliance: how it is forming, what is the role of Iran in it, and how Egypt will fit in it, if it does so at all.

Keywords: Syria, Syrian crisis, Syrian chemical weapons, Bashar al-Asad, Iraq, Iraqi civil war, Lebanon, Hezbollah, Iran, Egypt, Muḥammad Mursi, Muslim Brotherhood, Arab Spring, terrorism, Middle East, Middle Eastern balance, ISIL.

The winds of change

By now we can say with confidence that – regardless of how much we agree with the term "Arab Spring" – the year of 2011 brought about gradual change in the Middle Eastern landscape. We could see most of the countries of the region slowly or rapidly prospering under the leaderships of a charismatic president, king, emir or leader. Yet at the same time, most of these governments were losing moral message, and the social gaps were widening. As the so called "Arab Spring" swept across the region, many of these systems were wiped out - like that of Tunisia, Libya, or Egypt - or severely shaken - like that of Syria - by the same forces, under the same pretexts. While the media was loud of the youth, demanding a more free and democratic society, these authoritarian governments were taken over or threatened by fundamentalist Sunni Muslim movements, local Muslim Brotherhood branches. By the middle of 2013, we could see that the whole region was being taken over by these branches, united under the banner of freedom, democracy and revolution - but in reality by fundamentalist ideology and the zeal of holy war - only Syria standing in the way. Behind this gradual change, we could see Turkey, and the Gulf countries supporting this change and profiting from it - both morally and economically - and we could foresee Iran losing the struggle for regional influence.

But by the course of 2013, we saw the wind change once again. As Syria was still not yielding, the fruits of the "Arab Spring" turned bitter, and it became obvious that these new regimes were indeed different in slogans and aims from their predecessors, but severely lacking content and vision of the future. The same change of wind which stopped the Syrian government to erode, has shaken the Islamist regimes of Tunisia, Libya, and most importantly Egypt. Syria therefore became the symbol of resistance. Its ties proved to be stronger than expected not only with Iran, but with Iraq and Lebanon as well. With Iranian support at the back Syria, Iraq and Lebanon started to find new ways of cooperation, and a new block was forming. The impact became very visible, when the change reached Egypt and brought about the fall of Mursi. A new player was ready to join this side of the struggle, and started to look for ways to cooperate with this emerging block around Damascus. But that raised another question. How much can Iran and Egypt fit into the same alliance, and how much can they find terms with each other?

In this study, I will show how the wind changed in the region, discrediting the newly emerged Islamist movements and governments, and how a new alliance started to be formed around Syria, with Iranian guidance, but with possible link towards Cairo. What are the realities for a long-term alliance from that cooperation? On the other hand, it is important to examine how the improving Egyptian-Iranian relationship changes the possibilities for an alliance, and how these possibilities are changing this tangible relationship. Here I wish to express that from a precise and accurate evaluation one cannot exclude the role of the great powers, mostly Russia and China, and their struggle with the US and the European states, but here I wish to focus on the regional factors. Not only because they have an independent inner - social, moral, and strategic - motivation, but also because in these changes the great powers are rather sponsors on both sides than think tanks. Both sides support certain groups in the region, according to their own interest, but the craftsmanship is now left for the locals.

The Shiite Crescent? Perceptions of the future

More focusing on Syria, from the beginning of the crisis we could hear the lengthy polemics about a Shiite Crescent stretching from Iran to Lebanon through Iraq and Syria. By this concept, which was vocally stressed and discussed by mostly Gulf based media outlets and salafī clerics in their

programs; Iran started to stretch out its arms, and changed or influenced governments only to create a Shiite alliance. In consequence putting the Sunni population of these countries under oppression is only to bring about a Sunni-Shiite clash. Strange enough this mental concept was almost never publicized on Western media outlets.

This idea was ever ongoing throughout the years of the so called “Arab Spring”, and later on I aim to discuss how much reality it had. One can argue that for Iran a regional alliance with Arab partners forged on religious grounds was on the agenda, but it is a very different question whether this was a driving force for the others at all. That shall be discussed, but here it is enough to say that it was more of a concept, lacking solid proof until the alliance suddenly started to be visible. In the early days of January 2014 the terrorist organization called Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant¹ (ISIL) took control of several key Iraqi cities, most importantly Ramadi and Falluja.² The same organization emerged in Syria, and became famous as one of the key fighting force against the Damascus government, around the middle of 2012. Since then, it started to eradicate other fighting groups as well in Syria, while fighting a brutal war against government forces and civilians alike. Their activity was marked by numerous beheadings – sometimes even the leaders of rival groups³ -, and massacres⁴ in the Syrian conflict. But they were even active in the Iraqi civil war, which erupted after the American invasion in 2003. While this takeover by extremists is unfortunately not something new or surprising, this time it had great consequences. While the Iraqi army vowed to hit back, and started major operations in the province of al-Anbar against ISIL, the international reactions showed that the winds are indeed changing. On 5th of January American Foreign Secretary John Kerry commented on the issue of supporting the Iraqi government as: “This is their fight.”⁵ He added that no fighting troops will be sent to help the Iraqis. Right the same day, secretary to the chief of staff of the Iranian Armed Forces, General Muhammad Hijazi al-Asad, announced, that Tehran is willing to give full material support for Baghdad in its fight.⁶ In other words, while the US promises nothing but political support for Iraq when the Syrian conflict slips over to its grounds, but no meaningful help, Iran is vocally

¹ *Dawla Islāmiyya fī l-‘Iraq wa aš-Šām*. By its Arabic abbreviation Da‘aš.

² <http://rt.com/news/iraq-100-killed-battles-164/> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

³ <http://www.alalam.ir/news/1534341> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

⁴ <http://www.alalam.ir/news/1546379> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

⁵ <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2534105/This-fight-Kerry-says-no-US-troops-help-Iraqis-against-Al-Qaeda-militants-Fallujah.html> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

⁶ <http://middle-east-online.com/?id=168854> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

ready to fill the gap what the leaving American forces create. So the government of al-Maliki has no choice – even if wanted to resist – but to accept the help of the Persian state, and lean towards Tehran.

These sort of groups like ISIL, moving back and forth in the Syrian-Iraqi border caused great trouble for Baghdad for years, but they became extremely worrying only after the Syrian conflict really kicked in. Especially, since in fear of escalating the situation and losing much needed Iranian support, al-Maliki sided with Damascus in the Syria conflict rather than the so called opposition. The Iraqi army and government was promoting cooperation between the two Arab countries to fight terrorism, but with limited success. However, since the Falluja incident and the flare-up of the whole al-Anbar province, the armies started to really work together, to fight extremists, especially ISIL.⁷ So what we see now is a genuine Syrian-Iraqi cooperation on military terms, with Iranian support at the back. While one could find this a bit farfetched, here we have to remember that in 2013 al-Maliki had a suggestion for the Syrian president in that matter with the same content. Considering the fact that Lebanon also experiences turmoil since – and in consequence of – the Syrian crisis (a country so important for both Iran and Syria), we can see that this forming alliance reaches as far as Lebanon. In that sense, we should not forget that mutual military support exists between the two Levant countries, which was demonstrated not only in 2006 against Israel, but also in Hezbollah's clear involvement in certain segments of the Syrian war. Indeed, something new is about to be formed.

While this alliance has been on tracks for some time – even if it only became extremely clear in all of its segments just now – in the summer and the autumn of 2013 a new candidate appeared for the group. That is Egypt. After the fall of Egyptian president Muhammad Mursi by a military coup d'état on 3rd of July 2013⁸, Cairo gradually changed its stance towards Damascus. Until then, Egypt was one of the biggest supporters of armed resistance against the government of Basshar al-Asad. After the putsch, Cairo started to crack down on the same groups that are active in Syria. Therefore, the mutual understanding is quite logical. That was marked clearly in the Syrian chemical crisis, when the US was threatening to hit Syria militarily, but Egypt refused the idea, and even announced to halt any war vessel in the Suez Channel heading to the Syrian

⁷ <http://www.almayadeen.net/ar/news/iraq-k5CRwyXkfk5eaKwAMHMwg/العارعطق-طارعاعل> - عم-ش عاا-ءااا-طوطخ-عطق-طارعاعل (downloaded: 03-14-2014)
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⁸ http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

coast.⁹ While this could be easily taken as a political stance with relatively little importance, considering that the new leaders of Egypt know very well that if the US really wishes a military campaign Egypt cannot stop it. This is more than just a political move by a newly emerging administration, trying to show power, but there is a genuine military and popular wish behind it. Not only the Egyptian military and secret service delegations travelled to Damascus to discuss means of cooperation, but Egyptian nationalists announced their wish to volunteer in the Syrian army.¹⁰ So we can really state that the winds have changed along the Nile as well.

But when we consider the formation of a great sphere of mutually cooperating states in the region, curbing the interests of the Gulf states; and especially those of Saudi Arabia, we should evaluate the possibilities of such hypothesis. We could see that Iran is a key facilitator for an understanding between Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, but if Egypt comes into the picture, we should scale the relation between the two. In short, we can say that from the Iranian point of view, Egypt is a never-win never-lose scenario. Strictly scaling the situation between the two, for Tehran, Cairo has great advantages. Among the Arab countries it is fifth by area, but first by population, as by far it is the most populated Arab state. Its huge economy highly linked to the Gulf region is constantly in need of capital and foreign investments. So a great market for Iran's industrial output and capital. It has a huge, fairly modern army and a strategically key position, which are great assets. With all its virtues, could be a great help to stabilize an alliance – if forged – with Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, and to isolate the Gulf rivals. On the other hand, it causes just as many problems. With its size and population, it has just as a great magnitude than Iran itself, and would radically shift the balance in a possible alliance for the disfavour of Iran, since it wouldn't be the sole gravitational center any more. Moreover, the alliance's nature would shift radically, as it would be a predominantly Arab alliance. To see it better, we should consider the moral sphere. As long as the revolution in Egypt was taking a form of Islamism, it could be seen positively in Tehran, just like in Tunisia, or in Libya. For the public it could be pictured as the people finding their Islamic morality, rise up and topple an immoral, and un-Islamic dictator. Much like it happened in Iran in 1979. Though this interpretation had to be revised after Syria, but even staying

⁹ <http://www.jewishpress.com/news/egyptians-may-shut-suez-canal-as-bar-to-west-anti-assad-efforts/2013/08/28/> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

¹⁰ <http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921025000453;>
<http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/01/15/345660/egyptians-to-fight-syrian-militants/> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

with Egypt, this stance was, and still is problematic. Even though it is true that the plane of Egyptian revolution was hijacked and taken over by Islamist forces - in this case by the Muslim Brotherhood - just like it happened back in Iran, but the celebrations were too early and imprudent. The Egyptian Islamic revolution was not at all like that of Iran. It was not as much anti-West in character, but fundamentally sectarian, seeing the main enemy in Shiites and therefore also in Iran and in its main ally Saudi-Arabia. Furthermore, after Mursi took over, the economy was in ruins, and financial aid - even in the face of investment - was little and conditional from the West and the Gulf. A capable investor would have been greatly welcomed, if it didn't happen to be enemy #1. Since the fall of the Muslim Brotherhood in Cairo, the pragmatic possibilities are much better, but on the moral ground we are back to square one. Since Iran cannot openly congratulate to a military leader - seeming just like the father of the last shah - who came to power by toppling a popular Islamic revolution. From the point of Egypt, Iran could be a great help, and undoubtedly is a key player in the anti-Saudi club, but cannot take the hand of an Islamic Republic, while waging war on Islamist rebels.

So from both ways, the Iranian-Egyptian connection was much needed, but extremely complicated. That is the main reason why both countries are working hard to forge an alliance in the region, and so far feels under siege - Iran from the Gulf countries, Afghanistan and Pakistan, while Egypt from the Gulf countries and Libya. While it is obvious that they have a hard time with each other, yet their understanding fundamentally influences the future of the newly forming cooperation between Lebanon, Syria and Iraq, and by that, the faith of the whole region. So after examining the way this alliance came to life; and its possibilities in the future, we shall come back to this relationship, to evaluate some likely scenarios.

What changed all equations: the so called “Arab Spring”.

Even though I highly disagree with the term "Arab Spring", but for the sake of argument I will stick with it, since its chronological and territorial content is clear. Throughout the events of the phenomenon, there were two real interpretations and narratives for it in the eyes of the local factors and a religious-fundamentalist and a state centered one. Somebody could mention the approach and interpretation so popular in the West and so highly publicized by local sponsors, meaning that it was all a genuine movement for freedom and

human rights aimed at toppling the authoritarian regimes for the sake of more open and democratic societies. Here I don't wish to discuss the falseness of this myth in depth. I do not do it, not only because it is extremely naive; and only served as a catalyst, but also because after more than three years, we have a good insight in the motives and quite enough results to judge. First of all, while it is true that all the countries affected by this phenomenon can be characterized more or less as authoritarian, but yet the most extreme cases, some countries - Saudi-Arabia in the front line with no written constitution and no elected administrative body whatsoever - are almost entirely unaffected. More than that, they were the greatest promoters behind it. If that is not enough to prove how invalid this approach is, we can also judge by the results. Did this so called "Arab Spring" anywhere where it triumphed brought about greater democracy and plurality? The answer speaks for itself.

The religious narrative in the regional media quite soon reached a level, where it virtually announced war against infidelity, and quite soon the idea of "Shiite Crescent" came to the front. Though it focused mainly on the Syrian case, but quite often tried to define the whole phenomenon. There of course we come to a very logical question. How could the whole "Arab Spring" be explained by this religious idea? What is the role of Tunisia, Egypt, and Libya in it? Bahrain can be understood this way easily, given its predominantly Shiite society, and close cultural ties with Iran. But, surprising as it may be, Tunisia was left out easily, but Libya and Egypt was explained along these lines, by those media outlets - and of course by the countries, namely Saudi-Arabia and Qatar which control them. As not simply the people would overcome a dictatorial regime, but by that a purely moral, Islamic state would be created. On that notion it is enough to remember the Muslim Brotherhood's gradual overcome of politics in Egypt and their slogans, and speeches of imam Yusau al-Qaradawi on Libya¹¹ - who was one of the biggest religious agitator for these movements in the whole Arab world - with the active support of such channels like al-Jazeera. Here once again we have to remember that such an interpretation though resembles greatly that of the Islamic Revolution in Iran in 1979, but this is a very different heading for an Islamic revolution.

One can argue a lot, how much truth the idea of the Shiite Crescent had back in 2010, which had to be broken, since - at least on its religious grounds - it was more fiction than a reality. What matters for the sponsor countries was the

¹¹ <http://youtu.be/bp7h644lTH4> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

reality, regardless of its validity. What we could experience in the course of the years of 2011, 2012 and even 2013 is that all those countries in which the "Arab Spring" over-threw the previous governmental apparatus and some Islamist governing bodies were formed; are deeply in need of foreign economic and diplomatic support. They make serious efforts to seem moderate and functional, and obtain funds to support their domestic movements. That was given to them regionally by Gulf countries and Turkey through moral support and investments, and by that they even encouraged these countries to support the avalanche.¹² So practically they became satellite states to the policies of the Gulf, supporting the ongoing phenomenon morally, and by allowing many of their people to join the fight in Syria.¹³ All that happened even amid sporadic resistance and controversies even among the politicians of these governments, like the Interior Minister of Tunisia, but only after years.¹⁴ So by that, the Gulf agenda gained support and managed to use these countries. At the same time, while continuously curbing the Iranian influence in the region, some of these countries – like Libya or Egypt – were on amicable economic terms with Tehran before 2011. With the continuation of the fights in Syria and Lebanon, this agenda was going on clearly. So to sum it up, this agenda acknowledged no real border, as the fighters in Syria even clearly admitted that¹⁵. They view the whole chain of events, as a gradual Islamic awakening - deeply Sunni in content - and an eventual clash with Shiism, moving step by step closer to Iran.

The other narrative, that of a state-centered and secular - though never anti-religious - focuses on national concepts. That view, most openly expressed always by Syria, stressed the need for greater Arab nationalistic cooperation, and possible union, putting religion as a necessary, but secondary bound within the society. This opinion was not only expressed by governmental and Baath Party dignitaries - from whom such a view would come only natural - but even from the highest religious authorities of the country, like that of Sheik Badr ad-Din Hassan, the Grand Mufti of Syria.¹⁶ That person - far from being the only

¹² On that point we can remember the Turkish Prime Minister, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan and the speech he gave in Tripoli not much after the execution of Qaddāfi. http://youtu.be/_IAbV8zpr-o. This move was in the hope of bigger Turkish investments in the that country.

¹³ Among the foreign fighters in Syria Saudi, Tunisian, Egyptian and Libyan citizens are caught regularly, and in certain countries this support was acknowledged openly, or even publicized. About Syrian sources: <http://youtu.be/UfCMjTIFeOU>; <http://youtu.be/33yLO63DWk>; <http://youtu.be/HCeF7pvyjz4>. About Libya: <http://youtu.be/gHERBg-X1Zs>. About Tunisia: <http://youtu.be/OLWLF7ubjXQ>; <http://youtu.be/pKfGer74laA>; About Egypt: <http://www.dailynewsegypt.com/2013/06/15/egypt-to-aid-syrian-rebels/> (all downloaded: 03-14-2014)

¹⁴ <http://youtu.be/E02g8uxSQAI> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

¹⁵ <http://youtu.be/L2wfZU6qUQ> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

¹⁶ http://youtu.be/teQj_1aSRbg (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

one, but he is by far the best example - kept stressing this ideology, even in struggles against the religious leaders of the Gulf agenda and its media outlets like al-Jazeera¹⁷, and even after the assassination of his own son.¹⁸ Like him, many expressed similar views, like the imam of the Aqsā Mosque Salah al-Din ibn Ibrahim.¹⁹ These are of course random examples, but with these I only wished to point out that the two viewpoints don't contradict as religious versus anti-religious, but rather as a fundamentalist fatalist ideology, positioning a certain religious understanding above the state, practically founding the state upon this ideology, using it only as a tool contradicting with an ideology which is founded on concepts of nations, seeing the role of religion imperative, but as a moral tool and guide to the society.

I already demonstrated how much of the first viewpoint echoed in the Arab streets, and even further, all around the Muslim world. But as the fight in Syria ceased to stop, and the Syrian state refused to give in, it became the symbol of such resistance and viewpoint. By that, the words and statements of the Syrian government and that state-centered approach found audience all over the Arab world as well, especially in those states in which the people could already experience the results of the so called "Arab Spring". Most importantly Tunisia, Morocco and Egypt, where regular demonstrations expressed solidarity with the Syrian people, the Syrian Arab Army and even with Basshar al-Asad.²⁰ These demonstrations of course are internally focused issues, and events in Syria are only examples, but usually the demonstrators' aim is a political shift in their own countries, and only in rare cases are these masses willing to join the the Syrian conflict on the side of the government. Egypt is a rare example for that.²¹

So after three years we can say that in a way the Arab streets were never so divided, but on the other hand, never so united, completely polarized around the two contradicting ideologies, and nurturing cooperation and alliances above borders. That polarization brought Turkey also in the picture as its government was pursuing Islamist - though moderate - policies and economic advantages; and Iran was a target on the one hand and an old trusted ally of keystone country on the other. But fitting Iran into this Arab nationalist sentiment raising fast around Syria proves to be complicated, even if advantageous.

¹⁷ http://youtu.be/FLC6_dvxb8Y (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

¹⁸ <http://youtu.be/MAPgK4bHOkU>; http://youtu.be/VoNSk_GKasw (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

¹⁹ <http://youtu.be/AGCamegceRE> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

²⁰ About Tunisia: <http://youtu.be/Xn1jWpxSPeI>. About Morocco: <http://youtu.be/GxQkID8abUo> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

²¹ <http://youtu.be/88tTgqmcQSk> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

Of course we should not forget the bigger, more outer supporters on both sides. The West, namely the US and Europe on one side, while Russia and China on the other. Since here this is not the center of the topic I don't wish to go into depths, but some light should be shed upon this. As for a general trend, we could see from around 2000 that there was a slow but constant shift in the region as far economic and trade relations in the region. Most of the Middle Eastern countries, primarily the Gulf countries lean to shift towards the eastern markets, mostly towards China and India, but Russia as well. For that, it is enough to see the export-import ratios of the GCC member states. That shows the constant penetration of China and India and the fall back of Europe and the US in these countries. In this chain of events, the West has mainly a sponsor role. The main donor states financially were the Gulf countries, which would spend tremendous amount of money on weaponry, bought from their allies in the West. They did so, right at the time when the West suffered from an economic crisis, thus these weapons deliveries boosted their economy, helping them to get over, or even to solve their crisis. Such was the effect of the eight years long Iraqi-Iranian war, which did not change a thing in the regional balance, but was a great help for Western - and Russian - economy. Therefore Russia, China and India have no intention to pursue a war, since the trend, given that it is not interrupted, is in their favour. For them, it would be enough to wait, invest, and follow the track. But when they see a war on the horizon, which could squeeze them out completely, they have no choice, but to intervene and block the chain reaction. This of course is only a hypothesis hard to prove in all its complexity.²²

Finding and trusting each other. Alliances before and after the "Arab Spring". The role of Syria in the regional alliances.

With regard to the main topic, the possible chain of alliances with Syria being the keystone in it, we must remember, that the concept of regional alliance is not something new, but rather an old issue. Something which happened by the 2000s became already outdated. Though here I wish to discuss a multilateral cooperation between Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran - and even possibly Egypt involved in it - and therefore a multidimensional approach would seem logical, here I wish to concentrate on Syria's role in this regard. Not only because the

²² For the import-export data see individual countries at: <http://data.worldbank.org/country>, <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

whole case started to unfold around the Syrian crisis, but because this country was for a century the main facilitator of such understanding between countries.

First of all I wish to remind to an old cliché, that these Arab countries - like most of them for that matter - within their current borders are rather new entities. For centuries after the Arab invasion, and even after the collapse of a unified empire - like that of the Umayyads or the Abbasids and the rise of local states, local political thinking had no understanding for the region. Only the whole community, the *umma* was acknowledged in which for states only saw technical, administrative role, but had no understanding for mental or moral fraction. For that reason, Western concept of nationalism was hard to be introduced, not even between Arabs in different localities, but even between Turks, Arabs, Persian, and other Muslims. Even though a sort of regional feeling, like Syrian, Iraqi, or Egyptian was widely acknowledged, but that was overlapped by the sentiment for a type of commonwealth. And since until the First World War these modern states were all parts of the Ottoman Empire, that idea had even a political frame. As we know from history, after the First World War Syria and Lebanon came under French, while Egypt, Palestine, Jordan, and Iraq under British influence. By 1946, all of them became independent states, but because of the mentioned political thinking, these countries had a hard time to identify themselves, and therefore instantly started to move towards complete or at least partial unity. In that sense, the formation of the Arab League was the first, but quite a failed step. It failed because Egypt at the time was pursuing indirect control over the political motions of the Arab countries rather than real political union. A new, more serious approach was needed. Especially Syria was active in this regard, since its borders were the most artificial and had the hardest time to accept division between itself and Lebanon, or Iraq. Damascus approached Baghdad between 1946 and 1958 three times, only to be turned down eventually all the time, either because coup d'etats happened in Syria - like in 1949 - or because of Iraq's entry into CENTO, a Western lead military union. Ironically while among Egypt, Iraq, and Syria, Syria was the most unstable politically, that country became the most important field of regional dispute. In 1952 the British supported monarchy in Egypt was toppled, a republic was formed, and the new president Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir (1953-70) pursued real unionist policies and tried to avoid any Western colonial influence. Iraq stayed a monarchy similar to the Egyptian one before the revolution, and still holding on to British support. Therefore a dispute emerged between the two over their leadership and ideology. So Syria was important for both as if it could be

brought to their respective sides, the scale of balance could have been shifted. But pan-Arabic nationalist sentiment was rising in Syria making it impossible for it to join Iraq - which was the more logical choice for a union - and political instability made it shift from one side to the other.²³

That went on until 1958 when the political elite of Syria saw a union with Egypt, the only possible solution to the ongoing political turmoil. In on 01 February 1958, the United Arab Republic was formed by the merger of Egypt and Syria.²⁴ Later that year, July 14 a coup happened in Iraq toppling the monarchy here as well, and giving a chance that Baghdad would join the union. But the new Iraqi leadership led by 'Abd al-Karim Qasim was reluctant to join, wishing to settle things internally before any merger.²⁵ By the time it changed by another coup in 1962, the United Arab Republic already was over. Egypt was dominating the new state and for many Syrians it was viewed as an extended Egypt, so in 1961 a coup broke out in Damascus, and restored independence. Talks renewed between Iraq and Syria however, but continuous putsches throughout the '60s in both countries made such attempts unrealistic. In 1968 in Iraq, by the presidency of Ahmad Hasan al-Bakr - but more importantly by the vice-presidency of Saddam Husayn -, and in 1970 by the presidency of Hafiz al-Asad, political stability was restored in both countries, and in both were lead by the Baath Party, which was based on the concept of Arab unity. Therefore, it was only logical that despite all the negative experiences, unionist talks were renewed. Iraq first approached Egypt, but with the death of 'Abd al-Nasir in 1970 such a constellation became obsolete, and Syria became the next possible partner. The talks bore fruits by the end of the '70 and a new state was about to be created with the presidency of Hasan al-Bakr and the vice-presidency of al-Asad.²⁶ Once again personal interest overlapped strategic thinking, and in '79 Saddam Husayn pushed al-Bakr to the side, took over, and purged the Iraqi Baath from anyone whom he could not trust. Soon animosity arose between the two sides of the Baath Party and in consequence between Syria and Iraq. In Egypt, with the rise of Anwār Sādāt, another shift happened. Egypt left the

²³ Seale, Patrick: *The Struggle for Syria. A Study of Post-War Arab Politics 1945-58*, I. B. Tauris & Co., 1986, London. pp. 1-64, 186-237

Khoury, Philip S.: *Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism 1920-1945*, Princeton University Press, 1971, New York

²⁴ Seale: *The Struggle for Syria*, pp. 307-326

²⁵ Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East & North Africa, Philip Mattar [ed.], Thomson Gale, 2004, pp. 1872-1873

²⁶ Seale, Patrick: *Asad. The Struggle for the Middle East*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1989, pp. 312-315; Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East and North Africa, pp. 377-378

steadfast movement and the Soviet support, and by signing a truce with Israel became expelled and enemy number one within the Arab states.²⁷

In short, after numerous attempts for union between the three countries, going on for three decades - even though it had some successes - by 1979 the relations between them became worse than ever, making any approach towards each other impossible. More than that, they were working hard to isolate each other, and destabilize their opponents. That environment went on until 2003, but in reality until 2011. If there was any legacy for the unionist attempts, that was distrust, hatred and animosity, not only within the political circles, but even reaching the level of the societies. That is why this current shift in regional balance is remarkable, and caught my attention.

There is another relation however has to be understood as well, the role of Iran. The Persian state in the Pahlavi era (1923-79) - highly endorsed by Western powers such as the monarchies of Egypt and Iraq before - was overall passive in the Arab scene, only having disputes with Iraq. At that time Tehran was active in supporting the Kurdish insurgency in Iraq, but that came to an end in 1975 by the Algiers accords.²⁸ The Islamic Revolution in Iran changed everything once again. Iraq, seeing an easy target in a country in turmoil attacked Iran, and an eight-year long war erupted. Given the ill sentiment between Baghdad and Damascus at the time, Syria and Iran found logical to become allies. Since this alliance proved to be working and successful, many lose sight that this friendship was not at all born in heaven, since the two sides had fundamentally different views and ideologies. Syria after the Baath Party took over in 1963 changed its policies both internally and internationally. Internally became strictly secular - though it has to be stressed once again, that not anti-religious - state, a socialist economic and welfare system, and stressed Arab identity as the main cohesive force in the society between numerous ethnic and sectarian groups. After the continuous inner fights in the '60s and the triumph of Hafiz al-Asad in 1970, a military group took over, which was predominantly Alawi Shiite, and their representation in higher political and military circles was higher than their actual social share; and Shiites had no role in state identity. Not only because it was still a predominantly Sunni society, but because of the secular mind of the political elite. Consequently, in international politics it pursued pan-Arab goals. Higher Arab cooperation is based on regional affairs and ethnic, but not on religious goals. Iran on the other hand after the

²⁷ Encyclopedia of the Modern Middle East & North Africa, pp. 1955-1957

²⁸ Encyclopedia of Modern Middle East and North Africa, pp. 140-141

Islamic Revolution put aside the importance of ethnicity - partially because the Persian state had hard time to find allies, but also because the Iranian society as well was anything but homogenous ethnically - and replaced it with Islamic, predominantly Shiite identity. So it pushed for Islamic awakening, social justice on religious grounds, and to consolidate itself, tried to export its revolution. That only attracted enemies, not only within secular states in the region like the Baathist Iraq or Turkey, but even among Islamic states like Saudi-Arabia which did not favour a Shiite power in the region challenging their understanding of Islam. So while in one hand we had a secular Syria pushing for Arab ideals, on the other hand we had an Islamist Iran, trying hard to export its revolution. While it is true that for Iran the relatively big number of Shiites in the Syrian political circles made that country an acceptable ally, for the time being it had no importance, and the main driving force was the common enemy. From Iraq and the Gulf a Western influence was emanating. That is why an alliance which had its direct roots in the Iraqi-Iranian war and the Lebanese civil war survived these affairs. The common enemies kept the alliance alive, while as time built trust, made it strong. On that notion I have to mention as well that even though presently many like to see Syria as a proxy of Iran, in the beginning the Arab state had the upper hand in the relationship, and even now when Iranian support became imperative, Damascus predominantly pursues its own agenda for its own interests, and not those of Iran.²⁹

The role of the "Arab Spring"

So within these frames we can really understand the impact of the so called "Arab Spring". We had an Arab world with general distrust and inherited ill-sentiment all around, numerous Arab countries all pursuing their own interests and trying hard to build national identity, while on the other hand we had Iran trying to penetrate it, with only one trusted ally, Syria in the region, but with many enemies holding American troops on their soil.

As mentioned and explained before, the whole "Arab Spring" phenomenon - regardless of the interpretations used for and by the Western media - was first of all a mental struggle between the salafī ideology and its sponsors in the Gulf, and between states built on national agendas. Tunisia was

²⁹ Goodrazi, Jubin: *Syria and Iran. Diplomatic Alliance and Power Politics in the Middle East*. I. B. Tauris, 2009
Ehteshami, Anoushirvan - Hinnebusch, Raymond: *Syria and Iran. Middle powers in a penetrated regional system*, Taylor & Francis e-Library, London, 2002

more of a test ground to see whether the change can be achieved simply with conspiracy and deception by the use of media. The experiences gained here were used later well in Egypt, Libya and Syria.³⁰ The chain of events continued until reached Syria, where the domino effect turned around. As mentioned before, what is special in Syria is that the process stopped here, and the etatist narrative started to gain ground even before the government fell. This created yet another shockwave which resonated in all the countries where the "Arab Spring" changed government. How much this narrative managed to turn the table can be seen well in Egypt, in the ongoing incapability of the new Tunisian political class to stabilize itself, but in Syria as well. In Syria one could argue that it is far from over, since the war has not been finished yet, but on the ground, the result is obvious. By now, the majority of the armed forces fighting against the government are foreign fighters, and those who are Syrians start to put down their weapons, or even join with the government forces against the foreign Islamists. The most recent examples for that are the peace talks in the cities of Bibila and Bayt al-Saham.³¹

With the ongoing Western and Gulf support however, the result of the Syrian struggle is not anymore simply in the hand of the Syrians - state and people - but it became a bigger question. The attitude of the neighboring countries became imperative in the equation only to put the foundations of a future alliance. In the case of Iraq, in the beginning of the crisis one could expected that Baghdad will step against Damascus, given that the Iraqi government was built up and endorsed by the Western invading forces, first of all by the Americans. So when Iraq resisted to joining the forces against Syria one could be surprised. But here we should not forget that even though this is mainly a Western fabricated government, many of its members - like Prime Minister Nuri al-Maliki himself - during the years of Saddām Husayn took refuge in either Syria or Iran. Though gratitude is not political category, but economy is, and we should remember here, that during the years of the American invasion from 2004, the two neighbouring countries had huge investments in Iraq and became the major trade partners. They were in general supportive for the government in Baghdad, even when they pushed it hard in specific issues. So one can speculate that al-Maliki is already preparing for the time when the Americans withdraw completely, and he will be left alone to deal with the neighbors. More than that, as Iraq experienced deadly unrests and civil

³⁰ Daniel, Sógor: *Annától Ahdarig. Hová tart Szíria?* In: Szakmai Szemle, 2012 vol. 3-4, pp. 113-132

³¹ <http://youtu.be/1CbFaGo7WNI> (downloaded: 03-14-2014); <http://youtu.be/iSS-AhrqGps> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

war in the recent years and millions of Iraqis took refuge in either Syria or Iran, it is logical that Baghdad didn't want chaos in Syria, since that could have an overspill effect and destabilize Iraq once again. The events, most of all the rise of ISIL proved that fear well-founded. So Iraq as early as 2011 stayed close to Damascus and tried hard to close the borders with Syria. Even so that had very limited success, it was a big help for Syria. Overall we can say that in the abyss of regional chaos and crisis, Syria and Iraq - both for internal reasons mainly - started to cooperate, and for the first time in their history, mutually. In that process, no doubt, Iran was the main facilitator providing much needed financial, military, and diplomatic support for both Arab countries, and pushing them for cooperation.

The other neighbour where the Syrian crisis had a positive effect for a future alliance is Lebanon. This small country was very important for insurgency against the Syrian government. Lebanon is small, but full of well functioning ports - Beirut and Tripoli being the most important ones. The relatively weak state apparatus and the high level of general corruption made it a smugglers' paradise. Here I not only mean weapons and other means of material support, but even for the trafficking of foreign fighters, it was ideal. This even have a history here, since for long the illegal trafficking in the Syrian-Lebanese border was a well established business, with stabile trade routes, and trusted border patrol connections in both countries. While Damascus tried hard to close this mountainous border, also pushed Beirut to straighten border control and do more to stop the flood of fighters and weapons from Lebanon. But Beirut could do little in that matter. Not only because the high level of corruption, but because many in the political circles had considerable profit from the crisis - or even supportive participation like that of the former Prime Minister Saad al-Din al-Hariri (2009-2011)³² -, or for the lack of a strong, centralized army, but because there is a rift in the Lebanese political circles about Syria. Some of the forces resent the Syrian involvement in the Lebanese civil war, and its influence in the country, while others - mostly the beneficiaries of that involvement like Hezbollah or Nabih Barri - support the Syrian government.³³ They realize that with the fall of the Syrian support and its influence in Lebanon, Syria will be replaced with Saudi-Arabia. As one of the biggest Salafi cleric Sheik Ahmad al-Asir started to agitate against Hezbollah and the supporters of Damascus in the

³² http://www.academia.edu/1771526/The_Hariri_Political_Dynasty_after_the_Arab_Spring (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

³³ <http://youtu.be/KrtckcqvJJM>; http://youtu.be/Km0oN0nQ_Ow;
<http://dailystar.com.lb/News/Politics/2012/Oct-05/190274-berri-to-assad-syria-will-overcome-crisis-return-stronger.ashx#axzz2upp7jzJh> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

south, disturbance broke out and spilled over very soon to Tripoli as well. Open clashes broke out between the militias and the chaos deepened as the government of Najib Miqati - only formed in 2011 - broke down and became a caretaker government. So as the fight went on in Syria between the government and its Salafi inspired opposition, the same fight went on in Lebanon between Damascus' supporters and enemies. Strong will and strong clear stance was needed, and it became all too clear that the result of the Syrian crisis will determine the faith of all political parties in Lebanon as well.

As far as the neighbouring countries, the role of Turkey is important as well, but here I only wish to take notions, since this relation is not a major concern for my topic for the moment. Ankara, after decades of cold or hot conflict with Damascus, started a rapprochement as early as 2004 and it had very positive results. By 2010, the relation between Syria and Turkey was in all time zeniths; but when the "Arab Spring" reached Syria, Ankara gambled on the fall of the Syrian government and started to support insurgency. When timid support proved ineffective, it tried to provoke open war, but such attempts failed. Turkey gave huge backing for the insurgents in Syria, with open borders, material, training and intelligence support, but when all of that failed to have a decisive effect and the Islamist movements like ISIL threatened with causing trouble for Turkey itself, Ankara started to slowly move away and close its borders. There are reports, that there is already intelligence cooperation between Turkey and Syria against these groups.³⁴ The renewed talks between Ankara and Tehran in early 2014 also signalled that Turkey will eventually cease the support against Damascus. Though that is still far, if happens, Jordan will be the only stable country giving support against Damascus among its neighbors, which will eventually enable the Syrian government forces to overcome the crisis completely, and at the end have strong allies within and outside the region.

All is unfolding. The summer of 2013

All the fore-mentioned events could be speculated for some time, but in the summer of 2013 all that started to unfold with unbelievable speed. As the "Arab Spring" got stuck in Syria, it started to wear down the supporters. The first blow came from the most unexpected place. As early as April 2013 speculations started to circle in the Arab media, that a change in government is

³⁴ <http://www.shamtimes.net/archives/24438> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

about to happen in Qatar.³⁵ It was quite unbelievable since Amir Hamad Al Thani - one of the most active "Arab Spring" supporters - was relatively popular internally. But such a change indeed happened on 25 June 2013, when he stepped down in favour of his son, Tamim. Since then, Qatar took a much more neutral stance in regional affairs, and even started to restore ties with Damascus.³⁶

Then - only a week later - on July 3, the army arrested the president in Egypt and took over.³⁷ If there was a real success in the "Arab Spring" agenda, then undoubtedly that was Egypt, as the most populous Arab state. But after Muhammad Mursi formed a government and the Muslim Brotherhood took over Egypt, they failed to bring the expected results. They could not tackle the painful social and financial crisis in the country, they failed to restore order, or to attract foreign investments other than those of Turkey and the Gulf, which was actually not helping but even deepened the economic problems. Their last bid was to Islamize the society - in that sense, to carry on the revolution internally - and to push the agenda regionally, first of all in Syria. If Syria fell and the chain of the domino went on, than at least there wouldn't have been an alternative. But as Syria kept on resisting, the balance swung back, and eventually eroded the Islamist government, which led to the downfall of Mursi. But the army did not stop here. The Egyptian society could have a taste of the Brotherhood's governing skills, but as their support collapsed, the army now did not hesitate, but started to eliminate the whole Brotherhood. Not only the president got arrested but the ruling party was banned, the leaders - some five hundred people - arrested as well, and even all their properties were confiscated. Also the properties of the organization were confiscated, along with its facilities, and the schools affiliated to it were closed.³⁸ That was the biggest blow regionally since for long to the Salafists, because Egypt was the biggest source of Salafi ideology. That was not the financial center, but given the huge population here, most of the Salaf rank and file was from here. As long as it enjoyed governmental support, it radiated in the region, but with its crackdown by army, it suffered the most severe blow.

Turkey was shaking as well. On May 28, a protest started in Istanbul's main square, Taksim. While in the beginning it was only a minor local issue

³⁵ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/06/25/us-qatar-emir-idUSBRE95N19M20130625> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

³⁶ <http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/qatar-resets-syria-policy.html#> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

³⁷ http://www.nytimes.com/2013/07/04/world/middleeast/egypt.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0; (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

³⁸ <http://bigstory.ap.org/article/egypt-seizes-assets-muslim-brotherhood-leaders> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

about the reconstruction in its side, the Gezi Park, it soon evolved into a general unrest against the government, which this far seemed quite stabile. Although by September it was calmed down, with both police force and pro-government rallies, it had two major consequences. The overall unstable situation prevented the Turkish government from effectively reacting to the rapid changes in the region. Corruption charges, government reshuffles, and purges in the ranks of the army and the police showed all too clear that Erdogan lost the support of one of its most fundamental supporters, the Hizmet movement. This is one of the biggest religiously based substructures in Turkey, which has hundred of educational facilities in the country and abroad as well. Its leader, Fethullah Gülen, who lives in the US gave a rare interview to the BBC in January 27, 2014 in which categorically, denied all involvement in the internal struggle and the corruption investigations which shook the Turkish government.³⁹ However, analyses agree that Erdogan is losing control and will eventually have to give up its position.⁴⁰ That makes Turkey unable to continue to be the sponsor for the "Arab Spring" agenda. Not only because of its political instability and obvious inner struggle, as well as its economic crisis, but also because of the previous gains in Libya and Tunis fail to bring the expected fruits, while Egypt is severing its economic ties with Ankara, since its relationship was too close with the government of Mursi.

Iran opened new chapter in its history as well that summer. Ever since, Mahmud Ahmadinezhad won a controversial election in 2009 - which was followed by severe protests, and police crackdown - Iran suffered international sanctions and gradual isolation. But in 2013 a much anticipated presidential election was on the way, in which by the constitution Ahmadinezhad could not participate. In June 14, Hasan Rouhani, a moderate cleric won the election, who returned to the policies of Mohammed Khatami, and managed to achieve reconciliation internationally. As the nuclear negotiations brought certain fruits, some assets of the Iranian budget, which was frozen before, became freed enabling Tehran to tackle its economic problems, and improve its regional position.⁴¹ But in this reconciliation process there is something much more menacing to the "Arab Spring" sponsors, most importantly to Saudi-Arabia. For long, the Gulf was exaggerating the Iranian threat positioning itself as a shield

³⁹ <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-25885817> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

⁴⁰ <http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/english/domestic/10471052.asp?gid=244>; <http://world.time.com/2014/01/02/how-erdogans-troubles-are-good-for-turkish-democracy/> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

⁴¹ <http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/02/19/us-iran-nuclear-idUSBREA1H0S620140219> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

against this possible danger. But if Iran can settle its issues with the West, such a stance becomes obsolete. That, and the changes in the summer of 2013, which could mean a possible regional isolation, made Riyadh obviously aggravated. That is why it expanded its support for the insurgent activities in Syria, Iraq, and even in Lebanon. Since the continuous bombings in Beirut targeted Hezbollah and could aim to stir up conflict if the organization retaliated harshly, many suspected Saudi in the back. While conclusive evidence is yet to be provided, such a speculation seems logical. For the same reason, it is not a coincidence that Russia also blamed Riyadh for the bombings in Volgograd metro station in 29 December, 2013. That could have been also an attempt to divert Russia's attention from regional issues in the eve of Sochi Winter Olympics. If such speculations are true - as they are very logical and fit way too well with the profile of Saudi-Arabia - that shows well not only the desperateness, but also the general panic in Saudi political circles. They simply see no other way to alter the new equation forming.⁴²

However, the real change culminated in Syria once again. As back as April 2013, a major military operation was on the way around the Syrian-Lebanese border, with the aim to regain control over the city of al-Qusayr. This small border city was for long a center of smuggling arms and insurgents to Syria, and worked as a service center for the whole country. It was claimed by opposition forces as impenetrable. The siege went on for months, and when the Syrian Army reached the outskirts, the other side of the border became sealed as well by Hezbollah forces. Furthermore, these troops - since they have considerable experience in street fights and insurgent tactics - joined the battle. For the first time, the Shiite resistance organization became openly involved in the Syrian crisis, which polarized the Lebanese politics as well. The message was not that much for the region, but to Lebanon internally, that firm position is needed to save the country from possible overspill and turmoil, and Hezbollah is willing to take charge. After a long siege, the Syrian forces penetrated the city and by June 5, 2013 - only two days after the fall of Mursi - gained a decisive victory, while the terrorist forces virtually had no chance to retreat. Though that was hardly the end of the conflict in Syria, it marked that the army started to

⁴² <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/volgograd-second-bombing-hits-southern-russian-city-9029110.html>; <http://www.whatdoesitmean.com/index1728.htm> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

gain the upper hand, and that victory lead to the aforementioned situation that in more and more places the rebels put down their weapons.⁴³

But in Syria yet another issue came along that summer; the infamous chemical attack on 21 August 2013, in Eastern Ġuta, a suburb of Damascus. While international reaction was swift to condemn the Syrian government, such an assumption seems unlikely since Islamist militants claimed before that they indeed possessed such weapons, and they were willing to use them, and the Syrian army was advancing in there at the time. Right when that happened - since chemical atrocity happened around Aleppo previously - international investigation team was in Damascus, specialized in chemical weapons. Speculations went back and forth about the culprits until Massachusetts Institute of Technology provided a report in which provided detailed evidence, that the Syrian Army could not have committed the atrocity.⁴⁴ I do favor the concept myself that it was a desperate attempt to bring international concern, and to create a pretext for a possible military strike to topple the Syrian government. The US and most Western countries were ready to take military action, but at the end Syria showed strength and the West hesitated. The situation was solved with Syria's agreement to dismantle its chemical arsenal, and so far the Arab country complied with all its vows in the matter. The result was that right after a decisive victory for the Syrian Army, the West threatened to intervene, but it did not happen and both sides agreed to return to the political solution in the Geneva 2 Peace Process. This process is yet to bring result, but nonetheless proved that the Syrian government went through the abyss. After al-Qusayr it was clear that only a foreign military intervention can bring the Syrian government down. Damascus is clearly starting to restore order. Also, with all the changes in that summer in the region, we can say with confidence, that it is though yet to be over, Syria is over the worst.

The new equation and Egypt's possible role in it

Much of that has been discussed already, and here I only wish to sum it up. The whole "Arab Spring" phenomenon started in 2011 was moving the region to be under the direct or indirect control of Salafi Islamist forces under the influence of the Gulf and Turkey, gradually moving towards a regional

⁴³ <http://syriareport.net/al-qusayr-final-push-expected/>; <http://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounders/syria-update-fall-al-qusayr>; http://youtu.be/xymr7fZQ_E (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

⁴⁴ <https://s3.amazonaws.com/s3.documentcloud.org/documents/1006045/possible-implications-of-bad-intelligence.pdf> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

Sunni-Shiite war aiming to curb Iran's influence at the end, or even its destruction. Such a process was halted in Syria, as this Arab country's integrity was stronger than anticipated and foreign help - that of Iran, Russia and China most of all - was swiftly rallied. A general struggle emerged in the region between the religiously grounded Salafi ideology and the ideology of the secular modern states, which culminated around the Syrian crisis. And that moved all the forces. The old Middle Eastern pattern was burned to the ground, but on the ashes - much inherited from the past, but in many ways completely different - new equation was founded. As Syria resisted giving in, it even affected the countries already fell victims to the "Arab Spring" agenda and managed to turn the table around. As Damascus slowly overcomes its internal dispute, the conflict gave way to Islamist terrorism, which affected the neighboring countries as well. The change between 2011 and 2014 is most decisive mentally, since generally it is not a conflict about democracy or human rights any more, but about the threat of terrorism and Salafi Islamist governance. Therefore, there is a generally supportive regional sentiment about a cooperation to eliminate such a threat. Now Syria works together with Iraq to fight ISIL, all with Iranian endorsement, which can easily lead to further cooperation for the future, if they want to evade future external penetration. On the same way, as the Syrian Army is gaining the upper hand, the national reconciliation process shows achievements, it stabilizes Lebanon after turmoil. That could be experienced by the agreement of the Lebanese political circles to put an end to dispute and finally form a new government, as Tammam Saib Salam became the new Prime Minister on 2 February 2014.⁴⁵ Even though he was endorsed by the anti-Syrian political forces, he is far from being a staunch anti-Syrian and enjoys the support of Hezbollah as well. So far he seems to be ideal to bring back order in the country. Given the present situation, it cannot be ruled out that an alliance is to formed with Iranian endorsement among Lebanon, Syria and Iraq. In that we can clearly see Iran as a facilitator.

So far we would see a new Arab alliance with Iran in the back supporting it both economically and politically. In that way, the Persian state could create a block of countries in its favour, even influencing them along its ideological lines, and isolating Saudi-Arabia. If Egypt has a real intention to assist Syria and this newly forging alliance, it raises the question for Iran, how to fit this into the equation. While the governments of Syria or Lebanon are not Shiite at all, but at

⁴⁵ <http://www.presstv.ir/detail/2014/02/15/350814/lebanon-announces-unity-government/> (downloaded: 03-14-2014)

least there are bridgeheads to be built on. But while Egypt would be a great asset in a future alliance with its great population, strategic location and economic potential, there is nothing Shiite in it. For Tehran Cairo had its charm in the days of Mursi as an Islamist state, but was menacing as being Salafi, moving many times against Iran, and attacking regional allies. Although it is conforming for Tehran that Cairo wishes to join the same club, but this is now a secular anti-Islamist Egypt, which is pushing its Arab feature. If Egypt were to merge with Syria and Iraq - even if only on the level of cooperation - that would change the equation from a fundamentally religious understanding to an Arab one, moving these states to pursue their Arab identity and not at all their religious one. Such a phenomenon is not favourable for Tehran for many reasons. So while it is imperative for Iran to win Egypt, I would argue that it is better to alienate it from other Arab partners and form a special, bilateral partnership. As for Egypt, this solution would clearly bring less gain than the joining of the club with Damascus, Beirut and Baghdad, and push Tehran to the side. Whichever scenario will win is yet to be seen, but clearly a new Middle East is forming. And this "new region" will be not at all such as the sponsors of the "Arab Spring" agenda envisioned in 2011.

Summary

I tried to show and prove in this article that the phenomenon which by now became known as "Arab Spring" was highly boosted, sponsored and guided - even planned - by certain regional countries, with great powers at the back, with a clear plan to reorganize the regional balance. But as the plan went well in Egypt, in Libya or even in Yemen, it got stuck in Syria and therefore the events took an unexpected turn. In the Middle East, there are two political mentalities: a state and nation-centered against a religiously guided one, that have been in constant struggle with each other for at least a century. Syria, as one of the last and – even we can say – the strongest bastion of the nation-centered ideology, managed to turn the table around amid its deepest crisis in its history. Thus, it automatically started to reshape the regional balance even before getting over the crisis, and I envisioned a possible new regional equation, with a so far unseen cooperation between Lebanon, Syria, and Iraq, with Iranian guidance and sponsorship. It is the steps made so far in this direction that I tried to describe in my study. As this new equation started to formulate around Syria, its struggle resonated in the region, which brought about changes even in the countries where the "Arab Spring" triumphed already, mainly in Egypt. Egypt, with its new leadership, may prove to be a candidate to join this new "club" of

Arabic cooperation against fundamentalism and terrorism. However, such a change may cause an almost insolvable dilemma for Iran, the biggest sponsor and nurturer of this alliance, since it seems impossible for the two countries to completely harmonize their different issues and priorities.

So my vision is that the Syrian crisis created an atmosphere where cooperation between the regional countries has become imperative and will possibly put Syria – after its crisis – into a power position. Certain things however are yet to be seen. Since the crisis in Syria is far from over, we have yet to see the country's capabilities after the war to evaluate; how a prominent role could be played by it. At the same time, we cannot judge yet whether Egypt will be allowed in the "club", and if so, how Egypt and Iran can come to terms with each other.

There is yet another question though. So far we could see that by the "Arab Spring" the economic and political influence of the West, and most importantly that of the US was growing fast. If the above new equation becomes a reality, it would greatly curb the western footholds not only in Syria or Lebanon, but also in Iraq and Egypt, and even threatening the gains in Tunisia, Libya and the Gulf. So the question is, will the US and Europe sit back idly and let that happen? Or will they step up, and intervene militarily or by other means? This is yet to be seen as well.

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THE ROLE OF THE BUNDESWEHR IN AFRICA

Abstract

Germany's foreign policy (system) can be described as centered on Transatlantic and European relationship and focused, to some extent, on the relationship with the Middle-East and Africa. Due to local crisis with global effects and to the potential of energy sources, the political and economic weight of the region have been recently revalued, in the context of multilateral/inter-national relations. Germany feels responsible for the developing countries, especially in Africa, stressing the (mutual) interdependence. German troops have already participated in humanitarian missions abroad, some of them in Africa. At the beginning of the year, new Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen opted for a stronger commitment and said that Germany's involvement in peacekeeping missions in Africa will be strengthened. And the number of soldiers involved in Western Mali will be increased from 180 to 250. The aim of the present article is to examine the role of the Bundeswehr in Africa.

Keywords: international relationship, Africa, humanitarian aid

Introduction

In the last few years „the German question” became one of NATO's main dilemmas. In most crisis where NATO was involved the name of the Federal Republic occurred and usually not in a positive context. Erich Gujer¹ said in Neue Züricher Zeitung „Berlin is reluctant to take the lead – they do it mostly in the field of economy, rarely in foreign policy and never in military”². The USA and almost all NATO members expect Germany to represent a more active foreign policy which would also mean a greater share of military roles in different operations.

Foreign Minister Frank-Walter Steinmeier said at the beginning of this year that the policy of „the culture of military restraint” is correct, but it must not be

¹ He is the editor of Neue Züricher Zeitung international area. He is an expert on Germany and on strategic questions and terrorism.

² <http://www.nzz.ch/meinung/kommentare/die-neue-deutsche-frage-1.17383545>; Downloaded: 2013.09.25.

translated as the policy of „avoiding” because „We are a bit too big and a bit too important to do so”³ With this statement the German politician recognized that although Germany is Europe’s biggest geo-economic power with the largest population, they do not share the tasks of NATO accordingly. The new Defense Minister Ursula von der Leyen also took a stand on Germany’s greater involvement and announced that they increase the number of soldiers in peace keeping missions in Africa. Thus the German contingent participating in the mission to train soldiers in Western-Mali will be larger and Germany offered also aircraft with medical care to the planned mission in the Central-African Republic.⁴

The basis of critics relating to the participation of Germany can be traced back to historical reasons and the way Germans perceive their security and solve their problems. The first particularity is the Germany army itself. The Bundeswehr was founded in 1955 and one of the first terms of its emergence was the declaration of prohibition of aggression to make sure that no war could be unleashed from the country. The most important duty of the soldiers is to serve the Federal Republic loyally and defend the rights and the freedom of the German citizens.⁵

The ideal German soldier is a soldier of democracy who is formed from the values of the constitution and society and the conclusion of an imagined future-war. The German soldier is self-conscious and deployable who, while completing his tasks, respects human dignity and works according to the principles of constitutional state and all his actions – even against his enemy – are adequate to mankind’s moral values. Moral values played a very important role in forming the soldier-idol. The main task of the German soldier is to keep peace and retain his enemy from violence. If he has to use violence, he can resort to „only” such force as the situation demands. Killing the enemy has an effect of destabilization and demoralization.

³ <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/steinmeier-wirbt-fuer-aktive-aussenpolitik-a-946262.html> ; Downloaded: 2014.02.2.

⁴ <http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/von-der-leyen-fuer-staerkeres-engagement-der-bundeswehr-im-ausland-a-945568.html> and http://www.honvedelem.hu/container/files/attachments/40386/hsz_2013_5.pdf

⁵ This approach is exemplified in how Germany dealt with the Iraq crisis. In January 2003 Defense Minister Peter Struck openly rejected Germany’s participation in the operation in Iraq, this way the Article 5 of the Washington Treaty could not be applied. Germany said that the operation lack the authorization of the UN. The Defense Minister declared „I can hardly imagine Germany approving a military operation against Iraq” <http://kulfold.ma.hu/tart/rcikk/b/0/27603/1>. Downloaded: 2013. 03. 01.

According to the German Constitution (Grundgesetz) it is the role of the elected Parliament (Bundestag) to practise political control over the armed forces. Democratically elected politicians define the guideline of security and defence policy, they point the tasks of the military forces and decide on their deployment, their structure and equipment. To support the Bundestag in controlling, there is a National Defense Council, a military coordinator of the German Parliament and a financial committee, as well.

The deployment of the Bundeswehr out of NATO-area⁶ led to a constitutional crisis between government and military leaders. Finally the Federal Constitutional Court declared that the right of the decision is due to the government. According to the Federal Constitutional Court's crucial ruling of 18 July 1994 on deployment of the German armed forces "out of area", the term "defense" was defined⁷ to include not only protection of the borders of Germany, but also guarding the security of Germany anywhere in the world. The Bundeswehr can participate in crisis reaction and conflict prevention, as well. However, the Federal Constitutional Court also introduced the requirement for parliamentary approval under the defence provisions of the Basic Law. And also the Bundeswehr is allowed to take part in operations outside of the borders of Germany, as part of NATO or the European Union and mandated by the UN.

The soldiers of the German Army have already participated in more than 130 humanitarian missions abroad. To the NRF⁸ only volunteers can join – they can be professionals or contractuels. Conscripts can also take part, but they also have to volunteer for a service extension of 2-13 months.

Germany was severely accused for its role in Afghanistan based on their „national reservations”. The deployment of the Bundeswehr „out of area” is not only a question of security, economy or military, it is also a psychological matter. According to the Basic Law of Germany, the main goal of the security policy of the country – as part of a collective security system – is to disapprove war and to keep peace.⁹ The task of the Bundeswehr is national defense. This

⁶ „out of area deployment. The first out of area deployment of the Bundeswehr was in 1999 decided by Chancellor Schröder. It was an air-strike above Kosovo and as a military deployment it caused great quarels inside Schröder's party and in the public opinion.

⁷ http://www.Downloaded.com/pdfs/Vol11-No10/PDF_Vol_11_No_10_1161-1172_Developments_Wiefelspuetz%20FINAL.pdf, downloaded: 2014. 02. 28

⁸ NRF (NATO Response Force) A multinational special force of NATO which is highly ready and technologically advanced.

⁹ Basic Law Article 2 para 24

can be the reason why the Federal Government's foreign-policy decisions are quite often in opposition to the opinion of the Alliance, such as in 2003 when the Iraq crisis erupted.

The Bundeswehr is still an important asset in the German foreign and security policy, and the readiness and capability of the army is a multi-faceted assurance. German soldiers participating in different international missions have to help other nations to find or follow the way to democracy, this way they fulfil their humanitarian duty to protect human rights, to protect the environment, support energy-supply and innovation. Germany feels responsible for the developing countries, especially in Africa, underlining mutual interdependence.¹⁰ There is a great pressure on Germany and its military to create such a stronger peacekeeping capacity in the Bundeswehr that is able to react to crisis and represents a powerful force, as well.¹¹

The second speciality is the way Germans translate security and it goes back to a long and special way. The traditionally Prussian military thinking which says that the key of the successful problem-solving is the correct size and power of the military (re)action has been replaced by the pacifist-military approach, which rejects armed solution as a first step. Instead it believes diplomacy and negotiation can be effective and productive in the long term. That is why the rejection of using armed forces as a source of problem-solving is a constant part of the German foreign policy.

The idea of German defence-policy is based on the wide-translation of the word „security” and it is foresighted and multilateral. Because of their special history, the Germans believe that security can be guaranteed not only at the level of nations and not only by armed forces. The basis of the German and the collective security – such as the basis of Germany's security and defense policy – will still be the North Atlantic Treaty Organization in the future. The Alliance connects two continents; and has a unique political and military chance to keep and/or restore peace.

If we look back upon the ex-Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle's former statements, in connection with Libya, Syria or Afghanistan, he used almost the

¹⁰ http://www.zmne.hu/kulso/mhtt/hadtudomany/2007/2/2007_2_13.html; downloaded on: 2013.12.19.

¹¹ <http://www.euractiv.hu/nyomtathato-verzio/elemzesek/afganisztan-megosztott-es-vonakodo-europa-002048>; downloaded on: 2013.12.19.

same wording in all cases updating it to the given area. *"Germany has a strong friendship with our European partners. But we won't take part in any military operation and I will not send German troops to Libya."*¹² Also about Syria he declared *„A military solution will not yield lasting peace and stability”*¹³ and *„The problems in Afghanistan cannot be solved through military means, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle has said”*¹⁴. As the summing up of the country is very important for the Germans he was always very careful to keep up the positive image not only in his actions but also in his wording. About the Mali-operation Westerwelle told *„...We are shocked but it is Africa's responsibility. That is why we train Africans to be able to contribute to the stability to the Northern part of Mali. But we are unable to solve everything and we cannot keep up the appearance that the Bundestag is in the power to solve all problems in Mali on its own.”*¹⁵

The Munich Security Conference was not memorable only because it celebrated its 50th anniversary. It was the location where the long-awaited statement was finally delivered, and according to it, the Federal Republic of Germany would like to have a more active foreign and security policy. This statement was said at a time when 62% of the population did not support this more active role. Naturally it was emphasized that the use of military force can only be the last resort. If they have to use military force they must know definitely why they do it. In unison with the German crisis-solving, they insist on that the intervention into the conflict should happen in the first stage not when a civil war has already erupted.

Sudan

In the biggest African country the crisis erupted in 2003. Sudan became independent¹⁶, but there is no peace in the country, as military problems are nearly permanent among the Arab-lead Northern parts and the Christians living in the South and the animists. The reason for these fights is the heavy process of Arabisation by the Northern Muslim governments, and the victimization of

¹² <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/mar/17/germany-rules-out-libya-military> downloaded on 20/03/2011

¹³ <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/interview-with-german-foreign-minister-guido-westerwelle-a-900611.html>, downloaded on 20/05/2013.

¹⁴ <http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/politics-only-answer-for-afghanistan.aspx?pageID=238&nID=7241&NewsCatID=338> downloaded on 2/11/2013

¹⁵ <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/DE/Infoservice/Presse/Reden/2013/130220-BM-BT-Mali-Rede.html> ; Downloaded: 2014.01.23.

¹⁶ 1956. január 1.

Christians and animist tribes whose rights laid in the constitution is snubbed. The Comprehensive Peace Agreement – signed in 2005 by President Omar al-Basir and the leader of the Southern John Mebior Garang – led to the end of an infighting period of past decades.¹⁷

Despite the agreement, the rebels in South-Sudan restarted attacks against government forces and civilians, as well. Many thousand people died and ten-thousands had to run away. During these attacks not only the rebels but the South-Sudanese army also violated and neglected human rights and that was the reason to start UNMIS,¹⁸ the peace-keeping mission of the UN, which started in March 2005 in the Southern area to pacify the whole area and disarm the different fighting groups.

With the Peace Treaty South-Sudan became almost an independent state inside Sudan. After 20 years, in 2011 general elections were held and the question was whether the Southern part of Sudan should become independent. South Sudan celebrated its independence after the successful elections on 09 July 2011. It seemed to be the solution of a civil war lasting for 50 years which demanded the lives of millions. Although the connection between Sudan and South Sudan was not cloudless, up to the end of last year the armed fights had not caused bigger conflicts.

Sudan and South-Sudan are both among the poorest and most indebted countries of the world. Famine regularly leads to severe casualties in most areas and many people depend on the UN's humanitarian help. The lack of (drinking) water and *desertification* is also a typical problem of the country. These all put a stop on development and progress. On the other hand, both countries are rich in minerals such as oil, ore, and precious metals like gold. Mainly because of the water of the Nile there are potential agricultural lands. But due to the corruption they are among the poorest countries even though the incomes from oil are significant.

The population of South-Sudan reached 10 million by 2013 which was due to natural increment and also people moved back from surrounding countries, mainly from Sudan. Ethnically it is a very colourful country where

¹⁷ J. Besenyő: Panorama in Sudan or what is the situation in Darfur?
http://www.zmne.hu/Forum/07masodik/szudan_.htm; Downloaded: 2013.12.19.

¹⁸ UN Mission in Sudan

Dinkas and Nuers are the most populous as they are over 1 million. Dinkas are in relative majority and that is the main reason for the conflict which erupted between the two tribes. On 23 July 2013, President Kiir Mayardit, who is from the Dinka tribe, dismissed his Vice-President, Riek Machar, who is from the Nuer tribe. The President accused Mr. Machar and a part of the Presidential Guard of attempting a *coup d'état*, but the soldiers loyal to Kiir fought back successfully. The fight that seemed to be a political jarring became a grave ethical conflict between the two tribes within a couple of days. Almost one thousand died and about 8 hundred thousand fled from their homes. Fights started from the capital Juba; then the rebels claimed control of Bor, a city 200 km away from the capital. This town is on the border of the Dinka and Nuer tribes, but it is the center of the oil-exploit, as well.¹⁹

The situation was different in the Western part of Sudan, in Darfur, where the conflict erupted among government forces and allied Janjaweed militia and other armed rebel groups. In Darfur almost the whole population is Muslim, so there were no religious reasons in the background but ethnic problems. The Darfur cabinet tries to overpower the African-originated population in favour of the people with Arab-origins.²⁰ The government establishes „re-education camps” where they want to form (or rather force) the local Africans to become real good Muslims.

The United Nations tried to draw attention to the Darfur-crisis in 2003, as there were more than 200,000 casualties and at least 2 million people were forced to leave their home. The Peace Treaty of Darfur was finally signed on 05 May 2006²¹ under the protection of the African Union and with the support of the U.N. and its partners.

The African Union which had already started a peace-keeping mission asked for NATO's help during the spring of 2005. In September 2005, the Alliance decided to help the AU in peace-keeping and they prolonged the military mission in Sudan until October. At almost the same time, AU decided to enlarge the number of its soldiers staying in Darfur to 7,700 persons. The cooperation among the international organizations was such that Rwanda, Senegal and

¹⁹ V. Marsai: Crisis in Middle-Africa I.-South-Sudan at the edge of a civil war SVKK 2013/18.

²⁰ http://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/77169/StratL2_35.pdf?sequence=1 Downloaded: 2013.12.19.

²¹ http://www.unis.unvienna.org/pdf/UN-Darfur_fact_sheet_hu.pdf; downloaded 2009.12.19.

South-Africa displayed battalions to deal with the tasks and the USA and France helped them to carry the troops to Darfur.²²

On 31 July 2007, the UN's Security Council decided that the UN and the African Union would send collective peace-keeping forces into the area.²³ Germany offered significant financial aid to the mission. At the beginning of 2008, when UNAMID was established, Germany soon volunteered help. The first two policemen-training sessions were successful. The policemen were from Ghana, Senegal, Bangladesh, Zambia and Fiji, who were trained for 2 weeks to learn basics. The Federal Government of Germany still supports both missions of the UN in Sudan, especially in Darfur where the humanitarian aid²⁴ of Germany is a priority to the country.

During bilateral negotiations Germany worked hard to find a political solution to the Darfur-crisis. At present 14 German soldiers serve in UNMIS²⁵ who examine whether the Sudanese government and/or the Southerners keep their agreement. The role of UNAMID is to help stabilize the territory of Darfur. At present, Germany has 10 soldiers in the center of the mission²⁶ and to restore air-traffic this number can be increased to 250. Both missions last until 15 August 2010.²⁷

On 1 July 2009 the Federal Government of Germany decided to send 20 policemen to UNMIS and UNAMID who work as advisors and trainers in the area. They help local police to establish their forces in Darfur and West-Sudan and they also help to strengthen security in refugee camps. As they do not have guns on them, the approval of the Bundestag was not necessary. With the deployment of German policemen and soldiers Germany tries to support peace and stability in the region. In South-Sudan police badly needs training, proper equipment and infrastructure. Since 2005, this is the first time that South-Sudan

²² <http://www.hm.gov.hu/hirek/kiadvanyok/szudan> 2009.12.19

²³ UNAMID-African Union/United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur

²⁴ Germany undertook the task to prepare policemen especially from UNAMID, Africa for their mission, at the Kofi Annan International Peacekeeping Training Center, or KAIPTC.

²⁵ Datas of 2014.03.05. ; <http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/einsaetze/einsatzzahlen>; Downloaded: 2014.03.05.

²⁶ Datas of 2014.03.05.; <http://www.bundeswehr.de/portal/a/bwde/einsaetze/einsatzzahlen>; Downloaded: 2014.03.05.

²⁷ <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/AktuelleArtikel/090702-UN-MissionenBundestag.html> ; Downloaded: 2009.12.07.

has its own police force and 90% of them are ex-fighters who fought on the side of the rebels and about 80% of them are illiterate.²⁸

On 08 July 2013, due to the evolving situation, Hilde F. Johnson, the Special Representative of the United Nations asked to strengthen the peace-keeping mission of the UNMISS. The Sudan government fought against rebels in different parts of the county and there was a growing number of casualties among the innocent, civil population. Johnson announced during the meeting with the members of the UN's Security Council that with the present equipment the mission cannot fulfil its task. That is why she asked for drones, fighter and transporting helicopters with which the peace-keepers can fulfil their tasks more satisfactorily in the area.

Libya

The Libyan crisis has one of the greatest effects on present days. The objective summing up of the situation is encumbered by the number of participants and the multiplicity of the crisis itself. This can be the reason why everybody is very careful to give opinion about the situation.

The Arab Spring started at the end of 2010 in Tunisia when people marched into the streets to protest against President Zajn al-Ábidín Bin Ali, who was in power for 23 years. The demonstrators demanded to stop high unemployment, food inflation, corruption, and to get freedom of speech and other forms of political freedom, and also to improve poor living conditions. The government was unable to roll back the violence or to keep the peace, and finally the leaders of armed forces and governmental organizations backed out the president, who flew into exile in Saudi Arabia on 14.01.2011. A short-lived caretaker coalition government was created, but instead of getting better the situation was getting even more unstable.

Islamist parties were rising and when they finally gained power the persecution of Christians became more open.²⁹

On 14/01/2011, after the successful revolution in Tunisia, demonstrations started which led to clashes between the demonstrators and the security forces

²⁸ <http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/Afrika/AktuelleArtikel/090702-UN-MissionenBundestag.html> ; Downloaded: 2009.12.07.

²⁹ J. Besenyő: „Arab Spring“- changes of the political systems in the Norther Arab States, In. Kül-világ 2011/4.

that fired into the crowd. The protests escalated into a rebellion that spread across the country. The crisis aroused the interest of UN. The forces opposing Gaddafi established an interim governing body, the National Transitional Council, in Benghazi. At this stage, the government's military forces with mercenary troops fought and they managed to re-occupy most of the territories they had lost before. After the mercenary troops organized by Libyan military forces violated the basic human rights repeatedly on 17/03, the UN Security Council authorised its member states to establish and enforce a no-fly zone over Libya, and to use "all necessary measures" to prevent attacks on civilians.³⁰

Two days later the USA, the UK and France took lead of a Coalition of 27 countries. Military operations began, with American and British naval forces launching Tomahawk cruise missiles. The French Air Force, British Royal Air Force, and Royal Canadian Air Force undertook sorties across Libya and the Coalition organized naval blockade, as well. The rebels were supported not only by NATO or the Coalition and not only by air strikes or advisors but Arab states also supported the rebels financially.³¹

By the end of August, rebel forces took back territories lost months before and captured the capital city of Tripoli. Although Gaddafi evaded capture and loyalists still fought back. However, on 20 October 2011, he was captured and killed while he attempted to escape from Site.

The United Nations recognised the National Transitional Council as the legal representative of Libya, replacing the Gaddafi government. The National Transitional Council declared the liberation of Libya and the war officially finished on 23 October 2011.³²

France was among the first countries to suggest military intervention in Libya on 28 February 2011 in the UN. As the French had the widest experience in the area – being the second largest oil importer of Libya – they were the first to recognise the National Transitional Council, founded in Benghazi on 05 March 2011. The early success in Libya enlarged the then President Nicolas Sarkozy's popularity and the prestige of the French foreign policy. In the

³⁰ http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=37808&Cr=libya&Cr1#.Uz-_dah_tu4 Downloaded 2013.12.28.

³¹ http://kalasnyikov.hu/dokumentumok/orszagismerteto_libia.pdf

³² J. Besenyő: „Arab Spring”- changes of the political systems in the Norther Arab States, In. Kül-világ 2011/4.

international conference in Paris which was held to found a coalition against the Libyan regime, Morocco was the only African country to participate. The UN authorized the Coalition but the European Union did not. In the operation starting on 19 March, mainly the French were active. Great-Britain was also a stable partner – ruling out land intervention – supporting a no-fly zone over Libya. But they unequivocally agreed to participate in the light of a UN authorization. First they fired Tomahawk cruise missiles from submarines, later they gave support by air fighters. Washington was careful to deal with Libya, as it was not prepared for the Arab Spring and its effects. It did not want to openly reveal its support of the anti-Gaddafi movements. That's why the USA only decided to take part in the military action on 15 March 2011. The main motivation of the supporters of the operation was to strengthen the interests of America. As the violation of human rights in Libya intensified, Washington could not stay away from the fights.³³

While France took the lead in the NATO military intervention, Chancellor Merkel's government rejected direct participation. Since at the beginning of the crisis Germany kept the traditional „abstentional” foreign policy, during the voting of the no-fly zone over Libya, as a non-permanent member of the UN Security Council, they abstained. This step rendered thanks from the government of Gaddafi and shocked Germany's Western alliances, stirring up a diplomatic scandal. To alleviate the situation, Chancellor Merkel agreed that the USA can use its military bases in Germany to participate in the operation. And instead of taking part in Libya, Germany announced its greater participation in Afghanistan to relieve US and NATO forces.³⁴

Mali

The rebellion that broke out in the Northern part of Mali at the beginning of 2012 was not a lone case, but nobody expected that Islamists groups, which had been present in the area, would take part in the armed conflict. The rebels took over Northern Mali while neither politicians nor military troops did anything to prevent it. In March, the president was ousted and an interim regime was announced. Despite this, Islamic influence was getting stronger. By the beginning of 2013 the rebels gained power over almost the entire country. As in

³³ The motivation of the intervention in Lybia and its international summing up In: SVK Analysis

³⁴ http://www.bundestag.de/dokumente/textarchiv/2011/33798136_kw11_de_lybien/; Downloaded:

Libya, France took the first step in order to prevent the disintegration of the whole country and the gaining-ground of radical Islamists.³⁵

To put a stop to the more and more bloody conflict, with validation of the UN Security Council a military mission started. It is called AFISMA³⁶ and its aim is to unite Mali again. The operation tries to relieve the French army with 7,500 personnel. For the request of the government of Mali, the European Union has also started its own operation called EUTM Mali (European Union Training Mission in Mali), which helps by training and advising the [military of Mali](#).³⁷

The final aim is similar to the Afghan one: it is to improve the military capacities and the efficiency of MAF's (Malian Armed Forces') in order to enable them to re-establish their country's territorial integrity and to tend to peacekeeping tasks by their own.³⁸

In this case – learning from the Libyan case – Germany did not hesitate to give a helping hand to France. They offered two transport aircrafts to AFISMA and indicated their intent on participating in the EU operation. It shows Berlin's commitment that at first they got involved without the authorization of the Bundestag. This time participating in AFISMA and in EUTM, both got almost total support. To the Germans the so important „claim” is the threat of Islam they have to fight against, otherwise Mali can easily become the next base for terrorists and in close-relation Mali can be the centre of drug-, weapon-, and human smuggling which would lead to the destabilization of the area.³⁹

To both operations Germany contributed mainly pilots, technicians, logistics personnels and transport aircrafts. 250 German personnel participate in EUTM. 40 of them provide medical services for the mission. 80 of them are sent to give Mali's soldiers tactical and health-care skills. Due to the fact that they are entitled to „training”, German soldiers cannot engage in armed fights – unless there is „an imminent mortal threat”. The mandate of the Bundeswehr troops referred only to the Southern part of Mali and was only valid for a year.⁴⁰

³⁵ http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/svi_15_3.pdf

³⁶ African-Led International Support Mission to Mali

³⁷ J. Besenyő: War at the background of Europe: The crisis of Mali, AARMS, Volume 12, Issue 2, 2013, pp. 247-271.

³⁸ http://www.ieee.es/en/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2013/DIEEE093-2013_EUTM_Mali_CastillaBarea_ENGLISH.pdf Downloaded: 2014.02.28.

³⁹ Hettyey: The necessary minimum? Germany's role in Mali. MKI-Analysis2013/5.

⁴⁰ www.bundeswehr.de; Letöltés ideje: 2014.02.28.

But a recent Cabinet decision provides for an extension of the mission until 28 February 2015. And also the number of troops that can be deployed will rise from 180 to 250.⁴¹

The UN Security Council established a new mission, called MINUSMA (United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali) on 25 April 2013 to support political processes in Mali and carry out a number of security-related tasks.⁴² MINUSMA replaced AFISMA, which ended on 01.07.2013. The Bundestag wished to support UN's stabilization operation by sending more troops. To ensure the capacity of aircraft carriers, they offered the German transport aircrafts stationed in Mali and in the neighbouring countries such as Senegal. Dakar was appointed as the base of aircrafts. And in Germany an Airbus A310 was on a 96-hour standby. Although the personnel ceiling of this mission is 150 soldiers, at the moment the Bundeswehr has around 70 senior officers and two Transall transport aircrafts in MINUSMA.

Finally Germany showed where its loyalty lays and both financially and in the number of materials and personnel the country took its fair share. But this does not mean that inside Germany there is unity. While the Federal Government emphasizes that „The aim of the German training support is still to give Mali's soldiers tactical skills. In addition, the staff units and the Malian Defence Ministry are to receive advisory services.” and also that „Thanks to the engagement of the international community in Mali the security situation has already improved. The integrity of Mali's territory has been largely restored.”⁴³ However, there are some critical tunes. For example, Christine Buchholz, *the defense policy speaker of the Left Party, who* accompanied Defense Minister von der Leyen on her latest trip to Africa, said „I believe that the deployment of the Bundeswehr doesn't have much to do with Mali itself... Of course it's also about the training of the Malian army which can then be deployed in the north. But the main purpose is the training of the Bundeswehr for future assignments in Africa.”⁴⁴

⁴¹ <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2014/02/2014-02-06-von-der-leyen-mali.html>
Downloaded: 2014.02.28.

⁴² <http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/missions/minusma/> Downloaded: 2014.02.28

⁴³ <http://www.bundesregierung.de/Content/EN/Artikel/2014/02/2014-02-06-von-der-leyen-mali.html>
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⁴⁴ <http://www.dw.de/buchholz-mali-is-a-training-ground-for-the-bundeswehr/a-17418591>

We cannot be sure how Germany would react to a new crisis either in Africa or in another part of the world but it is for sure that the government would be in a tight situation to make a *decision to everybody's – the country's alliances and its people – liking*.

Final Conclusion

Germany has been living in the longest peaceful period ever (of its history), although the world around is more than not peaceful. New types of risks and threats appeared as unwanted side-effects of globalization, and Germany cannot avoid the effects. To manage to give correct response to these new types of challenges, the country has to reconsider its foreign and security policy. As one of the main tools of its foreign policy is the Bundeswehr, which has to adapt to the new circumstances either in preventing conflicts or settling them.

Inside the Transatlantic Alliance, Germany stood up for peacekeeping, and its tool again is the German troops, as the Bundeswehr participates in NATO's stabilization missions. But when it's time to deploy the Bundeswehr, it is always a hard decision, due to the „culture of military restraint”.

Chancellor Angela Merkel said that the Bundeswehr is „Our shared treasure”⁴⁵ This value is at the same time the military tool of achieving the aims of the German security policy.

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THE CIA IN IRAN

Abstract

The role of the United States of America in the Middle East is a current topic even today. After retreating from Iraq and Afghanistan, its current issues are Iran and Syria. And when we discuss the foreign policy of the United States, we must stress the importance of the intelligence services.

In this essay, I would like to present the role of the Central Intelligence Agency through three historical events: the coup toppling Mossadegh in 1953, the Islamic Revolution of 1979, and the Iraq-Iran War between 1980 and 1988.

After the examination of these events, it can be concluded that the Agency had a decisive role in the events, but not necessarily for the benefit of the US.

Keywords: Iran, CIA, covert operations, Operation Ajax, Islamic revolution, intelligence

Introduction

The relationship of the United States and the Middle East is a current topic even nowadays. It is already about two years since the American withdrawal from Iraq, and the settlement of the conflict in Afghanistan are currently on the agenda. The U.S. is highly involved in the Syrian civil war, and the Iranian nuclear issues. Iran discussed in the essay, gave way to fear at international level, even though the recent deal, struck in Geneva, could alleviate the tension about the issue.

As the paper would like to emphasise during the examination of the role assumed by the Central Intelligence Agency in Iran, the very controversial relationship of the United States and Iran could be attributed to a great extent to the agency's activities in the country. In the paper, the role of the CIA in Iran will be presented through three historical events, when the CIA had influence on the politics of Iran, as well as on the reputation of the United States in Iran. One of these is the coup toppling the government of Mohammed Mossadegh in 1953,

which resulted in Shah Pahlavi, supported by the CIA, being restored to power. Another such event is the Islamic revolution of 1979 that highlighted the fundamental shortfalls of the CIA regarding Middle Eastern intelligence gathering. The third event took place during the Iraq-Iran War between 1980 and 1988 that intertwined with the Iran-Contra affair, a political scandal uncomfortable for then president Ronald Reagan.

The paper is based mostly on the work of Tim Weiner, titled *Legacy of Ashes. The history of the CIA*, while *Diplomacy* of Henry Kissinger provided a good insight into the American diplomacy of the era.

The Middle East in the Cold War

The region of the Middle East has been in the focus of world politics in fact since the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Between the two World Wars, the mandate system of the League of Nations has *de facto* placed the region under English and French colonial influence, even though some states (like Egypt) came under the trusteeship of European powers much earlier.

The Second World War, however, has substantially rearranged the global power relations. The influence of classic colonial powers was undermined: France was shocked by the German occupation and Great Britain was also weary of the prolonged conflict. The former „colonizers” were difficult to convince to give up their regional positions, which could be attributed largely to the rich oil deposits in the area. But due to their diminished global role, they were not able to uphold their regional interests for a long time.

In its first years, the CIA¹ focused its activities on the Soviet Union and on the part of Europe under Soviet influence. Change occurred in this matter in 1953, when Dwight D. Eisenhower, a former general of the Second World War became the President of the United States, and the position of the director of the CIA was assigned to Allen W. Dulles, the brother of the Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles.²

President Eisenhower had to resolve the following problem: to confront the Soviet Union without risking a Third World War or any damage to American democracy. Thus, he decided to build his strategy upon nuclear weapons and

¹ Central Intelligence Agency.

² Tim Weiner: *Legacy of Ashes. The history of the CIA*. New York: Doubleday. 2007. pp. 69.

covert operations.³ In the framework of this strategy, he designated a new policy for the CIA, ordering the agency to „fight the enemy in Asia, the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America – and wherever colonial empires crumbled”⁴. This meant the beginning of the American activity in the Middle East – as well as in Africa,⁵ Asia, and Latin America – which continues even today.

In my essay, Iran will be highlighted as a defining country of the Middle Eastern region, where the CIA has influenced decisively the political developments. The three events discussed in the study are of great importance both from a CIA and an Iranian aspect: Operation Ajax in 1953 was the first serious covert operation and success of the agency in the Middle East, while the Islamic revolution in 1979 highlighted basic shortfalls within the agency. During the Iraq-Iran War, due to the Contra scandal and the „arms-for-hostages” scheme, the domestic reputation of the CIA plummeted sharply.

Events before Ajax

The interest of western powers towards the Middle East goes back far longer than the formation of the CIA. However, in order to understand the anti-West attitude of Iran, a short review of the country’s modern history seems to be necessary.

Iran’s antipathy against the classic western colonial powers can be traced back before the First World War. The British exerted only their economic influence until the Second World War: in 1901, an English businessman, William How d’Arcy managed to obtain for 60 years the monopoly of oil extraction in the southern areas of Iran (then Persia). This monopoly was transferred in 1909 to the Anglo-Persian (later Anglo-Iranian) Oil Company⁶, which company later became the main source of British-Iranian conflicts as the main oil supplier of the British Navy (that has been converted at the same time from coal to oil).⁷

The Second World War brought about significant changes. Due to the strategic importance of the Middle East, the British thought that it was necessary

³ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 74.

⁴ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 76.

⁵ Nowadays not only USA, but other countries – for example Hungary - interested in Africa from economic, political and diplomatic aspects. – More on this: Besenyő János: Magyar békefenntartók Afrikában, pp. 7-9

⁶ The company is the predecessor of today’s British Petroleum.

See: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/149259.stm> (accessed: 6 July 2013)

⁷ Titkos háborúk történetéből: A CIA kísérleti akciója, I. rész. In: *Belügyi Szemle*, 1988/9. pp. 74.

to reinforce their positions in the region. In Egypt, they forced the king to appoint a pro-British government. In Iraq, the government – sympathizing with the Germans – tried unsuccessfully to expel the British from the country, the British troops occupied Baghdad. In Syria and Lebanon, the troops loyal to Vichy France threatened British interests after the occupation of France. In response, the British invaded the two countries in the summer of 1941, with the help of the Free French Forces of Charles de Gaulle. In Iran, Reza Shah, who tried to approach the Germans, was toppled by the British, and followed by his 22-year-old son, Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The new Shah's policy regarding the British did not change; he also supported the influence of the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company in the country.⁸

With the end of the Second World War, as mentioned before, the influence of classic colonial powers dwindled in the region. Besides this, such powers became the leaders of world politics as the United States, that opposed harshly the still-standing colonial order, and their secret services, like the CIA, tried to represent this anticolonialist attitude during their activities.

In April 1951, the nationalist politician Mohammed Mossadegh was appointed as the Prime Minister of Iran; several days after the Majlis (the Iranian Parliament) approved the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry that, as mentioned before, was mostly owned by the British. The British leadership could not overlook this, of course, and the reaction led in the end to Operation Ajax, the first such serious operation of the CIA when it intervened into the home affairs of a Middle Eastern country.

Operation Ajax

The Middle East initially meant for the CIA only a gigantic barrel full of oil. The agency considered its main task to gain the support of these countries, in competing with Moscow, or – after Operation Ajax, the CIA favoured this method – to help such Middle East governments into power by the means of covert operations, over which the United States could exert its economic and political influence afterwards. In the early period of the Cold War, according to Kissinger, „Washington still considered covert operations more legitimate than military intervention.”⁹

⁸ *ibid.*

⁹ Henry Kissinger: *Diplomácia*. Budapest: Panem-McGraw-Hill-Grafo. 1996. pp. 511.

Operation Ajax developed from a British plan was aimed at toppling Prime Minister Mohammed Mossadegh. However, the United States did not want to support the plan in any way initially.¹⁰ The British resorted to the United States and the CIA after the Iranian Prime Minister has discovered the British plot to overthrow him in November 1952, with the help of his secret services. In reaction, Mossadegh expelled the employees of the British embassy from the country, thus also the British spies.¹¹

The intervention of the U.S. was influenced greatly by their fear that the planned direct military intervention of the British to defend their Iranian economic interests could induce the Soviet Union to send its troops into Northern Iran.¹² Besides this, the poor status of the Iranian economy and the resulting social tensions could increase the probability of a possible Communist rebellion. Mossadegh himself contributed to the American decision to intervene, by a miscalculated bluff, in which he outlined the possibility of a Soviet threat at the American embassy in Tehran.¹³ John H. Stutesman, a diplomat and State Department officer in charge of Iranian affairs said:

*„Mossadeq felt that if he kicked out the British, and threatened the Americans with Russian hegemony, that we'd rush in. He wasn't that far wrong.”*¹⁴

The operation was headed on the part of the CIA by Kermit Roosevelt, the agency's Middle East operations chief.¹⁵ The operation started controversially: while they obtained the approval of CIA Director Allen Dulles, the President and some essential individuals to the coup had reservations regarding the plan.¹⁶ Eisenhower declared in his speech a few days later that "*any nation's right to form a government and an economic system of its own choosing is inalienable,*" and "*any nation's attempt to dictate to other nations their form of government is indefensible.*"¹⁷ Loy Henderson, the United States ambassador to Iran, opposed the person of the pro-western Retired Major General, Fazlollah Zahedi. The main problem with Zahedi was the following: he was proposed to replace Mossadegh already after the British coup attempt, and this was known also by

¹⁰ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 83.

¹¹ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 81.

¹² Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 83., and: CIA. *Current Developments in Iran*. May 22, 1951. pp. 2.

¹³ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 85.

¹⁴ *ibid.*

¹⁵ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 83.

¹⁶ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 85.

¹⁷ *ibid.*

the Prime Minister.¹⁸ However, General Zahedi was the only one who could lead the coup, because both the British and the American side were convinced of his pro-western attitude.¹⁹

The tactics of Kim Roosevelt were as follows: the reputation of Mossadegh amongst the country's significant political parties and religious communities must be undermined. Although the Americans did not possess the several decade-long expertise of the British MI6 about Iran, neither the several local agents recruited by the British, the American operation was better financed and organized: the United States provided a yearly 1 million USD for the operation. Besides the financial foundations, they constantly received information from the network controlled by the British intelligence, excelling in buying influence, controlled by the Rashidian brothers, three sons of a rich Anglophile businessman. The network of the brothers maintained connections with the members of the Iranian parliament, merchants held in high esteem, military officers, editors and publishers, goon squads, as well as at least one member of the Mossadegh cabinet.²⁰

By May 1953, the planning of the coup reached its final phase: Zahedi received 75,000 USD from the CIA to establish a military secretariat and choose colonels to lead the coup. The CIA commissioned also a group consisting of religious fanatics, who were ready to launch attacks against Mossadegh's political and personal supporters, as well as renowned religious leaders, making it look like it were the work of the communist Tudeh Party. Besides these, the CIA also launched a 150,000 USD propaganda campaign to discredit Mossadegh.²¹

On the day of the operation, the coupists led by Zahedi would have occupied the essential institutions of the Iranian government and would have arrested Mossadegh and his cabinet. Besides this, the CIA tried to buy the votes of enough members of the Majlis to establish a majority that would have proclaimed Zahedi as the new Prime Minister, giving an appearance of legality to the coup. Afterwards, Zahedi would have had only the task to pledge fealty to the Shah and restore the monarchy.²²

¹⁸ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 86.

¹⁹ *ibid.*

²⁰ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 84.

²¹ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 86.

²² *ibid.*

The conspirators have committed several errors during organizing the coup, though. On 7 July, in a radio broadcast intercepted by the CIA, the communist Tudeh Party warned the Mossadegh government about the imminent coup. The CIA discovered also in July that one of the coup's most important elements was missing: the troops. The agency contacted General Robert McClure, who led a military assistance advisory group in Iran since 1950, in the framework of an American programme. He provided assistance to Kim Roosevelt in surveying the political affiliation of Iranian officers, and helped in the recruitment of about 40 officers.²³

The Shah still had to be convinced to support the coup that aimed actually at restoring him to power. The CIA tried to convince the twin sister of the Shah, Princess Ashraf to help persuading the Shah. Sources are controversial regarding the details²⁴: according to the relevant article of the Home Affairs Review of 1988, the princess has welcomed warmly the CIA operatives in Switzerland, and 36 hours after the meeting she was already bound for Tehran²⁵. According to the 2007 CIA monograph of Tim Weiner, however, it was already difficult to locate Princess Ashraf, in the end she was found on the French Riviera. It took 10 days then to convince her to help in the persuasion of her brother to support the coup²⁶. The meeting was a failure, though, according to both sources. General Norman Schwarzkopf was tasked next with the mediation, who tried to persuade the Shah on 1 August. The meeting was realized, but the Shah, in fear of being monitored, told the general only that, as he is not convinced of the military's backing, he is not willing to support the coup.²⁷

In the end, it was Kim Roosevelt himself who convinced the Shah to support the coup of General Zahedi. The two sources diverge also in this matter: according to Weiner, after the Middle East director of the CIA pressured the Shah, outlining him the picture of a „communist Iran” or a „second Korea”, the terrified Shah fled to his resort at the Caspian Sea. Following this, Roosevelt worded the royal decree, according to which the Iranian monarch dismissed Mossadegh and appointed Zahedi to his place.²⁸ The decree was of dubious

²³ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 87-88.

²⁴ The differences between the Tim Weiner-monograph and the Belügyi Szemle of 1988 (Home Affairs Review, a journal of the Hungarian Ministry of Interior) also reflect the different points of view of the two opposing Cold War blocs regarding the 1953 coup.

²⁵ Titkos háborúk történetéből: A CIA kísérleti akciója, II. rész. In: *Belügyi Szemle*, 1988/10. pp. 68-69.

²⁶ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 88.

²⁷ *ibid.*

²⁸ *ibid.*

legality, as under the law, only the Majlis could have dismissed the Prime Minister, not the Shah.²⁹ In the end, the document was delivered to the Shah by Colonel Nassir, the commander of the Shah's imperial guard for signing. However, according to the Home Affairs Review, the travel of the Shah to the Caspian Sea was planned, and Roosevelt intended to reach the Shah with the decree still in Tehran, but he had to resort to the colonel leading the imperial guard due to a delay in time.³⁰

Afterwards, the sources concur: after the signed decrees arrived back to Tehran, the operation was launched, and was unsuccessful at the first try, as Mossadegh had preliminary information about the attempt to overthrow him, and ordered the detention of the commander of the imperial guard, who arrived to arrest him. Thus on 16 August, Radio Tehran reported about the failure of the coup. General Zahedi was hidden at the safehouse of the CIA.

After the coup attempt, Mossadegh dissolved the parliament and announced that he was going to take over the parliament's power. Roosevelt thus decided to make the events look like the Prime Minister himself had organised the failed coup. In order to achieve this, he induced the Shah, who fled to Baghdad, to make a statement saying that he fled because Iran is threatened by a left-wing uprising. Afterwards, Roosevelt handed his agents 50,000 USD, asking them to produce a crowd posing as communist goons. At the same time, he ordered the recruitment of further street mobs and sent religious emissaries to the Shi'ite ayatollah of Iran.³¹

The second coup attempt on 19 August was successful: the masses occupied the key points of Tehran, including the radio building. Mossadegh managed to escape, but surrendered the next day: he spent the rest of his life in prison and house arrest.³² Shah Pahlavi remained in power until the Islamic revolution in 1979.

Operation Ajax could be regarded substantial from several aspects. On the one hand, it was the first successful operation of the CIA, when it intervened directly into another country's internal affairs. Andrew Killgore, a State Department political officer in Tehran from 1972 to 1976, said: "[The coup] was regarded as CIA's greatest single triumph. It was trumpeted as a great

²⁹ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 89.

³⁰ Titkos háborúk történetéből: A CIA kísérleti akciója, II. rész. In: *Belügyi Szemle*, 1988/10. pp. 71.

³¹ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 89.

³² Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 91.

*American national victory. We had changed the whole course of a country here.”*³³

Due to the successful operation, the popularity of covert operations soared within the ranks of the American political leadership. However, according to Ray Cline, one of the leading analysts of the agency, a great problem of Ajax was „the extravagant impression of CIA's power that it created”³⁴. Operation Ajax created an illusion for the CIA that the agency „could topple governments and place rulers in power”³⁵.

Iran, the exporter of the Islamic revolution

Following Operation Ajax in 1953, Iran was a stable point for the United States among the conflicts of the Arab world. The monarchy led by Shah Reza Pahlavi was described by the American President James Carter at a state dinner on 31 December 1977, as an „island of stability”. At least that is what the U.S. and the CIA wanted to believe. The agency did not notice any sign that would have warned it about the imminent collapse of the Shah’s regime. In August 1978, the CIA still reported to the president that there is no chance of a revolution in Iran in the near future. A few weeks after the report, riots broke out in Tehran, and the Shah fled the capital on 16 January 1979.³⁶

Howard Hart, who served in Tehran in 1978 as a CIA agent, predicted the general discontent in his reports. But the case of Hart’s reports was only one example of „how preconceptions often shape intelligence assessments”, as Kissinger said³⁷. As the pessimistic reports of Hart did not fit into the image formed by the analysts about Iran, it was easier to overlook and suppress them.³⁸

The religious revolution provided an opportunity for Ayatollah Khomeini, a religious zealot, to return to Iran. Quoting Weiner: „Few at the CIA believed that an ancient cleric could seize the power and proclaim Iran as an Islamic republic.”³⁹

³³ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 93.

³⁴ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 92.

³⁵ *ibid.*

³⁶ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 369.

³⁷ Kissinger, *op. cit.*, pp. 538.

³⁸ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 369.

³⁹ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 370.

In Khomeini's Iran, its own well-maintained reputation proved to be a disadvantage for the CIA. „Iranians from all walks of life, well-educated elites and wild-eyed radicals alike, thought the CIA was an omnipotent force with immense power over their lives.”⁴⁰ Reality was more disappointing: at the CIA station in Tehran, in the summer of 1979, there were only four novice CIA officers. In 1996, William J. Daugherty, one of them, recounted his experiences in Tehran in detail.⁴¹

According to him, he knew little about Iran and the Iranians.

*„My entire exposure to Iran, beyond the evening television news and a three-week area studies course at the State Department, consisted of what I had picked up during five weeks on the desk reading operational files.”*⁴²

A group of left-wing radicals have already invaded the American embassy in May 1979. The followers of the Ayatollah were those who repelled the attackers and freed the employees of the embassy. None of the CIA operatives believed that another such attack could happen.⁴³ They received the following information from the CIA headquarters: *„The only thing that could trigger an attack would be if the Shah was let into the United States...”*⁴⁴

This provocation actually took place: on 21 October 1979, the Shah was admitted to the United States for medical treatment. Two weeks later the U.S. embassy in Tehran was occupied by Iranian students. The Iranians have held 53 hostages for 444 days, precisely until the end of the Carter administration.⁴⁵

Daugherty recounts in detail his interrogations that were led by a future deputy foreign minister of Iran, Hossein Sheik-ol-islam. Initially, the CIA officer presented his official cover story, but was compromised on 2 December, when Hossein handed him a cable that the patient work of the Iranians has recovered from the shredded documents. But his interrogators had to be disappointed. Daugherty remembers the moment as follows:

⁴⁰ *ibid.*

⁴¹ William J. Daugherty: *A First Tour Like No Other*. In: *Studies in Intelligence*, Spring 1998. <https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/csi-publications/csi-studies/studies/spring98/iran.html> (accessed: 6 May 2012)

⁴² *ibid.*

⁴³ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 371.

⁴⁴ *ibid.*

⁴⁵ *ibid.*

„We spent more time than I could fathom on why it was that I did not speak Farsi and was not an Iranian specialist. These Iranians found it inconceivable that the CIA would ever send to such a critical place as Iran someone who was so ignorant of the local culture and language. It was so inconceivable to them that weeks later, when they at last came to realize the truth, they were personally offended. It had been difficult enough for them to accept that the CIA would post an inexperienced officer in their country. But it was beyond insult for that officer not to speak the language or know the customs, culture, and history of their country.”⁴⁶

The release of the hostages held at the embassy was timed exactly at the hour when President Carter left the White House. According to Ken Pollack, a veteran Middle East analyst of the agency, the taking of the hostages was an „act of vengeance”⁴⁷, the revenge of the Iranians for Operation Ajax in 1953.

„Arms-for-hostages”

After consolidating his power, Ayatollah Khomeini declared the „export of the Islamic revolution”. Within this framework, Iran supported the Lebanese Hezbollah, and got caught up in war with the secular Iraq that had a significant Shi’ite community, starting a conflict that determined the 80s.

In 1984, Americans started to disappear from the streets of Beirut. On 7 March, Jeremy Levin, the bureau chief of the CNN in Beirut was kidnapped. On 16 March, Bill Buckley, the CIA station chief in Beirut, disappeared. On 7 May, a Presbyterian missionary, Benjamin Weir got kidnapped. In all, 14 Americans were held hostages during the presidency of Reagan. For the CIA, Bill Buckley was the priority, of course.⁴⁸

The trail led to the Hezbollah, and thus to Iran. At the same time, the CIA had another operation in progress in Nicaragua, where it supported the resistance movement of the Contras against the Sandinist government. However, the Congress was not willing to provide funding for the operation. Manucher Gorbaniifar, a former agent of the Shah’s secret police, who was certified as a consummate liar by the CIA, proposed that the hostage situation connected to the Hezbollah could be solved by an arms trade with Iran.⁴⁹ The CIA director of

⁴⁶ William J. Daugherty, *op. cit.*

⁴⁷ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 374.

⁴⁸ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 396.

⁴⁹ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 397-398.

the time, William Casey, decided to link the two affairs after Reagan showed signs of willing to make deals with terrorists.⁵⁰ Casey planned to sell arms to Iran, thus the hostages would be freed and the agency would have enough financing to support the Contras. However, the affair turned out to be one of the most serious scandals of the agency, after both the Contra- and the Iranian “arms-for-hostages” affairs were uncovered. It also described the analytic capabilities of the CIA that they continued to believe in the erroneous narrative, according to which the Iranians participating in the arms deal and the hostage takers are different groups. According to Philip J. Wilcox, the liaison between the CIA and the Department of State, this was a grievous example of the way in which "the CIA was corrupted" during the Reagan administration.⁵¹

Besides this, the CIA was supporting both sides during the Iraq-Iran War. In the framework of the “arms-for-hostages” deals, it provided defensive missiles and battlefield intelligence to Iran.⁵² At the same time, the agency shook hands with Saddam Hussein, supporting him with military intelligence, including satellite imagery, as well as allowing him to procure high-technology equipment from the United States.⁵³

However, the agency did not profit much from supporting any of the sides. From the part of Iraq, it did not receive intelligence; the Iraqi state police remained impenetrable for the agency. From the part of Iran, the flow of information stopped in the fall of 1989, when the whole network of agents was uncovered due to the failure of a CIA clerk.⁵⁴

Conclusion

The CIA began to conduct activities intensively in the Middle East under the presidency of Eisenhower, and it has influenced the local events ever since. At the same time, the agency itself was affected by the same events.

In Iran, the CIA has brought to success its first large-scale operation, by toppling Prime Minister Mossadegh during Operation Ajax, but it also founded the basic dissent of the Iranian society towards the United States and the CIA.

⁵⁰ On 14 June 1985, the terrorists of the Hezbollah hijacked an airliner, which they diverted to Beirut. The hijackers demanded the release of Lebanese prisoners and captured Hezbollah members. In the end, due to the intervention of the American President, Israel released 300 prisoners. Source: Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 401.

⁵¹ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 406.

⁵² Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 407.

⁵³ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 425.

⁵⁴ Weiner, *op. cit.*, pp. 425-426.

This peaked during the events of the Islamic revolution in 1979. Iran proved to be one of the most dangerous places for the operatives of the CIA after the revolution, due to their dubious reputation, gained due to Operation Ajax. Finally, during the Iraq-Iran War, the “arms-for-hostages” scandal has undermined the credibility of the CIA also within the United States.

In all, the CIA has significantly influenced the Iranian politics, but in the end, it rather generated enemies for the United States than stabilized the region.

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Lt. Col. GYŐZŐ CSANÁDI

ATTENTION, DANGEROUS USER GROUPS!

(The good security design of a mission-critical system is reactionary and anti-revolutionist)

Abstract

When having a mission-critical information technology system, the security and the availability are paramount. During the installation or the usage of a complex system that consists of several mission critical functional (sub) systems, the correct measurement of security is a really difficult job. Normally, security settings are bound to user groups. If during the preparation the user groups are not identified well, it definitely leads to a situation where more than one kind of users must share the same user group. Having users undistinguished and cared in the same “amalgamating” user group, may beat gaps on our defence shield.

Keywords: mission-critical system, amalgamating user group, security gaps

Introduction

At the first glance everybody thinks that a gladiator without a shield is definitely weaker than the one with heavy armour. In the past the gladiator fight organisers were thinking in a different way. Their main aim was to amaze the audience giving them “panem et circenses⁵⁵” entertainment. Thus, the strength of fighting gladiators had to be balanced in order to have long, bloody and eventful struggles. One of the most defended gladiators was the “*secutor*⁵⁶”, his

⁵⁵ “**Panem et circenses**” Bread and circuses (for people) ancient Roman phrase is used to describe the creation of public approval.

⁵⁶ The **secutor** was a kind of gladiator equipped by heavy defence tools such as *Gladius*: Roman short sword; *Scutum*: tower shield; *Manica* (right arm): cotton or metal segments tied onto the striking arm for protection; *Ocrea* (left leg): a leather or metal greave to protect the leg beneath the shield; *Secutor Helmet*: a helmet with two small eye-holes, rounded top and neck-protective flanges.

counterpart the “*retiarius*⁵⁷”, who had hardly any defence just one net and a big trident. Which one was better? The well defended but slow secutor or the light but quick *retiarius*? The answer is obvious; they are equally bad in real life battles, because they are “designed” only for entertainment. A good old warrior in a regular Roman legionary⁵⁸ had to be quick but sufficiently defended at the same time.

Coming back to our post-modern reality, we can say that information technology has become our main entertainer. If we have a closer look at our modern battlefield, we will bump into the information technologies as a kind of fighting power like a Roman legion in the antique era. An entertainer can be a gladiator: a well-defended secutor or a quick *retiarius*. However, we have to pay attention to our modern fighting power like the Romans did with their legions. A legionary (information technology functional system) must be quick and defended at the same time.

In case of sensitive areas of information technology usage such as military, industrial, or medical applications or if the systems risk human life or even if the failure of the system jeopardizes the organisation’s main mission, a new definition must be introduced. These systems are the “*mission-critical systems*”.

There are situations (e.g. military environment) where more than one of mission-critical systems must share their environment in one massive network and host infrastructure. All sub-systems or in other words “*functional systems*” have their own needs for settings and services available. The factor that makes these complex system designs even more difficult is the existence of users. Some users have to use one or more functional systems, some users must use other ones. There may be different users or different kind of administrators in the same functional system (system administrators, database managers, power users, observers etc.), all different users may have different needs for environment and available services.

⁵⁷ **Retiarius** is a light but quick kind of gladiator, normally the counterpart of secutor. The equipment of a *retiarius* is: *Rete*: A weighted net used to trap opponents; *Fascina*: A three-pointed trident, as tall as a human being; *Pugio*: A dagger; *Manica* and *galerus*: Two guards to protect the arm and shoulder.

⁵⁸ **Roman Legionary** is the basic infantry warrior of the ancient Roman armed forces. The basic equipment is the following: *Chassis*: helmet; *Catafracta*, *Plumbata* weighted darts; and other warrior specific equipment like *Arcus*: bow or *Lapis*: stones and *Funda*: slings for slingers.

All similar users must be identified and treated in the same way. That means that users must be grouped and the necessary settings must be given to these groups. The name of this kind of group is the “user” or “security” -group. If the user groups are not identified or their differentiation is not detailed enough, it may happen that two or more types of users have to share their user group. In order to elaborate the phenomenon of the aforementioned grouping a new term must be introduced. I will use the term of ”amalgamating group” in this paper to refer to those groups, where more than one kind of user types are merged.

The differentiation of user groups can be made vertically⁵⁹ or horizontally⁶⁰, or even better the combination of vertical and horizontal design⁶¹. Giving further details on this vertical, horizontal or combined user grouping is beyond the capacity of this article. The present work concentrates on the danger of the situation when different kind of users are not well distinguished and it consequently results in user groups that amalgamates more than one different users not regarding that this group is part of a hierarchical directory system or a horizontal group.

Many years have passed by since the flags rose in Paris with this tripartite motto⁶²: “Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood⁶³”. In our era, mankind is more and more dependent on information technologies. If we consider mission-critical systems and their indispensable and indisputably important security, we can declare that a mission-critical system security design cannot afford to provide freedom for users, nor either equality or brotherhood. The organisation must follow exactly the opposite rules, the users cannot be free to do anything, cannot

⁵⁹ **Vertical organisation of user groups:** The most common vertical way of organisation of the user groups have a certain hierarchy. Most of the state-of-art operational systems have tools so called “directory systems” to do it, eg. Active Directory for Windows, Network Directory System for (recent) Novell systems, or NIS, NIS+, LDAP for UNIX systems. These directory systems can have hierarchical organisation units and the administrator can create the abstraction of his organisation hierarchy. Rights and permissions are inherited from the higher level. These directory systems control other resources as well printers, drives, folders, or other objects that can be abstracted into the system.

⁶⁰ **Horizontal user groups:** Usually called “security groups” or simple way just “groups”. Users can be members of more than one group. All groups are in the equal level, the difference among groups is the security rights and permissions bound to the group. Who is member of a group will receive the restrictions or advances that given by the authorized users for the group.

⁶¹ **Horizontal and vertical grouping:** When users are defined in a directory system, but also are members of groups. For example one user is member of organisation and another is member of another organisation unit really far in the tree, but both of them are members of a group which is authorized to use FTP protocol. Modern directory systems are able and advised to build user structure like this.

⁶² **Tripartite motto:** is a motto consist of three keywords

⁶³ **“Freedom, Equality, Brotherhood”:** Originally in French: “Liberté, Égalité, Fraternité” the revolutionist’s main motto during French Revolution.

have equal rights and it has nothing to do with brotherhood. Later I will provide evidence and a mathematical model in order to prove that a good mission-critical security design must deny that revolutionary tripartite motto. Ergo, a good mission critical system organisation is reactionary⁶⁴ and anti-revolutionist. The user equality in user amalgamating groups contains hidden dangers by granting unnecessary rights meanwhile can block the usage. Later I will suggest a possible methodology how to avoid having amalgamating user groups.

Methodology

The present article is based on real life experience and several struggles of set-ups in the complex military systems. Since technical details of these systems are classified information because of the nature of military environment, in the text pseudo names and fake ports folders (references) will be used without identification or compromising of real systems.

The most common situations will be presented as case studies, and after the abstraction of the problem; a simple mathematical model will be created.

With a fictitious experiment, the possibility of the dangers of the existence of amalgamating groups will demonstrate how our system will be sensitive and unusable at the same time.

Results

Out of the frying pan into the fire

If the usage of security measures is not balanced and moves from one extreme to the other, the situation is similar to the one in the old Hungarian metaphor⁶⁵: we fall over from one side of the horse to the other. If we use poor security, our system will be sensitive even to the accidental mistakes, and if we over-secure our system (like a secutor), it will be slow or nobody will be able to use it. How can we keep ourselves in the saddle on the top of our horse? The

⁶⁴ **Reactionaries:** Conservative sometimes radical movement against revolutionary groups. In the context of French revolution, reactionaries were the opposing force against revolutionaries.

⁶⁵ Hungarians consider themselves successors of mounted warriors that is why there are so much Hungarian metaphors with horses. The actual one resembles the funny event when an unskilled but really enthusiastic beginner tries to get on his horse but always finds himself on the other site of the horse. If somebody have ever tried to get on a horse will understand how difficult it is.

following case studies will present the most common mistakes (extremes) that extrudes us from our work position.

Case Study #1 Story from the information management stone age
Mottoes of the case:

- This is a military system with mission-critical functional systems, thus let's provide as a strict security as it is possible.
- Users are dangerous; users are bad boys and must be treated and punished in the same brutal way.
- Meanwhile the administrator is an always busy wise man who mustn't have any obstacle because he knows everything in the system.
- There are other stranger and suspicious administrators as well, therefore give them their servers to play but nothing more.

The situation is the following

The information technology organisation is installing a complex system in order to provide services for a military exercise. Servers are virtualised and most of them Windows based under the control the Active Directory System and integrated into a specific domain.

Critical activity

Due to lack of any instruction, the administrators define three security groups on their own as follows:

<i>Created user groups</i>		
<i>No</i>	<i>Security group</i>	<i>Function</i>
1	Domain admins	For the experienced administrators who have full permission and no limitations in the whole network and domains
2	Local admins	For the functional system administrators who come from different organisations and Domain admins are not familiar with these people. Consequently, only for specific servers (functional system servers) administrative rights are granted
3	Users	Rest of the word. All other users belong to the same group. This group has serious restrictions and limitations since users are considered dangerous factors of the system.

Analysis

Unfortunately, this point of view by the system administrators is more frequent than it is thought to be, but it has some (kind of) logics. Since building a differential user group system is over the level of system administrators, and the administrator is always busy, if there is no further instruction, administrators definitely start like this. According to their logics, if later there is a further need, they will create a new user group or grant more rights to the existing one. If there aren't any further concerns, the system will work like this.

This situation always happens when security staff does not give his contribution to system planning phase and neglects to create a well-tailored plan about user groups and their hierarchical or horizontal design.

The result is really bad; the management quickly becomes chaotic and quite provisory.

In this case, it is the really primitive grouping that in the beginning makes hardly any differences between users. This is a revolutionary idea following the principles of “equality” and “brotherhood”.

Summary of the case

If administrators do not receive any plan about user groups, they will make it as easy as it is possible to create one group for users and a few for administrators. Since administrators are aware of the existence of the mission-critical systems, consequently they know very well the importance of security, thus they will set strict security measures for users.

Case Study #2 Primus inter pares, a story about an unfinished installation

Motto of this case

Admin is an admin (but matters what kind)

The situation

Several functional systems are installed by one admin user who is a member of the “Domain admins” user group. Now there is a need for a new

functional system, but for some reason another admin has to execute the installation.

A previous installation of a similar system creates its folders and necessary configuration files. Actually one of the important configuration file is an XML file in the following folder:

(C:\TARGETINGSYS\SERVER\config\ServerDaemon.xml)

This file controls a version server application that can run different versions of the same server software. When the file is created, it becomes write-protected for everybody, except for Domain admin group users. The reason is simple: the installation program is launched by a user who belonged to Domain admin group. The installation process runs with the permissions of that user who has launched the software. During the installation when this sensible file was created, the software automatically limited the access for everybody else who is not member of the Domain admin group.

Critical activity

The installation procedure is not really difficult, because the developers of the software have made it as simple and automatic as possible. When a new version of this functional server was necessary to install, another administrator started to do it clicking on the icon. Unfortunately, nobody takes care of the fact that this new administrator is not a member of the Domain admin group.

The installation of the new functional system means that a new version of server instance will be installed in the application home folder (C:\TARGETINGSYS\SERVER).

Being a member of “Local admin” group grants the rights for putting the new server instance into the application home folder, but the user doesn’t have permission to modify the ServerDaemon.xml file. The installation software is quick and silent (probably because of a bug) nothing specific message appears and the installation apparently has finished successfully.

Although the new server folder was installed, the second <targetingsys-server> XML tag in the aforementioned configuration file was not created due to the insufficient security rights.

Although everything went well, but the new server did not started. During the error investigation all necessary folders are found and all files exist. Unfortunately, there is no further documentation for this SeverDaemon.xml file that makes it possible to edit this file manually, because normally this modification is executed automatically during the installation process by the install software.

Due to the lack of new reference in the configuration, the version server was not aware of the existence of the new server instance and ran without any error notice, although the new server files and folders had been installed.

Consequently, the installation was unfinished and had a difficult-to-locate error, although nothing serious had happened except for the fact that the new installation was executed by another “admin” right user.

The correct ServerDaemon.xml file contains the following:

```
<targetingsys-server>

<executable>%TARGETINGSYS_HOME%\SERVER\SERVER282\bin\serv28
2.exe</executable>
  <parameters>-IIOPport 42512 -IIOPnumeric -logLevel 3 -logFile
%TARGETINGSYS_HOME%\SERVER\SERVER282\log\version.log -hb
%TARGETINGSYS_HOME%\SERVER\SERVER282\log\heartbeat</paramete
rs>
</targetingsys-server>

<targetingsys-server>

<executable>%TARGETINGSYS_HOME%\SERVER\SERVER310\bin\serv310.
exe</executable>
```

```
<parameters>-IIOPport 42522 -IIOPnumeric -logLevel 3 -logFile
%%TARGETINGSYS_HOME%\SERVER\SERVER310\log\version.log -hb
widevec {TARGET%INGSYS_HOME% }\ widevec {SERVER}\ widevec
{SERVER310}\ widevec {log}\ widevec {heartbeat}< over widevec
{parameters}>
```

```
</targetingsys-server>
```

Analysis

Without Domain admin rights, the automated installation had no rights to finish the installation. The second XML tag of the <targetingsys-server> was not created. After granting the necessary rights, the installation was correct. That is why all Software Installation Plans start with the following sentence:

“Log in as administrative user” and it does matter what kind of “admin” executes the installation. Interestingly, in this case study it is important what kind of admin starts and who executes the second installation. If the installation was executed in the opposite order (local admin first, domain admin second), the outcome could be different, since the domain admin may have the permission to edit the configuration file and the installation could be completed.

Situation	First activity	Second activity	Outcome
Presented situation	Domain admin installed first server	Local admin tried to install a second server	Installation finished with a hidden error All files and folders exist but the second server is not running
Opposite way	Local admin installed first server	Domain admin installed a second server	The installation is successful

Summary of the case

If the user does not pay attention to his membership of the user group, it may cause incompetency. This case study demonstrated an example when apparently everything goes well, but because of the different user groups, the system can surprise the user. The main reason for this phenomenon is that the

system (programmers) assumes that user groups are well built and properly used.

Usage of non-differentiated (amalgamated) security groups

In case of superficial planning, it happens that different user or admin groups have not got defined security groups for the different security needs, but they have “amalgamated” big groups that try to merge and simplify the security settings for large group of users, although they have different necessary services.

This behaviour is comfortable either for the security management or the system administration because it may mean less work, but may result in unnecessary security gaps in the system.

Above there was provided an example about the importance of different security levels.

Unfortunately, the most common mistake when the possible user groups are identified is the following:

<i>Existing security groups</i>		
<i>No</i>	<i>Security group</i>	<i>Function</i>
1	Admin users	Administration purpose
2	Standard users	Normal user purpose

To provide a clearer view of the danger of the “amalgamated” security groups, here is a theoretical example to demonstrate what hidden danger has been put into the system.

Theoretical experiment (example)
Assumptions and basic design of the experiment

In the example there are four users: usrA, usrB, usrC and usrD, all having their own business in the system with different applications.

There are four security settings: setting01, setting02, setting03 and setting04, each setting represents a service to be granted or banned (logical “Y” or “N”).

The users are divided into:

- “Strong” users;
- “Weak” users.

The usrA and usrB are “strong” users, which means well-trained admin users, knowing what settings are necessary for their applications and they can articulate their needs during the security settings. Consequently, they can recognize the reason why their system is not working (in case of hidden withdrawal of grants) and ask services granted if the security admin closes them.

However, usrC and usrD are “weak” users, which means that although they are masters of their applications, they are not familiar with the technical details, if they do not have their services working, they cannot identify the reason so they are not able to articulate what security setting should be granted in order to have their system work.

Logic and rule

The following chart will show the users in columns and settings in rows
In the cross point the data means how the security setting is granted:

- “Y” means asked by user;
- “N” means not having been asked by user.

In the small “(y)” and “(n)” in brackets means the real need of the system for the security setting granted (y) or not important to be granted (n).

E.g.:

N(y) means NOT articulated but in reality permission needed.

The rule is the following:

- One “amalgamated” security group or all users;
- If somebody asks permission, it will be granted;
- If not asked the permission remains banned.

Outcome

The result matrix of this logic will be the following:

<i>Result matrix</i>					
<i>Sec settings / users</i>	<i>userA (strong)</i>	<i>userB (strong)</i>	<i>userC (weak)</i>	<i>userD (weak)</i>	<i>Applied policy of the melting group ($\sum_{1-4} SB$)</i>
setting01	Y(y)	N(n)	N(y)	N(n)	(Y or N or N or N)= Y
setting02	N(n)	Y(y)	N(n)	N(n)	(N or Y or N or N)= Y
setting03	N(n)	N(n)	N(y)	N(n)	(N or N or N or N)= N
setting04	Y(y)	N(n)	N(n)	N(y)	(Y or N or N or N)= Y
<i>User's system works or not?</i>	works	works	Not	works	
<i>Why does it work like this?</i>	The (strong) user asked and was granted his needs	The (strong) user asked and was granted his needs	The (weak) user did not ask and was not granted	The (weak) user did not ask but was granted because userA asked it for his system	

Analysis

Analyzing the chart we can state the following facts:

1. All the strong users' system will work (positive income),
2. and some of the weak users will (by chance) and some of them not (negative income).
3. The granted permission by the "amalgamated" policy group in some cases grants more than it is necessary (opens one unnecessary service), for example, userB does not ask and it is not necessary to have permission for

setting01 and setting04, but they will be granted because other users have asked for them.

Dangers

Unnecessary services granted (security gaps) are listed in the following chart:

<i>Provided security gaps by users</i>			
<i>User</i>	<i>Unnecessary services</i>	<i>Why have unnecessary service</i>	<i>Conclusion for user</i>
usrA	setting02	usrB asked	His system works with 1 unnecessary security gap
usrB	setting01	usrA asked	His system works with 2 unnecessary security gaps
	setting04	usrA asked	
usrC	setting01	usrA asked	His system does not work but he has 3 security gaps
	setting02	usrB asked	
	setting04	usrA asked	
usrD	setting01	usrA asked	His system works with 2 security gaps
	setting02	usrB asked	

Overview of security gaps in the melting policies setting by setting.

<i>Status of the security gaps and analysis</i>						
<i>Security settings</i>	<i>Setting in the melting group</i>	<i>Status of the setting according to necessity or un-necessity (security gap)</i>				<i>Analysis</i>
		<i>usrA (strong)</i>	<i>usrB (strong)</i>	<i>usrC (weak)</i>	<i>usrdD (weak)</i>	
setting 01	Y (granted)	Necessary and granted	GAP (not necessary but granted)	Necessary and granted	GAP (not necessary but granted)	2X GAP
setting 02	Y (granted)	GAP (not necessary but granted)	Necessary and granted	GAP (not necessary but granted)	GAP (not necessary but granted)	3X GAP
setting 03	N (not granted)	Not necessary not granted	Not necessary not granted	Necessary but NOT granted	Not necessary not granted	Does not have GAPs but prevents working of usrC
setting 04	Y (granted)	Necessary and granted	GAP (not necessary but granted)	GAP (not necessary but granted)	Necessary and granted	2x GAP

Statistics

In the matrix there are 16 fields.

Out of the 16, there are 8 wrong settings (50%).

Among 8 wrong settings:

- 1 prevents the work of one user (25% of users);
- 7 provide at least one security gap for all 4 users (100%), even for the one that is not able to use his system.

Mathematical analysis

Having a looser look at the system, we can recognize that:

ALL users have unnecessary security gaps.

There are users that (having gaps) never get proper service.

That shortly means that having amalgamated groups (not distinguished by real needs) is a great security failure and also the normal working is not predictable (some users will have some service that is not theirs).

The reason is the following:

Having that security environment melting groups, the working model follows the Boolean algebra laws.

That means:

the melting group of security settings will work according to following logical formula;

$$\sum_{1-n} SB = S_1 \vee S_2 \vee S_3 \dots \vee S_N$$

Where:

$\sum_{1-n} SB$ is the result in the melting group;

S_1, S_2, S_3, S_N are the settings requested (not requested).

Having “OR” operator (\vee) if there is one TRUE in the formula the result is always TRUE.

Conclusion: Avoid using amalgamated groups

To avoid this poor result (ineffective concerning the future installations) it is advised to give all function groups different security groups even if only one user is in each group. Later, make necessary permissions according to need to know, but not more and not LESS as it is necessary. These groups have good use in the operational environment, at the contrary of usage of “amalgamated” groups.

Summary of the experiment

To sum up this way the theoretical experiment, we can conclude that all (100%) users have security gaps and 25% of users cannot use the system.

Mitigation of aforementioned dangers

Use (identify) more security groups

Using of amalgamated groups is dangerous and does not serve either the defence or the availability of the systems. All well identified users **MUST** have its own security setting that prevents unauthorized access of the resources and availability of systems.

Suggested minimum groups are the following:

<i>Minimum necessary security groups</i>		
<i>No</i>	<i>Group</i>	<i>Description</i>
1	Group for Core system administrators	Enable all the op system and other core (common) services to administer like domain management mailing, antivirus, web server, and printing services etc.
2	Group of Functional Service No1 Administrator	Provide all the necessary services that necessary to administer the services of FS No1
3	Group of Functional Service No2 Administrator	Provide all the necessary services that necessary to administer the services of FS No1
n+1	... continued until all (n) FS has its own group	Etcetera for ALL FS MUST be independent setting
n+2	Group of user of the Functional Service No1	Provide all the necessary services that necessary to use the services of FS No1
n+3	Group of user of the Functional Service No2	Provide all the necessary services that necessary to use the services of FS No2
n+n+1	... continued until all (n) FS has its own group	Etcetera for ALL FS MUST be independent
n+n+2	Common user	If there is user who does not have any FS to provide all the necessary services for common applications

That means all used Functional systems have their own administrators and users, in case of need concerning the nature of the Functional System, it would be possible additional users group to set up.

For example: for the functional system named APLAN it is necessary to have minimum three kinds of users

- APLAN admin (installs manages services);
- APLAN database admin (deal with database and users permissions);
- APLAN user (uses APLAN).

In case of having the number (n) of Functional Systems the minimum number of security groups (nFS_{\min}) is the following:

$$nFS_{\min} = 2n + 2$$

The estimated number of security groups

Having proper groups distinguished by Functional Systems the security should be tailored easily for the users.

In case if the complex system uses eight different functional services the minimum number of security group must be 18.

And for example, for the user who uses APLAN, and TARGETINGSYS282 should be assigned these two groups and the common user group.

Create (identify) security group/permission matrix

In order to tailor each type of users' permissions, it is necessary to experiment (create) what are the minimum permissions needed for the specific security group.

For example for the APLAN user it is necessary to have only the following services enabled:

- Installed APLAN client available to run;
- RW permission for the folder C:\Program Files\aplan;
- R Permission for the shared folder in the server labelled N:\;
- R Permission for the map folder in the server labelled M:\.

The other functional services need other permissions granted.

An example of the group/permission matrix:

Group/permission matrix								
Security group	Security settings							
	Enable APLAN icon on the desktop	RW for the C:\Program Files\aplan	R for the APLAN shared folder in the and map N:\	R for the map folder in the server and ::\	Enable cmd prompt for the use	Enable FTP service for the use	Etc.	Etc.
APLAN user	x	x	x	x				
APLAN DbAdmin					x	x		
Etc.								
Etc.								

Use user/security group matrix

For the tailor the security settings creation of a user/group matrix is a good tool.

Following the example of previous paragraph, there are 15) users (User01 to User15) and there are 8 Functional Systems (LOGIST, TOPSYS, GOOG, APLAN, TARGETSYS, QUICK, EYES, SBIR).

The example matrix is the following

User/security group matrix																					
No	User	LOGIST		TOPSYS		GOOG		APLAN			TARGETSYS		QUICK		EYES		SBIR		common	Domain	notice
		admin	user	admin	user	admin	user	admin	dbadmin	user	admin	user	admin	user	admin	user	admin	user			
1	User01																			X	Domain admin
2	User02	X		X		X													X		LOGIST, TOPSYS, GOOG admin
3	User03							X			X		X		X				X		APLAN, TARGETSYS, QUICK EYES admin

4	User04																X		X	SBIR admin
5	User05		X				X			X									X	Logistician
6	User06		X		X													X	X	Logistician planner
7	User07				X		X											X	X	Operational
8	User08								X		X		X						X	Airforce
9	User09								X				X		X				X	Airforce
10	User10										X		X		X				X	Targeting
11	User11								X										X	APLAN dbadmin
12	User12		X				X												X	OPS
13	User13		X		X						X								X	PLAN
14	User14						X												X	Observer
15	User15																		X	Observer

Dedicate one administrator for security and audit

Security is paramount part of the system, which cannot be neglected, but cannot continue with poor results. Creating (experimenting) the necessary settings – as it was suggested before – needs special knowledge and time consuming activity. Having the proper settings does not mean that the security activity has been stopped. In several cases, during the operations new requests will be risen and it is important also the audit of the users’ activities, including the administrator’s job. That activity would be a full time job for a dedicated administrator.

Necessary actions step by step:

1. identify the systems;
2. identify types of users of systems;
3. define all necessary user groups;
4. collect all information about necessary security settings that grants for the user group the possibility to make the members do their job;
5. Give all users his one or more user groups depending on the users’ job.

Summary

As the case studies present, and the logic of the theoretical experiment demonstrates, it is easy to recognise the double-fold danger of the inaccurate usage of user grouping.

The first study demonstrates that without any further instruction, the administrators will create as a simple user group system as possible. The second study highlights that membership of the group matters, because the system (programmers) assumes that the user groups are well built and properly used. With the theoretical experiment, it is possible to have a closer look at the nature and the interior working logics of the user groups.

With the creation of amalgamated user groups, we may open several unwanted security gaps on our defence shield, meanwhile some services will stop working.

In the systems that contain mission-critical elements the security and the availability will be of primary preference. Accordingly, administrators will make serious efforts to enforce security, but if this process is paired with amalgamating groups, this dangerous mixture of measures will have an opposite result. The system becomes more unsecure and the services easily become unavailable. This situation makes the life of either the users or the administrators as difficult as the life of a gladiator.

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NEWS, EVENTS, INFORMATION

Lt. Dávid Vogel MH KDK, DKO

RECENSION: Tibor GRÜLL: Szépség és szörnyeteg

Do you know the most popular tourist attractions of the ancient times?" – This is one of the many questions raised in the book's blurb on the back of *Tibor Grüll's Szépség és szörnyeteg* (The Beauty and the Beast). The book subtitled as *Az európai művelődés története I. Az ókortól a reneszánszig* (The European cultural history – From antiquity till the Renaissance) is the first of the two volumes with the ambitious goal to introduce the reader into the 2500 years of European cultural history. The challenge is courageously taken by a historian, a professor with ten books published in 12 years, besides the more than hundred articles.



The piece that was already published 16 years ago was originally meant for high school students, but it was widely used in college and university classes. The topics of the volume are discussed in three main chapters *The Antiquity*; *The Middle Ages*; and *The Renaissance and the Reformation* that are made up of shorter texts, titled in a very meaningful way. Both the length of these writings and their language make the book very easy to read. The interesting facts, the different individual points of view used by the author really make the book unique of its kind. Tibor Grüll guides the reader through some 2200 years of European cultures and civilizations, with a special focus on religion and its influence on Europe.


The work – as it is stylishly foreshadowed by the title – offers a double interpretation of the centuries of the European cultural history: the *beauty* meaning the positive impacts, events, ideas, deeds of the *vieux continent* and the *beast* representing the dark side of all these aspects. This more complex viewpoint helps the reader to look at history with an even wider angle.

In order to make the journey more complete, the texts of the book are neatly illustrated with pictures and are reinforced with pronunciation help and explanations of foreign terms and expressions, as well as short biographies at the end of the book.

Lt. Dávid Vogel

RECENSION: Zsolt VISY: *The Ripa Pannonica in Hungary*

Throughout history, groups of people have been fighting against each other over territory, resources or other means of wealth. Realizing this, great states wanted to ensure their supremacy over their land, so if they had the possibility, they built fortresses and various military installations to defend their country. Some greater states had the ability to build something even stronger: a wall around their territory. This was the situation with the Great Wall of China or with the world's largest and longest lasting empire, the Roman Empire. 6,500,000 km² on three continents at its greatest extent in 117 AD, the empire had an extremely long border, a part of which was located in Transdanubia. Zsolt VISY's *The Ripa Pannonica in Hungary* published by the Akadémia Publishing Company in 2003 is the only book available in this depth about the frontier itself and the archaeological findings of those historic years.



Zsolt Visy's book is the outcome of 20 years of research, spent at institutions like the Map Library of the Military Historical Institute and the Air Photo Library of the Land-Survey Institute, besides the National Archive and the Manuscript Collection of the Széchényi Library. The *limes* – which is, as we can learn from the book in fact a *ripa* in this case, since it's not entirely man-made – is introduced section by section in a detailed way, in cases even mentioning its use after the Empire ceased to exist. The information gathered from various sources is then supported by very rich illustrations like original and up-to-date maps and photographs. The collection of these aerial photos showing the areas alongside the River Danube serves as the basis of the book. The institutional research and the huge compilation of illustrations – numbering around 200 – are strengthened by the information collected during the many years of field-walking, which was also used as a tool for double-checking the findings of the research.

Another unique feature of the book is the detailed map of the whole ripa Pannonica of Hungary at the scale of 1:25000 which really brings the ancient archaeological sites back to life, being a real help for those interested in further research or study visits to the actual locations. *The Ripa Pannonica in Hungary* is truly an essential guide for researchers of this era, for history fans and for locals of the given areas, who would want to learn more about their surroundings.

Judit Bagi, PhD aspirant

RECENSION: Zoltán Vörös: Kínai sakkjátszma – Tengeri kereskedelmi útvonalak és az energiabiztonság geopolitikája [Chinese Chess – Maritime Trade Routes and the Geopolitics of Energy Security]

Zoltán Vörös displays in this book an interesting and stirring geopolitical game – China’s race for oil. As we all know, the country’s petroleum-related consumption has been constantly on the rise and reached alarming levels in the past few years, since Beijing has been unable to satisfy its needs from its own resources. It seems highly likely that there is a widespread, general global knowledge about the oil producer regions and about the situation of these countries. This volume, however, presents the Chinese participation in this *complex game* presented in a very fresh approach: displaying their race for oil by regions, focusing on the main maritime trade route stretching from the African coast and the Middle East, going through the Indian Ocean, the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea as far as the Chinese Coast.

This is the trade route on which 80% of the Chinese oil import has been shipped, thus it is the most significant trade route of the country. While its importance is obvious, its safety is questionable – and this obviously concerns Beijing the most. As the author describes, China has to face several challenges throughout the route, which could affect its import, thus its economy as well.

The book is constructed in a logical and clear-cut manner. The first chapter introduces the economy and the energy need of China, while the second one puts the trade route in a historical context, preparing the readers for the upcoming chapters.

Chapter three focuses on Africa, a continent of great importance for China. The author analyses three countries, Sudan, Angola and Somalia, in particular in the context of maritime piracy there, to highlight the challenges China faces or might face in the future during its rush for oil.

The fourth chapter describes the complex region of the Persian Gulf and the Chinese interests in the main oil-exporting countries, also specifying the possible and actual challenges there.

India and the Indian Ocean are in the centre of the fifth chapter, concentrating on Indo-Chinese relations, and on the future of the South Asian country, especially on the growing energy needs of New Delhi, with an eye on a possible confrontation of the two giants.

The sixth chapter is about the final phase of the route, concentrating on the Malacca Strait and the South China Sea, describing the existing challenges of Beijing there, and mentioning also the China-ASEAN cooperation.

While these first six chapters are all about the challenges China has to face the following section is devoted to the reactions and steps made or planned by Beijing. It was a good idea to put these responses after the display of the regions, since most of the answers are complex, covering not only a region, but the entire trade route. The real significance of the work lies in this part – providing scholars, academics, students as well as businessmen, NGO representatives having an interest in the region and the topic – with an exciting reading experience.

The text is well edited; the figures and maps created by the author himself are advantageous; the layout of the book is modern, clear and handy.

In sum, *Chinese Chess* is an interesting worth-to-read volume, displaying a slice of the global geopolitical games.

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