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THEORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

ISTVÁN BANDI

CHAPTERS ON THE ACTIVITIES OF THE EMIGRATION DEPARTMENT OF THE ROMANIAN INTELLIGENCE FROM THE SIXTIES TO THE CHANGE OF REGIME

Abstract

During the last thirty years of the Romanian communist dictatorship, he continued his intelligence activities under the auspices of national communism. The Romanian citizens who fled to the Western states and the emigration organizations they set up were excellent at providing and covering agency activities. In addition to scientific and technical and commercial intelligence, the management and influence of Romanian emigration and, last but not least, the countervailing of the lobbying activities of Hungarian emigration and the elimination of Hungarian emigration centers in general have played an important role. Without wishing to be exhaustive, the present study attempts to present the targeted activities of Romanian intelligence before 1989.

Keywords: Socialist Romania, Foreign Intelligence Directorate, Iosif Constantin Drăgan, Gustav Pordea, romanian and hunagrian emigration, secret influence

Alexandre de Marenches,¹ former head of the French secret service, said: *"The intelligence work is a sort of constant puzzle game that is multi-shaped and diverse, incessantly taken to pieces and put together again [...]. The information gathering consists in the fact that it is always and everywhere necessary to look for a mosaic that others in the center of the same service try to gather to assemble the puzzle. The big difficulty stems from the fact that while you manage to cover the empty areas with new pieces, the game changes, it is on the move without a break."*²

Organization and goals of Romanian intelligence

A pattern similar to the research on the topic had to be followed in order to get somewhat of a picture of the activities of Romanian intelligence against Hungarian emigration. In this study, we try to give an insight into the exploration of locations in Italy and France, based on the archived organizational and operational documents of the Romanian Intelligence. These documents, however, limit the opportunities for research. During the processing, we kept temporal linearity in mind, but we also focused on understanding the operational methods, tools and logic of the contemporary Romanian intelligence agencies.

¹ Alexandre de Marenches (1921-1995) Director-General of the French Counter-Intelligence and Foreign Documentation Service (SDECE) from 1970 to 1981.

² OCKRENT, Christine– DE MARENCHES, Alexandre: *Consilier de taină al Puterii (Secret Adviser to the Powers That Be)*; Humanitas, București, 1992. p. 114.

At the end of World War II, the Romanian services were organizations that liaised with the French, British, and Germans and were familiar with the methods of elite intelligence schools. With the historical turn in the zone, the Romanian specialized services, like the national secret services in all other Soviet-occupied states, were reorganized by the Soviets along two lines. Along the military line, reorganization of the National Ministry of Defense (MApN) started in 1947 reached the stage of the Soviet model by 1951. The then Second Intelligence Department was transformed into the Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff (Direction Informații the Marelui Stat Major), which became the military intelligence agency and becomes known as the Army Intelligence Directorate (DIA).

The Directorate-General for Public Safety (DGSP - Directorate-General of Securității Poporului) established in 1948 under the Ministry of the Interior in 1967. It also followed the Soviet pattern to guide the State Security Council (CSS), just like the State Security Department (DSS) established in 1977. These structures coordinated the acquisition of political and military information. For a short time in the early fifties, Securitate was a ministry independent of the Ministry of the Interior.

In the area of intelligence, Department A existed within the Securitate in 1948, which was succeeded in 1954 by Foreign Intelligence Directorate Ia (Direction Ia Informații Externe), and by the Foreign Intelligence Directorate (DGIE) in 1963, and in the late 1960s it operated as Directorate I of Foreign Intelligence (DIE I) and from 1972, with an expanded remit but under the same name, Directorate of Foreign Intelligence (DIE). After Ion Mihai Pacepa escaped in 1978, the former Foreign Intelligence Directorate was renamed Foreign Intelligence Center (CIE) described before. For a short time, intelligence and counter-intelligence agencies, which had been operating as independent ministries for a short time, were formally placed under the Minister of the Interior from the late 1940s to 1989 and foreign intelligence was placed under the Council of Ministers for some time. Apart from all that, during the Ceausescu-period, i.e. from 1965 to 1989 all these agencies directly reported to Romania's leader number one, to the commander-in-chief of the Romanian armed forces.³

³ For a more detailed overview of the organizational history of the secret services, see BANU, Florian – ȚĂRANU, Liviu: Securitatea 1948-1989. Monografie vol I. (The Securitate 1948-1989, Monograph, Vol. I.); Editura Cetatea de Scaun, Târgoviște, 2016; BANU, Florian – BARBULESCU, Theodor– DUICA, Camelia Ivan – ȚĂRANU, Liviu: Archives Securității. (Archives of the Securitate) Volume 1. Editura Pro-Historia, București, 2002.; NEAGOIE, Elis – PLEȘA, Liviu: Arhivele Securității (Archives of the Securitate). Volume 2. Editura Nemira, Bucharest, 2004; DOBRE, Florica – BANU, Florian – DUICĂ, Camelia – MOLDOVAN Silviu B. – ȚĂRANU Liviu: Trupele de Securitate (1949–1989). (Securitate Troops [1949-1989]). Editura Nemira, Bucharest, 2004; TRONCOTĂ Cristian: Duplicitarii. The history of the intelligence and security services of Romania 1965-1989. (The two-faced. The history of the security and secret services of the Romanian communist system). Editura Elion, Bucharest, 2003; OPREA, Marius: Banalitatea răului. O istorie a Securității în documente (1949-1989). (The Banality of Evil. The History of the Securitate in Sources [1948-1949]). Polirom, București, 2002; SRI: Cartea Albă a Securității. (White Paper of the Securitate) 1-6. bind. SRI, Bucharest, 1994-97. TRONCOTĂ, Cristian: History of the state security services of Romania. (History of the Romanian State Security Services). Ion Cristoiu, Bucharest, 1999; WILLIAMS, Kieran – DELETANT, Dennis: Security Intelligence Services In New Democracies: The Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania. Palgrave, London – New York,

The Soviets, officially stationed in Romania until 1964, "reformed" the Romanian services with the intent to make them attached to the Soviet state security services and to be able to hold them under control, respectively. With the beginning of the withdrawal of the Soviet military troops in 1958, the total subordination of the Romanian state security agencies came to an end and the fight against Romanian émigré groups was given greater emphasis in the intelligence demand of the Romanian intelligence agency. The intelligence objectives set in the period of Soviet occupation virtually remained the same, namely the gathering of political, military economic and social information, acquisition of scientific-technical information, the mapping of the emigration (including emigration of ethnic Hungarians as well), demoralization and not least the execution of illegal operations.⁴

The activity against Hungarian emigration was justified by the Romanian intelligence service on the grounds that the Hungarian irredentists contradicts the history of Romanian origin in its historical conception. Beyond this ideological framework, Romanian intelligence wanted at all times and in all historical periods to know what kind of activities Hungarians emigrants who fled from either Hungary or Romania pursue that may be construed as anti-Romanian that could have harmed the interests of the prevailing Romanian political leadership.

Shortly after the 1956 revolution, intelligence agents were sent to the capitalist countries with the mission of assisting Romanian intelligence operations in the West in the long run. Mihai Caraman, who, as head of the Romanian residency in Paris, shook NATO with his agents infiltrated in the 1960s,⁵ the first successful agent being deployed in the West was through Hungary in 1958. He recruited and deployed in Vienna a monk, one of the close coworkers of Bishop Áron Márton, first to work with Cardinal Franz König of Vienna, and then sent him to the United States via Canada for a long-term deployment.⁶

2001; PELIN, Mihai: *Culisele spionajului românesc, DIE 1955–1980*. (Scenes of Romanian Intelligence, DIE 1955–1980). Editura Evenimentul Românesc, București, 1997.

⁴ In 1951, taking advantage of the World Youth Meeting in East Berlin, Romanian intelligence abducted Magos Constanța, political refugee, and Teodor Bucur, a professor at Humboldt University with the help of the Stasi. In 1958, Traian Puiu, one of the leaders of the legionary movement, was deceived into Vienna and transported to Budapest through Budapest, wrapped in a carpet. In 1958, Romanian intelligence carried out a punitive action against Oliviu Beldeanu. Beldeanu played a leading role in the 1955 attack on the Romanian embassy in Geneva.

⁵ In the autumn of 1958, Mihai Caraman began his intelligence activities at Romania's commercial office in Paris. He led the Romanian rezidentura in Paris for 11 years, during which time he recruited a number of NATO officials. Its established network included Imre Nahit, Head of Financial Control, Robert van de Wiehle, Francis Roushille, French Foreign Officer Pierre Rocheron, Sylvie Dagiun, Nuclear Planning Team, and Colonel Charles de la Salle, Intelligence Officer at the French Ministry of Defense. Caraman's network collapsed in 1969, when his Deputy, Captain Ioan Iacobescu switched sides to MI6 and exposed them. The network, which was built in a short time, provided documentation of the military technical development of several NATO member states, NATO's mobilization plans for a possible Soviet attack, and other top-secret material, a total of nearly 3,000 documents. The recruitment of Charles Hernu, who later served as Minister of Defense in the Mitterrand government, can also be linked to Caraman.

⁶ BANU, Florian: *Mihai Caraman, and spion român în războiul rece*. (Mihai Caraman, a Romanian spy in the Cold War). Editura Corint, Bucharest, 2019. pp. 95-97. Caraman did

In peacetime after the Second World War, just like the world's secret services, the Romanian state security services also adopted the practice of spreading false information, i.e. the disinformation and methods and splitting social groups. Under the motto "divide et impera" they not only set social groups on the domestic political stage against each other, but also communities forced into emigration. The year 1964 marked a turning point in Romanian intelligence in dealing with the issue of emigration. Alexandru Drăghici⁷ Minister of Interior proclaimed the principle of total intelligence against emigration.⁸ The background to this turnaround was that, from 1958, citizens who left Romania permanently were not always deprived of their nationality, and the diplomatic missions concerned registered those who had arrived in that country. They did this with the intention of starting a targeted organization based on the register and involving those involved in their events, as well as providing them with press materials on Romania. However, the proclaimed principle was not as successful as its planners had dreamed of, as emigrants living in the free world were organized according to their own needs and all their institutions could not be brought under the control of the communist dictatorship. It cannot be ignored in the zone that over the years, Romanian intelligence has managed to plant or recruit agents in a number of emigrant organizations.

The Intelligence Service used members of the emigrant groups in extremely varied forms to achieve its goals. University students, professors, journalists, entrepreneurs, army officers, engineers, writers and many other freelance intellectuals were induced to cooperate in some way or other with the Romanian state security services. Through archival research, which is not only based on memories and opinions of the officers or collaborators, we can gain a better insight into those sources than contemporary professionals and new and previously unknown operational details are revealed. This self-confidence based on the records can, however, be deceptive, because the archival sources do not include the daily routine of the career intelligence officers and the mission-oriented improvisations falling outside the domain of the pertinent regulations.

Romanian emigration presented a constant challenge for the specialized services of the Ceaușescu dictatorship, as intellectuals and economists in emigration had a serious potential for influence in the host states. The opinions of emigrant leaders of authority had a serious impact on the emigration communities of other states as well. Therefore, the groups of emigrants referred to above became prime targets of discrediting and divisive operations at a time when increasingly frequent and

not name the person who the story was about and the agent died in a car accident shortly after arriving in the USA.

⁷ Colonel-General Alexandru Drăghici (1913-1993). A member of the illegal communist movement, he was convicted in 1936 in the Ana Pauker trial. The rivalry between Ceaușescu and Drăghici had already begun. After Romania switched sides in August 1944, he led the party organization in the Romanian capital. From 1952 he was Minister of the Interior, between 1953 and 1957 he was the head of the Ministry of State Security, and from 1957 to 1965 he was again Minister of the Interior. Ceaușescu, who came to power in 1965, launched an investigation into past crimes (trials against the Patrascanu group and other communists). In 1968, he was deprived of his rank as commander-in-chief and relieved of all party and state positions. He retired as a company director in 1972.

⁸ NEMETZI, Cornel: *Ultimul curier ilegal. Memoriile unui spion român*. (The last illegal courier. Memoirs of a Romanian spy). Editura Marist, Baia Mare, 2013. p. 484.

widespread solidarity movements started all over the world in support of those who suffered under communist regimes. Human rights movements starting in the seventies were recorded in the Helsinki Final Act in 1975, thus the political and economic lobbying of Romanian dissident groups establishing themselves in various western states posed a serious risk to Romania's separate policy.⁹ Another important aspect is that the Securitate's operatives working among the emigrant groups were aware how receptive international publicity towards the positions and opinions of national emigrant groups, and they were also aware how their leaders related to the policies of the People's Republic of Romania.

By opting out of the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia, Nicolae Ceaușescu, who pretended to be an independent politician, was in fact trying to have the importance of his own personality accepted, emphasizing that he was a key player on the international political stage. His good relations with China and Israel were intended to demonstrate this.¹⁰ Good relations with the Soviet Union remained until 1989, and even the transfer of COCOM-listed materials and joint intelligence cooperation were continuous.¹¹ Ceaușescu, relying on the goodwill of the West, consistently adhered to the policy of a "state independent of the Soviet Union". During this period, Romanian intelligence was given the constant task of maintaining that image through active measures. One of the elements of this strategy was to influence Romanian emigration and to counterbalance the activities of Hungarian emigration. Western journalists and high-impact emigration centers were sought to work together to strengthen the image of independence. Thus, *Le Figaro's* deputy director, Michel P. Hamelet, was used to write an article praising Ceaușescu and his system.¹² So did *Vesitorul*, a paper of the Romanian emigrants in France, the *Dreptatea* of the Romanian emigrants in the USA, and *Stindartul*, the paper of the Romanian community active in the FRG.¹³ These contained discrediting and misleading information mainly about thinkers forced to emigrate, such as Paul Goma, Monica Lovinescu, and Vlad Georgescu. About them, the Securitate suggested that they cooperated with the Romanian communist special services.

In the operations of Romanian intelligence, it is not always clear whether they served the interests of contemporary Romania or the dictator, but the intrusion of intelligence serving the system into Romanian dissident communities was clearly done to refine the negative image of the dictatorship. This was one of the areas including the control and influencing the historical research and publications related to the history of Romania. The contemporary Romanian intelligence carried out a number of operations against Hungarian emigrants as part of this mission.

⁹ ALDEA, Patricia González: *Helsinki 1975. Începutul sfârșitului. Degradation regimens in Romania and singularity in the Bloc de Est (1975–1990)*. (Helsinki 1975. *The Beginning of the End. The Decline and Uniqueness of the System in the Eastern Bloc [1975–1990]*). Editura Curtea Veche, Bucharest, 2008.

¹⁰ WOLTON, Thierry: *K.G.B.-ul in Franta (The KGB in France)*. Humanitas, București, 1992. p. 238.

¹¹ FUNDERBURK, David B.: *Un-American Ambassador to the Department of the Communist Republic of Romania 1981–1985*. Editura Dacon, Constanța, 1994. pp. 59-75. Funderburk, the US ambassador to Bucharest, pulls the cover step by step away from Ceaușescu's mythology of independence.

¹² WOLTON op. cit. pp. 292-293.

¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 297.

The Italian line

The double life of Iosif Constantin Drăgan

On the Italian line, too, Romanian intelligence achieved great success thanks to Iosif Constantin Drăgan. Known as a successful businessman in Italy, Drăgan was an ardent secret agent of Securitate, who was involved in carrying out operations within the Romanian community in Italy in the 1960s and later continued to operate internationally. He was considered a successful Italian businessman on the one hand, and he wrote and disseminated international protochronist¹⁴ historical works, on the other. The intelligence activities of the Janus-faced entrepreneur were European in scale. The archival resources kept in ACNSAS can expand the image of the person in question and Romanian intelligence so far. It is not necessary to present a detailed history of the development of protochronism from its appearance in 1941 appearance to the Edgar Papu, who historically supported the nationalism of the Ceaușescu period, as we learn about Constantin Drăgan's double life and the role of Romanian communist power and international emigration in history, new dimensions of agency existence unfold before us. However, due to the complexity of the issue, we cannot present here a detailed analysis of the rich public life, public policy, cultural, literary, religious and other aspects of Drăgan's actions.

Iosif Constantin Drăgan was born in Lugos on 1917 as a Hungarian citizen. His father had his own tannery, which he ran until his death in 1946. Iosif graduated from the Faculty of Law of the University of Bucharest and then studied at the Academy of Commerce in Milan in 1939, where he also earned a PhD degree in economics.

Early in his studies, he became involved in Italian business and did not even return to his homeland. As a successful businessman, he first became a shareholder and then a majority owner of the Dacia oil company. After 1948, it engaged in extremely dynamic and diversified economic and commercial activities, soon setting up a number of companies producing, processing and transporting solid and liquid hydrocarbons. Among others, Butane Gas in 1948,

Petrol Chimica in 1951, and Fingas and Dragochimica in 1954. These companies had an extensive network of subsidiaries in Spain, Austria, the Federal Republic of Germany, Morocco, Greece, Belgium and South Africa. He acquired a monopoly on the Italian liquefied natural gas market and have played a significant shareholder role in several of the states already mentioned. By the early 1960s, he already had more than \$ 50 million in capital investment in these markets. Thanks to the commercial success of major Italian and international organizations he received an invitation in

¹⁴ Protochronism, a school of thought in 20th century Romanian historiography, was rooted in the traditionalism of the two world wars, warned of the dangers of Western thought and subjugation, and resolutely opposed cosmopolitan ideas. After the Second World War, in the 1970s, Ceaușescu became a hallmark of the official historical ideology in Romania, according to which Romanian culture took precedence over all other cultures. His nationalism is based on the so-called Dacology and Thracology. The methodological representative of modern Romanian protochronism was Edgar Papu, who in his 1974 study systematically presented the Romanian technical and scientific innovations that preceded Europeans. Protochronism is the historical school in Romania that survived the regime change and still exists today.

UCITS: until 1957, then became president of the Italian gas extracting Syndicate from 1952 to 1958, President of the Chamber of Commerce in Italy. The weight of his influence is well indicated by the fact that in 1957 he was present at the birth of the Treaty of Rome, which created the Common Market.

Constantin Drăgan was first contacted by Romanian intelligence in 1958,¹⁵ and this relationship developed along different interests, but it was still a success. After initial operational inspections, an extremely fruitful relationship developed between Drăgan and intelligence through a light conversation. The oil magnate earlier flirting with the legionary movement was employed under the codename "Dunăreanu" since 1958, then in the early '70s his codename was changed to "Olteanu". Depending on whether Drăgan was in Italy or France, he was contacted by a territorially competent and undercover intelligence officer. Thus, his activities in France were supported and assisted by three agents, and Securitate influenced and controlled him through them.¹⁶ His direct contact was a resident of France.

In return for supporting the relatives of the influential businessman who remained in Transylvania, he cooperated with Romanian intelligence so that Romania could buy petroleum equipment from the Italian company Eni at a discounted price. During the bilateral talks he provided preliminary data on the intentions of the Italian party so as to give the Romanian party an appropriate bargaining position. Drăgan later agreed to hand over the technical documentation for high-octane gasoline and rocket fuel, as well as Vatican briefings on the eastern opening, which he received from Cardinal Tisserant.¹⁷ Acquisition of the Borgward Arabella car manufacturing license, which would have been the basis for the first Romanian car production, was not successful despite Drăgan's best efforts and the two parties could not agree. Already in the first half of the sixties, Drăgan gained serious recognition among

Romanian party leaders, and in 1964 he sent gifts (paintings, watches) through couriers to the leaders of the RCP: Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej, party secretary general, Ion Gheorghe Maurer and Prime Minister Nicolae Ceausescu.¹⁸

Drăgan, over many years, built up a scientific network, in addition to economic and political relations in Europe, related to historical research, manufacturing and distribution. The most important organization of this network of 47 people was the Fundația Europeană Drăgan (Drăgan European Foundation), set up in 1964 in Palma de Mallorca. By the end of the 1970s, the foundation had branches in Rome, Munich, Paris, Palma de Mallorca, Montreal, Boston and Athens.¹⁹ The network delivered its propaganda materials to 4000 addresses (private persons worldwide, universities, libraries, etc.).²⁰ Although the organization's statutes provided that it worked on establishing the common European consciousness, in practice it dealt with cultural

¹⁵ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 99.

¹⁶ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 99.

¹⁷ Cardinal Eugène-Gabriel-Gervais-Laurent Tisserant (1884-1972) was ordained a priest in 1907, and in 1936 he was appointed Cardinal by Pope Pius XI. He represented France in the Vatican. Secretary of the Congregation for the Eastern Churches from 1936 to 1959. Member of the Cardinal Presidency of the Second Vatican Council.

¹⁸ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 12. pp. 3-4.

¹⁹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. 80/1.

²⁰ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 15. p. 266.

activities (conferences, seminars, publications, exhibitions) between the eastern and western Latin countries (the so-called "Romanities"). Historical works under his name were constantly published,²¹ in which he deals with the history of the Daco-Romanian origin.²² A significant part of the publications enjoyed the support of the Romanian communist regime, so these works showed a significant resemblance in content and style to the official Romanian national-communist conception of history. In addition to his monographic works, he published a permanent paper in Milan entitled *Europa și neamul românesc* (Europe and the Romanian Nation). Writings published in it dealt with the establishment of a "Great Europe" also including states in the eastern part of the continent, claiming that these states have always been part of Europe, and have made their contribution to European civilization, and the idea of Romania being the most Latinized island in the easternmost part of Europe was often voiced in them. Drăgan, with a background in the legionary movement,²³ never hid his views on Hungarians, including emigrant Hungarians. In general, he responded extremely impulsively when Hungarian emigration groups and organizations carried out educational and awareness-raising activities. It is not surprising that in 1965, in the journal *Exile et Liberté*²⁴ in an article on the Hungarian Revolution, the mere mention of Trianon sent the Italian magnate of Romanian origin into a fit of rage. He informed the director of the journal in so many details on the historical "reality", who indicated that the publication of the article did not aim to discredit Romania, and all that only happened because of lack of knowledge of historical facts.²⁵

By 1967, Drăgan's relationship with the Romanian authorities had become so intimate that, at the initiative of the Securitate, negotiations had begun for his return. The Italian businessman refused to settle for less than meeting Ceaușescu. By the early 1970's, Drăgan moved away from the extreme right-wing exile groups, and in parallel with this, in 1971 he started a series of visits in Romania. The intelligence leadership, the Doicaru²⁶ – Pacepa²⁷ Couple decided to support Agent "Olteanu" in the long run.

²¹ Some of them: DRĂGAN, Iosif Constantin: *Europa și romanitatea. Hispanitatea și romanitatea. (Europe and Romance countries. Hispanics and Romance countries)* 1966; *În serviciul Europei. (At the service of Europe).* 1971; *Românii din Istria. (The Istrian Romanians)* 1973; *România – țara a două lumi. (Romania – a country of two worlds)* 1973. *Autobiography: La mia Italia.* Editor Franco Orlandi, Milan, 1990. Published in collaboration with ODOBLE, Ștefan: *The Birth of Generalized Cybernetics on Romanian Soil.* Nagard, Milan, 1995; *History of Românilor. (History of the Romanians).* Ed. Europa Nova, Bucharest, 1994.

²² ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. 80/2.

²³ The Legionnaire movement is the Romanian version of European fascism.

²⁴ Founded on 1 January 1955, the newspaper was published by the Association for the Protection of Oppressed Peoples (UDPO). The director of the paper is the Russian-French François de Romainville, originally named Arsène Goulevitch.

²⁵ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 8. pp. 105-106.

²⁶ Colonel-General Nicolae Doicaru (1922-1990). From 1963 he was promoted to lieutenant general in 1966 by the head of the Directorate General of Foreign Intelligence and the Secretary General of the Ministry of the Interior. He remained head of intelligence for 18 years.

²⁷ Lieutenant General Ion Mihai Pacepa (1928–2021). From 1959 he became Deputy Head of the Securitate German Territories (Germany, Austria - later expanded to Northern European States) department. Colonel from 1963, Major General from 1967. In 1972, he represented the interests of intelligence as Secretary of State in the Consiliul Securității Statului (CSS) of the Ministry of the Interior, and was also Deputy Head of the Intelligence Directorate. In

Distinguished Romanian historians (academician Constantin C. Giurescu – "Iosif Mundescu") sent or invited to historical conferences organized through his Foundation and its research centers in Venice and Salzburg²⁸ or historian Randa Alexandru) supported Drăgan's aims in accordance with the requirements of the regime. In addition, agents in four states (Italy, France, Spain, Austria) were trained to provide support for the Italian magnate's "counterintelligence" activities.²⁹

He worked hard to make economic and social circles of the Hungarian emigrant centers in Italy impossible.³⁰ His cooperation with Romanian intelligence in countering Hungarian emigration proved to be proactive. In 1967, his contact officer reports that "*Constantin Drăgan pointed out that an increasing number of institutions in the West appear, which explicitly or implicitly propagate irredentism concerning Transylvania. He requests that, in order to defeat these institutions, no matter how, but provide him with materials on the atrocities committed during the Hungarian administration in Transylvania, which he would publish.*"³¹ In addition to the technical assistance he constantly urged his extensive network of researchers to find historical sources so that he could place them in his volumes and educational periodicals and publications and with more and more certain data prove the Romanian people's historical primacy in Transylvania. So in 1967 his contact officer reported that he held a little surprise in store for the Hungarians, as a Greek Catholic priest in the Vatican, Carol Capros was doing research for such resources in the archives of the Vatican. In this fight, his strategy is: "*As is well known, the best defense is attack, and therefore Hungarians should be intimidated. If I and others show that Romania has always existed up to the Tisza, then their desire to demand Romanian territories will go away.*"³² In 1970, according to Romanian intelligence, the NGO working with the Council of Europe, in addition to the Basque, Breton and Catalan minorities, "began to deal with the affairs of Hungarians, and it is feared that the issue of recognizing Hungarians may be brought before the council. The organizations of Hungarians living in exile prepared to hold a conference on the issue of Transylvania in Montreal". Drăgan left no stone unturned to obtain more information on the cautious Hungarians in London, and set about to discredit the Hungarian conference, i.e. he started to organize and publish thematic articles, conferences, which propagated the official Romanian position on history history.³³

In 1976, Drăgan established the Centrul European de Studii Tracice (European Center for Thracian Studies) and in 1978 set up the Italian-Romanian Chamber of Commerce in Milan. The Drăgan Foundation also had branches in other states, such as a Romanian lecture hall in Austria (Salzburg) and a research office in Spain. Both researched the history, culture and literature of Romania, and especially the Daco-Romanian continuity theory. In Venice, he set up a research center called the Centrul

1974, as Lieutenant General, he was the immediate commander of Nicolae Pleșiță, Secretary-General for the Interior and First Deputy Minister for the Interior, and also a candidate for the position of Chief of Intelligence. In July 1978, he traveled to the FRG, where he applied for and received political asylum from the United States.

²⁸ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 13.p. 80.

²⁹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol.13. pp. 77-80.

³⁰ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 16. pp. 187-189.

³¹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 12. p. 21.

³² ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 12. p. 60.

³³ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 13. p. 99.

Internațional de Studii asupra Tracilor to study the Thracian heritage and its impact on the peoples. In addition to research and processing, the foundation also edited and distributed a press conference publication throughout Europe.^{34,35} He also conducted serious thracologic activity to make sure that the above-mentioned history of origins is embedded in international and Romanian social history awareness. With the volume *Noi, tracii și istoria noastră multimilenară* (We, Thracians and our thousands of years of history) and with the journal *Noi, tracii* (We, Thracians), he revived the thracological ideas between the two world wars. The Ceaușescu dictatorship gave him the opportunity to take part in Second Thracological conference held in Bucharest on 4-6 September 1976 where he read a lecture. In the *Noi, Tracii* the periodical of the Thracology Historical Research Institute of Venice, he propagated thracology as a refutation of Eduard Rösler's theory.³⁵ Active support from the Romanian intelligence was behind the publication of certain works and publications. "The second volume of the *Noi, tracii* series, *Buletin circular tracologic* (1974–1976) (Thracological Circular) and *Noi, tracii* 23 and 24 Numbers dedicated to the Thracological Congress; thanks to our influencing operations," reads a transcript of the Romanian intelligence authorities dated 7 August 1976.³⁶ Drăgan at this point had been registered under the codename "Olteanu" for years, he was both a collaborative network member and he was also under extreme surveillance, that is, he was an agent subject to constant monitoring. As early as in the 1960's, officers of the Romanian intelligence Rezidentura in Italy sent reports of great appreciation of him, highlighting his extraordinary intelligence potentials. The Ceaușescu dictatorship after 1965 also connived at the fact that that his parents' house in Lugoj would be the seat of the Uniunea de Tracologie, (Association of Thracology), it was in fact designated by the local authorities. Drăgan never renounced his Romanian citizenship, so he asked the authorities to have his own permanent address in Romania. His international contacts were remarkable, and this is what the Romanian secret services built on. Europe-wide known personalities were in close contact with him, such as French President Valéry Giscard d'Estaing,³⁷ Giuseppe Pella with the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs,³⁸ Harold MacMillan, the British prime minister,³⁹ Minister of Health Enoch Powell,⁴⁰ as well as a number of high-ranking church leaders of the Vatican.

³⁴ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 80/3.

³⁵ Eduard Robert Rösler (1836–1874), Austrian historian. According to his migration theory, the cradle of the Romanian people lay south of the Danube, which he then abandoned and migrated north.

³⁶ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 16. p. 216.

³⁷ Valéry Giscard d'Estaing (1926-2020) is a French conservative politician.

³⁸ Giuseppe Pella (1902-1981) is an Italian Christian Democrat politician. Prime Minister from 1953 to 1954. In the 1950s and 1960s, he was, among others, Minister of Finance and Minister of Foreign Affairs. Between 1954 and 1956, after the death of Alcide de Gasperi, Pella also served as President of the European Parliament. From 1968 to 1972, he chaired the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Italian Senate, and for a short time was Minister of Finance in the government headed by Giulio Andreotti.

³⁹ Harold MacMillan (1894-1986), British Conservative politician, head of government between 1957 and 1963.

⁴⁰ John Enoch Powell (1912-1998) is an English conservative politician. From 1950 to 1974, he was a member of the British Parliament in conservative colors. Minister of Health from 1960 to 1963. From 1974 he transferred to the ranks of the Ulster Unionist Party. Prior to his career as a politician, Powell was a researcher in the field of ancient sciences and was an appointed Greek university professor in Australia at the age of 25. He served as an

In the 1970s, Drăgan continued his business in Romania even more spectacularly. At his suggestion and initiative, the Romanian-French Chamber of Commerce was set up in Paris in 1977.⁴¹ Romanian intelligence was also aware that this was not only about Drăgan's patriotic feelings, but also about his own personal interests. They knew that he had also used the opportunities created by Romanian foreign policy to gain a foothold in the market. For Drăgan, therefore, this opportunity served as a kind of safety valve during the period of economic divorce in Western countries.⁴² He regularly supported the foreign trade interests of the Romanian dictatorship, and during his visits to Romania he became acquainted with the leaders of intelligence (Nicolae Doicaru, Ion Mihai Pacepa), the party (Nicolae Ceaușescu, Ștefan Andrei) and also the leaders of the Ministry of Interior (Teodor Coman, Tudor Posteln). During these meetings, Drăgan informed them of his plans to develop Romania's foreign relations, including the establishment of the Dacomex joint foreign trade company in Paris with the aim of promoting the communist state in the capitalist world and at the same time spreading the idea of thracology. At these high-level meetings, they also discussed the interests of Romanian state security in Drăgan's activities, the direction in which he should continue to maintain the community of interests. The tangible evidence of the alienation of the "exiled" millionaire is the historical volumes published in the West, in which he conveyed the official propaganda of the dictatorship and the "truths" of socialist Romanian historiography. For in the 1970s (after a relative ideological loosening), Romanian official historiography entered a period of new myth-making, the history of the Dacian genesis.⁴³

Drăgan not only published thracologic works showing the ancient origins of Romanians other works in capitalist countries, but in the Romanian Socialist Republic as well. The support of the Writers' Union is further evidence of the symbiotic relationship between the Romanian millionaire established in Italy and the Ceaușescu dictatorship. In the 1970s, a number of Romanian publications competed to present Drăgan's professional and literary work with bombastic accolades. September 1, 1973 j on the *Luceafărul* literary journal, Mihai Gafița described him as "*a representative of the European spirit, cooperation and understanding among the states*".⁴⁴ On June 24, 1974, even the *Scînteia*, the official daily newspaper of the dictatorship, published a voluminous article by Ion Brad, elevating Drăgan's literary and historical work to the same level as that of Ion Creangă and Nicolae Iorga.⁴⁵ The praise series was continued by Dumitru Berciu, who noted in article placed in the literary journal *Prefață* on 27 January 1976, that the reader will find the ideas in the book entitled *Noi Tracii* that he has always craved for, that correspond to the historic reality of the Thracian world and contemporary Romanian historiography.⁴⁶ The same Berciu

intelligence officer during World War II and was already a brigadier general at the age of 30.

⁴¹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 2.

⁴² ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 16. p. 241.

⁴³ GOERGESCU Vlad: *History and Politics. Cazul comuniștilor români. 1944–1977. (History and Politics. Cases of Romanian Communists. 1944–1977.)* Editura Humanitas, București, 1991. pp. 6-66.

⁴⁴ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 12.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. pp. 16-17.

considered that the *Prin Europa* (via Europe) published by Drăgan in February 1977 could be considered a reinterpretation of Romanian national history.⁴⁷

It may have been a great honor and recognition for the famous Romanian intellectuals to receive invitations from the Drăgan Foundation. A series of lectures was given in Venice between 27 May and 2 June 1974, in which Marin Sorescu,⁴⁸ Ana Blandiana,⁴⁹ Alexandru Căprariu,⁵⁰ Edgar Papu,⁵¹ Eugen Jebeleanu⁵² were the Romanian guests. The announced goal of the event was to offer new opportunities for literary writers who have already gained recognition in domestic circles for their international appearance. The Drăgan Foundation also provided accommodation, meals and publicity for the event. The travel expenses were covered by the Romanian Writers' Union.

In late 1977, Drăgan wrote an account of the fruitful collaboration that had existed for years between the Romanian Writers' Union and him. On the occasion of

⁴⁷ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. pp. 17-18.

⁴⁸ Romanian writer Marin Sorescu (1936-1996). In 1960, he graduated with a degree in Modern Languages from Alexandru Ioan Cuza University in Iași. He was a member of the International Writers Program at the University of Iowa. In 1964 he began his career as a writer with a volume of parodies of Singur printre poeți (Alone among Poets). He published an additional 23 volumes until his death. In 1992 he became a member of the Romanian Academy.

⁴⁹ Ana Blandiana (1942–) poet, writer, journalist. He holds a degree in humanities from Babeș-Bolyai University in Cluj-Napoca. In 1959, his first poems appeared in the columns of the Tribuna. Between 1968 and 1974, he worked for several literary magazines, including Viața Studențească and Amfiteatru. From 1975 he was a librarian in Bucharest, from 1977 to 1979 he was an editor at the Romanian Writers' Association. In December 1989, he was a member of the interim leadership of the National Rescue Front. He resigned from this title on 29 January 1990 and founded the Alianța Civică (Civic Association), of which he was chairman until 2001. Fundația Academică Civică (Civic Association Foundation), Honorary President of the Romanian PEN Club. He has been a corresponding member of the Romanian Academy since 2016.

⁵⁰ Alexandru Căprariu (1929–1988), a Romanian philosopher. From 1957 to 1969 he worked for the Tribuna Literary Journal. In 1969, he became the publishing director of Dacia. For the last 12 years of his life, he worked again for the Tribunal.

⁵¹ Edgar Papu (1908–1993) is a Romanian essayist, literary critic and university professor. He obtained his degree in humanities in 1932, was a student at the University of Vienna from 1930 and then studied at the Istituto Interuniversitario Italiano in Florence from 1932. From 1936 to 1944 he taught Latin, French, German, Italian and Romanian as a secondary school teacher in Iași. From 1945 he was professor of aesthetics at the University of Bucharest until he was removed from the university in 1951 because of his ecclesiastical worldview. After a short absence, he returned to university in 1953 and taught comparative linguistics. He was arrested in 1961 and sentenced to 8 years. He was released in 1964 and writes his works on protochronism far from his university world: *Călătoriile Renașterii* (1967), *Din clasicii noștri* (1977). After his death, in 2006 he became a post mortem member of the Romanian Academy.

⁵² Poet Eugen Jebeleanu (1911–1991). He graduated as a lawyer from the University of Bucharest. In 1932 he became a member of the Romanian Writers' Association and published in several literary and public journals: *Adevărul*, *Dimineata*, *Cuvantul liber*. From 1939 to 1945 he worked as a clerk in the Press Directorate. He has been a corresponding member of the Romanian Academy since 1955. He received the Etna-Taormina Prize in Catania in 1971 and was awarded the Herder Prize in 1973.

the centenary of Romania's independence⁵³ he published a book in Bucharest entitled *Idealuri și destine* (Ideals and Fates), which should have been published in Hungarian by Kriterion in accordance with the central instructions. However, Géza Domokos, the publisher's director, prevented this. Drăgan emphasized that publication of the book in Hungarian had become so necessary that "(...) to reduce the chauvinistic spirit controlled by the Catholic Church, the impenetrable Alba Iulia closed circuit, as well as the foreign and Hungarian (i.e. working inside Hungary) radio stations, that are widely listened to in Transylvania."⁵⁴ For him, it was even more offensive that Kriterion Publishing House led by Domokos published 100 thousand copies of a volume by András Sütő to make sure the book can reach Argentina, too – Drăgan recounted, at the same time it gave him satisfaction that the Hungarian Radio reported on his work in prime time.⁵⁵

His complex collaboration took place at the level of heads of intelligence and home affairs, and he used his position to arrange alien administration matters (return of citizenship, entry and exit visas, issue of passports, etc.) for his acquaintances. He was regularly received at the highest level. Nicolae Ceaușescu invited him twice, in August 1971 and June 1980. Ministers of Interior Teodor Coman and George Homoștean met with him in 1978 and 1980. Discussions covered sensitive topics such as the relationship of power to various emigration groups and the Western dissemination strategy of information about the Socialist Republic of Romania.⁵⁶

Drăgan felt so confident in his position that he challenged Gheorghiu Mihnea, President of the Academy of Social Sciences, about the fact that his (i.e. Drăgan's) thracological creative and publishing efforts were not valued high enough: "*Mr. President, this is how history is falsified before our eyes. On whose order did the Romanian publishers publish my four books, which caused great waves?*"⁵⁷ – stressed his own inevitability of the oil tycoon "trapped" in emigration. Nor did Drăgan spare Emil Manu, editor of the chronological dictionary of *Literatura Română* (Romanian Literature). He complained that Manu did not include Drăgan's publications.⁵⁸

Through the Nagard (Drăgan spelled backwards), that is his own publishing house, he propagated his own book in the West published in three languages under the title *Falșii Martiri maghiar* (False martyr Hungarians), including France (*Les faux*

⁵³ The Kingdom of Romania waged a war against the Ottoman Empire in 1877-78 with the help of the Russian Empire. The Congress of Berlin in 1878 determined the situation of the countries of the Balkan region. In the Kingdom of Romania, Charles I (Karl von Hohenzollern-Sigmaringen) became king after May 10, 1881, from which time we can speak of a Romanian constitutional monarchy.

⁵⁴ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. 28. Exile et Liberté was a monthly newspaper of the international expatriate organization Defense des Peuple Opprimés. see: <https://www.retronews.fr/search#allTerms=Exile%20et%20Libert%C3%A9&sort=score&publishedBounds=from&indexedBounds=from&tfHistoPeriods%5B0%5D=V%C3%A8%20r%Cque%A9puberli%5D=Mensuel&page=7&searchIn=article> (downloaded 24 November 2020)

⁵⁵ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 32.

⁵⁶ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. pp. 120-121.

⁵⁷ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 134.

⁵⁸ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 135.

hongrois)⁵⁹ and in English (*How to become a Hungarian*)⁶⁰, in which he claimed that one million Romanians in Transylvania had been Hungarianized by the Hungarian authorities and their identity documents had been falsified.⁶¹ In 1978, he sent his volume *How to become Hungarian* to US President Jimmy Carter and sent a detailed historical briefing in the attached letter on the “real” historical facts of Transylvania.⁶² The French publication Giscard d'Estaing also received the French-language publication, accompanied by a letter spiced with similar historical explanations.⁶³ Furthermore, Section 1, the economic and political intelligence section of Foreign Intelligence Center I, reorganized in 1979, after the escape of Pacepa, (UM -0199 military unit code), in cooperation with Section 4 in charge of countering the emigration, and other hostile activities (UM 0225), through two agents, influenced Drăgan to publish in his publications material exposing the hostile acts by dissident Paul Goma.⁶⁴

In the annual news demand referred to, Drăgan was tasked in an action plan of the section in charge of “countering emigration and hostile activities” to vet, one of the Romanian-born members of the U.S. Foreign Service, Șerban Vallimarescu, to find out the Ronald Reagan-led administration’s vision for Romania. Drăgan was ready to argue in negotiations with American diplomacy that Romania had acted as an independent and sovereign state both under the Warsaw Pact and in its relations with the Soviet Union. The purpose of his visit and talks in the United States was to convince the U.S. foreign leadership that the most favored nation status for Romania would continue to be maintained. Moreover, he has been tasked to contact Nicholas Andrews⁶⁵ and during the discussions, persuade the US side to support the continued maintenance of Romania's trade preferences. According to the news demand, in addition to command overseas, he was still employed on scientific, technical and economic lines with the aim of carrying out transactions that meet Romania's liquefied gas needs. He had to conduct political intelligence at the Council of Europe, the Common Market and the Vatican. In the field of international promotion of Romanian cultural policy, in line with the ideas of the Ceaușescu regime, “Olteanu” was instructed to publish certain works in a foreign language at his own expense. Of course, the cost of distribution was also borne by him. Here it is, among other things, about Volume 2 of *Noi, Tracii*. He undertook to translate the work into English and German, and received distribution assistance from the authorities, allowing him to give lectures on the volume on news agencies, television and universities.⁶⁶ Intelligence officers prepared “Olteanu” to support certain groups of Romanian colonies in support of the mainland’s national-communist policy line. His primary mandate was to influence personalities in charge of Romanian emigration, such as the philosopher Mircea Eliade (USA), the philosopher Emil Cioran (France), the literary

⁵⁹ TELKES, Simon: *Les faux hongrois: la multiplication artificielle d'un peuple*, Milan, Nagard, 1977.

⁶⁰ TELKES, Simon: *How to Become a Hungarian: The Artificial Reproduction of a People*, Rome: Edizioni Europa, 1977.

⁶¹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 28.

⁶² ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. pp. 84-85.

⁶³ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. pp. 86-87.

⁶⁴ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 147.

⁶⁵ Nicholas Andrews was Head of the US DOS State Secretariat, Directorate for the USSR and the European Socialist States.

⁶⁶ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. pp. 142-143.

translator, writer Aurel Răuță (Spain). The goal was to gain their support for the "Romanian cause" announced by Nicolae Ceausescu, that is the national protochronist communism, namely for his idea of ancient origins of the Romanian people and its priority over all other nations. Under the auspices of this, Drăgan was *tasked with* gathering young writers around the magazine *Noi, tracii*, who will be able to take over the paper from him, and will continue to ensure the constant and operative publication of materials favorable to the Romanian dictatorship.⁶⁷

As compensation for the agent's tasks, the Romanian intelligence agency tried to comply with Drăgan's requests, the never hindered or investigated his trading activities and tried to arrange bureaucratic administration quickly and favorably for him. Visa applications submitted by him or his close acquaintances were generally processed quickly. For example, when he requested a passport to be issued for writers and historians so that they could work for his Foundation, he gained immediate support from the Romanian authorities. In addition, intelligence intervened to obtain a temporary visa or, if necessary, a permanent permit to leave Romania for his relatives and family members.⁶⁸

According to the professional rules of intelligence, the agent was regularly inspected, his activities evaluated and his direction of action improved as necessary, they were provided with the necessary information, the results achieved, the pace of missions were jointly discussed and new specific tasks were assigned to him. In order to maintain a proper conspiracy milieu, Drăgan also occasionally received counter-intelligence training.

Using the classic method of deception, the Romanian secret services instilled confabulated information into extremist, right-wing groups of Romanian emigration, which Drăgan then passed on through his own publishing and distribution system. The question arises whether Drăgan was used as a tool when he *Vlad Georgescu la stalpi infamiei* (Vlad Georgescu at the pillar of infamy) edited by the agencies. The article made reference to a paper of the Romanian far-right groups in West Germany, the *Stindardul* and Drăgan's network disseminated moral-based false information, prepared by the Securitate, in Italy, France, Spain and Canada.⁶⁹

Drăgan involved many intellectuals in his symbiotic relationship with the communist regime, writers, lawyers, historians who formed a real network of contacts through the foundation. Separate research would be needed to answer whether these people were better motivated by Drăgan's money or friendship. The answer is by no means simple, but archival sources attest that his rich work as a writer relied on the wide network of social contacts and friends he built and maintained. A number of publications and conferences were prepared by intellectuals, experts living in exile (linguists, lawyers, historians) and local professionals working anonymously or under their own name to have quasi professional articles or books published under Drăgan's name. Thus, the number of literary and historical works of the businessman increased spectacularly in a short time. In 1983, Drăgan was convinced by historian Stefan Pascu to write a preface to the second volume referred to and thereby canonize

⁶⁷ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 143

⁶⁸ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 17. p. 143

⁶⁹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 45.

Volume 2 of *Noi Tracii*, which was published in Bucharest by Editura Științifică și Enciclopedică (Science and Encyclopedia Publishing).⁷⁰ Later, the work was included, with minor modifications, in the *volume Imperiul milenial* (The Millennial Empire), which received permission from Suzana Gâdea and was also published by the Scientific and Encyclopedic Publishing House in Bucharest. Eugen Barbu, a recognized writer of the dictatorship and an adviser to Drăgan convinced the oil magnate to republish *the history of Romanian literature from the beginning to the present day* (*Istoria Literaturii române de la Origine până în prezent*) by George Călinescu, Densușianu's Prehistoric *Dacia* (*Dacia preistorică*) and all the works of Mihai Eminescu at his own expense.⁷¹ The professional polemic that broke out in 1983 between Ion Lăncrănjan and György Száraz⁷² quickly crossed the borders of the Iron Curtain, and the secret propaganda war between the two states continued in the ranks of emigration. On the Romanian side, intelligence worked hard, in accordance with the interests of the dictatorship, to propagate their own historical reality through Drăgan's institutional network. According to a 1983 intelligence report, the Hungarian diplomatic mission in Italy, together with members of the emigration, were working there to prevent and counter the spread of Romanian propaganda. The news that the *Budapest newsletter* is being distributed in Hungarian, Russian and English by Hungarians was considered significant. This was also important since the said publication in its Issue 1982/160. included the study of György Száraz, published in the 1982 issue of *Reality*. Romanian intelligence learned that the Italian parliament, government, foreign ministry, press, news agencies and parties also received the publication. As a result of articles published in the Italian press, the *Panorama*, *L'Espresso* etc.⁷³

In 1984, the intelligence of the dictatorship expected Drăgan to deliver certain materials to the OSCE meeting in Madrid, as well as to financially support the publications of loyal groups of Romanian emigration, in his own publishing house, *Nagard*.⁷⁴ To counter all these, the Intelligence arranged exit visas for the persons designated by him and gave their consent to the completion of Drăgan's own house in Lugos. He also asked permission to drive his car freely despite the restrictions imposed in Romania (alternating use of cars with even or odd number plates).⁷⁵

There were also sometimes "misunderstandings" between the oil tycoon and Romanian intelligence. In 1982, Drăgan published a historical work in Italian with his own publisher that was not in line with the official theses of the "golden age" in

⁷⁰ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 44.

⁷¹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 45 (hereinafter v.)

⁷² In 1982, in the work of the Romanian writer, Ion Lăncrănjan, *Thoughts on Transylvania*, the author presented the history of Transylvania and the Hungarians in a distorted way. The repressive activities of the Hungarians arriving in Transylvania after the Romanians caused serious damage to the Romanian nation before Trianon. The author presented the phenomenon of revisionism, which became the official policy of Hungary after the Treaty of Trianon, and of interference in the internal affairs of Romania. In October 1982, György Száraz responded to the volume communicating the historical view of the Romanian Communist Party in his essay *About a Strange Book* published in the Hungarian monthly *Reality*. The debate continued in the following years.

⁷³ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 36.

⁷⁴ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. 14-14 .v.

⁷⁵ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. pp. 4-6.

Romania. In one chapter of *Dal paese di Dracula* (On the Land of Dracula), the student organizations of the period between the two world wars coincide with the legionary movement. The chapter seemed to present legionism in a neutral way, but overall with a positive tone. The author argued that there are similarities between the communist and legionary movements in both organization and ideology.⁷⁶ According to the author, “The Scout movement [...] was created to counterbalance the “Brotherhood of the Cross”⁷⁷ and “legionary nests”⁷⁸ influence on young people, who were practically a kind of “communist cells”.⁷⁹ It also attracted the attention of the Romanian intelligence service that Drăgan, in the July 1985 157 / 158 issue of *Europa și Neamt românesc* published a protest call of the Asociația pentru protecția monumentelor și a șezărilor istorice în România (Association for the Protection of Romanian Monuments and Historical Settlements) under the title *Romania's historical and cultural heritage in danger*. The response, of course, did not fail to take place, the work of art offered by Drăgan to the Greek Catholic Church in Lugos could only arrive in Lugos late.

After a short "Cold War", co- operation between Drăgan and the Romanian intelligence continued even more intensively in 1986, with the commission and publication of the work *Mistificarea istoriei Europei - adevăr și impostură* (*Mystification of European History - Truth and Deception*), which was written by an officer one of the specialist services. Drăgan published it at his own expense and was emphatically prepared for the discrediting of the Hungarians. The publication had to be sent directly to universities and libraries in major Western countries. In addition, it was sent to leaders and major politicians and historians, as well as to groups of Romanian emigrants loyal to the Romanian regime. “This operation was initiated by the Securitate on the instructions of the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party.”⁸⁰ In the same year, Drăgan met with influential Ceaușescu officials in the Romanian capital. The thracologist was received by Suzana Gâdea, President of the Socialist Council for Culture and Education (Consiliul Culturii și Educației Socialiste), and then met with Ion Iliescu, Director of Technical Publishing. They discussed current and specific issues, including the *Dacia milenar Imperia* (Dacia millennial empire) and the *Țara lui Dracula* (Dracula's country) publishing volumes. At the end of the negotiations, “Olteanu” was able to leave with satisfaction, as he had contracted that his volumes would go to press on schedule in the second half of 1986.⁸¹ Several times a year, the magnate spent several months in Romania, as he did in 1986, when the presentation of the volume *Mileniul imperial al Daciei* (Imperial Millennium of Dacia) was scheduled to take place in Iași, where academician Mircea Petrescu-Dîmboviț presented the publication.⁸² In December, a symposium entitled *The 2500th Anniversary of the Establishment of the Centralized Dacian State* was organized by the Military History Committee of the

⁷⁶ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 99.

⁷⁷ Brotherhood of the Cross – Frățiile de Cruce, the youth organization of the Romanian Legionary Movement, founded in 1923 by Corneliu Zelea Codreanu.

⁷⁸ Legionary nest (club legionar): the basic unit of the Romanian Legionary Movement, which had no committee. The nest had only one leader, one liaison, and one treasurer. The liaison / courier connected the nests to other nests and/or the county leader.

⁷⁹ DRĂGAN, Iosif Constantin: *Dal paese di Dracula*, Nagard, Milan, 1982. p. 351.

⁸⁰ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 101.

⁸¹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. 103-103. v.

⁸² ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. 127-127. v.

Ministry of Defense, for which Drăgan was also invited. At the event, Gheorghiu Mihnea,⁸³ Ștefan Pascu, Dumitru Berciu,⁸⁴ Eugen Barbu⁸⁵ also praised Drăgan's publishing activities abroad.⁸⁶

Thanks to a grateful Drăgan, the 5th International Thracological Symposium was held in Spoleto, Italy in November 1987, under the auspices of the European Center for Thracian Studies established by him and the European Drăgan Foundation. The scientific event was attended by 40 guests from Romania, Bulgaria, Italy, Yugoslavia, Greece and Spain. The Romanian delegation consisted of eight historians and philosophers who received financial support from him.

In contrast, his business with the Ceaușescu regime is less well known. The Securitate file laconically recorded the fact that the millionaire had acted in accordance with instructions received, reveal new opportunities for the development of export of Romanian products. Among other things, Marimex Foreign Trade Company won, with some influence, an order from Fram Shipping Ltd. in Bermuda to build 15 oil tankers worth approximately \$ 90 million. Also thanks to the influential emigrant patriot, an agreement in principle was reached with Moroccan decision-makers on the construction of a railway network to be laid in Morocco. The stake was a 1,000 kilometer railway line between Marrakech and Aiouin worth \$ 1 billion. These contracts were handled by Securitate's foreign trading front company, ICE Dunărea.⁸⁷ In 1988, Drăgan held business negotiations in the United States with the aim of exporting 20,000 Dacia cars to the US market.⁸⁸

Although in 1971 Drăgan distanced himself from the Paris emigration group led by Ioan Rațiu, their relationship later improved and stabilized. For this relationship, since the magnate quite often turned up in French circles in Paris and Brussels, the Securitate drew up an operational combination, according to which they would establish a seed in the Romanian exile, that is control center, which would operate in accordance with the policies of dictatorship. In 1988, the Romanian Intelligence directed an illustrious member of the Romanian emigrant group in New York, Professor Serban Andronescu to Drăgan to recommend that he overtake the leadership of the Romanian exile organizations in some of the main western states, such as Paris and the US and Spain, so as to gain control over these organizations. Drăgan elegantly

⁸³ Gheorghiu Mihnea (1919–2011) was a Romanian poet, writer and translator. From 1944 to 1946 he was deputy editor-in-chief of the Communist *Scânteia* in *Tineretului*. He earned his degree in humanities from the University of Bucharest and then earned his doctorate in 1947. In 1996 he became a member of the Romanian Academy of Sciences.

⁸⁴ Dumitru Berciu (1907-1998) was a Romanian archaeologist and historian. He was the director of the Institute of Thracology in Bucharest. Honorary member of the Romanian Academy of Sciences.

⁸⁵ Eugen Barbu (1924-1993) was a journalist, writer and Romanian senator. He graduated in 1947 with a degree in humanities from the University of Bucharest. He worked as a communist journalist and also as a censor. In 1969 he was an alternate member of the Central Committee of the Romanian Communist Party. In 1975, Eugen Barbu was elected Member of the National Assembly. From 1970 to 1989 he led the literary magazine *Săptămîna* (The Week). After 1989, he was the founder of the *România Mare* (Greater Romania Party), a member of parliament from 1992 to 1996.

⁸⁶ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 141.

⁸⁷ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 134.

⁸⁸ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 225.

rejected the offer, as he trusted the international network of his own organizations and their strength more. The situation changed in 1989, and Drăgan invited Professor Serban Andronescu to join the Mișcarea românilor pentru unirea Europei (Romanian Movement for the Unification of Europe), which the magnate had founded 40 years earlier.⁸⁹

On July 7, 1989, Drăgan reported to the authorities in Bucharest that, unfortunately, he had not been able to publish an article in the Italian press about the revisionist and anti-Romanian aspects of the events of June 16 in Budapest. He expressed his intention to dedicate one of his periodicals to present this event.⁹⁰

The very last meeting between Drăgan and the Romanian intelligence agency loyal to Ceausescu took place on 27 November 1989. This time, the magnate invited Gheorghe Dolgu, Romanian ambassador to a restaurant in the UN palace in Geneva. Both reaffirmed the need to continue working together to offset Hungary's discrediting activities, and to hold a conference in the Romanian Socialist Republic next year on the protection of Romanian cultural property and historical monuments. Drăgan indicated to the ambassador that he intended to visit Bucharest in January 1990 to agree on the details with the competent authorities.⁹¹ According to archival sources, Drăgan's thracological activity and his cooperation with the secret services can be traced back to 22 December 1989. Following the change of regime, up to his death in 2008, we can only be informed about his social, historical dissemination and attitude – forming actions through the media. But an analysis of this era would already go beyond the scope of the study.

While cooperation between the specialized services and Iosif Constantin Drăgan was ongoing and it would be difficult to separate the interests of the dictatorship, cultural and economic policy of the tycoon's passionate thracological interests, his anti-Hungarian sentiments inspired by the legionary movement, in addition to his own economic interests, his person was surrounded by suspicions that stemmed from the nature of the Romanian intelligence institutions. Each time he returned home to Lugos or went anywhere in the country, he was closely followed by the counter-intelligence service, and they were aware of his every move with the help of operational technology and agent networks. As for his activities in West were monitored by the Rezidenturas of intelligence agencies in the western countries. through agent infiltration. Whether Drăgan was aware of the strengthening of historical protochronism in the motherland in the 1970s or the theoretical background of this system of ideas would require deeper research. It seems clear, however, that he perceived the receptiveness of the Romanian state leadership and the intellectuals in its orbit for the conceptual construct of the origins designed by him. His person was also important, because by propagating thracology internationally, he contributed to the international acceptance of the ideology of the Romanian power elite, and to operations against the Hungarian emigrant groups. His role in Romanian emigration went far beyond Italy. The institutional network created by him often provided

⁸⁹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. pp. 269-270.

⁹⁰ ACNSAS Fond SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 331. At that time, the re-burial of Imre Nagy and his fellow martyrs took place in Budapest.

⁹¹ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 00028 vol. 18. p. 367.

assistance to Romanian emigrants active in other countries and cover for the Romanian intelligence agencies for the conduct of various operations.

The French line

Gustav Pordea, the reluctant spy

Controlling Romanian emigration became a particular priority task for Romanian intelligence after a group of Romanian refugees occupied the Romanian embassy in Bern in February 1955. Thereafter they vetted all intellectuals, who showed some potential as intelligence agents. Accordingly, the Romanian Intelligence as early as in the fifties repeatedly analyzed the biography of a teacher named Gustav Pordea and his operational situation, but his more intensive processing was started only in the late fifties.

Gustav Pordea, whose father was a Liberal Party Senator, was born in 1916 in Cluj-Napoca. He studied in his hometown, then started to work as a lawyer there where his family owned three real estates, furthermore a hotel in Dej and another real estate in Bucharest. With his mother was related to Iuliu Maniu.⁹² With the communist regime change in 1945, the family suffered serious financial losses.⁹³ The young Gustav Pordea arrived in the Netherlands in 1947 on a diplomatic mission. However, with the persecution of King Michael in December 1947, Romanian diplomacy was also “cleaned up,” so in 1948 the young Pordea, serving in the Netherlands, decided to choose emigration. He maintained continuous correspondence with his parents, which fact was thoroughly used by the Romanian counter-intelligence mapping his new residence, place of employment, citizenship, his contacts in the emigration circles. Thus, the Romanian intelligence agency also knew that in 1955 at his father-in-law, Max Auschnitt⁹⁴ lived in Biarritz, and read lectures at the diplomatic institute. Pordea probably did not renounce his return home, was not deprived of his citizenship, and had a Romanian passport. In 1966, through the embassy in Paris, he formally applied for permission to return home. In 1968 he sent one of his children to Bucharest to attend a secondary school there. In 1969 he made another application to the competent authorities for his return home,⁹⁵ which also allowed the Pordea family to repatriate on condition that they take up a teaching position at the University of Bucharest and offered them an apartment in an apartment block. Pordea’s wife, however, considered the offer to be below their social status, because they requested a separate villa with period furniture in it, plus a charwoman, so their repatriation was cancelled. In 1971, Gustav Pordea submitted another request to the Romanian

⁹² Iuliu Maniu (1873-1953) was a Romanian lawyer, politician and prime minister in Transylvania.

⁹³ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 12.

⁹⁴ Max Carol Auschnitt (1888-1957), industrial tycoon. He was the richest man in Romania between the two world wars. Favorite of the Romanian royal family until 1939. His property, when he emigrated to America after the war, was nationalized in Romania.

⁹⁵ The intention to return home, and in particular the conditions, was previously notified to the Paris residence (under the pseudonym "Predeal", where the first two letters indicate that it was Paris) through an agent. In the code language, in the text sent to the center, the agent was designated as inventor, the first letter of the word, “i,” referring to the agent being an informant.

embassy in Paris. Under the previous conditions, in exchange for his return, he also demanded a serious sum of money to make up for all that the Romanian state had confiscated from him and his family after 1945.⁹⁶ He threatened to bring the matter before an international court. He argued that if a well-known Romanian patriot returned to Romania, it would serve as an example for other emigrants to follow suit. In recognition of his scientific activity, he wanted to receive the support of the Romanian state as a good patriot – and last but not least due to his lack of money.

In 1975, the Securitate learned of Pordea, who lived in Paris, that he was not settling home because he could inherit a large sum from his father-in-law through his wife. Rather, the reason was good only to find an opportunity to channel his patriotic feelings into a sphere of influence (meaning Romanian state institutions and their contacts) through which he could disseminate his scientific activity and obtain money. In 1980, Pordea complained to an undercover officer in the Paris rezidentura that the French political leadership, especially Raymond Octave, Prime Minister Joseph Barre⁹⁷ supported the Transylvanian Hungarian minority, and stands by Hungary and for Hungarians in the world. To counter this, he suggested that a series of thematic volumes such as *The contribution of Romanians to universal culture and civilization*, and volunteered to translate the works of Romanian authors into several world languages, including books by Mircea Eliade.⁹⁸ In addition, he thought the following year, 1981, would be a good opportunity to commemorate Octavian Goga (born 100 years earlier), by organizing programs against the Hungarians, and finally proposed to establish the House of Romanians in Paris.⁹⁹ He broached the idea of propagating topics such as the raised as the bloodshed Romanians suffered in World War 1 and World War 2 in support of the Allies, with an emphasis on Latinity through the theory of Daco-Romanian continuity. He emphasized that he had Hungarian acquaintances at the Sorbonne University and warned the undercover officer that 12 more teachers from Hungary were coming to Paris. He also drew attention to the fact that he was familiar with the propaganda tools of the Hungarians, as well as with the institutions that serve them, such as the Groupe pour les Minoritaires; the Hungarian branch of the Transilvanian Institute of Philadelphia, the Hungarian branch of the Danubian Research and Information Center, Florida.¹⁰⁰ The undercover officer met Pordea several times at the latter's apartment, at a reception at the U.S. Embassy in Paris, and spoke with him three times on the phone. During the talks, Pordea asked for the support of the undercover officer to spread his scientific work in Romania. The officer gathered from the conversations that Pordea was willing to act in the interests of socialist Romania, i.e. he could do a good service in dividing the Romanian

⁹⁶ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 20

⁹⁷ Raymond Octave Joseph Barre (1924-2007), French Prime Minister from 1976 to 1981. His wife was Éva Hegedüs, the daughter of Lóránt Hegedüs (1872–1943), former Minister of Finance of Hungary.

⁹⁸ Mircea Eliade (1907–1986) was a religious historian, philosopher and writer of Romanian descent, living in Paris after 1945 and in the USA after 1956. After 1945 he also wrote in French and English.

⁹⁹ It is possible that he was thinking of an institution competing with the Hungarian Institute in Paris.

¹⁰⁰ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 33. For details on the listed Hungarian emigration research and representative organizations, see: HARASZTI, Endre: *The Ethnic History of Transylvania*, published by Danubian Press (approved by Danubian Research and Information Center) Toronto, Sovereign Press, 1971.

emigration and counteracting the activities of the Hungarian emigration.¹⁰¹ There were initially small signs of support. First, through an agent called “Stan, the agency sent Pordea a lexicon published in Romania”, with the instruction for the agent to gain Pordea’s trust and invite him to events of the Romania Society (a Romanian NGO similar to the World Federation of Hungarians) in Romania.¹⁰² Agent “Stan” was a doctor-radiologist from Târgu Mureș, who had been registered by the Romanian counter-intelligence as a network asset since 1972.¹⁰³ Agent “Stan” sent the prepared letter to Pordea, promising to send him further publications, and help him join or infiltrate Romanian scientific circles. Copies of these letters were sent to the Romanian intelligence agency as well. Thus the two directorates assessed the possibility of channeling Pordea into the circles of the Italian magnate Drăgan. That is why they studied him thoroughly, which showed that by then he had a serious professional career,¹⁰⁴ and as a teacher at the Sorbonne, and someone whose second wife is a French woman, he completely assimilated into French society. Starting from the seventies, he turned to the cultivation of Romanian history, especially the history of the countries neighboring Romania, and the theory of continuity, respectively. His sweeping activity against the Hungarian emigration elicited appreciation from a significant part of the Romanian expat community in Paris (with the exception of the National Peasant Party grouping led by Ioan Rațiu), and he proclaimed that it was time that the Romanian emigration change their relationship with the Romanian state. He demanded more serious support for those emigrants who fought militantly against the Hungarians.¹⁰⁵ Based on the profile, there was a correlation between the news demand of the services and the ideas of one of the dominant figures of the far-right emigration group in Paris. The image of him was in line with the news demand of the services; Gustav Pordea was then one of the dominant figures in the far-right emigration group in Paris.

Based on the principle of the gradual approach, agent “Stan”’s professional training and travel to Paris first took place in 1972, when during the seven-month training he had time to thoroughly get to know Pordea as well. The relationship developed so well that in addition to ongoing correspondence, Pordea invited Agent “Stan” on a one-month vacation in 1980.¹⁰⁶

Pacepa’s defection in 1978 escape did not affect the Romanian intelligence agency’s contact with Pordea although the in next two years it underwent the largest reorganization in its history. From 1 October 1978, the entire organization of the Romanian intelligence service consisted of several units that were subdivided into independent departments and sections as follows: Section I – Europe: made up of five units, responsible for obtaining political, economic, technical-scientific and military intelligence from the major capitalist countries in Europe. Its military designation was

¹⁰¹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 33.

¹⁰² ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 35.

¹⁰³ Identification of “Stan” based on pages 137 and 282 of ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588: In 1983, G. Stanciu was 52 years old.

¹⁰⁴ In the 1950s, he was director of the Center International des Etude Latine (International Institute of Latin Studies) and, since the 1960s, a full professor at the Sorbonne University.

¹⁰⁵ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 41.

¹⁰⁶ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 42.

UM 0199.¹⁰⁷ This organizational unit continued to handle Pordea. Influencing the target person in Paris was consistently coordinated by the European Section with Section IV for emigration consisting of five units and two groups, which carried out intelligence and prevention activities among emigrants of Romanian and other nationalities. This organizational unit carried out espionage activities in the Romanian expat communities with the aim of developing a position loyal to Romania among Romanians who had fled abroad. It established organizations and associations, issued press publications, initiated the establishment of the Romanian religious councils surrounding Romanian orthodox churches and carried out other activities, through which it tried to persuade the Romanian expat communities to represent the interests of the Romanian state abroad. It was also the specific mission of this section to get to know and thwart the activities of the organizations, associations and circles of the Hungarian emigration against Romania. At the same time, it was also authorized to press the Saxons, Swabs, Jews and Greeks forced to emigrate from Romania to make gestures loyal to Romania, and also thwart, if necessary, their hostile actions. The military designation of the department was UM 0225.¹⁰⁸

The influencing operation ran under the codename “Replica” and was intended to publish works in capitalist states that served the purposes of the dictatorship. So Pordea was also tasked to write a book that would counteract the irredentist activities of the Hungarian emigre groups. An incentive of USD 2,000 was earmarked for Pordea for costs writing, distribution (in the USA, Canada and Western Europe) and for translation.¹⁰⁹ In early March, 1983, the Paris rezidentura noted with satisfaction that Pordea, as a member of the board of the Society for the History of Diplomacy, had given a lecture entitled *Notes on Romanian-Hungarian Relations* at the French Academy. The event was attended by representatives of several ancient families of the French aristocracy, as well as university professors, colleagues, researchers and prominent members of the Romanian emigration (families of the Dukes Kretzulescu and Moruz). The participants received a duplicate copy of the lecture material. The topic mentioned had already been printed in 3000 copies in book form. Romanian intelligence played a role in the distribution of the volume, translating it into English, German and Italian, and preparing it for distribution in the USA, Canada, England, the FRG, Italy and other Western states as required. To cover the influencing activities, in all reviews, and during the presentation and distribution of the lecture, Pordea’s integral attachment to French culture was emphasized.¹¹⁰ Romanian intelligence also agreed precisely with Pordea on the content elements of the work, the emphases, and the details of the Paris edition.¹¹¹ The publication of the volume took place within the framework of operation “Replica”, and was a response to a mass demonstration by several thousand outside the Permanent UN Representation of the Romanian People’s Republic in New York on 23 January 1983, which called attention to the anti-Hungarian policies of the Ceausescu regime.

¹⁰⁷ ȚĂRANU, Liviu: Evoluția Direcției de Informații Externe și defectorii din spionajul românesc. (Development of the Foreign Intelligence Directorate and Defectors of the Romanian intelligence service). Caiete CNSAS, 2008, Vol. I, No. 1 pp. 135-161.

¹⁰⁸ Ibid.

¹⁰⁹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 50.

¹¹⁰ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 0005588 pp. 51-52.

¹¹¹ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 0005588 pp. 53-61.

Due to the cooperation of the two intelligence sections (European and emigration), their two influential agents, Pordea in Paris and Drăgan working in Rome were linked. Pordea, who was on the same platform with Drăgan, quickly accepted his go-betweens' that is the undercover officers' suggestion that he make translations for Drăgan, who was glad in his turn that a knowledgeable compatriot of his, also living in exile, would be the translator of his works. It was in this way that the book *Les Roumains: peuple multimillénaire de L'Europe*, translated by Pordea, was published at the Edizioni Europa in Rome. Pordea received the fee in the form of an advance fee and against a receipt, which he signed in his own hand.¹¹² Afterwards he often arranged book presentations, and his lectures were also arranged and financed by Drăgan's Foundation: to the amount of USD 1,000 dollars and F 4,000.¹¹³

His relationship with Drăgan deepened, and the former's leading role was clear, as Pordea was given precise tasks in addition to the money from the magnate. Among other things, he had to organize a Romanian Friendship Association, a committee or a movement in France under the auspices of the Drăgan Foundation. He also undertook to involve the Foundation, through his political links, in the French and emerging European foundations (Fondation pour l'Europe and the Organization pour l'Unité de l'Europe¹¹⁴). He conducted negotiations for this purpose with Simone Veill¹¹⁵ and Olivier Stirn.¹¹⁶ He also met Otto von Habsburg on the matter.¹¹⁷

Although the involvement of Drăgan into the said French foundations and organizations did not prove to be a success, Pordea's recognition and reputation further widened and his political ambitions also surfaced. In addition to the issues of the foundations, the 1984 European Parliament elections were also discussed. The Securitate's intelligence center was aware as early as December 1983 that that Pordea left no stone unturned to gain candidacy for the 1984 elections to the European Parliament.¹¹⁸

Pordea repeatedly indicated that he would accompany Drăgan to Bucharest, where he would report on the activities of Hungarian emigration to the official agencies, and he would also like to suggest possible countermeasures. His handler explained to him that this would not be the right decision, as Romanian emigres in

¹¹² ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 94.

¹¹³ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 90.

¹¹⁴ Foundation for Europe and Association for the Unity of Europe.

¹¹⁵ Simone Veil (1927-2017) lawyer, French politician. In 1970, Georges Pompidou appointed her Secretary General of the French Council of Judges. During Valéry Giscard D'Estaing's presidency, she was Minister of Health in Jacques Chirac's government. Between 1979 and 1982, she was the first female President of the European Parliament. From 1993 to 1995, she was Minister for Health, Social Affairs and Urban Affairs in the Cabinet of Édouard Balladur. She was a member of the French Constitutional Council from 1998 to 2007. In 2008 she was elected a member of the French Academy.

¹¹⁶ Olivier Stirn (1936-) Secretary of State for Jacques Chirac, then five times Members of Parliament. In the 60s, politics started from the right, and by the early 80s, he moved to the left.

¹¹⁷ Otto von Habsburg (1912-2011) was a politician and public writer, the last heir to the Habsburg throne. In 1921 he was stripped of his throne. Member of the Pan-European Parliament since 1936, Vice-President from 1957 and President from 1973. From 1979 to 1999, he sat in the CSU Group in the European Parliament.

¹¹⁸ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 134.

Paris would immediately call him a collaborator, with a serious loss to the cause he undertook.¹¹⁹ However, they thought that deepening collaboration with Pordea (training, development of new operations), even with him visiting his home country, was a feasible idea, therefore they drew up a plan for him to travel to Romania by air, using indirect flights, so he can enter Romania without an entry visa. If this form of meeting had not been considered appropriate by the agent, then the Romanian intelligence would have proposed a meeting in Austria or Greece. The intelligence service notified Pordea of these alternate locations for the meeting via agents.¹²⁰ The contact agent at this time also was agent “Stan”, the doctor radiologist from Targu Mures. He also seemed to be a suitable liaison for intelligence, as he had already been twice in the circles of Romanian emigration to France. As a recognized physician, members of the Romanian emigration to Paris, including Pordea, with whom he was in constant correspondence, approached him with confidence, and even signaled the strengthening of the relationship that in 1982 Pordea had invited him on a cruise. The role of liaison under the pseudonym “Stan” was appreciated when Pordea decided to run for a seat in the European Parliament, occupying a seat reserved at the initiative of Otto von Habsburg for states behind the Iron Curtain since 1982. His idea was not entirely unfounded, as he gained the sympathy and support of Simone Veil and Olivier Stirn during his decades of emigration lobbying. In this combination operation, “Stan” was tasked with “acting as a mailbox” in Târgu Mureş, i.e. sending texts written by intelligence officers to Pordea on postcards or meeting the target person as a traveling agent in the western states. This is exactly what he did when he sent a postcard to Pordea in November 1983, arranging with him the date and place of a December meeting in Vienna.¹²¹ The “academic lecture” was held on December 13 -14 at Hotel Bristol in Vienna. At the six-hour meeting on the afternoon of December 13, Agent “Stan” was still present in addition to the professional intelligence. They talked to Pordea mainly about his activities in France, his work in Estonia, and about counteracting the activities of Hungarian emigration. The next morning, only the handler officer and Pordea met, and specific operational details were agreed, agreeing that the next meeting would be held in Geneva, and Pordea would approach the scene by car, thus avoiding being recorded in the border security computer system. They also agreed to assess, until the next meeting, the possibility of setting up an international organization in the Transylvanian cause involving well known French personalities. The details of the editing and publishing of a quarterly publication aimed at bringing French-Romanian relations closer together and presenting the irredentist activities of Hungarian emigration circles were also agreed upon. It was also agreed to create the conditions for the publication in France of a volume made under his name on the homeland base, written by a Securitate agent. He was asked to have a work plan for the next meeting at which he was to report on conferences, lectures and publications due in 1984.

Romanian intelligence made a good choice when fishing the financially distressed Pordea out of the Paris émigré community for itself, because the issue was also raised by the agent at a meeting in Vienna, asking for the support of the agency.

¹¹⁹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 112. 112 v. The rezidentura sent a coded report to the center on, among other things, Pordea's activities.

¹²⁰ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 118 v

¹²¹ The data were obtained by the Securitate of Mureş County from the Bucharest headquarters, UM 0199, i.e. the Economic and Political Intelligence Department.

Regardless of his request, Romanian intelligence handed over a \$ 1,000 reward and \$ 1,300 travel expenses to Pordea.¹²²

After the operational meeting in Vienna, Romanian political intelligence (Department I of the Center – UM 0199) assessed its relationship with Pordea, stating that the attitude of the teacher, who had been working against Hungarian emigration for many years, was in line with operational interests, what is more, by supporting his activities, his operational situation can be further exploited. He built a significant network of French political contacts, which provided an opportunity for Romanian intelligence to assert its operational interests, specifically to counteract the activities of Hungarian emigration and the Romanian editorial office of Radio Free Europe. According to the assessment, there was no risk on the counter-intelligence line, but it was considered necessary to constantly monitor Pordea's person and surroundings. Based on the meeting in Vienna, the intelligence service made its relationship with Pordea more active.¹²³

After Simone Veil, former European Parliament President, conservative politicians Jacques Chirac, and Olivier Stirn, despite their promises, did not put Pordea on the European Parliament election list, as a final solution, he turned to the National Front, led by Jean-Marie Le Pen. This political formation launched him under the auspices of the fight against communism. Through his contact officer, Pordea indicated to the Romanian ambassador to Paris that if elected, their relationship would not change at all, he would continue to support Romanian interests.¹²⁴

On 16 June 1984, the in the fourth place on the list of the National Front Pordea was elected Member of the European Parliament. Shortly afterwards, in August in Palma de Mallorca, he agreed with Drăgan on the direction and content of future cooperation. Pordea planned to publish his manuscript on Romanian-Hungarian historical relations with the funding of "Olteanu".¹²⁵ Even his access to the European Parliament did not change his decision, and he even made further promises to Drăgan that he would like to keep the volume unchanged and persevered that he would remain committed to the national sentiment.¹²⁶

His contact with the operational unit in the embassy was not broken, in fact, resulting from his position new opportunities arose to counteract Hungarian interests. Concerned, he indicated that the EP would send a committee to Romania led by Ceausescu, and its investigation would pose a serious threat to the regime, and also stressed that the Franco-Hungarian relations were soaring, an eloquent evidence of which he saw in the visit in Paris by János Kádár.¹²⁷ Pordea's fears were not unfounded, for William Newton Dunn¹²⁸ under the colors of the Conservative party

¹²² ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 144.

¹²³ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 pp. 144-145.

¹²⁴ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 179.

¹²⁵ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 156.

¹²⁶ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 162.

¹²⁷ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 212.

¹²⁸ William Francis Newton Dunn (1941–) Member of the European Parliament, British politician. From 1979 to 1994 he was a Lincolnshire representative as a Conservative. He joined the EP in 1999 and joined the Liberal Democrats in 2000.

family, tabled a proposal in the EP to condemn Ceaușescu's ethnic policy. Pordea also submitted a draft (counter) proposal in which he denied that the Transylvanian minorities' rights would be violated, in fact, he stressed that the authorities in Budapest were backing the actions that give rise to unrest between the two nations.¹²⁹

Romanian intelligence, acting according to the rules of covertness and due to the increased counter-espionage risk, minimized direct contact between Agent Pordea and professional intelligence. According to the logic of the contact model established, his friends and acquaintances and professional circles regularly sent visitors to Pordea, some of them were recruited by the Romanian intelligence agents. Thus, the previously mentioned doctor from Târgu Mureș and then a retired philosopher from Hunedoara County, who was run under the codename "Willy" by Securitate.¹³⁰ "Willy" was used for correspondence, thus signaling to Pordea that the previously arranged third-country meeting in Geneva would be canceled. The election of Pordea as an MEP posed new challenges for Romanian intelligence. His alternative contact with Agent "Willy" was discussed in detail back in December 1983 at a meeting in Vienna. In order to legalize their *relationship* and operational correspondence, the publication of the manuscripts *Dreptul istoric asupra Transilvaniei* (Historical Right to Transylvania) and *Conceptul unității europene* (Concept of European Unity) seemed sufficient.

According to the evaluation of the Paris rezidentura, the controversy surrounding the election of Pordea, which was sparked by various groups of Romanian emigration, was thoroughly exploited by both the French and American (and thus generally Western European) professional services. This was confirmed by the fact that Ion Mihai Pacepa who obtained asylum in the USA repeatedly frontally attacked the Securitate and the Ceausescu dictatorship, respectively.

While Pordea was only one of the intellectuals living in exile in Paris, it did not attract the attention of Western political and secret service actors, but after being elected an MEP, he not only brought to light Pacepa's memories, but was also of intense interest to members of Romanian emigration to Paris. Pacepa reported in detail on his previous professional experience and also instilled information about Pordea through French papers. The *L'Express* in the summer of 1984 and *Le Matin*,¹³¹ unveiled Pordea's relationship with the Securitate. In the February 2, 1985 issue of *Le Matin*, Agathe Logeart claimed that Pordea was an agent for Romanian professional services, and that Pacepa, a former second in command in Romanian intelligence, had recruited Pordea before he escaped. However, an analysis of the Romanian rezidentura in Paris revealed that Pacepa may have known at most about Pordea, but could not know the details of operations. The officer analyzing the fall of Pordea misinterpreted the operational radius of the activities of the Hungarian specialist services, combining and reconciling the interests of contemporary Hungarian

¹²⁹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 235.

¹³⁰ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 pp. 223-223. An agent under the codename "Willy" received 15,000 lei and \$ 1,000 for a "visit" to Paris in 1984 to cover travel expenses and other expenses. In the 1980s, the monthly wages of a skilled worker were 2,500 lei. An agent with the codename "Willy" can be identified on page 296 of Fond SIE 0005588. Based on the data found here, "Willy"'s real name is Isac Victor.

¹³¹ The *Le Matin* published in its February 2, 1985 issue an interview by Agathe Logeart with Ion Mihai Pacepa under the title "Surprise No. 4 from Le Pen's list".

intelligence and Hungarian emigration to France, saying they have a common interest in Transylvania in protecting the rights of the Hungarian minority in Romania. What Pordea did, on the other hand, lawfully aroused the interest of that specialist service. However, this conclusion can be attributed to Securitate's systemic color blindness, thus attributing to Hungarian intelligence an activity that has not been proven. The analyst suggested that it should be avoided that U.S. or French specialist services could pass on evidence to the Western press to support the daily relationship between Pordea and Securitate. Meanwhile, information from certain groups of Romanian emigrants in Paris appeared in the French and British press,¹³² that Pordea was an agent of the Securitate. Pordea denied the news published in the *Le Matin*, a daily close to the in French Socialist Party (Parti Socialiste) that the Securitate had an agent, and as the National Front and Le Pen person also was attacked, sued the newspaper. Finally, the *Le Matin* lost the lawsuit in February 1985, on the basis of a court decision; there was no evidence of cooperation with the Securitate, so it cannot be said that Pordea was an agent.

After that, contact with Gustav Pordea could not take place on the territory of a NATO state, so the Romanian intelligence suggested that the contact should be maintained through correspondence with a family member, i.e. his sister, who lives in Spain. Pordea's support has always been resolved through the Drăgan Foundation. Pordea was very pedantic, so she asked for and gave written proof of everything. However, the analyst took note with great satisfaction that during his active duty career Pordea did not receive "domestic matter" (orders) directly through the embassy or the local operational group and had never visited the consular section, either.¹³³

In February 1985, the Paris Court of Justice, pursuant to a fresh denunciation was hearing Pordea's espionage case. The Securitate analyst came to the conclusion that inflating this case was timed to cover up the exposure of a French spy¹³⁴ and used for domestic political purposes, thereby discrediting Jean Marie Le Pen and weakening the National Front with respect to Newton Dunn's proposal. They

¹³² ZAMFIRESCU, Dinu: Si noi am condamnat comunul din exilul parizian. (We also condemned Romanian Communism from exile in Paris). Editura Paideia, București, 2008. Dinu Zamfirescu, who also worked for the BBC, belonged to a group organized around Radu Câmpeanu, a member of the historic Liberal Party. In his book, he discussed the case of Gustav Pordea in a separate chapter. By 1985, the said emigration group had announced the cleansing of Romanian emigration from Securitate agents. However, this was more of a political gesture and was presumably capable of legalizing information from the French specialist services. Several agents and Romanian undercover officers were unveiled in the emigration press at that time. The officers switched in most cases, so their role was different from that of the agents they ditched.

¹³³ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 0005588 pp. 231-234.

¹³⁴ On January 21, 1985, espionage involving at least twenty influential people (businessmen, officials) was uncovered in the vicinity of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi. Lieutenant Colonel Alain Bolley, Deputy Military Attaché of France, was immediately repatriated. In his statements, Rajiv Gandhi sought to downplay the importance of espionage and stressed that mostly industrial secrets were violated that did not undermine India's military capabilities. The matter was smoothed, and the French-Indian relations not suffered the consequences;

https://www.larousse.fr/archives/journaux_annee/1986/174/1985_1_annee_des_espions
(downloaded 24 November 2020)

approached Axel Michael Stahlschmidt,¹³⁵ a Brussels official, who was asked about the implications of that submission. According to the information, Dunn's proposal proceeded properly through the EP bureaucracy, which ended with the chairman of the Subcommittee on Human Rights, who had just drafted the 1984 human rights report. The only question was whether the document will be included enshrined in the annual report. Stahlschmidt's suggestions for intelligence through Aurel Duma¹³⁶ were placed on the table of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs and the liaison of the secret services.¹³⁷ The proposal was an important element for the Romanian political leadership for President Mitterrand to visit Bucharest, but the Pordea and many other cases turned France from a friend foe.¹³⁸ The Romanian Intelligence highly developed broad and targeted counter-measures to counter the situation. Among other things, letters were sent on behalf of former political prisoners to their fellows in French emigration, stressing that the Securitate's second man, Pacepa, is helping to uncover the activities of Romanian authorities. It was part of the Romanian Intelligence deceptive operation of the article, which was placed in a Parisian newspaper, the *Revue du Liban*, in which the *Le Matin* newspaper liability was raised in connection with the Pordea-case, and also blamed the French Socialists responsible for the deterioration of the relationship between the two countries. Romanian intelligence gradually took advantage of the information that the Hungarian embassy had given the Socialist Party 8 million francs at the beginning of the presidential election. A separate plan was drawn up to provide the information, properly packaged, to the opposition in the election campaign beginning in March 1985. The intention

¹³⁵ Axel Michael Stahlschmidt has been an official in the European Parliament since 1964. In 1985, he was Head of Unit in the Directorate-General for Committees and Delegations. From 1987, in addition to German, he also acquired Luxembourg citizenship.

¹³⁶ Aurel Dima (1919-1993) Ambassador to Beijing 1966-1972. From 1972 to 1979 he was head of the RAC Central Committee. From 1979 to 1989 he was Secretary of State in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹³⁷ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 236.

¹³⁸ Politically and economically, Romania has traditionally relied on France. He first helped in the unification of the two Romanian principalities in 1859, then in the peace around Paris, and finally in the 1960s and 1970s by raising his trade relations with Romania to a high level (Dacia, helicopter manufacturing, etc.) and visiting French presidents (Giscard d'Estaing). Ceaușescu's visit to Mitterrand should have been like a mouthful of Tanase in 1982 ended in victory for the French counterintelligence (DST), with Romanian intelligence officer Matei Pavel Haiducu switching to them, and the operation ended unsuccessfully. There were even more sensitive topics that Mitterrand was aware of. Recruitment of French Minister of Defense Charles Hernu in the 1960s or in Bucharest was the fatal truck accident of Bernard-Marie du Cheyron de Beaumont d'Abzac, the head of the DST's eastern areas, just leaving the airport. https://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/politique/l-express-du-3-novembre-1969-espionnage-l-engrenage-roumain_2099179.html (downloaded 24 November 2020). Given all this, it is no wonder that the French leadership prevented Western leaders from visiting Romania in the 1980s. Among others, the King of Spain, the Belgian Foreign Minister, etc. (for details see <https://jurnalul.ro/special-jurnalul/Stefan-andrei-icirc-n-anii-80-franza-a-fost-cel-mai-mare-dusman-al-lui-Ceaușescu-115049.html> (downloaded 24 November 2020) bread, but by the early 1980s, Romanian secret service operations had an impact. Caraman's operations against NATO, which led the Paris residency in the 1960s, had a serious impact on the French position in NATO, as the French lost 50% of their positions after Caraman's downfall. The assassination attempt on Paul Goma and Virgil

was to publish articles in the international press through agents, emphasizing Romania's World War II liberation activities and Hungary's fascist satellite role.¹³⁹

Apparently, neither the Romanian political leadership nor the secret service wanted to take into account the French political realities. Political and intelligence responses to the situation continued to be given according to the enemy image of self-determination. The cover of Romanian intelligence was the foreign trade company Dacomex, established in Paris on Drăgan's initiative. As the co-director of the company in 1976 it was delegated from Romania under the codename of "Raul" to act as liaison to the intelligence officers of the rezidentura in Paris. Pordea's scientific publications were also funded through Agent "Raul". "Raul" was called home from time to time for reporting and training. Their talks with Pordea were dropped either in Dacomex offices or in restaurants in the French capital, depending on what Pordea's operational situation allowed. Pordea was aware that not only the French political forces were behind the proceedings against him, and that the statements condemning the communist camp in his public appearances were merely empty twists, he testified to 'Raul': "... *I will continue to do what I have to do, and nobody should be bothered if I deal indirectly, for the sake of credibility, with Eastern regimes. I never referred to the domestic regime.*"¹⁴⁰ During the press lawsuit, fearing his phone was bugged, he visited Raul without advance notice by phone, he delivered the EP-materials and gave a sitrep.

Agent "Willy" was also regularly sent out to do scientific work with Pordea and forwarded Pordea's wishes and requests to the center.¹⁴¹ This was how Pordea sent a message to the center saying he was concerned, seeing intense and effective action by the Hungarian irredentist emigration, and suggested that these be counteracted. He indicated that he would do his utmost to keep the Hungarian case under control in the EP. He also suggested that an institute for European affairs be set up, which, in liaison with the European Parliament, would provide him with an appropriate opportunity to liaise actively.¹⁴² The intelligence, political, and emigration departments developed common combinations to assess Pordea's situation. In order to launch future intelligence operations, two members of the Association of International Law and International Relations (Asociația de Drept Internațional și Relații Internaționale),¹⁴³

¹³⁹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 pp. 251-255.

¹⁴⁰ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 263.

¹⁴¹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 262.

¹⁴² ACNSAS Foundation SIE 0005588 pp. 269-270.

¹⁴³ The Association for International Law and International Relations (ADIRI) was established in 1965 and is based in Bucharest. It has two publications: *Revista Română de Drept Internațional* and *Revue roumaine d'études internationales*. The dominant figure was Adrian Năstase, a former Social Democratic prime minister.

Adrian Năstase¹⁴⁴ and Valentin Lipatti¹⁴⁵ were proposed to be sent to provide cover stories for the operation asserting Romanian interests in the “retro” European Parliament, and for future operations. Furthermore, to build personal and institutional relationships, establishing a research group on “Unity of Europe”, which would involve agents “Marinescu”, “Maxim”, “Silviu,” and “Willy. The focus of this activity has been on the Pan-European Movement, the European Parliament, the Council of Europe and the European Solidarity Corps, of course in line with the operational position of MEP Pordea.¹⁴⁶

Although the same court in Paris condemned the *Le Matin* again on 22 February 1985, in the Pordea libel lawsuit, however, the case was far from coming to a standstill. In its December 29, 1985 issue, *The Sunday Times* in London reported in great detail on the meeting between Gustav Pordea and Romanian intelligence in Vienna on December 13-14, 1983.¹⁴⁷ The editorial office of the *Sunday Times* seemed to be better informed, as details of the Vienna meeting were reported that only those who attended the meeting could know. About a year before the 1984 European elections, after his 36-year stay in Paris, Pordea applied for and obtained French citizenship. He traveled to Vienna in December 1983 and stayed in room 378 of the five-star Hotel Bristol; the same day, Costel Mitran, a senior member of the Romanian intelligence organization, also arrived in Vienna from Bucharest.¹⁴⁸ Both of them stayed in the Austrian capital December 13-14, 1983, and met in the Hotel Bristol. Here, Mitran commissioned Pordea to enter the European Parliament on the list of a French political party. According to the article, Pordea replied that there is only one way to do this: buy yourself a seat as a candidate. Mitran said that 500 000 dollars were available for this purpose.¹⁴⁹ This further warming of vote buying had a devastating effect on Romanian Intelligence Unit 4, as the details proved that someone was leaking along this line. Two days after the article appeared the inspection

¹⁴⁴ Adrian Năstase (1950–) lawyer, sociologist. In 1978, he received his doctorate in international law. From 1973 to 1990 he was a research fellow at the Legal Research Institute of the Romanian Academy, vice-president of ADIRI from 1977, member of the French International Law Society from 1984, and research director of the International Institute of Human Rights in Strasbourg. He is first the National Rescue Front (FSN), then the Romanian Social Democracy Party (PDSR), the Social Democratic Party (PSD) leader in international relations, and the deputy leader of the party, which has been transformed several times. From 2000 to 2008, he was head of the PSD. From 1990 to 1992 he was Minister of Foreign Affairs, from 2001 to 2004 he was Prime Minister.

¹⁴⁵ Valentin Lipatti (1923–1999) graduated from the University of Bucharest and then taught at the Department of Latin. He is an expert in the history of French literature. From 1964 to 1984 he worked for the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and from 1965 to 1971 he represented Romania at UNESCO. From 1972 to 1977, he was the head of the Romanian delegation to the Helsinki and Geneva Security Conferences.

¹⁴⁶ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 0005588 pp. 269-270.

¹⁴⁷ SWAIN, Jon: Euro-MP is a communist agent; *Sunday Times*, 29 December, 1985. <http://jonswain.org/articles/articles/articles/communistmep.html> (downloaded 13 March 2021)

¹⁴⁸ Costel Mitran retired in 2000 as an officer of the SIE, which was re-established in 1990, after completing a successful career in Vienna. On his retirement, President Emil Constantinescu awarded him the rank of Brigadier General. As a retired general, he continued his activity by touring in the country, delivering lectures on intelligence, and he did this as third chairman of the Retired and Reserve Officers Association of Professional Intelligence (ACMRRSIE).

¹⁴⁹ SWAIN op.cit.

department conducted a summary analysis, and contrary to what was published in the *Sunday Times*, the topic of access to the European Parliament was raised by Pordea himself by stating he had a secure place on Simone Veil's list. The motion was made in the presence of Agent "Stan". According to the report it was Pordea who he claimed: "One single condition must be met to make sure he gets onto the list, namely if they give him 500 000 dollars of the Romanian services."¹⁵⁰ The summary analysis emphasizes that reports on the meeting that took place in December 1983 did not indicate that the proposal of financial support for Pordea would be submitted to or approved by the Romanian intelligence service. During the coordination between Mitran and Pordea neither a promise was made of a future large sum of money in the form of support, nor Le Pen's name was mentioned. By contrast, at a meeting in Vienna, Pordea, in the presence of the Romanian ambassador, repeatedly professed belief in the need to respond to the irredentist attacks. The summary analysis revealed signs of betrayal in Pordea coming to the meeting with his son, saying he was very afraid of the meeting. In exchange for a receipt, the Romanian party gave Pordea \$ 2,300 in travel expenses and paid for his accommodation. According to the evaluation officer, Pordea's admission to giving half a million USD to Le Pen was to be expected, because this might have been the objective of the planners of the combination. This is also foreshadowed, the Westerners trumped up Pacea again: make further revealing confessions, as well as Swiss financial companies will be compromised by alleging they handle sums of money coming from Romania.¹⁵¹

Gustav Pordea's case would have been just another chapter in the Franco-Romanian spy stories had the man in question not submitted to the European Parliament draft resolution No. 2-545/84 on behalf of European Right, in response to Dunn's draft resolution. And he did it in the conviction that "*the demands of the minorities are unfounded, given the fact that as minorities they were granted a situation which is liberal, what is more, exceptional in nature.*" He believed that he had "a duty to condemn the demanding and unauthorized behavior of Hungarians in Romania as a probable source of terrorist acts." In his submission, he asked the relevant committee to make public the results of its investigation and to call on the Government of the Hungarian People's Republic to stop all support for the illegitimate activities of the Hungarian minority in Romania.¹⁵² The petition was not voted on by Parliament, but Romanian intelligence decided in September 1987 to suspend its cooperation with Agent Pordea on the basis of a number of indications and evidence,¹⁵³ who, despite what had happened, held his seat in the European Parliament, where he represented France under the colors of the National Front until 24 July 1989.

North and South American outlook

In addition to the Italian and French lines discussed so far, anti-Hungarian emigration activities were carried out with similar intensity through the Saxon and Swabian, Jewish and Romanian emigration groups in Canada, the United States and

¹⁵⁰ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 282.

¹⁵¹ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 282-282v.

¹⁵² The Pordea case. Literary Newspaper, 1986/1. p. 4.

¹⁵³ ACNSAS Fond SIE 0005588 p. 336.

South America. We can only report these influential operations in a panoramic way, mainly due to the unexplored sources.

To counteract the South and the North American Hungarian emigrant activities, the institutions of the emigrant/forced emigrant Saxon minority were used. The agency influence of prominent and at the same time influential personalities of the Saxon/Swabian emigration community was aimed at conveying a favorable image of the Romanian dictatorship in the United States and Canada due to their German descent. According to the schedule of the Romanian intelligence operation, various American Saxon emigration organizations, including the *Alianța Sașilor Transilvăneni* (Transylvanian Saxon Association), were forced to expose the activities of the Hungarian irredentists.¹⁵⁴ The fight against Hungarian emigration was also a constant task in the direction of German emigration organizations.¹⁵⁵ In response to this operational request, pre-written texts were sent from the Romanian Intelligence Center and published in *Ecouri Românești*, (Romanian Echoes).¹⁵⁶ Although the rezidentura built up in in Canada was insignificant in terms of manpower and quality, the center's instruction to take action against Hungarian emigration had to be carried out. Thus, among the Germans who left Romania, they had to find collaborators and persuade them to attack Hungarian emigration according to Bucharest's ideas, proving that the Germans and Romanians formed a unity against the Hungarian irredentism. The efficiency of agents operating in Saxon and Swabian exile organizations must have been minimal because the officers themselves reported that they had potent opportunities rise and would work more efficiently in the future.¹⁵⁷

Romanian intelligence also paid attention to the activities of Hungarian emigration organizations on the South American continent. Thus, it also rolled up the

¹⁵⁴ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 31125 p. 2.

¹⁵⁵ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 31125 pp. 13-14.

¹⁵⁶ ACNSAS fond SIE 31125 p. 13. The *Ecouri romanesti*, Toronto Romanian appearing between 1974 and 1984 emigration newspaper.

¹⁵⁷ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 31125 p. 26.

relations and activities of the leader of the Transylvanian World Federation. They were aware that in Transylvania Károly Király,¹⁵⁸ Edgár Balogh,¹⁵⁹

Ákos Egyed¹⁶⁰ and other prominent intellectuals are not only visited on behalf of the world organization, but also carry out intensive supportive and organizing work to build a network of contacts around these persons for their protection in order to protect them. The relationship between the Transylvanian World Federation and the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation (HHRF), led by László Hámos, was also

¹⁵⁸ Károly Király (1930–) economist, Hungarian politician from Romania. Between 1950 and 1965 he was an active member of the Romanian Communist Party, then the first secretary of the CYO Committee of the Hungarian Autonomous Province, hence the first secretary of the Gheorgheni District Party Committee. From 1966 to 1968 he was a member of the Central Committee of the RAC. From 1968 to 1972, he was the first secretary of the Covasna County Party Committee and an alternate member of the Political Executive Committee of the RCP. He became vice – president in 1968 to the Council of Hungarian Nationality Workers to be established on November 15. In 1972, he resigned in protest of official Romanian policy. He was “exiled” by the authorities, appointed the general manager of the Karánsebes Timber Production and Wood Processing Plant, inhabited by Romanians, in Caraş-Severin County, and later sent back to Târgu Mureş. In 1978, he protested in a letter against the Romanian state measures against the Hungarians in Transylvania. He was exiled to Caransebes again. By sending his letters abroad, he informed the international public about Ceauşescu's legal crackdowns. After the 1989 revolution, he was elected vice-president of the Council of the Romanian National Salvation Front. He attended the Democratic Union of Hungarians in Romania in forming, but was not a member of the DUHR, 1992-1993 in the alliance of three's organization was president. In 1990. He played a significant role in the events of 17-19 March in Târgu Mureş as Vice-President of the National Salvation Front. Specifically, it put pressure on the then leaders of the Mureş County Police and Army to intervene and stop the atrocities, otherwise it would take them to court-martial. Late May in 1990, he became a member of the Romanian Senate (the other house of the bicameral Romanian parliament next to the House of Representatives). He did not fulfill his mandate and resigned on 12 December 1991.

¹⁵⁹ Edgár Balogh (1906–1996) was a Hungarian journalist, editor-in-chief and university professor in Romania. As a native of the Highlands, he began his journalistic work at the Magyar Hírlap in Prague in 1926. He was the organizer of the left-wing Sarló (Sickle) movement of Hungarian youth in Czechoslovakia. He joined the Communist movement in 1931, which is why he was expelled from Czechoslovakia in 1935 by the Czechoslovak authorities. He settled in Brasov and became an internal collaborator of Our Time and an article writer for the Brasov Newspapers. He is the initiator of the 1937 meeting in Vásárhely. After the second decision in Vienna, he was the editor of Kelet Népe in Cluj-Napoca (1941) and an employee of the Hungarian Nation in Budapest, and from 1942 in the Kis Újság in Budapest. After the Soviet invasion, in 1944. On the initiative of Cluj-Napoca, the daily Naples was published on October 18, 1948, of which he was the editor-in-chief until 1948. He was the vice-president of the Hungarian People's Association (MNSZ) (until 1946) and, as the head of the cultural department, took part in the organization of the new cultural institutions of the Hungarians in Romania. From 1948 he was a university professor and then rector of Bolyai University. In the autumn of 1949, along with several other leaders of the MNSZ, he was imprisoned for violating socialist rule of law, and was only rehabilitated in 1956. From 1957 to 1971 he was the deputy editor-in-chief of OurTime, and the editor-in-chief of the Hungarian literary lexicon in Romania, which appeared from 1981.

¹⁶⁰ Ákos Egyed (1929–) is a Hungarian historian from Transylvania. He completed his secondary schools in Sepsiszentgyörgy, and from 1948 he became a student at Bolyai University. From 1951 to 1953 he was an intern there, after which he became a researcher at the Institute of History in Cluj-Napoca. Between 1990 and 1994 he lectured at the Lajos Kossuth University in Debrecen, and between 1995 and 1997 as a visiting lecturer at Eötvös Loránd University. He has been an external member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences since 1990.

mapped. Thus, they were also aware that István Zolcsák¹⁶¹ and László Hámos¹⁶² there is no consensus on several issues.¹⁶³ They also knew that László Hámos and Bulcsú Veress¹⁶⁴ tried to persuade Zolcsák to give up his hasty, thoughtless and noisy activities affecting the Transylvanian intellectuals. Let the HHRF be more involved in these matters, as they have more experience and are more organized than the World Federation, and prefer to support them financially. Romanian intelligence built on the tense disagreement between Zolcsák, Hámos and Veress and began discrediting and neutralizing operations.

In 1980, Romanian intelligence firmly thought that István Zolcsák was acting on the initiative and with the support of the Budapest professional services. According to the Romanian opposition in exile, Budapest initiated all this to awaken the "dying Magyar awareness", to win over the second generation of the exiles, and the central role in the management of emigration. Through thoroughly exploring and controlling his activities in the interests of the Hungarians of Transylvania,¹⁶⁵ Zolcsák's ("Pedro was his target person codename) future activities could be prevented – the Romanian state security services set the objective.

The fear of the Romanian services that the Hungarian secret service was behind Zolcsák is not completely unfounded, but it cannot be said that the Hungarian intelligence in the early eighties had a definite blow to Hungarian emigration and wanted to wage war against the Ceaușescu dictatorship. Even if he was not directly contacted by the Hungarian secret services, he was indirectly used as a reference point, i.e. the services were curious about who was behind the money in emigration, which group wanted what, which émigré organization intended to submit to American decision-makers. The Hungarian professional service was extremely cautious, as it

¹⁶¹ István Zolcsák (1921-2006) founded the Transylvanian World Federation in São Paulo in 1974, of which he became president. He asked Wass Albert, who lived in Florida, to co-chair, so that North American Hungarians / Szeklers were also represented in the association.

¹⁶² In 1976, the Committee for Human Rights in Romania was established under the leadership of László Hámos, which later took over the protection of the interests of Hungarians in the Highlands, which is why it changed its name in 1983 and continued its lobbying activities as the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation in American political circles.

¹⁶³ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 044009 pp. 4-5.

¹⁶⁴ Bulcsú Veress (1941-2012) Hungarian-American lawyer, political scientist. From 1981 to 1991, he was a Fellow of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and an expert on defense and national security. After the 1956 revolution, as a high school student, he was a member of an anti-communist student organization. He was arrested in 1958 and sentenced to 8 months in prison. He holds a law degree from Eötvös Loránd University. He studied comparative and postgraduate studies in international law at ELTE at the University of Strasbourg. After completing his studies, he emigrated to the United States in 1971. In the same year he was admitted to Columbia University in New York, where in 1976 (as a third degree) he obtained a doctorate in political science and international relations. From 1981 to 1991, he was a Fellow of the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs and an expert on defense and national security. Representing the New York-based Romanian Human Rights Commission (CHRR) (later the Hungarian Human Rights Foundation – HHRF), he lobbied for the Hungarian minority in Romania in the United States Congress in Washington.

¹⁶⁵ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 044009 p. 14.

did not want to establish direct agency relations with such exposed persons as István Zolcsák, who was also "processed" by the Romanians.¹⁶⁶

The wealthy Zolcsák was the founder and maintainer of several organizations (Movimento Pro Transylvania, Transylvanian World Federation), that had representatives in Argentina, Canada and Austria. His organizing power and lobbying may have disrupted Romanian state security, as can be inferred from the fact that Zolcsák was threatened with execution by the Romanian consul in Brazil. A report on this threat dated March 22, 1982, landed on the table of Iulian Vlad, the last commander of the Securitate. The threat was confirmed by András Fodor, who belonged to the inner circles of Zolcsák. The interesting thing about the case is that in 1946 Fodor left Hungary with an emigrant passport as a representative of Tunggram. He became a columnist for the *Brasil Herald* and worked for the Hungarian services as a social contact. In the same intelligence summary referred to above, a detailed description is given to the fact that Zolcsák was constantly protected by a personal bodyguard in the factory owned by him. An armed guard unit was established to provide personal protection for him, access to the referred institution was multi-tiered, and we also learn from the analysis that the residential area he lived in, Sao Paulo's most exclusive district, was under permanent police protection.¹⁶⁷

Closing remarks

The Romanian secret services used far-right press products against the émigré centers and communities to carry out their disinformation operations. Influence was usually achieved through émigré foundations and associations. This was not too difficult to achieve, as some of the emigrants who left Romania after 1945 were members of the Legionary movement, or at least sympathized with it. This part of the Romanian emigration also maintained good relations with the far-right organizations of the Western world. Like Codreanu's Iron Guard, Ceaușescu's national communism was anti-minority. At this point, the far right of emigration and the enemy image of Romanian communism became one, making it easier to understand why the Romanian secret services were able to effectively network and influence these circles. This mechanism was recognized by Thierry Wolte as early as in 1986; he presented the KGB activities analogy drawn between the Securitate and the Soviet big brother intelligence, and came to the conclusion that there was a difference in scale and size only between the two state security organizations, not in the nature and direction of their operations.¹⁶⁸ Augustin Gustav Pordea and Iosif Constantin Drăgan were involved in Romanian intelligence against the minority protection activities of Hungarian emigration in the Western world. Through presenting the cases we were able to demonstrate what Thierry Wolte, based on his experiences in France, wrote, namely that "it seems that one single person plays a part in these matters, Iosif Constantin Dragan", since far right wing Romanian émigré papers conveyed discrediting propaganda according to the taste of Bucharest against Paul Goma, Virgil Tanas and Monica Lovinescu forced into exile. Wolton's thoughts put to paper in

¹⁶⁶ OSZK, 1956 Institute and Oral History Archive: "I was a double agent and I am proud of it". Csaba Laszlo Seres Damenija's interview. www.rev.hu/ords/f?p7=600:2:31325026560896::NO:2:P2_PAGE_ID:420569.

¹⁶⁷ ACNSAS Foundation SIE 044009 pp. 24-25.

¹⁶⁸ WOLTON op. cit., p. 294.

1986 that Gustav Pordea's case, who made it to the EP from Jean-Marie Le Pen's list, is much more complex than Dragan's "and is linked to the magnate by a thousand threads."¹⁶⁹

Hopefully, the processed cases will provide an insight into the political and economic operations of Romanian intelligence, and more specifically on the modus operandi of Hungarian emigration. It is important to mention that the cases uncovered give only a partial picture of the activities of Romanian intelligence at the time, so we could not undertake to assess the full volume and depth of the operations. This will require further detailed research.

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Abstract

It is a well-known fact that the proportion of women in crime is lower than that of men, but this seems to be changing. On the one hand, the number of crimes perpetrated by women is on the rise, on the other hand, violence as a characteristic is increasingly apparent in the behavior of female perpetrators. As research on women in crime has heretofore received less attention in literature, and forms of violence have been showing signs of change, more intensive research into the perpetration of violent crime by women and focusing on features particular to women is necessary. Gender distinction is related to both biological and social differences in the behavioral level of aggression. Exploring gender specifics fills a long-standing gap in the research of the neurobiological background of aggression in the neurological, hormonal, and genetic fields.

Keywords: aggression in women, criminality, neurobiology

Introduction

The background to violence is evolutionary. Competitive behavior within species evolved as a matter of course due to the lack of unlimited availability of resources, forcing conspecifics to join forces and cooperate, since competition generated aggression, whose energy requirements and dangers (e.g. injuries, inability to fight) could significantly reduce the chances of survival. Given that the evolutionary interest in ensuring survival overrides individual flourishing, over time social norms have channeled aggressive behavior, the primary method of which is the establishment of pecking order. There is no chaos among conspecifics on this issue, but rather a set of principles that determine the feeding, mate selection and other options of group members. Thus, an internal system of aggression regulation has evolved from species to species and from population to population, which in the case of man has acquired a social and even cultural medium. As part of this process, the manifestation of aggression in the human species is essentially regulated by culture, and violence can therefore be said to be, in general terms, a manifestation of aggression that is not socially acceptable. Today, the role of the media – especially social media – is over-represented in this issue and is a key determinant of the social perception of a given act of violence.

Aggression is a complex human behavior whose comprehensive, uniform definition is beyond the scope of this study. There is a tendency to associate physical aggression and abuse with verbal abuse in our everyday lives, apart from war zones, conflict zones and certain forms of terrorism, exclusion, shaming and humiliation, the consequences of which are often more significant than the physical injuries, which heal sooner or later, while psychological injuries can stay with us for life.

In the course of a child's development, primary aggressive behavior (temper, anger) is initially manifested, which later matures and becomes "humanized", so that by the end of adolescence it becomes indirect aggression, characterized by sophisticated techniques, which may develop over the years, in accordance with or in deviant ways, in line with social norms. Primary anger (most often associated with physical acts of violence) is therefore not the same as resentment (which may also be expressed through verbal channels). The former is present in animals and children; the latter is human-specific. Indirect aggression can also be a form of social manipulation aimed at inflicting psychological/social damage to the other person, e.g. by spreading malicious gossip. It is not irrelevant whether the manifestation of aggression is reactive, i.e. in response to a stimulus, or proactive, i.e. ultimately "without cause", and merely a means of expressing dominance.

In the animal kingdom, the aggressive behavior of a conspecific can be triggered by the weaker opponent adopting a surrender posture, which can also stop the process of attack. At the social level, empathy and affection are on the opposite side of violence, distinguished from social intelligence by an emotional component, since the latter can operate without emotion or attachment (e.g. a sociopath may use his social skills to inflict harm on others without feeling mercy).

Despite the generally accepted view that schoolboys are more likely to use physical forms of aggression and schoolgirls are more likely to use verbal and indirect aggression, it is surprising that in our country nearly 25% of schoolgirls were involved in fights in a given period (HBSC – WHO Health Behavior in School-aged Children, 2011).¹

The study of female perpetrators of violence has been based largely on social science and criminological analysis, primarily on the role of women in society and the family. The experience of recent years and decades, based on forensic case studies and international trends, shows that the role of female perpetrators in violent crime has undergone a marked change, not only in terms of proportions, but also in terms of violence, with a greater emphasis on the female perpetrator. The biomedical and neurobiological study of women's aggression is a less studied and new trend, which seeks to understand the specific characteristics of women in this field, independently of the social sciences and on a physiological basis.

Women are more likely than men to engage in so-called indirect aggressive acts (e.g. spreading false rumors, gossip, exclusion from a social group or community, making someone suspect someone without justification, criticizing the appearance or personality of others).² The finding is even more valid for adult women.³

¹ BUDA, Mariann: Rude boys - gentle girls?... Bullying behavior of school girls; In: NÉMETH, Nóra Veronika (ed.): Educators and trainees: Snapshots of teacher education and teachers in the 21st century; Szeged, Hungary, Belvedere Meridionale, 2014, pp. 133-154

² ARCHER, John et al.: An integrated review of indirect, relational and social aggression. Pers. Soc. Psychol. Rev. 2005, Issue No. 9, pp. 212-230

³ ÖSTERMAN, Karin et al.: Cross-cultural evidence of female indirect aggression. Aggressive Behavior, 1998, Issue No. 24, pp. 1-8

Most cultures reward "militant" behavior in men, but punish women for such behavior. Social norms of behavior prohibit physical aggression by women.⁴

In experimental conditions, in which responses to behavior, electric shock, pain, loud noise, exclusion, rejection are tested, unprovoked women show lower physical and verbal aggression than men, while aggression to physical provocation or unjust attack is equally divided between men and women.⁵

In terms of alcohol-related aggression, studies show that acute and chronic alcohol consumption increases aggression in both sexes, in part through abnormal frontal lobe function.⁶ An interesting finding is that low-dose, moderate alcohol consumption increased aggression in women, whereas increasing the amount did not increase aggression.⁷ This may be due to the deliberative effect of alcohol, whereby women's inhibitions are released by low alcohol and they are therefore "braver" in overt aggression, whereas when drunk their concentration and motor skills are impaired. Another study in this area found that alcohol-related aggression in women increased only for explicit provocation, but not for minor, harmless bullying.⁸

With regard to aggression in partner relationships, studies show that women are more likely than men to use some kind of instrument, weapon, throw objects and bite their victims.^{9,10} This may be due to the fact that women's smaller muscle mass may favor "fighting" at a distance and make it more difficult, but not impossible, for violent behavior to manifest itself. According to a study published by the WHO in 2013, which analyzed 1121 cases involving 65 countries and covered the period 1982-2011, the proportion of women killed in intimate partner violence was 38%, while the same rate for male victims was 6%. Other studies have found equal rates of partner involvement in forms of physical abuse such as punching, slapping and knife attacks.¹¹ Studies from the field of justice have found that more serious forms of violence are equally likely to be used by women and men.¹² However, women's involvement in double perpetration, where both partners are accused of violence against each other, is due to the fact that women defend themselves in the context of violence and

⁴ EAGLY, Alice H. et al.: Gender stereotypes, occupational roles, and beliefs about part-time employees; *Psychol. Women Q.* 1986, Issue No.10, pp. 252-262

⁵ BETTENCOURT, B. Ann et al.: Gender differences in aggression as a function of provocation: a meta-analysis. *Psychol. Bull.* 1996, Issue No. 119, pp. 422-447

⁶ HEINZ, Adrienne J. et al.: Cognitive and neurobiological mechanisms of alcohol-related aggression; *Nat. Rev. Neurosci.* 2011, Issue No. 12, pp. 400-413

⁷ ROHSENOW, Damaris J. et al.: Effects of alcohol and expectancies on verbal aggression in men and women; *J. Abnorm. Psychol.* 1984, Issue No. 93, pp. 418-432

⁸ CRANE, Cory A. et al.: Provocation and target gender as moderators of the relationship between acute alcohol use and female perpetrated aggression; *Aggress. Violent Behav.* 2018, Issue No. 40, pp. 36-43

⁹ ARCHER, John: Sex differences in physically aggressive acts between heterosexual partners: a meta-analytic review; *Aggressive Violent Behavior*, 2002, Issue No. 7, pp. 313-351

¹⁰ MELTON, Heather C. – BELKNAP, Joanne: He hits, she hits: assessing gender differences and similarities in officially reported intimate partner violence; *Crim. Justice Behav.* 2003, Issue No. 30, pp. 328-348

¹¹ *Ibid.*

¹² BUSCH, Amy L. et al.: Comparing women and men arrested for domestic violence: a preliminary report; *J. Fam. Violence* Issue No. 19, 2004, pp. 49-57

therefore also participate in the aggressive act as perpetrators.¹³ Studies have shown that the motivation for female aggressive partner violence is anger, control of the partner, attention-seeking or revenge.¹⁴

In terms of sexual aggression, which includes forced sexual acts or oral sexual intercourse, forced kissing, use of sexual objects, forced genital display, studies show a female rate of only 2.2%.¹⁵ It should be noted that some of the violent sexual acts committed by women remain undetected because studies show that the victim fears that society will blame her for the incident, that there may be retaliation or that the official report will not be taken seriously.¹⁶

The not negligible and not insignificant nature of women's criminal behavior was already highlighted by the UN's Fourth United Nations Congress in 1970 and the Fifth UN Congress in Geneva in 1975. It was felt that female crime was on the increase worldwide, that it was undergoing a marked change, that female offenders were becoming more independent and aggressive, and that this was due to the emancipatory lifestyle and the trend towards emancipation which was characteristic of the period and which was on the increase.¹⁷ In the decade or so before the Congress, the number of female offenders in the United States and France nearly doubled, but the trend is even more marked in countries with traditionally low female crime rates, such as Australia and Japan. In Brazil, the number of crimes committed by women increased by 90% in absolute terms over the period, and in India the number of women prisoners increased by a similar amount. In 1973, in New York alone, there were 23 separate gangs of women gangsters, the majority of whom were juveniles. Not only crimes of a violent nature, but also so-called intellectual crimes such as fraud and embezzlement, have shown an upward trend in female crime: in the United States, the increase in these areas was 136% in the above period, according to the relevant FBI figures.¹⁸

The upward trend in female crime has continued after this period. In the nearly one and a half decade following the above-mentioned Congress, the female crime rate in Germany rose from 17.5% to 22.5%. In the United States, the proportion of women arrested rose by almost 80% in this period, while the participation of men in this category increased by only 40%.¹⁹ Internationally, the rate of violent female offenders continues to rise. In the 10-year period prior to 2008/2009, the proportion of female offenders in Australia and Western countries showed a steep increase. While the

¹³ Ibid.

¹⁴ BAIR-MERRITT, Megan H. et al.: Why do women use intimate partner violence? A systematic review of women's motivations; *Trauma Violence Abuse*, 2010, Issue No. 11, pp. 178-189

¹⁵ CORTONI, Franca et al.: The proportion of sexual offenders who are female is higher than thought: a meta-analysis. *Crim. Justice Behav.* 2017, Issue No. 44, pp. 145-162

¹⁶ STEMPEL, Lara et al.: Sexual victimization perpetrated by women: federal data reveal surprising prevalence; *Aggress. Violent Behav.* 2017, Issue No. 34, pp. 302-311

¹⁷ RASKÓ, Gabriella: *Female Crime*; 1978, pp. 10-23 and 234-235

¹⁸ Ibid.

¹⁹ FEHÉR, Lenke: *Female Crime*; In: GÖNCZÖL – KORINEK – Lévai (Eds.): *Criminology, crime, crime control*; Budapest, Corvina, 1999

number of male offenders increased by 29% over this period, the proportion of female offenders increased by 35%.²⁰

Relevant data on domestic conditions can be examined from 1931 onwards, showing that the proportion of women in crime ranged from 10 to 15 % and remained similar until recently,²¹ although it should be noted that the statistical evidence depends significantly on the type of offending behavior under consideration. It is also not a minor circumstance that the proportion of female offenders shows a significant spike in certain periods, showing that as socio-economic circumstances change, women 'take advantage' of the opportunity to commit crime. An example of this is the First World War period, which clearly shows what happens when the vast majority of men fighting on the front line are replaced by women in certain areas of life – when the overall female crime rate in the country rose to 21%.²² Looking at the period after the regime change it can be stated that female criminality, after some stagnation has shown a trend of continuously increasing.²³

The literature also monitors the upward trend in female crime. In the 1999 national criminology textbook, the chapter on women's crime was only eight pages long; the 2006 textbook devoted eighteen pages to the subject, and ten years later the chapter on women's crime has grown to twenty-one pages. In the 2020 criminology textbook of the National University of Public Service, twenty-five pages are devoted to the subject. This trend shows that domestic research on women's crime is becoming increasingly important in the academic world.²⁴

The origins of gender differences in aggression

Gender differences in aggression first manifest themselves in early childhood (3-6 years).²⁵ A number of risk factors can cause problems related to aggression (e.g. smoking during pregnancy, birth complications),²⁶ but there is evidence of gender differences in maternal depression, with a strong correlation between maternal depression and aggressive behavior in boys around 2 years and girls around 6 years.²⁷

²⁰ LIDDEL, Margaret – MARTINOVIC, Marietta: Women's Offending: Trends, Issues and Theoretical Explanations. In: International Journal of Social Inquiry, 2013, Vol. 6, Issue No. 1, pp. 127-142

²¹ KÖVÉR, Ágnes: Female crime before and after the regime change; Home Affairs Review, 1998, Issue No. 3, pp. 5-8

²² Ibid.

²³ Ibid.

²⁴ FAIL, Ágnes: Recent Hungarian criminological literature on female crime. In: Prison Review, 2017, No. 2, p. 7

²⁵ ARCHER, John: Sex differences in aggression in real-world settings: a meta-analytic review; Rev. Gen. Psychol. 2005, Issue No. 8, pp. 291-322

²⁶ JIANGHONG, Liu: Early health risk factors for violence: conceptualization, evidence and implications; Aggressive Violent Behavior, 2011, Issue No. 16, pp. 63-73

²⁷ BLATT-EISENGART, Ilana et al.: Sex differences in the longitudinal relations among family risk factors and childhood externalizing symptoms. Dev. Psychol. 2009, Issue No. 45, pp. 491-502

Mothers' cannabis use during pregnancy increased aggression in their 1.5-year-old daughters.²⁸

The difference in aggressive behavior between adult women and men is partly due to biological and partly to social causes. Research into the biological causes is a recent trend in which the role of the hypothalamic-pituitary-sex hormone axis is a key issue. There are still many questions to be addressed in the study of the hormonal relationship. The relationship between high levels of the male sex hormone testosterone and aggression has long been known, but it seems that high testosterone levels are not a cause but rather a consequence of aggressive behavior. Placing dominant male copperhead monkeys in a different group when their influence is reduced may induce a decrease in hormone levels. Similarly, in athletes, testosterone levels are higher in winners than losers following competition. However, for women, the hormonal link remains to be tested, as the small number of studies so far have not found a significant correlation between hormone levels and aggression. Gender differences are also associated with perceptions of the dangerousness of the situation. Women are more effective at inhibiting their emotions and behavior, especially when emotions of fear are also present.²⁹

From a cultural point of view, the process of socialization of women is primary, and the defining element of this process is the relationship; women define themselves in terms of their participation in relationships and in the group.³⁰ In this light, the dominance of indirect aggression, i.e. the ability of women to hide their rage and anger behind kindness, femininity and charm, but not to engage in open confrontation for socio-cultural reasons, is understandable.

Women see direct, even pathological, aggression as a problem of self-control, a fact which is also reflected in the traditional avoidance of direct aggressive behavior by women.³¹ It is also attributable to the socialization background that women are better able to control their aggression. "A little girl doesn't do that", the girl-child is taught to control her temper.

Two factors play an important role in women's aggression at school, mainly indirectly. On the one hand, and with reference to the above, the importance for women of belonging to a group and their role in the community is paramount. They do not tend to oppose group opinion and do not risk exclusion from the group.

Another factor is that boys are more preoccupied, for example, during school holidays, while schoolgirls are in small groups watching other schoolgirls and seeing

²⁸ EL MARROUN, Hanan et al.: Intrauterine cannabis exposure leads to more aggressive behavior and attention problems in 18-month old girls; *Drug Alcohol Depend*, 2011, Issue No. 118, pp. 470-474

²⁹ CAMPBELL, Anne et al.: Intent to harm or injure? Gender and the expression of anger; *Aggressive Behavior*, May/June, 2008, Vol. 34, Issue No. 3, pp. 282-293

³⁰ UNDERWOOD, Marion K.: *Social aggression among girls*. Guilford Press, 2003, pp. 13-35

³¹ CAMPBELL, Anne et al.: Social Representation of Aggression as an Explanation of Gender Differences: A Preliminary Study; *Aggressive Behavior*, 4/1/1992. Vol.18, Issue No. 2, pp. 95-108

what they are doing; they have an inner urge to make a change or to make something happen.³²

Socio-cultural perceptions of female aggression

The general social perception is that men are the ideal perpetrators and women are the ideal victims.³³ Women are generally believed to be non-threatening, non-criminal, passive and non-aggressive because of their gender and social status. If she does commit a violent act, it is assumed that she has a disturbed mind or personality disorder, or is motivated by her status as a victim.³⁴ In other words, it is assumed that if a woman commits a violent (criminal) act typical of men, it is because she has a mental illness or hormonal imbalance. Femininity as a condition is to be assessed as an extra-legal factor, similar to age or ethnicity. Accordingly, female status may lead to a more lenient treatment in criminal proceedings, and possibly to a lighter sentence (the so-called chivalry hypothesis).³⁵

In an experiment involving 232 psychology students, half of the students were given photographs of male and half of female offenders, all of whom pleaded not guilty to the charges against them, some of which were serious (e.g. manslaughter). The study showed that female offenders were significantly less likely to be found guilty than male offenders. However, it was a curious finding that the students were particularly lenient towards female offenders with a more attractive appearance.³⁶

The prominence of femininity in this issue goes as far as to suggest that the incompatibility of criminality with female nature calls into question whether women can be held responsible for committing the offence in the first place.³⁷

In another approach, it is not absolutely necessary to judge a female offender more leniently or leniently in relation to a particular criminal act, but if she transgresses the traditional female role, which is described in terms of feminine purity, femininity, obedience and submissiveness, she may be subject to a more severe punishment than her male counterparts, to whom these characteristics do not generally apply (the so-called 'Tutelage Hypothesis').³⁸ In other words, aggressive behavior that is not in the nature of a woman is more severely punished because of its deviant nature, since it is not – in social terms – the norm for men. The difference between 'tutelage' and the 'chivalry' approach is therefore that the 'chivalry' attitude is reserved for

³² OWENS, Laurence et al.: „Guess what I just heard!”: Indirect aggression among teenage girls in Australia; *Aggressive Behavior*, 2000. Vol. 26, Issue No. 1, pp. 67-83

³³ DUGGAN, Marian: *Revisiting The 'Ideal Victim'*; Bristol: Policy Press, 2018, p. 52

³⁴ WEARE, Siobhan: “The Mad”, “The Bad”, “The Victim”: Gendered Constructions of Women Who Kill within the Criminal Justice System. *Laws*, 2013, Vol. 2, Issue No. 3, pp. 337-361

³⁵ TURNER, Kevin B. et al.: The Effect of Gender on the Judicial Pretrial Decision of Bail Amount Set; *Federal probation*, 2006, Vol. 70, Issue No. 1, pp. 56-62

³⁶ AHOLA, Angela S. et al.: Justice Needs a Blindfold: Effects of Gender and Attractiveness on Prison Sentences and Attributions of Personal Characteristics in a Judicial Process; *Psychiatry, Psychology and Law*, Issue, 2009, No. 16, pp. 90-100

³⁷ Ibid.

³⁸ Ibid.

'normal' women, who, being deviant or aggressive by nature, are in fact committing a double crime: on the one hand, they are breaking the law, which is punishable by criminal law, and on the other, they are defying social expectations of their gender – their femininity (the so-called Devilish Woman Hypothesis). The "normal" woman is passive, accepting and submissive, while the "devilish" woman is violent and aggressive, so that the latter behavior in itself violates social – not legal – norms.³⁹

To be distinguished from the so-called Chivalry Hypothesis is the Battered Woman Syndrome,⁴⁰ the essence of which is that any leniency or mitigation in criminal law is not based on the femininity of the perpetrator, but on the fact that the subsequent female perpetrator has previously been subjected to torture or suffered mental or physical injury that led to the commission of such an act.

In a "chivalry" approach, the female perpetrator is emotionally unstable, weak and mentally fragile, which implies that she is only partially responsible for the act committed. The assault as a background is an additional factor that establishes the basis for the violent behavior, which is far from the woman's default, as if it triggered and provoked it.

Generally speaking, women are reported in the media as victims and not as perpetrators of criminal activity, and the role of women as victims is over-represented in the media. When female offenders are reported, individual factors such as selfish behavior and family circumstances are typically examined, highlighting the abnormal nature of women's offending.⁴¹

Media coverage of female offenders can be summarized from one study as showing that offences against children (including the offender's own child) are more harshly perceived in the media than other forms of behavior that can be committed by women. The reason for this is, with reference to the above, that the woman has not only violated criminal law, but has also violated societal expectations of femininity, and thus committed a double crime (see Devilish Woman Syndrome, above). It can be argued, therefore, that society has a certain expectation of women, that there are some acts that are not only legally but also socially unacceptable, that are 'not appropriate' for women. A typical example is aggressive acts against children, given that motherhood and child-related activities are traditionally linked to women, and therefore the rare case of a woman committing violence against her current partner because of a relationship problem is less shocking than committing the same act against a child.

According to the study, a similar situation occurs when a woman's act of violence against a child is considered in the light of the same type of crime committed by a man. For the above reasons, when caring and motherhood are far from the man's responsibility according to the general social perception, the man's aggression against

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ CHESNEY-LIND, Meda: Media misogyny: Demonizing "violent" girls and women; In J. FERREL – N. WEBSDALE (Eds.): Making trouble: Cultural representations of crime, deviance, and control; 1999, pp. 115-141

⁴¹ Ibid.

the child, although not nice, is not subject to the same consideration as the woman's crime against the child.

A particular manifestation of media perception is the case where a man and a woman commit their crime together, as co-conspirators. In such cases, the woman's perception – and the social criticism of the couple in general – is harsher and more severe than the description of them separately, as if the woman's aggravating circumstance were that she committed the crime not alone but in collaboration with a man (the so-called Bonnie & Clyde effect).⁴²

The neurobiological background of female aggression

Neurobiological theories are based on the results of genetic, neurobiological and hormonal research.

It is not disputed that offending behavior has genetic factors. These factors act in multiple and indirect ways, by influencing the functioning of the nervous system and by inducing changes in the structure of the brain, which in turn lead to changes in psychological characteristics and thus to an increased risk of offending. It is important to note that genetic factors are not predictive but probabilistic factors. The twin studies that have been carried out on the 'criminal gene' have ultimately demonstrated that the propensity to commit crime is heritable, and that the role of this heritability, together with the circumstances of upbringing, determines the propensity to commit crime.

Epigenetics is one of the most important fields of science today, but also one of the most difficult to grasp from a legal and ethical point of view, and one that focuses on the links between environmental and genetic influences. By definition, it includes heritable changes in gene expression that are not associated with changes in DNA sequence.⁴³ Epigenetic research aims to clarify the environmental influences on female aggression, in particular how childhood, adolescent and youthful influences generate the occurrence of aggressive acts in later life. This is significant because research shows that a proportion of female perpetrators of violent crime are victims of previous sexual or physical abuse.⁴⁴

The relationship between brain function and offending behavior has been the subject of thousands of publications in recent years. These studies suggest that there may be a link between criminal behavior and organic abnormalities in the nervous system, although there is currently no conclusive evidence on this subject. In particular, this finding is supported by publications that show that brain injuries of a certain localization lead to certain types of offending behavior, that other types of injuries lead to other types of offending behavior and that injuries that do not lead to any criminal attitudes may be suppressed. The relationship is not clear and, more importantly, cannot be simplified. The nervous system links behavior to information from the sensory organs, which is analyzed by the supra-coordinate brain area, the

⁴² Ibid.

⁴³ EMBER, István – Kiss, István – Cseh, Károly: Public Health Medicine. Pécs, Hungary: University of Pécs, 2013, pp. 101-109

⁴⁴ Ibid.

frontal lobe, and this process results in the manifestation of an actual muscular response, which can be both delinquent and non-delinquent.

Brain imaging techniques, primarily functional MRI, form the basis of the investigation of the functioning of the nervous system, but other neurological methods of investigation, such as EEG scans, can also be informative. In the latter measurement, the so-called event-related potential (ERP) shows the correlation between the onset of anger or aggression and the electrical activity of the brain. In an explicit gender-focused study involving 25 men and 24 women, the results showed no difference between the sexes electrophysiologically.⁴⁵

One of the brain structures most involved in aggression is the so-called amygdala. In this respect, a study measuring the size of the amygdala using functional MRI in women with so-called reactive aggressive personality disorder found no correlation between amygdala size and aggressive personality in women.⁴⁶ In a two-phase study, in which women with this personality disorder were divided into an anger phase and an aggression phase (the first phase was only for rude behavior and the second for explicit aggressive behavior), the aggression phase showed a positive correlation with the amygdala.⁴⁷

The relationship between offending behavior and the hormonal system can be embodied in two processes that can be isolated from each other. The first is a state of prompt arousal induced by stress hormones (adrenaline, noradrenaline and cortisol), which has a neurological effect that makes cognitive (thinking) functions secondary to emotional expression; this typically includes highly aroused offending. The other, long-term and long-lasting process is the neurobehavioral depressant effects linked to testosterone and cortisol action. The relationship between testosterone and offending behavior is controversial, particularly with regard to the differential differences between men and women. Early childhood (~2 years) and adolescence are sensitive periods of neurodevelopment in which so-called toxic stress requires sustained adaptations of the organism. As a result of this process, the opposite of the homeostasis characterized by internal equilibrium, the so-called allostasis, may develop, which expresses a "different state", an imbalance, and whose basis is to be found in the genetic-epigenetic effects of cortisol. The effects may also extend to the nervous system structure, resulting in criminal behavior. Animal studies have suggested that there is a direct causal relationship between low cortisol levels and aggression.⁴⁸ The initial stress hormone-overloading effect of prolonged stress is later reflected in deficits, which manifest themselves in a tendency to aggression. Published studies on the subject have causally linked reduced cortisol levels to delinquency, but not always. This may be due to the phenomenon that low cortisol levels are only accompanied by aggressive behavioral attitudes years later (~2-5 years), so the time

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ MANCKE, Falk et al.: Amygdala structure and aggressiveness in borderline personality disorder. *Eur. Arch. Psychiatry Clin. Neurosci.*, 2016, Issue No 268, pp. 417-427

⁴⁷ HERPERTZ, Sabine C. et al.: Brain mechanisms underlying reactive aggression in borderline personality disorder–sex matters; *Biol. Psychiatry* 2017, Issue No. 4, pp. 257-266

⁴⁸ FARKAS, Johanna – HALLER, József – FOGARASI, Mihály – KOVÁTS, Daniella – MALÉT-SZABÓ, Erika: Biological factors of crime; In: HALLER, József (Ed.): *The criminal's mind*; Budapest, Ludovika University Publishing House, 2020, pp. 1-66

lag may be a significant factor in explaining this process. Early, sustained increases in cortisol production, as well as slow decreases, may generate epigenetic changes that can lead to brain structural and functional disturbances. An important distinction, however, is that the deficit is correlated with premeditated violence, whereas the increased level is correlated with violent crime. The question is what determines whether an individual will respond to stress with increased cortisol production or whether low levels will result. The discrepancy may be due to the fact that some people's genetic make-up predisposes them to a breakdown of the hormonal system – a cortisol deficit – while others are more 'hardy' and produce high levels of the hormone. Another possibility is that toxic stress occurs at different ages and that this condition plays a role in later behavioral change. It has been observed that stress in early childhood induces impulsive attitudes (increased cortisol levels) and violent, aggressive criminal behavior in adolescence (cortisol deficiency), but this hypothesis needs to be confirmed.⁴⁹

In women with congenital adrenal hyperplasia, where there is an overproduction of androgenic hormones, including testosterone, a marked increase in physical aggression was detected compared to healthy controls.⁵⁰

It is generally accepted that higher testosterone concentrations may be behind the increased aggression in men. Fewer studies are available on this in women. A study of 87 female prisoners showed a correlation between dominant, aggressive behavior in prison and testosterone levels.⁵¹ A similar finding was found in a study of a female rugby team, where pre-match testosterone levels showed a positive correlation with aggression during the game.⁵² The results of a double-blind experiment with 12 female participants suggested that an increase in testosterone levels is associated with a decrease in sensitivity to abuse and an increase in responsiveness to reward in relation to aggression.⁵³ To better understand the relationship between testosterone and aggression, the role of cortisol was also examined. Based on the so-called dual hormone hypothesis, the results show that low cortisol levels enhance the effects of testosterone on aggression, while high cortisol levels block this effect.⁵⁴ Other studies have not found a clear link with the so-called dual hormone hypothesis. A study of 326 adolescent girls and 134 boys, which examined the detectability of testosterone from hair samples, found a positive correlation between aggression manifestations and low cortisol levels,⁵⁵ and also showed that hair sampling resulted in more stable individual differences than the

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ HINES, Melissa: Sex-related variation in human behavior and the brain. *Trends Cogn. Sci.*, 2010, Issue No. 14, pp. 448-456

⁵¹ DABBS, James M. et al.: Age, testosterone, and behavior among female prison inmates. *Psychosom. Med.* 1997, Issue No. 59, pp. 477-480

⁵² BATEUP, Helen S. et al.: Testosterone, cortisol, and women's competition; *Evol. Hum. Behav.* 2002, Issue No. 23, pp. 181-192

⁵³ VAN HONK, Jack et al.: Testosterone shifts the balance between sensitivity for punishment and reward in healthy young women; *Psychoneuroendocrinology*, 2004, Issue No. 29, pp. 937-943

⁵⁴ MEHTA, Pranjali H. et al.: The dual-hormone hypothesis: a brief review and future research agenda. *Curr. Opin. Behav. Sci.*, 2015, Issue No. 3, pp. 163-168

⁵⁵ GROTZINGER, Andrew D. et al.: Hair and salivary testosterone, hair cortisol, and externalizing behaviors in adolescents; *Psychol. Sci.*, 2018, Volume 29, Issue No. 5, pp. 688-699

sampling and detection of testosterone and cortisol from saliva samples. The researchers agree that further studies on this topic are needed.

In women, changes in the concentrations of two hormones produced by the ovaries – estradiol and progesterone – show fluctuations parallel to the menstrual cycle. The levels of these hormones are elevated during the so-called follicular phase, around the middle of the period between the two menstrual periods. Elevated levels of these hormones were found to correlate with lower levels of aggression and irritability in a study of 122 female participants.⁵⁶ On the other hand, a study of 281 women of reproductive potential, analyzing hormone levels within 24 hours of a suicide attempt in the participants, showed a correlation between low levels of progesterone and estradiol and increased intention to commit suicide.⁵⁷

Breastfeeding mothers typically have higher levels of oxytocin and, under laboratory conditions, there is a positive correlation between breastfeeding – elevated oxytocin – and manifestations of aggression,⁵⁸ although the association is not entirely conclusive on the basis of other studies.⁵⁹

Summary

The biology of female aggression encompasses a broad range of interrelated and interconnected disciplines (biology, genetics, endocrinology, neurology, criminology). The definition of aggression itself is not a simple task, and many approaches and theories have emerged. The feminine nature of aggression is evident in some of its manifestations, for example, so-called indirect verbal aggression is generally more characteristic of women. The development of this female specificity begins in early childhood and can be traced back to a number of biological and social factors. Socio-cultural judgements of female offending are generally more lenient than those of male offenders. Trends both internationally and domestically show that female offending is changing both numerically and in terms of its nature, with an increase in the number of female offenders and a shift towards male offending in terms of its nature and violence. Despite the partial results, the genetic, neurological and hormonal research on female aggression is not conclusive and conclusive, and further research is needed in this area.

⁵⁶ ZIOMKIEWICZ, Anna et al.: Higher luteal progesterone is associated with low levels of premenstrual aggressive behavior and fatigue; *Biol. Psychol.* 2012, Issue No. 91, pp. 376-382

⁵⁷ BACA-GARCIA, Enrique et al.: Suicide attempts among women during low estradiol/low progesterone states. *J. Psychiatr. Res.* 2010. Issue 44, pp. 209-214

⁵⁸ HAHN-HOLBROOK, Jennifer et al.: Maternal defense: breast feeding increases aggression by reducing stress; *Psychol. Sci.* 2011, Issue No. 22, pp. 1288-1295

⁵⁹ NE'EMAN, Rina et al.: Intranasal administration of oxytocin increases human aggressive behavior; *Horm. Behav.* 2016, Issue No. 80, pp. 125-131

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Abstract

At the end of the 20th century, a concept was created which before its creation had already developed a long time in its meaning, and then even more so. Hybrid warfare, as a terminology for many, was born in 2014 of result of the events in Ukraine, but was known to soldiers long before that. In the two-part study, we examine which processes induced its creation and to whom its origin creation is due.

Keywords: hybrid warfare, fourth generation warfare, unrestricted warfare, compound warfare

Introduction

„A war which changed the world ultimately changed war itself.”
Qiao Liang – Wang Xiangsui²

In the second half of 2014, a series of security studies and military publications announced that the Russian Federation had occupied the Crimea using hybrid warfare and was constantly supporting the breakaway forces in eastern Ukraine in their struggle for secession. From 2015 to the present day, ‘hybrid warfare’ as a term, thanks to the international media, has received so much resonance, that despite the fact that Russian military science did not know and use this concept, still the Crimean annexation, the method used by the Russians is identified with this terminology.³

Nowadays, thanks to research efforts in the past seven years, there are several interpretations of hybrid warfare, what is more, sometimes one can find other terms with similar meaning. In the present study we do not seek to resolve this terminological chaos and do not wish to compare terms in current usage. Likewise, we do not aim to act as arbiter as to which which terminology most expresses the phenomenon, its underlying design, the methods used and the mechanisms of action triggered by it.

Our research focuses only on the presentation of the origin, as we are convinced that the understanding of the processes of our present age is most often helped by

¹ „The work was implemented in the framework of project No. TKP2020-NKA-09, financed by the Thematic Excellence Program 2020 from the National Research Development and Innovation Fund.”

² QIAO Liang – WANG Xiangsui: Unrestricted Warfare, 1999. p. 5. <http://www.c4i.org/unrestricted.pdf> (downloaded 10 March 2017)

³ HOLECZ, József: The Gerasimov Doctrine – In Another Enlightenment; Felderítő Szemle, 2017/3-4. pp. 5-7. <https://www.knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/fsz/2017-3-4.pdf> (downloaded 04 June 2021); FRIDMAN, Ofer: Russian 'Hybrid Warfare'. Resurgence and Politicization; C. Hurst & Co. Ltd., London, 2018, pp.127-152. ISBN 9781849048811

getting to know the past and exploring past processes. We present our research results on the origins of hybrid warfare in two studies, which will make it possible to follow the continuous broadening of meaning, its causal relationships, and to identify the factors under which the currently known terminology has developed under its complex influence.

Our interest in the topic is not an end in itself. The National Military Strategy (NMS) issued in 2021 makes it clear when it presents our volatile and unpredictable security environment, envisions the rapid spread of emerging crises, assumes the combined threat of security sectors, and therefore states that the issue of national defense can only be examined in a complex way, addressing all its areas. The legislator also deals with our research topic, according to which *“in the so-called hybrid warfare, state and non-state actors seek to assert their interests in achieving a specific strategic goal to the detriment of the opposing party by using military and non-military means for a specific strategic goal, and they may take steps to aggravate the challenges and crises that Hungary faces.”*⁴

The NMS defines today’s challenges in a modern way, where the greatest threat lies in the expansion of the theatres of war, its forms and means and the typically dynamic change of the features thereof. States seek to reduce the possibility of military confrontation as much as possible and increasingly use sub-war conflicts to achieve their goals. In addition to the military, diplomatic means, the possibilities of manipulating the media, the information warfare, the malicious exploitation of the opportunities inherent in social, political and economic instability, and the escalation of existing or emerging crises will come to the fore. Increasingly, proxy forces, various criminal and terrorist groups/organizations, and civilian alliances disguised as various non-governmental organizations are used with state support and management.⁵

However, our research on the above is not only justified by the National Military Strategy, or the National Security Strategy published in 2020 as a comprehensive strategy. We started the comprehensive study of the topic as early as 2015, the results

⁴ National Military Strategy of Hungary, Government Resolution 2021. (1393/2021. (VI. 24.)), pp. 5069-5070.
<https://magyarkozlony.hu/dokumentumok/2a94d595e4bc33b3515c09b0f6f04c4ca3df69c6/megképes> (downloaded 03 July 2021)

⁵ Ibid. pp. 5069-5072;
FORGÁCS, Balázs: Guerrillas, partisans, insurgents. History of the Theory of Irregular Warfare – The Challenges of Our Time; Zrínyi Publishing House, Budapest, 2020. pp. 217-222. ISBN 978 963 327 798 0;
FORGÁCS, Balázs: New Wars, Old Theories; Commentary, 2021/1, pp. 77-78.
RESPERGER, István: Security Problems of the Future; Szakmai Szemle, 2021/2. pp. 5-22. https://www.knbsz.gov.hu/hu/letoltes/szsz/2021_2_szam.pdf (downloaded 04 July 2021);
EMBER, István: The proxy war of market participants; Military Science, 2021 electronic issue
https://www.mhht.eu/hadtudomany/2021/2021e/EMBER%20Istvan_%20Piaci%20szereplok%20proxy%20haboruja.pdf (downloaded 21 November 2021);
CHIFU, Iulian: Hybrid warfare, lawfare, information warfare – The wars of the future; In: SIMONS, Greg – CHIFU, Iulian (eds.): The Changing Face of Warfare in the 21st Century; Routledge-Taylor & Francis Group, New York, 2019, pp. 35-36. ISBN 978-0-367-90134-9

of which were summarized in 2017 in a master's thesis⁶. The date is also interesting because a year later, Ofer Fridman's now famous book⁷ was published, in which he drew similar conclusions about the formation and development of hybrid warfare.⁸ The aim of this publication is to share with the readership our thoughts expressed in the 2017 publication, which have since been supplemented with numerous research findings related to hybrid warfare that have not been published in either the domestic or international academia.

Changes in strategic and operational environment - initial theories

In the world of science, terms and their meanings are constantly changing. A few centuries ago, it took up to hundreds of years to change the content of a terminology. Today, thanks to dynamic technological change, this has been significantly shortened. The development history and terminological development of hybrid warfare did not begin with the creation of the concept itself, and since it is the 'child' of today, similarly intense changes can be observed in the meaning. At the end of the 20th century and the beginning of the 21st century, researchers in military science, security studies, history and strategic studies became aware that dynamic changes in the world no longer merely result in the development of weapons systems and their mechanisms of action, but change war itself as well. In the legal, ethical and cultural sense, the process has already brought about great changes in the interpretation of war (armed conflict), in the way it was fought, in its constantly evolving possibilities and limitations as a political tool.⁹

The rise of technological advancement through globalization for developing societies, the advancement of the computer, Big Data, artificial intelligence, and the possibilities of manipulating available information have all provided the space for novel uses of the extended effects of the devices. Similar to the interdisciplinary relationship of different disciplines, the elements of the national force are able to achieve a synergistic effect together, in synchronization with each other and based on the principle of multiplication of effects. The combined use of forces and means is not new in warfare. This has been the case in all historical eras, on the one hand in the world of battlefields (military sector)¹⁰, but also, of course, in terms of politics, using a wider range of instruments (diplomatic, economic, financial, religious-ethical-

⁶ HOLECZ, József: War Theory of Hybrid Warfare; Diploma Thesis, 2017. National University of Public Service, Faculty of Military Sciences and Military Training

⁷ FRIDMAN (2018) op. cit.

⁸ Ibid. pp. 11-29.

⁹ FORGÁCS (2020) op. cit. p. 217.

HOLECZ, József: The study of hybrid warfare from the perspective of strategic studies; Seregszemle, 2018/2. pp. 43-46.

https://honvedelem.hu/files/files/115177/seregszemle_2018_2.pdf (downloaded 04 June 2021)

¹⁰ It is in terms of service branches, special troops and cooperation of troop elements within those that we can talk about military operations of combined arms and joint nature, at the basis of which lies the subunit-unit-higher unit level cooperation to achieve military objectives. Regardless of the existence of these concepts, this was already evident in the world of ancient battlefields, when the commander tried to forge an advantage from the use of forces with different capabilities precisely from the goal-oriented cooperation of capabilities through maximizing impact.

cultural sector). What has changed by the end of the 20th century, is the arsenal of modern possibilities inherent in synchronization and measurability of the synergic effect of the use of the means. We are able to elicit not only intended, positive and negative, effects on the opposing party, but thanks to the technology we are able to follow, evaluate and, if necessary, shape them with a relatively high accuracy in a 'real-time' way. And all this in terms of all means of asserting the will (interest), not just the military sector.

According to Fridman, four main sources can be identified that influenced the theory of hybrid warfare: Chinese warfare without borders (others: unlimited warfare), Lind's fourth-generation warfare, Huber's complex warfare, and the 2005 U.S. National Defense Strategy.¹¹ In our 2017 thesis, we identified the same elements of developmental history that led to the creation of Hoffman's first 'hybrid warfare'¹² terminology of 2005/2007.¹³ At the same time, our opinion certainly differs from the findings of Fridman that only these would have played a role in the process. In our opinion, in the 21st century, a terminological development in all academic areas or disciplines takes place in an inter- or rather transdisciplinary way, i.e. they develop partly independently of each other, but sometimes interacting with each other, in most cases unpredictably influencing one another. We believe that representatives of different disciplines examined strategic and operational environmental changes simultaneously, but from different perspectives, and identified their implications for security and warfare. The development process is more akin accordingly to a multiple DNA spiral, where the threads lean on each other, occasionally linked to each other denote a variety of research and theories, like a staircase, where the time factor and the development can be demonstrated, but does not illustrate the inter/transdisciplinarity of this day and age.

As mentioned above, our research does not necessarily follow the Fridman line of thought, but rather focuses on the development of terminological meaning content. Accordingly, we partly present the theories also used by the famous English writer, and partly beyond them we try to interpret the processes influencing terminology and meaning on a wider basis.

Like Fridman, we must first and foremost deal with an Anglo - Saxon theory: the American generation theory of warfare, which perfectly shows how authorities of different directions are mixed around the study of a subject. The publication in 1989 of a study entitled "*The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*" is not linked to William S. Lind, as he, being a civilian, wrote the theory jointly with four military officers (Keith Nightingale, John F. Schmitt, Joseph W. Sutton and Gary I. Wilson). It is clear that both members of the army and the security studies publicist perceived the changes in warfare.¹⁴ In an article published by Lind on his own in 2004,

¹¹ FRIDMAN (2018) op. cit. p. 12.

¹² In our view, during the development of the concept, the first acceptable terminology was formulated by Frank G. Hoffman. The two dates are justified by the fact that in 2005 he carried on a discourse with James N. Mattis in a short publication on the features of hybrid warfare represented by the two of them, and in 2007 he formulated his thoughts in a more extensive study on his own.

¹³ HOLECZ (2017) op. cit. pp. 6-17.

¹⁴ LIND, William S. – NIGHTINGALE, Keith – SCHMITT, John F. – SUTTON, Joseph W. – WILSON, Gary I.: *The Changing Face of War: Into the Fourth Generation*; Marine Corps

entitled “*Understanding Fourth Generation War*”, he already further shaped his theory independently based on the directions and effects of the trends that occurred since 1989.

Lind's theory, with regard to periodization, is subject to critique and attacks to this day, but what he wrote about the effects of environmental change on warfare is beyond debate and clearly relevant to our topic. It presents the most marked and radical change since the Peace of Westphalia (1648), according to which the state loses its monopoly on war.¹⁵ It identifies several reasons for this, which is partly the cause of this radical change, partly the consequence of technological revolutions and many economic, socio-political processes. Due to the opportunities provided by technology, in addition to/instead of military force, non-military entities, in many cases civilians, may be involved in the cause of the conflict, which induces a blurring of the line between classical war and peace. This effect is enhanced by the fact that in addition to conventional warfare used in the majority of terminologies, new toolkits have also appeared that in most cases defy interpretation in terms of combat procedures.¹⁶

Since the first World War, the in-depth possibilities of operations have more and more spectacularly been ensured, which in World War 2 demonstrated the horrors of war for the population. At the same time, it is a definitely new phenomenon, that the aggressor did not necessarily have to attack protected civilian and military targets, but much rather the critical infrastructure in today's parlance, through which the government's public esteem can be shaken, and public support for a possible war can be reduced. The military levels are mixed as strategic goals are achievable through tactical means, i.e. destruction of civilian and military infrastructure, that is, war is no longer a purely military issue, it is an issue for everyone in the given country.¹⁷

To match the new theory, new activities were created were – on top of the existing toolkit. According to Lind, psychological operations may become a decisive strategic weapon in the future, primarily in the form of media and information influence. Both the media and computer viruses are able to influence the mood and morale of civil society and the military. According to Lind, these tools create the condition for us to think of the enemy not just as an army to be destroyed. It is much more optimal if the enemy country's collapses internally collapse by having the termination of the general public support for the war available. In fourth-generation warfare, modern technologies offer us additional opportunities. Lind believes that a much smaller military force in the theater of war will be able to bring about a similar effect than a numerically much larger force up until then.¹⁸

Gazette, October 1989, pp. 22-26.

https://www.academia.edu/7964013/The_Changing_Face_of_War_Into_the_Fourth_Generation (downloaded 10 July 2021)

CHIFU (2019) op. cit. p. 36.

¹⁵ LIND, William S.: *Understanding the Fourth Generation War*; *Military Review*, September-October 2004, p. 12. <https://www.hsdl.org/?abstract&did=482203> (downloaded 10 July 2021)

¹⁶ *Ibid.* pp. 22-24.

¹⁷ *Ibid.* pp.18-19.

¹⁸ *Ibid.* pp 36-37.

In parallel with the fourth-generation theory, a theory in China also appeared, which, like Lind's theory, departs from the observation that the Cold War following World War 2, the restricting capabilities of the international organizations, globalization based on economy, military professionalism based on technology, the military hegemony of the United States of America, the weakening of the states' opportunities to control and dominate over war all foreshadowed the need to reconsider earlier warfare principles and the interest-asserting opportunities shaped by the above processes.¹⁹

The study published in 1999 was written by two senior officers of the Chinese air force, Qiao Liang and Wang Xiangsui, under the title *Unrestricted Warfare*²⁰ (the original title of the work: in simplified Chinese script: 超限战, or in traditional Chinese characters: 超限戰)²¹. The authors noted that, by the end of the 20th century, human societies have become much more complex and heterogeneous, also much more inexplicable than ever before. At the same time their susceptibility to crises, crises, conflicts also increased.

In their writing, they eerily identify strategic environmental changes similar to those of the creators of fourth-generation theory. After World War 2, the bipolar world order, and the constant risk of the possibility of nuclear war, resulted in the use of military means in the conflicts of the modern age being either limited or avoided where possible. In parallel with this process, there is a clear increase in the use of non-military, political, economic and technological, means of resolving these conflicts. Recognizing that, as a result of these changes, war still remains war, but in addition to the physical coercive ability of the military, other means, armed and non-armed, military and non-military, and deadly and non-lethal, can ensure that the political end goal is achieved.²²

The new warfare appears as a 'grand warfare method' in the study, which is nominally linked to the phenomenon of war, but only in its purpose. This method or approach is already breaking with old forms of war, instead it combines military and non-military means.²³ It includes the opportunity to use many of the means of will assertion, such as diplomatic means (alliance building, diplomatic agreements), economic warfare (applying trade pressure, granting aid and imposing sanctions), financial instruments (stock market speculation, currency devaluation), the cyber warfare (hacking, virus attacks, actions against critical infrastructure), the information warfare (media manipulation, disinformation), interventions against networks (disrupting the operation of large national support systems) as well as exploiting the

¹⁹ NAN Li: *Unrestricted Warfare and Chinese Military Strategy*; pp. 1-2. <https://www.rsis.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/2014/07/CO02022.pdf> (downloaded 10 July 2021)

²⁰ It should be noted that both the Hungarian and English translations of the title refer to the 'unlimitedness' of warfare, while the use of the 'unrestricted' or 'unregulated' signaling structure could be better understood, which would make it clearer that it is about a way of thinking and approach that goes beyond the national-international regulation of will assertion, which exploits and even utilizes its shortcomings.

²¹ Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unrestricted_Warfare (downloaded 10 July 2021)

²² QIAO – WANG (2017) op. cit. p. 7.

²³ Ibid. p. 119.

opportunities provided by industrial and environmental disasters. This can, in our understanding, be resource warfare, technology warfare, intelligence warfare, psychological warfare, space warfare, cultural or ideological warfare, virtual warfare, international legal warfare, or even ‘warfare’ using terrorist tools, guerrilla warfare, or gaining advantage through criminal acts.²⁴ At the same time, Qiao and Wang did not rule out any use of old methods, either, i.e. conventional warfare, the use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear war, bio-chemical warfare) they considered these likewise suitable as a means to achieve the political end goal.²⁵

However, the power of the above possibilities is not in themselves, but in their almost infinite combination possibilities. “*Any of the above types of methods of operation can be combined with another of the above methods of operation to form a completely new method of operation. [...] Regardless of whether it is intentional or unintentional, the carrying out of combined methods of operation using...*”²⁶ they formulate. However, this combined application, the synchronization required for this, does not take place within the application limits of the different areas. The rules of operation of all instruments need to be pushed out, which is of course not an option without limits/boundaries, but in any case it requires a kind of thinking “outside the box” mindset. The synergistic effect of the resulting combined application will be much greater than would normally be expected, as the suffering state faces novel threats and their complex effects in several areas, which do not take into account the framework provided by the rules.²⁷

At the same time, the authors also suggest that the novel toolkits brought about by the changes of the modern age, due to technological developments, in addition to the possibility of gaining political/military advantage, also pose at least as much vulnerability. And the threat they feel is much more complex today than it used to be, as the rapid changes in technical development, the new opportunities inherent in the instruments and the varied synergies resulting from their combination require a constant knowledge of the situation at the political strategic level.²⁸

Accordingly, Wang and Qiao consider the following to be the most important characteristics of modern will assertion:

- *360-degree approach* to the combined use of available and applicable means and toolkits;
- *synchronization* to harmonize different activities;
- *identification of limited objectives*;
- *unrestricted application of measures* to achieve limited objectives;
- search for *asymmetry*, in all possible military and non-military domains, in order to assert our will;
- *minimize the use of resources* in a way that the objectives are reasonably set and then the necessary resources are used efficiently;

²⁴ Ibid. p. 146.

NAN Li (2017) op. cit. p. 3.

²⁵ QIAO – WANG (2017) op. cit. p. 146.

²⁶ QIAO – WANG (2017) op. cit. p. 146.

²⁷ QIAO – WANG (2017) op. cit. pp. 181-182.

FRIDMAN (2018) op. cit. pp. 13-17.

CHIFU (2019) 2019, p. 38.

²⁸ QIAO – WANG (2017) op. cit. pp. 115-116.

- *multidimensional coordination* between all *dimensions*, military and non-military, in order to achieve a common goal;
- *to control the situation for the whole period*, which can be ensured by continuous *acquisition* of information, correction of activities and control of the situation.²⁹

In the Chinese study, the characteristics of the ‘hybridized’ conflicts of our time are easily recognizable. The political, military or even diplomatic toolbox, the economy in the culture of, or even religion inherent in, exerting influence, the growing role of psychology and the media, but also domains that were not yet a priority then, but which have now become priorities, such as cyber space and space.³⁰

American military thinking has also come to realize that there are new opportunities in the combined use of military force of different legal statuses. The theory of the next author, compared to fourth-generation theory, or the thoughts of Chinese theorists, might seem to us to be a kind of setback, yet we do not think we should disregard its presentation. The reason for this is very simple: the theories of various thinkers have been largely determined not only by the situation and ambitions of their own country, but also by their own interests and vocations. Based on this, these theories are simultaneously affected by the author’s nationality that determines their world view, its approach and subjective evaluation criteria and by their profession, which is defined as soldier, social scientist, strategic analyst or defense politician which determines the criteria of examination. Based on this, the theory of Compound Wars is an unavoidable theory.

The blending of the combatants, the appearance in the theater of operations of actors of differing legal status, respectively, gave rise to the following theory. The publication in 2002 of *Compound Wars: That Fatal Knot*, edited by Thomas M. Huber³¹, which in two studies also dealt with the fact that warfare modes can be mixed in some form due to the complexity of the combatants. Huber also points out that war had earlier been clearly defined, thanks to which its basic principles, the dividing line between war and peace could easily be formulated. The author presents future warfare as the use of regular and irregular forces for a common objective. However, the joint commander, who is able to see through the strategic and operational situation and to achieve the political objectives by properly and effectively using the two types of military potential, each radically different in terms of capabilities, plays a key role in mingling the combatants.³²

²⁹ QIAO – WANG (2017) op. cit. pp. 206-215.

FRIDMAN (2018) op. cit. pp. 17-19.

HOLECZ (2017) op. cit. pp. 8-9.

³⁰ QIAO – WANG (2017) op. cit. p. 192;

³¹ Besides Huber, many contributed to the publication, but most important for us is the article entitled *Compound Warfare: A Conceptual Framework*, contributed by the editor. The origin of the theory is dated by many back to 1997, however, the Internet only contains a version of it (containing several studies) published in 2002 by the US Army Command and General Staff College. References here are made to the version of 2002, available on the Internet.

³² HUBER, Thomas M.: *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot*; US Army Command and General Staff College Press, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, 2002.
<https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA481548.pdf> (downloaded 21 July 2012) pp. 1-7;

By mentioning historical examples, he tries to shed light on the fact that in previous eras there were numerous instances of regular forces cooperating with irregular forces. In his opinion, it is beyond doubt that in this case they can exert much greater influence on the tide of war than those military leaders who do not recognize it, namely the fact that a strategy utilizing compound warfare gains the upper hand over a strategy that uses solely conventional forces.³³

In addition to the above theories, a number of monographs and studies were published in the 1990s on the political and military understanding of the rapidly changing strategic and operational environment, on the conclusions that can be drawn from them with regard to understanding the changes in warfare. Without being exhaustive, this list includes a book by Martin van Creveld, published in 1991, *The Transformation of War*, a book published in 1993, entitled *War and Anti-War*, written jointly by Heidi Toffler and her husband, Alvin Toffler, famous for his *Third Wave* theory (*The Third Wave*, 1980), mention must be made here of Charles C. Krulak's *The Three-Block War*³⁴ theory developed in 1999 and published on the pages of the *Marines Magazine*, under the title *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War*. All of them examined, from different approaches, changes in both the strategic and operational environment and the conclusions that can be drawn from them.

The birth of terminology

The collocation 'hybrid warfare' has now become almost a 'buzzword' and most scientifically demanding analyses or studies deal to some extent with its origins. This study of origin is less likely to interpret the circumstances of the creation of a new

FRIDMAN (2018) op. cit. pp. 24-27.

³³ HUBER, Thomas M.: Napoleon in Spain and Naples: Fortified Compound Warfare; In: HUBER, Thomas M. (ed.): *Compound Warfare: That Fatal Knot*; University Press of the Pacific, 27 July 2004. p. 91. ISBN: 978-1410215307

FLEMING, Brian P.: *The Hybrid Threat Concept: Contemporary War, Military Planning and the Advent of Unrestricted Operational Art*; United States Army Command and General Staff College, 2011. p. 13.

<http://cgsc.contentdm.oclc.org/cdm/singleitem/collection/p4013coll3/id/2752/rec/1>
(downloaded 30 March 2017)

³⁴ According to the Three-Block War theory, the U.S. military must cope with three radically different systems of tasks at the same time in an operational space. According to Krulak, modern military application is no longer a mere war activity. A military force must be deployed at a level of preparedness, which enables it to perform combat operations, stabilizing operations and also humanitarian tasks simultaneously, practically in the same operational area. There is a continuation of the theory that has become less commonplace, thanks to hybrid warfare, which has been dubbed the Four-Block War. An article by James N. Mattis and Frank G. Hoffman in 2005, *Future Warfare, The Rise of Hybrid Wars*, added one block to the three that already existed: information operations. However, the theory of the Four-Block War shifted the focus to another name: hybrid wars, precisely because of the authors' research direction and choice of title. In: KRULAK, Charles C.: *The Strategic Corporal: Leadership in the Three-Block War*; <https://apps.dtic.mil/dtic/tr/fulltext/u2/a399413.pdf> (downloaded 10 July 2021);

MATTIS, James N. – HOFFMAN, Frank G.: *Future Warfare: The Rise of Hybrid Wars*; <http://milnewstbay.pbworks.com/f/MattisFourBlockWarUSNINov2005.pdf> (downloaded 02 October 2017)

name in a broader sense (as we did in the previous section), but it is much more common to focus on the formation of the term itself. In the following, we will deal with the latter. Researchers on the subject are currently divided on the inventor of the term 'hybrid warfare'. Perhaps it is no longer a question that the creation of terminology has nothing to do with the Russian Federation or its activities in the Ukraine in 2014. In the creation of 'hybrid warfare' as a technical term, most mention either the name of William J. Nemeth or Frank G. Hoffman. However, this is a mistake. The terminology itself already existed, and its appearance was precisely brought about by the changed operational environment, and, respectively, by the need for the US armed forces to effectively apply the capabilities required to defeat the adversary identifiable at the operational-tactical level.

During my research work between 2015 and 2017 I already came across a piece writing by Robert G. Walker who had talked about 'hybrid warfare' and 'hybrid forces' as early as 1998.³⁵ In recent years, during our examination of the subject, another author came into view, James C. Dugan, the person who, like Walker, addressed hybrid warfare in 1998. They both define the concept of hybrid (military) force and the purpose for which it is necessary to create a military force with such capabilities.

Although the domestic and international literature I found does not mention the above two American military officers at all in connection with the development of hybrid warfare, it is clear that they came to hybrid warfare along the same lines of thought as Huber to Compound Warfare. Consequently, we believe that we also need to address the ideas they represent in relation to the birth of the terminology.

Robert G. Walker completed his dissertation entitled *SPEC FI: The United States Marine Corps and Special Operations* upon his graduation from the Naval Postgraduate School in December 1998. The author assumed that the use of the U.S. Marine Corps had provided them with new operational experience in recent years. Based on the present study, the expected challenges of the security environment of the future, and the operational experience, it sought to support the need to modify the applicable warfare and the correctness of the corresponding, then recent past, American military organizational restructuring.

Walker's research is not an end in itself. It focused on the development of the American special operational capability that was already underway and to justify the related organizational restructuring, to demonstrate the characteristics of the applicable modern warfare.³⁶ In examining the environmental characteristics that determine the warfare of the future, he also uses the findings of the theories presented earlier, according to which "in [...] conflicts are increasingly fought between states and non-state actors, as well as between technologically and militarily developed states against underdeveloped or emerging states. The future of warfare as described by these authors, as well as many others, possesses a number of unconventional

³⁵ HOLECZ (2017) op. cit. pp. 11-12.

³⁶ WALKER, Robert G.: *SPEC FI: The United States Marine Corps and Special Operations*; Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 1998. p. 7. <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/8989> (downloaded 11 June 2021)

characteristics, including the use of guerrilla tactics, terrorism, and perhaps information warfare or even weapons of mass destruction (WMD).³⁷

Following this environmental factor study, Walker concludes that such a complex threat cannot be effectively addressed by a conventional force. In his view, this challenge requires units of complex readiness, armed, non-traditional thinking, commanded differently from regular troops, i.e., “hybrid force”.³⁸ In the study, the author also created the content elements of the hybrid combatant, according to which such a force can be interpreted as a cross between a special and a conventional force. He believes that in this way this form of warfare “... possesses characteristics of both the special and conventional realms, and requires an extreme amount of flexibility in order to transition operationally and tactically between the special and conventional arenas.”³⁹

James C. Dugan, like Walker, deals with hybrid warfare in his December 1998 dissertation entitled *Elusive Armies and Invisible Hands: Combining the Conventional and Guerrilla Forces from 1776 to the Present*. He, too, sought to substantiate his hypothesis, based on the processing of historical experience, that in the operational environment of the late 20th century, one must adapt to an enemy using irregular warfare. Unlike Walker, Dugan, however, does not envisage hybrid forces as a section of conventional and special operations, but, like Hubert, as the combined use of regular and irregular forces, which is realized under a single command.⁴⁰

Dugan also seeks, primarily through the military eye, to create a better-functioning, more adaptable, more flexible force that, unlike traditional military force, is much more versatile and more likely to achieve political and military goals. It identifies two key factors: organizational flexibility resulting from the combination and cooperation of forces, and command flexibility at all levels resulting from decentralization. Both factors build leadership adaptation, which can be the foundation of success.⁴¹

The force combinations of Dugan and Walker are not independent scientific ideas, by the way. As early as the first half of the 1990s, research was conducted into how American military supremacy could be effectively applied in a changing operational environment in the then unipolar world order. A good example of this finding is Michael M. Kershaw’s study in 1994, *The Integration of Special Operations and General Purpose Forces*, in which the author argues in a similar way as Walker or Dugan did. What the above two military officers are definitely pioneers in is ‘hybrid warfare’ as the first users of the term. Although the concept they define is far from comparable to today’s ‘hybrid warfare’, in terms of the theories presented before them, only environmental changes have given the concept a sense of relevance and

³⁷ Ibid. p. 7.

³⁸ Ibid. pp. 2-12.

³⁹ Ibid. pp. 4-5.

⁴⁰ DUGAN, James C.: *Elusive Armies and Invisible Hands: Combining Conventional and Guerrilla Forces from 1776 to the Present*; Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California. December 1998, pp. 2-5. <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/8306> (downloaded 07 March 2020)

⁴¹ Ibid. pp. 100-110.

development, but since 1998 it has been proven to exist, it has been researched and used by some.

Knowing the above, we have to disagree with our fellow researchers who attribute the creation of the term 'hybrid warfare' to the work of William J. Nemeth. It is undisputed among us that Nemeth to a great extent refined the terminology presented so far, but since what he has articulated is still far from today's 'hybrid warfare', so overall we consider him to be just one of the stations in development history of terminology.

William J. Nemeth wrote his study *Future War and Chechnya: The Case for Hybrid Warfare in 2002*, in which he believes that the mode of warfare used by the Chechens can be practically identified as hybrid warfare. In his view, although the assertion of the will applied can be equated with guerrilla warfare, i.e. an irregular form, he emphasizes that behind the seemingly disordered forces, strategically coordinated activities, a high degree of awareness, modern technology and networking make a qualitative difference. All this gave a new dimension to the Chechen forces, who, taking full advantage of these elements, successfully fought against regular Russian troops in 1994-96. Chechen forces are not measurable to the irregular warriors of earlier ages. In contrast, conventional weapons systems, terrorist methods, or even the 'capabilities' of organized criminal groups have been used extremely flexibly. They do not exclude the possibility to learn and creatively apply adaptable elements of Western and Russian military doctrine, what's more they were able to consciously and in an organized manner combine one with the other.⁴²

According to Nemeth, hybrid warfare is the future form of warfare, which is rooted in the strength of the guerrilla approach, opposed to which the technically advanced and centrally commanded conventional forces are cumbersome.⁴³ The author sets the social system as the basis of his whole theory, where he creates the concept of 'hybrid society'. These social forms operate within a gray zone between the modern world and the pre-state state. In practice, these states/societies have returned to a traditional socio-political structure of the past, as a result of which their system of norms is radically different from the ethical approach of modern states. Hybrid societies are anarchist, for whose members war and violence are accepted as the norm. At the same time, a hybrid society emphasizes their traditional roots, yet is open to the possibilities offered by modern technology.⁴⁴

The above basic orientation determines the relationship of such a society to hybrid warfare, but also the characteristics of the successful operations to be carried out against them! Traditional thinking is dominated by the struggle for life, as a result of which the use of other means and methods beyond guerrilla warfare, which are morally unacceptable to modern society, such as kidnapping, murder, hostage mutilation, genocide, or bomb or mine attacks. To this end, the blurring of the legal distinction between combatant and non-combatant, which was fully accepted as an intentional principle, was also used. From these characteristics Nemeth draws the

⁴² NEMETH, William J.: *Future war and Chechnya: a case for hybrid warfare*; Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey, California, 2002. pp. 28-29. <https://calhoun.nps.edu/handle/10945/5865> (downloaded 21 March 2017)

⁴³ Ibid. pp. 73-76.

⁴⁴ Ibid. pp. 68-76.

conclusion that, for Western societies, a hybrid society can be practically perceived as a terrorist state.⁴⁵

In addition to the above findings, Nemeth summarizes the key military features of hybrid warfare and the non-traditional characteristics of the responses to them.⁴⁶ According to the author, the strengths of a hybrid force are not the same as those considered by Western societies to be military strengths, and therefore these different ways of thinking/values in operations give a decisive advantage to a hybrid force over a regular force. The hybrid strengths which mainly define these different mindsets are as follows:

- **Novel thoughts/ideas** that may arise both in command and in the use of the means/methods. Hybrid forces are able to effectively adapt the advanced technology systems so that they are efficacious, or cause a surprise. They are able to use modern and outdated equipment in a way different from the conventional, thereby bring about unexpected effects, demoralizing their enemies. They also take advantage of the regulation of Western societies: when a new military system is introduced, the rules for its use are incorporated into doctrine, which immediately determines the direction of training. As a result, the trained staff will no longer be able to use these tools in a new way (even in a prohibited way), i.e. it will be predictable and recognizable. Nemeth stresses the importance of the use of modern media, as tools of command and control, disinformation or propaganda.
- **Use of personalities and charismatic leaders** and bringing them to the forefront, which is a basic necessity of decentralized command (nowadays we practically talk about it as the basic criterion of mission-oriented command – *the Author*).
- **Society and the military**, precisely because of their strong instincts of survival, are able to bear almost any loss, which gives the appearance of indestructibility.
- **The strong belief in the cause** to ensure the supply of motivated new members for the hybrid force, but also one of the most important bases for guerrilla warfare, the support of society as well.
- **The decentralized approach** ensures the flexibility of the subunits performing the tasks, the rapid adaptation to the situations, and decouples the execution of the tasks from possible obstacles in the flow of information and the possible bureaucracy of the leadership.⁴⁷

⁴⁵ Ibid. pp. 72-74.

⁴⁶ Nemeth summarizes 13 points of this system of political, social, and military relations of hybrid society and its hybrid warfare, its mechanisms of interaction, and makes recommendations to those who oppose them.

⁴⁷ Based on the whole of the study, the five bullet points were supplemented, since the summary only mentions them as entries. In: NEMETH (2002) op. cit.

The author considers it important to mention another aspect, which, although it appears as a special condition in the region, it also had key consequences⁴⁸, namely the knowledge of the Russian language and culture provided the perfect backdrop for them for the successful accomplishment of psychological and information operations. They were able to accomplish all this so efficiently that they not only strengthened their own social basis, but managed to weaken the morale of the Russian troops and, above all this, earned the political support and sympathy of Western societies.⁴⁹

Conclusion

In our study, we showed how hybrid warfare was first formed in its meaning, and then how the name itself was found, in the late 1990s and early 2000s. However, the development process was unstoppable. Hybrid warfare increasingly demanded room for itself in terminology, which is true even if “*The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America*” adopted in 2005 makes no mention of it at all. In fact, the U.S. Strategy Paper does not yet address the subject of our research, but at the same time already addresses the changed security (strategic and operational) environment, the emerging new types of threats whose understanding and identification of responses is a policy and, in part, military task. The strategy divides the identified threats into four major groups.

On the one hand, of course, traditional threats can still not be ruled out, which other states can realize through their regular forces. In addition, a range of non-traditional threats is emerging, which can be identified with non-state actors (political, religious, ethnic or extremist groups), uprisings of irregular armed groups, guerrilla warfare and acts of terrorism. The third group are the threats associated with the disaster that the theft of weapons of mass destruction, illegal possession, storage, or malicious use thereof. Finally, threats of a destructive (destructive, subversive, disruptive) nature are mentioned in the document, which means the development and malicious use of advanced technologies for the purpose of gaining control over key areas (biotechnology, cyber activities, lasers, etc.).⁵⁰

The strategy takes over the possible actors of the identified sources of threat from the theories discussed above: state and non-governmental organizations, organized crime groups and terrorist organizations as well. It also stresses that the trait presented as a central element of the study is that these threats may occur separately, but the security environment is increasingly challenged by the simultaneous existence of these threats, different variation characteristic, which represents a growing challenge for the responses with respect.⁵¹


⁴⁸ This factor may seem marginal to the reader, but we still consider it important to highlight. Last but not least, also because Russia used this same way of thinking in the 2010s to build up its influence on the Ukrainian cultural and educational institutions and finally used it to perform the operation that ended in 2014 with the annexation of the Crimea.

⁴⁹ NEMETH (2002) op. cit. pp. 58-59.

⁵⁰ The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, pp. 2-3.
FRIDMAN (2018) op. cit. pp. 27-29.

⁵¹ The National Defense Strategy of the United States of America, March 2005. pp. 2-5.
<http://archive.defense.gov/news/Mar2005/d20050318nds1.pdf> (downloaded 20 April 2017)

Our study presented only the first phase of the evolutionary history of the original, American, ‘hybrid warfare’. We have recorded that the concept has existed since 1998, although a significant difference can be identified between the interpretations of the time and today. We demonstrated how the changes in the strategic and operational environment transformed the development of various theories, which, combined, led to their being recorded in 2005 in one of the key strategic documents of the United States of America. As a continuation of our research, in the next section we come to the hybrid warfare of today, with all its positive and in many cases contradictory features.



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Abstract

The global pandemic, COVID 19 and its mutations have a significant impact on the structure of crime and law enforcement, and it will have a serious impact in the near future, on the branch of the criminal service. In my research, I examine the impact of a pandemic on global and domestic crime and how resilient law enforcement has been to respond to these challenges. I examine and present the changes in the structure of crime as a result of the pandemic, relying on international law enforcement professional sources. I established the trends and data on domestic crime on the basis of interviews and the analysis of statistical data.

In my research I have found that there have been changes in the qualitative and quantitative structure of crime due to the forced effects of the pandemic on society and I made suggestions for more effective law enforcement and intelligence activities.

Keywords: criminal intelligence, impact of pandemic, crime

The development and change of domestic criminal intelligence

Based on the professional history development of the Hungarian criminal service branch, already at the end of the 1880s the aim of the detectives' criminal intelligence activities was to monitoring, preventing and detecting crime. In order to monitor crime, effectively prevent, interrupt and detect crime, confidential intelligence procedures were carried out, such as surveillance, informants, covert methods of information gathering and various traps.

The confidentiality of criminal intelligence was justified by the nature of the assumed offenses (eg. crime without victim, political nature, identity of interest between the parties, organized crime, etc.) or by obtaining information with confidence way, informants or by an effectiveness of investigation.

Revolutionary events, periods of World War, new types of political crimes, which could have posed a threat to the whole society, social order, ruling regime, necessitated the detection of political crimes, primarily of a communist nature, and the development of an organizational system suitable for their prevention.

These extraordinary (revolutionary, war) circumstances necessiated the complex development of organizational systems suitable for obtaining information on a confidential basis (eg. police, gendarmerie, customs guard, army) in Hungary. Later,

¹ The publication was implemented with the support of the National Research Development and Innovation Fund TKP2020-NKA-09 project, in the financing of the Thematic Excellence Program 2020 application program

due to the prevention of parallel information and procedures of a state defense nature, an information center was established, but it ceased to function at the end of the Second World War.

In the losing domestic political situation of the Second World War, the social and political system of the country, based on centuries of civil traditions, gradually transformed. The new, dictatorial, Soviet-type, ideologically based social and political transformation changed the organization and goals of criminal intelligence.

The covert methods and procedures that have been preparing the judicial activity so far have been named secret operational activities and the state defense and state security units serving the ideological and political system have been set up on the Soviet model.

The secret operational activities did not have a preparatory role for the judiciary, and the prosecutor's office supervising the legality of the investigation could not have been aware of them. The use of confidential information gathering tools that severely restrict fundamental human rights took place without external scrutiny.

After the change of regime, following the so-called Danube-gate² scandal, the Parliament enacted Act X of 1990 on the temporary regulation of the licensing of special intelligence equipment and methods to regulate the secret information gathering activities of secret services and law enforcement agencies.

There was still no legal regulation on the use of internal authorized secret means and methods for law enforcement (and state security) purposes other than those subject to external licensing.

More than a hundred years have passed since the establishment of the Hungarian Detective Corps until the change of regime, and the nature and character of crime and criminal offenses have changed significantly, but the circumstances underpinning confidential information (eg victimlessness, organized crime) have not changed. These circumstances continue to justify to collect information and record data without the knowledge of the party concerned, using appropriate external control.

After a long preparatory work, was born in 1994 The Act on the Police, which regulates the secret gathering of information for "criminal purposes" in a separate chapter (VII.), Which became a new, legal-level name for the activities called earlier "covert confidential procedures" and later „secret operational tools and methods". With this, the prevention, detection and proof of crime has gained new, available, legally regulated opportunities, with little external control.

The criminal intelligence system based on the internal, classified norms was similar of the procedures prior to the change of regime. The secret information gathering procedure was divided into two stages. The first phase was the control of

² In December 1989, the State Security Service of the Ministry of the Interior conducted secret means and methods of investigation against opposition parties and organizations, despite the fact that under the new constitution adopted on October 23, 1989, this was already illegal and even unconstitutional activity.

the primary information called secret control of information and the second phase was further verification of the information supporting the suspicion called secret investigation.

This continues to mean that the investigating authority independently, at its discretion, ordered and carried out a secret information gathering procedure at the aim of criminally relevant information check, at the aim of finding of suspicion and the existence of evidence without a substantive external audit.

In 2018, the time has come to transform the domestic criminal intelligence system and legal bases in order to ensure the continuity of supervision, investigations, the loss of information and the strengthening of the law.

The new Criminal Procedure Act, which entered into force on 1 July 2018, changed in system level the law enforcement model according to which the tasks of criminal intelligence remained in the Police Act, the National Tax and Customs Administration Act and the Prosecution Act. The covert methods for criminal investigation purpose are set out in the Criminal Procedure Act.

The established system of procedures ensures the possibility that proactive prior detection can be applied within a short period of time before ordering an investigation, but already within the framework of criminal proceedings.³

Current modern criminal intelligence⁴

First, domestic modern criminal intelligence needs to be defined on the basis of relevant legislation and literature, and then we take an international perspective.

In order to achieve the policing and law enforcement objectives (protection of public security, public order and state border, prevention and detection of criminal offenses) reflected in the Hungarian Basic Law the Hungarian modern criminal intelligence activity can be characterised as a proactive information gathering and analysis activity for the respect for family life, private residence and correspondence and its closely related information self-determination, the free flow of information and the protection of personal data⁵.

Domestic criminal intelligence can basically have strategic, tactical or investigative support tasks.

The starting point of *strategic criminal intelligence*⁶ is strategic criminal analysis, which provides criminal analysis methods and examines the extent, dynamics and structure of crime, as well as the long-term pattern and tendencies of the characteristics and prevalence of certain crimes.

³ NYESTE, Péter – SZENDREI, Ferenc: A bűnügyi hírszerzés kézikönyve; Dialog Campus, 2019.

⁴ NYESTE Péter: A bűnügyi hírszerzés; Magyar Rendészet 2012/4. pp. 25-32.

⁵ NYESTE, Péter – NAGY, Ivett: A bűnügyi hírszerzés az elméletben és a gyakorlatban; Rendőrségi Tanulmányok vol. 2021/1. pp. 1-2.

⁶ 23/2018(VI.21.) ORFK Utasítás a Bűnügyi Elemzési Szabályzatról 2.§ n) pontja

The aim of strategic criminal intelligence is to satisfy current news needs formulated on the basis of continuous strategic analyzes and thus to establish strategic decision-making.

The purpose of *tactical intelligence* is to serve the immediate prevention, handling and solution of individual and specific criminal problems.

This includes intelligence activities that can be carried out in order to maintain the criminal intelligence infrastructure (eg protection of informant, covert investigator), but also protection of privileged persons and places based on risk analysis.

The starting point for *investigative criminal intelligence*⁷ is investigative support analysis, which is the activity of examining data obtained through individual criminal proceedings and from the use of secret information gathering and from special investigative methods, which can assist in detecting an unknown perpetrator, planning investigative actions, to recognize the connections between the objects that can be connected to them, to detect organized criminal groups and their activities, to define the tasks of law enforcement work against the groups.

The task of criminal intelligence in support of an investigation is to provide information and result products (possible means of proof) to support further investigations based on the data containing individual and specific criminal offenses or elements referring to them.

In the European Union, instead of the concept of criminal intelligence, the term special investigative activities and special investigative tools can be found, and these indicate that the purpose of collecting confidential manner criminal information is to prepare and assist justice.

At the same time, criminal intelligence as crime monitoring, mapping of organized criminal groups, crime prevention, and the facilitation of other law enforcement tasks under police and other laws, are used yet with appropriate control outside of criminal proceedings.

In the European Union, by Special Investigative Means (SIM) we mean those special tools and methods, with the help of which evidence or information and analyzed information can be obtained in a covered way, without the knowledge of the person concerned. Their deployment will involve a breach of the right of private right, wich will have to be justified by those carrying out/ authorising the operation.⁸

The concept of special investigative tools is similarly defined in the European Union Recommendation:⁹ “special investigation techniques” means techniques

⁷ 23/2018(VI.21.) ORFK Utasítás a Bűnügyi Elemzési Szabályzatról 2.§ k) pontja

⁸ Council of Europe Office in Belgrade: Deployment of special investigative means. Belgrade, 2013. pp. 12-13.

⁹ Recommendation Rec (2005) 10 of the committee of Ministers to member states on „special investigation techniques” in relation to serious crimes including acts of terrorism; <https://www.legislationline.org/download/id/1732/file/46f9ab2c5ef4d150d845540a9b79.pdf> (downloaded 22 September 2021)

applied by the competent authorities in the context of criminal investigations for the purpose of detecting and investigating serious crimes and suspects, aiming at gathering information in such a way as not to alert the target persons.

According to a report¹⁰ prepared by the European Commission's Directorate-General for Migration and Home Affairs, the special investigative tools, technical, can be divided into two parts: one part is the so-called "Legal instruments" that belong to the area of justice (e.g., witness protection), the other is "investigative tools" as well as in law enforcement operations.

The report identified and examined eight special investigative tools:

- Interception of communication: interception of post, wiretapping, bugging, telecommunication data, location acquisition, telecommunication devices, computer remote searching, mobile and radio frequency identification devices, computers and Internet data file control devices are used to detection of serious crimes and usually for a maximum period of 6 months.
- Surveillance activity is not interpreted uniformly in the Member States. Some Member States distinguish between technical surveillance and non-technical surveillance (Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Luxembourg), other Member States distinguish between short-term and long-term surveillance and distinguish between surveillance with or without a judicial authorization.

The broader concept of observation can be the collection and examination of samples in a covered way, the replacement of goods in a covered way, the taking of videos, the taking of photographs in a covered way, hidden image recording, body-mounted hidden devices and tracing.

- Covert investigations refer to the following investigative activities in Europe: infiltration, pseudo or test purchase, participation in controlled deliveries¹¹.

It is carried out by a trained member of the authority or by a civil person, who conceals his identity by means of cover documents. There are three types of use of undercover investigators: the first is the general, systematic collection of information to detect specific crimes, the second is the execution of short-term pseudo purchase type operations, and the third is long-term infiltration in a criminal organization.

- Controlled delivery is the technique of allowing illicit or suspect consignments to pass out of, through or into the territory of one or more States, with the knowledge and under the supervision of their competent authorities, with a view to the investigation of an offence and the identification of persons involved in the commission of the offence.
- Employment of Informants, as defined by Europol¹²

¹⁰ DI NICOLA, Andrea – GOUNEV, Philip – LEVI, Michael – RUBIN, Jennifer: Study on paving the way for future policy initiatives in the field of fight against organised crime: the effectiveness of specific criminal law measures targeting organised crime; Final report, February 2014, Brussel p.223.

¹¹ Ibid. p. 266.

¹² EUROPOL: Covert Human Intelligence Source Handling, European Union Manual on Common Criteria and Principles, Europol, 2012. (Law enforcement only) p. 8.

Informant is a person who, in return for a guarantee of confidentiality, provides information, inside knowledge or assistance to the competent law enforcement agencies or intelligence services which facilitates the detection, investigation and detection of criminal offenses.

Two large groups of informants have emerged in the EU, which are often used in parallel in one Member State (eg Hungary). One group includes the employment of informants by a dedicated special unit (eg National Investigative Unit of Rapid Respond Police) developed and supported by Europol, the other model is the traditional one, in which any law enforcement investigator himself selects, studies and recruit their informants. In the latter case, the control and supervision of informants and contacts is only periodic.

- Joint investigation teams: a fixed-term group of judges, prosecutors, members of investigative bodies set up for the purpose of a specific investigation by written agreement to investigate criminal offenses involving two or more Member States.
- Witness protection includes the implementation of a witness protection program, which can be applied against protected "witnesses" who meet the requirements.
- "Hot pursuit" allows a person who has been convicted of a crime in one Member State to be prosecuted across borders for the purpose of apprehension.

According to the report, most often measures, that Member States are in place: interception of communications, followed by surveillance tools, followed by informants, followed by the use of a covert investigations, and controlled deliveries, witness protection, joint investigation teams and "hot pursuit".

In terms of the usefulness of the measures, it is first and foremost a very useful special investigative tool the interception of communications, followed by surveillance tools and informants, controlled deliveries, witness protection, and the line is closed by "hot pursuit" measures with case-by-case usefulness.¹³

Special covert investigative activities may be used in the European Union if:

- there is an available, public national legal mandate;
- there is an appropriate authorization and control procedure;
- its application is necessary and proportionate.¹⁴

The principles of application¹⁵ are necessity, proportionality (with the gravity of the offense and the least possible restriction), and the last principle is the condition of application, "threshold", meaning the connection with a criminal offense. However, this does not preclude using covered measures for the prevention and countering of a public security emergencies (eg protected personal protection, crime prevention).

In the European Union, the need to develop intelligence and analysis-based law enforcement has gradually spread in the various strategic programs and action programs, particularly in order to combat organized crime, terrorism and serious crime

¹³ DI NICOLA – GOUNEV – LEVI – RUBIN (2014) op. cit. pp. 221-337.

¹⁴ Council of Europe Office in Belgrade: Deployment of special investigative means. Belgrade, 2013. p. 13.

¹⁵ DI NICOLA – GOUNEV – LEVI – RUBIN (2014) op. cit. p. 243.

more effectively. The Hague Program, which is also based on information from strategic intelligence, drew attention to the need to apply a new strategic criminal intelligence methodology to changed crime. The so-called European Criminal Intelligence Model (ECIM) is based on the acquisition and analysis of operational-based quality information. The strategic goal is to reduce the legal, financial and human opportunities of organized crime.

Based on the information of the criminal intelligence agencies, the data of other public administration control and licensing organizations, the analytical units are able to make a fairly accurate group and activity analysis of the structures identified as criminal organizations.

The legal fixation and application of the criminal intelligence model is mainly in the Anglo-Saxon area, but the EUROPOL Manual on the Use of Covered Human Intelligence sources¹⁶ also discusses in detail the rules for the use of human resources in criminal intelligence as a recommendation to law enforcement.

In addition to the English National Intelligence Model¹⁷, U.S. federal law also discusses in detail the principles of how criminal intelligence systems work. (Code of Federal Regulations, CFR Part 23 Criminal intelligence systems operating policies.)¹⁸ Part 23 of the law describes in detail the rules of operation of law enforcement intelligence systems, which includes the objectives, applicability, operating principles, operational guidelines, system control and audit activities.

The impact of the pandemic on crime and criminal intelligence

The performance of law enforcement agencies has been and continues to be significantly affected by various local, regional or global challenges and emergencies. The COVID 19 virus falls into the latter category and thus has had a global impact and later versions of the pandemic are still affecting law enforcement agencies.

This global epidemic has been a challenge never seen before in modern societies.

Governments had to try at the same time to maintain the standard of services in modern societies, such as security or the operation of the economy, and to ensure stopping the spreads of pandemic and that health care systems were maintained.

Following the emergence of the pandemic in Europe, the primary tasks of law enforcement agencies were to apply quarantine measures, to reduce social contacts, and to apply lockdowns, border closures and border controls. These measures have fundamentally affected the normal performance of law enforcement.

¹⁶ EUROPOL: Covert Human Intelligence Source Handling, European Union Manual on Common Criteria and Principles, Europol, 2012. (Law enforcement only)

¹⁷ ACPO: Guidance on the National Intelligence Model;
<https://whereismydata.files.wordpress.com/2009/01/national-intelligence-model-20051.pdf> (downloaded 09 September 2021)

¹⁸ Criminal intelligence systems operating policies; CFR Part 23,
<https://www.ecfr.gov/current/title-28/chapter-I/part-23> (downloaded 21 September 2021)

Ensuring the continuity of the work of health authorities and preserving the safety of society by introducing and maintaining various restrictive and control measures was the primary task of law enforcement agencies.

At the same time, after a brief halt, organized crime saw serious opportunities in the effects of the epidemic on society. There have been significant changes in crime and crime trends that have been quiet affected by the closures.

„More people are spending more time online throughout the day for work and leisure during the pandemic, which has greatly increased the attack vectors and surface to launch various types of cyber-attacks, fraud schemes and other activities targeting regular users. A lot of these goods are offered on online trade platforms, which have made it easier and cheaper for counterfeiters and other criminals to access a broad customer base. Creating virtual and obscuring real identities is easier online than in offline interactions, which greatly aids criminals using aliases and creating front companies online.”¹⁹

The majority of citizens were forced to stay in their homes and forms of crime that targeted people in their homes emerged or intensified. During the pandemic, the grew in fear, frustration, anxiety of citizens making them more vulnerable to crime and criminals responding flexibly to exploiting vulnerable people.

Crime, organized crime, has invented a number of forms of fraud that exploit the above effects of a pandemic. Organized criminals against property gained access into the elderly, vulnerable people's homes with various tricks, impersonation of representatives from public authorities or medical staff who providing sanitarie products or perform a “Corona test” while stealing property from their homes.

Also a popular method of organised criminal groups to deceive vulnerable elderly people is the so-called "grandson frauds" also increased significantly during the pandemic. Fraudsters use essentially the same method to commit crimes. Elderly victims are called by a member of the organization and pretended to be a relative during the conversation. The caller most often claims to have caused an accident and needs money immediately to make good the damage. The fake relative, to avoid direct encounters, he convinces the victims that he cannot go for the money but sends an acquaintance for it.

A courier is then directed to the home of the elderly, who takes over the money, jewelry. There were also examples of criminals asking for a bank account to transfer money or dictating bank card details and using them to cause property damage through online transactions.

Due to "home office" and "home study", the children and juveniles were often at home without parental supervision and this opprutnities has not been left unused by criminals. Increase in activities related to the distribution of child abuse material online and the conversations of potential offenders around the increased accessibility

¹⁹ Beyond the Pandemic – What will the criminal landscape look like after COVID-19? <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/beyond-pandemic-what-will-criminal-landscape-look-after-covid-19> (downloaded 20 September 2021)

and vulnerability of children online due to isolation, less supervision. Online child sexual exploitation includes all acts of a sexually exploitative nature carried out against a child that have, at some stage, a connection to the online environment. There has been a continuous increase in activities related to online child sexual abuse over recent years.²⁰

The use of encrypted communication channels, tools, programs, and Darknet forums facilitates the commission of this type of crime. The perpetrators use file-sharing networks and livestreaming platforms.

In both 2019 and 2020, several Darknet marketplaces were liquidated thanks to law enforcement cooperation. A coalition of law enforcement agencies across the world announced the results of a coordinated operation known as DisrupTor which targeted vendors and buyers of illicit goods on the dark web. This operation follows the takedown in May of 2019 of Wall Street Market, the world's then second largest illegal online market in the dark web.²¹

Interpol provides global assistance to law enforcement agencies around the world by continuously updating the International Child Sexual Exploitation database. Interpol's Child Sexual Exploitation database holds more than 2.7 million images and videos and has helped identify 23,564 victims worldwide.²²

International Child Sexual Exploitation (ICSE) image and video database is an intelligence and investigative tool, which allows specialized investigators to share data on cases of child sexual abuse. Using image and video comparison software, investigators are instantly able to make connections between victims, abusers and places. The database avoids duplication of effort and saves precious time by letting investigators know whether a series of images has already been discovered or identified in another country, or whether it has similar features to other images.

It also allows specialized investigators from more than 64 countries to exchange information and share data with their colleagues across the world. The priority of Crimes Against Children unit of Interpol is to identify and rescue young victims of sexual abuse, block access to child sexual abuse material and prevent sex offenders from travelling abroad to abuse children or escape justice.

Europol established in 2017 the Stop Child Abuse – Trace An Object initiative. This initiative invites the public to identify objects and places in the hope that it can lead to the identification of victims down the line. Since then, Europol has received

²⁰ European Union Serious and Threat Assessment 2021; <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment> (downloaded 17 September 2021)

²¹ International sting against dark web vendors leads to 179 arrests; Press release, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/international-sting-against-dark-web-vendors-leads-to-179-arrests> (downloaded 17 September 2021)

²² International Child Sexual Exploitation Database; Interpol, <https://www.interpol.int/Crimes/Crimes-against-children/International-Child-Sexual-Exploitation-database> (downloaded 17 September 2021)

26.000 tips which have already led to the identification of ten children and the prosecution of three offenders.²³

The rate of domestic violence and sexual abuse crimes among citizens forced into their homes due to the pandemic has also increased in the world.

According to official statistics of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior²⁴, the number of crimes "endangering a minor" was 779 in 2019, while in 2020 it was already 964, which means an increase of almost 24%. By September 2021, 651 such crimes had occurred.

The number of „sexual violence” offenses was 240 in 2019 and 327 in 2020, an increase of 36%. By September 2021, 172 such crimes had occurred.

The number of „sexual coercion” crimes was 56 in 2019 and 95 in 2020, an increase of 17%. By September 2021, 42 such crimes had occurred. The number of „domestic violence” crimes was 392 in 2019 and 650 in 2020, an increase of nearly 66%! By September 2021, 410 such crimes had occurred, which is already in excess of the 2019 base year!

Looking at the base year 2019, it can be stated that in 2020, people who forced into their homes due to the pandemic, lockdowns, restrictions, other stressors, and psychological difficulties, caused to them a serious impact and there was a significant increase in deviant behaviors at home, violent, sexual violence within the family have increased significantly.

The numbers for 2021 are more encouraging, but for some types of crime they already exceed the base year, despite the extremely high latency for these crimes.

At the same time, due to the restriction of social interactions and lockdowns and increased law enforcement presence have led to a decline in street violence and property crimes, as well as human trafficking. As a result of supply disruptions, drug trafficking also came to a halt in the beginning. However, it was later stabilized or other supply routes emerged (Dutch, Belgian ports).

There has been an increase in the rate of social engineering attacks, mailware, phishing emails around the COVID 19, in which perpetrators mislead victims by referring to the coronavirus epidemic by selling fake cures or medicines against the coronavirus, or by other epidemic-related fakenews.

It identifies significantly more misleading or deceptive publications than before, so the National Investigation Bureau of the Rapid Response and Special Police Force of Police of Hungary has set up a special investigation team to prevent such crimes from being followed. Fake news or misleading content is experimented with on a daily

²³ Experts meet to identify victims of child sexual abuse; News Article, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/experts-meet-to-identify-victims-of-child-sexual-abuse> (downloaded 18 September 2021)

²⁴ Criminal Statistic System; Ministry of Interior, <https://bsr.bm.hu/> (downloaded 18 September 2021)

basis, and the commission of the crime is established, and proceedings are initiated immediately.

In the event of an emergency, new criminal code facts have also come into force, such as the crime of spreading false news suitable for disturbing the general public.

There has been a significant increase in cyber attacks with various extortionist viruses (etc. Wanna Cry, Emotet, NotPetya). It can be observed that the attacks are much more sophisticated, personalized.

In the course of committing a crime, they make contact with the victims and threaten them, which results in a very high latency for such crimes. Typically, they target smaller, less resilient targets with viruses. Users who are forced to go online due to a pandemic with little cyber security awareness can be attacked by installing various malware.

It can be a Bootnet that is an attack on networks, a Rootkit that is gaining administrator privileges, it can be a worm that infects without control, or it may be a Trojan that is embedded in other software, Backdoor which is obtaining remote access, Extortion Virus, Spyware, or Adware that is unsolicited advertising or Scareware which is a fake antivirus program

Today, not only individuals but also various organizations and health care institutions have become the targets of various cyber attacks. During the pandemic, targeted attacks hit hospitals and health care systems.²⁵

Significantly increased and sophisticated a business e-mail compromise (BEC) The initial simple phishing and malicious attacks have become more personalised and complex. Ransomware to target particularly affected sectors such as healthcare and education.

The rate of investment fraud exploiting economic fears of the pandemic has also increased. There is an increase in the number of incidents related to bank and loan fraud, money laundering and corruption. The real estate and construction sectors become more attractive for money laundering

According to the official statistics of the Hungarian Ministry of the Interior, the number of money laundering crimes was 188 in 2019, while in 2020 it was already 308, which means an increase of 61%. By September 2021, 168 such crimes had occurred.

The number of „fraud crimes committed using the information system” was 2,624 in 2019, compared to 3,400 in 2020, an increase of nearly 30%. By September 2021, 1,438 such crimes had occurred.

²⁵ PALICZ Tamás – BENCSIK Balázs – SZÓCSKA Miklós: Kiberbiztonság a koronavírus idején – a COVID-19 nemzetbiztonsági aspektusai; *Scientia et Securitas*, 2021/1. p. 82.
<https://akjournals.com/view/journals/112/2/1/article-p78.xml> (downloaded 08 October 2021)

The number of crimes against the information system or data was 587 in 2019, compared to 830 in 2020, an increase of more than 41%. By September 2021, 579 such crimes had occurred.

Statistics from cases in recent years show that some crimes have moved in online space independently of the pandemic, but forced home stays, lockdowns and increased use of online services during the pandemic have helped increase the number of crimes committed online.

During the pandemic, organized crime also exploited the huge demand for medical devices and hygienic products and sold counterfeit or poor quality medical devices such as masks, rubber gloves or medicines, disinfectants, some of which were actually sold, others only as part of financial fraud. Law enforcement officers identified more than 2 000 links to products related to COVID-19. A Member State's investigation focused on the transfer of €6.6 million from a company to another company in Singapore to purchase alcohol gels and FFP2 and FFP3 masks. The goods were never received. In another case reported by a Member State, a company attempted to purchase 3.85 million masks and lost €300 000. Similar supply scams of sought-after products have been reported by other Member States.²⁶

Some business sector suffering negative economic pressures such as hospitality, catering, tourism are becoming more vulnerable to criminal infiltration.²⁷

In Italy organised crime networks penetrated the healthcare system and able to divert investments originally aimed at providing financial resources, equipment and influence procurement, commercial agreement within the healthcare system.²⁸

Organized crime, taking advantage of the weakening of closures and supply chains, is vigorously present in the counterfeit and substandard foodstuff and beverage illegal market. During the first months of 2020 there was a decrease in organized crime involvement in food crime. The illicit livestock and meat products remain a threat for public health and potentially add additional risks in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic, and infection can spread rapidly amongst the workers of meat processing plants or in specialized markets. The pandemic created critical shortages of basic necessities (e.g. maize, wheat, dairy products, rice, sugar, tomatoes, vegetables). In lack of genuine raw material, whose cost raised a lot, dishonest producers used low quality or unsuitable ingredients. Consequence has been an increase of illegal, counterfeit and potentially unsafe food on the market.²⁹

²⁶ Pandemic Profiteering: How criminals exploit COVID 19 crisis; Report, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/pandemic-profiteering-how-criminals-exploit-covid-19-crisis> (downloaded 16 September 2021)

²⁷ Enterprising criminals – Europe's fight against global networks of financial and economic crime; Report, <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/enterprising-criminals-%E2%80%93-europe%E2%80%99s-fight-against-global-networks-of-financial-and-economic-crime> (downloaded 16 September 2021)

²⁸ Coronavirus: The impact on crime and criminal networks; Global Initiative Against Organised Crime, <https://globalinitiative.net/analysis/crime-contagion-impact-covid-crime/> (downloaded 16 September 2021)

²⁹ Operation Opson IX. – Analysis Report; <https://www.europol.europa.eu/publications-documents/operation-opson-ix-%E2%80%93-analysis-report> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

The counterfeit and substandard foodstuff and beverage illegal market poses serious challenges for food safety authorities, who need to obtain up-to-date information in the field of organized crime in order to detect and prevent the placing on the market of food that is harmful to human or animal health.

Europol expects that the impact of the pandemic will unfold in three phases³⁰:

- the current and immediate short-term outlook;
- a mid-term phase which will become apparent over the upcoming weeks and months;
- a long-term perspective

In the first phase the most notable immediate impact has been in the areas of cybercrime, the trade in counterfeit and substandard goods as well as different types of frauds and schemes linked to organised property crime. There has been limited impact of the pandemic on the level of terrorist threats to the EU. Another highly visible phenomenon has been the proliferation of scams promoting fake COVID-19 test kits and treatments.³¹

In the second phase (mid-term phase) cybercrime threats are likely to continue to be the dominant threats from serious and organised crime during the pandemic as continued lockdown and social distancing measures will only enhance the reliance on digital services to continue to work and interact.

Child sexual exploitation online will remain a significant threat as a result of the lockdown and online education. The trade of counterfeit and substandard goods especially those related to healthcare such as pharmaceuticals and equipment remains very high, counterfeiters will continue to provide counterfeit and substandard versions of these goods.

In the third phase (long-term perspective) communities, especially vulnerable groups, tend to become more accessible to organised crime during times of crisis. Economic hardship makes communities more receptive to certain offers, such as cheaper counterfeit goods or recruitment to engage in criminal activity.

Some of the most threatening organised criminal groups (mafia-type) are likely to take advantage of a crisis and persistent economic hardship by recruiting vulnerable young people, engaging in loan-sharking, extortion and racketeering, among other criminal activities. Organised groups are able to exploit the global financial crisis with real estate investments, which allow them to launder illicit profits.

Cybercrime activity is unlikely to diminish and new cyber threats that have emerged during the COVID-19 pandemic will continue to target victims even after

³⁰ Beyond the Pandemic – What will the criminal landscape look like after COVID-19? <https://www.europol.europa.eu/newsroom/news/beyond-pandemic-what-will-criminal-landscape-look-after-covid-19> (downloaded 20 September 2021)

³¹ European Union Serious and Threat Assessment 2021; <https://www.europol.europa.eu/activities-services/main-reports/european-union-serious-and-organised-crime-threat-assessment> (downloaded 17 September 2021)

the end of the current crisis. A global recession as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to have a significant long-term impact on migration.

The long-term impact of the COVID-19 pandemic may be particularly significant in the area of economic and financial crime. Criminals will likely intensify their use of shell companies and companies based in off-shore jurisdictions with weak anti-money laundering policies.

Cashless payment options are likely to continue to become popular, which are key targets for cybercriminals

Europol's databases are updated by obligatory data uploads from Member States' authorities. Based on these, its ex-post and forward-looking analyzes are of paramount importance to the governments and law enforcement agencies of the European Member States.

Conclusions

Member States' criminal intelligence systems and procedures have been and continue to be affected by the pandemic. Mainly during the initial period of the pandemic, law enforcement agencies had to perform other tasks to reduce the health risks of the pandemic or to carry out control tasks at the state border instead of their usual tasks.

As a result, the investigations were delayed in time, and some procedural acts could only be carried out later. In several cases, the investigators were also infected with the coronavirus and after thus were able to perform their duties with a reduced number of staff. Of course, investigating and following up the legality of high-profile crimes was a priority even during this difficult period.

In addition to the aforementioned difficulties of investigations, the lockdowns and restrictions made difficult for the criminal staff of law enforcement agencies to handle covert informants. Certain covert measures were more difficult to enforce against criminals forced to stay longer in their homes. Effective action against new criminal trends requires closer cooperation between law enforcement agencies and national security services.

Law enforcement has greater emphasis must also be placed on monitoring, detecting new criminal trends, and preventing crime. Close co-operation is needed between police counter-terrorism units, given the link between organized crime and terrorist organizations. The latter are strongly present on online platforms.

The intensification of crime and organized crime online performance has entailed the importance of training investigators in cybercrime and strengthening the anti-cybercrime activities of organized crime units.

Responses to the current challenges of cybercrime include the operation of international cooperation channels 24/7, the development of virtual currency analyzes, the development of Big data, the use of Darknet operations, the use of covert investigators, covert informants, and ever closer cooperation with NGOs and continuous organization of awareness - raising campaigns (eg ENISA, Europol, National Investigation Bureau of the Rapid Response and Special Police Force of Police of Hungary).

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Abstract

The definition of time and the determination of safety are the most debated concepts; thus, many disciplines try to define them. However, even the most unqualified man is able to perceive the time and the safety/security. The time – from an engineering viewpoint – is exactly such an important unit of measurement as the distance. What is the possible way to measure the safety/security?

Keywords: safety, time, measuring, time measurement, distance measurement, safety measurement

Introduction

More than ten years ago, I started a research with the aim to find a widely accepted scientifically determined definition of security. The results of the research were published in 2012 in Hungarian and English as well. The definition is applied to a system, where predictable processes can be examined within the system and between the system and its environment.

For a long time, I did not even think about the further development of this concept and the problem of predictability. My studies in the meantime have led to the solution; they have produced an arithmetical ratio, by which the degree of security and its effectiveness can be expressed. To create this ratio, the time – as I will explain later – seems to be one of the most adequate parameters, compared to the others. In the following, the relationship between security and time will be examined.

1. The definition from safety system view

The authors mean something else by the concept of safety/security, when they examine this concept by taking into consideration different areas of science or within the given science a narrower special area.

Due to this fact, the concept of legal security¹, public safety², food safety³, industry safety⁴, the military safety⁵, the social safety⁶, transport safety⁷, ecological safety⁸, IT safety⁹, etc. can be significantly different from time to time. Only in the Cambridge Dictionary, I find 18 different interpretations of the term Security.¹⁰

Of course, since all concept creators concentrate on their own research subjects, the definition of certain subjects may be different.

1.1 The concept of the safety system view definition

Security constitutes a system, a complex status of its one or more elements, examined in a certain timeframe and between determined limiting values, when security – taking into account the environment and the context of the system – can be considered as stable and predictable.

1.2. Elements of the concept

Status of one or more elements of the system; is an examined status of one or more elements of the system that can be the base for drawing conclusions concerning the stability of the system. Later on, the critical element(s) can be determined by examining the threat sources and risks. Its changes can generate events or unusual events.

Referring to a given time frame; we can make conclusions from the beginning of the examination of the system until its first changing point. We have to evaluate from time to time the system's stability level.

Examined within certain limits volume; mutual effects of the system's elements cause changes within the system's stability. During the estimation phase, we take into consideration only those factors that we can influence. Factors below the limit can be neglected, they are irrelevant, and they do not harm the existing system.

¹ <https://dictionary.thelaw.com/security/> (downloaded 21 August 2021)

² <https://www.goodwin.edu/enews/what-is-public-safety-and-where-do-you-fit-in/> (downloaded 21 August 2021)

³ https://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/general_food_law_en (downloaded 21 August 2021)

⁴ <https://www.safeopedia.com/definition/1052/industrial-safety> (downloaded 21 August 2021)

⁵ <https://worldjusticeproject.org/resource-hub/military-and-public-safety> (downloaded 21 August 2021)

⁶ <https://www.thefreedictionary.com/Social+safety+net> (downloaded 21 August 2021)

⁷ https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318251449_Safety_in_transportation_a_review_of_the_concept_its_context_safety_preservation_and_improvement_effectiveness (downloaded 21 August 2021)

⁸ over 900.000 articles
https://scholar.google.hu/scholar?as_vis=0&q=ecological+safety+definition&hl=hu&as_sdt=0,5 (downloaded 21 August 2021)

⁹ <https://information-technology.web.cern.ch/staff/safety/overview> (downloaded 21 August 2021)

¹⁰ <https://dictionary.cambridge.org/dictionary/english/security> (downloaded 21 August 2021)

Effects of the factors above limit volume (remainder risks) require the system's reorganization and the execution of emergency plans.

Relations of the system components; In order to achieve security – first of all – it is necessary to ensure balanced and predictable circumstances, within the inner functioning of the system.

Relation between the system and the environment; without examining inputs and outputs of the system, it is impossible to provide security. The completely autonomous functioning of a system is possible only for a short period.

Stable, predictable; the system is stable until its elements and existing relations between them or outer effects do not disturb its mechanism. If the system is efficiently examined, its some disturbing factors (an event) and a factor that makes its function – even for a short period – impossible (or generates an unusual event) can be determined and prevented.

The interpreted definition is useful in the everyday life and in scientifically is important too. This latter, system-based concept of safety facilitates the interpretation of a concept and promotes its uniform interpretation. In this way, we can get a useful definition, in the everyday life.

Based on the above reasoning, a concept can be equally applied to an atom, an active organism and a planet or even to the Milky Way, since all of them can be contemplated as a system and can be interpreted their safety in the context of their own components and environment. The above definition of security can be applied to any simple or complicated system; furthermore, to any subsystem.

2. How do we apply the time parameter to measure security?

Calculating the time is essential for the planning or execution of a military or police operation.

Risk assessment and risk management use the time as well, as one of the important parameters. For example, the time of wear and tear, the time period available for intervention and many other time-dependent parameters have to be examined.

There are many areas where time-based risk assessment and risk management are applied. A significant part of disaster control measures – for instance – is time-based, such as evacuation, area closure, etc.

It is also utilized in health care, in order to determine whether or not a patient can be saved or not. In case of a large number of injuries, time is a determining factor, whether some patients have to be treated immediately or others have to be prioritized.

Various service providers such as energy, IT, transport and other providers also measure how fast they can restore or reestablish their service, in the event of failures.

The various economics concepts, such as rate of return, profit and loss, are all dependent on time as well. The examples enumerated so far have demonstrated the assumption that time is a suitable parameter for determining the degree of security..

I find that risk assessment methodology can be developed, enabling time-based risk and security level classification for all safety-related activities. The exact values can be used to perform clear calculations.

Several people have indicated that M.L.Garcia has already conducted these calculations; thus, there is no reason for me to thinking about this. Let us see what Garcia has reached during her researched and published!

The book, „Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems”¹¹ shows us, how can calculate the effectivity of troops in case of an attack. The author – Mary Lynn Garcia – naturally uses their own interpretation to Security and Safety. “*Security, on the other hand, refers to systems used to prevent or detect an attack by a malevolent human adversary*” and “*For the purposes of this book, safety is meant to represent the operation of systems in abnormal environments, such as flood, fire, earthquake, electrical faults, or accidents.*”¹²

If this definition is accepted, there is a trouble. Roman law distinguishes four different types of criminal behavior. However, she associates only the „dolus directus¹³” deliberate crime – with Security. The „dolus eventualis”, „luxuria” and „negligentia” do not belong here, but do not belong to Safety either. What have crimes done in these three states of consciousness? It is probably better to ignore this issue of interpretation and examine the strengths and positive aspects of the book that are numerous.

A very thorough and logical conclusions can be drawn from her method: how to protect a facility in the event of a deliberate attack. All of these are profound thoughts, including very useful formulas and calculations. She identifies one – only one – extraordinary event, and examines the protocol, with which this event could be prevented. She examines the effectiveness of protective measures by comparing the time periods of the attack.

She measures only the effectiveness of the Physical Protection System (PPS), from the viewpoint of the attacked facility. The author has never written down that the efficiency indicator is expressing the security level of the facility.

If Garcia would have expanded her investigation over all types of crime, and not only over the deliberate ones, she could have recognized that with the application of further mathematical operations, together with the average of the effectivity values or a similar method, the security rate of the facility with respect to crimes could be expressed.

¹¹ GARCIA, Mary Lynn: The Design and Evaluation of Physical Protection Systems Second Edition, CPP Sandia National Laboratories ISBN-13: 978-0-7506-8352-4

¹² Ibid p. 2.

¹³ <https://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195369380.001.0001/acref-9780195369380-e-571> (downloaded 21 August 2021)

This is shown in chapter 1.2. “Elements of the concept”. If we identify all those risks that we are able or we want to handle, and we prepare protocols that are suitable for effectively treating them, we can declare that safety has been achieved.

Garcia's book shows a very good method to prepare good risk management protocols. The formulas she used for the calculation can be applied to many other risks as well. The same calculations can be used for any criminal offenses if we are prepared to detect them and prevent their consequences.

The same applies to addressing the risks arising from violation of the law and internal regulations.

The calculations by Garcia that are capable of protecting against deliberate attacks are perfectly applicable in the case of industrial or natural disasters as well. And these calculations can be used not only for the protection of facilities! If we wish to protect an area or some sport, political or cultural events, we have to use the same calculations. The order of the procedure is based on the following principle in all cases. First, we select and determine all those risks we wish handle. Secondly, we prepare protocols for the treatment of determined risks. Thirdly, we make calculations and detect the risks from the very beginning of the process, until its end (i.e. until the intervention).

Of course, this is only a conceptual description of the calculation process to ensure the effectiveness of our protocols, capable of handling all risks. The final solution can be found and elaborated by prepared professionals, with deep mathematical knowledge and engineering precision, similar to Garcia.

3. Results: How can the level of a security system be measured?

We can probably answer this question, based on the above analyzes.

So, based – amongst others – on the formulas of Garcia, the safety, interpreted in Hungarian language, can also be pictured and explained through equations. In a similar manner, the effectivity of each system – in other words, its safety level – can be expressed with a given numerical value.

While we are assessing the possible risk and we can concretely determine such a risk that requires an effective intervention, we have to elaborate appropriate protocols.

These protocols describe how to handle the events or the specific, extraordinary events. They identify the affected elements within the facility protection system and those procedures and measures that have to be implemented.

Protocols must be prepared in a way to ensure their effective and successful execution, in other words, to guarantee the safety in the protected facilities.

Only two timeframes need comparison:

- a.) the timeframe of the unwanted event, from its initial starting point until all its effects are felt;
- b.) the timeframe of facility protection, from the first detection until the conclusion of an effective counter-action (intervention), essentially the timeframe of the protocol.

These two time values can be subtracted from each other ($a-b=c$; if c is positive, the protection is not effective; if it is negative, efficiency has been achieved). If the two indicators are divided by each other ($a/b=c$; and c has a greater value than 1, the protection is not efficient, if it is less than 1, efficiency has been achieved), or we analyze the efficiency through much more sophisticated mathematical operations.

If the lifetime of the mechanical protection (T_m) is added to the timeframe of detection (T_d) and then the result is divided by the timeframe between the detection and the successful intervention (T_i), it can already be seen, whether the system designed is indeed secure or not. A relevant formula is presented here:

$$\frac{T_m+T_d}{T_b} < 1 = \text{Safe}$$

Naturally, the formula can be further complicated, broken up into parts, as seen previously in the listed examples. The result of the formula is a numerical value, in which time is not a variable anymore, and this numerical value – as an efficiency-value of the subsystem of facility protection – can also be considered as the safety value of the facility. The formula also satisfies the definition of safety, first published in 2012.¹⁴ A stable system is its status interpreted in the context of its one or more designated elements, which system – analyzing its components within a specific period and between determined timeframes as well as in a given environment – can be viewed as stable and predictable.

The management of an extraordinary event is elaborated in a protocol, in every case, from the initiation of the manifesting risk – taking into account one or more highlighted elements of the system which are affected in the extraordinary event – until the conclusion of the expected timeframe (determined time), evaluating the predetermined degree of attack, damage or threatening circumstance (examined within the predetermined timeframe). If some calculations are performed – which is not always the case, it is almost exclusively conducted only for evacuations. If a protocol were to be elaborated for all the possible risks to be handled within a facility, then it can be determined whether or not the system is safe.

Conclusions

Based on the above arguments, we can confirm – with complete certainty – that there is a possibility of measuring safety with time parameters. However, we have to declare: this is only one of the existent possibilities! We have to continue our work on

¹⁴ SZABÓ Lajos: Mi a biztonság? Pécsi Határőr Tudományos Közlemények XIII. Tanulmányok „A biztonság rendszertudományi dimenziói – változások és hatások” című tudományos konferenciáról. HU ISSN 1589-1674 73-84. pages.

the relevant theory; however, we know it quite well: “Even a travel of one thousand miles begins with a single step – Lao Ce”. Notwithstanding, this naturally does not rule out the possibility that someone else develops another definition for safety, and – based on the parameters within this definition – he carries out calculations, and determines the degree of security/safety with the help of these parameters.

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BERK CAN KOZAN – ALI MIRZADADE

AUKUS' ORIGINS AND MAIN PURPOSE: NUCLEAR DETERRENCE FROM GEOPOLITICAL PERSPECTIVES

Abstract

A historic trilateral security pact in the Asia-Pacific has been announced by the United Kingdom, the United States and Australia, which is seen as a counter-offensive to China. For the first time, Australia will be able to build nuclear-powered submarines using US technology. The AUKUS agreement will also cover artificial intelligence, cybersecurity and quantum technologies. In the South China Sea, the United States is attempting to expand its external balancing strategy by forging new alliances against China, which it sees as the greatest threat to its waning hegemony. A multi-centre structure is emerging in the international system, with Cold War conditions developing between the centres. AUKUS cooperation is likely to activate some critical fault lines in this environment. AUKUS stands for a lot more than the fact that Australia will build eight nuclear submarines using US technology.

Keywords: AUKUS, nuclear deterrence, USA, China, Australia, pacific region

Introduction

After the signing of the AUKUS Pact on September 15, 2021, the Pacific and Indian Ocean basins began to become a hypo-centre of 21st-century global geography. The formation of a coalition of giant countries, such as the United States, Britain and Australia is already being viewed as one of the events that will accelerate changes in the political and economic landscape of the Pacific and Indian Ocean. The signing of the AUKUS pact is already a sign of the entry of states into a new configuration system and new geopolitical realities in global politics after a political stagnation caused by recent COVID-19 events. As a consequence, this military alliance, which comprises the three geographical regions provided above, incorporates economic relations as well as a new geopolitical orientation.

The signing of the AUKUS military pact did not only economically develop relations between the three co-operation nations but also drew huge global geopolitical criticism, including from the European continent. Beforehand it was signed, there was an agreement between Australia and France for \$60 billion in 2016. This deal included Australia's \$60 billion purchase of boats from France and ships for the Navy. However, for France, the deal was enormously substantial not only in terms of selling \$60 billion worth of military equipment but also for its economy, not to mention its political vision.

Moreover, there was another agreement that would be organised by French companies to repair and recondition the equipment, which would bring more than \$90

billion in economic resources to France. Therefore, the signing of the AUKUS treaty and Australia's refusal to give up the \$66 billion Century Treaty has dealt a serious blow to France. As a result, the emergence of the AUKUS organisation strained relations not only with China but also with European countries. Consequently, this article will analyse the relationship between the AUKUS organisation and its supporters in various regions, along with economic, geopolitical and political issues and will provide an analysis not only by presenting a political and geopolitical outlook but also economic.

A New Military Alliance in The Pacific: AUKUS

There can no longer be any doubt that tensions between the U.S. and China in recent times' international relations are bearing the essence of the cold war, moving not only in terms of trade but in several directions.¹ The struggle of potential rivals such as the United States and China to become a superpower is already forcing the international order to change anywhere in the world political geography. In a bipolar review of today's international order, it can be noted that there is already economic and political conflict in many parts of the world's political geography.² One of these geographies is the Indo-Pacific region. The Indo-Pacific region has always been one of the regions distinguished by its geopolitical complexity.

There have been two factors that have influenced this political geography into a recent ideological confrontation and a place of conflict. First, it is a Chinese factor that seeks to increase its political and economic influence by pursuing new regional cooperation. Second, it is a U.S. factor that seeks to strengthen its economic position along with its military and political support. However, the AUKUS military alliance, which was unexpectedly revealed on September 15, 2021, by the United States, Great Britain and Australia, aimed at ensuring security, peace and stability in the Indo-Pacific region. Great Britain and Australia were also to become two of the three states that could at least deploy their influence in the Indian-Pacific region, the other being the United States. Therefore, the alliance may be one of the most significant foreign policy steps in international politics in recent years.

Although the reasons for each country's participation varies, the fundamental objective of the alliance is to establish a geopolitical defensive bloc with a high degree of deterrence. In point of fact, fundamentals of AUKUS give insights about the present global situation. When the issue is scrutinised in depth, it is feasible to conclude that the United States' efforts to stalemate China will continue because "*China's growing*

¹ HUANG, Y.: The U.S.-China Trade War Has Become a Cold War; 2021. <https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/09/16/u.s.-china-trade-war-has-become-cold-war-pub-85352> (downloaded 19 September 2021)

² DEMPSEY, J.: The United States and China: The Return of a Bipolar World; 2012. <https://carnegieurope.eu/strategieurope/49969> (downloaded 2 September 2021)

hard power is now eliciting a genuinely tough and structural political-military reaction”,³ though “*China was not mentioned anywhere in the announcement.*”⁴

New Geopolitical Realities, New blocks: the AUKUS' Trinity

The fast withdrawal of the US from Afghanistan in order to develop a new grand strategy that would reinforce US leadership under Biden might be viewed as an effort to build a new Chinese-oriented alliance rather than a return of the US to international politics. Equally, the United States, which has long viewed China's growth as a threat to its global leadership, aims to offset China's economic, military and diplomatic predominance in the Asia-Pacific region by balancing China. Mark Leonard points out the situation that “*for the US, AUKUS comes hot on the heels of its chaotic withdrawal from Afghanistan and thus is being held up as evidence that the Biden administration is serious, competent and tough on foreign policy.*”⁵ The AUKUS treaty presents a crucial chance for the United States to take a stance against China and it wishes to respond militarily to China as the dominant force in the area in the global power rivalry by reactivating the Cold War-era nuclear deterrent policy.

With this move, the United States has taken a step towards balancing, deterring and containing China in the Asia-Pacific region. Miller proposes to regard that “*America now rationally categorises the Pacific region as more important than the Middle East.*”⁶ China's One Belt, One Road project and ambitious geography have long posed threats to the U.S.' global hegemonic role. Against this, the United States tried to implement a geopolitical strategy that would encompass the AUKUS pact. The strategy was to ensure the safety of the U.S. and its allies on sea routes from the Pacific and Indian Oceans to Africa, the Middle East and Europe.

Likewise, it should be noted that Australia, Great Britain and the US announced the creation of a new partnership in the geopolitical framework for security on September 15. Under the security pact, Australia plans to build at least eight atomic submarines based on U.S. technologies, as well as equip its armed forces with U.S. wing missiles. Stephan Walt goes further and clarifies that “*three states are close allies of long standing but the headline item in the new arrangement is a joint effort to equip Australia with a fleet of advanced nuclear-powered submarines. U.S. President Joe Biden, Australian Prime Minister Scott Morrison and British Prime Minister Boris Johnson also announced plans for more extensive cooperation on cyber-security, artificial intelligence and quantum computing.*”⁷

³ NIBLETT, R. Dr. CMG: AUKUS reveals much about the new global strategic context; 2021. <https://www.chathamhouse.org/2021/09/aukus-reveals-much-about-new-global-strategic-context> (downloaded 20 September 2021)

⁴ WALT, S. M.: The AUKUS Dominoes Are Just Starting to Fall; 2021. <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/18/aukus-australia-united-states-submarines-china-really-means/> (downloaded 24 September 2021)

⁵ LEONARD, M.: The false promise of AUKUS; 2021. <https://ecfr.eu/article/the-false-promise-of-aukus/> (downloaded 2 October 2021)

⁶ MILLER, J.: From Afghanistan to AUKUS: The Painful Pivot to Asia; 2021. <https://harvardpolitics.com/painful-pivot-to-asia/> (downloaded 9 October 2021)

⁷ WALT op. cit.

To achieve these goals, Canberra has cancelled a €50bn agreement with France saying it did not meet the country's national interests.⁸ The termination of a previous deal between Australia and France, which was for building about 12 conventional submarines, heightened tensions between France and the United States, the United Kingdom and Australia. Céline Pajon analyses that *“Paris had never been consulted, nor notified in advance, despite the historic importance of the deal and the huge implications that it bears for France’s interests, not least the brutal termination of the contract to provide 12 submarines to Canberra”*.⁹ Moreover, France regarded it as a *“stab in the back”*.¹⁰

In response, Paris accused the Australian government of deliberate deception and recalled its ambassadors to Canberra and Washington for consultations, which is why, with the signing of this agreement, it is already clear that in this political geography, not only the United States and China but also the United Kingdom and Australia have begun to play a key role in the region. Therefore, it is feasible to argue that the alliance is one of the most significant expansions since Brexit for the United Kingdom. *“AUKUS is also the first and (so far) only expression of a “Global Britain”, the newly empowered global player that was supposed to arise after Brexit.”*¹¹

The United Kingdom, which regarded Russia as a greater danger than China, will sooner or later be posing equaliser policies to balance China, as defined by the notion of “Global Britain”, with multifaceted foreign policies. Furthermore, the *“AUKUS alliance unites the core of the Anglosphere against Beijing”*,¹² and allows the UK to return to the Indo-Pacific region while providing a new strategic initiative for the UK's repositioning in global affairs. At this moment, it is extremely likely that the United Kingdom is part of the process of strategic disintegration that is becoming more visible across the European continent. In other words, by placing itself inside the Anglo-Saxon geopolitical wing, the UK appears to have moved beyond the conventional geopolitical centre on the Germany-France axis.

In addition to all these, AUKUS is important to Australia for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, during recent years and through its economic might, China has grown its influence in Australia. The Chinese government increased its power through

⁸ WINTOUR Patrick: As China threat rises, can Aukus alliance recover from rancorous birth? 13 November 2021; <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/nov/23/as-china-threat-rises-can-aukus-alliance-recover-from-rancorous-birth> (downloaded 25 November 2021)

⁹ PAJON, C.: AUKUS, the Indo-Pacific, and France’s Role: *Fluctuat Nec Mergitur*; 2021. <https://www.ifri.org/en/publications/publications-ifri/aukus-indo-pacific-and-frances-role-fluctuat-nec-mergitur> (downloaded 22 September 2021)

¹⁰ DE HOOP SCHEFFER, A. – QUENCEZ, M.: The new AUKUS Alliance is yet another transatlantic crisis for France; 17/09/2021. <https://www.gmfus.org/news/new-aukus-alliance-yet-another-transatlantic-crisis-france> (downloaded 21 September 2021)

¹¹ LEONARD op. cit.

¹² BECKLEY, M. – BRANDS, H.: The End of China’s Rise, Beijing Is Running Out of Time to Remake the World; 2021. <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2021-10-01/end-chinas-rise> (downloaded 2 October 2021)

investments in Australian companies and it has been a source of security concerns for the Australian government.¹³

Moreover, some regulatory measures have been implemented in various sectors to reduce China's influence. It was further claimed that China was responsible for the cyber-attacks in Australia in 2020;¹⁴ therefore, there was a significant decrease in Chinese investments in Australia. As a result, the trade volume between the two countries was severely affected and the Australian State of Victoria tear up the Belt and Road Initiative.¹⁵ All of these things have heightened the tension between Beijing and Canberra. Moreover, the agreements reached in June 2020, as well as increased bilateral military drills between India and Australia in the domains of Indo-Pacific maritime problems, defence, and cooperation, was already strained ties between China and Australia.¹⁶

Furthermore, it should not be forgotten that the alliance is directly connected to nuclear submarines for Australia. Moreover, "*equipping Australia with long-range, extremely quiet nuclear-powered submarines will enable Canberra to play a more active role in the region, along with the other members of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (the United States, India and Japan).*"¹⁷ In addition to China's aggressive stance in the South China Sea, the trilateral security pact is unquestionably groundbreaking in terms of Australian foreign policy. Likewise, China's aggressive actions in the South China Sea deserved to be answered. To do so, cooperation within the AUKUS framework was extremely important. In this respect, the signing of the AUKUS alliance, geopolitically, shows that by choosing Australia as a supporter, the U.S. is already making it a bastion of the struggle against China in the Pacific Ocean.¹⁸

The AUKUS agreement also interests Australia as much as other AUKUS members in its active role in the region, which has become a centre of global geography. In fact, the selection and strengthening of Australia under the AUKUS pact is also seen in geopolitical terms as being directly linked to Taiwan.¹⁹ As it is known, the Chinese Communist Party considers Taiwan as its land and does not hide this fact. As Taiwan's geopolitical area is also extremely important to the U.S., it is a

¹³ BECHEV, D.: Is NATO in crisis? 2021.

<https://www.aljazeera.com/opinions/2021/9/25/will-the-aukus-pact-undermine-nato> (downloaded 28 September 2021)

¹⁴ PACKHAM, C.: Australia sees China as main suspect in state-based cyberattacks, sources say; 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-australia-cyber-idUSKBN23P3T5> (downloaded 18 September 2021)

¹⁵ WESTCOTT, B.: Australian government tears up Victoria's Belt and Road agreement with China, angering Beijing; 2021 <https://edition.cnn.com/2021/04/22/business/australia-china-belt-and-road-initiative-intl-hnk/index.html> (downloaded 18 September 2021)

¹⁶ MIGLANI, S. – NEEDHAM, K.: Australia will join naval drills involving India, U.S., Japan; 2020. <https://www.reuters.com/article/india-military-exercises-idUSKBN2741J1> (downloaded 19 September 2021)

¹⁷ WALT op. cit.

¹⁸ MOSS, D.: Will Australia's Nuclear Sub Gamble Pay Off? 2021. <https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2021-09-26/why-the-aukus-deal-is-a-major-strategic-gamble-for-australia> (downloaded 29 September 2021)

¹⁹ KASSAM, N. – LIM, D.: Successful deterrence: Why AUKUS is good news for Taiwan; 2021. <https://www.smh.com.au/world/asia/successful-deterrence-why-aukus-is-good-news-for-taiwan-20210918-p58su7.html> (downloaded 22 September 2021)

label for the U.S. to protect it from China as much as it can. Additionally, the existence of allies that will balance China is extremely important to the U.S. For example, Japan, which has the potential to balance power for China alongside Australia, is also included in the U.S.' goals in this strategy.²⁰

In fact, when it comes to political processes, it can be observed that not only Taiwan but the Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei also have problems with China. These problems also lead those states to enter into alliances with both the U.S. and each other against China. The U.S. is apparently trying to recruit new and reliable allies for new geopolitical competition with China. It also shows that a major factor in geopolitics is largely due to China's One Belt, One Road Initiative.²¹

Australia has demonstrated that it would take a more active part in the Asia-Pacific strategy with this step. Moreover, it is easy to anticipate that Australia's move, which has a mutual economic dependency on China, would have significant economic consequences. However, owing to nuclear-powered submarines with incredible speed, range, stealth and endurance, Australia will acquire substantial deterrent options with AUKUS. Starting from this point, most importantly, the agreement is that the United States and the United Kingdom are committed to supplying Australia with nuclear submarines; hence, with the completion of new-generation aircraft carriers by the United Kingdom and the United States, the goal of establishing an Anglo-Saxon navy to dominate the world's seas will be reached. Therefore, *"If it comes to fruition, the AUKUS agreement will, in sum, lead to industrial cooperation, particularly in the military field, which is of course far from negligible."*²²

Where does China stand in this geopolitical reality?

Openly, China was highly uneasy about this move which would land them in difficulties not just politically but also militarily. Although the signing of the AUKUS agreement has been condemned by China and reported by U.S. officials that there is no security deal for China geopolitically, recent relations between both the U.S. and China suggest it is the beginning of a new geopolitical conflict between China and the U.S. that would begin in the Indo-Pacific region.²³

It depicts the coming together of long-term inclination steps. The reason for this is that China, which was at odds with the US economically and politically, found itself on the armed side of the conflict for the first time. AUKUS, a military manoeuvre,

²⁰ TANAKA, M.: 'Quad' and AUKUS put Biden's Indo-Pacific shift under microscope; 2021. <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2021/09/26/asia-pacific/quad-aukus-biden-china/> (downloaded 30 September 2021)

²¹ REISINEZHAD, A.: What AUKUS and Afghanistan Tell Us About the US Asia Strategy; 2021. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/09/what-aukus-and-afghanistan-tell-us-about-the-us-asia-strategy/> (downloaded 23 September 2021)

²² PEROT, E.: The Aukus agreement, what repercussions for the European Union? 2021. <https://researchportal.vub.be/en/publications/the-aukus-agreement-what-repercussions-for-the-european-union> (downloaded 29 September 2021)

²³ GIRARD, B.: China's AUKUS Response Highlights Beijing's Bunker Mentality; 2021. <https://thediplomat.com/2021/10/chinas-aukus-response-highlights-beijings-bunker-mentality/>, (downloaded 2 October 2021)

was viewed as a military danger by China for the first time. In fact, it has long been observed that the United States has been constantly fighting ideologically, economically and politically to try to protect and retain its political hegemony over different regions since the advent of liberal internationalism and its own global hegemony. However, China's rising economic initiatives and its growing hegemony in the Indo-Pacific region also prompted the United States to take action, specifically, against China.

One example is Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, which the United States did in 2007 with countries such as Japan, India and Australia. However, China's relentless increase in regional influence power was already a geopolitically important step for the U.S. to sign such a security pact after NATO. This was because of the revisionist aims of China in certain areas. Stunningly, *“among the 10 member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN), the reception to the news has been surprisingly mild”*.²⁴

In this situation, China may strengthen ties with nations in the area that are ideologically opposed to the West, not just in the Asia-Pacific region but also in the Middle East-Central Asia and the Gulf. In reality, Iran's admission to the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation is a development that may be associate alongside it. China's policies toward North Korea may be accelerated further. China has the potential to make North Korea a nuisance for the West as they said *“it could trigger a nuclear arms race, a concern North Korea has also voiced”*.²⁵ Perhaps the United States can pursue a more forceful approach in areas where it has political issues and has been evacuated and can establish an anti-Atlanticism wing and become a part of this diplomacy in some way.

Fracture of AUKUS in the European Union

*“Germany, France and the Netherlands had each published their own Indo-Pacific strategies but last week, the EU finally released its own strategy on the region.”*²⁶ However, the European Union, led – militarily heavy – by Germany and France, was driven out of the game by the United States with the signing of AUKUS. On the other hand, the fact that France began to raise its domination in world affairs and desired to act alone was not tolerated by the United States, which is the dominating force in the Asia-Pacific region. Philippe Le Corre comments that *“The*

²⁴ SUPRIYANTO, R. A.: Why Southeast Asia Should Welcome AUKUS; 2021 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/28/southeast-asia-asean-australia-aukus-china-united-states/> (downloaded 2 October 2021)

²⁵ ZHU, M.: Aukus alliance: what is it, what does it have to do with China, and why is France angry? 2021. <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3151700/aukus-alliance-what-it-what-does-it-have-do-china-and-why> (downloaded 10 October 2021)

²⁶ VARMA, T.: After AUKUS: The uncertain future of American and European cooperation in the Indo-Pacific; 2021. <https://ecfr.eu/article/after-aukus-the-uncertain-future-of-american-and-european-cooperation-in-the-indo-pacific/> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

*country's presence in the Indo-Pacific pre-dates that of many major powers, including the United States".*²⁷

Given the global processes that are taking place, it can be observed that France is not heavily reliant on these processes, neither geopolitically nor politically. In addition, the signing of this agreement has led to a kind of geopolitical crisis not only in relations with China but also with Europe due to the problem with France.²⁸

There have been many negative examples of this in terms of institutional relations between the United States and France. As France's objection to the U.S. invasion of Iraq and the expulsion of the NATO headquarters from its country are still quite recent, these factors make France an ally that is not both geopolitically and politically reliable.

From all these perspectives, it is understood that the U.S.-focused area is the Indo-Pacific region, both after Afghanistan and after the new U.S. geopolitical strategy. In this region too, the U.S. already prefers to act with its new and healthy allies rather than its former allies. This circumstance might lead to France reconsidering its role in Atlantic politics and transforming Europe into another global player by bringing other European countries, particularly Germany, into Eurocentric politics.

In this situation, the European Union must improve its ability to act independently in order to be more successful and proactive in foreign affairs. This applies not just to economic independence but also to security and defence concerns. Nathalie Tocci concludes and claims that *"the only reasonable conclusion for the EU to draw is to step up to its own responsibilities in its neighbourhood. Both Afghanistan and AUKUS have reignited the debate about European defence and strategic autonomy"*.²⁹

Furthermore, the European Union may pursue a structure that may freely make military decisions by enhancing its own strategic autonomy. *"The EU could find a role of its own, as an independent strategic player at the same level as the US, China and Russia, with its own grand strategy."*³⁰

Greater accountability is evident in the two old nations, France and Germany, which are well-versed in geopolitics. On the other hand, the European Union's desire for strategic autonomy in the sphere of defence will intensify. It is apparent that the AUKUS alliance is a significant effort aimed at creating a regional deterrence against China on an Indo-Pacific Ocean spectrum.

²⁷ LE CORRE, P.: France's Indo-Pacific "Third Way"; 2021.

<https://carnegieeurope.eu/strategieurope/85525> (downloaded 7 October 2021)

²⁸ LEONARD op. cit.

²⁹ TOCCI, N.: After the Honeymoon, How to Make the EU-US Relationship Work; 2021.

<https://www.belfercenter.org/publication/after-honeymoon-how-make-eu-us-relationship-work> (downloaded 8 October 2021)

³⁰ BISCOP, S.: AUKUS and the EU: A Snub for the Bloc? 2021.

http://aei.pitt.edu/103610/1/AUKUS_and_the_EU_A_Snub_for_the_Bloc_%2D_Egmont_Institute.pdf (downloaded 24 September 2021)

Conclusion

The formed alliance with the United Kingdom and Australia demonstrates that the United States is looking for alliances with nations who regard China as a danger. The alliance in question arose in response to Beijing's military build-up in the South China Sea. As a result, the region may become one of the new hotspots in the international system. The introduction of AUKUS cooperation following QUAD and similar pacts implies that the United States, which has departed Afghanistan, a formerly vital strategic hub in the middle of the Eurasian landmass, would concentrate on encircling China from the south and preserving its supremacy in the Indo-Pacific region.

Australia, a Pacific country, will attain technological parity with China on submarines as a result of this collaboration. China will confront a new regional adversary in South-east Asia as part of its collaboration with the Russian Federation in North-east Asia. If the United States, which dominates the Bering-New Zealand Power Longitude, captures Australia together with the United Kingdom, it will be a major setback for China which aspires to open up maritime lanes to the Indian Ocean by crossing the Malay Area and going around Australia.

Despite the fact that China is a Pacific-coast state which must breach the Wall of the USA erected by the United States on its coasts and find a route to the rest of the world across the sea. China is in a state of panic because, in moments of crisis, China's One Road Project will be unable to find a passage even from the China Sea. It should also have realised that Australia, which is developing submarines with nuclear reactors to breach the Wall of Australia on its shore, will not be the last state to achieve this capacity.

The security pact also signifies the restoration of nuclear deterrence policy. The submarines that Australia would deploy with nuclear fuel can only be transformed into nuclear submarines carrying nuclear weapons if the required procedures are followed and it will be helpful from a military standpoint for the efficient use of the pact's military presence in the Asia-Pacific region. It will publicly use a nuclear trump to discourage China. This signifies the return of deterrence and a restoration in the balance of power politics.

It is obvious that the cause for the new global blocks and the new cold war analogies is a new power struggle, yet a different conflict dynamic from the Cold War period may emerge. A space may be established in which we can go beyond the non-conflict state that existed throughout the cold war. Pacific geopolitics is getting increasingly complicated and deadly. This is due to a variety of factors; specifically, with the advent of AUKUS, the region's geopolitical competitiveness grew and as a result of this geopolitical battle, the region's governments boosted their defence spending, opening the path for the spread of nuclear weaponry in other locations through submarines.

On the one hand, China is attempting to broaden the scope of the order it wishes to build; on the other hand, the United States is attempting to limit/surround Beijing, as it has done with AUKUS and QUAD (together with Australia, Japan and India). The EU – and its rationale, the strategic autonomy policy – do not appear to be able

to compete with these new alternative institutions. The EU's fragility is not the sole cause for this. The presence of France and Germany in the Pacific demonstrates that the EU cannot fight alone because it lacks physical strength and military might.

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Abstract

The Western Balkans is the only sub-region of Europe which, after the Cold War, sought a solution to its own individualisation aspirations in conflict-induced war. Although relations between the countries of the region have changed, they remain prone to national and inter-national disputes. Although the Western Balkans now present a more consolidated security picture, with national security indicators that are barely below those of EU Member States, the Balkan countries face a number of problems in terms of cross-border challenges. Ethnic tensions, corruption, organised crime, Islamic radicalism, which are at the core of internal regional security issues in South-Eastern Europe. This paper attempts to present these four main transnational challenges with regional relevance.

Keywords: Western Balkans, ethnic conflicts, corruption, organised crime, radicalism

Introduction

Events in the Western Balkans in the 1990s are still having an impact more than 20 years later. The transition process is still ongoing, leaving the region with a number of uncertainties. The Western Balkans settlement has led to a more fragmented geographical picture, the emergence of several new states which, after two decades of construction, present a more consolidated picture from a security perspective, and, although the internal security challenges of the states are among the uncertainties, the so-called security indicators have shifted towards what can be called transnational problems. While the overall data confirm that the national security scores of the Western Balkan countries are barely below the European average, the cross-border challenges are prominent in the region.¹

Although the countries of the region do not have a uniform understanding of the basis of their security policies, it is certain that the strategy papers of the Western Balkan states identify terrorism, organised crime, proliferation of conventional and weapons of mass destruction, environmental challenges, extremism at global level and, although to varying degrees, all countries are concerned by these issues.

Security dynamics in the Western Balkans

The term "Western Balkans" is not a geographical term, but a political term that entered the political discourse in the 1990s, during the process of building relations

¹ UNODC: Crime and its impact on the Balkans and affected countries., UNODC Research, 2008. pp. 7-24

with the European Union. In 1999, the Stabilisation and Association Process² between the European Union and the Western Balkans was launched, and the group of Western-oriented Balkan states involved was named after them. Today, 6 countries stand on the threshold of European integration - Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo. Geographically, it therefore covers the south-eastern part of Europe, which is culturally, religiously, ethnically and politically diverse, with a history of religious and ethnic strife and conflicts of interest between the great powers - hence the term Balkans and Balkanisation are very often used pejoratively.³

The region, as is well known, was plagued by numerous conflicts, which went hand in hand with constantly redrawing state borders - often separating ethnic groups, and thus cultures and religions, and thus manifesting themselves in territorial claims in the course of time. There is hardly a country in the Western Balkans today that does not have territorial claims on another. With the break-up of the Cold War regime in the 1990s, the socialist federal republic then known as Yugoslavia fell apart in war conditions. The events between 1991 and 1995 were the most deadly conflict in Europe since the Second World War. I will not go into the chronological events of the conflict, but it is worth noting that Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina became independent first, and then, in the second phase of the war, the clashes of 1999 led to Kosovo coming under international control under UNSC Resolution 1244. This did not yet recognise its independence from Serbia, so the Albanian leaders of the former autonomous province unilaterally declared Kosovo's independence in 2008, but the status of the territory remains a source of international dispute.⁴

The Western Balkans is thus known as the only sub-region of Europe that has sought a solution in conflict-induced war rather than opting for a transition to democracy after the Cold War. The Western Balkans have not been fully integrated into NATO and the EU since then, and remain prone to national and international disputes and conflicts of a nationalist nature. As a consequence of this power asymmetry, NATO and the EU have a responsibility to push the region towards the European security complex, thus creating a barrier to the potential for reopening open conflict. However, cooperation without full NATO and EU membership is very difficult. In the last decade, the relationship between the countries of the region has shifted from war to peace, isolation and then to bilateral and multilateral agreements and cooperation. Of course, not only the changes at the state and regional level, but also the impact of global trends cannot be ignored. These have an impact on trends in the development of political, technological, economic, social and environmental

² The Stabilisation and Association Process (SAP) was launched in 1999, under which the European Union signed Stabilisation and Association Agreements (SAA) with countries that expressed their wish to join the Union. The Agreements are based on the EU acquis and are based on its proclamation in the legislation of the cooperating states. The Western Balkan countries are currently at the heart of the process.

³ DOBROWIECZKI, Péter – OROSZ, Anna: A Nyugat-Balkán; In: SZÁLKAI, Kinga – BARANYAI, Tamás Péter – SZARKA, E. Luca (eds.): Biztonságpolitikai Corvinák I.; Antall József Tudásközpont, Budapest, 2019. pp. 275-276.

⁴ Ibid.

dimensions – and they have obviously not been ignored or avoided in the Western Balkans.⁵

It is undeniable that the Balkan region certainly presents a more consolidated security picture, with no imminent threat or armed conflict in sight, but it is also a lack of perspective, with political elites and societies unable, despite their perceptions of their members, to define, think through and prioritise the foundations of their security policy in a structured way. However, following international pressure and with international assistance, the first security documents for the countries of the region were practically in place from the turn of the year 2000 until 2006.⁶ The documents contain a classic threefold division into groups of internal, regional and global threats – and in all three areas we find so-called nontraditional security challenges.⁷

Environmental indicators of nontraditional security challenges

The Western Balkans is rich in porous borders and geostrategically important, located at the crossroads of Europe and the Mediterranean Sea, on the East-West axis, between Europe and Asia. This has a fundamental impact, but is also attractive for various trade flows. And the issue of border control is a rather sensitive one, as it is best described as incomplete and corrupt, which in turn means that it is not only the shortest route to reach Europe via the Western Balkans, but also a less risky option compared to other alternatives. Weak border controls therefore imply corruptible border and customs officials. This is further compounded by the fact that there are no visa requirements between most Western Balkan countries and cross-border trade accounts for a large share of national GDP, with a parallel increase in cross-border crime. Weak institutions, weak economies, lack of transparency create an excellent breeding ground for corruption and the security sector is no exception. The police, customs officials and the judicial system are not immune to political interference. Ethnic diversity is a tool for cross-border collusion, in addition to being a source of conflict. For the time being, organised crime appears to be a regional 'cooperation' in the Western Balkans that is able to transcend ethnic differences.⁸

The phenomenon of corruption will be discussed later in this paper, but it is worth mentioning not only as a persistent security challenge, but also as a cause, given the interests of various major powers in the region. Countries and their ruling political elites in the region seek to maintain a delicate balance between these powers. This balance can be beneficial to them, in the form of economic agreements or political

⁵ TERZIEV, Venelin – KOLECI, Redon – KOLECI, Baki: Security Dilemmas and Defense Challenges in Kosovo and Western Balkans. *Journal of Innovation and Sustainability* Vol. 4, No 3., 2018. pp. 75-84.

⁶ ABUSURA, Adel: Comparative analysis of the strategic documents of the Western Balkans. In: HADZIC, Miroslav – TIMOTIC, Milorad – PETROVIC, Pregrad (eds.): *Security Policies in the Western Balkans*. Belgrad Centre for Security Policy, Belgrade, 2010. pp. 165-183.

⁷ ANDREYCHUK, Raynell: *Security in the Western Balkans*. Report, Political Committee, Subcommittee on NATO Partnership (PCNP), 178 PCNP, 18 E rev, 1. final, 2018. pp. 1-4.

⁸ KEMP, Walter: *Global Initiative against Transnational Organized Crime Crooked Kaleidoscope Organized Crime in the Balkans*; 2017. https://globalinitiative.net/wp-content/uploads/2017/07/OC_balkans.pdf (downloaded 12 May 2021)

support, and it is a general, unspoken rule in the Western Balkans that stability and strategic partnership take precedence over revising or questioning these relations.⁹ Russian relations are overwhelmingly present, and are an obstacle to the process of EU integration.¹⁰

A further, but perhaps the most significant, pillar of the region's vulnerability is the legacy of the conflicts of the 1990s. For the Balkan states in general, it may be true that they are still in a post-conflict phase, which is a breeding ground for further ethno-nationalist action or organised crime. The South Slavic wars were intertwined with organised crime, as smuggling was a livelihood for many at the time. The legacy of the war is that even today many weapons are still in private hands in the region. In the 1990s, arms were acquired partly at the profit of drug smuggling. Organised crime has therefore been a survival strategy for sanctioned regimes, but it can also be said that if this activity sustains the ruling regime, i.e. profits from instability, there is no incentive to seek peace. Vulnerability attracts all this, but political and economic development does not prosper as a result.¹¹

In this environment, therefore, so-called nontraditional security challenges have taken root and persist. In the Western Balkans, there are four major groups to consider, such as ethnic conflicts and tensions, organised crime, corruption, and the rise of extremism, including Islamic radicalism.

Ethnic conflicts, tensions

As we have seen, the security concerns in the region are partly the result of the war and partly the result of incomplete or non-implemented political and economic transition. The successor states to Yugoslavia that emerged after the break-up of Yugoslavia are still sources of conflict because of their multiethnic character. This can be seen in the ethnically tinged political discourses that continue to maintain divisions, tensions and mistrust in society. The political palette in the region, although fragmented, is still dominated by a nationalist political elite, based mainly on fear for their rights and opportunities.¹² Ethnic tensions are almost invariably evident in all six Western Balkan countries, but are most pronounced in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Macedonia and Kosovo.

Bosnia and Herzegovina is a country where the compromises that defined the framework of the Dayton Peace Agreement¹³ have led to increasing tensions over time, by giving constitutional guarantees to nationalism. However, for pragmatism to

⁹ Ibid.

¹⁰ Major powers in the region: Russia, China, Turkey, UAE, Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Iran.

¹¹ KEMP (2017) op. cit. pp. 11-12.

¹² DOBROWIECZKI – OROSZ (2019) op. cit. p. 277.

¹³ The Dayton Agreement was signed by former Serbian President Slobodan Milošević, former Bosnian President Alija Izetbegović and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman at the conclusion of a conference held from 1 November to 21 November 1995 at Wright-Patterson Air Force Base in Dayton, Ohio, USA. The Dayton Peace Agreement is a general framework agreement for peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The agreement was intended to bring the three and a half year war in Bosnia to an end and to ensure a post-conflict political settlement.

prevail over nationalist politics, a radical change in the attitude of society is needed at a very deep level, and the confrontational relationship between one ethnic group and the other is too great. Bosnia and Herzegovina's internal and external administrative borders, its nation-state status and three different ways of imagining itself. Bosniaks support centralisation, which could increase the efficiency of the country's functioning at the state level. Serbs oppose Bosniak ambitions. The centralised Bosnian idea would take away significant powers from the entities, and Serbs see it as an attack on them.¹⁴ The Croat position is that they are thinking of a third entity. Ethnic discrimination in the exercise of public power is almost a natural phenomenon, exacerbated by the nationalist political rhetoric of the parties. The constituent nations, the Bosniaks, Croats and Serbs, elect their own presidents, so that politicians need only convince their own ethnic group. However, nationalist, emotive rhetoric does not lead to reconciliation or promote reform in the longer term. The practice of religion is also highly politicised, as the political narrative often sees orthodox, Catholic and Muslim sentiment as a tool.¹⁵

In Northern Macedonia, the persistence of problematic relations can be traced back to the Slavic Macedonians and the Macedonian Albanians. On 13 August, the Ohrid Framework Agreement¹⁶ sought to settle the constitutional rights of the Macedonian Albanians. The Agreement accelerated the peace process and raised the possibility of the creation of a Macedonian-Albanian political entity, which led to heightened antagonism between members of the former National Liberation Army (ONA)¹⁷ and the Albanian National Army (ANA)¹⁸. Nearly 20 years after the adoption of the Convention, the relationship between the state and civil society in Macedonia, both within and between themselves, is weak. The issue of ethnicity is therefore more dominant than that of citizenship. The Ohrid Framework Agreement sought to strike a balance by strengthening the role of the state, which would reduce the number of ethnic conflicts. Despite the decentralising power of the Framework Agreement, ethnic fault lines remain. Although the Convention is intended to promote social reconciliation, it does not explicitly take into account the basic social and security situation in the Balkans.¹⁹

Minority issues in Kosovo remain unresolved, despite the efforts of the Kosovo authorities and the international community. Tensions and violence between ethnic groups were a defining feature of the armed conflicts of the 1990s, and three generations of what is generally considered the "post-trauma forgetting period" have

¹⁴ KEMENSZKY, Ágnes: Bosznia-Hercegovina, a mozaikosra töredezett állam. Mediterrán és Balkán Fórum, X. évfolyam, 1-2. szám, 2016. pp. 49-51. http://www.mbforum.hu/wp-content/uploads/2016/12/41_Mediterr%C3%A1n-%C3%A9s-Balk%C3%A1n-F%C3%B3rum_2016_1_2.pdf (downloaded 17 April 2021)

¹⁵ NÉMETH, Olivér: Bosznia-Hercegovina: politikai helyzet és az euroatlanti integráció esélyei (2019. 05. 12.) https://diplomaci.blog.hu/2019/05/12/bosznia-hercegovina_politikai_helyzet_es_az_euroatlanti_integracio_eselyei (downloaded 19 March 2020)

¹⁶ In 2001, the agreement ending the Macedonian-Albanian armed conflict, which gave the Albanian minority more extensive rights.

¹⁷ Albanian guerrilla organisation, Osloboditelna Narodna Armija (ONA)

¹⁸ Albanian National Army (ANA), Armata Kombëtare Shqiptare (AKSh)

¹⁹ BIHARI, Rita: Társadalom és identitás a Nyugat-Balkánon; *Felderítő Szemle* 2020/1.

not yet passed, so ethnic divisions in society are still a dividing line.²⁰ This fragmentation plays a role in advocacy at the grassroots and top political levels. Its conflict of interest and ethnic conflict is uniformly pronounced in relation to Serbia. The integration of Serb-inhabited areas, which is problematic. Kosovo declared independence on 17 February 2008, which has not enjoyed full international recognition since then. There remains a significant Serb minority, which suffered serious atrocities at the turn of the millennium. Almost 51,000²¹ people were killed in violence that lasted for nearly four years, many of them forced to flee. This is the last conflict of this scale in the 21st century Albanian-Serbian relationship, and although the political leadership is trying to keep control, the tension is palpable.

Organised crime

Organised crime is not a new phenomenon in the Western Balkans, as the region's geographical location on the East-West trade route makes it a particularly attractive target for organised crime circles.²²

The Balkan routes used for smuggling goods and people have been identified over time, ranging from the traditional Balkan route, the two alternative routes developed during the war, and the southern route from Turkey through Bulgaria, northern Macedonia and Albania, mainly to Italy, Austria and Germany, which has been used since the 2000s. However, France, Belgium and the Scandinavian and Baltic States, which are destinations for illicit firearms trafficking, should be mentioned.²³

The regional characteristics of organised crime are determined by the legacy of the South Slavic wars, whether it be political factors, the emphasis on ethnic and religious differences or the weakness of the established Yugoslav successor states. The newly formed states often focused on nationalism, even in the field of law enforcement.²⁴ The bureaucratic, centralised structure worked against corruption and in many cases limited mechanisms such as police interventions and justice. A marked vulnerability in the region is that certain criminal circles have reached high political levels.²⁵

²⁰ REMÉNYI, Péter: Koszovó; In: KOLLER, Boglárka – ÖRDÖGH, Tibor (eds.): Európaizáció a Nyugat-Balkánon; Dialóg Campus, Budapest, 2018. pp. 237-238.

²¹ DOBROWIECZKI – OROSZ (2019) op. cit. p. 280.

²² CRAMPTON, Richard J. – ALLCOCK, John B. – DANFORTH, Loring: Balkans in: Encyclopaedia Britannica; <https://www.britannica.com/place/Balkans> (downloaded 15 December 2020)

²³ GÁSPÁR, Miklós: A balkáni szervezett bűnözés és hatásai – az illegális lőfegyver kereskedelem. In: ANTALÓCZY – GÁSPÁR – ISTVANOVSKI – NYESTE – PATÓ – SZENDREI – SZÜCS (eds.): A nemzetközi és honos szervezett bűnözés története, XX. századi fejlődése és várható tendenciái; KÖFOP-2.1.2-VEKOP-15. „A jó kormányzást megalapozó közszolgálati fejlesztés.” 2020. p. 133.

²⁴ MITIC, Kiril – VASILIEVSKI, Goran: Illicit trafficking in firearms – type of organised crime as a destabilisation factor for the security of the states in Southeast Europe; 2013. p. 58.

²⁵ ANASTASIEVIC, Dejan: Organised Crime in the Western Balkans; 2006. p. 4.

Since the 2000s, it is safe to say that organised crime in the Western Balkans has focused on three main areas of operation: drugs, arms and human trafficking. These activities cross borders and Balkan criminal groups are simultaneously cooperating with Western European organisations and, despite their ethnic conflicts, Serbian, Bosnian, Croatian and Albanian smugglers maintain close links with each other in the logistics between the source and the destination of the smuggled goods. This applies to drugs, crime against persons and arms trafficking. There is now also an economic shift in the focus of activities, with the principle of lower risk but higher profit predominating.²⁶




Figure 1. Share of persons convicted of drug production and trafficking, trafficking in persons, smuggling of migrants and firearms-related crimes in the Western Balkans, by links to organized crime, 2012-2018²⁷

²⁶ GÁSPÁR (2020) op. cit. p. 135.

²⁷ UNODC elaboration of national criminal justice data. In: Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans, United Nations office in Drugs and Crime, Vienna 2020.

Drug trafficking

In the Western Balkans, heroin smuggling is the most lucrative, although almost all types of drugs can be found and accessed in the region. Approximately 90% of heroin originating in Afghanistan reaches European markets via the Balkan route.²⁸ This operation is facilitated by ethnic groups with a history of smuggling, living in isolated communities, weak border controls and alternative mountain routes. Easy crossing of borders is quite typical of Kosovo, so it is not surprising that Albanian organised crime rings are prominent in the drug trade. The slow and corrupt judicial system in Kosovo also complicates the situation. Of course, it is not only Kosovo that is affected by the illegal trade in narcotics. Drugs enter Kosovo via Albania and northern Macedonia, where they are stored in areas close to the Serbian border and then smuggled through easily accessible areas near the Presevo Valley. In Serbia, those involved in organised crime have close political links. In the Western Balkans, Bosnia and Herzegovina is the next stop on the southern smuggling route, where the drug smuggling problem has long been a local problem, but where specialised units are now working to track organised crime rings.²⁹




Figure 2. Number of persons convicted for drug production and trafficking in the Western Balkans 2013-2017³⁰



Figure 3. Example of a multi-layer drug trafficking group in the Western Balkans³¹

²⁸ UNODC: Drug Money: the illicit proceeds of opiates trafficked on the Balkan route. UNODC Research, 2015. p. 19.

²⁹ GÁSPÁR (2020) op. cit. pp. 136-138.

³⁰ UNODC elaboration of national criminal justice data; In: Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans, United Nations office in Drugs and Crime, Vienna 2020.

³¹ Data from interviews with prisoners conducted under the MACRO project; In: Measuring Organized Crime in the Western Balkans, United Nations office in Drugs and Crime, Vienna 2020.

Trafficking and smuggling of human beings

The Western Balkan manifestation of trafficking in human beings mainly concerns trafficking in women, children and, in the latter category, infants. Statistics show that almost 30% of trafficking in human beings to the EU comes from Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia. Nevertheless, the fight against trafficking in human beings is the most successful area. It should be noted here that the Western Balkan states have ratified the relevant Palermo Convention and its Protocol, which includes criminal sanctions for trafficking in human beings, with a focus on trafficking in women and children, yet the slow pace of justice and the sentences imposed do not deter those involved in the act. It is futile to call this segment a success in terms of action, when what we are seeing is a kind of symptomatic treatment by the authorities in the Western Balkans rather than a root-cause solution mechanism.³²




Figure 4. Number of persons convicted for drug production and trafficking in the Western Balkans, 2013-2017³³

The illegal arms trade

In terms of arms trafficking, it is safe to say that a large number of mainly illegal small arms have accumulated since the events of the 1990s. In terms of localisation, the arms trade can be either internal or cross-border, and in the Western Balkans it can be regional.

As with other goods, arms smuggling is already taking place along the well-established Balkan route, using different methods and in different forms:³⁴

- transshipment of international road consignments from legal businesses,
- for smaller quantities, by distributing them in truck stashes,
- using false documents,
- reporting false theft activities.

³² GÁSPÁR (2020) op. cit. pp. 138-139.

³³ UNODC elaboration of national criminal justice data op. cit.

³⁴ MITIĆ– VASILIEVSKI (2013) op. cit. pp. 61-62.

In the case of arms, land-based smuggling predominates, greatly assisted by its geostrategic and human resource situation. The latter is inherently due to the fact that the unsatisfactory economic situation has generated high unemployment rates, making the promise of money linked to the illicit trade attractive to individuals without economic prospects. At this point, it is worth pointing out that drug trafficking also involves waterborne transport, although the Internet is becoming increasingly popular as a means of selling on the Dark Web,³⁵ whether for weapons, drugs or even as a back office for trafficking in human beings.³⁶




Figure 5. Number of persons convicted for firearms related in the Western Balkans, by links to organized crime, 2013-2017³⁷

Corruption

Since the turn of the millennium, the EU's enlargement policy has delivered results in terms of corruption pressures, but the region has lost momentum and lags behind the worst performing EU members in terms of corruption. Looking back over the last 4 years, corruption has increased in four of the six Western Balkan countries still to join, affecting Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, Kosovo and Serbia. In contrast, Albania and Northern Macedonia saw marginal decreases in the run-up to the promise of the opening of accession negotiations in 2019. This shows that in countries where there is more direct political pressure from the EU, negative trends

³⁵ The term dark web or darknet dates back to 1971, when it referred to networks independent of ARPANET, the ancestor of the modern internet. The Dark Web is a layer of information, its functioning dependent on layers built on top of the Internet. It is the smallest part of the web. Its use is mainly subject to technical preconditions, which in turn provide greater anonymity to the users of the platform, making it popular in criminal circles.

³⁶ GÁSPÁR (2020) p. 145.

³⁷ UNODC elaboration of national criminal justice data; op. cit.

may be curbed in the short term, although there is a general view in both Albania and Northern Macedonia that there is little confidence in government policies on corruption measures. Monitoring of anti-corruption actions and progress therefore remains important, including through EU engagement with civil society in the region. There is a need to strengthen the technical aspects of the accession negotiations, to step up the fight against corruption and to develop mechanisms that can neutralise the harmful effects of authoritarian political elites. This is necessary because corruption is damaging in itself, but if the European Union does not, Russia and China will move towards the Western Balkans and fill the resulting great power vacuum. Russia has a proven track record of exploiting fault lines within and outside the EU in order to halt or reverse Euro-Atlantic integration in the region. Russia is present in the region in many areas, economically, culturally and in its social aspects. China, on the other hand, defines itself as supporting enlargement, but exploiting and perpetuating corruption and the authoritarian political model of the Western Balkan countries in its own interests, which are mainly economic.³⁸

It is therefore necessary to translate promises of anti-corruption reforms into tangible action in the Western Balkans, as corruption pressures remain quite high throughout the region. Serbia has an outstanding record in this respect, with a rate of 27% - confirmed by the rather high protest potential of society - twice as bad as the worst performing member of the European Union in the same reference year.³⁹ A 5%⁴⁰ pendulum swing in the corruption rate, which would already be an acceptable rate over a period of approximately 5-10 years, could be achieved through concerted efforts. This would still be a positive forecast, as there is an economic component behind it, as this result can be achieved through sustained economic growth, with a steady rise in incomes. One might think this process unlikely in a region where bribery is also perceived as a daily occurrence. This in turn hinders economic development. The EU could of course extend its support instruments for the rule of law to the Member States, which is likely to be linked to the fate of financial assistance to the Western Balkans. But the role of the national side is unquestionable here too, whether it be in setting up state bodies, effectively prosecuting corrupt practices in the form of criminal proceedings, involving civil society and building the necessary capacity to investigate money laundering and other crimes.

Islamic radicalism

The phenomenon of travellers to the conflict zone and returning foreign fighters has undoubtedly defined the security landscape in the Western Balkans over the past 10 years. The most obvious manifestation of this has been the large number of fighters from the region who have left for Syria and Iraq and, to a lesser extent, Ukraine. Of the six Western Balkan countries, the most affected were Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Northern Macedonia and Kosovo. Not surprisingly, these countries have dysfunctional administrations, have suffered several frozen conflicts, and are

³⁸ Corruption in the Western Balkans 2019: Trends and Policy Options. SELDI policy brief no. 9 December 2019. pp. 5-6.

³⁹ Ibid. p. 7.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

characterised by unresolved identity issues and weak governance.⁴¹ In any case, it is worth noting that the terrorist threat in the region is only in the moderate category, and the radicalisation associated with high-level terrorism is rather overrated. The region's national security services estimate the number of people travelling to Syria and Iraq at approximately less than 1,100, of which women and children account for a perceived 35%.⁴² The risk is further reduced by the fact that there were also a number of elderly men who did not make up the number of fighters. The general presumption in the four Western Balkan countries is that religious radicalisation, the politicisation of religion, is a potential threat to the country, with Salafism undermining democratic values in an already difficult socio-political space. The political fragility of the country is seen as a key contextual factor for radicalisation, in which both nonviolent religious and nationalist extremist ideologies are being promoted. The propensity to leave the country peaked in 2014, with 70% of those leaving for the conflict zone already in Syria and Iraq. The reasons for this phenomenon certainly include the fact that ISIS's core Syrian-Iraqian organisation has become peripheral to its operations, regional and international efforts have become more prominent, mainly in terms of prosecuting returning fighters, and the intensification of fighting in the conflict zone, which has made it increasingly difficult to leave the ranks of terrorist organisations, but has also depleted their staff.⁴³ For security and law enforcement professionals in the Western Balkans, the temporary or permanent cessation of returnees and, at the same time, of exits, means that they need to shift their focus to other forms of extremism, including groups long burdened by tensions over ethnicity and national identity. This is not helped by the fact that local media and political discourse is a hotbed of ethno-nationalism.⁴⁴

Three important moments in terms of radicalisation and recruitment are worth noting. Firstly, that the outflows were almost invariably of Muslim faith, and secondly, that recruitment was more successful in countries where Muslims were in relative minority, as minority groups and diasporas are generally perceived as more prone to radicalisation towards violent extremism. This is also possible because they suffer perceived or real discrimination by the majority group around them, and are thus part of political, social and economic marginalisation. Thirdly, an interesting trend is that there is a significant difference in the extent to which violence is used. Individuals radicalised in the Western Balkans did not engage in acts of violence against their own country of origin, and thus did not define themselves as being against the Western Balkans.⁴⁵

There are a number of problems in addressing this phenomenon in the region. It is essential that the management mechanisms involve the whole of society and that the systemic drivers behind the phenomenon are understood. Emphasis must be placed on prevention, with deradicalisation, reintegration and resocialisation programmes

⁴¹ BIHARI, Rita: Radikalizmus a Nyugat-Balkánon; Hadtudomány, Magyar Hadtudományi Társaság, DOI: 10.17047/Hadtudomány 2020. 30. E. p. 165.

⁴² AZINOVIC, Vlado: Understanding Violent Extremism in the Western Balkans. Extremism Research Forum, Regional Report. 2018. p. 3.

⁴³ OROSZ, Anna – SZALAI, Máté – WAGNER, Péter: A külföldi harcosok jelentette fenyegetés a „kalifátus” bukását követően (2.) – Európai válaszok a hazatérők problémájának kezelésére, E-2019/35. Külügyi és Külgazdasági Intézet, Budapest, 2019. pp. 9-10.

⁴⁴ AZINOVIC (2018) op. cit. pp. 3-4.

⁴⁵ Ibid. pp. 5-7.

designed to unravel the specific web of these factors, helping to identify and understand the root causes.⁴⁶ It is also important to recognise that there is no single profile of exiting fighters and radicalised individuals. Behind the personal reasons, there is also a need to address the functional dysfunctionality linked to the country, as the countries of the region are relatively young, their institutions are not fully developed and fragile, and the problems of economic deprivation, corruption and the political and institutional dysfunctionality just mentioned are problems that are present throughout the region.⁴⁷ This leads to both an economic and social identity crisis, which is mainly due to high youth unemployment and social disenfranchisement.⁴⁸

The fact that the fault lines that emerged in the 1990s can still be easily activated today does not paint a very positive picture of the region. The majority of returning fighters may be such an activator, but they do not represent a clear threat of violence. The majority of them are serving prison sentences, although this also carries a number of risks, as local prisons are not equipped to deal with them, and it is possible that returnees could pose a potential threat to other prisoners from a radicalisation perspective. Despite this, the Western Balkan countries are still pursuing this approach of monitoring events, when prevention would be of great importance. Obviously, it does not help the process that returnees return to the same economic situation that triggered the process, making it increasingly difficult to achieve reintegration. The apolitical nature of the issue of returnees also slows down the process, as it prevents the development of the necessary context-specific programmes. However, religious sensitisation and awareness of the role of the internet should be an important part of the programme to be implemented, as it is often exploited, the lack of understanding of religion is exploited by recruiters who, according to their own interpretation of Islam, pass on self-interested reduced information to followers. And the Internet is now arguably the easiest and most dangerous arena for spreading extremist messages. networking. Facebook and Twitter are therefore the most valuable from a propaganda perspective. Nor is it irrelevant that content outstrips its creator on web-based platforms. The last 10 years have thus been surrounded by the phenomenon of Islamic radicalisation, yet no country has implemented a fully comprehensive programme to tackle it. It is predominantly a top-down series of actions in which society is not involved. Although there are updated CVE⁴⁹ strategies and action plans, implementation in practice is very difficult, mainly due to the economic obstacles countries face. A whole-of-government approach is needed to develop a whole-of-society security model, with government and citizens acting as partners, in order to develop a bottom-up initiative.⁵⁰

⁴⁶ KIS-BENEDEK, József (2016): *Dzsihadizmus, radikalizmus, terrorizmus*; Zrínyi Kiadó, Budapest, 2016. p. 90.

⁴⁷ PETROVIC, Predrag: *Islamic radicalism in the Balkans*, EUISS, 2016. p. 2.
https://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/dsee/dv/10_balkan_radicalism/10_balkan_radicalismen.pdf (downloaded 11 April 2021)

⁴⁸ AZINOVIC op. cit.

⁴⁹ *Countering Violent Extremism*

⁵⁰ AZINOVIC op. cit. pp. 2-17.

EU conclusions, recommendations

Overall, all six Western Balkan countries are struggling to join the European Union. Recognising this, the European Union has outlined a credible enlargement strategy for all six Balkan states for 2018: Serbia, Montenegro, Albania, Northern Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina and Kosovo. The Strategy foresees the first accession by 2025. It is important to stress, however, that this is not a target date, but part of an overall roadmap. The Strategy sets out aspirations and reforms, presents a possible roadmap, and brings together the steps and measures the EU needs to take to maintain a credible perspective.⁵¹ All of this, of course, while continuing to focus on the rule of law, fundamental rights, the fight against corruption and organised crime, and ensuring overall stability in the region. The European Union has an interest in the stability of the Western Balkans and in return for its support, it expects credible efforts to promote reforms. The Strategy underlines that joining the European Union is a choice. It requires political and social consensus. This is generally absent or very weak in the region.

All four of the security challenges outlined above were addressed in the European Parliament's post-2020 Summit report on the Western Balkans. The European Parliament's recommendations to the Balkan states focus mostly on strengthening democracy and the rule of law, helping them on their integration path. In the integration negotiation process, they are strongly expected to give priority in the opening of chapters on justice, corruption and organised crime, and to give priority to human rights, minority rights and freedom of expression. Of course, the development of state capacity is an indispensable step in this direction, because it is undoubtedly the only way to successfully fight corruption and organised crime and to implement judicial verdicts and judicial reforms without any residual effects. With this in mind, the Western Balkan countries need to place greater emphasis on regional cooperation to combat radical extremism, terrorism and organised crime in all its manifestations. In view of the UK's ties to the region, they should work in close alliance with the UK, beyond the regional concept, both to strengthen the fight and to achieve the objectives of the missions carried out under the Common Security and Defence Policy, in addition to the proposals mentioned above.⁵²

In addition to having the right apparatus in place and working together at political level, it is important that civil society is an integral part of the development process. A meaningful and comprehensive dialogue should be initiated to develop European values in the fight against corruption, as security challenges across the region are mainly seen as mechanisms of influence due to corruption, which can be traced back to local power structures and organisations with dubious funding and perceptions. Accordingly, there is a need to improve the coherence, efficiency, visibility and transparency of EU funding, in which IPA III funding has a key role to

⁵¹ Communication From The Commission To The European Parliament, The Council, The European Economic And Social Committee And The Committee Of The Regions A credible enlargement perspective for and enhanced EU engagement with the Western Balkans. European Commission, Strasbourg, 6.2.2018 COM (2018) 65 final.

⁵² European Parliament recommendation of 19 June 2020 to the Council, the Commission and the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the Western Balkans, following the 2020 summit, Brussels (2019/2210(INI))

play. In this way, particular attention to strengthening conditionality can be noted among the results achieved in macro-financial assistance, the fight against corruption and the management of ethnic tensions. In order to promote positive actions for ethnic, national and religious minorities, the implementation of anti-discrimination policies should be actively supported, in particular the development of inclusive policies to protect fundamental rights. The European Union calls for a decisive step by the Western Balkans to allocate resources to support reforms, which will require the development of a rules-based economic system with competitive conditions and the adoption of EU standards on citizens' social rights.⁵³

Of course, the European Union's claim and its implementation are not in themselves sufficient. In the meantime, the EU's approach to addressing security challenges is important. Although it requires further investigation, it is clear that the human security situation in the region may contribute to the persistence and escalation of transnational security challenges. This is because the transnational nature of nontraditional security issues means that security cannot be confined to national territorial defence alone, and therefore security issues must be addressed not only with reference to the state, but also to individuals and social groups. In the aftermath of war, the Western Balkans, and with it Europe, face threats that are diverse but less visible or predictable. Given its geographical proximity, the EU plays a crucial role in maintaining peace and stability. The pattern of security threats and the vulnerabilities of the post-conflict situation can hardly be addressed by a traditional approach to security. The multidimensional nature of the concept of human security seems to be appropriate to the security challenges in post-conflict societies. It could also be a suitable tool for the European Union to redefine its role in the region. The conclusion drawn from the HSI (Human Security Index) indicators measuring human security is that the economic, social and environmental tissue indices, which are an overarching category, are also fraught with problems that carry additional short-, medium- and long-term risks.⁵⁴

In my view, security issues, especially those of a nontraditional nature, should not be treated superficially, but should be tackled at their root causes. Along these lines, it can be shown that the human security priority does not exclude but enhances national security, which may be particularly true in the Western Balkan area under study, although I assume that EU integration is mostly a process that reduces the value of security challenges, but cannot be a complete solution to the security situation in the region.

⁵³ Ibid.

⁵⁴ AĞIR, Bülent Sarper – GÜRSOY, Barış – NECİP ARMAN, Murat: European Perspective of Human Security and the Western Balkans, RSP, No. 50. 2016. pp. 41-54.

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GÁBOR BOLDIZSÁR¹

SIGNIFICANCE OF CULTURAL/RELIGIOUS VALUES IN PEACE OPERATIONS²

“And I looked, and behold a pale horse: and his name that sat on him was Death, and Hell followed with him. And power was given unto them over the fourth part of the earth, to kill with sword, and with hunger, and with death, and with the beasts of the earth.”

(John, Revelation 6:8)

After the end of the bipolar world order, Hungary envisioned its future within the framework of the Euro-Atlantic orientation. For the sake of the wider area, the region and global peace and security, Hungary's forces have joined the international peace operations in the context of finding a way. Initially, under the auspices of the United Nations, unarmed military observers served to resolve crises in remote areas. The complexity of the security of the new world order, its new orientations and integration aspirations, the operational experience gained and the building of mutual political trust have deepened peacekeeping activities. The Hungarian Defense Forces took part in increasingly complex (more security dimensions, conflict sources and participants) increasingly dangerous, more and more faraway international operations with increasing military ties and tasks with an increasing risk of failure. The operational experience of the Force had an invigorating effect on the evolution of the forces' units, assets and operational/tactical procedures. The indoctrination, preparation, training and instruction, and a wide range of combat equipment, the procedures applied during operations, the doctrinal background all evolved continuously in response to the challenges of security and operational environment.

As a result of taking part in increasingly complex operations it has become evident that conflicts can only be dealt with in a holistic vision and comprehensive approach. It has become increasingly clear that in order to resolve conflicts within states, it is not only necessary to find a solution in the dimension of physical security (military and homeland security), but also in economic (scarce resources and self-sustaining economy) and political/administrative (power sharing, central and local

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² The international and domestic literature uses several terms and a complex system of definitions to define international crisis management (UN: essentially peacekeeping and peace enforcement, NATO: a six-part subsystem of peace support operations), the author uses the term peace operations here.

administration, management and organization of the performance of state functions), but the stability and predictability of the social or social security dimension has also become increasingly important.

The recognition that the behavior of individuals and communities affects the development of the security environment, and what roots such behavior stems from, has made the application of a wide range of social sciences a key issue in order to better understand human behavior and its relationship to the conflict.

International intervention during peace operations of the armed forces can only succeed if the sources of the conflict are taken into account and effective responses to them are found both separately and in an integrated way. Sources of conflict of social origin stem from human behavior, getting to know and influencing which is indispensable for a successful operation.

In the armed forces, the set of capabilities that provide a solution to the problem of getting to know and winning is evolving continuously and during these complex operations. One of the main focuses of the increasingly complex operations, civil-military cooperation, psychological operations, information operations, reconnaissance and intelligence, non-kinetic capabilities is the exploration of the retention and motivation of the conflict zone at the individual and group level.

Behavior is determined by individual observations, experience, faith, and customs, passed on from generation to generation by the individual and the collective group. Among these determining factors, the formation of group consciousness and group identity and the linguistic, ethnic and religious dimensions are essential. This study presents the development of the relationship between the Hungarian Armed Forces and this religious dimension through the system of international crisis management and peace operations.

The evolution of the armed forces in a changing security environment³

The **basis of state existence is the existence of a functioning and efficient force.** The creation and sustenance of **physical security**, the guaranteeing of sovereignty and territorial integrity is essential to ensure implementation of state functions displayed in the everyday life of the state and of the citizen (withdrawal, distribution, control, sanctions, mirroring values and interests, protection).

Throughout history, the environment, security, power, and economic conditions continued to induce changes in the force structure, its capabilities, command and set of missions. The Basic Law of Hungary⁴ defines the mission of the **Hungarian Armed Forces in a complex way:**

³ BOLDIZSÁR, Gábor: The place and role of the armed forces in dealing with security challenges. Budapest, National University of Public Service, 2019, pp. 67-70.

⁴ Articles 45 and 48-54 of the Basic Law of Hungary

- the armed **protection of** the homeland, the preservation of its sovereignty and territorial integrity;
- the fulfillment of **international obligations**, including peace operations and humanitarian aid;
- contribution to **disaster management missions** in the field of ensuring safety of life and property for the benefit of the population and the state;
- in some unusual cases, it also performs tasks in cooperation with other state actors for the protection and security of the country within the framework of the **special legal** order.

In the early **90's**, countries that achieved freedom from the grip of the Cold War, sought their place in a more complex new world, full of dangers. In a region that became free from influence after the disappearance of the Warsaw Pact treaty and the Comecon, after the collapse of Soviet, orientation towards the West and the Euro-Atlantic integration began in earnest. The Hungarian armed force formed in the Cold War, was a **mass army**, whose doctrine was based on the Prussian-Russian **movement-centered** military culture and was defined by the **order-oriented** command structure present at all levels. Organized and prepared for missions that were fundamentally offensive in nature, the conscripted armed forces faced a huge challenge at the time of the country's independence. Instead of a high intensity offensive war to be waged within the framework of an alliance, an effective response to the challenges stemming from the **disintegration of the Yugoslav state** had to be found. The **civil war process required completely different forces, equipment and procedures**. With the legacy of the Warsaw Pact, performing these missions presented constant challenges. Thus, in the summer of 1991, the newly independent Hungary had to guarantee its statehood and the security and life of its citizens in a series of crisis management operations lasting for years.

In **parallel with the** disintegration in Yugoslavia, political and professional dialogue and building relationship with the **West began**. Initially, in addition to conferences, meetings and short-term courses, unarmed military observers started our country's contribution to global peace and security. These shared experiences in crisis management peace operations and the NATO-led search of the way ahead in the mid 90's led to the declaration of NATO's Partnership for Peace (PfP) and to Hungary's accession to it in 1995.

1995 was a milestone in the development and transformation of the Hungarian armed forces.

- joining NATO PfP,
- the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended four years of Yugoslav disintegration,
- NATO begins the first out-of-area peace operation in its history,
- which was joined by Hungary as a partner country, contributing an engineer battalion (within the IFOR then SFOR mission),
- in the autumn of that year two designated platoons of the HDF are deployed in Cyprus (UN) and the Sinai (MFO) as armed peacekeepers.

With the development of operational cooperation, the quality and content of international training and education also improved continuously.

In the period leading **up to Hungary's accession to NATO in 1999**, relations became increasingly deepened not only in the area of education, training, exercises, conferences, but also in the area of peace operations.

Another milestone was Hungary's accession to NATO in 1999, and following that the contribution of a guard and service support battalion to a NATO operation in Kosovo (KFOR).

Restructuring of the Hungarian armed continued into the 2000s as well. Hungarian military units were contributed to a coalition operation, in Iraq, and to a NATO operation in Afghanistan to perform combat missions. In 2004, EU membership had also set new missions of a new alliance that we had to be ready to accomplish in a year when conscription was suspended in this country, so the organizational structure of the armed forces became that of an all professional one. In the same year, a Hungarian light infantry company started its mission in Afghanistan. In the second half of the 2000s the process of operational transformation of the Hungarian armed forces culminated in the **Hungarian contribution to the mission in Afghanistan**. As a lead nation, HDF units performed complex state buildings tasks in the triple context of **developing public administration, rehabilitation of the economy and improving the security situation** in the northern province of Baghlan with an area of 21,000 square km-s. The operational contribution was characterized by combat operations by the Operations Military Liaison Team (OMLT), which mentored, trained and supported an Afghan military battalion, and by various units of the Hungarian Special Operations Forces. In addition to combat operations, the complex development also included the development of the capabilities of the Afghan security forces, and our soldiers performed consulting and training tasks in the areas of logistics, artillery, engineering and helicopters. The increase in the number and complexity of operations has not stopped: Mali, Iraq, the Central African Republic, Sudan are just a few crisis areas where Hungarian soldiers have been deployed and are still serving today.

The Hungarian armed forces' transformation beginning in the 90s brought about great changes by the second decade of the 21st century. In addition to co-operations, education/training, joint exercises, and alliance membership, the experience of joint operations helped the Hungarian armed forces to be able to fulfill its basic mission in the new age as well. **Increasingly dangerous missions accomplished in an increasingly complex operational environment, and operations with increasing contingencies in increasingly remote crises, required more skilled, experienced leadership and execution**. The operations that were complex in all respects and performed in remote areas and in a multi-national environment affected and to this day affect military thinking, decision making and problem solving, thus helping the leadership move from an order-oriented leadership culture towards a **mission command** one, thus preparing the way for quick decisions and interventions adapted to the quickly changing operational environment, creating a leadership mentality based on knowledge, trust, risk-taking and initiative.

The **experience gained during peacekeeping operations**, allied cooperation and procedures have significantly **contributed to the accomplishment of national defense missions** and the development of defense capabilities, which since 2014 has once again become the focus of allied capability development. NATO member

countries decided on this change of priorities, the direction of the Alliance's territorial defense concept and reaffirmation **at the NATO Summits in Wales and Warsaw in 2014 and 2016,**⁵ due to radical changes in the security environment.

Development of peace operations

The transformation of the Hungarian Defense Forces is taking place in an ever-changing international security environment. Management of crises in the international background is a complex system, just as the crisis itself. The use of force is one such tool, essentially in addition to political/diplomatic and economic pressure. The domestic crisis management (in case of conflicts raging in neighboring countries) and peace operations conducted in remote areas (the countries taking part in the peace operation are not directly involved in the crisis) undergo continuous changes, but according to their time and complexity, the wide ranging literature discusses them divided into certain periods.

Apart from the **early peacekeeping operations**, which took place before and during the First World War in Crete, the Balkans and China, the peacekeeping operations carried out by the United Nations during the Cold War are considered a classic peacekeeping operation. The most fundamental difference between this classical or traditional peacekeeping and the subsequent generations of peacekeeping operations is that in the first case we are talking about conflicts between states, while in subsequent cases there are crises between groups, groups and states. In the case of conflicts within the state, the importance of the groups' sense of identity and belonging to the community becomes more and more important. Grouped according to the similarities in groups of the same value - develop a system of interest and a strong bond between the members. The cohesive force of these groups can be varied, but bonds and identities withstanding time and great challenges lie, in addition to interests and values, in culture, religious and popular beliefs, customs and perceptions, in addition to linguistic, religious and ethnic criteria.

For us, Hungarians, the first of the four known early peace operations, “firefighting operations” according to the terminology of the day, is particularly important, when on 4 February 1897, Gyula Pintér, Consul of the Austro-Hungarian Empire had sailors from a warship of the Monarchy deployed on the Isle of Crete to quell street riots resulting from the Greco-Ottoman conflict. Later, mandated by the European powers and through their military intervention, Gyula Pintér, as leader of this multinational mission, achieved a political success in as much as the Ottoman Empire created a new legal status for the Cretan (basically Greek) population and thereby put an end to civil war conditions.⁶

⁵ NATO NAC (2014): NATO Wales Summit Declaration.
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/meetdocs/2014_2019/documents/sede/dv/sede240914walessummit_/sede240914walessummit_en.pdf (downloaded 15 March 2018)
NATO NAC (2016): NATO Warsaw Summit 2016 Declaration.
http://www.msz.gov.pl/en/foreign_policy/nato_2016/documents/nato_warsaw_summit_2016_declaration (downloaded 15 March 2018)

⁶ BOLDIZSÁR op. cit.

The **first-generation or traditional peacekeeping** is linked to the establishment of the United Nations and the global acceptance of the Security Council's decisions. Although these operations were inter-state struggles with their regular armed forces, in which essentially military targets were damaged, they nevertheless caused significant suffering to the populations of the countries concerned.

The basic feature of **second generation**, also known as **multidimensional peacekeeping**, and of subsequent generations, is that conflicts also take place within the state. Part of the population does not accept the supremacy of the state or different groups (based on language, ethnicity or religion) turn to face each other. Another characteristic is that the will of the state, the central control, is weakened or in many cases even terminated. The internationally recognized method of measuring the relationship between the state and the citizen and the differences between groups within the state is the **Fragile State Index (FSI)**.⁷ This index is compiled annually by Fund For Peace, an independent nonprofit organization, and examines the stability of each state in five categories along 12 factors. Of the five categories (cohesion, economic, political, social, and overarching), the cohesion, political, and social elements fundamentally examine the relationship between the state and its citizens and groups within the state.⁸

In case some of the citizens reject the central authority, it cannot perform the essential public functions and services as well as control of the territory, the removal of the state monopoly in the possession and use of force, then the state sets off on the road of weakening to disintegration, and ultimately towards elimination. In these conflicts, the search for self and community identity is valued, as belonging to a community can provide not only spiritual and spiritual reinforcement, but also physical protection. Another important root of inter-group conflicts is access to dwindling resources. If the country and the region do not have the necessary quantity and quality of the goods necessary for individual and community existence, then a constant struggle will start for the distribution of these, in which the community identity, belonging to the bloodline, to the religious and linguistic community will be highly appreciated.

Further generations of peace operations show a more complex picture. After the crushing of a rebellious power in the country in **coalition war**, it is through **state-building** to make that country a stable and predictable player again. The 21st century history of Iraq and Afghanistan is an example of this complex international peacekeeping operation. But in recent years, **non-state actors** and **stateless** "states", **quasi-states** such as the Islamic State, have **emerged**. After the fight against, and victory over it, it is necessary to build a stable and predictable state from the ruins here as well.

The **hybrid threat** and attack is another level of conflict. In the case of multi-phase pressure, the fact of a complex attack cannot be established at first. The aggressor has been proven to be unidentifiable, creating tensions in the economic,

⁷ FUND for Peace (2017): Fragile States Index 2017. pp. 26-33.
<https://reliefweb.int/sites/reliefweb.int/files/resources/951171705-Fragile-States-Index-Annual-Report-2017.pdf> (downloaded 15 March 2018)

⁸ BOLDIZSÁR op. cit. pp. 58-60.

social and physical security space through the use of intelligence methods and even the use of organized criminal groups. In a region destabilized in this way, the good relationship between the state and its citizens is disrupted, political stability is damaged and weakened, which can eventually lead to disintegration through civil war.⁹

It is necessary, even essential, in peace operations to explore and understand the root causes of the conflict. Intra-state violence The existence of quasi-states is the aggression of non-state actors, the **common feature of hybrid attacks is that it puts pressure on individuals, on communities.** The different characteristics of different communities lead not only to the development of **self- and community identity**, but also to the **recognition and persecution of otherness in an age of climate change, religious impatience and intolerance, competing for dwindling resources of shrinking living space.**

Cognitive knowledge and skills, development of the ability to win

The behavior of the local population in the area of operation, can be of three kinds in relation to the international peacekeeping forces and the process of reconciliation: friendly and supportive, neutral or abstaining, hostile or dismissive. This attitude, personal preferences or group thinking is to help or complicate the success of international intervention. In traditional societies, the imprinting and the durability of the attitude is much stronger. Based on the knowledge of the factors determining the behavior of the individual and the communities, it is possible to predict what kind of behavior and reaction to expect on the part of the individual and the community in the given situation. For **those who are** exposed to **physical danger and who** compete on a daily basis for **scarce resources**, a **basic condition of existence is belonging to a community** that, if its standards are maintained, provides security where possible. If you succeed to meet the needs at the individual or family level at the two lower levels of the Maslow pyramid of needs,¹⁰ physiological and physical security, life can be called stable and predictable. This is the desire of all people in all crisis areas of the world. In a crisis situation, the formation and maintenance of group identity is key, as the strength of the community exerts its impact not only through physical security, help, but also through spiritual support. Belonging to a community in emergencies, conflicts and armed aggression is determined by the **commonly spoken language, professed faith, ethnic cohesion.**

And the behavior of individuals and communities is determined by interests and values, family and traditions, beliefs and customs, experiences and beliefs, past and teachings. But the organizing principles of belonging to a community, the determinants of behavior, hide not only benefits but also risks. Visible, recognizable elements for enemy troops, which manifestations of group identity (building, clothing, decoration, and sacred signs, customs, behavior) become suitable for discrimination,

⁹ BOLDIZSÁR op. cit.

¹⁰ Maslow's needs pyramid: it systematizes the different needs of human existence in a way that builds on each other (from basic to complex). Level 1: physiological level 2: physical security, level 3: love and togetherness, level 4: self-esteem, level 5: self-realization.

exclusion, persecution, rejection of otherness. Groups competing for scarce resources thus identify not only provide protection for individuals but also serve them as targets.

Knowledge of the factors that shape the belonging of the group provides an opportunity to use the broad material knowledge with the right preparation to influence (persuade) the thinking of the target group to change its behavior.

Recognition: Peacekeeping forces able to deal, and capable of dealing, with the complex challenges of a changing world must recognize the origins and complexity of conflicts during the analysis of the security situation. The need for complex security and its components are mapped at both the individual and group levels. The social/social security dimension has become essential due to the influence of the factors outlined above in intra-state conflicts in civil war conditions.

Cognition: Exploring and understanding the **roots** of a conflict is a long process and requires the region-specific and joint application of many fields of **social science**. The **historical, religious, cultural, cultural – anthropological, political science, economic, sociological and psychological** knowledge is indispensable in the process of cognition. The combined application of the above knowledge can ensure the “**human space**” to understand the behavior of the local population, to predict its reactions and the possible directions of acceptance and persuasion. This information and knowledge, method and experience are also passed on during the preparation of peacekeeping forces, and this knowledge is developed by the functional elements entrusted with the management of the 'human space' and the building of relationships.

Persuasion: Using the opportunities provided by cognition, knowledge can be used to change the behavior of the selected **target group** of the “human space” to be **influenced**. Hostile behavior can be neutralized or supportive behavior can be developed. The first step in persuasion is to get to know the target audience and then create messages for the desired behavior. Finally, these messages need to be transformed and delivered in a form and content that is acceptable to the local population.

Organizational elements of persuasion: In the complex management of complex crises, many actors are involved in different security dimensions, whose efforts need to be coordinated in order to succeed.¹¹ Based on operational experience, peacekeepers are continuously developing their knowledge of the “human space”, potential target groups and the organizational units that manage them, as well as cooperation with the local population.

Initially, in the era of basically multidimensional peacekeeping, the co-operation and coordinated efforts of the actors, the exploration of the needs and values of the local population could be found in the UN peace operations. A quarter of a century later, the **Civil-Military Cooperation (CIMIC)**, as an organization that liaises with the local population, government and influencers, appears as a medium in **NATO's IFOR** and then **SFOR** operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina. The next element - considering its domestic introduction - the basic purpose of **psychological**

¹¹ BOLDIZSÁR Gábor (2014b): Paratroopers in future operations; Security and Defense Quarterly, No. 2014/2. p. 47.

operational capability (PSYOPS) is to influence and persuade, so the CIMIC ability actively complements and builds on the acquired knowledge in this subject. Due to the increasingly complex operational environment, an integrating military capability of **Information Operations (INFOOPS)** came into being, which, in addition to the other six components (computer network based operations, electronic warfare, use of force and threat thereof, information and operations security, deception) also includes cognitive abilities. In addition to the CIMIC and PSYOPS the **key leader engagement (KLE)** and the **presence, posture and profile (PPP)** have a joint effect on the local population and its opinion forming.

NATO has established a **CIMIC Center of Excellence (CCOE)** in the Netherlands, of which Hungary is a member, in order to better understand and persuade civil-military cooperation, interactions with the local population, to process experience (lessons learnt) and to develop doctrine. The knowledge transfer of the center is also utilized by the Hungarian Military Non-Kinetic Capability Organization, the Hungarian Civil-Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations Center.

An important element in getting to know communities, especially traditional societies, groups living in **crisis areas** is the exploration of **religious ties, beliefs** - and its impact on thinking. The power of religion, faith is complex. Not looking here at the **spiritual emotion** and **value-determining** effects, its **community-building and retention, providing protection, guidance, opinion-forming** functions are what make it crucial in respect of community existence and survival. The above triple (practical) function is what **necessitates learning** the religious environment, system of beliefs, habits and norms even for peace operation forces coming from different cultures.

The army's non-kinetic capabilities complemented with functional experts of CIMIC possessing specialized knowledge provide an opportunity to achieve the desired peacetime conditions not only through violent means, but through affecting the hearts and minds of the local population.

The "human space", the condition for learning about and influencing human behavior, is the knowledge and ability to apply social science to specific communities and regions. During peace operations, compliance with, and observance of, laws and agreements/treaties governing **warfare, armed conflicts and management of international crises**, the Washington Treaty, the UN Charter and Security Council Decisions, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and requirements of other international documents is indispensable for the legitimacy and success of the operations. But in addition to these regulations, international peace operation personnel also need a number of specific professional documents, to use a professional term, a **doctrinal background**, without which the desired lasting peace and security cannot be achieved. These documents prescribe mandatory practical, readily usable and experience-/research-based knowledge and procedures, or make recommendations for their use. This doctrinal background is of dual importance in international crisis management and peace operations. First, they create the document hierarchy of transforming political decisions into professional instructions, their **operationalization** at the planning-organization, command and control, implementation level. On the other hand, they are important in the **training** of designated forces, both as professional regulators and as recommendations and

guidelines. During the preparation for peacekeeping missions, two types of **knowledge transfer** take place, on the one hand for the specific transfer of social science knowledge in the **education** system to the general crisis area, and on the other during the general and pre-deployment special preparation of the forces assigned to the operations, in the context of **training**. The doctrinal regulatory system is constantly changing and evolving as a result of changes in operational experience, changes in the security and operational environment, political decisions and guidelines, the tools used and other specialist procedures.

The doctrinal regulatory background of learning about and managing, influencing and cooperating with the “human space” should be reviewed in relation to the **UN and NATO**. Having regard to the fact that **from the perspective of our country’s operational participation** these two organizations are relevant, it is important to know the mentality and system of regulations that are formulated around issues of **religion, religious communities** in the form of recommendations or specific requirements.

Based on the chronology of the peacekeeping periods, in the course of the **UN's** international crisis management activities, basically from the age of post-Cold War multidimensional peacekeeping (Generation 2) it becomes more and more important to get to know and understand the population.

In its course description issued in 1994 to train military observers, the United Nations sets out the obligation and necessity of educating **cultural differences**.¹²

The service must be performed in compliance with the principles set out in the above-mentioned 1995 General Peacekeeping Guidelines, such as the principles of **neutrality, impartiality and objectivity**.¹³

Published in 1997, the United Nations Peacekeeping Handbook in addition to history, customs and beliefs classifies **religious knowledge** as **culture and the local culture**.¹⁴

The Guidelines for the Selection and Training of Military Observers, also issued in 1997, require the transfer of **historical, demographic, cultural and traditions** knowledge relevant to the crisis area in the general operational knowledge category in a broader context during preparation. This document, in the chapter “We are the UN peacekeepers”, presents respect for local customs, traditions, culture and **religion** at all times as a mandatory rule of conduct.¹⁵

¹² United Nation: UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVER TRAINING CURRICULUM (UN, New York, 1995)

¹³ United Nation: GENERAL GUIDELINES FOR PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (UN, New York, 1995)

¹⁴ United Nation: UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING HANDBOOK FOR JUNIOR RANKS (UN, New York, 1997)

¹⁵ United Nation: SELECTION STANDARDS AND TRAINING GUIDELINES FOR UNITED NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS (UN, New York, 1997) p. 47.

The concept and content of the CIMIC are already published in the Military Observer Handbook, published in 2001, and the importance of learning about cultural differences is reiterated in the context of social customs and behavior.¹⁶

The detailed UN Multidimensional Peacekeeping Operations Manual, published in 2003, requires respect for and **protection of cultural rights** in addition to (often as part of) civil, economic, political and minority rights in accordance with UN mandates.¹⁷

Taking into account the UN recommendations and requirements of the similar **international** courses, two curricula compiled by the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations – UN DPKO in 2017 and 2020 have been incorporated in **domestic peace operations training courses**; these cover social diversity, **cultural knowledge, religious knowledge and inherent values**, and the conduct of peacekeeping forces in societies with different cultures make it obligatory to define the teaching of topics and also provide educational aid for this.¹⁸

NATO intervened in the disintegration process in Yugoslavia as a result of its search for a path/direction, from 1995 onwards with ground forces to curb the civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and to implement the Dayton Peace Agreement. From the very beginning, it was clear to the Alliance that without getting to know and winning over the civilian population, lasting peace and reconciliation, a **functioning state and later nation-building could not be achieved**.

NATO, to discharge this responsibility in 1995 applied **civil-military cooperation** (CIMIC) capability with its staff elements on the organization-planning level and on the level of the **executive** subunits. The professional work of both organizational elements were supported by a special element, the **CIMIC Functional Experts** Group who have specialized in-depth expertise and experience. These experts cover **five main functional areas**: administration, infrastructure, humanitarian affairs, economy, culture and education. Research, exploration and knowledge of **religious issues** and traditions are part of the latter field.¹⁹

The issue, importance and the need for the knowledge of **religious matters** not only at expert level, but also in **various CIMIC assessments** (urban, quick, full, summary assessments) together in the **context of cultural affairs**, the history of the population linguistic/cultural/community composition, together with study aspects of monuments and cultural heritage, in a complex way.²⁰

Preparations for cultural issues, which are also important for the overall peacekeeping force, are increasingly reflected in the training of CIMIC personnel.

¹⁶ United Nation: NATIONS MILITARY OBSERVERS HANDBOOK (UN, New York, 2001) p. 27, p. 119.

¹⁷ United Nation: HANDBOOK ON UNITED NATIONS MULTIDIMENSIONAL PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS (UN, New York, 2003) p. 101.

¹⁸ UN 5th STANDARDIZED TRAINING MODULE (2020) Chapters 5A and 5B and UNDPKO CORE PRE-DEPLOYMENT TRAINING MATERIALS (20 17) 3.2. module

¹⁹ CCOE CIMIC/CMI FIELD HANDBOOK 3rd EDITION (Civil-Military Co-operation Center of Excellence, Netherlands, 2012) pp. 5-9.

²⁰ Ibid. Annex 6-1 and 6-2 and 9-1

Eliminating uncertainty resulting from different cultural conditions, customs and religious differences may be necessary to remove the effect of shock, but at least to reduce it.²¹

The NATO CIMIC Center of Excellence (CCOE), as a professional knowledge center, experience processor, doctrine developer, knowledge transfer and training organization, draws on and processes its experience of peacekeeping and state-building in crisis areas, and strongly **recommends** that **in-depth knowledge** of different **cultures** facilitates the strengthening of the state, thus the given country setting foot on the path of stable and self-sustaining peace can once again become a reliable partner in the international relations.²²

Another result of the development of NATO's operational procedures and doctrines in this field at the end of 2010 was that there are factors that affect several areas simultaneously in several security dimensions, so their examination, understanding and application require a holistic approach. These so-called “**cross-cutting topics – CCT**” are an important element of the **Cultural Property Protection**.²³ These goods **embody the culture, religion**, traditions and history, values and merits of **a community**. The physical appearance of these goods as symbols of the cohesive power of the community, the physical destruction of which results in spiritual damage, intimidation, loss of identity and hatred. The protection of these goods is of paramount importance in order to resolve conflicts on a lasting basis and to promote reconciliation.

By embracing international examples, trends, allied regulations and expectations, understanding and influencing the behavior of individuals and communities also plays a key role in the development of Hungarian peacekeeping capabilities. The **HDF CMCPOC (Civil-Military Cooperation and Psychological Operations Center)** since its establishment in 2004 has been regularly issuing its CIMIC Manuals, regularly updated and adapted to various crisis zones, containing complex assessments (the Balkans, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Baghlan, Iraq). The Center has also compiled the **Mission Basics Handbook**, which places great emphasis on working with different cultural circles to address religious differences.²⁴

Conflicts with society, stemming from cultural diversity and religious differences have been and continue to be increasingly important in both international organizations. Getting to know **the way of thinking** of peoples with **cultural and religious differences** and their better understanding of was given a serious impetus by the mid-90s when the peace operation forces tasked to resolve **civil war conditions** were faced with the horrors of human brutality, **religious intolerance and ethnic**

²¹ GUIDANCE FOR CIMIC OPERATORS CIMIC FIELD HANDBOOK (Civil-Military Co-operation Center of Excellence, The Netherlands, etc.)

²² GOOD GOVERNANCE MAKES SENSE A WAY TO IMPROVE YOUR MISSION (Civil-Military Co-operation Center Of Excellence, The Netherlands, 2012)

²³ Cultural Property Protection (CPP) https://library.cimic-coe.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/07/20180701_UC_CCOE-Fact-Sheet-Cultural-Property-Protection-CPP.pdf (downloaded 15 August 2020)

²⁴ MISSION BASIC KNOWLEDGE HANDBOOK (Hungarian Armed Forces Command, 2010) pp. 70-114

cleansing in Bosnia and Herzegovina (e.g.: Srebrenica), Rwanda, East Timor or later in Kosovo.

Summary

The last 30 years have been a time of change for the world freed from the captivity of the bipolar order, but lasting peace has not come. The **conflicts are becoming more complex** new actors and threats, sources of conflict and solving experiments have appeared. In this changing world, the Hungarian armed forces are being transformed, participating with increasing force, in increasingly distant and dangerous, increasingly complex and high-risk operations. During these operations, it becomes increasingly clear that getting to know and understanding the **origin of conflicts**, influencing it is vital for peace and security. Recognizing that in changing conflicts, **human behavior** is decisive, the **identity** and cohesiveness of the individual and the community, **ethnicity, religion, and language** are three important guiding principles along which organized communities are able to defend themselves, effectively represent their interests and values.

The relationship and good relations between the state and its citizens are a basic condition for a stable and predictable international existence, security and development.

During the complex operations dealing with complex crises, the role and impact of the applied **social sciences** has increased. It is important to get to know the given community in order to get to know, understand and positively influence human behavior and reactions (friendly, neutral, rejecting). Over the past 30 years, during domestic and international peace operations such knowledge and expertise has been accumulated that is indispensable for the development of national defense capabilities and for adapting to the challenges of the human space at all times.

Among the planning, organizing, command and control and executive functional elements of the armed forces, such as the knowledge base, the **doctrinal** foundations and **education / training** also appeared in their capabilities, which are intended for winning over human space. Certain elements of CIMIC, PSYOPS and INFO OPS are the very non-kinetic capabilities whose main purpose is winning over, "overwriting" hostile emotions and actions.

Human behavior is determined by a myriad of factors, but **faith and culture**, customs and traditions, language and ethnicity, experience and beliefs are essential. To change people's behavior in a positive direction, these factors need to be known, respected, protected, but if need be, changed.

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Abstract

The coronavirus epidemic is increasingly affecting migration and illegal migration processes, a significant proportion of migrants to European destinations reached the EU border during this time of period. The number of migrants confirmed to be infected with the coronavirus on the Western Balkans migration route cannot be considered high due to timely and strict regulations, despite overcrowding and poor hygiene opportunities for migrants with typically weakened immune systems. However, it is feared that a drastic increase in illegal migration routes to Europe is expected in the future thanks to the effects of the coronavirus.

Keywords: coronavirus epidemic, European illegal migration, migration routes, destination countries, strict regulations, health care, public hygiene, transit country, epidemiological protection measures

The coronavirus epidemic has been in our daily lives for more than a year now and, like everything, is increasingly affecting migration and illegal migration processes. Prior to the outbreak, a significant proportion of migrants to European destinations¹ reached the EU border via the Western Balkans - from Turkey to Greece, then to Hungary via northern Macedonia and Serbia, or to Croatia via Bosnia and Herzegovina. On 29 February 2020, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, President of Turkey, decided not to detain migrants intending to leave for the European Union. As a result of the measure, and the mass transport of migrants by bus near the Greek borders, tens of thousands of migrants tried to cross the Turkish-Greek land and sea borders in the spring. (Many of them succeeded) The escalating clashes and the situation were frozen for a while² by the frightening spread of the coronavirus epidemic.

As part of the epidemiological protection measures of the countries along illegal migration routes, the procedures and rules for entry, immigration and treatment of illegal migrants have been temporarily changed. The brief presentation of this can provide a comprehensive picture of illegal migration in Europe in the shadow of Covid-19.

¹ Germany, France, Great-Britain, and western countries

² KOC SIS, Máté: Overview of illegal migration in Europe;
<https://biztonsagpolitika.hu/egyeb/a-gorog-migracios-valsag-es-az-eu-torok-egyuttmukodes> (downloaded 21 March 2021)



Figure 1: Disinfection in a refugee camp by WHO, Syria, Refugees Camp³

The situation has also brought significant changes to the migration route⁴ in the east-central Mediterranean. The number of migrants landing in Italy from Tunisia and Libya nearly tripled last year.

And from Western Africa, the more dangerous route to the Spanish Canary Islands set a record 22,600 arrivals, a number eight times higher compared to the previous year and the highest since Frontex⁵ began collecting data in 2009. According to the organization, most people came from the Gambia, Senegal, and Mauritania. However, not all migrants were so lucky. According to official UNHCR⁶ statistics, last year at least 913 people drowned or disappeared on a sea voyage⁷ to the islands. In the months following the outbreak of the coronavirus epidemic in Europe, the trend was reversed, and thousands of North Africans returned home to their homeland for fear of the epidemic, some with the help of human traffickers⁸. Spain is in a special situation as it is the only European country with several autonomous provinces (Ceuta and Melilla) on the African continent. Due to the migration popularity of the islands and provinces, the government has been forced to pursue a consistent and rigorous migration policy, as part of which the authorities do not transfer asylum seekers from the provinces or islands to the Spanish mainland. Nevertheless, the reasons for the migration popularity of the Spanish islands are as follows.

On the one hand, border closures due to the virus have diverted smugglers, mainly to alternative routes, and on the other hand, due to the situation in Libya, some sub-Saharan Africans have already embarked on this route. Based on the nationality

³ www.reuters.com 2020 March

⁴ Typically departing from Africa to Spain or Italy.

⁵ Frontières extérieures, the European Border and Coast Guard Agency

⁶ United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

⁷ ABDULRAHIM, Raja: Covid-19 Restrictions Decrease Illegal Migration to Europe; <https://www.wsj.com/articles/covid-19-restrictions-decrease-illegal-migration-to-europe-11610130562> (downloaded 26 March 2021)

⁸ AL-ALAOUI, Mohamed Mamouni: Pandemic sparks reverse migration from Spain to Morocco; <https://theArabweekly.com/pandemic-sparks-reverse-migration-spain-morocco> (downloaded 27 March 2021)

of the arrivals, the majority – sometimes travel up to 1,500 km by sea – for economic reasons and not for reasons stated among the five reasons of the Geneva convention⁹. The situation is only exacerbated by the fact that, due to the pandemic, the Spanish government was also unable to carry out deportations based on bilateral agreements because the issuing countries did not receive the planes. Thus, due to migrants gathered on the islands, it is questionable how the crisis will affect the region’s already bleeding¹⁰ tourism sector¹¹.

In Europe, Italy and Spain were the most affected by the first wave of the virus, so this route was blocked until May due to measures restricting free movement and closing borders. Under epidemiological regulations, migrants in Italy had to stay in designated camps, so the government had to deal with the daily care of 85,000 people. Not only the supply, but also the closure and guarding of the camps and compliance with the curfew restrictions posed a serious challenge to the authorities. In most cases, this was very difficult or impossible to handle. At several points in the country, the armed forces had to prevent several violent attempts to break out, which also resulted in injury and significant material damage. In addition to the demonstrations, due to their culture, coronavirus-infected Africans were in many cases aggressive, failing to comply with regulations, as exemplified by an incident at a Roman hospital in late August. After being told by a Nigerian asylum seeker that he was coronavirus, he angrily bit the doctor and abused¹² the staff rushing to his aid. Mandatory 14-day quarantine for newcomers has been introduced in the country since March.



Figure 2. Disinfection in a refugee camp by WHO, Syria, Refugees Camp¹³

⁹ A refugee who is persecuted on the grounds of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion.
¹⁰ Many immigrants were housed in tourist buildings, but it is not uncommon for tent camps to be set up in military facilities.
¹¹ Many immigrants were housed in tourist buildings, but it is not uncommon for tent camps to be set up in military facilities.
¹² Nigerians attack staff at Rome Covid-19 treatment center; <https://www.thelocal.it/20200830/nigerians-attack-staff-at-rome-covid-19-treatment-centre/> (downloaded 28 March 2021)
¹³ www.reuters.com 2020 March

In May 2020, due to the pandemic, there were so many missing or returning guest workers that Italy's agricultural workforce was significantly reduced. This has become a burning issue because they feared there would be no one to harvest the crop of the agricultural sector. In response, the government approved¹⁴ the residence permits of half a million unregistered immigrants for work purposes. Interestingly, since mid-2020, most people have come to Italy, not from Libya, but from Tunisia – typically Tunisian nationals – which has changed due to increased unemployment due to the viral situation and the worsening economic situation. In addition, the Italian government does not have an effective migration policy and has withdrawn most of Matteo Salvini's previous strict migration regulations, which had previously effectively reduced the number of arrivals. However, the renegotiation of the Spanish Moroccan migration agreement, which resulted in 28% fewer illegal migrants compared to the previous year,¹⁵ can be seen as a positive development.

The austerity measures taken due to the pandemic situation - increased border controls, travel restrictions – also had a significant impact on the dynamics of the migration route in the Western Balkans. On March 17, 2020, hotspots in **Greece** were closed, affecting thousands of migrants sensitively: the camps could not be left by the residents there, and humanitarian organizations and NGO's¹⁶ could not reach those in need as easily as before. During and after the security incident – and, of course, because of the epidemic - Greece is stepping up its action against illegal migration, both in terms of border protection and legislation. Therefore, despite the pandemic situation, many asylum seekers left the country and continued their illegal migration journey to their European destination countries in the Western Balkans, which also showed an increase of 78% compared to 2019, which is not a calming number. Greece has not only used the relatively calmer months of the epidemic to strengthen its land borders but is also looking for concrete solutions to prevent and address existing migration problems. As part of this,¹⁷ Athens is trying to address the current situation with faster and more effective repatriations, tightening the legal environment and relieving the Greek islands, while using effective deterrence tactics with alternative solutions such as floating fences or strengthening land fences. On September 8, a nearly 11,500-strong Moria refugee camp burned down because of deliberate arson, which, according to follow-up investigations, was set on fire by residents because of stricter quarantine measures. Some of the camp's inhabitants have disappeared, some have been received by European Member States and some by the Greek authorities have been transported¹⁸ to other, also overcrowded, camps. Since then, by the way, the camp has been set up again and is fully operational again.

A state of emergency has been declared in Serbia, and nearly nine thousand migrants in the country have been unable to leave reception centers. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, severe restraint measures were introduced, which also applied to the

¹⁴ FELEGYI, Júlia: Italy's migration policy. *Reconnaissance Review*, 2020/3. p. 65.

¹⁵ JANIK, Szabolcs – MARSAL, Viktor: Overview of illegal migration in Europe; p. 1., 7. https://www.migraciokutato.hu/wpcontent/uploads/2021/01/20210113_MKI_GYORSEL_EMZES_2021_1_europai_illegalis_migracios_korkep.pdf (downloaded 25 March 2021)

¹⁶ non-governmental organization

¹⁷ JANIK – MARSAL op. cit. p. 1.

¹⁸ UNHCR shocked by fires at Moria asylum center, ramping up support for affected asylum seekers; <https://www.unhcr.org/news/briefing/2020/9/5f5b3a774/unhcr-shocked-fires-moria-asylum-center-ramping-support-affected-asylum.html> (downloaded 26 March 2021)

camps, and the free movement of migrants was transported by the authorities to camps in the Canton of Una-Sana. To facilitate the accommodation of large numbers of migrants gathered around Bihács, the authorities set up two temporary camps.¹⁹ Migrants have demonstrated several times in both Bosnia and Herzegovina and Serbia to protest the measures. And the population, which was already strained by the pandemic, was demonstrating for even more stringent measures and against crimes committed by migrants, typically in the vicinity of the camps. Hungary is heavily guarded due to the temporary security border, but migrants continue to try to cross illegally from Serbia or from the area of the Serbian Romanian-Hungarian triple border on a daily basis. Some of the successful passers-on are still caught near the border section, and some of them in the western part of the country, during the control of highways and international trains. On the other hand, it is undeniable that in many cases they also get through Hungary and can go further to their Western European destinations.

The number of migrants confirmed to be infected with the coronavirus on the Western Balkans migration route cannot be considered high due to timely and strict regulations, despite overcrowding and poor hygiene opportunities for migrants with typically weakened immune systems. By the end of April 2020, 715 people had been monitored in the Bihács area on suspicion of the disease, and a total of four cases had been detected in refugee camps in the area. In Greece, three migrant coronavirus tests were positive²⁰ at the Moria camp in Lesbos on March 25 and at the Ritzona camp in early April.



Figure 3. Disinfection in a refugee camp (Kindergarten) Syria, Refugees Camp²¹

¹⁹ The camps in the northern part of Lipa and Bihács were set up by the IOM, NGOs and authorities. Lipa was closed by NGOs in 2021 citing inappropriate conditions.

²⁰ NÉMETH, Ferenc – OROSZ, Anna – WAGNER, Péter: Coronavirus epidemic and migration situation; p. 5. https://kki.hu/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/42_KKI-elemzes_MENA_Balkans_Nemeth_Orosz_Wagners_20200427-1.pdf (downloaded 22 March 2021)

²¹ www.reuters.com 2020 March

On the migration route in the Western Balkans, but also in Europe, Serbia was the first to start vaccinating illegal migrants against organized coronavirus. The country used as a migration corridor not only protects its own population from the spread of infections, but immigrants to Western European countries do not continue to carry the disease to EU Member States. AstraZeneca vaccinations were started on March 26 for more than 570 people²² in reception centers. In my opinion, this is an important and useful financial investment that pays off in the long run, especially for the western destination countries, so I would not be surprised to hear in the future that Germany, for example, supports similar campaigns in countries along migration routes, either financially or with vaccines. I mention here as an interesting fact that among migrants with a specific culture, in many cases, the danger of the coronavirus and the importance of its prevention need to be raised by more specific means than an average media campaign. A good example of this is the case of immigrants in Finland and Somalia: the rate of virus infection was much higher among a community of more than 20,000 people, so they were produced a series of bilingual soap operas to draw attention to the dangers of the virus. The campaign was considered a success²³ in the light of the statistics.



Figure 4. Disinfection in a refugee camp (Kindergarten) Syria, Refugees Camp²⁴

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- ²² Serbia starts COVID-19 vaccinations at migrant camps;
<https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-serbia-migrants-idUSKBN2BI2A4>
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https://hiiraan.com/news4/2020/Oct/180480/finland_s_somali_community_uses_soap_opera_and_tv_talk_show_in_coronavirus_awareness_push.aspx?utm_source=hiiraan&utm_medium=SomaliNewsUpdateFront (downloaded 26 March 2021)
- ²⁴ www.reuters.com 2020 March

Summary, or the effects of the pandemic on migrants and the population living in illegal migration routes in European target countries.

- In several countries of transit and destination, the processing of asylum applications, family reunification applications and other entry permits has been suspended for months, citing the pandemic, so that migrants intending to stay are in a more difficult situation. crime, illegal activities and even the tendency to extremism may increase among those who turn to integration assistance, such as those who may temporarily turn to their compatriots or fellow travelers.
- The pandemic also reduced the labor market and available job opportunities, drastically reducing the income opportunities of both legal and illegal migrants.²⁵
- The nearly 160,000 migrants trapped in the countries along the Balkan route still want to reach the EU's economically developed countries.
- The risk of infection is also high, according to the OECD and other world organizations, among migrants with weakened immune systems and often inadequate hygiene and health care in overcrowded camps. At the same time, rigorous and consistent measures introduced in a timely manner prevented a significant proportion of mass deaths and infections.
- Experts say Covid-19's travel restrictions have made smuggling more dangerous and expensive, both within countries and across borders, although this has not stopped activity altogether.²⁶ As a result of the restrictions, illegal migrants are choosing much more risky, more dangerous sea routes and alternative methods of human trafficking, with almost no chance of getting help.²⁷
- The causes of migration and illegal migration would not only have decreased during the pandemic, but rather increased significantly for the citizens of countries deteriorating from the deteriorating economic and public security situation and the increasingly fallen statehood, as well as those that have already fallen.
- The population of both migratory transit countries and European destination countries has become less and less tolerant of the presence of illegal migrants over the past year. The reasons for this can also be found in the coronavirus infection, as the media is willing to report cases of infections in the camps, news about migrants escaping from quarantine measures, escaping - possibly infected. It is also a fact that some of the people living in security situations, who are in an increasingly difficult economic situation, see migrants as a potential source of infection, and some of them are increasingly open to resentment due to the growing number of smaller, typically property-related, crimes.

²⁵ SCARPETTA, Stefano – DUMONT, Jean-Christophe – LIEBIG, Thomas: What is the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on immigrants and their children? <http://www.oecd.org/coronavirus/policy-responses/what-is-the-impact-of-the-covid-19-pandemic-on-immigrants-and-their-children-e7cbb7de/#contactinfo-d7e2917> (downloaded 25 March 2021)

²⁶ ABDULRAHIM op. cit.

²⁷ SANCHEZ, Gabriella: Stranded: The impacts of COVID-19 in irregular migration and migrant smuggling; <https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/stranded-impacts-covid-19-irregular-migration-migrant-smuggling/> (downloaded 24 March 2021)

- According to Frontex information, the number of illegal border crossings into the EU fell by 13% in 2020 to 124,000, an unprecedented decrease since 2015.²⁸ However, this is only due to strict measures in response to the coronavirus epidemic, and it is feared that a drastic increase in illegal migration routes to Europe is expected in the future, precisely because of the effects of the coronavirus. In this case, the involvement of Hungary may increase further, of course still primarily as a transit country.

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- Nigerians attack staff at Rome Covid-19 treatment center; <https://www.thelocal.it/20200830/nigerians-attack-staff-at-rome-covid-19-treatment-centre/> (downloaded 28 March 2021)

²⁸ ABDULRAHIM op. cit.

- SANCHEZ, Gabriella: Stranded: The impacts of COVID-19 in irregular migration and migrant smuggling; <https://blogs.eui.eu/migrationpolicycentre/stranded-impacts-covid-19-irregular-migration-migrant-smuggling/> (downloaded 24 March 2021)
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Abstract

In August 31 2021 both the American and NATO missions have come to an end, and definitely a new era begun in Afghanistan’s life. A power vacuum is growing bigger day by day as the international forces left the Central Asian state at an ever-increasing pace. It seems that as the attention of the great powers is diverted to other parts of Asia, the attention of the regional powers towards Afghanistan is increasing. One of the prominent players in this is Turkey, which has taken more and more steps to pacify the region over the years. Although Turkey has been using the tools of soft power in the Afghan conflict since its inception, over the past few years, the country’s shift in foreign policy has become increasingly clear; a greater role was given for the military. A new manifestations of this turn is Ankara’s attempt to operate the Hamid Karzai International Airport in Kabul, which can be seen as a clear sign of Turkey’s regional power aspirations in the Central Asian region. The study analyses the changes in the Turkish-Afghan relations, pointing out to Ankara’s participation in the Afghan reconciliation attempts, with particular reference to the current events.

Keywords: Turkish foreign policy, Afghan reconciliation, Taliban, regional powers

1. Introduction

In the middle of August the most powerful fundamentalist Islamic organization of Afghanistan, the Taliban took power. They re-occupied the country in an incredible pace and finally they marched into Kabul on 15. August without firing a shot. In the last month a new regime began to take shape; the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan re-established. Similarly to the former Taliban regime the current one also lacks the formal recognition of the international community, even though they have a constant connection with some – mainly regional – actors.¹ Besides the two neighbouring great powers – China and Russia – who desire take advantage of the benefits from the vacuum left by the United States and NATO, another country’s name is constantly arises: *Turkey*.

Turkey’s attempts to become the strongest regional power has become increasingly apparent in recent years; thinking back to Turkish offensive into north-eastern Syria, or to the Libyan intervention, or even to the European migration crisis.

¹ NOUWENS, Meia – ROY-CHAUDHURY, Rahul – RAINE, John – LEVESQUES, Antoine – HOKAYEM, Emile – GOULD-DAVIES, Nigel – ÖZCELİK, Burcu – ALHASAN, Hasan: Adapting to a new reality in Afghanistan; The International Institute of Strategic Studies. <https://www.iiss.org/blogs/analysis/2021/08/afghanistan-taliban-region-response> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

Under president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, Ankara has embarked on an *assertive foreign policy*, branding itself as a growing Sunni Muslim power and wading into regional conflicts.² As the Justice and Development Party came into power, both domestic and foreign policy began to change slowly but steadily, in parallel with the national identity. Changes in Turkey's foreign policy were mainly perceptible after the attempted coup d'état in 2016.³ The central elements of changes of the Turkish foreign policy are: the militarization, the Sunni Islam as a tool of regional domination, and the deviation from Western civilization.⁴

Turkey has always maintained friendly relations with Afghanistan and it seems like it will not be interrupted by the changes of the leadership in Kabul. Ankara has been holding talks with the movement's leaders since they seized power, which can be seen as an evidence of their intent to adopt a political and security role in Afghanistan. However the Turkish military contingent has been pulled out by August 27, Ankara expressed its desire to become the Taliban's primary interlocutor with the West.⁵

2. A shift in Turkish foreign policy

Turkey has declared itself as a part of the West since the late Ottoman Empire, and this was reinforced by the reforms of Atatürk in the first half of the 20th century. Since the foundation of the modern Turkish state, security has been a top priority of the country both at global and regional levels.

Examining the country's foreign policy, it can be observed that it has undergone several significant changes in the 21st century. The most defining element in Turkey's foreign relations in the 20th century was its Western orientation – as it created strong connection with the West through various international organizations.⁶ The new millennium has brought a shift in strategic paradigm on a global scale, therefore the Turkish foreign policy has also followed. The strategic concept of Turkish foreign

² HACAĞLU, Selcan: Turkey Gears Up for Risky Afghan Mission That No One Else Wants, BNN Bloomberg, Jun 25, 2021. <https://www.bnnbloomberg.ca/turkey-gears-up-for-risky-afghan-mission-that-no-one-else-wants-1.1621605> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

³ LECHA, Eduard Soler i: The International Impact of the Failed Coup in Turkey. Barcelona Center for International Affairs, Opinión 425, July 2016. https://www.cidob.org/en/publications/publication_series/opinion/mediterraneo_y_oriente_medio/the_international_impact_of_the_failed_coup_in_turkey (downloaded 26 September 2021)

⁴ ÖZTÜRK, Ahmet Erdi (2021): Turkey's Post-2016 Foreign Policy Drivers: Militarisation, Islam, Civilisation and Power. HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN & FOREIGN POLICY (ELIAMEP), Policy Paper # 58/2021 https://www.eliamep.gr/wp-content/uploads/2021/03/Policy-paper-58-Erdi-Ozturk_final.pdf (downloaded 26 September 2021)

⁵ YAZICI, Ezgi – ÜNLÜ, Doga – GÖK, Kursat: Turkey Aims to Play Stabilizing Role in Afghanistan after NATO Withdrawal. Institute for the Study of War, September 3, 2021. <https://www.understandingwar.org/backgrounder/turkey-aims-play-stabilizing-role-afghanistan-after-nato-withdrawal> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

⁶ YAPAR, Hakan: From Strategic Depth to Blue Homeland and Beyond: Understanding Turkey's Drift towards Greater Strategic Autonomy. Instituto Espanol de Estudios Estratégicos, Opinion Paper, 12 April 2021. pp. 2-3. https://www.ieee.es/Galerias/fichero/docs_opinion/2021/DIEEE040_2021_HAKYAP_Turquia_ENG.pdf (downloaded 26 September 2021)

policy for the 21st century was defined by the “*strategic depth*” published by Ahmet Davutoğlu.⁷ The concept brought the states of the region and the wider Muslim world into the focus of the Turkish foreign policy. Davutoğlu, as Foreign Minister, sought to put into practice his theory: he had initiated strategic cooperation, mainly with neighbouring countries, increased trade and solidarity with them in the framework of the “zero problem with neighbours” policy. The main tool during this period was clearly *soft power*, with this tool Turkey could easily reach the wider Muslim world, with an emphasis on religion, culture and political dialogue. However, amid the notable changes in the region in 2010s (the Arab Spring or the Eastern Mediterranean debates), the continuation of Davutoğlu’s foreign policy threatened to isolate the country. To avoid this, Turkish foreign policy has changed direction and – especially after the coup attempt in 2016 – has *shifted* noticeably *towards hard power*.

The Turkish foreign policy became increasingly assertive, even though some elements of Davutoğlu’s doctrine appear in the new foreign policy but in a much lower profile. Turkey’s new foreign policy is characterised by the changes on three main areas; military, religion and power.⁸

2.1. Militarization – development of defence industry

Turkey’s military expenditure saw a significant increase, from 2015 to 2020 the defence budget has ascended from approximately 11 to 16 billion US\$.⁹ Turkey has always had a powerful army for historical reasons, but the recently seen active usage its military capacity in the wider region is definitely the cornerstone of Erdoğan’s foreign policy. Beside the launched operations’ (Syria, Libya) and bases established (e.g. Iraq, Qatar, Cyprus) in the Middle East and in the Mediterranean Turkey focused on developing its defence industry in recent years. The growing defence industry gives Turkey greater manoeuvrability in its foreign policy by ensuring less reliance on arms imports and more autonomy.¹⁰ By 2019 Ankara has transitioned from importing 70 percent of its military hardware to 30 percent.¹¹ However the accomplishment of the Turkish government in this area is remarkable, the growing defence industry is as more about projecting an image of power to the domestic population.

⁷ GRIGORIADIS, Ioannis N.: The Davutoğlu Doctrine and Turkish Foreign Policy. HELLENIC FOUNDATION FOR EUROPEAN AND FOREIGN POLICY (ELIAMEP) Working Paper Nr 8/2010 https://www.researchgate.net/publication/318298808_The_Davutoglu_Doctrine_and_Turkish_Foreign_Policy (downloaded 27 September 2021)

⁸ ÖZTÜRK (2021) op. cit. pp. 3-4.

⁹ HACKETT, James (ed.): The Military Balance 2021. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. Routledge, London, p. 152.

¹⁰ GURINI, Ferhat: Turkey’s Unpromising Defense Industry. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, October 09, 2020 <https://carnegieendowment.org/sada/82936> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

¹¹ Directorate of Communications, Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye. 30.08.2020 <https://www.iletisim.gov.tr/english/haberler/detay/we-have-reduced-our-external-dependency-in-defense-industry-from-around-70-to-around-30> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

2.2. The leading state of the Islamic (Sunni) world

Although Turkey is a predominantly Muslim country, it has mainly retained its secular character. Secularism has been one of the key elements in Turkey's modernisation, from Atatürk to the AKP coming to power. Currently it seems that religion has become a new element of Erdoğan's Turkey and it has been transforming many areas, as well as foreign policy.¹² The 'New Turkey' is synthesising religion with nationalism and actively using the resulting product as a tool of foreign policy.¹³ Through the Presidency of Religious Affairs Turkey cooperates with other domestic and international Islamic organizations such as the National Outlook Movement. The ideology of this movement had a great impact on Turkey's approach both to the Islamic world and the West.¹⁴ While Erdoğan turns away from the western civilization often represent himself as a leader of the Muslim world. Sunni Islam became the link between Turkey and the Central Asian and Middle Eastern countries.

2.3. Hard power in action - power projection

Between 2002 and 2011 Turkey – despite being a middle power – practiced a deliberate foreign policy. After the Arab Spring Ankara had to adapt to the new circumstances in the Middle East, and especially after the 2016 coup attempt it started to portray itself as more powerful than actually was.¹⁵ The transformation of domestic politics into an authoritarian regime also supported the more adventurous foreign policy. One of the most spectacular element in the changes of Turkish foreign policy concept is the increasing military involvement. The strategic power projection of Ankara is based the existing diplomatic relations extended with basing, military exercises, defence-industrial cooperation and military interventions.¹⁶ On the one hand the network of defence and strategic partnership of Turkey provides a greater room for manoeuvre in the region, as well as further diplomatic influence and geopolitical assurance. The network also provides a counterbalance to the great and regional powers acting in the area of interest of Turkey – China (in Africa), Iran (in Iraq and Syria), and Russia (Black Sea Caucasus).¹⁷ On the other hand, Erdoğan can also use the harder power projection for some domestic political gain, even if a foreign intervention or a new mission can only increase the AKP's support in the short term.

¹² YAVUZ, M. Hakan – ÖZTÜRK, Ahmet Erdi: Turkish secularism and Islam under the reign of Erdoğan. *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies*, 19:1, pp. 1-2. <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/full/10.1080/14683857.2019.1580828> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

¹³ ÖZTÜRK (2021) op. cit. p. 5.

¹⁴ ÇAĞAPTAY, Soner: Secularism and Foreign Policy in Turkey. *The Washington Institute for Near East Policy. Policy Focus #67*, April 2007. pp. 1-4. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/secularism-and-foreign-policy-turkey-new-elections-troubling-trends> (downloaded 28. September 2021)

¹⁵ ÖZTÜRK (2021) op. cit. p. 7.

¹⁶ OUTZEN, Rich: Deals, Drones, and National Will. *The New Era in Turkish Power Projection. The Washington Institute for Near East Policy, Policy Notes*, July 2021 No. 108. p. 7. <https://www.washingtoninstitute.org/policy-analysis/deals-drones-and-national-will-new-era-turkish-power-projection> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

¹⁷ OUTZEN (2021) op. cit. p. 11.

3. Historical ties between Turkey and Afghanistan

Turkey's foreign policy towards Afghanistan is based on four pillars: maintenance of unity and integrity of Afghanistan; providing security and stability in the country; strengthening of broad based political structure in which popular participation is a priority and finally restoration of peace and prosperity by eliminating terrorism and extremism.¹⁸

The relations between Turkey and Afghanistan are historically steady and friendly, dating back to the pre-Republican period. Following the opening of the Turkish Grand National Assembly on April 23 1920, one of the first decisions taken by the first government established in Ankara on May 3 was to send a Turkish officer of Afghan origin to Kabul as a representative. Then the Afghan counterpart sent Sultan Ahmet Khan, who supported the War of Independence in Afghanistan, to Ankara as an ambassador. With the Turkish-Afghan Alliance Agreement signed in Moscow on March 1 1921, Turkey indirectly recognized the independence of Afghanistan and the Ankara Government as the representative of the Turkish state in Afghanistan.¹⁹ The agreement was the first legally valid international political bond between the Turkish and Afghan government. Afghan King Amanullah Shah, who was impressed by Atatürk's revolutions and his efforts to put the Republic on solid and modern foundations, visited Turkey in 1928. This visit was the first state visit to the Republic of Turkey. During this visit, a new agreement was signed on May 25, 1928 with the name of "*Friendship and Co-operation Agreement between Turkey and Afghanistan*".²⁰ The bilateral relations turned into strategic relations as this exerted influence in several sectors in Afghanistan such as military, economy, education or administration.²¹

Even after Amanullah Shah abdicated the throne the Turkish-Afghan relations continued to flourish under the new rulers of Afghanistan. Under the reign of Zahir Shah, who was the last king of the Afghans, the Turkish-Afghan Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation was renewed in 1937. Therefore Afghanistan continued receiving Turkish financial, technical, military, educational and medical assistance.²²

In the post-World War II period, Turkey made efforts for Afghanistan to join the Baghdad Pact, which was established in 1955. The relations, which were interrupted

¹⁸ Turkey-Afghanistan Bilateral Political Relations. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Republic of Turkey. https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_afghanistan-bilateral-political-relations.en.mfa (downloaded 26 September 2021)

¹⁹ ÖZLÜ, Hüsnü: 'Türk-Afghan doktluk ve işbirliği anlaşması' kapsamında Atatürk dönemi Türkiye Afganistan ilişkilerine bakış, Uluslararası Avrasya Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Yıl: 3, Sayı: 8, Eylül 2012, p. 35. <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/ijoess/issue/8534/105953> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

²⁰ KİREN, Akın: Afganistan'ın Yeniden Yapılandırılmasında Türkiye'nin Rolü. İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü, Yüksek Lisans Tezi, 2012. pp. 65-68. https://tez.yok.gov.tr/UlusalTezMerkezi/tezDetay.jsp?id=WIVAceuNEF-4O1sMx6W06A&no=Jph2Gay7CxrMymH3Ck_TbA (downloaded 26 September 2021)

²¹ GENÇTÜRK, Ahmet: A history of fraternal Turkish-Afghan relations. Anadolu Agency, 22. 08. 2021. <https://www.aa.com.tr/en/asia-pacific/a-history-of-fraternal-turkish-afghan-relations/2342587> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

²² KİREN (2012) op. cit. pp. 68-70.

during the Soviet occupation, were revived with the end of the occupation. During this period, Turkey made efforts to ensure peace and stability in Afghanistan and to remove Afghanistan from being a territory that constitutes a base for extremism, terrorism and drug trafficking, and also invited the international community to show active interest in the Afghan problem.

Even though Turkey participated in the Bonn Meeting as an observer it played a constructive role by using its good relations with all groups. It has endeavoured to achieve consensus among ethnic groups and to establish a broad-based, representative government. Turkey, in order to contribute to the establishment of security and stability in Afghanistan, decided to join the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), which was established by the UN Security Council upon the call of the Afghan groups at the Bonn Meeting. The Turkish military contingent had performed non-combat duties at several parts of the country. Turkey also established a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) in Wardak and it was operational between 2006-2013.²³

Another way to transform civil and military efforts in Afghanistan into permanent gains is to strengthen the basis of dialogue and cooperation between Afghanistan and its neighbours. In line with this understanding, Turkey initiated a trilateral dialogue between Afghanistan and Pakistan with its mediation. Therefore Ankara has hosted several meetings of the Turkey-Afghanistan-Pakistan Trilateral Summit process.²⁴ Besides the Pakistani way Turkey initiated a more broader regional forum for the resolution of the Afghan-issues. The so called "Friendship and Cooperation in the Heart of Asia" organized with the participation of Afghanistan, its neighbours and observer states and international organizations.

3.1. Turkey as a soft power in Afghanistan

Throughout the past twenty years Turkey had the goodwill of the Afghan people even though they were part of the United States-led international intervention. The reasons behind this constant positive attitude of the people of Afghanistan can be summarized as follows:

- *Perceptions – brotherhood*

The Turkish mentality usually takes Central Asia (including Afghanistan) as the root of their culture and for the government in power it is natural to assist or to cooperate these states. Turkey from an interest-based approach wants to have a connection in the areas of Central Asia, Afghanistan and Pakistan to promote common goals. The perceptions of the Afghans about Turkey and Turkish people were always positive due to the historical connections of the two countries. During the last two decades Turkey could strengthen the people of Afghanistan's positive attitude – especially in the city centres, where there is a positive interpretation to Turkish contribution to Afghan daily life. Even the Taliban spoke appreciatively about

²³ ERONEN, Oskari: PRT Models in Afghanistan. Approaches to Civil-Military Integration. CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies Volume 1: Number 5/2008. pp. 23-24.

²⁴ SHAH, Rahat: Pakistan-Afghanistan-Turkey Trilateral Summits and its implication for the region; <https://moderniplomacy.eu/2020/02/24/pakistan-afghanistan-turkey-trilateral-summits-and-its-implication-for-the-region/> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

Turkey: “Turkey is a great Islamic country. Afghanistan has had historical relations with it. We hope to have close and good relations with them as a new Islamic government is established in the country in future.”²⁵

- *Military presence – ‘they are one of us’*

Turkey joined to the NATO mission in Afghanistan as early as 2003, and throughout the past 20 years it has always played a key role in the mission. Ankara led a non-combat mission from the first day of the NATO mission started, and this created an increasingly positive attitude towards the Turkish soldiers. Moreover Turkey was the only Muslim-majority country, which also strengthened this fundamentally positive image.

Turkey positioned itself as a low-key ally in the global war on terror, as they used the *soft power* from their ‘arsenal’. Putting the emphasis on soft power was in line with the main direction of Turkish foreign policy of the 2000s. Among the ‘soft’ tasks of the Turkish forces the *train, advise, assist* ‘trinity’ had a central role well before the second act of the NATO’s mission, the Resolute Support has started. In 2006 a Turkish-led Provincial Reconstruction Team has been created in Wardak, located the central region of Afghanistan, in the proximity of Kabul. Ankara did not use an already existing PRT model created by other countries, but it set up its own. It was the only *civilian-led organization*, and its focus were on governance and development, which gave a uniqueness to the Turkish model.²⁶ The Turkish forces rather took on logistical and security duties, from which the most remarkable was the security tasks at Kabul Airport.²⁷ Because Turkey provided troops for strictly non-combat roles, it has contributed to their positive perception. Therefore, there is a common saying in Afghanistan about Turks: ‘No Afghan was ever killed by a Turkish bullet’ and ‘no Afghan trained by Turks has ever betrayed his country’. How could Turkey have reached this status? Turkey’s tasks were conducted not with paternalism or the imperial arrogance of an occupying power; therefore, they gained the trust and respect of the Afghan people.²⁸

- *Financial support*

During the two decades of the international community’s missions in Afghanistan beside the military presence an enormous amount of aid were given to the Central Asian state. Turkey also took its share from this activity; altogether it spent more than 1 billion dollar mainly on capacity building initiatives (health, education, economy), on its military role, and on its mediator and facilitator role in multiple peace processes.

²⁵ TASTEKIN, Fehim: Türkiye için mayımsız bir Afgan rotası mümkün mü? AL-Monitor, 06. 24. 2021. <https://www.al-monitor.com/tr/originals/2021/06/turkey-needs-build-support-new-afghan-mission> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

²⁶ ERONEN, Oskari: PRT Models in Afghanistan. Approaches to Civil-Military Integration. CMC Finland Civilian Crisis Management Studies Volume 1: Number 5/2008 pp. 23-24.

²⁷ YAZICI – ÜNLÜ – GÖK (2021) op. cit. p. 1.

²⁸ WALBERG, Eric: From Postmodernism to Postsecularism: Re-emerging Islamic Civilization, Clarity Press, 2013. pp. 394-395.

Turkey launched its development assistance program in 2004 for Afghanistan. The focus of relief efforts in Afghanistan was the reconstruction of the country, increasing the capacities of the Afghan army and police, and training areas, especially for girls. In 2015 Ankara's largest share of bilateral development co-operation for Afghanistan still had a prominent place despite the ongoing Syrian crisis.²⁹ Most of the Turkish companies operating in Afghanistan were working on the field of construction and contracting sectors. The remaining 10% of the companies operated in services – such as health, logistics or consultancy, etc. – and in the energy and mining sector. The above-mentioned companies have realized 701 projects between 2003 and 2018, amounting to approximately USD 6,6 billion.³⁰ In 2019 Afghanistan was the 5. in the list of countries most benefitting from the bilateral official development assistance with the amount of 32,94 million US dollars.³¹ The Turkish Cooperation and Coordination Agency (TIKA), has completed more than 1,000 projects – especially on developing education, health, agriculture and infrastructure. Turkey also made contributions to Afghanistan on multilateral level – via UN and NATO – as well.

4. Afghanistan as a theatre of opportunities

4.1. Turkey's current goals

It seems like Turkey wants to strengthen its position in Central Asia. Moving away from its traditional sphere of interest, Turkey is also looking for those areas on the southern border of the Turkish republics of Central Asia where it can set foot. Analysing the steps of the Turkish leadership in the reconciliation process of the Afghan conflict makes it clear that Turkey's aim is to play a central role in the post-US era in Afghanistan. Turkey, which is NATO's only Muslim majority member state displays some unique characteristics and has a long history of diplomatic co-operation with Afghanistan, which entails a more active policy in the Central Asian state compared to other Western countries.³²

²⁹ Turkey's Official Development Assistance, OECD <https://www.oecd.org/dac/dac-global-relations/turkeys-official-development-assistanceoda.htm> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

³⁰ Turkey-Afghan Economic and Trade Relations. Directorate of Communications, Presidency of the Republic of Türkiye https://www.mfa.gov.tr/turkey_s-commercial-and-economic-relations-with-afghanistan.en.mfa TASTEKIN, Fehim: Türkiye için mayınsız bir Afgan rotası mümkün mü? AL-Monitor, 06. 24. 2021. <https://www.al-monitor.com/tr/originals/2021/06/turkey-needs-build-support-new-afghan-mission> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

³¹ Turkish Development Assistance Report 2019. Turkish Development assistance report 2019. p.21.

The above-mentioned companies have realized 701 projects between 2003 and 2018, amounting to approximately USD 6,6 billion.

³² USUL, Ali Resul: What's next for Turkey – Afghanistan relations after the Taliban takeover? TRT World, 25 Aug 2021 <https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/what-s-next-for-turkey-afghanistan-relations-after-the-taliban-takeover-49460> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

- *Providing security*

Even though by 31 August all international forces have left Afghanistan and have evacuated most of their citizens, Turkey – unlike other NATO members – decided to maintain its diplomatic presence in Kabul. Ankara is also considering to operate the Hamid Karzai Airport in Kabul³³ and it has begun negotiations with the Taliban even before the U.S. withdrawal.

In a meeting on June 14. Joe Biden and the Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdoğan agreed on the Turkish presence in the capital of Afghanistan. Turkey could run security at the airport if the US president provided it with the “diplomatic, logistical and financial support” required for the mission.³⁴ Even though the American and the Turkish president agreed on launching a new, Turkish-led mission,³⁵ for the first time the Taliban – which came to power in the meantime – expressed a clear disapproval of Erdoğan’s plan following his announcement. The spokesperson of the Taliban’s Political Bureau in Qatar highlighted: *“The airport is Afghan territory and Afghans are responsible for their land, institutions and honour. [...] No country in the world accepts the security of its own airport by someone else. We also ask everyone to respect the rules and sovereignty of visiting the country.”*³⁶ However, a month later the newly formed Taliban government were the one who asked for technical assistance from Ankara and Doha to be able to run the international airport.³⁷ The issue of operating the airport is currently off the agenda, as Turkey insists on using its own security forces to secure the airport, to which the Taliban do not consent. Yet it would be beneficial for both parties to reach a consensus in the case; as Turkey's influence would be enhanced by its personal military presence in the Central Asian country, while for the Taliban, Kabul airport is the main window to the world.

- *Refugees and migration*

Turkey’s past and planned investments to boost Afghanistan’s security situation is not an altruistic act, rather it can be seen as a further step in creating a more stable and predictable environment for itself. As the level of violence shows an increasing tendency in Afghanistan in the last year,³⁸ more and more Afghan decides to leave the

³³ GÖKSEDEF, Ece: Ankara’da Kabil Havalimanı’yla ilgili olarak hangi değerlendirmeler yapılıyor? BBC Türkçe 17. 08. 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-turkiye-58248131> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

³⁴ Turkey tries to cement role in Afghanistan; Financial Times, 07. 07. 2021. <https://www.ft.com/content/2a5ab86d-a416-4f91-a011-a24c342ac84d> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

³⁵ According to the first draft, the purpose of the Turkish-led mission would be to guard Kabul airport, which would be implemented together with Hungary and Pakistan.

³⁶ Taliban says it asked for Turkey's support in Afghanistan; Daily Sabah, 25 Aug 2021. <https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/diplomacy/taliban-says-it-asked-for-turkeys-support-in-afghanistan> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

³⁷ کابل هوایی میدان اداره در کمک برای ترکیه از طالبان درخواست, Tolonews, 4 September 2021. <https://tolonews.com/fa/afghanistan-174398> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

³⁸ Afghanistan – Protection of Civilians in Armed Conflict Midyear Update: 1 January to 30 June 2021. pp. 1-2. https://unama.unmissions.org/sites/default/files/unama_poc_midyear_report_2021_26_july.pdf (downloaded 27 September 2021)

country.³⁹ Although mostly the immediate neighbours are affected by the refugees' flow, a significant part of them go beyond this area – making Turkey as a transit and a destination country at the same time. Since the Syrian crisis broke out Ankara hosted 3.6 million registered Syrian refugees and approximately 320,000 persons from other nationalities. In the following years – especially since 2018 – Afghanistan has become the main country of origin for newly arriving refugees in Turkey.⁴⁰ According to data, provided by Directorate General of Migration Management (DGMM), as of September 2021 44,565 unregistered Afghans were identified by Turkish authorities⁴¹ and other 22,606 Afghan citizen applied for international protection.⁴² Even though Turkey emphasises the fraternal relationship with Afghanistan, refugees and migrants are placing an increasing economic burden on the state. The growing tensions created a domestic political issue in Turkey; therefore, the Turkish leadership was determined to take stronger actions⁴³ to avoid harsh political consequence of a potential refugee crisis.⁴⁴

5. Conclusions

Afghanistan is not the graveyard of empires, rather it is their crossroads. Amid the chaos of the Taleban takeover regional players have been working on strengthening their position in Afghanistan and in the region as well. The steps Turkey have taken in the Afghan soil is part of a bigger picture; through its wide range of activities and (planned) cooperation with the Taliban regime Ankara seeks to achieve its foreign policy objectives.

The Turkish-Afghan relations have always been special since the foundation of the modern Turkish state. There is a sense of togetherness and a kind of kinship between the two nations, and using this as a base, the Turkish foreign policy was able to build deeper connection with the main actors of the Afghan conflict, creating a better position for themselves in the race between the great powers.⁴⁵ Even though a concrete military intervention in Afghanistan led by Turkey was removed from the agenda, Turkey will definitely intends to play an important role in the Central Asian

³⁹ BBC News: Afghanistan: How many refugees are there and where will they go? 31 August 2021. <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58283177> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

⁴⁰ The Situation of Afghan Refugees in Turkey; Stiftung Pro Asyl. Expert opinion. March 2021. p. 6. https://www.proasyl.de/wp-content/uploads/PA_Expert-Opinion_The-Situation-of-Afghan-Refugees-in-Turkey.pdf (downloaded 27 September 2021)

⁴¹ T.C. İçişler Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü. Düzensiz Göç <https://www.goc.gov.tr/duzensiz-goc-istatistikler> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

⁴² T.C. İçişler Bakanlığı Göç İdaresi Genel Müdürlüğü. Uluslararası koruma <https://www.goc.gov.tr/uluslararasi-koruma-istatistikler> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

⁴³ E.g.: Ankara decided to reinforce its Iranian border with a three-metre wall to block Afghan refugees. Turkey reinforces Iran border to block Afghan refugees. The Guardian, 23 Aug 2021 <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2021/aug/23/turkey-reinforces-iran-border-to-block-afghan-refugees> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

⁴⁴ Selim Sazak: Turkey's Refugee Problem Is Reaching a Breaking Point. Foreign Policy, September 8, 2021 <https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/09/08/turkey-refugee-erdogan-akp-crisis-chp-syria-afghanistan/> (downloaded 27 September 2021)

⁴⁵ KEMAL, Levent: Turkey's role in Afghanistan: a major risk. Al Jazeera Centre for Studies, August 29 2021. <https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/turkeys-role-afghanistan-major-risk> (downloaded 28 September 2021)

state. Afghanistan always had a special place in Turkish foreign policy and it will remain in the 'herat of Asia' and the Turkic World that Turkey attaches great importance.⁴⁶

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⁴⁶ <https://www.trtworld.com/opinion/what-s-next-for-turkey-afghanistan-relations-after-the-taliban-takeover-49460> (downloaded 26 September 2021)

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CULTURE MATTERS: EUROPEAN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS' POLICIES FOR CULTURAL PROPERTY PROTECTION IN CONFLICT AND CRISIS SITUATIONS

Abstract

Cultural property protection (CPP) has been raised more and more explicitly to the international peace and security agenda in recent years due to the growing volume of international terrorism and identity-based armed conflicts. Along with it, several international organizations recognized the necessity to stand up for the protection of cultural values and sites as an indispensable element of their external activities. By applying an institutional approach, the aim of the paper is to shed light on what international rules and standards exist in the framework of four international organizations critically impacting the European security environment (Council of Europe, EU, NATO, OSCE) regarding cultural property protection in conflict prevention, crisis situations or in post-conflict environments based on publicly available documents and the results of a survey conducted in this regard.

Keywords: Cultural property protection, Council of Europe, NATO, OSCE, EU

Introduction

The aim of this paper¹ is to present the activities and strategies regarding cultural property protection (CPP) of four international organizations determining European defence and security structures and policies either as a security-focused organization by nature (North Atlantic Treaty Organization – NATO), Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe – OSCE), or as an initially economy-oriented (European Union – EU) or even as a primarily human rights (Council of Europe – CoE) organization. The research leans partly on the results of a questionnaire survey entitled “*International organizations’ standards and experience in cultural property protection in operational environments*” conducted throughout the spring of 2021, partly on the publicly available documents (reports, strategies, regulations, etc.) of the examined organizations.

The questionnaire was circulated among the relevant departments of CoE, EU, NATO and OSCE.² After a clarification of the organizations’ definition of cultural property (CP), the questionnaire was built around four main segments, which provides the structure of the present paper as well, examining (1) the relevant strategic

¹ SUPPORTED BY THE ÚNKP-20-3-II-NKE-54 NEW NATIONAL EXCELLENCE PROGRAM OF THE MINISTRY FOR INNOVATION AND TECHNOLOGY FROM THE SOURCE OF THE NATIONAL RESEARCH, DEVELOPMENT AND INNOVATION FUND.

² The following departments or institutions contributed to the survey: Council of Europe Culture and Cultural Heritage Division; European Commission DG for Education, Youth, Sport and Culture in cooperation with DG HOME and EU EEAS; NATO Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence; OSCE (not specified)

documents & framework regulations; (2) the operational experience of the organizations regarding CPP; (3) the existing cooperation & partnerships with other intergovernmental organizations, international non-governmental organizations or the local community in this regard; and finally (4) the potentially existing recommendations or requirements for their members³ on CPP. The survey aimed to outline a comparison of:

- what role CPP has in strategies, guidelines and in the operational experience of the examined organizations in conflict prevention, crisis situations or in post-conflict environments;
- what standards exist within the examined organizations as regards CPP that member/participating states shall conform with either during the training of the security forces personnel, the establishment of regulations for special legal order or as for the deployment of personnel in peace operations; and finally,
- what objectives and priorities the examined organizations have in the development of CPP within their activities for the future.

First and foremost, it is important to refer briefly to the differences in the terminology used by the organizations regarding this field. NATO and OSCE do not dispose of their own definition for “cultural property” but use the term adopted by the 1954 Hague Convention and the 1970 UNESCO Convention⁴ respectively. An important difference between the two terms is that while the first includes immovable, the second focuses exclusively on movable property.⁵ As for CoE, the later elaborated Nicosia Convention adopted in 2017 introduces a new definition for CP, which covers both movable and immovable elements – a term principally inspired by the 1970 UNESCO Convention and the EU Directive 2014/60 in relation to movable property and UNESCO’s (United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization) 1972 World Heritage Convention as regards immovable property.⁶ While in relevant documents of the EU, we meet either the term “cultural goods”⁷ – based on the definitions of the 1970 UNESCO and the 1995 UNIDROIT (International Institute for the Unification of Private Law) Convention⁸ – referring to movable cultural property

³ The applied terminology is Member state in the case of EU and CoE, member country as for NATO and participating state in the case of OSCE.

⁴ Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property (Paris, 1970)

⁵ In Merryman’s approach, the two conventions represent two different attitudes concerning CP: the 1954 Convention – applying an internationalist approach – regards CP as part of common human culture independently of origin protecting it from damage or destruction, while in the 1970 Convention, CP is part of a nation’s cultural heritage, supporting the retention of cultural objects by source nations, thus conveying different values and meaning of protection. Source: MERRYMAN, John Henry: Two Ways of Thinking About Cultural Property; *The American Journal of International Law*, Oct., 1986/4. pp. 831-853.

⁶ Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property. Nicosia, 19.V.2017.

⁷ The EU’s definition of cultural goods is heavily relying on the definition of its Member States. (see: Directive 2014/60 /EU of the European Parliament and of the Council). A list of categories of cultural goods/objects is laid down by Annex I of Council Regulation 116/2009 and by Annex of Regulation 2019/880 of the European Parliament and of the Council respectively.

⁸ UNIDROIT Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural Objects (Rome, 1995)

or the wider category of “cultural heritage”⁹ involving built and intangible heritage too. This divergence of terms already anticipates the differences in the focus of relevant actions of the organizations elaborated in the below chapters.

1. Strategic documents & regulatory frameworks for CPP

The present study is principally focusing on two types of threats CP can face in armed conflicts:¹⁰ on the one hand, the destruction of or damage to built heritage either deliberately or as collateral damage, the former often being an element of intentional attacks on identity, and on the other hand, the theft, appropriation and illegal trafficking in artefacts and its possible links with terrorism and organized crime. These two aspects give the two main axes of the examined tools and activities presented in the next chapters. The growing importance of and attention to security threats related to CP – reflected by the below presented documents – predominantly lies in the fact that there is increasing evidence about their potential to cause significant harm to identity and collective memory attached to cultural sites and thus impede reconciliation, besides important economic consequences.

As a strongly value-oriented organization, the activity of the CoE is based on the protection and promotion of its core values (human rights, democracy and the rule of law) throughout Europe. Disposing of a wide range of culture-related conventions, the *Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property* (often referred to as Nicosia Convention or “Blood Antiquities Convention”) adopted in 2017 can be regarded as an important milestone in the organization’s role played in CPP in conflict- and crisis-related situations as it is the first international legal instrument aiming to stand up to prevent, fight against and criminalize destruction, damage, and illegal trafficking of CP. The Convention – drafted in collaboration with other international organizations including UNESCO, EU, UNIDROIT and UNODC (United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime) – is open for signature for any country at a global level, although at the time of the finalization of the present study, it has not entered into force yet.¹¹ Its preamble explicitly states that the organization is concerned about the growing number of such crimes and that terrorist groups are involved in the deliberate destruction of cultural heritage and also profiting from the illicit trade of CP, being

⁹ The definition given to cultural heritage by the Concept on Cultural heritage in conflicts and crises is as follows: „*the resources inherited from the past in all forms and aspects - tangible, intangible and digital, including monuments, sites, landscapes, skills, practices, knowledge and expressions of human creativity, as well as collections conserved and managed by public and private bodies such as museums, galleries, libraries and archives. It originates from the interaction between people and places through time and it is constantly evolving.*” Source: 9962/21. Concept on Cultural heritage in conflicts and crises. A component for peace and security in European Union’s external action. 19 April 2021. p. 4.

¹⁰ The paper will only refer to some elements of the regulatory framework as regards CPP in relation to natural or man-made disasters.

¹¹ As of 1 August 2021, Cyprus, Greece, Latvia and Mexico have ratified the Convention and other 8 countries signed it. The condition of entry into force is 5 ratifications including at least 3 member states of the CoE. Chart of signatures and ratifications of Treaty 221. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/conventions/full-list/-/conventions/treaty/221/signatures?module=signatures-by-treaty&treatyenum=221> (downloaded 01 August 2021)

one of the most profitable ways of transnational organized crime.¹² Furthermore, the emerging role of social media and deep web in the trading also sets new challenges that international organizations as well as state entities must respond to.¹³ Applying an encompassing approach by providing criminal regulation for all phases of the trade, the Convention – as a gap-filling initiative – can provide an effective method for policing illicit trade in cultural objects – either stolen artefacts or recently excavated antiquities.¹⁴

On a broader scale, the *Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society* (also known as Faro Convention) adopted in 2005 shall be mentioned, which is building on the strong relationship between cultural heritage, human rights and democracy, putting heritage as a key resource for social inclusion, human rights and community¹⁵ and whose impact is well reflected in the later mentioned projects.¹⁶

Although the principal purpose of NATO – the military alliance of European and North American countries based on the principle of collective defence – is not directly linked with CPP, the preamble of its founding treaty states that the “*Parties [...] are determined to safeguard freedom, common heritage and civilisation of their peoples*”.¹⁷ Reflecting on the changing nature of 21st-century conflicts and on lessons learned from NATO operations and missions, a Science for Peace and Security (SPS) Programme has been launched on CPP in 2014 to improve NATO’s activities and institutional framework in this field, uniquely using both a conceptual and a practical military approach. The final report of the project has formulated several recommendations for enhancing the establishment of a NATO CPP framework, emphasizing that as CPP has a cross-cutting nature, it is an element to be mainstreamed in the whole range of NATO activities.¹⁸

¹² Offences relating to Cultural Property. Council of Europe, Culture and Cultural heritage. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/culture-and-heritage/cultural-property> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

¹³ Explanatory Report to the Council of Europe op.cit.

¹⁴ FINCHAM, Derek: *The Blood Antiquities Convention as a paradigm for cultural property crime reduction*; *Cardozo Arts & Entertainment*, 2019/2. pp. 299-336.

¹⁵ *Convention on the Value of Cultural Heritage for Society*; Council of Europe, Culture and Cultural heritage. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/culture-and-heritage/faro-convention> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

¹⁶ In the case of CoE, we shall mention other legal instruments shaping the organization’s activities in the field of heritage protection (using the broader term of cultural heritage in these cases). For instance, the EUR-OPA Major Hazards Agreement aims to promote prevention and resilience of major natural and technical disasters by strengthening cooperation in this field. Cultural heritage appears here as a separate topic, because of its exposure to catastrophes and its negative socioeconomic consequences on local communities, involving a loss of identity-generating values and of cultural diversity. Source: Cultural heritage. *European and Mediterranean Major Hazards Agreement*, Council of Europe. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/europarisks/cultural-heritage1> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

¹⁷ North Atlantic Treaty, Washington D. C., 4 April 1919.

¹⁸ The key recommendations of the report were: 1) elaboration of a bi-command CPP directive; 2) working on a NATO standardization agreement on CPP; 3) Inserting CPP in NATO Crisis Management Process; 4) developing NATO CPP terminology; 5) inserting CPP elements in NATO policy and allied joint doctrine publications; 6) completing ongoing NATO initiatives to create GIS CPP data layer for NATO maps; 7) sustaining a dialogue with relevant non-NATO associates; and 8) considering the need for elaborating a NATO

As a result of a work starting in 2016 between NATO's two strategic commands (Allied Command Operations [ACO] and Allied Command Transformation [ACT]), a Bi-Strategic Command Directive was adopted in 2019, which sets direction and guidance regarding the organization's activities in the field of CPP in the preparation, planning and realization of its missions and operations, training and education programmes, and its evaluation activities. The physical harm to CP – as a growing security threat due to the changing nature of conflicts¹⁹ –and its effect on social cohesion, post-conflict recovery and reconciliation are at the centre of NATO's attention, emphasizing the strong link between collective identity and CP related to the given community. Applying a comprehensive approach, CPP is a task to be considered across the spectrum of conflict and all branches of the organization.²⁰ An important element of NATO's handling of CPP is its role in strategic communication of the organization's activities, recognising also that the failure to protect CP in operational environment may have significant consequences on the operation's success and NATO's legitimacy.²¹

At a branch level, CIMIC is the most affected area, several CIMIC documents²² include regulations on CPP as one of NATO's 5 so-called cross-cutting topics,²³ describing the importance of supporting and taking a proactive role in CPP (against damage, destruction, theft etc.) as part of building a safe and secure environment.²⁴ NATO's *Policy for the Protection of Civilians* (2016) is the framework document for the protection of civilian persons, objects and services, implicitly including CPP. Since its 2019 London Summit, a Human Security approach is being given shape inside NATO which indicates a shift in the organization's security conception gathering under a unified multi-sectoral concept the efforts in relation to certain cross-cutting topics, including CPP.²⁵

policy on CPP. Source: ROSÉN, Frederik Dr.: NATO and Cultural Property. Embracing New Challenges in the Era of Identity Wars; Report of the NATO SPS Project Best Practices for Cultural Property Protection in NATO-led Military Operations. CHAC, 2017. pp. 31-35.

¹⁹ The above-mentioned report outlines the following developments in the strategic environment of 21st century conflicts as the main – strongly interrelating – drivers for a changing role of CP: new regime of international norms for CP; the evaluation of identity in armed conflicts; globalization and urbanization of conflicts; rise of hybrid warfare; the growing issue of looting and illicit trafficking of antiquities. Source: ROSÉN op.cit. pp. 13-16.

²⁰ NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 086-005 on Implementing Cultural Property Protection in NATO Operations and Missions, 1 April 2019.

²¹ Response on the questionnaire

²² For instance, as part of CIMIC CCOE's „Makes sense” series already two editions of a volume on CPP (later referred) have been published, or the later referred CIMIC handbook also includes provisions on this topic.

²³ The current cross-cutting topics – i.e. topics which could affect a mission in several ways, but are not part of the military's primary responsibilities – are the protection of civilians; children and armed conflict; women, peace and security; cultural property protection; building integrity. CIMIC Handbook. Chapter VII, <https://www.handbook.cimic-coe.org/> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

²⁴ CIMIC Handbook *ibid.* Chapter VII, 7.6.

²⁵ Human Security. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_181779.htm (downloaded 23 July 2021)

As for future challenges, NATO documents indicate several lines of development, such as in the field of databases, information sharing and standardisation, education and training, partnerships both between the civil and the military sector and between specialised military departments. Furthermore, it is also important to provide that data on CP be available and incorporated in an early stage of the operations planning cycle which is a key for effectively protect CP in the field of operation.²⁶

The EU – as a regional cooperation established on common inheritance and values – was primarily meant to create economic integration, but spilled over to other fields to become nowadays an international security organization characterized by collective security. In addition, since the adoption of the Lisbon Treaty, it shows traits of collective defence with regard to its member states as well.²⁷ The importance of heritage protection is well reflected in the Treaty of the European Union, stating that the organization “shall ensure that Europe’s cultural heritage is safeguarded and enhanced.”²⁸ Apart from a range of regulations in the field of risk management,²⁹ culture has been getting at the forefront of its external policies since 2016. Building upon the joint communication of the European Parliament (EP) and the Council in 2016 visioning an EU strategy for international cultural relations,³⁰ the Council conclusions adopted in 2019 recognized the importance of the combat against illicit trafficking and of culture and cultural heritage in peacebuilding and in post-conflict situations.³¹

It became apparent from 2018, that cultural heritage preservation and protection has a role in the activities of EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions: in the Council conclusions of 19 November 2018 on the establishment of a civilian CSDP compact – by highlighting the importance of this dimension in EU’s integrated approach concerning external conflicts and crises – the Council expressed that “the preservation and protection of cultural heritage is one of the focus areas for Civilian Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions.”³² The adoption by the Council on its 21st June 2021 meeting its *Conclusions on EU approach to cultural heritage in conflicts and crises* can be considered as a further, particularly significant step in this regard. It demonstrates an express political commitment on and provides a political and operational framework for cultural heritage protection in conflicts and crises, giving the issue strategic importance. The document regards cultural heritage

²⁶ Cultural Property Protection (CPP). A CCOE Fact Sheet. CIMIC Centre of Excellence. <https://www.cimic-coe.org/resources/fact-sheets/fact-sheet-cpp-2020.pdf> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

²⁷ MOLNÁR, Anna: Az Európai Unió – a biztonsági közösségtől a kollektív védelemig terjedő folyamat; In: MOLNÁR, Anna – MARSAL, Viktor – WAGNER, Péter (Eds.): Nemzetközi biztonsági szervezetek; Dialóg Campus, 2019. pp. 81-98.

²⁸ Document 12012M/TXT. Consolidated version of the Treaty on European Union

²⁹ The conclusions on risk management in the area of cultural heritage 26 May 2020; or the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015-2030 shall be mentioned in which latter the EU played a key role in the negotiations and provides support in its implementation.

³⁰ JOIN (2016) 29 final. Joint Communication to the European Parliament and the Council. Towards an EU strategy for international cultural relations.

³¹ 2019/C 192/04. Council conclusions on an EU strategic approach to international cultural relations and a framework for action.

³² Response on the questionnaire

as possessing a twofold strategic role: a potential trigger for and a target in conflicts and crises and a subject to disinformation or information manipulation, but also a tool for fostering peace, reconciliation, mutual understanding, intercultural dialogue and sustainable development.³³ The Conclusions invite the European External Action Service (EEAS) to make efforts in streamlining cultural heritage and its protection in the whole spectrum of EU's toolbox regarding conflict prevention and crisis management – including CSDP –, also setting a reporting obligation on a regular basis on the progress in this field. It is important to note that the Conclusions make provisions regarding the integration of aspects of cultural heritage protection into the appropriate financial instruments too, especially NDICI – Global Europe (Neighbourhood, Development and International Cooperation Instrument), thus providing financial means for its external actions in this field.³⁴ The basis of the Council's decision, the Concept elaborated by the EEAS – recognizing cultural heritage as a “*powerful and complementary component for the revitalisation of the EU approach to peace, security and development*” – defines the main axes of EU's future engagement and priorities in this field in line with the humanitarian-peace-development nexus which builds on the handling of humanitarian needs together with the strengthening of resilience and preventive measures. To ensure the horizontal implementation of the provisions, the Concept also set up an informal inter-service task force for cultural heritage in conflicts and crises coordinated by EEAS.³⁵

It shall be noted that Hungary – building on the experiences of the Hungary Helps Program which supported several (principally) religious heritage rehabilitation projects in the framework of its humanitarian and development activities in conflict-stricken areas – has taken an active role in the elaboration of the Concept and the relating Conclusions. On the occasion of the adoption of the Conclusions, the Permanent Representation of Hungary to the EU together with EEAS has organized a roundtable discussion entitled “*Cultural heritage, as a new component for peace and security in the EU's external action*” to provide a platform for gathering best practices and encouraging a stronger engagement of the EU institutions in this field.³⁶

The other area where the EU actively engages to safeguard CP is in the fight against illicit trafficking, especially as regards its possible links with terrorism financing. In a row of documents relating to the fight against terrorism and terrorism-financing, the EU stressed its concerns in this regard, and it is also highlighted in the Council Conclusions of 2021, The Conclusions recall the development of an Action Plan on tackling illicit trade of cultural goods by 2022, already schemed by the *EU strategy to tackle organised crime* adopted in April 2021 by the Commission. It was in line with the *EU Security Union Strategy* adopted in July 2020, which also stated

³³ The importance of cultural heritage in conflict prevention and resolution was also emphasized by the Council in its Conclusions on EU Peace Mediation of 7 December 2020. (13573/20)

³⁴ 9837/21. Council Conclusions on EU Approach to Cultural Heritage in conflicts and crises.

³⁵ Concept on Cultural heritage in conflicts and crises. op. cit.

³⁶ Round-table discussion at the Permanent Representation entitled “Cultural Heritage, as a new component for peace and security in the EU's external action”. Permanent Representation of Hungary to the EU. <https://eu-brusszel.mfa.gov.hu/eng/news/round-table-discussion-at-the-permanent-representation-entitled-cultural-heritage-as-a-new-component-for-peace-and-security-in-the-eus-external-action> (downloaded 01 August 2021)

that “[...] trafficking in cultural goods has also become one of the most lucrative criminal activities, a source of funding for terrorists as well as organised crime and it is on the rise. Steps should be explored to improve the online and offline traceability of cultural goods in the internal market and cooperation with third countries where cultural goods are looted as well as providing active support to law enforcement and academic communities.”³⁷

OSCE – the Euroatlantic institution of cooperative security rooting in the relenting atmosphere of the Cold War – is operating with primarily soft power tools, of which the human dimension includes culture.³⁸ The mandate of the organization in the field of CPP is based on, among others, the *OSCE Border Security and Management Concept* (BSMC,) adopted in 2005, as regards its contribution and assistance to participating States in the prevention and fight against all forms of cross-border illicit trafficking (implicitly including cultural property).³⁹ OSCE’s activities on organized crime are set out by the 2020 *Declaration on strengthening co-operation in countering transnational organized crime* (MC.DOC/1/20) in correlation with *Ministerial Council Decisions No. 3/05 on combatting transnational organized crime* and *No. 5/06 on organized crime*; although neither of them naming cultural property explicitly. The *Ministerial Council Declaration on strengthening OSCE efforts to prevent and counter terrorism* (2016), however, indicates the need to take appropriate steps in preventing and suppressing terrorism financing refraining from direct or indirect in trade in CP and other items of archaeological, historical, cultural, rare scientific and religious importance in favour of terrorist organizations and emphasized the key importance of information-sharing in this regard.⁴⁰ The Parliamentary Assembly’s 2014 *Resolution on Protection of cultural property in the OSCE area* shall be also mentioned here, which emphasized the importance of CPP, constituting an integral part of the organization’s efforts. For this purpose, the document called participating States for taking appropriate measures and also to establish an OSCE mechanism “to prohibit and prevent within conflict zones any illicit export, other removal or transfer of ownership of cultural property, or archaeological excavation, any alteration to, or change of use of, cultural property which is intended to conceal or destroy cultural, historical or scientific evidence, any form of theft, pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed against cultural property”.⁴¹

In the framework of efforts to effectively address transnational threats, the OSCE Transnational Threats Department is currently working on a programme dedicated to the fight against illicit trafficking in CP in the OSCE area in order to enhance the capacities of law enforcement organizations and handle its direct links to organized crime and terrorism financing, money laundering and corruption networks.⁴²

³⁷ COM (2020) 605 final. Communication from the Commission on the EU Security Union Strategy.

³⁸ REMEK, Éva: A Európai Biztonsági és Együttműködési Szervezet – kooperatív biztonság; In: MOLNÁR, Anna – MARSAL, Viktor – WAGNER, Péter (Eds.): Nemzetközi biztonsági szervezetek; Dialóg Campus, 2019. pp. 99-114.

³⁹ Response on the questionnaire

⁴⁰ MC.DOC/1/16. OSCE Ministerial Council: Declaration on Strengthening OSCE efforts to prevent and counter terrorism. 9 December 2016.

⁴¹ Resolution on Protection of cultural property in the OSCE area. OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, 2014.

⁴² Response on the questionnaire

2. Operational experience and CPP-related activities in the field

Figure 1 shows what specific, CPP-related task(s) the examined organizations can perform in the field (either in the framework of missions/ field operations /crisis management operations or through realization/financing of projects) based on the questionnaire.




Figure 1: Fields of activity potentially performed based on the operational experience of the examined organizations based on the responses of the questionnaire
(Author's own edition)

The EU's activities in this regard include realizing/ contributing to concrete projects on the one hand and acting in the frame of civilian CSDP actions on the other hand. The NDICI – Global Europe – the financial tool supporting EU's external action⁴³ – and the IcSP (Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace)⁴⁴ – providing funding for actions on conflict prevention, crisis response, peacebuilding and global or response to trans-regional threats – have supported / are supporting projects in the Balkans, Middle East and the Maghreb both in reconstruction of heritage and in the fight against illicit trafficking.⁴⁵ Additionally, based on a Memorandum of Understanding signed in 2012, significant cooperation with UNESCO has been realized by supporting joint initiatives funded by the European Commission and

⁴³ European Commission welcomes the endorsement of the new €79.5 billion NDICI-Global Europe instrument to support EU's external action. European Commission. 19 March 2021. https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/IP_21_1267 (downloaded 23 July 2021)

⁴⁴ Some examples: building on the positive outcomes of previous actions and also expanding activities, the *Interim Response programme in favour of Kosovo* (2021-24) aims to improve inter-community trust through the protection of cultural heritage. The „*Protecting cultural heritage and diversity in conflicts*” project in Iraq, Libya and Yemen which ran between 2017 and 2019 aimed to provide rapid assessments and immediate safeguarding measures to the cultural resources affected by the conflicts, together with reducing the vulnerability of the populations by contributing to UNESCO's efforts in improving the integration of a cultural dimension into conflict stability and peacekeeping efforts. Sources: Response on the questionnaire; Instrument contributing to Stability and Peace. Report. European Commission. <https://icspm.eu/pdf/?format> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

⁴⁵ Response on the questionnaire

implemented by UNESCO with the objective of reducing illicit trafficking of CP in the area of EU and partner countries.⁴⁶

On the other hand, possible actions in the framework of EU's civilian CSDP efforts might include a wide range of activities from the provision of strategic advice to capacity building either to preserve and protect built heritage or to fight illicit trade in CP.⁴⁷ The need to integrate cultural heritage protection in CSDP framework first appeared in 2017 from the part of EEAS,⁴⁸ in parallel with the gradual expansion of civilian CSDP priority areas as a response to a changing international security context.⁴⁹ It has then culminated in the establishment of the EUAM Iraq as the first (and to day the only) CSDP mission employing a dedicated expert in the field and with a mandate which includes the support of Iraqi authorities to protect their cultural heritage, on the initiative of Italy, Germany and France to increase political awareness on the issue. Reflecting on the widespread destruction perpetrated by ISIL (Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant) in the country, the advisory mission deployed since 2017 could reach important results – heavily building on member state contributions (especially Italy) – in raising awareness and in training local forces amongst others.⁵⁰ The mission organized a round of three workshops (“The Casket of our History”) during 2018-19 on the topic of the fight against illegal trade in cultural goods bringing together international and local key actors to strengthen the collective efforts in preserving cultural heritage.⁵¹

The experience of EULEX Kosovo may also be recalled here as the mission provided support in the establishment and technical assistance in the work of the

⁴⁶ For instance, the project entitled „*Fighting illicit trafficking of cultural property in the Western Balkans*” launched in 2020, aims to improve the legal, technical and institutional capacities and frameworks in the combat against illicit trafficking of CP. The project is supported by the EU with 2.8 million EUR and implemented by UNESCO. An other example, the *Emergency Safeguarding of the Syrian Heritage* project implemented between 2014 and 2016 with an overall objective or contributing to the restoration of social cohesion, stability and sustainable development through cultural heritage protection and preservation through capacity-building, awareness-raising and technical assistance. Source: UNESCO's Cooperation with the European Union to Fight Illicit Trafficking of Cultural Property. UNESCO. <https://en.unesco.org/fightrafficking/eu-cooperation> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

⁴⁷ Response on the questionnaire

⁴⁸ EEAS(2017) 977 REV 2. Issues Paper – Preservation and Protection of Cultural Heritage in CSDP Missions and Operations. Working document of the European External Action Service.

⁴⁹ JUNCOS, Ana E.: Beyond civilian power? Civilian CSDP two decades on; In: FIOTT, Daniel: The EU's legacy and ambition in security and defence; EU Institute for Security Studies, 2020. pp. 74-87.

⁵⁰ PARKES, Roderick dr. – PIETZ, Tobias: CSDP Missions and the Protection of Cultural Heritage. Lessons from EUAM Iraq and the Way Forward; Workshop Note. DGAP – ZIF, 17 November 2020. https://dgap.org/sites/default/files/article_pdfs/zif_dgap_workshop-note_protection_of_cultural_heritage_oct_2020.pdf (downloaded 23 July 2021)

⁵¹ The Casket of our History – EUAM Iraq fights illegal trade in cultural goods. Delegation of the European Union to the Dominican Republic. 27 November 2019. https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/dominican-republic/71130/casket-our-history-%E2%80%93-euam-iraq-fights-illegal-trade-cultural-goods_It (downloaded 23 July 2021)

Kosovo Police Cultural Heritage Unit, besides contributing to the rehabilitation of cultural sites in the territory of Kosovo.⁵²

The possibilities of future EU engagement are laid down in the above-mentioned 2021 Concept, promoting EU engagement for CPP throughout all the conflict cycle and with a cross-cutting (i.e. integrating it to all actions in EU toolbox for conflicts and crises) and “conflict sensitive” approach. Drafting a comprehensive approach for mainstreaming cultural heritage protection in its political, diplomatic and legislative engagement, the concept determines the possible activities of EU in the field of prevention, safeguarding and recovery of cultural heritage as well. The Concept envisions the elaboration of a mini-concept dedicated to the security challenges related to the protection of cultural heritage which will specifically consider the possible areas of civilian CSDP compact’s engagement.⁵³

In the case of NATO, CPP is a factor to be considered in all decision-making processes in the organization’s operations from planning through targeting to risk assessment and risk mitigation. Its significance also has to be emphasized from the aspect of strategic communication. The specific CPP-related tasks that NATO is involved depend on the concrete situation and the relating mandate.⁵⁴ The example of KFOR (Kosovo Force) shall be emphasized here, as the mandate of the peace-support operation includes the protection and the support of the protection of cultural and religious sites in the territory of Kosovo⁵⁵ – as a response to claims coming from the Serbian Orthodox Church. The 2004 riots also highlighted the critical role of heritage and NATO’s role in safeguarding it. Until 2013, KFOR was responsible for the protection of securing nine designated sites of religious and cultural importance.⁵⁶ Nowadays, NATO forces are present only at Decani Monastery, primarily as a third responder providing support for Kosovo authorities and EULEX upon request.⁵⁷

Although aspects of CPP were not institutionalized in the organization’s activities in Afghanistan, NATO forces participated in a number of initiatives and projects regarding CPP on an ad hoc basis, including the provision of courses, the building of temporary facilities for storing archaeological objects, contribution to the reconstruction of the National Museum and to the protection of Ghazni’s cultural heritage.⁵⁸

The Libyan intervention of 2011 serves an important and widely praised example of how aspects of CPP can be integrated in military operation planning. During NATO’s Operation Unified Protector, a cultural “No-strike List” made up of about 1450 sites was composed based on data gained from the preceding Operation

⁵² EEAS (2017) 977 REV 2. op. cit.

⁵³ Concept on Cultural heritage in conflicts and crises. op. cit. 12.

⁵⁴ Response on the questionnaire

⁵⁵ NATO’s role in Kosovo; NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_48818.htm (downloaded 23 July 2021)

⁵⁶ The sites included: Gazimestan Monument, Gracanica Monastery, Zociste Monastery, Budisavci Monastery, Gorioc Monastery, the Archangel site, Devic Monastery, Pec Patriarchate, and Decani Monastery.

⁵⁷ ROSÉN op. cit., 22.

⁵⁸ Cultural Property Protection. NATO. https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_166114.htm (downloaded 23 July 2021)

Odyssey Dawn, UNESCO and academia amongst others in order to evade collateral damage in cultural heritage during NATO airstrikes.⁵⁹ These operational experiences led NATO to launch the above-mentioned SPS programme on CPP in 2014 to map further possibilities of developing NATO's engagement in this field. A further element that underlines the importance of handling CPP aspects within NATO, that in recent years, CPP has been integrated into training exercises as well, like Trident Jaguar (2018) and Trident Jackal (2019).⁶⁰

CoE does not have an external presence on a regular basis (apart from its field offices responsible for the implementation of certain cooperation activities), its contribution in this field is principally focusing on awareness-raising about the importance of multi-stakeholderism in the governance of cultural heritage, increasing knowledge of and adherence to the organization's standards and enhancing formal and informal exchange of practices.⁶¹ CoE is present in post-conflict situations with concrete projects which touch upon cultural heritage – utilizing its potential for post-conflict reconciliation, – ranging from the rehabilitation of the built environment to using heritage in a cross-sectorial way as a tool for encouraging inter-community dialogue and fostering sustainable economic development. As an example, the PIAG project (*"Post-Conflict Actions for the Social and Economic Revitalisation of the Communities and the Cultural Environment in the Municipality of Gori"*) in Gori shall be mentioned which was a response to damage to cultural heritage and more broadly, the built environment by the 2008 conflict in Georgia. Through the rehabilitation process, the project aimed to enhance economic development and prevent the impoverishment and abandonment of a conflict-stricken, culturally rich land, reflecting the strong interrelations of cultural heritage and economy.⁶² The cross-sectorial Joint Programme *"European Union/Council of Europe Support to the Promotion of Cultural Diversity in Kosovo (PCDK)"* which ran between 2009 and 2015 used cultural heritage as an instrument to encourage inter-community dialogue and also to enhance economic development.⁶³

OSCE is primarily intervening in the prevention and fight against illicit trafficking of CP, through organizing workshops, trainings and providing advocacy for local organs. The relevance of CPP has been growing since 2016 within the activities of the organization. In the survey as a positive result, the increased outreach to local authorities was mentioned – especially in the Balkans and South-Eastern Europe – and also increased communication and cooperation with local stakeholders

⁵⁹ FOLLANT, Yvette maj.: Cultural Property Protection Makes Sense. A Way to Improve Your Mission; Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE), The Hague, The Netherlands, 2015. <https://nlp.jallc.nato.int/iks/sharing%20public/cpp-makes-sense-final-version-29-10-15.pdf> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

⁶⁰ BERENDS, Jolien: Cultural Property Protection Makes Sense. A Way To Improve Your Mission; Second edition. Civil-Military Cooperation Centre of Excellence (CCOE) 2020. p. 6.

⁶¹ Response on the questionnaire

⁶² Post-Conflict Actions for the Social and Economic Revitalisation of the Communities and the Cultural Environment in the Municipality of Gori (PIAG). Council of Europe, Culture and Cultural heritage. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/culture-and-heritage/piag> (downloaded 01 August 2021)

⁶³ EU/CoE support to the promotion of cultural diversity in Kosovo. Council of Europe, Culture and Cultural heritage. <https://www.coe.int/en/web/culture-and-heritage/kosovo> (downloaded 01 August 2021)

in the field of CPP. But due to the constantly evolving nature of related crimes, there is a continued need for conducting awareness-raising exercises as well as regular assessments. As the Head of OSCE Border Security and Management Unit put it: “this problem can be tackled efficiently only by increasing the knowledge of the officers from different government agencies and promoting co-operation among them.”⁶⁴ Furthermore, in certain cases, there is still a lack of full awareness of how states could be affected by or involved in the phenomenon as potential host-, transit- or destination countries.⁶⁵

Regional workshops on combating illicit cross-border trafficking in CP have been organized in the OSCE area and also for the Asian partners for cooperation by OSCE Border Security and Management Unit in recent years, in which Italy and the Italian Chairmanship have taken a leading role.⁶⁶

3. Cooperation & partnerships at an international and local level

Considering the complexity of activities related to CPP and the scale and outreach of the issue, broad cooperation can be seen among the different actors at an international level. Based on the responses of the questionnaire, Figure 2 shows the network of cooperation of the examined organizations, which include crime prevention, crime policing/law enforcement and customs organizations; other regional/global security organizations and heritage-protection related international governmental and non-governmental organizations as well.

In the examined organizations we can perceive a multilateral approach, collaborating with several partners regarding CPP. Based on the survey, the examined organizations cooperate with each other too (only between NATO and CoE, there was no cooperation detected), and the EU disposes of the widest range of connections in this field. In its 2016 strategy, the EU laid down that its international cultural relations

⁶⁴ OSCE and Cyprus police organize international seminar on combating trafficking of cultural property and antiquities. 2 November 2017. OSCE. <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/354326> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

⁶⁵ Response on the questionnaire

⁶⁶ In 2017 in Vizenza, Italy, covering the Mediterranean region organized by the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, with the support of Italy, as the 2017 Chair of the OSCE Contact Group with the Mediterranean Partners for Co-operation, and in co-operation with the Center of Excellence for Stability Police Units (CoESPU) of Italy’s Carabinieri service. In 2018 a Workshop was organized in Podgorica, Montenegro for South-Eastern Europe and the Caucasus Region by the Italian OSCE Chairmanship in co-ordination with the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Transnational Threats Department, the OSCE Mission to Montenegro and the Ministry of Culture of Montenegro. An other was in Tashkent covering the Central Asian region (2018) Italian Chairmanship. Most recently, in the region of the OSCE Asian partners for cooperation held in Mongolia. (2019) organized in close coordination between the Border Security and Management Unit of the OSCE Secretariat, the Italian OSCE Chair of the Asian Contact Group, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Ministry of Education, Culture, Science and Sports of Mongolia. Source: Workshop on combating illicit cross-border trafficking in cultural property in the region of the OSCE Asian partners held in Mongolia. 2 September 2019. <https://www.osce.org/secretariat/428906> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

contribute to the strengthening of its role as a global actor, and as regards cultural heritage protection in conflict zones, CoE and UNESCO are highlighted as its most important partners.⁶⁷ The commitment to cooperating with other international organizations in prevention, protection, documentation and restoration has also been affirmed by the European Parliament highlighting UN (United Nations), UNESCO, ICCROM (International Centre for the Study of the Preservation and Restoration of Cultural Property) and ICBS (International Committee of the Blue Shield) besides civil and military authorities, cultural institutions and professional associations.⁶⁸ The Concept elaborated by EEAS determines the promotion of partnerships and multilateralism as one of the organization's principles in its engagement for cultural heritage protection in conflicts and crises in which regional organizations (like ASEAN [Association of Southeast Asian Nations], African Union, GCC [Gulf Cooperation Council], and Arab League) and other European institutions (as NATO or CoE) as well as UN and its specialized agencies (UNESCO, UNODC), other intergovernmental organizations (ALIPH [International alliance for the protection of heritage in conflict areas], ICCROM, ICOMOS [International Council on Monuments and Sites], ICOM [International Council of Museums], WCO [World Customs Organization]), civil society organizations and the academic world are key.⁶⁹

OSCE is cooperating closely with INTERPOL (International Criminal Police Organization) in the creation of national specialized units in fighting CP-related crimes and with WCO in increasing capacities and structures of customs services.⁷⁰ The organization's Joint Action Plan for the period 2018-2019 with UNODC – as a new element to previous ones – also covered combating trafficking in CP.⁷¹

UNESCO – as the main global player in the field of culture – has a central role in the activities related to CPP in conflicts and crisis situations, all the examined organizations are cooperating with UN's specialized agency in culture. As for NGOs, ICBS shall be outlined, partnering with OSCE, EU and NATO as well. NATO SHAPE and ICBS signed a letter of intent in 2020 to foster further cooperation in CPP – among others in information exchange and training –, but ICBS had already taken part in NATO operation exercises before.⁷²

⁶⁷ JOIN(2016) 29 final. op. cit.

⁶⁸ 2014/2149(INI). European Parliament resolution of 8 September 2015 towards an integrated approach to cultural heritage for Europe

⁶⁹ Concept on Cultural heritage in conflicts and crises. op. cit. 9.

⁷⁰ Response on the questionnaire

⁷¹ OSCE and UNODC sign new 2018-2019 joint action plan. 31 January 2018. OSCE. <https://www.osce.org/secretary-general/368856> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

⁷² NATO & BSI sign Letter of Intent for CPP. Blue Shield International. <https://theblueshield.org/nato-and-blue-shield-sign-letter-of-intent-for-cpp/> (downloaded 01 August 2021)




Figure 2: Network of cooperation of the examined organizations in relation to cultural property protection based on the responses of the questionnaire
(Author's own edition)

As for cooperation with local non-governmental organizations in the operational environment, concrete examples can be found on a mission level. As for NATO, conducting key visits by commanders and staff – besides acknowledging CP – are aiming to improve situational understanding but also force acceptance and force protection.⁷³ Developing close ties with local CP experts and NGO-s is of key importance amongst others in countering looting and trafficking of CP in order to dispose of up-to-date information.⁷⁴

In the case of the EU, the 2021 Conclusions stressed the importance of the need for local ownership and engagement at all stages of cultural heritage protection efforts in the aftermath of conflicts or crises.⁷⁵ The associated Concept recognizes the role of cultural heritage protection in economic recovery and development (through job creation and tourism), but also in the fight against disinformation by supporting the development of local networks of different stakeholders. To serve the goals of the Concept, the organization encourages dialogue and regular exchanges with civil society organizations, including local religious communities and faith-based organizations as well.⁷⁶

⁷³ Response on the questionnaire

⁷⁴ BERENDS, op. cit. 59.

⁷⁵ Council Conclusions on EU Approach to Cultural Heritage in conflicts and crises. op. cit.

⁷⁶ Concept on Cultural heritage in conflicts and crises. op. cit.

As regards OSCE, for example, its mission in Montenegro cooperates with the local council of museums. Its mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina is closely cooperating with the NGO *Centre for the Fight against Trafficking in Art*⁷⁷ in raising awareness by among others organizing training courses for law enforcement forces,⁷⁸ or disseminating related materials through traditional media, social networks and other events.⁷⁹

4. Recommendations or requirements for members

It is well beyond the limits of the present study to address in full detail the full scale of regulations touching on recommendations or requirements for members of the examined organizations, this chapter rather seeks to highlight some key elements of the relevant normative framework. As for OSCE, in its Resolution, the Parliamentary Assembly stressed the need from the part of participating states to adopt appropriate national-level legislation including on the prohibition of illicit activities in cultural sites and on the rendering of effective criminal sanctions against perpetrators and inciters interrelated with CP-related crimes determined by international law (especially the 1954 Hague Convention and its protocols). The Assembly encouraged participating States to agree on common standards, exchange information, working in synergy with each other and with other competent international partners.⁸⁰

The 2019 NATO Bi-Strategic Command sets out the provision of CPP-related training as a national responsibility so that personnel of armed forces have knowledge on and abide by the relevant legal framework.⁸¹ Dedicated trainings on CPP exist in a number of member countries such as the *Army Monument Officers Training (AMOT)* program, a partnership between the U.S. Army Civil Affairs and Psychological Operations Command and the Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative to develop training for U.S. Army Reserve Civil Affairs Soldiers.⁸² The Greek *Hellenic Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center* has also provided a course for NATO-member country participants on CPP co-organized with OSCE.⁸³ Furthermore, Poland established an *International Centre for Training and Research*

⁷⁷ Response on the questionnaire

⁷⁸ Smuggling and illegal trade in art and cultural property focus of OSCE-supported training course in Bosnia and Herzegovina. OSCE, 29 July 2019. <https://www.osce.org/mission-to-bosnia-and-herzegovina/426794> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

⁷⁹ Brochure on the protection of cultural property (in Bosnia and Herzegovina); OSCE Polis. 21 April 2021. <https://polis.osce.org/brochure-protection-cultural-property-bosnia-and-herzegovina> (downloaded 23 July 2021)

⁸⁰ Resolution on Protection of cultural property in the OSCE area. Parliamentary Assembly, 2014.

⁸¹ NATO Bi-Strategic Command Directive 086-005 op. cit.

⁸² Military Training. Smithsonian Cultural Rescue Initiative. <https://culturalrescue.si.edu/what-we-do/resilience/military-training/> (downloaded 01 August 2021)

⁸³ Cultural Property Protection (CPP) Pilot Course; Hellenic Multinational Peace Support Operations Training Center. <https://mpsotc.army.gr/en/cultural-property-protection-cpp-pilot-course> (downloaded 01 August 2021)

on Culture Heritage in Danger operating from 2020 with the aim of providing training for civilian and military personnel on CPP.⁸⁴

In the case of EU, the 2021 Council Conclusions – in a spirit of multi-stakeholderism – emphasize the need from the part of the Member States to increase collaboration between competent ministries, regional and local authorities, actors of civil society and of the academic world, but also with relevant international, regional, intergovernmental and non-governmental organizations, and the importance of collection and sharing of best practices in relating initiatives.⁸⁵ In the field of preventing of and combating against illicit trade of cultural goods, there exists certain legislative acts to provide unified regulations at an EU level as regards the export of cultural goods outside the customs territory of the EU⁸⁶, the ensuring of uniform control on certain imports,⁸⁷ or the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State.⁸⁸

The CoE's Nicosia Convention sets a number of provisions for its State Parties that shall be introduced in national criminal law. Chapter II enumerates the relevant offences that shall be criminalized by domestic legal systems (theft and other forms of unlawful appropriation, unlawful excavation and removal, illegal importation and exportation of movable CP, or the acquisition, placing on the market of these objects, falsification of documents, and the destruction or damaging of movable or immovable CP or the unlawful removal of any elements from them with a goal of impartation, exportation or placing on the market). Chapter III sets out the need to ensure that persons and services responsible for the investigation shall be specialised in this field or trained for this purpose. The provisions of the convention also encourage stronger cooperation among State Parties. Chapter IV sets out the preventive and other administrative measures to be taken at a national level, amongst others the development of inventories or databases, introduction of import and export control measures, enabling of the monitoring and reporting of suspicious dealings on the internet and providing and adequate institutional framework for the coordination of CPP-related tasks.⁸⁹

⁸⁴ Międzynarodowy Ośrodek Szkoleń i Badań nad Dziedzictwem Kultury w Zagrożeniu – wspólna inicjatywa MKiDN i MON; Ministerstwo Kultury, Dziedzictwa Narodowego i Sportu. <https://www.gov.pl/web/kulturaisport/miedzynarodowy-osrodek-szkolen-i-badan-nad-dziedzictwem-kultury-w-zagrozeniu-wspolna-inicjatywa-mkidn-i-mon> (downloaded 01 August 2021)

⁸⁵ Council Conclusions on EU Approach to Cultural Heritage in conflicts and crises. op. cit.

⁸⁶ Council Regulation (EC) No 116/2009 of 18 December 2008 on the export of cultural goods

⁸⁷ Regulation (EU) 2019/880 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 17 April 2019 regarding the treatment of non-EU cultural goods entering the customs territory of the Union.

⁸⁸ Directive 2014/60/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014 on the return of cultural objects unlawfully removed from the territory of a Member State and amending Regulation (EU) No 1024/2012

⁸⁹ Council of Europe Convention on Offences relating to Cultural Property. op. cit.

Conclusion

We can see a rise in the commitment and the instruments from the second half of the 2010s, in line with the large-scale destructions in the territories of Iraq and Syria and in Mali, drawing the attention of the international community to the issue. These events have gradually led to the recognition of the strategic role of CP in contemporary armed conflicts and of the strong interrelation of CPP with international security and humanitarian issues. The paper aimed to give a panorama of policies and practices of the four examined organizations in relation to CPP, however, a deeper analysis would be needed to be able to provide an all-encompassing description of all the related instruments in this regard.

Although the organizations are not signatories of the international legal instruments that serve the basis of CPP in conflict or crisis situations (ex. 1954 Hague Convention and its Protocols or the 1977 Protocols of the Geneva Convention), the personnel acting on their behalf have an obligation to comply with relevant legal provisions, furthermore, the organizations through their external activities can provide support for host nations to abide by the relevant international law.

Recognizing the cross-cutting nature of CPP and its complementary role to reach wider goals in crisis management, two of the examined organizations (NATO, EU) have already established a comprehensive strategic document towards CPP aiming to widely integrate its aspects in their activities: the NATO released a bi-strategic command directive in 2019 and further efforts are being made for streamlining CPP in its missions and operations. The EU – by recently adopting its Council Conclusions on cultural heritage protection in conflicts and crises – aims to strengthen the role of this issue in its external actions, providing also an institutional and financial background for the realizations of its goals. The Nicosia Convention elaborated by CoE is a unique international instrument to enhance the investigation and prosecution of offences against either movable or immovable CP. In the case of OSCE, there is no dedicated strategic document or framework regulation on CPP in place, but in practice, efforts have been made in broadening the outreach of the organization on capacity building and awareness-raising in CPP especially as regards the combat against illicit trafficking.

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Abstract

The most comprehensive development program of the last quarter of a century is the Zrínyi Defence and Military Development Program. The purpose of the study is to present last year's military procurements and aspirations as well as review the new organizational units of the Hungarian Defence Forces. In respect of the military equipment, last year the Hungarian Defence Forces carried out several procurements which means the foundation stone of modernization. Thanks to the overall modernization and the procurements so far, the carrying capacity has been re-established, the rotary-wing capability has been reconstructed, the country has regained its protective ability and the country's defence capability is constantly improving so it can increasingly contribute to the Euro-Atlantic security and the maintenance of European peace.

Keywords: Hungary, Defence and Military Development Program, modernization, military equipments

Introduction

The most comprehensive development program of the last quarter of a century is the Zrínyi 2026 Defence and Military Development Program published in the 1298/2017. (VI.2.) government decree.¹ The development of the Hungarian defence industry is highly important, nevertheless the Hungarian Defence Ministry places a strong emphasis on the innovations and modernization of military technology, the preparation of human resources, providing reinforcements, scheduled salary increase and the social recognition of soldiers.² During the process of developing the Zrínyi Defence and Military Development Program the main task was to create such defence forces that are ready to face the security challenges of the present and future.³ Since the launch of the Military Development Program in 2017, in the last 4 years, the renewal of Hungarian Defence Forces has been carried out according to plan. During the session of the Parliament's National Security Committee in October 2020 the

¹ 1298/2017. (VI.2.) Korm. határozat a Zrínyi 2026 Honvédelmi és Haderőfejlesztési Program megvalósításáról;
<https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=A17H1298.KOR&txtreferer=00000001.TXT>
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² Parlament.hu: Honvédelmi Minisztérium,
<https://www.parlament.hu/irom41/00503/adatok/fejezetek/13.pdf>, p. 3. (downloaded 21 September 2020)

³ 2026-ra a térség meghatározó haderejévé kell tenni a Magyar Honvédséget, 2017.
<https://www.kormany.hu/hu/honvedelmi-miniszterium/hirek/2026-ra-a-terseg-meghatarozo-haderejeve-kell-tenni-a-magyar-honvedseget> (downloaded 21 September 2020)

Hungarian Minister of Defence, Tibor Benkő said that the results attained by the program can ensure that Hungary becomes one of the decisive military forces of the region. Given the right amount of subsidy the program is constantly expanding, so the name “Zrínyi 2026” cannot be considered adequate any longer. Besides the first stage, (until 2026) the planning of the second stage has already started, the implementation of which is estimated between 2030-2032.⁴

The present study summarises the most substantial goals of 2020 and their implementation. In respect of the military equipment, last year the Hungarian Defence Forces carried out several procurements which means the foundation stone of modernization. 216 billion HUF, 30% of the 616 billion HUF overall defence budget was invested in the improvement of the Hungarian Defence Forces.⁵ This not only made possible the procurement of modern equipment and tools, but also had a positive impact on the ratio of defence spending to GDP. Thanks to the increasing tendency, the country may reach this year the 1,66%, which is getting closer and closer to the 2% specified by the NATO. According to the government’s budgetary proposal for 2021, the amount of defence spending increased with 162 billion HUF, 25-30% of which was spent on further developments.⁶

Innovations of military technology in 2020

The Hungarian Minister of Defence, Tibor Benkő expounded at the annual progress and task allocating conference for 2020: *“we need modern, fighting fit, well prepared defence forces which consist of soldiers loyal to their country to ensure Hungary’s and the Hungarian citizens’ security.”*⁷

It is worth analysing last year on several aspects. It is the soldiers who are in the centre of the Military Development Program, since the aim is to create a military career program, but the procurement of the military equipment is also treated as a priority. According to the government’s current plans the sum aimed to improve the Hungarian Defence Forces could exceed the 3500 billion HUF by 2026.⁸ During the course of last year, the procurement of the Leopard 2A4 tanks, the Lynx infantry fighting vehicles, the Airbus H145M light multi-role helicopters, the ZLIN trainer

⁴ MH/MTI: Benkő: Ütemterv szerint halad a haderőfejlesztés, 2020. <https://www.magyarhirlap.hu/belfold/20201027-benko-utemterv-szerint-halad-a-haderofejlesztes> (downloaded 05 May 2021)

⁵ RÉVÉSZ, Béla: Rekordnagyságú lesz a honvédelmi költségvetés 2020-ban, 2019. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/rekordnagysagu-lesz-a-honvedelmi-koltsegvetes-2020-ban.html> (downloaded 22 September 2020)

⁶ Folytatódnak a honvédelmi fejlesztések, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/folytatodnak-a-honvedelmi-fejlesztesek.html> (downloaded 22 September 2020)

⁷ RÉVÉSZ, Béla: Magyarország biztonsági környezete szabja meg a feladatokat, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/magyarorszag-biztonsagi-kornyezete-szabja-meg-a-feladatokat.html> (downloaded 12 October 2020)

⁸ Zrínyi 2026, A haza védelmében, pp. 4. http://www.katona-suli.hu/img/zrinyi2026_190_190.pdf (downloaded 22 September 2020)

aircrafts, the NASAMS surface-to-air missile system and the 3D radar system all show that the procurement of the most modern military equipment is going on.⁹

The military technology improvement of the ground forces in 2020

Last year, one of the most substantial aspects of the program was an innovation of the ground forces, the deployment of the Leopard 2A4 “trainer” tanks, for the procurement of which an agreement was signed between the Hungarian Defence Forces and the German Krauss-Maffei Wegmann factory in 2018. The Hungarian Defence Forces leased 12 tanks altogether from the German manufacturer, the delivery of which was continuous between June and December. The first 4 tanks arrived on 22nd July 2020 in MH 25. Brigade Klapka György of Tata with a Hungarian ensign. In spite of the pandemic situation, the first leased pieces of the Leopard 2A4 tanks were transported on time by the German factory and thus, with the help of Austria, the training and re-training of the staff could be started in time.¹⁰ After the arrival of the 4 tanks, further 2 tanks arrived on 8th September, 29th October, 24th November 2020. After the November shipment, finally on 1st December the last 2 pieces arrived at the establishment, thus enough military equipment to implement the adequate training with tanks.¹¹ After the arrival of the last tanks, last December a live fire training was held with them on the shooting range of Szomód.¹²



Figure 1: Leopard 2A4 tanks in Tata¹³

⁹ MTI: Vegyesvállalatot alapít gyalogsági harcjárművek gyártására egy német céggel Magyarország, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/vegyesvallalatot-alapit-gyalogsagi-harcjarmuvek-gyartasara-egy-nemet-ceggel-magyarorszag.html> (downloaded 11 February 2021)

¹⁰ RÉVÉSZ, Béla: Négy csúcsragadozó érkezett a tatai dandárhoz, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/negy-csucsragadozo-erkezett-a-tatai-dandarhoz.html> (downloaded 21 September 2020)

¹¹ Teljes a „létszám”, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/teljes-a-letszam.html> (downloaded 12 February 2021)

¹² ANTAL, Ferenc: Megtörtént az utolsó két Leopard harckocsi belövése is, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/megtortent-az-utolso-ket-leopard-harckocsi-belovese-is.html> (downloaded 04 February 2021)

¹³ Source: <https://www.portfolio.hu/global/20201203/megerkezett-tatara-mind-a-12-leopard-2a4-harckocsi-460280#> (downloaded 03 February 2021)

The tanks “*are armoured vehicles with great firepower and quick manoeuvrability,*” said Ferenc Korom¹⁴, that time commander of the Hungarian Defence Forces. They have such innovations as the fire conductor and choke system, titanium tower armour, laser target finder, gun stabilizer and the night-vision optics. The top speed of these 55-ton-tanks can even reach the 68km/h.¹⁵ New technology needs new storage conditions, for the sake of which new hangars were delivered. The hangar created last October provides modern storage conditions and besides being covered, it is also lockable.¹⁶

Besides the consolidation of the ground forces, the other aim was to modernize the military technology, the process of which was initiated by the procurement of the Leopard 2A4 tanks, however, these new “top predators” in fact represent only a transition between the T-72 “old warriors” and the 44 pieces of high-tech Leopard 2A7+¹⁷ tanks, the delivery of which is estimated between 2023 and 2025. According to the commander of the Hungarian Defence Forces the arrival of the Leopards means an epoch-changing event and it is to be considered as the most important stage of last year’s procurements.¹⁸

Besides the Leopard tanks, the so-called Lynx infantry fighting vehicle (IFV) are also last year’s predominant equipment. The Hungarian State concluded a contract and founded a joint venture with the German Rheinmetall company, thanks to which the production of the Lynx IFV can commence in Hungary too, at the same time a more than 2 billion euro worth of program was launched, thus Hungary is the first EU and NATO member state, which decided on the procurement of the Lynx IFV.¹⁹ Hungary is going to produce more than half of the 218 pieces of Lynx KF41 IFV (172 pieces) in the factory of Zalaegerszeg.²⁰ The foundation stone of the factory was laid on 17th December 2020, thereby one of last year’s most important investment was

¹⁴ MTI: Korom Ferenc vezérezredes: átmenetet jelentenek a most érkezett új harckocsik, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/korom-ferenc-vezerezedes-atmenetet-jelentenek-a-most-erkezett-uj-harckocsik.html> (downloaded 22 September 2020)

¹⁵ ERDŐS, Norton: Harckocsikkal megpakolt katonai konvojra kell számítani a hazai utakon, 2020. <https://www.vezess.hu/vezetunk/2020/09/07/harckocsikonvojra-kell-szamitani-a-hazai-utakon/> (downloaded 10 December 2020)

¹⁶ SNOJ, Péter: Leopardok korszerű hangárban, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/leopardok-korszeru-hangarban.html> (downloaded 01 February 2021)

¹⁷ SNOJ, Péter: Bemutakoztak az első magyar felségjelzésű Leopardok, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/bemutakoztak-az-első-magyar-felsegjelzesu-leopardok.html> (downloaded 12 October 2020)

¹⁸ RÉVÉSZ, Béla: Négy csúcsragadozó érkezett a tatai dandárhoz, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/negy-csucsragadozo-erkezett-a-tatai-dandarhoz.html> (downloaded 21 September 2020)

¹⁹ BARANYAI, Gábor: Hiúzokkal erősít a Magyar Honvédség, 2020. <https://magyarnemzet.hu/belfold/hiuzokkal-erosit-a-magyar-honvedseg-8541843/> (downloaded 13 May 2021)

²⁰ TRAUTMANN, Balázs: Lynx: magyar gyártás, magyar fejlesztés, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/lynx-magyar-gyartas-magyar-fejlesztas.html> (downloaded 12 October 2020)

commenced and as a result of this Hungary got closer to its commitment made to the NATO that it would restore its ground forces.²¹



Figure 2: Lynx infantry fighting vehicle²²

Innovations in the Air Force

This year was not only of great importance for the ground forces, Hungary's air force and air defence also went through important changes. In the framework of a new airplane procurement of the Hungarian Defence Forces, the Airbus H145M multi-role helicopter and the ZLIN engine powered trainer aircraft were procured. As to the procurement of the total number of 20 pieces of Airbus H145 helicopters, 7 pieces are already used by the Hungarian Defence Forces, since the procurement of the helicopters already began at the end of 2019 – the first 4 pieces arrived in Hungary, at the 86. helicopter base of Szolnok²³ of the Hungarian Defence Forces in November and December 2019 – however, one is not to forget about last year's procurements either. Last year 9 helicopters arrived altogether – this year further 4 pieces will arrive of the same type whose arrival can be regarded pretty continuous. With a few months' time difference the 8th and the 9th helicopters also arrived (July 2020)²⁴, then the next two landed in Szolnok for the first time in October 2020. With these 11 helicopters, half the number of the complete fleet has been reached.²⁵ This number was increased in November with further 2 pieces, then other 3 helicopters landed on the base in

²¹ RÉVÉSZ, Béla: Hadiipari üzem épül Zalaegerszegen, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/lynx-megkezdodott-az-epitkezés.html> (downloaded 10 February 2021)

²² Source: <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/lynx-megkezdodott-az-epitkezés.html> (downloaded 03 February 2021)

²³ Új helikoptertípus, új évtized, új korszak – Rendszerbe áll a H145M, 2020. https://harcihelikopter.blog.hu/2020/01/02/uj_helikoptertipus_uj_evtized_uj_korszak_rendszerbe_all_a_h-145m (downloaded 12 October 2020)

²⁴ SNOJ, Péter: Újabb két H145M helikopter érkezett, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/ujabb-ket-h145m-helikopter-erkezett.html> (downloaded 30 January 2021)

²⁵ Újabb két Airbus helikopter érkezett, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/ujabb-ket-airbus-helikopter-erkezett.html> (downloaded 30 January 2021)

December. Thus, the number of helicopters with a Hungarian ensign reached 16 by the end of 2020. Besides the continuous arrival of equipment, the re-training of pilots also started in Donauwörth, Germany. At the end of last year colonel Tamás Bali, the deputy commander of the helicopter base reported that 24 pilots have been re-trained, 20 of whom already have licences.²⁶

If we take a closer look at the construction of the helicopters, we might notice that fundamentally they have a homogenous construction, however, they will have the following equipment later on: 10 pieces of light transport helicopters, 5 pieces of search and rescue helicopters and 5 pieces of fire support helicopters.²⁷



Figure 3: Airbus H145M helicopters arrived in Hungary²⁸

Besides the rotary wing procurements, the procurement of the ZLIN trainers continued last year. The corps already had from this kind of trainers, since 2 pieces arrived in 2017 and 2018 as well – in 2018 further 2 –, which provide a more advanced technology instead of the old-fashioned JAK-52 type of airplanes. During the course of last year 4 airplanes joined the current fleet, so their increased to 8.²⁹ Major general Nándor Kilián, the military observer of the MHP air force, at the time of the demonstration of the ZLIN airplanes said that these aircrafts provide the basis of the pilots' training as well as the selection of the navy crew. In his speech he said that

²⁶ Újabb helikopterek érkeztek, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/ujabb-helikopterek-erkeztek.html> (downloaded 30 January 2021)

²⁷ Új helikoptertípus, új évtized, új korszak – Rendszerbe áll a H145M, 2020. https://harcihelikopter.blog.hu/2020/01/02/uj_helikoptertipus_uj_evtized_uj_korszak_rendszerbe_all_a_h-145m (downloaded 12 October 2020)

²⁸ Source: <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/ujabb-ket-h145m-helikopter-erkezett.html> (downloaded: 03 February 2021)

²⁹ BALOGH, Ákos: Három új ZLIN motoros kiképző repülőgép érkezett Szolnokra, 2020. <https://www.szoljon.hu/kozelet/helyi-kozelet/harom-uj-zlin-motoros-kikepzo-repuloget-erkezett-szolnokra-3105241/> (downloaded 30 January 2021)

“the airplane can fly for approximately 4,5 hours and can travel a distance of roughly 1000 km.”³⁰

Besides the procurement of the rotary wing aircrafts and trainers, a contract was signed with the Embraer company to procure 2 Brazilian-made KC-390 Millennium type millenary transport airplanes, thereby Hungary will be the third operator of these planes.³¹ After the withdrawal of the Antonovs, the cargo aircrafts, capable of air replenishment are very much needed, their arrival is estimated between 2023 and 2024. Thanks to it, airlift capability could also get back to normal in Hungary by 2024.³²

Air defence/airspace protection

The procurement of the anti-aircraft missile system also met the requirements specified by the NATO.³³ The contract regarding the purchase of the anti-aircraft missile systems was signed last November. The system developed by the Norwegian Kongsberg and the American Raytheon companies (Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System – NASAMS) is considered as one of the most advanced short/medium-scale ground-based anti-aircraft missile systems in the world. This system will replace the current Russian KUB missile system which has been in military use for 4 decades. The system will not only guarantee the security of the Hungarian airspace, but also that of the NATO and the member states of the European Union.³⁴ The system delivered to the MH 12. Arrabona Anti-Aircraft Missile System in Győr will be the newest type of NASAMS (NASAMS-3) that the Norwegian air force used for the first time in 2019. As a result, our country will be the 6th NATO member state that uses this kind of weapon system.³⁵

³⁰ Töretlenül halad a légierő fejlesztése, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/toretlenül-halad-a-legiero-fejlesztese.html> (downloaded 30 January 2021)

³¹ DRAVECZKI-URY, Ádám: A Magyar Honvédség pontosan tudja, mit kell venni; Interjú Maróth Gáspárral, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/a-magyar-honvedseg-pontosan-tudja-mit-kell-venni.html> (downloaded 07 May 2021)

³² DRAVECZKI-URY, Ádám: KC-390-es hadszíntéri szállító repülőgépeket vásárol a Magyar Honvédség, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/kc-390-es-hadszinteri-szallito-repulogepeket-vasarol-a-magyar-honvedseg.html> (downloaded 01 February 2021)

³³ Európai viszonylatban is jelentős a magyar haderőfejlesztés, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/europai-viszonylatban-is-jelentos-a-magyar-haderofejlesztes.html> (downloaded 10 February 2021)

³⁴ RÉVÉSZ, Béla: Csúcstechnológia a légvédelem szolgálatában, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/csucstechnologia-a-legvedelem-szolgalataban.html> (downloaded 01 February 2021)

³⁵ TRAUTMANN, Balázs: NASAMS, a közös védőernyő, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/nasams-a-kozos-vedoernyo.html> (downloaded 11 February 2021)



Figure 4: Norwegian Advanced Surface to Air Missile System³⁶

Air defence is just as important as airspace protection. For the sake of a complete air space security in the country, such a multi-functional 3D radar system is needed that covers the full territory of the country. The country would like to secure it by the contract regarding the procurement of an air space surveillance system signed on 11th December 2020.³⁷

If we take a look at last year in the aspect of the air force, then December of 2020 was the most significant. We can call the final month of the last year the „happy month” of the air force, since during this one month the contracts were signed regarding the air defence missile development, the transport aircrafts and the new radar system (NASAMS). It was this month when the last three pieces of the H145M helicopters also arrived.

	Number	Date of arrival
Leopard 2A4 tank	4 pc.	22 July 2020
	2 pc.	8 September 2020
	2 pc.	29 October 2020
	2 pc.	24 November 2020
	2 pc.	1 December 2020
H145M helicopter	2 pc.	20 July 2020
	2 pc.	6 October 2020
	2 pc.	13 November 2020
	3 pc.	8 December 2020
ZLIN trainer airplane	2 pc.	March 2017
	2 pc.	March 2018
	4 pc.	December 2020
Total:	29 pieces	

Figure 5: The process of the procurement of the Leopard 2A4 tanks
(Author's own edition)

³⁶ Source: <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/nasams-a-kozoz-vedoernyo.html> (downloaded 03 February 2021)

³⁷ Csústechnika a légtérvédelemért, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/csucstechnika-a-legtervedelemert.html> (downloaded 10 February 2021)

With the help of the table one can keep track of the process of the procurements and can also see how many pieces of military equipment arrived altogether at the Hungarian Defence Forces during the course of last year. Beyond the equipment that already arrived, a number of contracts have also been signed, based on which we can establish that the Defence and Military Development Program affects the entire Hungarian Defence Forces.

Other facts

Besides the development of the ground and air forces, the structure of the Hungarian Defence Forces is also undergoing a constant development. Firstly, it deserves to be mentioned that on 1st August 2020 the Command Transformation of the Hungarian Defence forces was founded – the high responsibility of which is to train officers and junior officers – subordinated to the MH Academy of Junior Officers, the MH Bakony Combat Training Centre, the MH Peace Support Training Centre and the Ludovika Battalion. According to Tibor Bozó, the commander of the Command Transformation, what is not a financial task in military development, but theoretical and related to knowledge, can be considered as a transformational task.³⁸ Secondly, it can be stated that because of the newly established Material Supply Warehouse of the Hungarian Defence Forces, military logistics will also play a role in the 21. century. The function of the logistics warehouse base handed over in Szentkirályszabadja in December, last year is to support the Hungarian Defence Forces and the organizations of the Ministry of Defence both in peacetime and during the time of a special legal order. The 21.000 square meter warehouse with a gallery shelving system and a headroom of 10 m can store more than 24.000 pallets.³⁹ Thirdly, in the summer of 2020 in Szentes the MH 37. II. Rákóczi Ferenc Engineer Regiment Technical Support Battalion was founded with assignments of military installation, road and camp building and technical rescue. Basically, the country can notice the importance of the battalion in a specific legal order, however, their special features are used in peacetime too, during the renovation of barracks, for example. Besides all this, in Gyula, during the course of last year the construction of the factory or the Airbus also began, whose reinforced concrete structure was completed at the beginning of May this year. Gáspár Maróth spoke confidently about the fact that in 2022 the production is expected to begin and that with the completion of the factory Hungary can also participate in the Next Gen Medium Multi-Role Helicopter program announced by the European Union at the end of last year.⁴⁰ Besides the factory in Gyula, the Hungarian State also made an agreement with the Rheinmetall group on the construction of an ammunition and explosives factory. The two parties made the agreement in December about the construction of the factory to be built in the

³⁸ RÉVÉSZ, Béla: Új utakon, Transzformáció minden szinten, 2020.
<https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/uj-utakon-10-19.html> (downloaded 03 February 2021)

³⁹ ÖRDÖG KOVÁCS, Márton: A 21. századba lépett a katonai logisztika, 2020.
<https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/a-21-szazadba-lepett-a-katonai-logisztika.html> (downloaded 03 February 2021)

⁴⁰ MOLNÁR, Szabina, SOMKUTI, Bálint: Épül a gyulai Airbus-gyár, 2021.
<https://index.hu/gazdasag/2021/05/06/innovacios-es-technologiai-miniszterium-gyula-airbus-gyar-kozlekedes/> (downloaded 11 May 2021)

surrounding area of Várpalota. The ammunition of a caliber of 30 mm and 120 mm will be made for the Lynx infantry fighting vehicles and the Leopard tanks.⁴¹

Summary

To summarise the facts, it can be said that the military equipment of the Hungarian Defence Forces underwent and is undergoing a full-scale modernization. Thanks to the procurements so far, the transport capacity has got back to normal, the rotary wing capability has been rebuilt and the country has regained its protective capability.⁴² According to Gáspár Maróth, government commissioner responsible for defence development, “*A complete modernization is going on regarding military equipment in the framework of the Defence and Military Development Program, which will affect all branches of military equipment.*”⁴³ Thanks to the so far accomplished plans of the program, the Hungarian defence industry is constantly improving so Hungary can increasingly contribute to the Euro-Atlantic security and the maintenance of European peace. According to Tibor Benkő, the Hungarian Minister of Defence, “The Hungarian Defence Forces has now reached the adequate standard to join the 21st century with its devices.”⁴⁴ Besides the European Union, the positive changes have also been confirmed by the NATO at the virtual meeting of the defence ministers in October 2020. After completing the current study and the survey I have conducted about last year I think it can be said that our country’s Defence and Military Development program is successful so far and it is in accordance with the strategic purposes of the European Union and the NATO.⁴⁵

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⁴¹ SZABÓ, Péter: Lőszer- és robbanóanyaggyár épülhet Várpalotán, 2020. <https://varpalotaihircentrum.hu/loszer-es-robbanoanyaggyar-epulhet-varpalotan/> (downloaded 15 February 2021)

⁴² DRAVECZKI-URY, Ádám: „A Magyar Honvédség pontosan tudja, mit kell venni” Interjú Maróth Gáspárral, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/a-magyar-honvedseg-pontosan-tudja-mit-kell-venni.html> (downloaded 07 May 2021)

⁴³ Ibid.

⁴⁴ RÉVÉSZ, Béla: Négy csúcsragadozó érkezett a tatai dandárhoz, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/hazai-hirek/negy-csucsragadozo-erkezett-a-tatai-dandarhoz.html> (downloaded 21 September 2020)

⁴⁵ Magyarország haderőfejlesztési programja sikeres és összhangban van a NATO céljaival, 2020. <https://honvedelem.hu/hirek/magyarorszag-haderofejlesztesi-programja-siker-es-osszhangban-van-a-nato-celjaival.html> (downloaded 11 May 2021)

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OLIVER ANDONOV

**POLITICAL-CULTURAL ASPECTS OF INFLUENCE ON THE
ABOLITION OF THE MACEDONIAN NATION¹**

Abstract

In the modern developments in the Balkans, we are witnessing continuous political action in order to abolish the Macedonian nation. This process, which was intensified with the signing of the Agreement with Bulgaria in 2017 and with Greece in 2018, in addition to the political aspects, included the cultural aspects.

This paper aims to make a brief overview of the connection between the political and cultural aspects through which Bulgaria and Greece influence or more precisely lead the process of abolition of the Macedonian nation. In the light of these aspects, one should look at the contemporary attitudes of Bulgaria and Greece (certainly not alternately together) towards Macedonia and issues related to history, language and culture as basic features of the Macedonian nation.

Through this paper we will make a scientific overview of current developments in political relations between North Macedonia and Greece, North Macedonia and Bulgaria, but with special reference to cultural issues affecting the Macedonian nation with consequences for its abolition, but also with political consequences for the region in terms of its destabilization, by moving similar processes in Bosnia and Herzegovina above all.

The focus of the review will be primarily on the Macedonian-Bulgarian relations and the dispute over history and language, which basically has an identity-political significance for the uniqueness of the Macedonian people and the creation of the Macedonian nation. Of course, the focus on North Macedonia's relations with Bulgaria is stimulated by the current developments in bilateral relations between the two countries and the consequences of the signed "Good Neighbor Agreement", on the basis of which Bulgaria openly shows strength by threatening North Macedonia with veto of the start of negotiations for full membership in the European Union.

Understanding this dispute motivated solely by Bulgaria's political and strategic motives is very important, especially for the scientific and academic public in Europe. The reason is that this is a socio-political construction as a unique phenomenon, but which can have extremely large political-security consequences on other regions in Europe in the first place, and as an empirical result of this process related to North Macedonia and the Macedonian question that for two centuries Europe has no power to solve it. North Macedonia is still a European country and the Balkans and North Macedonia as the root of the modern Christian European civilization are of great importance for Europe, its stability and future.

Keywords: Political aspects, cultural aspects, North Macedonia, Bulgaria, Greece, Europe, history

¹ The author doesn't agree with some provisions of the Prespa Agreement but as a legal obligation he uses the new constitutional name of the country, North Macedonia throughout this paper. Nonetheless, „Macedonian” as an adjective like Macedonian nation, people, language etc. can freely be used according to the above mentioned agreement.

Introduction

The achieved political goal of Greece and Bulgaria to politically-diplomatically break North Macedonia and to succeed in corrupting and politically and socially compromising the current Macedonian government, thus achieving the formal political goal called "changing the name of the state of (North) Macedonia", has become an accelerator for the continuation of their long-term strategic goal "abolition of the Macedonian nation and state".

This strategic goal is simply not able to be achieved exclusively through the political aspect of the name change and constitutional changes through the formal naming of Macedonians as "citizens of the Republic of North Macedonia", which is an unnational and vague synonym. For its full realization, it is necessary to realize the second segment, which we consider to be more important than the purely political one, and refers to the cultural aspects and characteristics of the Macedonian people. The nations, and thus the Macedonian nation, are not defined exclusively by the territory, the name of the state, the state system and the exercise of power. Above all, at the root of nations are cultural features - characteristics of the nation such as language, ethnography, folklore, tradition, culture and art and of course the common history and historical heritage that actually connects and shapes the nation by distinguishing it from an ethnic group, a religious group, or another social group, and especially it is the common memory of a people.

That is why the most important segments of the two agreements (with Bulgaria and Greece) are not the change of the name of the country, but the cultural consequences and the obligations undertaken in the agreements by the Macedonian government of Zoran Zaev. Those obligations refer to opening issues with neighbors for which there is no formula for a positive solution, ie they violate the characteristics of the Macedonian nation. In this way, in practice, it becomes pointless to talk about cultural changes in the characteristics of the nation, and which characteristics were built over the centuries and led to the formation of the Macedonian nation.

This is where the question of defined history begins, which completely destroys the fabric of the nation. This process, which is taking place in front of the eyes of the world and in Europe itself, instigated by EU member states, is a cultural genocide against a nation and a culture, but its eventual realization does not go back to the beginning. It brings us back to the political strategic goals of Bulgaria and Greece, which is the abolition of the Macedonian nation and turning Macedonia into an undefined territory with a geographical landmark "Northern", but without Macedonian people and politically defined nation, its cultural features and historical continuity as empiricism. and the collective memory through which the nation is created and maintained dynamically.

If we have in mind that in the agreement with Greece, Greece itself agreed to recognize the existence of the Macedonian language "as part of the group of Slavic languages, verified at the UN in 1974", it is not in the agreement with Bulgaria and here we have the use of terminology "The official languages of the two countries" or "the constitutional language". In conditions when the current government of North Macedonia, through the disputed Law on Languages on the entire territory of Macedonia introduced bilingualism, ie introduced Albanian as the second official

language, it is only a matter of time before that formulation in two official languages will be required to be included in the Constitution of North Macedonia, and as a political demand of the Albanian minority in North Macedonia. After this, the term "constitutional or official languages" will become extensible. Hence, one can see the depth of Bulgaria's political strategy in relation to North Macedonia and that the issue of language as a political, above all identity-cultural feature is only one of the key instruments for the abolition of the Macedonian nation.

When this is followed by the political tendency of Greece, which through the Prespa Agreement in 2018 managed to realize the distinction of continuity of the origin of the Macedonian nation from the Macedonian people as a historical process, and by creating discontinuity by appropriating the ancient history of Macedonia as exclusively Greek (Hellenistic) which is certainly a big untruth, because the cultural heritage of North Macedonia is extremely multicultural and even in antiquity, then we are amazed by the steps of Bulgaria to take over medieval and modern Macedonian history as Bulgarian. This is the way to take away the historical-cultural aspect of the creation of the Macedonian nation through the collective history, memory, culture and language of the Macedonian people as by far the largest in North Macedonia (about 67% of the total population). Precisely for these reasons, the conduct of the census and especially the column for declaring the population by ethnicity on an ethnic basis is politically manipulated. In this way, the Macedonian nation is abolished, but not only the Macedonian nation, but also the Macedonian people as a pillar and creator of the Macedonian nation, which means that on an immature simple political decision of a current political nomenclature in North Macedonia is created a new non-existent quasi nation in a territory called "North" Macedonia, which is not allowed to claim the right to historical, cultural and linguistic heritage, but is an undefined amorphous mass that has yet to be formed. In Bulgarian contemporary political thought it is called "re-Bulgarianization of Macedonia", and this process in the area of Macedonia² is known from the late 19th and early 20th century when Greece in the struggle to conquer territories, and with the help of the Constantinople Patriarchate carried out a "re-Hellenization" of the Macedonian Christian population, in accordance with their "Megali Idea".

The results of the processes around Macedonia as the last Ottoman province in Europe in the 19th and early 20th century were the Balkan Wars and the division of the territory of Macedonia. If at that time Europe was comforting and calming its conscience with the fact that Turkey was expelled from Europe, now in modern times, the games with North Macedonia, the tendencies to abolish the Macedonian nation and turn North Macedonia into an undefined territory with an amorphous mass of people, is a long-term Europe's political blindness, conformism and undemocracy, as well as disrespect for basic human rights and the right to self-determination. This inevitably leads to the opening of a crisis region which will include not only North Macedonia's neighbors, but also the wider region as well as global political actors. Consciously or unconsciously, Europe is pushing North Macedonia and the Balkans to repeat history. It is as if both neighbors and Europe have forgotten how bloody the Balkan wars were.

² The territory of Macedonia as a historical, geographical and ethno-cultural region includes Aegean Macedonia in today's Greece and Pirin Macedonia in today's Bulgaria besides the area of today's North Macedonia or geographical name Vardar Macedonia

The political aspects of the influence, as well as the cultural influence and their consequences will be presented in the following text of the paper.

1. Political aspects of the influences for the abolition of the Macedonian nation

The basic idea of political influence in order to abolish the Macedonian nation, and thus the Macedonian people as a bearer in the functioning of the nation is the historical annulment of "Macedonianism". The so-called "Macedonianism" is an inevitable historical and political process of the Macedonian people to create their own state and nation which is a positive process for the Macedonian people, while North Macedonia's neighbors interpret it in a negative connotation, using countless historical half-truths and untruths. In fact, through the so-called destruction of Macedonianism, it is a matter of implementing in practice a reverse historical process, ie the Macedonian people who in the last two centuries fighting for their national and church-spiritual independence and managed to create their own national state on August 2, 1944. It should now be brought back into a process of historical re-examination and dismantling. This process does not refer exclusively to the Macedonian statehood, but inevitably refers to the issue of the Macedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archbishopric with a tendency to in the area of church autocephaly and spiritual freedom of the Macedonian people and their local church, the situation went back to 250 years, ie at the time of the abolition of the Ohrid Archbishopric. The Macedonian people, creating the Macedonian national state in practice laid the foundations of the phrase "Macedonia of the Macedonians" and the territory of Macedonia raised to the level of a nation-state at least a part of its geographical whole Macedonia, which with the Bucharest Peace Agreement in 1913 was completely unnaturally fragmented.

If we know that nations created on the principle of "nation-state" are composed of many different peoples, ethnic groups, religious or cultural minorities, but within which one nation is the bearer, then it is very clear that under the pressure of historical events Macedonian people, by shaping their nationality and fighting for the autonomy and independence of Macedonia, managed to create the Macedonian nation and state. This historical process is natural and de facto and de jure was completed, and it shows all the features of the formation of the nation and its modern dynamics.

The basic characteristic of the modern nation and everything related to it is its modernization³.

Therefore, we can say that the emergence of Macedonianism as a tendency to create a Macedonian nation and state is a process that took place for almost two centuries in specific historical circumstances and environment. That tendency in the relevant historical circumstances and the historical moment led to the formation of the Macedonian nation with all its attributes as an expression of Macedonianism in practice. At the same time, the national, historical, cultural, linguistic and ethnographic distancing of the Macedonians from the neighboring nations is literally

³ WAEVER, Ole – BUZAN, Barry – KELSTRUP, Morten – LAMAITRE, Pierre: Identity, Migration and the new Security Agenda in Europe; Printer Publishers, Ltd, London, 1993. p. 49.

realized, which achieves the political distancing represented by the formation of their own state as a political entity and international legal entity.

Therefore, the basic political goal of the influence for the abolition of the Macedonian nation is the historical annulment of Macedonianism as a national platform. Within this goal, each of North Macedonia's neighbors plays its role of influence within their national strategies. This game of North Macedonia's neighbors is directly related to the consequences that will occur as a result of the return of historical processes and the possible re-reduction of North Macedonia to a territory without a leading people and its own nation. That is why the question arises as to whether Europe has learned the historical lessons on the issue of North Macedonia and the Balkans, because it allowed the opening of the "Macedonian question" 70 years later after its closure in 1944 and the formation of the Macedonian state, and as a political interest first of Greece, awakened the appetites of all neighbors. In this way, Europe, through the institutions of the European Union, justifies and encourages abuse of the power that member states derive from the EU as a global actor. It is obvious that the Balkan countries see Macedonia as a potential territory for their political-territorial and national expansion in some form and in the long run, but also as one of the key regional interests in the implementation of their national strategies.

The opening of the Macedonian question under the pretext of protecting geopolitical interests in the clash of global actors, primarily the United States and Russia, which inevitably takes place on the territory of Europe, and there is no more suitable place for these games in the Balkans, is a political short-sightedness of Europe. which in its own backyard awakens and fuels a strong potential for conflict. If this conflict escalates, the situation will be even worse than in 1912-1913, because the conflict will inevitably involve Albania, Kosovo, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Bulgaria and of course Turkey and Greece.

Realizing their chance for historical revisibility of the processes, Greece and Bulgaria, above all, set out towards the strategic destruction of Macedonianism, ie its presentation as a historical fabrication. In that context, both countries found themselves in the same positions of interest towards North Macedonia. Greece by appropriating Macedonia historically giving Greek character and appropriating the name of the entire geographical territory of Macedonia, while Bulgaria appropriating the Macedonian people for Bulgarian, and presenting the Macedonian language as a dialect of the Bulgarian language, as well as problematizing the events and personalities of the new history of Macedonia. In this way, they help each other, because Greece gets the historical heritage of the name Macedonia, which historically "justifies" its violence and ethnic cleansing during the conquest of Macedonia a century ago, as Bulgaria shows the "Bulgarian" character of Macedonia based on the composition of the population and the cultural features and history. The historical potential of "Megali idea" is visible in both concepts and the idea of "San Stefano Bulgaria",⁴ a potential that led to several horrific wars in the Balkans, precisely among these current "allies" in the European Union.

⁴ Great Bulgaria including the territory of Macedonia was created as a result of the San Stefano Peace Treaty closing the Russian-Ottoman war in 1878 and abolished on the Berlin Congress by other great powers in the same year to avoid overwhelming Russian influence in the region. Bulgaria's national goal was to re-establish this „San Stefano's Bulgaria

However, let us not forget that Serbia also has its own interests in North Macedonia and that is why already for more than 50 years has kept the "church question" open regarding the recognition of the Macedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archbishopric. It is actually a political issue which Serbia keeps open so that they can be an active player in relation to Macedonia, especially in the relations with Bulgaria and with Albania and their interests in Macedonia. Of course all the actors-neighbors of North Macedonia have one common goal, and that is the abolition of the Macedonian nation and the Macedonian people as the bearing people of the nation and the state of North Macedonia. That's the way for destruction of Macedonianism and turning North Macedonia into an undefined territory, amorphous mass of population. This tendency is not new, Macedonian revolutionaries and patriots have met it and fought against it in the 19th century, so the members of the "Secret Macedonian Committee" in Sofia in 1885: Naum Evro, Kosta Grupce, Vasil Karajovov and Temko Popov, who wrote in their native language - Macedonian, said: *"The main thing is for Macedonia to become more Macedonian"*.

Prompted by this situation around North Macedonia and the modern challenges of political - security aspect of regional security in Europe, within this paper, through the prism of the analysis of the Bulgarian strategy we will be able to see the synergies of every neighbors' strategies. Especially the Greek and Bulgarian strategy towards North Macedonia, their abuse of membership in the European Union and the European institutions, but also to see the concrete indicators of future conflict potential, precisely between the "allies", the neighbors of North Macedonia, regardless of whether they are members of the European Union or aspire to it, or NATO members just like North Macedonia.

1.1. A look at the Bulgarian strategy towards North Macedonia

In the context of the current developments in the relation North Macedonia - Bulgaria and the tendencies of Bulgaria for influence on the abolition of the Macedonian nation, we will consider the "Strategy for Bulgaria's relations with the Republic of Macedonia" by Ljubomir Ivanov, a study prepared in Sofia in 2008⁵. Considering the allegations and the strategic and operational political goals exposed in this strategy we will be able to understand why Bulgaria is pushing so hard towards realization of the cultural goals, ie the history, language and culture of the Macedonian people, with the main goal of destroying Macedonianism as a historical process realized in appropriate political-historical conditions.

The strategic basis of the Bulgarian strategy is: "The Macedonian nation is invented and the Macedonian doctrine is a product of Serbia and its geopolitical strategy in the region".

The explanation of this strategic basis given in the strategy itself is: "The Macedonian nation and state were formed in the process of realization and evolution of the Serbian political construction, first published in 1889, supported by a solution

during three lost wars (Second Balkan War, First and Second World War). Date of San Stefano Treaty (3rd of March) is the National Day of Bulgaria.

⁵ IVANOV, Lyubomir et al: Bulgarian Policies om the Republic of Macedonia; Eirst Edition, Manfred Worner Foundation, Sofia, 2008.

of The Communist International in Moscow in 1934 and realized between 1944 and 1991 year in the part of the historical-geographical region of Macedonia known as Vardar Macedonia".⁶

The accusations that the Macedonian nation is a Serbian concept are practical political phrase for calculating with Serbian interests in Macedonia, because it is a fact that when part of Macedonia (present-day Republic of North Macedonia) was under the administration of the Kingdom of Serbia, of The Kingdom of SHS and the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in the period from 1912 to 1941, with certain interruptions in this territory called "Southern Serbia" or Vardar Banovina, Serbian hegemony dominated. The Macedonian people were not recognized, and in no way did a word came up for Macedonian nation, although in those state creations the Slovenian nation and the Croatian nation existed as an integral part of the state. Even today, in modern conditions the practical behavior of the Serbian Orthodox Church or part of its clergy towards the Macedonian Orthodox Church-Ohrid Archbishopric is a relapse of this Greater Serbian policy.

Basically, the approach of Bulgaria's strategy is much broader. It aims to lead the reader or analyst to the conclusion that the Macedonian nation is artificially created and that it is part of the Bulgarian nation, which is why "Macedonianism" should be destroyed⁷. The thesis was put forward that: "today's ethnic Macedonians, (non-Bulgarians) and the ethnic Bulgarians in the Republic of Macedonia are the same, that there is no difference between them, and this is understand in a completely opposite sense and by all of them some understand that they are all Macedonians or non-Bulgarians, while others bear in mind that they are all Bulgarians in some sense or at least in re-Bulgarianization process. "

The second phase of the process of destruction of the Macedonian nation is in fact "Re-Bulgarianization" of the Macedonian people and this is as clearly stated as we quoted, thus a more detailed explanation is not required. It is happening in Europe on the European political scene in regional and bilateral relations in the Balkans in the eyes of the European Union which through the European Parliament and the European Commission with various documents, and for short-sighted political goals sometimes support this "re-Bulgarianization". At the same time, Europe seems completely unaware for the consequences that will arise in the long run and escalate conflicts in the Balkans. First of all, the question is raised: *"Will at some point if the Bulgarian strategy for the re-Bulgarianization of North Macedonia "succeeds" in its realization, Greece will allow any form of enlargement, territorial or political domination of Bulgaria in the Balkans"?* How will react to that Serbia, Albania and Kosovo? The EU's capacity to influence and control such an escalating conflict process, with the escalating potential like the one into Bosnia and Herzegovina is questionable.

Details of operational political action in accordance with the objectives of the Bulgarian strategy towards Macedonia are operationalized in the "strange" so-called "Agreement for good neighborliness" which precisely covers the areas of history, education and of course inevitably the Macedonian language.

⁶ Ibid, p. 33

⁷ Ibid, part 1.1.3., p 37.

*"Termination of history education with textbooks that completely falsify history and contain offensive qualifications for the Bulgarian state and nation, bordering on open racism. At the Bulgarian request, in the textbooks, officially approved by the competent authorities of the Republic of Macedonia to explicitly emphasize the Bulgarian ethnicity (established by world historical science) of prominent figures from our general history as St. Clement of Ohrid, Tsar Samuel, brothers Miladinovci, Goce Delchev."*⁸

Here are in fact the disputed and unspoken Articles 8 and 11 of the "Agreement for good neighborliness" with Bulgaria, which was signed by the Macedonian government in 2017, and the consequences will be inconceivable on the further existence of the Macedonian nation and state, which in context of the Macedonian language and culture will be explained later in the text.

Analyzing Bulgaria's strategy towards North Macedonia, it is interesting to give a brief overview of the actions and implications for the other neighbors of North Macedonia, which is in fact a perception of the Bulgarian regional policy and its strategic and long-term positioning in the Balkans.

"An insignificant part of the attempts for retrospective remediation of the Serbian-Yugoslav project for the creation of a Macedonian nation are the efforts of Skopje to join that project of the descendants of the Macedonian Bulgarians in Greek Macedonia and some areas of Albania and Kosovo."

In this context of the use of the term "Greek Macedonia", we talk about the meaning of Greece in the implementation of politics in the Balkans through *"the relevance of politics and behavior of Greece towards the good neighborly relations between Bulgaria and the Republic of Macedonia."* *"...the Greek territory includes over half of the geographical region of Macedonia, as it is from the 19th century onwards and of course, thanks to their historical memory the Greeks – just like the Albanians - are aware of the Bulgarian ethnic character of Vardar Macedonia in the past and its evolution in recent decades."*⁹

*"Bulgaria and Greece could initiate, in the European Union elaboration, the development and acceptance of appropriate *acquis communautaire* of education, which should provide a certain general standard of objectivity in school and academic history education"*.

This is a complete harmonization of the current policy of Greece and Bulgaria to Macedonia and their requests. Their EU membership is based on the fact that they will actively use all opportunities (instruments and mechanisms) to achieve their national goals which they set as demands to North Macedonia, and through the "Agreement for good neighborliness" with Bulgaria from 2017 and the "Prespa Agreement" with Greece from 2018. These disputed agreements have already been accepted by the Macedonian government, which only facilitated the procedure in front of the international community so that Greece and Bulgaria can act in a spirit of respect of international agreements.

⁸ Ibid, part 1.1.4., p. 39

⁹ Ibid, part 1.2 and 1.3. p. 40-41.

This last statement is confirmed by the "Action Plan" in the above Bulgarian's strategy, which states: "In the first place, a solid internal Bulgarian preparation is necessary, of a package of historical, cultural, political, geographical, economic and other arguments, in favor of the above theses, a package that would become the basis for foreign politics and position of the state".

"This Bulgarian package should be well balanced with a consistent policy of Athens to protect Greek interests from the bad neighborly policy of Macedonia, so that the general application is cooperative towards Skopje, and preferably - cumulative and coordinated ".¹⁰

In the strategy it is visible that Bulgaria is making a strategy towards the Republic of North Macedonia which should be balanced, cooperative and cumulatively coordinated with Greece. For clarification and analysis, this means that no country in the world will support strategic national interests of another state if its own national interests are not more important and do not depend on the realization of the interests of that state, and refer to a third state. This is a simple rule in international relations.

In this context, it remains to emphasize the position of Bulgaria visible in the strategy, and that refers to opposing Serbian influence in Macedonia, which undoubtedly as historical experience will not deter Serbia from acting, but on the contrary will motivate it to implementing its own strategy that will undoubtedly confront the Bulgarian strategy.

Guided by these remarks and the interests of the Balkan states, the behavior of Europe is astonishing, especially the institutions of the European Union and their inaction in order of prevention. Certainly an exception to this EU behavior is the Resolution of the European Parliament of October 2020, regarding the situation in Bulgaria in relation to respect the human rights and the rule of law in Bulgaria in general, and in which the case of OMO Ilinden¹¹ is mentioned, which was rejected by the Bulgarian Parliament.

A key aspects in the new circumstances in North Macedonia are the cultural aspects which emphasize the Macedonian language which will be discussed in the next chapter of the paper.

2. Cultural aspects of influence for the abolition of the Macedonian nation

The Macedonian cultural experience that has been crystallizing for more than a millennium is organically associated with the great civilizations of Ancient culture and Byzantine art. Hence, Macedonian culture will characterize the beauty, the art of the sublime of ancient Byzantine civilization. In particular, it will develop in medieval iconoclasm as its own authentic expression in painting, poetry and medieval music.

¹⁰ Ibid, part 2.2.1. and 2.2.2., p. 43.

¹¹ Human rights organization of the Macedonian minority in Bulgaria. Existence of Macedonian minority is denied by Bulgarian authorities.

Although the Macedonian culture in itself assimilates part of the ancient and Byzantine culture, it will get its own specific aesthetic autonomous experience.

Macedonian culture, predominantly Dionysian, consists of specific colors, sounds and words characteristic of the uniqueness of the Macedonian artistic fabric, with a specific sensibility in the aesthetic tragic experience of the world. The Macedonian cultural spirit not once was closed by the influences and penetrations of other cultures and arts. With that the Macedonian characteristic autochthony was not lost, but on the contrary, was enriched and deepened its unique essence.

Macedonian culture is characterized by the permanent opposition of the violence. For a century and a half, monstrous means have been created to destroy Macedonian culture, language and art and they do not stop to this day.

But it was through the opposition to violence that Macedonia managed to preserve its identity.

2.1. Brief overview of the Macedonian language as a separate language in the group of Slavic languages and the goals that Bulgaria wants to achieve

The basic conflict between the Macedonian and Bulgarian sides in terms of language is concentrated on the authenticity of the Macedonian language as a separate language in the group of Slavic languages. The problem is actualized by the Bulgarian side with reliance on some "facts" from the period of the 19th century and the influence that the church (later the Bulgarian Exarchate) had in that period through the Liturgical Church-Slavic language (or Old Slavonic). Exactly the Church Slavonic language or the Old Slavonic language is the basis of all Slavic languages, which below in the paper we will explain through a review of the Ohrid Literary School from the IX century, but to speak and encourage a tendency for non-recognition of a separate Macedonian language is certainly nothing more than simple political malice. Namely, it is clear that languages suffer changes, especially in the spoken part, but of course in the grammar and the literary part too. However, the Macedonian language began its differentiation at the beginning of the 19th century through The Church-Spiritual Awakening, the time of the "Renaissance" and a whole century of Cultural National turmoil in the period from 1802 to 1903.¹²

The chronology of the events in the crucial 19th century for the Macedonian national, and in that time linguistic differentiation and self-knowledge is actually a chronology of the output of The Balkans from the Ottoman "Millet System" and the movement of people towards the path of creation of nations. This chronology in the 19th century and the beginning of the 20th century can be divided into several periods:

1. Cultural-educational and ecclesiastical-spiritual awakening of the Macedonian people (1802-1844).
2. "Our history" as a separatist expression of national consciousness in the struggle for its church and language (1845-1859).

¹² RISTOVSKI, Blaze: Key Problems in the Macedonian Revival Process; The Development of Macedonian Literature, Institute of Macedonian Literature, Skopje, 2011. pp. 31-32.

3. The emergence of national and religious propaganda and the literature of national awakening (1859-1875).
4. National - political programs and acts, revolutionary liberation movements and mass uprisings (1876-1893).
5. Decade of Consolidation of National Liberation Thought and Action (1893-1902).
6. Ilinden as an expression of the political urge of the people for freedom and for their state, the unused Mirczest reforms, the Revel meeting and the anti-Macedonian Young Turk coup (1903-1908).
7. Period of historical feats and fateful defeats (1913-1918), struggle for the preservation of the territorial integrity for the unification of the Macedonian people and the affirmation of cultural-national identity.

In the mentioned periods of national, spiritual and cultural awakening of the Macedonian people and the affirmation of national identity there are constant attempts to represent Macedonian uniqueness before the international public, as well as the formation and codification of Macedonian as a separate language in the group of Slavic languages.

Thus, Milan Grasev, who is the editor of the magazine "Macedonia", in Sofia, in 1902 writes: "Ivan S. Aksakov advised his Macedonian students in 1866 to separate Macedonian literary jargon and to amaze the world with their independence... So far no one understood them. *"Recently we heard that a Macedonian student association was being formed in St. Petersburg, which will work on the Macedonian language"*¹³

In the newspaper "Denica", Sofia from 1890, the editor Ivan Vazov says: *"The Macedonian dialect, all too far away and even completely foreign to the dialect in western Bulgaria cannot be deprived of its right to remain completely special independent dialect."*¹⁴

In the newspaper "Svoboda", Sofia, year VI, no. 744 p.3. from 18.02.1892 it is said: *"This is not the first time such political and literary ideas have appeared among Macedonians. If our memory works fine, Mr. K. Shapkarev started writing books right from the very beginning of the revival of the national idea among the Macedonians in Macedonian dialect. His plan to create a special Macedonian letter failed as any unnatural thing fails, and his efforts are buried in the archives of eternity."*

This is a glaring example of how the Bulgarian authorities led in the late 19th century organized state struggle against the Macedonian language. Quite similar to today, which shows that Bulgarian politics is the same as in the 19th century which is not a feature of a member state of EU.

¹³ GRASHEV, Milan: New Fatal Roads and Prolomies – Macedonia; book IX, Sofia, 1903, pp. 27-28.

¹⁴ Ivan Vazov (1850-1921) is Bulgarian author and academic, called father of the Bulgarian literature, and during the period from 1897 to 1899 was a Bulgarian minister of education and science.

Conclusion

Detailed explanation of the political and cultural influence of Bulgaria and Greece on the dismantling of the Macedonian nation requires much more space for historical, linguistic, cultural and experiential retrospective of the creation of the Macedonian nation as a centuries-old struggle of the Macedonian people for their national and state independence. Therefore, at the end of this paper we will address exclusively the role of Europe through its institutions in relation to tolerating the politics of Bulgaria and Greece and the possible consequences on the security of The Balkans, and thus the security and political stability of Europe as a global actor.

It should be noted that the dismantling of the Macedonian nation, and the destruction of the Macedonian people and its "re-Bulgarianization" in the first place covers a large number of disputes that Bulgaria and then Greece will pose as a "problem" at the beginning of North Macedonia's accession negotiations for its full membership in the European Union. In the first place, these will be questions from a historical aspect, especially about the Macedonian revolutionary movement and the key figure in the Macedonian struggle for national and state freedom and independence from the end of the 19th and the beginning of the 20th century, Goce Delchev. Then, the attack will be focused on the uniqueness of the Macedonian language and all historical facts and features that make the Macedonian people special from the other Balkan nations and leaders in their formation of its national state and the Macedonian nation.

The role of Europe that consciously, for political reasons, allows Bulgaria and Greece to abuse their position as EU members and put pressure on North Macedonia through setting up blockades on membership in the Union is a self-destructive path of the European Union. This can be seen from two points in the Balkans:

First, as an example of abusing full membership for the sake of achievement of great state aspirations of individual members, which is contrary to the commitments of the Union. This abuse will arouse additional conflict in the Balkans over the Macedonian question, which will inevitably involve Serbia, Albania and Kosovo in the conflict, which will mean entering the next stage of a conflict with strong potential. That phase will be each of the neighboring countries of Macedonia to enter into conflict with each other for only one reason. An opportunity to satisfy their interests towards Macedonia without their mutual conflict in the literal sense, does not exist. Europe saw it once and allowed it in 1913, but the experience of that period showed us that not resolving the Macedonian issue and not allowing the Macedonian people to form their own independent state of Macedonia and in it Macedonian nation, have provoked wars between the states concerned, internal conflicts and tensions.

Second, if the destruction of the Macedonian people and the Macedonian nation and the state of North Macedonia is allowed, Europe will send a message that justifies these great aspirations, so that the next conflict without a solution will be Bosnia and Herzegovina in which undoubtedly will join Turkey (and in relation to North Macedonia, too), which will cause a regional conflict. One such regional conflict will not pass without the involvement of global actors, ie the United States and Russia, and all this will still happen on European soil. Such developments further will weaken

the Union, involve NATO in the conflict and create long-term instability in the Balkans and Europe.

The solution to avoid such a scenario and stabilize the European security and the construction of an European security identity in the Balkans is a support of The European Union of North Macedonia and the survival of the Macedonian people against the aspirations of Bulgaria and Greece. The Macedonian people as a special people in the Balkans with their own history, language, culture and all the attributes of a nation cannot be denied in the 21st century and subjected to violent assimilation, and Europe to be silent about it, because North Macedonia and the Macedonian people have its share in world culture both in the past and in the present.

In the end, there is only one solution expressed more than 150 years ago by The British Prime Minister William Gladstone on the occasion of resolving the Macedonian issue, who will summarize the solution in the maxim "Macedonia of the Macedonians".

It is meaningless 80 years after the creation of the modern Macedonian state and thirty years after its independence, to go back in history and again raising the resolved question of the existence of the Macedonian people and the Macedonian state and nation. Within the maxim Macedonia of the Macedonians and the Macedonian nation, all citizens, ethnic and religious groups living in Macedonia, are included, because they are part of Macedonia and together with the Macedonian people make up the Macedonian nation.

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RUDOLF NAGY PHD – TAMÁS SOMOGYI
**THE FINANCIAL INFRASTRUCTURE AS A CRITICAL
INFRASTRUCTURE AND IT'S SPECIALITIES**

Abstract

What if no bankcard services available and money transfer is down as well? This article introduces the infrastructure used for financial services as a critical infrastructure. The specialities of this critical sector is described based on the EU and Hungarian regulations and the relevant literature. Moreover, some example from the world is also discussed.

Finally, proposals are made in order to further enhance the protection of financial critical infrastructures and improve their preparedness for disastrous events.

Keywords: Critical Infrastructure, Financial Sector, Financial Infrastructure, Disaster Recovery

Introduction

The daily life of civilisations in this ever changing world is being threatened more and more as new problem arise. Although cold war is ended by the end of the XX. century, the possibility of a wide and devastating war is still exists. Environmental changes rooted in the activity of mankind also endangers the life and infrastructure on Earth as Nagy pointed out¹. Moreover, other non-military related safety aspects had been determined (e.g. running out of certain raw materials)². In addition, as new technologies emerge, governments and disaster management bodies face new challenges from time to time.

Beyond doubt that answering these aforesaid challenges is crucial from our future's point of view. As the politicians and respective experts realised this, much effort had been made and still has been made in order to identify, prepare for and prevent the catastrophic situations and those infrastructures that essential for the accustomed daily life of our civilisation.

As financial services plays a vital role in the growth of economy and in the political stability through the well-being of the people, financial infrastructure should be considered part of the critical infrastructure and be protected accordingly.

¹ NAGY, Rudolf: A természeti katasztrófák, mint globális kihívások, In: Védelem tudomány, 2017/3. pp. 156-169. ISSN 2498-6194

² VAMOS, Zoltán: Biztonságpolitikai aspektusok; In: BOGNÁR, Balázs – BONYAI, Tünde (Eds.): Kritikus infrastruktúrák védelme I. Budapest, Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2019. pp. 11-27.

Critical Infrastructure

The idea of protecting the important or even vital infrastructure may be rooted in the ancient civilisations where for examples wells, dams or shallows were guarded. It can easily be accepted that realising the fact that some natural or man made structure is needed to survive is not new. What is new nowadays, at the beginning of the XXI. century, is the high cross-border impact. In the EU due to the already developed integration and the still increasing connection between member states, a disruption in the essential services may have an effect on more member states. Hence the critical infrastructure (CI) had been defined at EU level, as well as the framework for identifying, assessing and operating the essential services vital for the safety and well-being of member states.³ The overall objective of EU member states is to improve the protection of the CIs and be well prepared for managing the disruptive events.

In 2006, an EU-level programme called *European Programme for Critical Infrastructure Protection* had been adopted, and in 2008, the 2008/114/EC *EU Council Directive on the identification and designation of European critical infrastructures and the assessment of the need to improve their protection* had been adopted. This directive had been applied since 12 January 2009.

The terms critical infrastructure (CI) and European critical infrastructure (ECI) had been defined in Article 2:⁴

- I critical infrastructure „means an asset, system or part thereof located in Member States which is essential for the maintenance of vital societal functions, health, safety, security, economic or social well-being of people, and the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact in a Member State as a result of the failure to maintain those functions“
- II European critical infrastructure „means critical infrastructure located in Member States the disruption or destruction of which would have a significant impact on at least two Member States. The significance of the impact shall be assessed in terms of cross-cutting criteria. This includes effects resulting from cross-sector dependencies on other types of infrastructure“

The Council Directive named two ECI and, moreover, created a framework to identify additional ECIs. The two originally named ECIs are related to the Transportation sector and Energy sector. No doubt, both the transportation and the energy sector should be treated as critical infrastructure, as their services are essential services. Nevertheless, other sectors with essential services should have been analysed to identify other CIs.

Hungary, as an EU member state, in line with the respective Council Directive, identified other CIs⁵, as Table1 shows.

³ EU Council Directive 2008/114/EC, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/HU/TXT/?uri=CELEX%3A32008L0114>, (downloaded 8 October 2021)

⁴ EU Council Directive 2008/114/EC, Article 2

⁵ Act CLXVI of 2012, Annex 1, <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1200166.tv>, (downloaded 8 October 2021)

Sector	Relevant Hungarian regulation
Energy	374/2020 Government Decree
Transportation	161/2019 Government Decree
Agriculture	540/2013 Government Decree
Healthcare	246/2015 Government Decree
Finance	330/2015 Government Decree
ICT	249/2017 Government Decree
Water	541/2013 Government Decree
Public safety	512/2013 Government Decree
National defence	359/2015 Government Decree
National insurance	-

Figure1: Hungarian critical infrastructure
(Author's own edition)




Figure 2. hierarchy of critical infrastructures based on the 2008/114/EC EU Council Directive
(Author's own edition)

Figure 1 shows the hierarchy of the CIs including the financial sector as well, based on the definitions of the 2008/114/EC EU Council Directive. Must be noted that regulations relating to information security also have to be applied to CIs, since cyber security plays an important role in the (critical) infrastructure protection. In the EU the Network and information security directive took effect on 8 August 2016⁶. In Hungary the national regulation relating to information security is Act L of 2013 which also have to be applied to CIs⁷.

⁶ EU Directive 2016/1148 of the European Parliament and of the Council, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/eli/dir/2016/1148/ojgre>, (downloaded 8 October 2021)

⁷ Act L of 2013, <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1300050.tv>, (downloaded 8 October 2021)

Critical infrastructure protection

A Green Paper had been presented by the Commission of the EU, in which critical infrastructure protection (CIP) is defined as „*the ability to prepare for, protect against, mitigate, respond to, and recover from critical infrastructure disruptions or destruction*“.⁸ According to the advised strategy and principle, member states are responsible for their CIP. Worth to mention that the Green Paper also introduced a Critical Infrastructure Warning Information Network.

In line with the above mentioned principle and the adopted framework, the responsibility of disaster management bodies in Hungary had been determined and the national system for CIP had been created as Act CLXVI of 2012 had come into effect.⁹ The legislative background and institutional structure is prepared for new challenges, new problem or newly identified essential services.¹⁰

Threats in the financial sector

The financial sector can be considered as the backbone of the economy. Financial institutions offers a large array of services and products to individuals and to the largest corporations as well. Without these financial services, our life would be unimaginable. Beyond dispute, significant disruption of the financial services has economical, social and political effect. Taking into consideration the networks of parent companies and subsidiary companies, the effect can easily cross the borders and impinge on other states.

Threats in the financial sector can be divided into two main groups, as a threat can be either a general threat affecting more sectors or a sector-specific threat.

General threats

Beyond dispute that all kind of CI has been threatened by natural disasters and intentional man made destruction, regardless the sector of the essential service. In the financial sector the threat of these kind of disasters is twofold. First, the infrastructure of the OES itself is menaced or other CI that financial services depend on. Second, natural disaster and man made attack can cause serious damage to customers, e.g. damage in properties.

Infrastructure of the financial sector is designed, built and operated in such a way that service continuity is maintained. National Bank of Hungary, as the sector-specific authority, recommends that business continuity plans should exist, and OES be

⁸ Green Paper on a European programme for critical infrastructure protection, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A52005DC0576>, (downloaded 8 October 2021)

⁹ Act CLXVI of 2012, <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1200166.tv>, (downloaded 8 October 2021)

¹⁰ BONNYAI, Tünde: Special tasks for professional disaster management bodies related to the identification, designation and protection of critical infrastructures in Hungary; AARMS, 2014/4. pp. 519-524.

prepared for the unavailability of site of operation, the unavailability of IT infrastructure and the disruption in the services of other critical sectors¹¹. Therefore in the financial sector location of headquarters, data centres and branches has been carefully chosen and appropriate security controls have been applied. Backup sites are maintained and redundant IT infrastructure is operated in order to meet the recommendations of service continuity. If possible more service provider has been contracted in order to decrease the exposure.

Severe damage in properties of customers have a significant impact on the financial sector. The work of Barth et al. demonstrates that after natural disasters both deposit and loan rates are being increased¹². The study carried out by Noth and Schüwer revealed that in the affected region non-performing asset ratios, foreclosure ratios and probabilities of default are being increased while return on assets and equity ratios are being lowered¹³. All of these have a temporal but significant weakening effect on the stability of banks that are active in the affected region. Furthermore, McDermott et al. established a link between low levels of financial sector development and the negative effects of a natural disaster on economic growth¹⁴.

Sector-specific threats

Threats endangering the infrastructure of the financial sector are considered sector-specific threats. Among these threats IT and cyber risk had been very much increased as the European Central Bank pointed out: “40% of the banks were the target of at least one successful cyberattack in 2019, a considerable increase from the 28% reported in 2018”¹⁵. As the supervisor’s figures shed light on, the number of cyber incidents is increasing, especially the number of phishing attacks, which had been the leading type of incidents in 2020.

Emergence of the highly sophisticated cyber attacks also can be seen. The European supervisor reports an example in which a widely used monitoring software was illegally modified in order to make OES download a malware as if it was a normal regular update¹⁶.

As these data demonstrate white collar criminals targeting the infrastructure of the financial sector which implies that the increasing challenge of cyber risk should be better addressed.

¹¹ National Bank of Hungary: Recommendation 8/2020., <https://www.mnb.hu/letoltes/8-2020-informatikai-rendsz-vedelmerol.pdf>, (downloaded 8 October 2021)

¹² BARTH, James et al.: Banks and Natural Disasters; SSRN Electronic Journal 2019. 10/2139. [ssrn.3438326](https://ssrn.com/abstract=3438326).

¹³ NOTH, Felix – SCHÜWER, Ulrich: Natural Disaster and Bank Stability: Evidence from the U.S. Financial System; SAFE Working Paper No. 167. 2018. [ssrn.2921000](https://ssrn.com/abstract=2921000)

¹⁴ MCDERMOTT, Thomas et al.: Disasters and development: natural disasters, credit constraints and economic growth; Oxford Economic Press, 2014/3. pp. 750-773.

¹⁵ European Central Bank: IT and cyber risk: a constant challenge, Supervision newsletter 18 August 2021.

¹⁶ Ibid.

Throughout the COVID-19 crisis the usage of online bank and insurance services had been increased significantly while the majority of the staff was working from home. Future studies will have to explore the effect of these factors on the increasing number of cyber attacks against the infrastructure of the financial sector in Europe and in Hungary as well.

Financial infrastructure in Hungary

In line with EU Council Directive 2008/114/EC, the financial sector in Hungary had been identified as a sector that provides essential services. Three part of the financial sector had been defined as CI¹⁷:

- I commerce, payment and clearing of monetary assets and liabilities
- II security of banks and credit institutions
- III cash management

According to the relevant national regulation (330/2015 Government Decree), the Minister responsible for financial sector (a.k.a. Minister of finance) - based on the recommendation of the National Bank of Hungary, as proposing authority - nominates parts of the financial sector for CI¹⁸. The Minister is supported by a committee composed of experts of the financial sector.

The National Bank of Hungary is the supervisor and control coordinator of CIs in the financial sector¹⁹. As a supervisor, may call the operator of essential service (OES) to fulfil the relevant requirements; call for modification of the operational security plan (OSP); or impose a fine.

The protection of the identified financial CI should be organised in accordance with the OSP²⁰. Emergency cases in the financial sector had been defined by 330/2015 Government Decree²¹:

- I disruption of a control system that has no alternatives within 30 minutes or for the recovery the OES has to be supported;
- II disruption of ICT or other facility necessary for the fundamental activities that has no alternatives within 1 hour or for the recovery the OES has to be supported;
- III more than 1 hour long outage or breach of the service level agreement of account management services, e-channel services and cash management;
- IV more than 1 day long outage or breach of the service level agreement of cash management;
- V quarantine at the OES;
- VI outage of human resources causing a shutdown of CI.

¹⁷ Act CLXVI of 2012, Annex1

¹⁸ 330/2015 Government Decree, <https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a1500330.kor>, (downloaded 8 October 2021)

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ BONNYAI (2014) pp. 519-524.

²¹ 330/2015 Government Decree, Section 7/A, 7/B, 7/C

Realising the significant impact of the events listed above on the state, possibly on more states, OESs have to be prepared for such disruptive events. Worth to mention, that each OES had to appoint a contact person who is the single point of contact between the OES and the relevant authorities.

Financial infrastructure in the world

Examples can be seen for treating the financial sector as part of the national CI within the EU and outside of the EU as well.

Financial system had been determined as CI in Poland. CI and CIP had been defined just as relevant principles had been established by Act of 26 April 2007²². The major tasks relating to CIP are:

- I information collection on CI and threats;
- II implement CIP procedures;
- III restore CI;
- IV cooperation between public administration and respective bodies;
- V create OSP and maintain necessary backup systems;
- VI a contact person had to be appointed at each OES.

In Poland the legal and institutional basis for improve the CIP had been created similarly to the Hungarian way.

The financial sector in the USA is also considered as CI. According to the *Homeland Security Presidential Directive 7*, creating a sector-specific plan for CIP is the responsibility of the US Department of the Treasury. This sector-specific plan is part of the overall *National Infrastructure Protection Plan*, which is integrating all sector-specific plans of the national CIs. In the above mentioned Presidential Directive the private-public collaboration had been ordained, therefore there is a close work between the Department of the Treasury and the *Financial Services Sector Coordinating Council*. This collaborative work ensures the achievement of security goals relating to CIP in the USA²³.

Finance is among the critical infrastructure sectors according to the Canadian *National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure*. In Canada all the responsibilities for CI are shared by federal, provincial and territorial governments, local authorities and OESs, however, the first response is the OES's duty. A partnership had been implemented among the different levels of government and OESs to protect the CI from all type of hazards. Led by Bank of Canada, the *Canadian Financial Sector Resiliency Group* is responsible for coordinating and support the resiliency activities within the financial sector. Furthermore, to strengthen the sector networks, a *National*

²² WRÓBEL, Rafał – DERENDA, Zuzanna: The concept of critical infrastructure protection in Poland for years 2015-2017; *Védelem tudomány* 2017/3. pp. 66-83. ISSN 2498-6194

²³ The Department of Homeland Security: Banking and Finance: Critical Infrastructure and Key Resources Sector-Specific Plan as input to the National Infrastructure Protection Plan, May 2007. ISBN 978-1503022256

Cross-Sector Forum is established to have a better information sharing across the different sectors of the essential services²⁴.

Improvement ideas

The field of security and infrastructure protection is subjected to continuous improvement. To be better prepared for incidents and disruptive events, a public-private partnership is highly recommended, especially in the following areas.

- 1) Training for employees of the sector-specific agencies, disaster management bodies and OESs should be required. Training is essential to spread a security culture, develop the awareness, strengthen the „human firewall“ and increase the level of preparedness²⁵. Therefore more kind of training should have been organised in cooperation with the members of the financial sector and those authorities that are possibly involved in disaster recovery. It is worth thinking about a mandatory special course for certain positions.
- 2) Although tests and simulations are regularly held, these are organised individually. During a disastrous event, communication between and cooperation of authorities and OESs are essential. Therefore simulations and tabletop exercises should be organised for respective members of the financial sector and relevant disaster management bodies.

Taking into account that some of the CIs have a significant impact on each other (e.g. telecommunication and finance), simulations and exercises also should be organised for authorities and entities acting in different sectors.

- 3) Research & Development programs should be started in cooperation with academic institutions. A better understanding of the natural, intentional and accidental hazards; the advanced infrastructure architecture; the human and social issues surely contributes to more developed operational security plans.
- 4) As new technologies emerge and new services become part of our daily life, risk assessments should be comprehensive and cover the innovations and new things. Partnership with startup companies should be considered as the understanding and usage of new technical solutions may have a benefit in CIP.
- 5) Legislation should be ready to change the regulations when necessary, and should be open to feedback from the respective public and private members of the complex system of CIP. Sector specific authorities and agencies may have an important role in information sharing between sector members and legislators. In addition, legislator is supposed to give priority to certain exercises.
- 6) Competent independent audit against the accepted standards of CIP can contribute to a higher level of preparedness within the whole financial sector by identifying weak points at OES.

²⁴ Public Safety Canada: National Strategy for Critical Infrastructure. ISBN: 978-1-100-11248-0, Bank of Canada: Bank of Canada announces partnership to improve resilience in financial sector, 27 June 2019. <https://www.publicsafety.gc.ca/cnt/rsrscs/pblctns/srtg-crtcl-nfrstrctr/index-en.aspx>, (downloaded 8 October 2021)

²⁵ FRANCHINA, Luisa et al.: Passive and active training approaches for critical infrastructure protection; International Journal of Disaster Risk Reduction 2021. Vol 63, 102461, ISSN 2212-4209.



*Figure3: the complex system of CIP and the possibilities of improvement
(Author's own edition)*

The increased cross-border interconnectedness of financial institutions is a fact of life, and a cross-border impact of a disruptive event is highly possible. Consequently future studies will have to examine the circumstances under which an international CIP program is feasible, with for example cross-border simulations and international R&D programs.

Summary

In our daily life the benefits of the financial services is very much enjoyed. Economic growth, which contributes to well-being and political stability, is also stimulated by the financial sector. This article based on the regulations and relevant literature underpins the idea that the services of the financial sector are essential, part of the critical infrastructure, therefore should be protected accordingly. Threats of the financial sector are described and related trend is also shown.

To increase the level of preparedness for any kind of hazard, examples of EU and not EU countries were provided as good practices, just as improvement possibilities were recommended.

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Abstract

As the risk of cyberattacks are high at everywhere and anytime, and the damages caused by the attacks are also steep and effect both governments and individuals, more preventive cautiousness should be implemented about cyberattacks and their effect on critical or otherwise important governmental organizations. This paper reviews the general literature about the power grids and its components. Also, define the cyberattacks in a general concept, and pays particular attention to attacks on power grids. Additionally, explains on how smart power grid is depending on many standards, has numerous vulnerabilities, and security challenges, and how to protect smart power grids from cyberattacks. The paper also provides a case study of cyberattack which was the Ukrainian power grid attack. The case study consists of many aspects following the scenario of the attack such as opportunities, chain mapping, delivery, and installation and finally the recommendations

Keyword: cyberattack, cybersecurity, Ukrainian power grid, power grid, smart grid

1. Introduction

Using computers, Internet of Things (IoT), network, and data sharing in infrastructure technologies significantly advance this sector. By using IoT and other smart technologies, infrastructure systems become vulnerable and exposed to a risk of cyberattacks and electronic sabotage. These attacks can be for stealing data or changing the setting or even controlling the whole system.

The smart power grid infrastructure gives the ability to manage the power system in a smart way, which includes a verification of energy measures and operations such as

- Demand Response (DR): this technology provides monitoring and controlling the system depending on the load and the power supply information in real-time. Even collects the data of consumption and production of the electrical power over a year in a way that monitors the expected behavior of the power grid and makes a balance between the production and the consumption.¹
- Advanced Metering Infrastructure (AMI): This technology is responsible for improving the efficiency of electrical power meter and providing monitor and control capabilities. This technology gives the grid operators the ability to disconnect the service for customers remotely or add new control paths, which can affect the customer's behavior in a way that has not been experienced by grid operators.²

¹ GKATZIKIS, L. – KOUTSOPOULOS, I. – SALONIDIS, T.: The role of aggregators in smart grid demand response markets; IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications, 2013/7. pp. 1247-1257.

² GHOSAL, A. – CONTI, M.: Key management systems for smart grid advanced metering infrastructure: A survey; IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, 2019/3, pp. 2831-

New technology brings a new level of risk. Security is a great challenge in the smart grid. AMI network gives access to functions that control the whole grid, which may affect the integrity of the system or the availability of data in case of unauthorized person can get the right to access this network. This can have a significant risk on human safety and the privacy of the consumer's data. Therefore, protecting the system and mitigating the risk of cyberattacks are vital in this technology.³

Recently, the market penetration and cyber threat increased for criminal or cyberwarfare reasons and attackers learning and developing malware, virus, phishing attacks, password theft, so the system should be improved and fixed the security gaps for all types of infrastructure. For instance, smart meters can be hacked to cut power bills as happened in Spain in 2014 or due to a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack or malware infection, gives the attackers access to the communication and control over the system network, causing damage or halt on the energy production. It is effective on several systems, for instance, in the case of cyberattack on the Ukrainian Power Grid on December 23, 2015.⁴

This paper highlights the main security challenges, demonstrating how to protect, and mitigate the risk of cyberattacks on smart grid systems, and investigates the cyberattack on the Ukrainian power grid as an example of a national threat.

2. Power grid

The classic power grid is facing a lack of robustness and flexibility to transfer electricity between the generating stations and customers with the one-way transmission; hence it is not available to share information. In addition, the response to the disaster or problem on the transmission network is slow and cannot self-restore the capability of energy.⁵




Figure 1: Classic power grid with one direction connection⁶

2848. YAN, Y. – QIAN, Y. – SHARIF, H. – TIPPER, D.: A survey on cyber security for smart grid communications; IEEE Communications Surveys Tutorials, 2012/4, pp. 998-1010.

³ CASE, D. U.: Analysis of the cyber-attack on the Ukrainian power grid; 2016; Electricity Information Sharing and Analysis Center, vol. 388, 2016.

⁴ ZHOU, J. – HE, L. – LI, C. – CAO, Y. – LIU, X. – GENG, Y.: What's the difference between traditional power grid and smart grid? – from dispatching perspective; in: 2013 IEEE PES Asia-Pacific Power and Energy Engineering Conference (APPEEC) 2013. pp. 1-6.

⁵ CUNJIANG, Y. – HUAXUN, Z. – LEI, Z.: Architecture design for smart grid; Energy Procedia, 2012. vol. 17, p. 1524-1528.

⁶ Source: ANJANA, K. – SHAJI, R.: A review on the features and technologies for energy efficiency of smart grid; International Journal of Energy Research, 2018/3, pp. 936–952.

On the other hand, the smart grid is an electrical grid integrated with various operational, innovative measurement and communication technology that efficiently controls energy production and electricity distribution.




Figure 2: Smart power grade⁷

2.1 Architecture of smart grid

There are several architectural systems are being developed by stakeholder and international companies. Therefore, the National Institute of Standard and Technology (NIST) and smart grid inter-operability panel (SGIP) created a standard policy, what any smart grid frameworks should achieve. This international standard has many advantages. It accelerates the time of development, guarantees more integration between equipment from different companies, provides more benefits for the high-tech smart grid market and ensures a high level of security.⁸

There are some architectural goals and recommendations should any smart power grid achieve:⁹

- Options: The architecture framework should support a broad range of hi-technology and flexible enough to work with legacy equipment and incorporate evolving technology in a standard way that avoids additional capital investment.

⁷ Source: GREER, C. – WOLLMAN, D. A. – PROCHASKA, D. E. – BOYNTON, P. A. – MAZER, J. A. – NGUYEN, C. T. FITZPATRICK, G. J. – NELSON, T. L. – KOEPKE, G. H. – HEFNER Jr, A. R., et al.: Nist framework and roadmap for smart grid interoperability standards, release 3.0; 2014.

⁸ EGOZCUE, E. – RODRÍGUEZ, D. H., – ORTIZ, J. A. – VILLAR, V. F. – TARRAFETA, L.: Smart Grid Security: Recommendations for Europe and Member States; European Union Agency For Network And Information Security (ENISA), 2012.

⁹ Ibid.

- **Interoperability:** Architectures should support standard interfaces with other system and manual processes and work with third-party product and cybersecurity infrastructure.
- **Upgradeability:** Architectures should support the system's ability to be enhanced without any difficulties and remain operational during partial system upgrades.
- **Innovation:** Architectures should enable and enhance innovation. This includes the ability to accommodate innovation in regulations and policies; business processes and procedures; information processing, technical communications, and integration of new and innovative energy systems.
- **Scalability:** Architectures should have architectural elements suitable for the applications built within them. The architectures must support the development of massively scaled, well-managed, and secure systems with lifespans appropriate for the type of system, which ranges from 5 to 30 years
- **Maintainability:** Architectures should support the system's ability to be safe, securely, and reliably maintained throughout their life cycle.
- **Legacy:** Architectures should support legacy system integration and migration.
- **Security:** Architectures should support the capability to resist unvetted/unauthorized intrusion, access, or use of physical and cyber assets. This support must satisfy all security requirements of the system components.
- **Flexibility:** Architectures should allow an implementer to choose the type and order of implementation. Flexibility also allows parts of implementation to deviate from the original plan without incurring a penalty.
- **Governance:** Architectures should promote a well-managed system that will be enabled through consistent policies over its continuing design and operation for its entire life cycle.
- **Affordability:** Architectures should fundamentally enable capital savings as well as life-cycle savings through standards-based operations and maintenance. They must enable multi-vendor procurement of interoperable smart grid equipment through the development of mature national and international markets.

2.2 Framework core

The core is a set of desired cybersecurity activities and outcomes organized into categories and aligned with informative references. The framework core is designed to be intuitive and act as a translation layer to enable communication between multi-disciplinary teams using simplistic and non-technical language. The core consists of three parts: Functions, Categories, and Subcategories. The core includes five high-level functions: Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, and Recover. These five functions are not only applicable to cybersecurity risk management but also to regular risk management at large.¹⁰

¹⁰ Ibid.

2.3 Communication networks in smart grids

Figure 3 illustrates a standard communication network architecture of a smart grid, and we can see how it physically separated between each section of the power grid, which provides more secure communication.¹¹




Figure 3: The communication network on the smart grid¹²

3. Cyberattacks

The traditional grid power is upgraded to a smart power grid depending on two-way digital communication, which supports most other technology such as intelligent monitoring and measurement, which provide more efficient power management and raise the dependence on renewable energy. However, the complex system comes with many vulnerabilities in communication technology, software, and devices that work in a smart power grid. Providing security for all components and communication line from cyberattack or sudden malfunctions is not an easy task.¹³

Hence, the smart power grid creates a new type of problem. Some problem we cannot well- understood and need to study the case and analyze the situation, potential vulnerabilities, and then solutions can be recommended, also there are some problems with a good background knowledge about it, but it needs a complex result and explanation. One of the most complex security case problems, when related to the privacy data and information of a consumer, so it needs to develop legal and regulatory

¹¹ MATTIOLI, R. – MOULINOS, K.: Communication network interdependencies in smart grids; European Union Agency For Network And Information Security (ENISA), 2015.

¹² Source: HAHN, A. – GOVINDARASU, M.: Cyber attack exposure evaluation framework for the smart grid; IEEE Transactions on Smart Grid, 2011/4, pp. 835-843.

¹³ BENDOVSKI, A.: Cyber-attacks—trends, patterns and security countermeasures; Procedia Economics and Finance, 2015. vol. 28, pp. 24-31.

regimes that respect consumer privacy and promote consumer access to his information by the third-party company.¹⁴

In the next several years, the smart power grid security will face serious problems in securing processes, identifying the gaps in systems and organization tasks.

3.1 Smart grid cybersecurity challenges

This challenge can be summarized as follows:¹⁵

- Lack of expertise and budget limits
- A robust and resilient grid
- Data protection and secure data handling
- Lack of awareness among manufacturers and operators
- Technical challenges
 1. proper integration of equipment and software in the system
 2. unauthorized access to systems or devices
 3. availability of traffic analyzers, communications monitoring, and application log monitoring
- Incomplete or inexistent regulations
- Common vulnerabilities and risk factors in smart grid communication networks
- Vulnerable consumers: the intelligent devices of the smart power grids can handle huge information and data of the customer and power demand then send this information and data to the service provider by a bi-directional communication line. Therefore, protect private consumer data and consumption habits is particularly necessary to prevent unauthorized disclosure of information.¹⁶
- The massive number of devices: the massive number of devices lead the system to several networks connection between them, which provide a communication line to manage the demands and supply electricity with many features covered by the power grid. Therefore, the system will be complicated to manage. On the other hand, the vulnerabilities could result in intelligent devices or network being used as entry attack points to the network.¹⁷

¹⁴ SGOURAS, K. I. – BIRDA, A. D. – LABRIDIS, D. P.: Cyber attack impact on critical smart grid infrastructures; IEEE PES Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, ISGT, 2014, pp. 1-5.

¹⁵ YAN, J. – HE, H. – ZHONG, X. – TANG, Y.: Q-learning-based vulnerability analysis of smart grid against sequential topology attacks; IEEE Transactions on Information Forensics and Security, 2016/1, pp. 200-210.

¹⁶ ISLAM, S. N. – BAIG, Z. – ZEADALLY, S.: Physical layer security for the smart grid: Vulnerabilities, threats, and countermeasures; IEEE Transactions on Industrial Informatics, 2019/12, pp. 6522-6530.

¹⁷ ALOUL, F. – AL-ALI, A. – AL-DALKY, R. – AL-MARDINI, M. – EL-HAJJ, W.: Smart grid security: Threats, vulnerabilities and solutions; International Journal of Smart Grid and Clean Energy, 2012/1, pp. 1-6.

- Coexistence of legacy and new devices: Integration of smart grid technologies is an immense challenge in developing and deploying smart grids, especially the compatibility between them without malfunctions. This coexistence may result in possible incompatibilities at physical and protocol levels vulnerabilities and threats due to possible interdependencies between devices and networks.¹⁸
- Implicit trust M2M by default: Several devices in their Machine to Machine (M2M) communications use an implicit trust. This is a critical weakness due to the interdependency with the other machine led to the appearance of additional vulnerabilities. If an attacker gains control of the other machine involved or pretends to be it, he could send incorrect data to the first machine or receive confidential and private data. Data Spoofing is a threat to Device-to-Device communication in control systems. Even more, this implicit trust can be used by attackers to carry out Man-in-the-Middle attacks, compromising the network interconnection between these devices and even the rest of the network.¹⁹
- Commercial hardware and software: Commercial hardware and software usually developed separately from the operator's grid, creating a problem incompatibility between different hardware, and might not be implemented the security protocol or communication. Therefore, using commercial software and hardware creates vulnerabilities inherently, such as backdoor or sudden malfunction, what present serious vulnerabilities for the system.²⁰
- Communication protocols: communications between devices in the smart grid upgraded using wireless protocols, i.e., Bluetooth, ZigBee, Infrared, WiMAX, Wi-Fi, LTE, UMTS or GPRS also is a source of vulnerabilities and well-known by attackers.²¹
- Human factors: Even with the increasing sophistication of cyberattacks from outside sources, human errors still cause the most significant proportion of data losses and failures. The operators depend on software to protect data and information from cyberattacks instead of humans because it is more secure and integrated. However, we can avoid mistakes from a human by training employees to receive and the take security actions for the organizations, especially regarding the use of network communications and the management. Configuration of the smart grid assets to ensure that their communications are done securely and reliably is also a challenge.²²

¹⁸ PAUL, S. – NI, Z.: Vulnerability analysis for simultaneous attack in smart grid security; in 2017 IEEE Power&Energy Society Innovative Smart Grid Technologies Conference, ISGT, 2017. pp. 1-5.

¹⁹ ISLAM – BAIG – ZEADALLY op. cit.

²⁰ LIANG, G. – WELLER, S. R. – ZHAO, J. – LUO, F. – DONG, Z. Y.: The 2015 Ukraine blackout: Implications for false data injection attacks; IEEE Transactions on Power Systems, vol. 2016/4, pp. 3317-3318.

²¹ Ibid.

²² ALOUL – AL-ALI – AL-DALKY – AL-MARDINI – EL-HAJJ op. cit.




Figure 4 Cyber-attacks reported in 2018²³

4. Case study: The attack on the Ukrainian power grid

The cyberattacks in Ukraine are considered the first incidents to result power outages. It is important to study the effect of this attack on customers and the operators.

However, the operators' rating in these incidents highly important because they can measure the system's reliability. Moreover, it is important to understand the vulnerabilities and develop the defense system, which provides mitigation strategy concepts related to the attack. This attack was demonstrated varying tactics and techniques to match the defenses and environment of the three impacted targets.²⁴

The following list summarizes the technical components used by the attackers:²⁵

- Spear-phishing to access the business networks of the power suppliers;
- Identification of Black Energy 3 at each one of the impacted power suppliers;
- Theft of credentials from the business networks;
- Using virtual private networks (VPNs) to enter the ICS network;
- Using the existing remote access tools within the environment or issuing commands from a remote station which is like an operator HMI;

²³ Source: Infographic, 2018

²⁴ KHAN, R. – MAYNARD, P. – MCLAUGHLIN, K. – LAVERTY, D. – SEZER, S.: Threat analysis of blackenergy malware for synchrophasor based real-time control and monitoring in smart grid; 4th International Symposium for ICS & SCADA Cyber Security Research 2016, pp. 53-63.

²⁵ ZHOU – HE – LI – CAO – LIU – GENG 2013. op. cit.

- Serial-to-ethernet communications devices impacted at a firmware level;
- Using a modified Kill Disk to delete the master boot record of impacted organization systems;
- Using UPS systems to affect connected load with a planned service outage.

4.1 Opportunities

The firewall allowed the attacker to remote the admin out of the environment by using a remote access capability native to the systems. In addition, according to media reports, there did not appear to be any resident capability to monitor the ICS network continually and search for abnormalities and threats through active defense measures, like network security monitoring. These vulnerabilities would have provided the attacker with the chance to persist within the environment for more than six months to do reconnaissance on the environment and eventually execute the attack.²⁶

4.2 ICS Cyber kill chain mapping

1. Reconnaissance: It is the first stage for attackers before the target and final attack plan is set. Attackers leverage information from various sources and factors that help them understand their target more, identifying vulnerable and insecure software. But there were no reports of observed suspicion of traffic in the network before targeting the energy companies. However, the attack and targeting plan was highly coordinated, which indicate that there was reconnaissance before the attack and analysis of the affected system. They were enabling the remote opening of breakers in several substations.²⁷

2. Weaponization: In the second step, attackers break into the network, delivering targeted malware, vulnerable to systems and people. Often happens without the user being aware that they are a target. In this attack, it was needed to access specific infrastructure. The attackers weaponized Microsoft Office documents (Excel and Word) by embedding Black Energy 3 within the documents.²⁸

3. Deliver, exploit, and install: Delivery, the malicious office document was sent via emails to the individuals in companies. Exploit, when these documents were opened, there was a popup display to the users to encourage them for enabling macro document. Install, this malicious macro document allowed the macro-office to install the malicious program Black Energy 3 on the victims' system.²⁹

4. After the malware was installed, the Black Energy 3 malware connected with the IP command and control system to enable communication between adversary and affected systems. Then the attackers harvest credentials, privileges, and move laterally throughout the environment (e.g., target directory service infrastructure to manipulate and control the authorization and authentication system directly). At this point, the attackers completed all the necessary actions to establish persistent access to the

²⁶ KONSTANTINO, C. – SAZOS, M. – MANIATAKOS, M.: Attacking the smart grid using public information; 2016 17th Latin-American Test Symposium (LATS); IEEE, 2016. pp. 105-110.

²⁷ ZHOU – HE – LI – CAO – LIU – GENG 2013. op. cit.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

targets. With this information, the adversaries would identify VPN connections and avenues from the business network into the ICS network. Using native commands and connections allows the adversaries to discover the remainder of the systems and extract the data necessary to formulate a plan.³⁰

5. Using the stolen credentials, the adversary could pivot into the network segments where SCADA dispatch workstations and servers existed. Upon entry into the network, the actions of the adversaries were consistent in theme but different in technical minutia. Then the attackers discovered a network connected to a UPS and reconfigured it. The attackers would have needed to conduct some network reconnaissance against these systems and then find specific targets to execute their coordinated attack.³¹

6. The available information indicates that the malicious firmware was consistent amongst devices and uploaded within short time between each other to multiple sites, which means the malicious uploads of firmware were probably developed before the attack for quick and predictable execution.³²

7. During the ICS Attack Stage, the adversaries used native software to deliver themselves into the environment for direct interaction with the ICS components. They achieved this using existing remote administration tools on the operator workstations. The threat actors also continued to use VPN access into the IT environment.³³

8. During the same time, the attackers leveraged a remote telephone denial of service on the energy company's call center with thousands of calls to ensure that impacted customers could not report outages.³⁴

5. Protect and recommendation

The emerging cyber threats targeting electricity systems highlighted the need to integrate advanced security to protect critical assets without impacting operations. Steps should take for protecting cybersecurity:

1. Foster awareness-raising and training initiatives for staff: Initial recommendations would point to end-user awareness training and ongoing phishing testing. Specific training initiatives should also be created for manufacturers on how to build secure devices and applications, for grid operators on the threats and risks affecting the resiliency and security of the grid, and for service providers and end-consumers on fraud prevention, privacy, etc.^{35,36}

As the social engineering components of attacks, targeted email, and internet accessible cyber assets. Therefore, these areas should be considered untrusted, and the communication with these areas should be controlled, segmented, and monitored.³⁷

³⁰ Ibid.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

³⁵ MATTIOLI – MOULINOS 2015 op. cit.

³⁶ PAUL – NI 2017. op. cit.

³⁷ MATTIOLI – MOULINOS 2015 op. cit.

2. Improve the regulatory and policy framework: Policies and regulations should at least contain:³⁸

- considering privacy and cybersecurity as two intrinsically interdependent topics;
- defining security measures to be considered in current smart grid deployments (e.g., smart meter rollouts);
- demanding grid operators for mandatory risk assessments;
- demanding manufacturers, integrators, services providers, and grid operators to comply with specific security certifications;
- establishing regulatory pressures (e.g., fines) for not complying with companies;
- making public the compliance results;
- demanding operators to report on cybersecurity related incidents to a national or supranational entity.

3. Foster the creation of a Public-Private Partnership (PPP) entity to coordinate smart grid cybersecurity initiatives.³⁹

4. Develop a minimum set of reference standards and guidelines.^{40,41}

5. Promote the development of security certification schemes for products and organizational security.⁴²

6. Foster the creation of testbeds and security assessments.⁴³

7. Foster research in smart grid cybersecurity leveraging existing research programmes.⁴⁴

8. Using the YARA tool and antimalware can search, detect, and remove the malware from the infected systems.⁴⁵

9. Monitor the users' behavior on network and communication, throughout the environment and should be focused on the directory (e.g., Active Directory, Domain, eDirectory, and LDAP).^{46,47}

10. Disable remote management of field devices when they are not required.⁴⁸

³⁸ Ibid.

³⁹ ZHOU – HE – LI – CAO – LIU – GENG 2013. op. cit.

⁴⁰ MATTIOLI – MOULINOS 2015 op. cit.

⁴¹ PAUL – NI 2017. op. cit.

⁴² ZHOU – HE – LI – CAO – LIU – GENG 2013. op. cit.

⁴³ PAUL – NI 2017. op. cit.

⁴⁴ MATTIOLI – MOULINOS 2015 op. cit.

⁴⁵ ZHOU – HE – LI – CAO – LIU – GENG 2013. op. cit.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ PAUL – NI 2017. op. cit.

⁴⁸ ZHOU – HE – LI – CAO – LIU – GENG 2013. op. cit.

6 Conclusion

To conclude, the cybersecurity of infrastructure is important for the future because it is the type of war in the future that affects the country, such as malfunction of the production, essential service, and data of the citizen. However, it is impossible to stop the attacks, but the correct response, good protection system, the strict standard and policy can mitigate the effect of these attacks.

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EVENTS

ZOLTÁN NYIKES PHD – TÜNDE ANNA KOVÁCS PHD
ICCECIP 2021 INTERNATIONAL SCIENTIFIC CONFERENCE

The **ICCECIP 2021** - 3rd International Conference on Central European Critical Infrastructure Protection was held this year on 15th November. This year conference was the third after the 2019 and 2020 ones. This event as part of the Hungarian Science Festival was organized by the Bánki Donát Faculty of Mechanical and Safety Engineering of the Óbuda University, Milton Friedman University and Batthyány Lajos Foundation in a historical place of the Castle, in the Villa of Lónyay-Hatvany. The motto of this year's conference is "**Kinetic and cyber tools in the critical infrastructure protection**".

The conference chief patron in this year and also the years before was **Szilárd Németh** Deputy Minister of Ministry of Defence, Hungary. The conference scientific patron was **Prof. Dr Miklós Maróth** the President of the Eötvös Loránd Research Network who supported the conference series continuously in the last few years. The conference was organized in English, in a hybrid form in accordance with the recommendation of the COVID situation. In the place of the chief patron Dr Ferenc Attila Varga colonel, Head of Department of the MOD Department of Defense Administration, Hungary held a welcome speech in the opening ceremony. **Dr Ferenc Attila Varga** colonel, Head of Department of the MOD Department of Defense Administration, Hungary held a welcome speech in the opening ceremony and welcomed the participants of the conference, instead of the chief patron. **Prof. Dr Zoltán Rajnai** Honorary chair of the conference, dean of the Bánki Donát Faculty of Mechanical and Safety Engineering had greeted the conference participants in his opening remark. After it the rector of the Milton Friedman University, Dr János Perényi delivered his opening speech. The final remark of the opening ceremony was interpreted by István Pócza on behalf of the host, Batthyány Lajos Foundation.

The event was persisted by plenary speakers presentations. The first plenary speaker was **Prof. Dr Alexis Rusinek** Attaché of the French Embassy in Budapest. He was followed by **Prof. Dr Tibor Kovács** associate professor of Óbuda University and after by **Dr Kostiantyn Afanasenko** associate professor of the National University of Civil Defence of Ukraine, Ukraine and **Dr Robert C. Castel** the scientific associate of the Israel National Parks Authority, Israel. The final plenary speaker was **Prof. Dr Kornélia Lazányi** professor of Óbuda University, who closed the plenary session with her excellent speech.

This year during the one day conference was delivered 21 presentations included plenary speeches too, on Individual Security, Cyber Security, Physical Security and Political Security of Critical Infrastructure Protection. In the poster session, it was displayed several different research area results on eight posters. The success of the conference is confirmed by several foreign participants. Other than the Hungarian participants were from Poland, Albania, Bosna-Herceg, Serbia, Romania, Ukraine, Marokko, France, Iraq, Algeria, Syria, Izrael, China, speakers, represented on 16 universities and 3 associations. The scientific results of the conference speeches and

posters will be published in article form in different journals, like Defence Review, Interior Review, Military Technique, National Security Review, Military Logistic, Közéletés, Safety and Security Sciences Review, Aeronautical Science Bulletins are Hungarian scientific journals, also the Critical Infrastructure Protection Review and Cyber Security Review British scientific journals, the Security Engineering of Anthropogenic Objects és Részecskék/Engineering Exper Polish scientific journal, Transactions of the VSB – Technical University of Ostrava Safety Engineering Series Bohemian scientific Journal and the European Journal of Materials Science and Engineering Romanian scientific Journal.

As part of the closing ceremony **Prof Dr Zoltán Rajnai**, dean of Bánki, Honorary chair of the conference in his closing speech told thanks for the speakers and poster presenters, the participants in the event and told thanks for the organizer group and told highlighted thanks for the organizing of the event for **Dr Tünde Anna Kovács** chair of the international organization board, for **Dr Zoltán Nyikes** director of the international organization board and **István Pócza** the professional program director of the host.

The honorary chair in addition invited the participants for the fourth event, which will be held in November 2022, the ICCECIP 2022 as part of the conference series.

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1. Tibor ÁCS: Military culture in the reform era. Budapest, 2005, Zrínyi Publishing House. ISBN 963 9276 45 6
2. Lajos BEREK: Basic elements of research work in Military Science. In: Tivadar SZILÁGYI (editor): Excerptions. Budapest, 1944 Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy. pp. 31-50.
3. Jenő KOVÁCS: Roots of the Hungarian Military Science, ideological problems of its development. In: New Defense Review, 2993. 47. vol. no. 6. pp. 1-7, ISSN 1216-7436
4. www.Globalsecurity.org/army/iraq (downloaded: 19 04 2012)

Requirements for pictures, sketches, illustrations, diagrams and other appendixes:

- title of the picture or illustration;
- source of the picture or illustration (or its drafter);
- serial number of the picture or illustration, (e.g. 1. picture);
- if it is possible, a Hungarian legend should be provided when the caption of the picture or illustration is given in a foreign language.

Requirements for abbreviations and foreign terms:

- foreignisms and abbreviations should be explained – at their first appearance – in the footnote, in Hungarian and in the original foreign language;
- e. g. WFP – World Food Program – ENSZ Világélelmészési Programja.

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