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BUDAPEST

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HISTORY OF NATIONAL SECURITY

BOOK REVIEW

ÁRON TARKÓ[1]

COMPARISON OF THE LAWS AND DATA ACQUISITION METHODS OF PRIVATE INVESTIGATION AND NATIONAL SECURITY SERVICES

Abstract

The role of information in the 21st century has become more valuable, which stands major challenges to information-gathering tasks of the national securities and private investigation. The information gathering of national securities is facilitated by their access to administrative and law enforcement repositories, whilst the private investigator has got limited access to central repositories. In view of open source data acquisition, having many data provides an opportunity to examine certain other information too. By the side of World Wide Web, the co-operation with foreign colleagues is successful because in the western part of Europe, it is possible to find out the data needed to the investigation, as the legislation allows the data request from government offices and law enforcement.

Keywords: challenges, private investigation, information gathering, national security, law enforcement repositories

Introduction

In this study, I examine the comparison of the laws and data acquisition methods of the private investigation and nation security services. The two professions were also regulated in the period before the change of regime, and the adopted decrees had an impact on the current legislation. Both the private investigation and asset protection activities were regulated by ministry of interion Minister's decrees in the 20th century. The change of political system had a serious impact on politics, society, economy and the national security services, too. There were/are significant similarities and differences in the structure and task system of the given services. In my study, I would like to compare how legislation has developed in the 21st century. The systems of the national security/secret service were fundamentally affected by the change of regime. The basis of the outlook is the legislation under which the state security services operated in the 20th century. An overall investigation happened in the field of state security in Hungary.

The idea was approved by the Central Committee (KB) and the Political Committee (PB) of the Hungarian Socialist Workers' Party (MSZMP) in June 1962. The unified state security civilian organization is the Ministry of the Interior (BM) III. became his main group chief and military intelligence operated alongside him as one of the group chiefs of the general staff/command. The services also had five group chief in Hungary: BM III/I intelligence, BM III/II counterintelligence, BM III/III internal political counterintelligence, BM III/IV military counterintelligence and BM

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III/IV technical support to intelligence. This organizational structure operate in this form from 1962 to 1989.[2]

The ministerial orders contained the detailed instructions. This period is characterized by the absence of legal regulations on national security. After the revolution of 1956, but in this year on December 30, the BM II (political investigator) department was established on the basis of Decree XXXV. of 1956. Within this, the task of counter-espionage was carried out by Division II. After the change of regime, the legislature separated the national services into military and civilian services.[3] The legislature defined the basic task of the national security services in ensuring the sovereignty and constitutional order of the Republic of Hungary. The Hungarian civilian secret services operated in the form of two services: Information Office and National Security Office.[4] The activities of the Information Office started on March 1, 1990 and were regulated by the Act X of 1990,[5] and the performance of national security tasks was regulated by the MT Decree 26/1990 (II. 14).[6] However, the operation of the national security services was not regulated by law. The date of entry into force of Act CXXV of 1995[7] on the currently effective national security services happened on January 1 in 1996, which covered constitutional operation.

The forces, tools and methods of secret information gathering are specifically recorded in internal licensing regulations, which are considered top secret and classified. The services collect both confidential and open information. The acquisition of information is achieved through human operations, technical intelligence, open source intelligence and international cooperation. After the change of regime, the legal background in the mentioned two professions changed. In this study, I would like compare how the two professions have developed in the 21st century in the terms of legislation.

An overview of the legal background of private detective activity

In the period before the change of regime, private detective activity was banned for 15 years in 1982, and that activity could not operate during this time. The Council of Ministers' decree of 6/1982. (VIII. 1.) and 24/1987. (VII. 22.)[8] specifically prohibited the conduct of private detective activities in Hungary. A big change took place in 1995, when the Government Decree of 87/1995 (VII.14.)[9] temporarily

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2   JAGADICS, Péter – RAJOS, Sándor – SIMON, László – SZABÓ, Károly: The Hungarian
    Military Counterintelligence. Metropolis Media Group Kft., Budapest, 2018. pp. 100-101.
3   KOBOLKA, István (Ed.): Basic knowledge of national security. National Public Service
    and Education Publishing Co. Budapest, 2013. p. 25.
4   http://www.mkih.hu/tortenet.html/ (downloaded: 08 January 2022)
5   https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=99000010.TV/(downloaded: 08 January 2022)
6   26/1990 (II.14) MT rendelet.
    http://www.jogiportal.hu/index.php?id=taipazxcsr4tnkuns&state=19960327&menu=view
    (downloaded: 09 January 2022)
7   https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=99500125.tv/(downloaded: 09 January 2022)
8   https://jogkodex.hu/jsz/1987_24_mt_rendelet_6142363 (downloaded: 30 December 2022)
9   http://www.jogiportal.hu/index.php?id=3ud5btyzq9g6oeext&state=20181228&menu
    =view (downloaded: 30 December 2022)

regulated the protection of persons and assets and the activities of private investigators.

After three years, the Act of IV of 1998[10] was created by Parliament, which specifically regulated the protection of persons and property as well as private detective activities. Pursuant to this law, the BM Decree 24/1998 (VI. 9.)[11] of Ministry of Interior was created in relation to private detective work, which is the law on the rules of personal and property protection and private investigative activities carried out within the framework of the enterprise, the Professional Chamber of Personal, Property and Private Investigators provided for its implementation. Another legal change happened in the early 2000s in the duties of personal and property protection and private investigator. Act of CXXXIII of 2005[12] was created. It already states that the workers of personal and asset protection and private investigators can carry out activities within the framework of a business. This is the first law that specifically regulates activities like the extend of their powers or the way of doing their job. For a year, the BM decree[13] of 22/2006. (IV. 25.)[14] was voted by the legislators, which covered the operating license, the operating license of private investigators, the administrative service fees and the contractual conditions of liability insurance.

Data acquisition methods of private investigation and national security services

Nowadays, the role of information has increased, which presents great challenges to the national security services and the information-gathering tasks of private investigation. The data acquisition of the national security services is facilitated by the fact that they have access to the public administration and law enforcement databases, whilst a private detective has limited access to the central databases.

In terms of open source data acquisition, the World Wide Web and other OSINT methods provides the opportunity to view certain data. In addition to this, a private investigator has the opportunity to collaborate with foreign colleagues during data collection which is usually an effective way of it. In Western Europe, it is possible to get to know the data necessary for the investigation, as the legislation allows the request for data from state offices and law enforcement agencies.

The challenge appears during the process of private investigation. Obtaining information has become more difficult, because neither the legislation nor other instructions define the activity, how a private investigator can legally collect information. Current legislation does not allow private investigators to access official, state or even police databases in Hungary. A private detective has the opportunity to

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[10] https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=99800004.TV (downloaded: 30 December 2022)
[11] https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=99800004.TV (downloaded: 30 December 2022)
[12] https://mkogy.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a0500133.TV (downloaded: 30 December 2022)
[13] https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a0600022.bm (downloaded: 30 December 2022)
[14] https://net.jogtar.hu/jogszabaly?docid=a0600022.bm (downloaded: 30 December 2022)

legally exchange information with foreign colleagues thus they can obtain information in connection with the given case.

The national security services do face more and more challenges and obstacles in terms of obtaining information. Thanks to the technical achievements, it is increasingly difficult to obtain information by involving HUMINT sources because the method of technical data collection has come to the front. To be in possession of the right information, the uncertainty of various decisions can be reduced.[15] At the same time, the decision-making process can be accelerated, the effectiveness and efficiency of the use of other resources can also be increased which is a key condition for quick response to internal and external influences. Anyone, who has access to the right information can have a huge advantage by decision-making in the future.

An information advantage can be achieved by obtaining the right information, which enables its owner to gain benefit in many areas of life by utilizing the information communication systems and their capabilities. These days everyone has the opportunity to obtain information with the help of various external, open sources or other methods, which can be used during the evidence procedure. Information can be obtained in several ways depending on the availability of source(s).

The information can be acquired through and form open sources and other data acquisition sources. The national security services conduct information gathering activities in several ways: HUMINT[16], OSINT[17], SIGINT[18], IMINT[19], CYBINT[20], MASINT[21], MARKINT[22], FININT[23], CULTINT[24] and so on.

"The services must meet strict requirements due to the importance of their activities and the special authorizations granted by law. The requirements for the national security services are the following: full compliance with the legislation; the implementation of tasks defined by law; predicting factors that have a negative impact on safety; satisfying users' information needs; efficient use of resources; political neutrality and the transmission of national security information of appropriate quality." There is no specific legislation of data collection methods for private investigators.[25]

It is extremely important for the national security services to secure their licenses in compliance with the law. Not only limits the work of the services, but also gives

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[15] BODA, József PhD: XXI. challenges of the century. Pécs Border Guard Scientific Publicataions, XX. volume, Pécs, 2018. pp. 5-6.
[16] HUMINT: Human Intelligence
[17] OSINT: Open Source Intellingence
[18] SIGINT: Signals Intelligence
[19] IMINT: Imaginery Intelligence
[20] CYBINT: Cyber Intelligence
[21] MARKINT: Marketing Intelligence
[22] MASINT: Measurement and Signature Intelligence
[23] FININT: Financial Intelligence
[24] CULTINT: Cultural Intelligence
[25] VIDA, Csaba: The role of national security activities in society (Thoughts on why national security services are needed). Military Science Review, 2015/E. http://real.mtak.hu/29936/1/19_VIDA_CSABA.pdf (downloaded: 30 December 2022)

them other opportunities that other government organizations do not have. If the legal regulations were not tight, there would be a risk of illegal abuses taking place, which would make the work of the services ineffective. The national security services can fulfil their data collection methods by complying with the legislation and by carrying out the specified tasks.[26]

The function of the services is to provide decision-makers with adequate information, what prevents the development of security problems. Nevertheless, by obtaining suitable information, both analysing and evaluating of information, it is possible to make statements about the future, so to make predictions.[27]

The possibilities of the two professions differ in terms of obtaining information. This difference can be seen in the fact that the purpose of obtaining information is different. Law enforcement and other databases are available to the national security services, which facilitate their work, unlike private investigators whose do not have the opportunity to look into databases.

The law of national security specifically describes the principles of information acquisition methods (forces, tools, methods), unlike the law in connection with private investigation which does not describe exactly the way of data acquisition how it can be done against individuals or companies. The services basically have more opportunities to access information via databases, law enforcement organizations and authorities, as this is required by the goals of the state and national security interests.

Nowadays, it is difficult for the services to get information by involving human resources. It is becoming more and more difficult to involve trusted persons and informants for the services because the technological advancement has been prioritized. Thanks to it, services use more efficiently the methods of data acquisitions such as SIGINT or OSINT, ELINT[28], IMINT which allow them to get information faster. The disadvantage of it is that the information is not cross-checked unlike HUMINT. During the relationship building, the national security services can cooperate with civil organizations thus there is the opportunity to build relationships using HUMINT tools.[29]

The ongoing national security and state goals determine the tasks. For the cooperating persons with who the service works a legend or pretence must be invented, by which the identity of the agent remains undercovered. When the agent is technically equipped (well-equipped), he can do his job effectively. Regarding the apparatus, it is possible for the investigator to maintain continuous contact with the person providing the information for the sake of the national security services.[30]

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[26] BÖRCSÖK, András –VIDA, Csaba PhD: The system of national security services, (International practice for the development of the national security system). National Security Review, 2014/1, pp.76.

[27] VIDA, Csaba: Does the intelligence cycle still exist? Felderítő Szemle, 2013. September–October, pp. 43-46

[28] ELINT: elektronic intelligence

[29] REGÉNYI, Kund: Contact Sources for collecting information. Magyar Rendőr, 2021/3. pp. 205-207 http://real.mtak.hu/132577/1/17_Mezei_205-207_MR_2021_3.pdf (downloaded: 30 December 2022)

[30] Ibid. pp. 205-207

After obtaining HUMINT-information, it can be verified in several ways: by monitoring or by the cooperating person. The obtained HUMINT-information is described in a report by a staff member of the national security services and then handed over to a superior. At the national security services, information is collected several times for a given task.[31]

If the received information relevant – regarding to its task –, there is no need to obtain new information. As the current task is completed, there is no possibility to build new information-gathers because the given goal determines what kind of data we need. During the process of HUMINT, the given environment must always be assessed in order to see what kind of information it can provide to the services.

The process of obtaining information is generally characterized by its need to define the goals, capabilities, human resources and the method of collecting information based on which information can be collected. It is very important to define the purpose of whom and where the information is obtained. National security capabilities mean that the agent conducting HUMINT has adequate local knowledge in the given area which ensures a successful activity.

It is using covert methods as well during the process of information collecting. It carries out the data acquisition in accordance with the rules of the conspiracy. Why is it important? There are two things: on one hand is to protect the national security services from finding out who they are doing the work for; on the other hand is the protection of the agent which makes his/her identity undercover, thus protecting both himself/herself and the information is provided. HUMINT is more effective compared to other data acquisition methods, because it is possible to obtain information with it, but it is not possible with other methods.

A big advantage of HUMINT is that it is possible to check the information back. During the preparation of HUMINT, it is worth starting with secondary information like the research of the Internet and the media, as already mentioned above. It partly reveals, who the target person about whom we want to collect information. After that it is worth checking the primary information that we gained during the research.

As soon as the preliminary work is completed, then the information is analysed to see what is usable during HUMINT. After all, the investigation plan follows in which is described exactly the kind of legend should be used and where the information is should be collected. It is very important that the legend is written such a way that the living environment of target person does not suspect anything about this process.[32]

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[31] RESPERGER, István: The theory of national security in the public service. International cooperation of the national security services. Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest, 2018. pp. 140-143

[32] TARKÓ, Áron: The role of HUMINT in national security services (civil and military) and in private investigations, Felderítő Szemle, 2022/3. pp. 127-139.

Conclusions

In the 20th century, were only partially regulated. The two professions were regulated in BM decrees and government decrees until the change of regime. Regarding to private investigation, it did not function as an activity for a long time. The legal background of the state security services has undergone continuous changes. After the change of regime, the first law of the national security services was born in 1990 which regulated their work in detail. Furthermore, three legislation were created that regulated the operation and structure of the services. In terms of private investigation, a breakthrough occurred in 1995 when the activities of private investigation could be carried out again. This activity has been constantly changing. After the year of 1995, three of legislations were created. Another major breakthrough happened in 2005: the first law in connection with the activity of private investigation was born which regulated this activity in detail. Clear legislation has already been established in the two professions.

Regarding to the Act of Private Investigation a more detailed description would be needed. My sense is that, this law should explain much better the special provisions in the activity of private investigation. I found that the current legislation of private investigation does not allow to detectives to use databases of state office, police, National Taxes and Customs Service or to receive information whilst the national security services can access all databases. Services have methods to exploit HUMINT soruces to build or maintain relationships with individuals who provide information related to the case. The national security services must constantly study the individuals with information and check whether the information they provide is authentic and realistic. There are no such cooperative persons in private investigation since we do not know who the person is to be investigated. A private investigator does not rely on technological tools during his work, as he cannot use them, but on human resources. The law should also describe how private investigators can employ data-provider individuals.

It is important to mention that the government submit its request for information to the services, then the services implement the request for this information, so that the government can properly decide on its questions. Their authority covers everything in terms of databases: law enforcement, government offices and offices maintained by the state, unlike private investigators, no legislation gives the opportunity to do so. In terms of its national security structure, it is a centralized and hierarchical system that executes orders. The Act of The National Security specifically describes the principles of its methods of obtaining information in contrast to private investigation, where law does not exactly define how data can be obtained against individuals.

Regarding to the structure of the private investigation, it is not that kind of activity which executes orders, but can make decisions freely without restrictions. The personal and property security is a structurally independent system. Furthermore, it raises the question why a private detective cannot use technological method within the framework of state control (prosecutor), unlike the national security services. In the case of the Act of Personal and Property Security Services and Private Detective Activities, these two activities are not separated, which is a major problem. The other main problem is that a private detective does not have investigative powers to access

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data and information, and the law does not specifically describe which data collection methods can be used during work.

Regarding to the services, it is specifically determined who can use the data collection method unlike in the case of a private detective, where the data collection methods are not exactly defined. The services have been regulated by law, similarly to the law on private detectives.[33]

The information acquisition methods used by the Act of National Security are the following: HUMINT, OSINT, SIGINT, IMINT, CYBINT, MASINT, MARKINT, FININT, CULTINT.

In terms of services, there are individuals, who have information, such as networks, cooperating persons, occasional informants, which facilitate the possibility of a successful information exchange. A private detective does not have the opportunity to retain such persons, as the law does not allow detective to obtain information through a financial source. **That is why it would be important to be able to employ data providers in a transparent legal system.**

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[33]   Ibid.

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GEOPOLITICS

BERK CAN KOZAN PHD – ALI MIRZAZADA

LEGITIMATE REALITIES ALLOWING AZERBAIJAN NOT TO INTEGRATE INTO NATO

Abstract

The South Caucasus region has always been one of the political regions that emboded the theory of realism and applied this theory to the implementation of any political activity, in the process of international relations. The Republic of Azerbaijan, as a state located in the South Caucasus, has always implemented its acts by taking into account the realistic position of South Caucasus, when it was entering into relations with its neighbours and other states, in the framework of international relations. A clear example of the implementation of these realistic acts by the Azerbaijani state is its existing relations with NATO. While it is dealing with NATO, it has always been aware of the regional reality – which is shared also by the countries in the region – and acted accordingly. This article also analyzes what factors divert the Azerbaijani state from integrating into NATO and what realities the Azerbaijani state takes into consideration in its relations with NATO.

Keywords: NATO, Azerbaijan, Russia, the South Caucasus, and Non-Aligned Movement.

Introduction

Although many governments in the world try to transform the world into a place, based on liberal cooperation and values also in the case of organization or unity, the fundamental principle of unity or organization is often the concept of power. Such an organization is the NATO – built on the principle of realism that emerged during the Cold War – to safeguard liberal values and ensure security. NATO has been an international organization that has tried to expand since its inception, and has attracted a lot of partners to spread democratic and liberal values in the states. During the Cold War, the NATO organization found many allies for itself at the Euro-Atlantic region to promote the values listed, but after the end of the Cold War, its expansion policies have already begun to advance towards the East. As a result, after the end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union, states in several post-Soviet regions, including the South Caucasus, became an independent subject of international relations. Following this political change, the NATO also changed its geopolitical targets to create conditions for cooperation in the framework of mutual interests, in accordance with the principle of realism. Although actors such as Eastern European states succeeded in this transition, other states such as Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Armenia in the South Caucasus, which were slightly closer to them, failed to do so. The existence of Iran and Russia, NATO's largest rivals in the South Caucasus, automatically affected the intelligence policy of their neighbors in the South Caucasus. Under these circumstances, Georgia took integration steps, without regarding the reality and the political balance, and pursued an unbalanced policy, overestimating the NATO's role

in the South Caucasus, but the Azerbaijani government was pursuing a somewhat more realistic and more pragmatic policy. This article analyses this realistic policy of Azerbaijan in the Southern Caucasus and also its well-balanced, realistic policy pursued towards the NATO. The article also seeks to clarify what factors are rationally preventing Azerbaijan from integrating into NATO. The analysis will be presented first by providing normative and practical samples, and then the conclusive section will clarify why they are right, concerning their NATO-policy.

Significant prospects of the relationship between Azerbaijan and NATO, within the post-bipolar international relations

After the end of the Cold War in 1990, the bipolar world-system also collapsed. The sudden independence of the long-ruled countries by the Warsaw Pact led to the formation of both new independent states and the emergence of new geopolitical realities, in areas controlled by the former Soviet Union.[1] In these states, which emerged after the change in the international political order, two factors were largely of crucial importance – the factor of security and the factor of cooperation.[2] The significance of these factors for the newly independent states was that with the end of the Cold War, the values of liberal internationalism were elevated, resulting in the collapse of both the socialism, the bipolar system, and the Soviet Union. Therefore, in this rising liberal internationalism, the states tried to build a strong economic bond and sought such a security cooperation that constituted the foundation of both economic and sound democratic security.[3] In that view, integration into centralized institutions such as the European Union and an international security institution such as NATO, the main security corporation of Euro-Atlantic policy, was extremely important for most of these states.

After the fall of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan was one of the countries that regained its independence in the once-controlled Southern Caucasus region. For the Republic of Azerbaijan, which regained its independence in the 1990s and became a sovereign of international law, was also very important – in the new international order – to establish political relations with other developed states, both economically and in a way of security, and to cooperate in the economic framework.[4] Therefore, after the collapse of the Soviet Union, governments that had long been governed by the economic principles of socialism were suddenly thrown into a liberal-capitalist world, and it was very important for most of them to cooperate with other developed states, in a variety of ways to integrate into the world's new system.[5] The Republic of Azerbaijan was also one of those countries that regained its independence after the

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collapse of the Soviet Union and lived in a very economically and politically complex way[6]. After Azerbaijan regained its independence, like Tajikistan, Chechnya, Ossetia and Abkhazia – having ethnic conflicts like many post-Soviet countries – it began to experience both ethnic and territorial conflicts with Armenia. These conflicts significantly affected its influence not only in terms of its political reputation, but also economically, socially and politically.[7] Additionally, the fact that the Republic of Azerbaijan, which had just regained its economic and political independence, faced such a conflict that made the existing transition a more difficult and tough process. Therefore, in the newly formed international relations system, the development of NATO and Euro-Atlantic relations was one of Azerbaijan's main priorities for effectively facing these challenges and establishing a balanced cooperation at both regional and global levels.[8]

Another factor was that in 1992, during the war between the Republic of Azerbaijan and Armenia, the Armenian side signed the Collective Security Treaty Organization, along with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan. Under the terms of the treaty, it was also viewed as aggression against also the other member countries if there was a threat against any of the member countries. Naturally, during the war, Armenia's side was becoming on the verge of another power line than Azerbaijan. Therefore, it is no coincidence that in 1992, the Republic of Azerbaijan, along with several Central and Eastern European states, joined the NATO's newly formed coaching forum, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council.

Additionally, Azerbaijan's geopolitical role – in the Southern Caucasus, its location in the centre of the Eastern and Western roads, and its exit from its territory through Iran to the Middle East, and later to Central Asia – makes it one of the transnational states in the Southern Caucasus region. Therefore, in the implementation of both transnational projects and political projects in the region, Azerbaijan has been very important for the political missions of leading NATO members, both in the first years of independence and in the subsequent years.[9] As another factor in the South Caucasus security, i.e., in counter-terrorism activities and other global policies, Azerbaijan plays an important role as a bridge and reliable partner for the route from the South Caucasus to Central Asia. As it turns out, the Central Asian region is important in terms of monitoring NATO's rivals, Russia from the south, Iran from the east, and China from the northwest. From another point of view, Central Asia is of serious importance for the NATO's central powers, in terms of four nuclear powers, namely Russia, China, India and Pakistan and being a region in the middle of four different beliefs.[10] Therefore, in terms of geopolitics, the implementation of both the

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9   Ibid.

10 ARAZ, A.: QLOBAL SİYASƏTDƏ QAFQAZ: 22 İL ƏVVƏL VƏ İNDİ. 2013. https://www.qafsam.az/pages/article-details/427/1 (downloaded:23 November 2021)

mentioned factors and the common goals of the cooperative areas in the Southern Caucasus is one of the most important factors in NATO's foreign policy.

The Russian factor, hindering NATO ideas in the South Caucasus

In the new world system, there are several obstacles before many states to take steps towards both NATO and European integration. One of those obstacles is the Russian factor[11]. Following the collapse of the bipolar system, the change in international relations brought new political realities to the regions, controlled earlier by the Soviet Union. The South Caucasus region was also one of those regions, experiencing these political realities. However, after the decline of the bipolar system, the Russian state still wanted to control the regions, which once was controlled by the Soviet Union. Andrei Kozyrev, who was once Russia's foreign minister, argued in his article that despite the change in the international relations system, the concept of controlling somehow the nearby surroundings of Russia has still a special importance in Russia's foreign policy, also in the post-Cold War era.[12] The transformation of this concept into a doctrine in Russia's foreign policy shaped the balance of power in the South Caucasus, in the new international relations system. The transformation of this balance of power into a judge's position in Russia's political ambition, especially in the South Caucasus, had a profound effect on both the Euro-integration of the countries there and their dependence on Russia. It is a fact that Russia itself, like any post-Soviet countries in the post-Cold War international relations system, had dramatically altered its political dynamics. In the early years, it pursued an EU-oriented policy, but after a change in political power and the Eurasianist political approach became analogue in Russia's politics, it began to pursue political acts that had more opposite poles with the European Union.[13] According to Eurasianism, NATO and the European Union memberships are unrealistic options on the road to expansion abroad, and the failure is inevitable that these options will be directed to Eurasia.[14] Therefore, the expansion of their NATO's relationship by any of its neighbours in the region is viewed by Russia, as an obstacle to its re-existence as a single force in the world.

Under such circumstances, the choice of the right foreign policy strategy is also a key issue for Azerbaijan, which shares its neighbourhood border with Russia. In general, Azerbaijan has always pursued a strategic and balanced policy, in the South Caucasus region. It has done so also towards Russia, and has always tried not to

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[11] MARTEN, K.: NATO enlargement: evaluating its consequences in Russia. International Politics, 2020/57, pp. 401-426.

[12] KOZYREV, A.: The Lagging Partnership. 1994. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1994-05-01/lagging-partnership?utm_medium=referral&utm_source=www-foreignaffairs-com.cdn.ampproject.org&utm_campaign=amp_kickers&_gl=1*5e81d8*_ga*am9vY2RY VzRHWjljVERwQ2VwM3NqMEZQN0RCeGpZNjdIMHNTVG (downloaded: 23 November 2021).

[13] YALCINER, S.: PUTİN DÖNEMİ RUSYA FEDERASYONU-NATO İLİŞKİLERİ. Süleyman Demirel Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 2007. pp. 339-358.

[14] TSYGANKOV, A. P.: Hard-line Eurasianism and Russia's contending geopolitical perspectives. East European Quarterly, 1998/3, pp. 315-334.

undermine its friendship with Russia, the dominant force in the region, and has never continued a strategic manoeuvring policy against it – maintaining a balance – by refusing to form an open alliance with other major powers.[15] Therefore, Azerbaijan has tried and is still working to maintain a balanced regional policy, despite the fact that the NATO highly appreciates Azerbaijan's favourable geopolitical position, military and economic opportunities and its cooperation with NATO, regarding security, maritime and cyber issues.

Naturally, there are a number of factors in Azerbaijan's policy of integration into NATO, including the institutions of the European Union, in pursuing such a balanced policy. The first and most important one of these factors for Azerbaijan was the Karabakh conflict. As it is known, the Karabakh conflict was frozen within the OSCE for many years before the Karabakh war. Many years of diplomatic efforts, meetings and misunderstandings between the parties could not end the OSCE mission or the Karabakh conflict in the South Caucasus. Russia also had the dominant power in the Karabakh conflict, because it was one of the three leaders of the OSCE and had a dominant position in the region. Therefore, it wanted to always maintain the status quo in the region, so that it could maintain its regional influence as a dominant force in the integration of both countries against Western institutions in foreign policy.[16] Additionally, Russia's regional policy and influence were reinforced by the neglect of France and the United States and the handing over many details to Russia. Therefore, when working with European Union institutions, including NATO, the Azerbaijani government has always maintained a regional balance sheet and sometimes even ignored opportunities to regulate balanced policies.

Another issue is that the South Caucasus region is crucial to Russia in preventing alternative natural resources from being exported to the world market, both to preserve the dependence of such supplies on Russia as much as possible and to prevent new states from strengthening their independence.[17] As its military presence in the South Caucasus region is of utmost importance in terms of Russia from the perspective of its global role, it controls its former post-Soviet counterparts militarily and economically in the region to control both the economic market and political hierarchically. The fact that this hegemony is in Russia's hands can prevent those countries from directing the NATO integration. However, it is claimed that Azerbaijan may already have a positive dynamic of the strategic integration toward NATO because of the resolution of the Karabakh War. However, by putting aside regional reality, hypothesis from a broad framework reveals that neither historically nor now Azerbaijan's failure to make serious efforts to join NATO and its preference to maintain a regional balance has not been based on hypothetical political analogues. Historically, Azerbaijan understood the dynamics of regional politics and was able to do so. It did not pursue a policy like Ukraine, which carries neighbourhood geography with Russia, or by fantasies like Georgia. The institution of realism in Azerbaijan's foreign policy helped it to pursue a perfect balanced policy and to maintain a positive relationship with neighbouring states without damaging them. Additionally, when considering Russia's regional policy, it is evident that creating instability with its

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[15]   ARAZ (2013) op. cit.
[16]   MAKILI-ƏLIYEV (2017) op. cit. p. 651.
[17]   STRONSKI, P.: The Shifting Geography of the South Caucasus. 2021.
         https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/06/23/shifting-geography-of-south-caucasus-pub-
         84814 (downloaded: 23 November 2021).

peacekeeping mission to its former Soviet Union partners is one of the fundamental methods of its foreign policy.[18] Given the practical example of this, the example of Georgia, one of the South Caucasus countries, can clearly be a descriptive one. Moreover, the main key point should be understood that following the 2020 ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, Russian peacekeepers entered Azerbaijan slightly more fundamentally on its post-war foreign policy. Therefore, Azerbaijan, which has Russian peacekeepers in part of its territory, understands that any change in the region is impossible without Russia's consent and therefore does not ignore the country when building its relationship either with NATO or EU institutions.

Dilemmas created by the Non-Aligned Movement

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cold War ended in many parts of the world and the NATO bloc was declared the victorious side, but soon a small Cold War broke out in the geography of the former Soviet Union, including Azerbaijan. The backdrop of this small Cold War was largely two factors. The first was the CSTO initiated by Russia. The second was a plan for NATO to move eastward. The fight had already put Russia and NATO states within a series of conflicts, not as globally as in the bipolar system.[19] Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan, like two other Southern Caucasus states, became members of the CSTO, and over time it emerged that it did not respond to Azerbaijan's national interests. On the one hand, Armenia, a member of the CSTO, continued to occupy Azerbaijan's territory and, on the other hand, Russia, the leading state of the organization, tried to protect the balance sheet in the region by arming Armenia.[20] In the years that followed, Azerbaijan pursued a balanced policy and institutionalized its realities in foreign policy.

Unlike Azerbaijan, the Georgian government, which is located in the Southern Caucasus, wants to join NATO, but Azerbaijan has always established its relationship with NATO within the framework of cooperation, not membership.[21] Azerbaijan has continued its cooperation with NATO under the Partnership for Peace program since 1994. Talks on this military alliance continued until the second phase of the IPAP program, but they were not further advanced. On the other hand, Azerbaijan's refusal to join both military organizations were because it did not want to be a place for the ongoing geopolitical struggle in the region. In that sense, Armenia from the Southern Caucasus states played a role in all projects of the Russian Federation in the region, and Georgia implemented its policy of membership in the European Union and

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[18] NAHMADOVA, F.: Influence through Trade: Russia's Power Play in Azerbaijan. 2021. https://bakuresearchinstitute.org/en/influence-through-trade-russias-power-play-in-azerbaijan/ (downloaded: 23 November 2021).

[19] WEINSTEIN, A.: Russian Phoenix: The Collective Security Treaty Organization. Whitehead Journal of Diplomacy and International Relations, 2007. p. 167.

[20] CAVID, V.: Azərbaycan Qoşulmama Hərəkatında: məqsəd və gözləntilər. In: F. MƏMMƏDOV, C. VƏLİYEV – A. MƏMMƏDOV (Eds.): AZƏRBAYCAN RESPUBLİKASININ XARİCİ SİYASƏTİNİN ƏSAS İSTİQAMƏTLƏRİ (1991-2016). Bakı, s.n., 2017. pp. 719-733.

[21] MALEK, M.: NATO and the South Caucasus: Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia on Different Tracks. Connections, 2008/3, pp. 30-51.

NATO. As a result of all these processes, Azerbaijan has always pursued an independent foreign policy in the region, resulting in a membership in the 2011 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) to internationally confirm its policy of not joining blocs. There can be no doubt that Azerbaijan's joining the Non-Aligned Movement was mainly because it maintained balanced policies in the region. Before becoming a member of the Azerbaijani Non-Aligned Movement, it was able to analyse the consequences of unbalanced politics in the region. Additionally, the Azerbaijani government was well aware that the Southern Caucasus region was a region of dominant forces, and in a world where the laconic foundations of the Cold War continued, NATO would undoubtedly not be allowed to approach the region by the dominant forces there. Therefore, as a member of the Non-Aligned Movement in 2011, it pursued a one-sided and realistic policy, both as a target of the global conflict and to ensure that the then-occupied Karabakh policy did not fall into crisis. However, as a member of this movement, not only did Azerbaijan pursue a realistic policy, but also seriously hampered both its future relations with NATO and its membership policy[22]. Currently, since 2019, the chairmanship of the Azerbaijani Cooperation Movement and the recent escalation of NATO relations with Russia have once again demonstrated that the Azerbaijani government will once again keep the NATO integration process in the framework of this dilemma as a part of cooperation, not for membership.

In addition, Azerbaijan's membership in the Non-Aligned Movement could be considered to be a dualistic manoeuvre in terms of international political cooperation. The first dualistic approach seems to be that Azerbaijan is in a region in which there are dominant powers and realist theory-based international relations, therefore, when carrying out any political act, it should consider not only its own interests, but also the interests of other dominants as appropriate. Therefore, the Non-Aligned Movement provides Azerbaijan with alternative conditions here. Thanks to NAM, it forms a balanced policy in the region, emphasizing in advance that it will not be a member in any regional, international, multinational organization, and accordingly can cooperate politically with any organization.

On the other hand, with this political manoeuvre, it can use the Non-Aligned Movement as a kind of shield for both NATO and the CSTO organization, which Russia has used for years to influence the states in the region. In this way, without violating the balance, it prevents NATO from entering the South Caucasus and ensures the interest of the dominants here, while not joining CSTO and NATO, maintaining political relations with both sides in stabilization, balancing its international policy. Therefore, although the Non-Aligned Movement is a closed gate on the path to NATO for Azerbaijan, it is also a guarantee of the stable existence of Azerbaijan in this region, where is overwhelmed by the theory of realism.

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[22] ABBASOV, S.: Azerbaijan: Facing a Choice Between NATO and NAM? 2011. https://eurasianet.org/azerbaijan-facing-a-choice-between-nato-and-nam (downloaded: 23 November 2021)

Conclusion

As a result, the argument section of the article also notes that while factors that prevent Azerbaijan from integrating into NATO have long been criticized, a realistic perspective shows that Azerbaijan has rational factors in not integrating NATO. As it turned out, the Azerbaijani state has been institutionalizing the realist approach to the theory of international relations in the South Caucasus regional policy for a long time, so it is acting in accordance with the reality of this region. Therefore, it does not pursue an unbalanced policy, making strategic mistakes, such as the neighbouring state of Georgia, or Ukraine, but it has the principle of proximity to Russia. Since some of the factors mentioned in the argumentation were once applicable to both Georgia and Ukraine, they have not been able to institutionalize it in professional foreign policy. Therefore, at different times in history, they were seriously confronted with the hard power of Russia. However, since the Azerbaijani state has long maintained this balanced policy and is aware of the realist policy of the region, it is well aware of the timing and extent of cooperation with Russia's rivals. In addition to strategic realities, there is currently no political dilemma in Azerbaijan's foreign policy, such as integrating into NATO. NATO itself is hypothetically unconscionable, and because it is clear in the Ukrainian example, it prevents Azerbaijan from pursuing a realistic radical policy. Therefore, as the policy of cooperation with NATO is known, it is the most optimal option for Azerbaijan to pursue more cooperation than membership in the existing international relations system.

From another point of view, although the NATO security paradigm has been artificially praised for many years, recent practical examples show that the NATO security paradigm is not for countries towards which step forward NATO, but its members. For instance, Georgia's steps, believing in NATO cooperation and losing its territories, Ukraine's free policy, relying on NATO's support, and its only release in the camp of threats are concrete descriptive examples of assumptions of realistic theory. Moreover, the confidence of Article 5 available to NATO members is also under the hypothetical question. Since this article was used only in the events of 11 September against terrorism in Afghanistan, the question is whether it will work under any threat against such an incredibly large state of tangible and intangible resources as Russia. As a result, Azerbaijan has instituted these normative and descriptive realities into its policy from practical and theoretical conclusions for many years, and therefore has been acting according to the political psychology of its region and its existing limits. At least, this is already a reality that the realistic theory of maintaining sovereignty as a state should be at least one of the attributes of a state.

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KALEAB TADESSE SIGATU[1]

FOOD SECURITY AS A MATTER OF NATIONAL SECURITY: LESSON LEARNED FROM RUSSIA–UKRAINE WAR FOR ETHIOPIA AND THE HORN OF AFRICAN STATES

Abstract

This paper aims to offer an overview of the impact of the Ukraine-Russia conflict in the Horn of Africa region. The war has exposed the region's dependence on food imports. The two warring nations are the suppliers of most of the region's wheat and maize, sunflower oil, and fertilizer. The paper is based on the theoretical approach from the securitization theory of the Copenhagen School and methodologically it employed empirical examination of literatures on the subject matter of food security from various sources. The paper concludes food security is not a humanitarian problem, and it should be seen as a national security matter. It also commends AfCFTA, the drive of some initiatives that are working on African agriculture, and the recent efforts of Ethiopia to tackle food insecurity.

Keywords: Russia-Ukraine war, National Security, Food Security, Horn of Africa, Ethiopia

Introductions

Food security became at the top of global agenda, especially for African states, when the powerhouse producers and exporters of basic food staples got in to war, as a result halting food export to the global market. In late February 2022, Russian forces launched a military attack against Ukraine. The attack began on the morning of 24 February, when Russian President Valdmir Putin announced a 'special military operation' against Ukraine. It became a full-scale war, one of Europe's largest wars since World War II. Due to this NATO activated for the first time in its history elements of its Response Force, which includes the deployment of a multitude of air, land, and maritime assets throughout the eastern front, especially to reinforce the security of countries neighboring the conflict zone and Russia, such as the Baltic States, Poland and Romania.[2] In addition, this Russian action was immediately met with heavy Western sanctions on Russian institutions and figures, including President Vladmir Putin himself,[3] while global prices for key commodities like oil and natural gas have skyrocketed because of the conflict.[4] Russian banks removed from the

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[1] ORCID: 0000-0003-0013-7827

[2] STARR, Barbara – HERB, Jeremy: NATO Response Force activated for first time. cnn.com, 25 February 2022, https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/25/politics/nato-ukraine-russia/index.html (downloaded: 01 November 2022)

[3] Al Jazeera (2022a): List of sanctions against Russia after it invaded Ukraine. Al Jazeera, March 3 https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/25/list-of-sanctions-on-russia-after-invasion (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[4] CHAUSOVSKY, Eugege: The Russia-Ukraine Conflict: Accelerating a Multi-Polar World. Al-Jazeera Center for Studies, 21 April 2022,

international financial messaging system Swift and The US, EU, UK and other countries have sanctioned more than 1,000 Russian individuals and businesses, all Russian flights are banned from US, UK, EU and Canadian airspace.[5]

The world grain trade has also been severely disrupted by the war. One of the largest exporters of grains worldwide, Ukraine faced risks when shipping grain to foreign markets due to Ukrainian ports on the Black Sea, like the key city of Odesa, are under blockade. Russian fleets are blocking the route, and the area became heavily mined.[6] Ukraine provides about 10 percent of the global share of wheat exports, and almost half of the world's sunflower oil. Alongside Russia, Ukraine makes this region one of the world's "breadbaskets".[7] In 2021, both the Russian Federation and Ukraine ranked amongst the top three global exporters of wheat, maize, rapeseed, sunflower seeds and sunflower oil.[8] In addition, Russia, the world's top exporter of nitrogen fertilizers, the second leading supplier of potassium fertilizers, and the third largest exporter of phosphorous fertilizers, limited its fertilizer exports in response to the sanctions.[9] Fears of a global grain shortage arose as a result, raising the possibility of starvation in most of developing nations.

The impacts of the war in Ukraine are being felt not only regionally, but also around the world because of the region's significant contribution to food and energy supplies. Commodity prices are reaching record highs across the board. On 8 April 2022, the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) published its third consecutive record food price index. Food prices are 34 percent higher than in 2021 and have never been this high since FAO started recording them. Similarly, crude oil prices have increased by around 60 percent, and gas and fertilizer prices have more than doubled.[10]

Specifically, the invasion of Ukraine has disrupted energy and food supply chains in sub-Saharan Africa and exposed their vulnerability and law resilience, which threaten to have major consequences on food security and socio political stability in

https://studies.aljazeera.net/en/analyses/russia-ukraine-conflict-accelerating-multi-polar-world (downloaded: 09 October 2022)

[5] BBC News: What are the sanctions on Russia and are they hurting its economy? BBC News, 30 September 2022, https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-60125659 (downloaded: October 24, 2022)

[6] KIRBYJEN, Jen: Why grain can't get out of Ukraine: About 20 million tons sit in storage, as this season's harvest begins. vox.com, 20 June 2022, https://www.vox.com/23171151/ukraine-grain-wheat-russia-black-sea-odesa-food-crisis (downloaded: 09 October 2022)

[7] Ibid.

[8] WFP (2022b): Impact of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict on WFP Operations in Eastern Africa. ReliefWeb.int, July, 2022 https://reliefweb.int/report/world/impact-russia-ukraine-conflict-wfp-operations-eastern-africa-july-2022 (downloaded: 13 October 2022)

[9] Reuters: Russia extends quotas for fertilizer exports to help domestic farmers. reuters.com, 31 May 2022, https://www.reuters.com/article/ukraine-crisis-russia-fertilisers-idUSKBN2NH1G4 (downloaded: 02 October 2022)

[10] UNCTAD: Trade and Development Report 2021. United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, 28 October 2021, https://unctad.org/webflyer/trade-and-development-report-2021 (downloaded: 01 October 2022)

the continent.[11] War in Ukraine has also exposed the region's chronic dependence on food imports.[12] Wheat imports account for about 90% of Africa's $4 billion trade with Russia and nearly half of the continent's $4.5 billion trade with Ukraine.[13] Due to this condition, June 3, 2022, Senegalese President and African Union (AU) Chairman, Macky Sall traveled to Russia to discuss the release of grain stocks that had been halted in Ukraine as a result of the conflict.[14] Macky Sall criticized the circumstance: *"Anti-Russia sanctions have made this situation worse and now we do not have access to grain from Russia, primarily to wheat. Most importantly, we do not have access to fertilizer. The situation was bad and now it has become worse, creating a threat to food security in Africa."*[15]

June 20, 2022, President Zelensky addressed the AU virtually. However, only 4 out of 54 African leaders showed up: Macky Sall, President of Senegal and current AU Chairperson, Alassane Ouattara, President of Cote d'Ivoire, Mohammed al-Menfi, President of the Libyan Council and Denis Sassou Nguesso, President of the Republic of Congo. The meeting was held behind closed door although a few excerpts are accessible. In his speech, Zelensky said

„…Africa is actually a hostage. It is a hostage of those who unleashed war against out state. It was not for the Russian war people in Africa people in Asia and elsewhere in the world would not suffer from the catastrophic rise in food prices."[16]

„…This war may seem very distant to you and your countries. However, catastrophically raising food prices have already brought it home to millions of African families. As well as to many families in Asia, Europe, Latin America. The unjust and provoked by the Russian war high level of food prices is painfully felt on all continents. Unfortunately, this can become a particular problem for your countries. We need to take into account various factors – population growth the African continent, the ongoing economic recovery after the pandemic, the lack of domestic financial resources in many countries to buy food at much higher prices. Given the physical shortage in the global market, some countries on African continent find it particularly difficult to maintain the necessary food supplies."[17]

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[11] HATAB, Assem A.: Intra-African trade key for long-term food security. YouTube, 19 September 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=NFp0mvTLtNw (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[12] VERKOOIJEN, Patrick et al: Out of Ukraine war, a plan for Africa's food security. afdb.org, 25 March 2022, https://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/opinion-out-ukraine-war-plan-africas-food-security-50555 (downloaded: 11 October 2022)

[13] Ibid.

[14] KLOMEGAH, Kester K.: Vladimir Putin meets with AU Chairperson and Senegalese Macky Sall. 5 June 2022, https://moderndiplomacy.eu/2022/06/05/vladimir-putin-meets-with-au-chairperson-and-senegalese-macky-sall/ (downloaded: 09 October 2022)

[15] Klomegah 2022).

[16] CGTN Africa Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy addresses African Union. YouTube, 22 June 2022 https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=c5uVMm6JAKI (downloaded: 01 October 2022)

[17] The African: Zelensky gives a speech to African Union. YouTube, 21 June 2022, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ylqjeXS6toc (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

On August 1, the first ship carrying more than 26,000 metric tons of Ukrainian maize has left the Black Sea port of Odesa because of United Nations and Turkey brokered an agreement between Russia and Ukraine.[18] The first ship carrying Ukrainian grain to the Horn of Africa since beginning of conflict arrives in Djibouti on 30 of August.[19] According to Mike Dunford, East Africa regional director for the UN's World Food Program (WFP), the shipment will feed 1.5 million people, for one month in Ethiopia.[20]

According to Patrick Verkooijen et al, Africa's food crisis has been building for some time because of climate change is disrupting weather patterns and damaging agriculture, not only in Africa but also in many parts of the world, which is behind rocketing food prices.[21] Moreover, food insecurity was global agenda before the war. A resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 25 September 2015, 'Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development' targeted seventeen goals. Goal number two was "End hunger, achieve food security and improved nutrition and promote sustainable agriculture".[22] However, according to 'The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022' report the world is moving in the wrong direction and food insecurity further deteriorated in 2021.[23] Moreover, according to FAO's World Food and Agriculture - Statistical Yearbook 2021, the global level of the prevalence of undernourishment (PoU) has increased sharply between 2019 and 2020, mostly due to the COVID-19 pandemic. The PoU in Africa is the highest among all regions and in 2020, 21% of its population were undernourished.[24]

Some African leaders are exasperated by the status quo, like the President of Rwanda, Paul Kagame made a very cogent speech asserting as follows:
„It is unacceptable that Ukraine a country of 44 Million people will feed Africa a continent of 1.4 billion people. I promise all Rwandans that Rwanda will attain food self-sufficiency before 2025. I have authorized 1 billion dollar worth of farming Materials, and all logistics involved in boosting up our farming industry."[25]

[18] Al Jazeera (2022b): First grain ship leaves Ukraine: What, where and why it matters. Al Jazeera, August 01, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/8/1/first-grain-ship-leaves-ukraine-what-where-and-why-this-matters (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

[19] WILKINS, Henry: First Ship Carrying Ukrainian Grain to Africa Since Beginning of Conflict Arrives in Djibouti. voanews.com, 30 August 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/first-ship-carrying-ukrainian-grain-to-africa-since-beginning-of-conflict-arrives-in-djibouti-/6722878.html (downloaded: 09 October 2022)

[20] Ibid.

[21] The African (2022) op. cit.

[22] UN: Transforming our world: the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, 25 September 2015 https://sdgs.un.org/2030agenda (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[23] FAO et al: The State of Food Security and Nutrition in the World 2022. Repurposing food and agricultural policies to make healthy diets more affordable. fao.org, 20 November 2022, https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cc0639en (downloaded: 01 October 2022)

[24] FAO: World Food and Agriculture – Statistical Yearbook 2021. fao.org, 2021, https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cb4477en (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[25] QUENUM, Olmeta: Rwanda: Paul Kagame promises Rwandans food self-sufficiency by 2025. afro-impact.com, 16 June 2022, https://www.afro-impact.com/en/rwanda-paul-kagame-promises-rwandans-food-self-sufficiency-by-

Moreover, Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed has urging government officials and all stakeholders to commit themselves to nation's aspirations for wheat self-sufficiency and export.

„There is no country that has achieved sustainable benefits, sustainable change, sustainable development through aid. There is only permanent dependence on aid. Perpetual dependence means being a parasite, not being independent. If we can act aggressively coming together, and get ourselves and our people out of this kind of issue [aid]; In the current situation, sovereignty is not separate from food. Self-sufficiency in food means being able to ensure the sovereignty of a country. ...When we finish the term that we got through democratic elections. Wheat in Ethiopia, milk in Ethiopia, honey in Ethiopia, meat in Ethiopia, eggs in Ethiopia, chicken in Ethiopia, should not be an issue. We want to create an environment where people can work and eat after earning money. Our time is very short. This government has had a maximum of less than 4 years."[26]

The Concept of National Security

It is the Human Development Report of 1994 for the first time that made a paradigm shift on the perception of security. It states, *"From nuclear security to human security. For ordinary people security symbolized protection from the threat of disease, hunger, unemployment, crime, social conflict, political repression and environmental hazards. ...Human security is not a concern with weapons-it is a concern with human life and dignity."*[27] Security in traditional sense is all about military security. It was interpreted narrowly *"as security of territory from external aggression, or as protection of national interests in foreign policy or as global security from the threat of a nuclear holocaust. It has been related more to nation-states than to people"*.[28] The concept of human security stresses that people should be able to take care of themselves: all people should have the opportunity to meet their most essential needs and to earn their own living.[29]

The 1994 Human development report argued 'the concept of security must thus change urgently in two basic ways: from an exclusive stress on territorial security to a much greater stress on people's security; and from security through armaments to security through sustainable human development. Moreover, listed seven main categories of threats to human security: economic security, food security, health security, environmental security, personal security, community security and political security.[30]

2025/#:~:text=According%20to%20Rwandan%20President%20Paul,food%20self%2Dsuf ficiency%20before%202025 (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[26] FBC (2022a): PM Abiy urges stakeholders to commit themselves to nation's aspirations for wheat self-sufficiency, export. fanabc.com, 09 October 2022, https://www.fanabc.com/english/pm-abiy-urges-stakeholders-to-commit-themselves-to-nations-aspirations-for-wheat-self-sufficiency-export/ (downloaded: 01 October 2022)

[27] UNDP: Human Development Report. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994

[28] Ibid.

[29] Ibid.

[30] Ibid.

The Copenhagen School of security studies places particular emphasis on the non-military aspects of security, representing a shift away from traditional security studies. Security is perceived as a survival phenomenon[31] Barry Buzan argue as follows that security is about fulfilling all conditions necessary for existence and survival.

„Security is taken to be about the pursuit of freedom from threat and the ability of states and societies to maintain their independent identity and their functional integrity against forces of change, which they see as hostile. The bottom line of security is survival, but it also reasonably includes a substantial range of concerns about the conditions of existence. Quite where this range of concerns ceases to merit the urgency of the "security" label (which identifies threats as significant enough to warrant emergency action and exceptional measures including the use of force) and becomes part of everyday uncertainties of life is one of the difficulties of the concept."[32]

In order to explain the various approaches to the global war on terror issue and, more recently, to the issue of food shortages and food insecurity, particularly in Africa, the conceptual framework of the Copenhagen school of securitization studies has also been used.[33] The Copenhagen securitization theory was also used in terms of its view on the clustered nature of security in a geographical region, in relation to the Horn of Africa.[34]

Defining Food Security

The 1994 Human Development Report defined food security as *"all people at all times have both physical and economic access to basic food. This requires not just enough food to go round. It requires that people have ready access to food-that they have an 'entitlement' to food, by growing it for themselves, by buying it or by taking advantage of a public food distribution system."*[35]

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[31] Moller, B.: Towards a New Global Military Order? In Working Papers. Copenhagen, Copenhagen Peace Research Institute, 1997/23;
Ivančík, Radoslav: Security theory: Security as a multidimensional phenomenon. Vojenské reflexive. 2021/3. pp. 32-53;
Diskaya, Ali: Towards a Critical Securitization Theory: The Copenhagen and Aberystwyth Schools of Security Studies. e-ir.info, 01 February 2013, https://www.e-ir.info/2013/02/01/towards-a-critical-securitization-theory-the-copenhagen-and-aberystwyth-schools-of-security-studies/ (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[32] Buzan, Barry: New Patterns of Global Security in the Twenty-first Century. International Affairs, 1991/3, pp. 432-433.

[33] Ladan, Ruqayyah M.: Food Insecurity in the Horn of Africa: Challenges and Prospects. A Thesis in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Master of Arts in International Relations. Eastern Mediterranean University. Gazimagusa, North Cyprus, 2017.

[34] Sigatu, Kaleab, T.: Military Power as Foreign Policy Instrument: Post-1991 Ethiopian Peace Support Operations in the Horn of Africa. Ph.D. Dissertation in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Military Sciences. Doctoral School of Military Sciences, National University of Public Service. Budapest, Hungary, 2021

[35] UNDP (1994) op. cit.

According to FAO et al, food security exists:

„When all people, at all times, have physical, social and economic access to sufficient, safe and nutritious food which meets their dietary needs and food preferences for an active and healthy life. Household food security is the application of this concept to the family level, with individuals within households as the focus of concern. On the other hand, food insecurity exists when people do not have adequate physical, social or economic access to food as defined above."[36]

Food security can be composed of three dimensions. First, the physical availability of food through production, import, or aid in sufficient quantities and on a consistent basis. Second, food access that is sufficient resources are available to obtain appropriate foods for a nutritious diet, and third food use that is able to utilize the food appropriately based on knowledge of basic nutrition and care, as well as adequate water and sanitation for nutrient absorption.[37]

The Committee on World Food Security also stated there are four pillars of food security are food availability, access to food, utilization and stability. In addition to this, the nutritional dimension is integral to the concept of food security.[38] US Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) defines food security as perceived and physical four supplies sufficient to meet basic needs and preferences at every level—individual, community, state, and global.[39]

World Food Summits

The first world food conference or summit have taken place in 1943, which led to the creation of the FAO. Then that led to formulation of 'food security' as a concept originated only in the mid-1970s, in the discussions of international food problems at a time of global food crisis.[40] It was used at the second World Food Conference took place in Rome from 5-16 November 1974, which was organized by FAO. At the conference, the Universal Declaration on the Eradication of Hunger and Malnutrition[41] was also adopted. Food security was defined at the conference as:
"availability at all times of adequate world food supplies of basic foodstuffs to sustain a steady expansion of food consumption and to offset fluctuations in production and

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[36] FAO et al. (2022) op. cit.
[37] SULERI, Abid: Hunger: A National Security Threat. un.org, June 2012, https://www.un.org/en/chronicle/article/hunger-national-security-threat (downloaded: 21 October 2022); ODNI: Global Food Security. fas.org, 22 September 2015, http://fas.org/irp/nic/globalfood.pdf (downloaded: 11 October 2022)
[38] CFS Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition. fao.org, 22 June 2011, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/cfs/Docs1011/WG_GSF/GSF_annotated_outline _formatted_Rev1_22_Jun_11.pdf (downloaded: 08 October 2022)
[39] ODNI (2015) op. cit.
[40] FAO: Trade reforms and food security: conceptualizing the linkages. Commodity Policy and Projections Service Commodities and Trade Division Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 22 October 2003, http://www.fao.org/documents/show_cdr.asp?url_file=/DOCREP/005/Y4671E/Y4671E00 .HTM (downloaded: 01 November 2022)
[41] UN: Report of the World Food Conference. un.org, 16 November 1974 https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/701143?ln=en (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

prices."[42] Also it led to the creation of the Committee on World Food Security (CFS), an intergovernmental body to serve as a forum in the United Nations System for review and follow up of food security policies.

The third summit, World Food Summit, which was organized by FAO was held at FAO Headquarters in Rome, Italy, from 13 to 17 November 1996. The outcome of the summit was the adoption of 'Rome Declaration on World Food Security' and 'World Food Summit Plan of Action', the Rome Declaration on World Food Security introductory statements reads as follows:

„We, the Heads of State and Government, or our representatives, gathered at the World Food Summit at the invitation of the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, reaffirm the right of everyone to have access to safe and nutritious food, consistent with the right to adequate food and the fundamental right of everyone to be free from hunger.
We pledge our political will and our common and national commitment to achieving food security for all and to an ongoing effort to eradicate hunger in all countries, with an immediate view to reducing the number of undernourished people to half their present level no later than 2015."[43]

The forth 'World Food Summit: five years later' was held at FAO Headquarters in Rome, Italy, from 10 to 13 June 2002. The summit adapted the 'Declaration of World Food Summit: five years later' which focused human right to food.[44] The fifth summit was held in Rome, 16-18 November 2009, World Summit on Food Security, and one of the most important outcomes of the summit was the Declaration of World Summit on Food Security that focused on common systems for food-price crises.[45] Finally, last year 'World Food Systems Summit 2021' took place on 23 September 2021, during the UN General Assembly in New York. Its focus was to set the stage for global food systems transformation to achieve the Sustainable Development Goals by 2030.[46]

It is also important to note that FAO by the 127th Session of the FAO Council November 2004 adopted the Voluntary Guidelines to Support the Progressive Realization of the Right to Adequate Food in the Context of National Food Security, providing practical guidance to States in their implementation of the right to adequate food.[47]

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[42] Ibid.
[43] FAO: Rome Declaration and Plan of Action. fao.org, 17 November 1996, https://www.fao.org/3/w3613e/w3613e00.htm#Note1 (downloaded: 09 October 2022)
[44] FAO: Report of the World Food Summit: five years later 10-13. fao.org, 2002 June, https://www.fao.org/3/Y7106E/Y7106E00.htm#TopOfPage (downloaded: 08 October 2022)
[45] FAO: Declaration of the World Summit on Food Security. fao.org, 18 November 2009, http://www.fao.org/fileadmin/templates/wsfs/Summit/Docs/Final_Declaration/WSFS09_Declaration.pdf (downloaded: 08 October 2022)
[46] IISD: Event: 2021 UN Food Systems Summit. IISD, 23 September 2021, https://sdg.iisd.org/events/2021-un-food-systems-summit/ (downloaded: 09 October 2022)
[47] FAO: Voluntary Guidelines: to support the progressive realization of the right to adequate food in the context of national food security. fao.org, 2005, https://www.fao.org/3/y7937e/y7937e00.htm#:~:text=Right%20to%20Food%20Guidelines,Food%20Summit%20Plan%20of%20Action (downloaded: 02 October 2022)

Food Security as a National Security Concern

Ehud Eiran, Michaela Elias and Aron M. Troen, scholars from Stanford University and Hebrew University of Jerusalem brought three important historical events; two from antiquity and one contemporary history about access to food and national security are tightly connected. They mentioned in the Bible, Joseph rose to power after resolving Egypt's food shortages and as early as perhaps the Zhou dynasty, numerous Chinese emperors lost the "mandate of Heaven," or the right to rule, when they failed to address famines. In addition, recently the Norwegian Nobel Committee awarded the 2020 Nobel Peace Prize to the World Food Programme for *"bettering conditions for peace in conflict-affected areas and for acting as a driving force in efforts to prevent the use of hunger as a weapon of war and conflict."*[48]

The three scholars described how food – and the lack thereof – affect national security in three ways or 'hierarchy of threats'.[49] A first-order threat could be a direct threat to the food supply, like withholding food during times of war. A second-order threat could be the possibility of social unrest when public access to food is questioned, like the bread riots that occurred in Egypt in 1977 after the end of food subsidies; and a third-order threat could be problems that arise from ongoing conditions of restricted food access, like weak governance or displaced populations. In regard to the direct threat to food supply, even though *"intentionally using starvation of civilians as a method of warfare by depriving them of objects indispensable to their survival, including willfully impeding relief supplies as provided for under the Geneva Conventions"*[50] constitutes a war crime in international armed conflicts, food is still a common weapon of war.

US Senator Pat Roberts from Kansas said, *"Show me a nation that can't feed itself, and I'll show you a nation in chaos."*[51] It is a common sense that hunger and poverty make communities more susceptible to conflict, violence, and instability. To be a secure state, household or individual must have access to adequate food at all times. Johanna M. Forman argue that *"the increasing attention paid to food's impact on poverty, humanitarian crises, conflicts and climate change all suggest that food security is a national security concern."*[52] Uganda, for example, has merged its Ministry of Agriculture's National Agricultural Advisory Services (NAADS) into its Ministry of Defense.[53]

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[48] EIRAN, Ehud et al.: No Bread, No Peace: National security experts need to put food back on the table as a core issue. foreignpolicy.com, 23 January 2021, https://foreignpolicy.com/2021/01/23/food-hunger-national-security-issue-instability/ (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

[49] Ibid.

[50] ICRC: Customary IHL – Practice Relating to Rule 53. Starvation as a Method of Warfare. icrc.org, n.d. https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/customary-ihl/eng/docs/v2_rul_rule53 (downloaded 22 October 2022)

[51] SOVA, Chase: Hunger Is Making the World Less Stable — Malnutrition Deeply thenewhumanitarian.org, 10 April 2018, https://deeply.thenewhumanitarian.org/malnutrition/community/2018/04/10/hunger-is-making-the-world-less-stable (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[52] FORMAN, Johanna M.: Should Food Security be a National Security Issue? Stimson Center, 22 April 2015, https://www.stimson.org/2015/should-food-security-be-national-security-issue/ (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[53] Ibid.

Johanna M. Forman strongly argue as follows food security should be viewed as a national security matter by policy makers:

„By mid-century the world will have 9 billion people to feed. Access to food will be a challenge, not because the planet cannot grow enough for all, but because there will be barriers that prevent its even distribution. Putting food security on the national security agenda will allow policymakers throughout government to create a national strategy that does not dissociate the consequences of climate change, the reduction of water supplies, the impact of urbanization, and ongoing conflicts from the responsibility to feed our citizens. Food can no longer be an isolated issue in the broader conversation about the security and development of the global commons."[54]

Therefore, improving food security offers the best chance for long-term peace and is the most efficient way to prevent war. Finally yet importantly, according to Johanna M. Forman, *"Hunger is not just a byproduct of war; it can also be the root of instability."*[55]

Food Security in the Horn of Africa

The Horn of Africa region, for this study includes eight countries of the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) member states: Djibouti, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Kenya, Somalia, South Sudan, Sudan and Uganda. IGAD is also one of the regional economic communities (RECs) of the African Union. Eritrea suspended its IGAD membership in 2007 over its border rift with Ethiopia. Following the peace deal with Ethiopia in 2018 there is a high probability it will be rejoining. These states are found in a same regional security complex.[56] Where the dynamics of security contained within operates in interconnected spectrum of military, political, economic, societal and environmental sectors.

About 70 to 75 percent of the IGAD region is made up of arid and semi-arid lands, which receive less than 600 mm of rainfall annually; the rest has a great variety of climates and landscapes including cool highlands, swamp areas, tropical rainforests and other features typical of an equatorial region.[57] The Table 1 show land area, arable land, forest area and the population of the Horn of Africa states.

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[54]   Ibid.
[55]   Ibid.
[56]   MESFIN, Berouk: The Horn of Africa Security Complex. In Sharamo, Roba and Berouk Mesfin. Regional Security in the Post-Cold War Horn of Africa. Institute for Security Studies (ISS). Monograph, 2011, p. 178.;
       HETTEYEY, Andras – MARSAI, Viktor: Africa and the Regional Security Complexes Theory. In: HADA, Bela et al. (Eds.): Regional Security Studies. Budapest, NKE Szolgáltató Nonprofit Ltd. 2016;
       CLAPHAM, Christopher: The Horn of Africa: State formation and Decay. London: Hurst & Company, 2017;
       SIGATU (2021) op. cit.
[57]   IGAD AED: Agriculture and Environment Division at a Glance. The Intergovernmental Authority on Development, July 2020, https://resilience.igad.int/wp-content/uploads/2020/08/Agriculture-and-Environment-Division-at-a-Glance-1.pdf (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

	Country	Land area (sq. km)	Arable land (% of land area)	Forest area (% of land area)	Population (As of 2021)
1	Djibouti	23,180	0.1	0.3	1,002,197
2	Eritrea	121,040.8	5.7	8.7	3,213,969
3	Ethiopia	1,128,571.3	14.4	15.1	117,876,226
4	Kenya	569,140	10.4	6.3	54,985,702
5	Somalia	627,340	1.8	9.5	16,359,500
6	South Sudan	631,930	3.8	11.3	11,381,377
7	Sudan	1,868,000	11.2	9.8	44,909,351
8	Uganda	200,520	34.4	11.7	47,123,533

Table 1: Land area (2020), arable land (2020), Forest area (2020) and population (2021)[58]

Arable land is a land that can be used for growing crops. Sub-Saharan Africa has the largest area of arable uncultivated land in the world.[59] It has 60% of the world's uncultivated arable land.[60] As of 2020, Russia's arable land is 7.4% and Ukraine's 56.8%.[61] In regards to the Horn of Africa states, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Sudan has the top three arable land in the region.

Forest area is one of the most important aspects of food security. It provide ecosystem services water regulation, soil fertility and conservation, pollination services, temperature regulation, all of which support sustainable and resilient food systems.[62] It is also important to note that, according to a study be Center for International Forestry Research, countries with higher agricultural yields have lower deforestation rates.[63] As of 2020, 49.8% Russia and 16.7 % Ukraine is covered by forest.[64] In regards to the Horn of Africa states, only Ethiopia, South Sudan and Uganda has more than 10% of their land is covered by forest.

[58] World Bank (2022a): World Bank Open Data. https://data.worldbank.org/ (downloaded: 08 October 2022)
[59] FAO and ITU: Status of digital agriculture in 47 sub-Saharan African countries. fao.org, 07 March 2022, https://www.fao.org/documents/card/en/c/cb7943en (downloaded: 09 October 2022)
[60] World Economic Forum: How Africa can feed the world | World Economic Forum (weforum.org). 22 June 2016, https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2016/01/how-africa-can-feed-the-world/ (downloaded: 08 October 2022)
[61] World Bank (2022a) op. cit.
[62] NURHASAN, Mulia et al.: Contribution of Forests, Trees and Agroforestry to Sustainable Food Security and Nutrition in a Time of Crisis. cgiar.org, 7 July 2020, https://a4nh.cgiar.org/2020/07/07/contribution-of-forests-trees-and-agroforestry-to-sustainable-food-security-and-nutrition-in-a-time-of-crisis/#:~:text=Forests%2C%20trees%20and%20agroforestry%20provide,to%20the%20diversification%20of%20diets. (downloaded: 11 October 2022)
[63] SUNDERLAND, T. et al: Food security and nutrition: The role of forests. Discussion Paper. Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), 2013, https://www.cifor.org/knowledge/publication/4103/ (downloaded: 08 October 2022)
[64] World Bank (2020a) op. cit.

In regards to share of agriculture, forestry and fishing employment in total employment, as of 2020, in Africa, it was 49.5%, Americas 9.4%, Asia 30%. Europe 5.2%, Oceania 11.9%. Table 2 shows the share of employment in the agriculture, forestry and fishing employment sector in the Horn of Africa states.

	Country	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019
1	Djibouti	40.1	36.9	32.8	28.2	24.6
2	Eritrea	68.0	67.8	67.3	65.5	63.1
3	Ethiopia	76.7	78.1	74.0	69.4	66.6
4	Kenya	48.7	61.1	60.3	57.3	54.3
5	Somalia	83.2	82.6	81.8	81.0	80.3
6	South Sudan	65.7	64.2	62.8	61.8	60.4
7	Sudan	51.6	49.0	45.7	41.2	38.4
8	Uganda	70.0	68.3	66.8	72.3	72.1

Table 2. Share of Agriculture, forestry and Fishing employment in total employment (percentage)[65]

Except Djibouti and Sudan, agricultural sector employed more than 50% of the population even though the region is under food shortage. For example, Ethiopia and Kenya also Djibouti designated by Global Hunger Index (GHI) with a serious hunger level, Somalia and South Sudan were designated as alarming level in 2021.[66] The agricultural sector is not productive to feed the whole population in the region. One of the reasons for this is according to Hannah Ritchie is labor productivity in the agricultural sector is poor in sub-Saharan Africa.[67] Moreover, the majority (82%) of those in extreme poverty live in rural areas, and more than three-quarters (76%) of working adults in extreme poverty are employed in agriculture sub-Saharan Africa.[68]

In addition, the Global Food Security Index (GFSI) evaluates food security in 113 countries across four key pillars: affordability, availability, quality and safety, and sustainability and adaptation. Kenya rank 82nd, Uganda 93rd, Ethiopia 100th and Sudan 105th out of 113 countries in the world.[69]

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[65] FAO (2021) op. cit.

[66] GHI: Global, Regional, and National Trends - Global Hunger Index (GHI) - peer-reviewed annual publication designed to comprehensively measure and track hunger at the global, regional, and country levels. globalhungerindex.org, 2022, https://www.globalhungerindex.org/trends.html (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[67] RITCHIE, Hannah: Increasing agricultural productivity across Sub-Saharan Africa is one of the most important problems this century. Our World in Data, 04 April 2022, https://ourworldindata.org/africa-yields-problem (downloaded: 02 October 2022)

[68] CASTANEDA, R. et al: Who are the poor in the developing world? worldbank.org, 2016 October https://documents1.worldbank.org/curated/en/187011475416542282/pdf/WPS7844.pdf (downloaded: 09 October 2022)

[69] The Economist: Global Food Security Index (GFSI). economist.com, 20 September 2022, https://impact.economist.com/sustainability/project/food-security-index/download-the-index (downloaded: 04 October 2022)

In regards to import dependency, Table 3 shows cereal import dependency. On the table, the higher the value of the indicator, the higher the dependence. Specifically, the cereal imports dependency ratio tells how much of the available domestic food supply of cereals has been imported and how much comes from the country's own production. It is computed as (cereal imports – cereal exports)/ (cereal production+cereal imports – cereal exports) * 100. Given this formula the indicator assumes only values less than or equal to 100. Negative values indicate that the country is a net exporter of cereals. The indicator is calculated in three-year averages, to reduce the impact of possible errors in estimated production and trade, due to the difficulties in properly accounting for stock variations in major foods. Wheat, rice paddy, barley, maize, popcorn, rye, oats, millets, sorghum, buckwheat, quinoa, fonio, triticale, canary seed, mixed grain and cereals nes are all considered cereals.

	Country	2011-2013	2012-2014	2013-2015	2014-2016	2015-2017	2016-2018
1	Djibouti	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
2	Eritrea	-	-	-	-	-	-
3	Ethiopia	7.0	5.6	5.9	7.7	7.9	7.5
4	Kenya	32.7	34.1	36.2	42.9	43.7	44.1
5	Somalia	-	-	-	-	-	-
6	South Sudan	-	-	-	-	-	-
7	Sudan	18.3	18.8	25.6	25.7	29.7	23.6
8	Uganda	8.6	7.9	5.1	5.0	4.8	5.2

Table 3. Cereal Import Dependency Ratio (percentage)[70]

There were no data for Eritrea, Somalia and South Sudan. Whereas Djibouti depend on imported food 100%, Kenya more than 40% and Sudan more than 20%. Ethiopia and Uganda though their import of cereals is less than 10%, both states are aid dependent states. Ethiopia one of the largest recipients of food aid in the world.[71] Currently, 20.4 million people are in need of food assistance in Ethiopia, 4.5 million internally displaced persons across the country due to conflict and drought, and 11.5 million people WFP aims to reach in 2022.[72] Table 4 shows specific wheat import dependency on Russia and Ukraine.

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[70] FAO (2021) op. cit.
[71] SIYOUM, Aschale et al: Food aid and dependency syndrome in Ethiopia: Local perceptions. Journal of Humanitarian Assistance. 27 November 2012, https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/food-aid-and-dependency-syndrome-ethiopia-local-perceptions (downloaded: 01 October 2022);
The New Humanitarian: Struggling to end food aid dependency. thenewhumanitarian.org, 3 November 2015, https://www.thenewhumanitarian.org/report/58056/ethiopia-struggling-end-food-aid-dependency (downloaded: 21 August 2022)
[72] WFP (2022c): Ethiopia. World Food Programme, https://www.wfp.org/countries/ethiopia (downloaded: 02 November 2022)

	Horn of African states	Russia	Ukraine
1	Djibouti	56%	-
2	Eritrea	53%	47%
3	Ethiopia	18%	20%
4	Kenya	21%	14%
5	Somalia	43%	50%
6	South Sudan	No data	No data
7	Sudan	32%	3%
8	Uganda	23%	13%

Table 4. Wheat import dependency, net importers in 2021 from Russia and Ukraine (%)[73]

Wheat and wheat products account for 25 percent of the average total cereal consumption in Eastern Africa with the highest consumption per capita in Djibouti, Eritrea and Sudan. Up to 84 percent of wheat, demand in the region is met by imports.[74] Nearly all the wheat sold in Somalia comes from Ukraine and Russia, According to WFP considering reliance on direct imports from Russia and Ukraine, rising global prices since the start of the war and significant internal challenges, Sudan, Kenya, Ethiopia, Somalia and South Sudan are likely to be the hardest hit.[75] Moreover, Russia and Ukraine supplied 78 percent and 95 percent of sunflower-seed oil imports to Kenya and Sudan respectively.[76]

The Horn of Africa is suffering from persistent drought and countries that depend on Russia and Ukraine for wheat and sunflower oil imports have seen prices skyrocket out of reach of ordinary people.[77] According to OCHA, across the Horn of Africa, at least 36.1 million people are affected by severe drought, including 24.1 million in Ethiopia, 7.8 million in Somalia and 4.2 million in Kenya.[78] In Somalia, about 740,000 people in the drought-affected areas are estimated to live within territory controlled by Al-Shabaab and remain largely out of reach, while more than 2 million people live in hard-to-reach areas.[79] Conflict, drought, and macroeconomic difficulties all combined to raise the number of people in Ethiopia who are severely food insecure. In southern Ethiopia, conflict and drought overlap, including in southern Oromia (especially in rural Guji and West Guji zones) and parts of Somali

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[73] FAO: The Importance of Ukraine and the Russian Federation for Global Agricultural Markets and the Risks Associated with the War in Ukraine. fao.org, 10 June 2022, https://www.fao.org/3/cb9013en/cb9013en.pdf (downloaded: 02 October 2022)

[74] WFP (2022b) op. cit.

[75] Ibid.

[76] Ibid.

[77] World Bank (2022b): Putting Africans at the Heart of Food Security and Climate Resilience. worldbank.org, 17 October 2022, https://www.worldbank.org/en/news/immersive-story/2022/10/17/putting-africans-at-the-heart-of-food-security-and-climate-resilience (downloaded: 02 November 2022)

[78] OCHA: Horn of Africa Drought: Regional Humanitarian Overview & Call to Action. reliefweb.int, 21 September 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/horn-africa-drought-regional-humanitarian-overview-call-action-revised-21-september-2022#:~:text=With%20the%20October%20to%20December,Nutrition%20Working%20Group%20(FSNWG) (downloaded: 11 October 2022)

[79] Ibid.

region and SNNPR.[80] Across all three conflict-affected regions of the north, Afar, Amhara, and Tigray, more than 9 million people are in need of humanitarian food assistance.[81]

The Way Forward

As discussed above, labor productivity in the agricultural sector low in the region. Hannah Ritchie, a researcher at Our World in Data argue, "to grow food you need two things: some land and some of your time. These two – land and labor – are two of agriculture's 'inputs'. To build a food system that works for people and the planet, humanity needs to achieve high productivity in both of them."[82] She also reason the low labor productivity can be changed for good as follows:

„All countries were once in the position that many African countries are in today. Take England, France or Italy as examples. Until two centuries ago more than half of the labor force worked in agriculture similar to the African average today. During that period, agricultural output per worker was very low, and therefore most lived in extreme poverty. That has changed dramatically: less than four percent now work in agriculture, and the amount generated per worker is much higher – at least 30 times higher – than across Africa today. This was the result of a significant improvement in productivity."[83]

Other regions have seen success in productivity more recently. There were rapid progress across China,[84] Brazil.[85] Moreover, massive advancements have also been made in several sub-Saharan African nations during the past few decades, and the agricultural value added per worker has almost tripled in South Africa and Nigeria.[86]

African agricultural initiatives like the African Green Revolution Forum (AGRF) and Alliance for a Green Revolution in Africa (AGRA) are commendable. AGRF seeks to unleash the full potential of Africa's millions of smallholder farmers and their families who earn their livelihoods from small-scale farms and provide about 80% of the food and agricultural products consumed across the continent.[87] AGRA work with African governments, private sector, civil society institutions and development partners in the African agricultural landscape, to catalyze agricultural transformation and the achievement of the Malabo Declaration, the Comprehensive

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[80] Ibid.
[81] WFP (2022a): Emergency Food Security Assessment: Tigray Region, Ethiopia. ReliefWeb.int, 28 January 2022, https://reliefweb.int/report/ethiopia/emergency-food-security-assessment-tigray-region-ethiopia-january-2022 (downloaded: 13 October 2022)
[82] RITCHIE (2022) op. cit.
[83] Ibid.
[84] GARNAUT, R. et al. (Eds.): China's 40 Years of Reform and Development: 1978-2018. ANU Press, 2018
[85] BARROS, Sergio – SILVA, Vandoir: Brazilian Economic and Agricultural Overview. United States Department of Agriculture, 09 February 2022, https://apps.fas.usda.gov/newgainapi/api/Report/DownloadReportByFileName?fileName=Brazilian%20Economic%20and%20Agricultural%20Overview%20_Sao%20Paulo%20ATO_Brazil_01-25-2022.pdf (downloaded: 16 October 2022)
[86] RITCHIE (2022) op. cit.
[87] AGRF: About AGRF. AGRF, n.d. https://agrf.org/about/ (downloaded: 03 October 2022)

Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP), the Sustainable Development Goals, and Africa's Agenda 2063.[88]

In addition, Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT), a programme of the African Development Bank, part of the bank's Feed Africa Strategy of 2016–2025, launched in 2018.[89] TAAT aims to boost the production of wheat and other crops in Africa. TAAT is already helping the continent fulfil its enormous potential in the agriculture sector by employing high-impact technologies to boost output. The goal is to help 40 million farmers increase their harvests of heat-tolerant wheat varieties, rice, soybean and other crops to feed about 200 million people.[90]

Moreover, Monir Ghaedi argue that even though Africa has immense potential for feeding itself, with vast amounts of arable lands, however Africans produce cash crops such as coffee, cocoa, and cottonseed oil for export, while the staple crops of the African diet, wheat, and rice, mainly come from outside of the continent.[91] Furthermore, Ghaedi argue that much of this imported food could be produced locally, but also it is possible to replace foreign cereals with indigenous crops such as fonio, teff, sorghum, amaranth, and millet continent, which would also serve as the basis for a healthy diet.[92]

Finally, individuals like Josefa Sacko and Ibrahim Mayaki, AUC Commissioner for Agriculture, Rural Development, Blue Economy and Sustainable Environment (ARBE), CEO of AU Development Agency – New Partnership for Africa's Development (AUDA-NEPAD), respectively advocate for promoting intra-African trade. They argue, *"To prevent future disruptions in the supply chain for wheat and sunflower across Africa, countries that produce these cereals need to increase their capacity to produce and supply to other countries through intra-African trade."*[93] Luc Christiansen also affirm, with better regional food market integration, the food could be imported from other African countries, creating employment among neighbors.[94]

A breakthrough for intra-African trade is the African Continental Free Trade Area (AfCFTA), the world's largest free trade area bringing together the 55 countries of the AU. AfCFTA's mandate is to create a single continental market. AfCFTA aims to achieve this by transforming intra-Africa trade from around 16% in 2018 to 50 per

[88] AGRA: Our Strategy. AGRA, n.d. https://agra.org/our-strategy/. (Downloaded: 03 October 2022)

[89] IITA: Technologies for African Agricultural Transformation (TAAT). iita.org, n.d. https://www.iita.org/technologies-for-african-agricultural-transformation-taat/ (downloaded: 09 October 2022)

[90] VERKOOIJEN, et al (2022) op. cit.

[91] GHAEDI, Monir: Why is Africa dependent on imported grain? DW, 29 June 2022 https://www.dw.com/en/with-vast-arable-lands-why-does-africa-need-to-import-grain/a-62288483 (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

[92] Ibid.

[93] SACKO, Josefa – MAYAKI, Ibrahim: How the Russia-Ukraine conflict impacts Africa | Africa Renewal (un.org).21 April 2022, https://www.un.org/africarenewal/magazine/may-2022/how-russia-ukraine-conflict%C2%A0impacts-africa (downloaded: 29 August 2022)

[94] CHRISTIANSEN, Luc: Africa imports billions in food a year. It could be creating local jobs instead. worldbank.org, 09 November 2020, https://blogs.worldbank.org/jobs/africa-imports-billions-food-year-it-could-be-creating-local-jobs-instead (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

cent by 2030.[95] This will also launch a free movement of labor and investment within Africa. For example as of 2017 Kenya export 1 billion dollar worth and 500 million dollar worth export to Europe and US respectively while only 69 million dollar worth goods to Ethiopia. AfCFTA removing about 90% of trade tax this will drastically change trade in the region. As of April 2022 54 out of 55 member states of AU have signed the AfCTA agreement and 43 have deposited their instrument of ratification.

In case of Ethiopia, the government is currently running two initiatives. First, Green Legacy Initiative, launched in June 2019, which is focused on boosting forestation and afforestation. The government planned to plant 20 billion seedlings till 2022.[96] As of 2022 it surpassed the plan by planting 25 billion trees with survival rate of 70%.[97] Mobilizing over 20 million people across the country. Working on the environment and the ecosystem is vital because increased food production should not have to come at the cost of turning natural habitats into agricultural land. In addition to this, according to the report of the Office of the Prime Minister of Ethiopia, in 2022 alone more than 500 million seedlings were plants that have values in local and international markets such as avocadoes, mangoes, apples and papayas, which directly feeds into the current drive of becoming food self-sufficient by promoting sustainable agriculture.[98]

The second initiative is the National Wheat Development Program, which was announced in 2018, to become wheat self-sufficient and to replace wheat imports through enhanced local production.[99] This is similar to as[100] suggested, treating food as a security issue in practice, could take the form of states and regions becoming more self-sufficient in producing their own food.[101] In Ethiopia 70% of the wheat consumed by the country is domestically produced and 30% is imported in the form of purchase or foreign aid. Through this ambitious program extensive summer farming, cluster farming instead of using fragmented plots, mechanized farming, and government subsidy and distribution of fertilizer and high-quality seed, Ethiopia wants to completely halt wheat imports.

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[95] AfCFTA Secretariat & UNDP. (2020) The Futures Report: Making the AfCFTA Work for Women and Youth. africa.undp.org, December 03, https://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/library/the-futures-report--making-the-afcfta-work-for-women-and-youth.html (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[96] PMO: Green Legacy. greenlegacy.et, 2019 https://greenlegacy.et/green-legacy/home (downloaded: 11 October 2022)

[97] FBC (2022b): Building resilient African means developing of homegrown solutions: PM Abiy Ahmed. fanabc.com, 15 October 2022, https://www.fanabc.com/english/building-resilient-african-means-developing-of-home-grown-solutions-pm-abiy-ahmed/ (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[98] UN DESA: Green Legacy Initiative. Department of Economic and Social Affairs, n.d. https://sdgs.un.org/partnerships/green-legacy-initiative (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[99] Ethiopian Monitor: PM, World Bank Officials Visit Irrigated Wheat Farms in Oromia. Ethiopian Monitor, 22 March 2022, https://ethiopianmonitor.com/2022/03/22/pm-world-bank-officials-visit-irrigated-wheat-farms-in-oromia/ (downloaded: 08 October 2022); BOSSUET, Jerome: A wheat self-sufficiency roadmap for Ethiopia's future. CIMMYT, 5 December 2018, https://www.cimmyt.org/news/a-wheat-self-sufficiency-roadmap-for-ethiopias-future/ (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[100] EIRAN et al. (2021) op. cit.

[101] Ibid.

In October 2022, Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed announced that Ethiopia will export wheat production to foreign market (ENA 2022a). In this regard, the Ethiopian Commodity Exchange (ECX) announced that it would start trading wheat to Djibouti and Kenya.[102] Although the ECX began trading wheat and maize 15 years ago, the activity was short-lived due to a lack of wheat supplies. This shows the National Wheat Development Program, showed some optimism to the future of wheat self-sufficiency of Ethiopia. As[103] maintain, *"while national food systems must become more robust and resilient, governments can ensure that international trade routes remain open, and relationships between importing and exporting countries remain stable, since few – if any – countries can sustainably produce all the food their populations need."*

Conclusion

The Russia-Ukraine War has exposed Africa's dependence on food imports and the important lesion for the states in the region and beyond is states should more focus on boosting local food production and tackle climate threats than relying on foreign aid and import. The AU declared 2022 the Year of Nutrition with the main objective to strengthening resilience in nutrition and food security on the African continent. And states should also take the full advantage of AfCFTA. Food has entered the security space, and food insecurity is one of the important factors that exacerbates other political, economic, and social drivers of conflict.[104] Studies show that, the environment created by poverty, social injustice and political alienation enhances the ability of religious extremists to export their philosophy and of terrorists to find local support for their infamous acts.[105] Thus, African governments and their international development partners should collaborate and concentrate their efforts on increasing the production capacity of food systems in the continent in order to lessen their reliance on the global market, particularly in these times of shocks and disruptions on the global scale.

Food insecurity should be seen as a national security threat, not as a humanitarian issue, that necessitates for pledges, charity, food aid, emergency food supplies. Even though each of these actions might be crucial in certain situations, they are unable to address current food security issues or guarantee long-term food security. In the words of Billene Seyoum, Foreign Press Secretary for the Office of Prime Minister of Ethiopia, *"Dependency on aid has held back most Ethiopians, and for that matter Africans, from utilizing resources effectively."*[106] In today's globalized word no country can keep itself insulated from the effect of any global problem, but a state must at least able to be self-sufficient in most important essentials for the survival and sovereignty of a nation.

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[102] ENA (2022b): Commodity Exchange to Commence Trading Wheat. ena.et, 27 October 2022 https://www.ena.et/en/?p=39608 (downloaded: 01 November 2022)

[103] EIRAN et al. (2021) op. cit.

[104] FORMAN, Johanna M: Foreign Policy in the Kitchen. e-international relailations.info, 05 October 2016, https://www.e-ir.info/2016/10/05/foreign-policy-in-the-kitchen/ (downloaded: 08 October 2022)

[105] DE CONING, C.: Poverty and Terrorism: The Root Cause Debate. Conflict Trends, 2004/3, pp. 20-29.

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JÁNOS MAGDÓ[1]

SOME ASPECTS OF ROMANIA'S CHANGING GEOPOLITICAL SITUATION IN THE LAST DECADES OF THE COLD WAR

Abstract

With the withdrawal of Soviet troops in 1958, Romania was given considerable room for manoeuvre in foreign policy, which Ceausescu, who came to power in 1965, exploited to the full to achieve his national goals. The apparent distancing from the Soviet Union attracted the attention of Western countries, especially the United States, which sought to weaken the cohesion of the Eastern bloc through Romania. By balancing the bipolar world, the Romanian leadership strengthened the country's sovereignty, kept the Soviet Union out of its internal affairs and took advantage of the financial and technological opportunities offered by the Western world. As human rights issues came to the fore in the early 1980s, conflict between the Western world and the expanding dictatorship of the Ceausescu regime became more pronounced, isolating the regime by the end of the decade. The Western countries put increasing pressure on the Romanian communist leadership, demanding a detailed account of the commitments made in the 1975 Helsinki Final Act and in follow-up meetings. Unwilling to meet these, Ceausescu turned his back on the West, while at the same time he could no longer find support in the reform-minded Soviet Union, and tried to salvage his power through a failed third-passenger policy. During the revolution, the communist leadership accused the two great powers of wanting to intervene directly to overthrow the regime, but the available sources do not support these allegations.

Keywords: Romania 1989, revolution, cold war, geopolitics, Romanian-American relations, Romanian-Soviet relations, human rights, Reports of the Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest

Romania in the post-WW2 bipolar world

The Soviet Union permanently withdrew its troops from Romania, occupied during World War II, in June-July 1958. The reasons are speculated by Romanian historiography, including the Soviet Union's policy of détente with the West after the tensions of the Hungarian Revolution and the Suez Crisis, and the change in Soviet military thinking with the advent of intercontinental ballistic missiles.[2] Soviet

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[1] ORCID: 0000-0003-4986-2974.

[2] CONSTANTINIU, Florin: Retragerea trupelor sovietice din România (1958): aspecte obscure https://historia.ro/sectiune/general/retragerea-trupelor-sovietice-din-romania-1958-571577.html (downloaded: 01.March 2023). Another obstacle to clarity is that Russia did not make the documents of the period available. According to another opinion, the withdrawal of Soviet troops was not initiated by the Romanians, but as a reward for Gheorghiu-Dej's compliance policy See: FÜLÖP, Mihály: Stalin's donation. The Tismaneanu-report, Hungarian Minority, 2008/1-2, pp. 93-105. http://www.jakabffy.ro/magyarkisebbseg/pdf/2008_1-2_007Forum-Fulop.pdf (downloaded: 01. March 2023). Vladimir Tismaneanu, historian, was commissioned by

withdrawal allowed Romania to shape its foreign policy and internal affairs with a certain degree of sovereignty. This did not mean that Romania was out of the Soviet zone of influence and could shape its diplomacy independently, but it did give a new room for manoeuvre, which was exploited in particular by Nicolae Ceausescu, who took up the post of General Secretary of the Romanian Communist Party on 22 March 1965. In a spectacular display of these new opportunities, Romania condemned the military intervention of the Warsaw Pact states in Czechoslovakia in August 1968, thus creating the appearance of an autonomous Romanian foreign policy from the Soviet Union in the eyes of the West.[3] This opened up new perspectives for the Romanian leadership, as the West, especially the US, was looking for countries within the bloc that were 'out of the ordinary', and Ceausescu, superficially, met this criterion. The US saw the move away from Soviet influence and the „independence" of Romanian foreign policy as an opportunity to strengthen its geopolitical position in a region that had hitherto been closely controlled by the Soviet sphere of interest. Thus, US President Richard Nixon visited Romania on 2 August 1969, followed by Gerald Ford on 2-3 August 1975, and Ceausescu was also a welcome guest at the White House: Nixon met him in December 1973, Ford in June 1975 and Jimmy Carter in April 1978. Through these contacts, Romania was granted „most-favoured-nation" status in 1975, a status that brought the country many advantages in bilateral trade.[4]

Another manifestation of Romania's special foreign policy was its relations with Israel. Diplomatic ties between the two countries were established on 11 June 1948, and diplomatic missions were opened in the same year and upgraded to embassy status in 1969. Relations were cool, especially between 1948 and 1957, due to the Israeli-Arab conflicts and the obstruction of the emigration of Romanian Jews, but Romania was the only country in the Eastern Bloc to maintain diplomatic relations with Israel during and after the Six-Day War (5-10 June 1967).[5] Romania's accession to the International Monetary Fund in 1972 (10 years before Hungary) was also a sign of the country's opening to the West. The Helsinki Process, the signing of the Helsinki Final Act on 1 August 1975, was also used by Ceausescu to increase the visibility of Romanian foreign policy and to reduce the scope for Moscow to interfere in the policies of the Romanian Communist Party.[6]

Despite (or perhaps in the shadow of) the spectacular diplomatic achievements, the repression of the population (especially the nationalities) in Romania increased already in the early 1970s. The turning point was the so-called "July Theses" of 1971 ("Tezele din Iulie"), in which Ceausescu introduced strict enforcement of communist ideology in many areas of life, stifling the relative freedom of earlier years, especially

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Romanian President Traian Basescu in 2006 to prepare a report exposing the crimes of the Romanian communist regime to the public.

[3] FÜLÖP, Mihály (2008) op. cit. In his study on the Tismaneanu Report, the author points out that the Soviets did not even ask Romania to participate in the intervention in Czechoslovakia.

[4] Romania was the first country in Eastern Europe to benefit from the agreement. https://countrystudies.us/romania/78.htm (downloaded:01.03.2023.)

[5] Information site of the Romanian Embassy in Tel Aviv on Romanian-Israeli relations. https://telaviv.mae.ro/node/221 (downloaded: 01. March 2023)

[6] ALEXANDRU, Livia-Irina: Vizita Lui Gerald Ford în România (Gerald Ford's visit to Romania). https://historia.ro/sectiune/general/vizita-lui-gerald-ford-in-romania-579979.html (downloaded: 02 March 2023)

in the field of culture.[7] As increasingly brutal internal repression built up in parallel with the Western human rights movement, the deep divide between the two became more and more apparent, and by the 1980s could no longer be ignored in the West's dealings with Romania. This was not even changed by Romania's participation in the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles, the only country in the socialist bloc to do so, as a further confirmation of its special foreign policy.

As a result of the changed domestic and international circumstances, Romania's foreign policy isolation became more pronounced towards the end of the 1980s. According to a May 1989 report of Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest, Romania was characterised by international isolation in 1988, for both domestic and foreign policy reasons.[8] At international level, human rights violations and the intended raze of thousands of villages (officially called "rural systematization program") attracted the most criticism. Isolation was evident among Western countries (USA, Canada), but the reticence of South American and Arab countries was also conspicuous, so that Romanian attempts to organise high-level meetings to widen the space for manoeuvre failed, and Ceausescu visited in 1988 only seven African countries, a few Asian countries and Australia. On the other hand, the report notes that the socialist countries did not take a clear position against Ceausescu's policies, but only a growing reticence and behind-the-scenes expressions of opinion could be observed. There were no high-level meetings with Bulgaria, thanks to the arrogant Romanian attitude towards the environmental pollution in Ruse, but there was a perceptible rapprochement between Romania, Czechoslovakia and the German Democratic Republic.

Relations with the Soviet Union were formally normal, with Ceausescu and his wife being received in Moscow for several days, and even the head of state, Andrei Gromyko visited Romania that year. However, there was no progress in Romanian-Soviet relations and sensitive issues were put aside. A good insight into this subject is provided by a report from the Embassy in Bucharest on the Soviet Embassy's assessment of Romanian domestic policy.[9] According to Soviet diplomats, there were no significant changes in Romania's internal situation in 1988, and the economic and social problems of the previous years persisted. Romania was unable to meet the targets of the National Economic Plan, there was no economic growth, there was a decline in the machinery and equipment industries, quality deteriorated and competitiveness declined. Agricultural performance was below that of 1987, and Romania was unable to supply the Soviet Union with the quantities of cereals it has committed to export. Domestic meat supply was below critical levels, meat exports were unregular, and overall public supply was critically low, with similar trends expected for 1989. The country's main effort was to repay the debt, not to improve the

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[7] LUPȘOR, Andreea: Tezele din Iulie, punctul de cotitură al regimului Ceaușescu (The "July Theses", the turning point of the Ceausescu regime).
    https://historia.ro/sectiune/general/tezele-din-iulie-punctul-de-cotitura-al-regimului-578114.html (downloaded: 02 March 2023) The new line was presented by Ceausescu in a speech to the RKP Executive Committee on 6 July 1971. Ceausescu drew the ideas during his June 1971 trips to China, North Korea, North Vietnam and Mongolia.

[8] Romanian foreign policy in 1988 (118/Szt/1989, 24.05.1989, Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest), Hungarian National Archives XIX-J-1-j

[9] Soviet Embassy's 1988 assessment of Romania: the development of Romania's domestic and foreign policy in 1988 and the development of Romanian-Soviet relations (44/Szt/1989, 2 February 1989, Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest)

situation of the population. The Romanian leadership distanced itself from reforms in socialist countries because it considered such attempts dangerous for Romania. According to the Soviet Embassy's assessment Romania was isolated in foreign policy terms, even in the Arab world. The main aim of foreign policy has been to secure the economic base and improve the country's image, but plan for the destruction of villages and the increasing violations of human rights have led to growing international criticism. Romania was not able to initiate independent foreign policy actions due to domestic political constraints. In 1988, there were several political events between Romania and the Soviet Union contacts, but no progress was made. Ceausescu visited Moscow in October 1988, and there were significant differences of opinion between the parties, but these were not addressed in the end in order to avoid a deterioration of relations. Ceausescu is opposed to glasnost and perestroika, and rivals the much younger Gorbachev. The Romanian press suppresses Gorbachev's foreign policy initiatives or presents them as Ceausescu's own earlier proposals. The bilateral relationship is complicated by the fact that Romania wants to change the mechanism of the Warsaw Pact, but this would require a change in the text of the treaty. To the above analysis of the situation by the Soviet Embassy, the Hungarian Embassy added that the assessment has no practical consequences for the Soviet Union's policy towards Romania, and that Moscow is supporting the Romanian leadership with gestures such as the letter and gift sent by the Soviet government and party leadership on the occasion of Elena Ceausescu's 70th birthday.

The report on the development of Romanian foreign policy in 1988 also briefly touches on the Romanian-American relationship, in which, according to Hungarian diplomacy, a serious break can be identified. Although the US did not prevent Romania from maintaining a significant foreign trade activity, it focused on isolating Ceausescu politically. American politicians criticised Bucharest for its failure to respect human rights, but Ceausescu took a lecturing, rigid stance in response to the criticism.

A report of a conversation with a counsellor at the US Embassy in Bucharest points directly to a US assessment of the state of Romanian-American relations.[10] According to the diplomat, there are contradictory trends in relations between the US and socialist countries (including the Soviet Union) and between the US and Romania. In the former, there is a lot of room for progress, while with Romania there is a continuous deterioration and regression. The US is perplexed by this situation, given Romania's former „shining" position in Washington. According to the American diplomat, a further deterioration in relations is to be expected. The US administration has for long sought to maintain good relations in order to maintain its leverage, but this is impossible in the current situation. 1988 was a black year in bilateral relations, with two visits to Romania by US Assistant Secretary of State John Whitehead, which were unsuccessful and Whitehead personally witnessed the razing of villages. The visit of the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister responsible for human rights to Washington was also a failure. By the beginning of 1988 it was clear that the US was suspending the Most Favoured Nation trade preferences, but the Romanians

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[10] State of Romanian-American Relations, (46/1/1989/Szt, 8 March 1989, Hungarian
     Embassy, Bucharest)

anticipated this and renounced them themselves.[11] Romania, however, was keen to maintain good relations and assured the US that it would continue its emigration practices for family reunification, while criticising the US leadership for interfering in Romania's internal affairs. Bucharest also expressed its disapproval of US policies by officially not accepting the US compendium on the human rights situation in 1988. Despite the decline in bilateral relations, the Romanian side continued to press for high-level meetings in 1988, but the Americans balked. The American view was that spectacular meetings would not produce concrete results, but rather that expert contacts should be strengthened. Besides the political, there was also a decline in Romanian-US economic relations in 1988, with a significant drop in trade in the second half of the year after the most-favoured-nation trade was withdrawn. However, the 1:4 import-export ratio was maintained with US exports to Romania valuing US$ 174 million and Romanian exports to the US valuing US$ 694 million. Imports of US goods into Romania have been hampered by the slowdown in the licensing process, and in addition Romanian isolation has been accompanied by a decline in cultural contacts and an 18% drop in the number of Romanians emigrating to the US (1987: 2,670, 1988: 2,118).

Another Bucharest report also looks at developments in Romanian-American relations.[12] On 10-11 January 1989, Senators Mark Hatfield of Washington and James McClure of Idaho visited Bucharest and met with the Romanian Deputy Foreign Minister. The parties noted the deterioration of bilateral relations in the political and economic spheres, and Romania blamed the US for this and for the loss of the MFN status. According to Bucharest, certain US circles distort and exaggerate the Romanian reality, use human rights to interfere in domestic affairs and try to impose obsolete views on Romania. The basic intention of the US guests was to promote family reunification, so there was no debate, but it was noted that Romania has not done anything to ensure human rights, so no improvement in bilateral relations is expected. Ceausescu, unlike in the past, and apparently deliberately, did not wish to meet the US senators.

The issue of human rights

The Helsinki process and the conventions adopted in the process gave the Western countries a new instrument to hold the countries of the Eastern bloc to account for their humanitarian commitments (in exchange for recognition of their sovereignty and territorial integrity). After 1975, pressure could be brought to bear on the countries of Eastern Europe for non-compliance with human rights, and the West, led by the USA, did not hesitate to use this instrument against Romania. On the one hand, this was a signal to the people of Eastern Europe that the Western states were holding their governments to account for their rights (e.g. in the areas of family reunification, freedom of travel or freedom of religion) and, on the other hand, it was an opportunity to shift the focus of political discourse to human rights issues and the

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[11] https://digitalcommons.law.uga.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2349&context=gjicl and http://countrystudies.us/romania/78.htm (downloaded: 02 March 2023) Romania withdrew from the status in February 1988, which was due to expire at the beginning of July.

[12] Developments in Romanian-American relations (46/Szt/1989, 6 February 1989, Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest)

Western social model, thereby weakening the social structures of Eastern European countries and, ultimately, the geopolitical expansion of the USA at the expense of the Soviet Union in the 'grey zone' of Europe. With this effective "soft power", the Western states were able to foment discontent in the countries of the Eastern bloc against the regimes there.

On behalf of Romania, Nicolae Ceausescu signed the Helsinki Final Act in the hope that the agreement would confirm his country's status on the basis of the principles of inviolability of borders, territorial integrity and non-interference in internal affairs. This was primarily relevant vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, while the clauses on East-West economic cooperation opened up the possibility of modernising the Romanian economy. In the field of human rights, Romania was already in a downward spiral since the proclamation and implementation of the 'July Theses' in 1971, but in the 1970s this fact had not yet crossed the sensitivity threshold of the Western countries. In his Helsinki speech, Ceausescu touched on the issue of human rights, and in response to Western criticism, he hit back at the difficult living conditions of "savage capitalism", with problems of drug abuse and crime.[13]

The issue of human rights became increasingly prominent in dealings with Romania in the 1980s. This was linked not only to the deterioration of the dictatorship but also to the gradual weakening of the Soviet Union, which opened up space for the West to bring the human rights weapon more emphatically to bear. The third follow-up meeting of the Helsinki Process in Vienna (4 November 1986 - 19 January 1989) ended at the beginning of 1989, and the commitments of the Final Act were immediately used as a reference in the toolbox of Western diplomacy, holding Romania to account for its failure to comply with certain conditions. This situation is recorded in the 1989 embassy reports from Bucharest of French, German and American diplomats' actions against Romanian leaders, which were clearly the result of a coordinated Western action.

An April report describes the French ambassador's intervention with Foreign Minister Ioan Totu.[14] The ambassador criticised Romania's human rights policy, specifically mentioning the Romanian authorities' attitude towards six signatories of a letter published three weeks earlier [15] and the case of the journalists of the Romania

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[13] https://www.facebook.com/nicolae.ceausescu89/posts/1230476206964564:0 (downloaded: 02 March 2023)

[14] French protest in the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (99/Szt/1989, 17 April 1989, Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest).

[15] The so-called "Letter of the Six" refers to a joint letter in English from six former communist leaders, sent by the authors to the BBC and Radio Free Europe, where the letter was read on 11 March 1989. In it, the signatories stand up for the ideals of socialism, while expressing their concern that the letter puts their freedom and their lives at risk. They criticise Ceausescu for his failure to respect the Helsinki Final Act and the Romanian Constitution, for the destruction of villages and for his ban on contacts with foreign citizens. They say the Securitate has become a tool to intimidate party members and intellectuals. They are worried about the introduction of forced labour, the violation of the confidentiality of letters and the failure of planned economy. They are unhappy about agrarian policy, the massive emigration of minorities and the collapse of the country's international prestige, the loss of its status as a most favoured nation. The signatories demand a halt to the destruction of villages, the restoration of constitutional rights and the introduction of a food export freeze. After the letter was made public, the authorities interrogated the authors, kept

Libera daily who were abducted in January accused of leafleting. The ambassador asked to be assured that the Romanian authorities are ensuring the freedom of the six signatories and that Romania is complying with the relevant international human rights standards. The ambassador told the Hungarian diplomat that he had twice tried to contact one of the signatories, former foreign minister Corneliu Manescu, but had been prevented from doing so. President Mitterrand, who has long-standing personal links with Manescu, expressed his incomprehension and concern. In Paris, the question was raised whether the signatories had been deprived of their personal freedom. The French ambassador said that at the meeting, Foreign Minister Totu responded with the usual panels: the six retired signatories had made unfounded accusations against Romanian politics and it was a Romanian internal affair anyway. Totu pointed to Hungary's role as an "instigator", saying that an American, British, French and West German platform is being formed on this issue at Hungary's initiative. The report says that after the meeting, the French ambassador made another unsuccessful attempt to contact Manescu, but was impeded by police outside the former politician's house. According to the ambassador, relations with Romania have fallen to their lowest level since World War II. On the French side, the EEC countries are seeking concerted, joint action against Romania to impose an economic blockade. This would mean that all EEC member states would completely suspend imports from Romania. The report notes, however, that the plan is not expected to be supported by West Germany because of its economic and emigration interests, and that Italy and Greece are not willing to participate in such an initiative.

Also in April, the West German ambassador intervened with Foreign Minister Totu.[16] The German Ambassador regretted that Romania, although a signatory to the Vienna Final Act, does not in practice comply with the provisions of the Act. The ambassador told the Hungarian diplomat that Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher had once again invited Corneliu Manescu to visit West Germany, and that the German side hoped to be able to hand over the invitation to the recipient. The ambassador has discussed with Genscher the West German position towards Romania, and the Minister said that more vigorous action should be taken against human rights violations in Romania in order to enforce the relevant international agreements.

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them in house confinement and tried to persuade them to withdraw the letter. The six former politicians are Gheorghe Apostol, Alexandru Barladeanu, Constantin Parvulescu, Grigore Raceanu, Silviu Brucan and Corneliu Manescu. The latter in particular, as a former diplomat, came to the attention of the embassies. Manescu (1916-2000) was briefly Ambassador to Hungary (1960-61), then Foreign Minister (1961-1972) and during this period President of the UN Parliamentary General Assembly (1967-68) and finally Ambassador to France (1977-82). Because of his Hungarian connection, Hungary also undertook significant diplomatic activity on Manescu's behalf.
Scrisoarea celor sase (Letter of the Six) https://www.hetel.ro/scrisoarea-celor-sase-text-integral/ (downloaded: 02. March 2023).
Corneliu Mănescu. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Corneliu_M%C4%83nescu (downloaded: 02. March 2023.)

[16] West German protest to the Romanian Foreign Minister, 103/Szt/1989 (20 April 1989, Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest)

US diplomacy has been the most active in taking action, although the Hungarian Embassy in Bucharest has only circulated a short cable.[17] In it, the counsellor of the US Embassy in Bucharest tells his Hungarian counterpart that information has been requested from the Romanian authorities on three specific cases, based on the 'human dimension resolutions' of the Vienna follow-up meeting of the Helsinki Process: the first is the fate of the arrested editor of the daily Romania Libera,[18] the second is a family reunification case, and the third is a case classified as psychiatric by the Romanian authorities. However, the Romanian MoFA did not provide any information and the US request for consultation was rejected. The US diplomacy has not had such difficulties with other signatories to the Helsinki Final Act and plans to inform the Member States of the Helsinki Process of the negative Romanian attitude.

Much more detail on the violations in Romania is contained in a memo prepared by the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which summarises a note verbale of the US Embassy in Budapest.[19] In it, the Hungarian side is informed that the US Embassy in Bucharest on 23 March 1989 requested information from the Romanian authorities on some specific cases of human rights violations in Romania. The note illustrates the priorities of US foreign policy in the field of human rights (freedom of the press, freedom of religion, freedom of movement/family reunification):

- The arrest of journalists and printers of the newspaper Romania Libera in January 1989. The US requested information on the names of the printers, the reasons for the arrests, the charges against them and urged their release;

- Ignoring the request for an extension to the Pentecostal church building in Bistrita. The US requested information on the expected date of approval;

- Refusal to allow a five-year-old child to travel to his parents in the United States. In the note, the US urged the issuance of the child's passport on humanitarian grounds and requested an explanation for the delay;

- A Romanian citizen was discriminated against at work for converting to Baptism: he was dismissed from his job and is being held in a psychiatric hospital against medical advice. The US has demanded his immediate release.

According to the US note verbale, no response to the above cases has been received from the Romanian authorities. The interesting thing about the note is that for each case is the specific passage of the Vienna Final Document is mentioned that the Romanian state is in violation of.

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[17] American Human Dimension Inquiry in Bucharest, 98/RT (4 May 1989, Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest)

[18] On 24 February 1989, journalists P.M. Bacanu and A. Umcu from the staff of the Romanian newspaper Romania Libera were arrested by the police. In both of their lockers they found leaflets against the Ceausescu regime. Source: Romania Libera journalists' leaflet case, 51/Szt/1989 (13 February 1989, Hungarian Embassy Bucharest).

[19] American Note on Human Rights Violations in Romania, 686/Ko (May 10, 1989, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, László Kovács Secretariat)

Among the archived documents, there is a remarkable US policy initiative. The Hungarian Embassy in Washington forwarded to the Hungarian MFA a letter signed by 53 senators. We can find among the signatories Robert Dole and George Mitchell, the Republican and Democratic leaders of the US Senate respectively. Also politicians who later went on to hold important positions, such as Joseph Biden, John McCain, Albert Gore Jr. and John Kerry.[20]

In the letter, the senators demand that the US administration provide an appropriate response to the „ongoing and unheard-of human rights abuses" in Romania. The letter writers note that Romania has gradually become the most repressive state in the Eastern Bloc, and that even Romania's Warsaw Pact allies are ashamed of this. Ceausescu's plan is to destroy half of the country's 13,000 villages and force people into agro-industrial centres without piped water. Family houses, churches, synagogues and traditional folk architecture are being systematically destroyed. Believers are under daily threat of arrest and interrogation by the fearsome Securitate. This is compounded by the increasing repression of national minorities, with the increasingly harsh crackdown on Hungarians being particularly well documented. Tens of thousands of Romanian citizens, especially Hungarians, fled to neighbouring Hungary. This is the first large-scale exodus from one communist country to another. Because of these abuses, the UN Human Rights Committee appointed a Special Rapporteur to investigate human rights violations in Romania - first and foremost the problems of village destruction and forced collectivisation. Several European countries have passed resolutions condemning the razing of villages in Romania and the European Parliament has condemned human rights violations. So serious is the situation that six former Romanian leaders have written letters to President Ceausescu expressing their concerns about forced collectivisation and other abuses, putting their freedom and their lives at risk. The Senators recommended that the US government should not participate in high-level meetings with representatives of the Romanian government because of the action against the six former politicians, and should take further action, as France and Germany have done by cancelling meetings and programs. Previous US administrations have refrained from taking action against human rights violations in Romania, on the grounds that they wanted to maintain their influence on Romanian decision-makers, but this has not led to improvements in the field of fundamental human rights in Romania. However, President Bush could be more forceful, and the current situation requires a stronger diplomatic response, including economic sanctions. The letter-writers conclude by saying that the US is a model country in the world in the field of human rights, and that strong support for the citizens of Romania is therefore essential.

The letter is intended as a political pressure by the Senators to get the US government to take tougher action against Romania for human rights violations. The letter mentions the familiar issues: the devastating consequences of village destructions, the persecution of believers and, as a new element, the oppression of national minorities (especially Hungarians). The Letter of the Six seems to have reached the threshold of resonance in Washington as well. It is remarkable that, after the effective presentation of human rights violations, the proposals for retaliation do not go any further, and only high-level meetings are advised against the government,

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[20] Letter from U.S. Senators to President Bush on U.S. Attitudes Toward Romania, 210/RT (May 4, 1989, Hungarian Embassy, Washington, D.C.)

with economic sanctions raised only as an option. The letter is a strong political statement, given weight by the fact that it was signed by a majority of senators, but it does not give any clue as to how President Bush could take more forceful action. The US did not have the MFN status as a pressure tool at the time any more, but the letter also shows that it was not suitable for that purpose even when it was in force.

The US's constant raising of the human rights issue, especially after the Helsinki commitments, effectively thematised the international political discourse and besieged the Eastern bloc states with demands that they could not meet without the ruling elite endangering its own power. By the late 1980s, it became clear that Western lifestyle was more attractive to the people of Eastern Europe than the domestic conditions, and the maintenance of the system demanded ever greater sacrifices from the communist leaders, further increasing the oppression and misery of the population. This was particularly true in Romania, where Ceausescu and his inner circle clung to power until the very end, only to be overthrown by a series of events in December 1989.

The question of external intervention in the December 1989 revolution

In his speeches during the December Revolution, Ceausescu repeatedly referred to the fact that the 'terrorist actions' were organised in close collaboration with the secret services of foreign countries with the aim of destabilising the country, territorialising it and eliminating its independence and sovereignty. In his televised appearance on 20 December, Ceausescu did not forget to add that radio stations in Budapest and other countries had launched an unscrupulous campaign of slander and lies against Romania, as part of a comprehensive plan to eliminate the independence of certain peoples.[21] The accusations against Budapest have been backed up diplomatically by the Romanian authorities: On 20 December, in the late evening, Foreign Minister Ion Stoian summoned the Hungarian chargé d'affaires a.i. (the ambassador was in Hungary), who was told that *"we have data and evidence that the events in Timisoara were organised by foreign spy organisations [...] with the support of forces interested in destabilising the situation in Romania, changing the territory of our country, attacking our territorial integrity. We must say that such objectives have been declared [...] by politicians and press organs of your country. According to the information available to us, the spy organisations have activated their activities."* According to Stoian, Bush and Gorbachev discussed Romania in Malta over the distribution of spheres of influence and are acting against Romania's independence and territorial integrity on the basis of a *"carefully worked out plan. We have clear information about the intentions of the Soviet Union to intervene in Romania with military force. [...] In this context, we must also refer to the anti-Romanian actions, well known to the Hungarian authorities, supported by Hungary, aimed at destabilizing Romania. [...] These actions contain territorial claims, which are expressed in Hungary with unimaginable frequency."*[22]

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[21] Nicolae Ceaușescu, cuvîntarea din 20 decembrie 1989 (Nicolae Ceausescu's speech of 20 December 1989). https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ioBKBXF3LEY (downloaded: 02. March 2023)

[22] Message from Foreign Minister Stoian to Mátyás Szűrös, 316/KT (21.12.1989, Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest)

According to the communication of Romanian top leaders, the destabilisation of Romania, the disruption of its territorial integrity, is thus being carried out on the basis of plans by foreign spy organisations, on the basis of a Soviet-American agreement, with Hungarian support. The narrative of foreign interference in the revolution persists in some Romanian circles to this day. They suggest that Hungary wanted to start a civil war, which would have involved the intervention of the West and the Soviet Union, and that the great powers would have helped Hungary as arbitrators to annul the Treaty of Trianon.

The narrative of an acute external threat, of Hungary's or a great power's intention to intervene, has been refuted by Romanian historians on several occasions.[23] Not a single document in the CNSAS archives has proven the role of persons trained by "foreigners" or "foreign spy services" in the revolution.[24] The alleged possibility of Soviet intervention was a foregone conclusion, as the Soviet Union had repeatedly and publicly ruled out any military intervention of any kind since 1988. Such an action would only have strengthened Ceausescu's position and anti-Soviet sentiment in Romania, deepened the crisis and destroyed international confidence in Gorbachev, and would therefore have been contrary to the interests of the Soviet Union.[25] Even if they had wanted to, the Soviets could not have focused their attention on Romania, which did not directly threaten their economic and military interests, because of German reunification and separatist tendencies in the empire. According to Soviet sources, Moscow rejected outright the US invitation to intervene in Romania on behalf of the National Salvation Front.[26]

The „invention" of an external attack was in the interests of those in power alone: Ceausescu saw it as an opportunity to declare martial law and thus preserve his power, and the Securitate offered him the „proof" he needed. And after the revolution, the Securitate tried to justify its actions in Timisoara with the external threat: the state security forces were not acting against the people fighting for freedom, but against a riot started by foreign forces, whose aim was to destabilise the country and undermine its territorial integrity.

Summary

Romania, especially in the 1970s, cleverly took advantage of the limited room for manoeuvre provided by the bipolar world system: while respecting the rules of the geopolitical space dominated by the Soviet Union, it was able to play the role of "internal resistor" and "internal disruptor" towards the West, thus scoring points with the United States, which was seeking to extend its influence in Eastern Europe. This

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[23] Thus, for example: CORNEANU, Constantin Dr.: The Romanian Army and the Collapse of Communism (December 1989). Romanian Military Archives Bulletin, 2019/4, pp. 1-13.; URSU, Andrei – HODOR, Mădălin – THOMASSON, Roland O.: Who shot at us after 22. A study on the guilt for the victims of the Romanian Revolution of December 1989. (Translation) New Journal of Human Rights, 2018/4, pp. 5-128.

[24] Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității - National Council for the Study of Security Archives

[25] URSU – HODOR – THOMASSON op. cit. p. 81

[26] BOTTONI, Stefano: Was there a revolution? And how did it happen? Reflections on the interpretation of the 1989 Romanian Revolution. Credit 2015/3, p. 34.

gave the regime the opportunity to expand its domestic policy space and fulfil Romanian national objectives, mostly at the expense of national minorities, while at the same time embarking on a forced industrialisation with Western loans and technology, transforming society as a whole. The 1980s, as is clear from the embassy reports under investigation, saw a turning point, with pressure from the West to change Ceausescu's policies, to guarantee human rights and to abandon village-destruction plans. What is striking, is the often overlapping assessment of the situation by Soviet and American diplomats regarding Romania's domestic and foreign policy, even if the Soviet Union did not criticise Romania on human rights. A significant difference, however, was the Soviet "all is well in the socialist camp" attitude towards the public, which was understandable from the point of view of not wanting to endanger the (apparent) unity of the Eastern bloc.

Increasing pressure from the West resulted in Romania turning its back on the Western world, and a shift that went directly against the grain of Romania's post-1968 foreign policy. As György Földes writes about the late 1980s: *"What had previously been a defining element of Romanian sovereignty – an independent foreign policy, free association with the West, unlike in other socialist countries – now became a dangerous proximity that limited domestic politics and Romanian nation-building. At the same time, it became increasingly important for the Romanian leadership to keep the socialist camp together, since only within the camp was it possible for the Romanian Communist Party to survive."*[27] In the second half of 1989, however, it was clear that the process of regime change in Poland and Hungary was unstoppable, and the Soviet Union, struggling with internal political tensions and economic crisis, no longer had the power to hold the Eastern bloc together and thus indirectly maintain Ceausescu's power. Földes writes of a „real paradox", a „travesty of history", when, at the Warsaw Pact meeting in Moscow on 4 December 1989, the member states condemned the 1968 intervention in Czechoslovakia: *"Ceausescu [...] might have felt that history had done him justice. But meanwhile, the Romanian leader had spent half a year trying to find a way to prevent the independence of the states of the region by a coalition reminiscent of 1968."*[28]

Romanian-American relations began to develop in the early 1970s, to the advantage of both countries: the US was primarily seeking political gain and wanted to weaken the unity of the socialist bloc by giving Romania special treatment. Romania was the enfant terrible from the US point of view at a time when the later reform states – Hungary and Poland – were still pursuing a conformist policy. However, Romania's primary foreign policy objective was to distance itself from the Soviet Union in order to pursue its domestic agenda undisturbed. To this end, the US (along with other Western states) was only one tool that the Ceausescu regime needed primarily to make itself internationally presentable and to strengthen its political positions both inside and outside the Eastern bloc. At the same time, the West also helped Ceausescu to bring technology and capital into Romania (including, somewhat absurdly, by 'buying out' the Germans and Jews), thus indirectly contributing to the consolidation of the regime and the intensification of repression.

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[27] FÖLDES, György: Hungary, Romania and the national question 1956-1989. Napvilág Publishers, 2007, p. 443.
[28] Ibid. p. 479

In the mid-1980s, a break occurred after the upswing of the 1970s, when the US realised that there was no realistic basis for its hopes of driving a wedge into the Soviet bloc by favouring Romania. Despite this, the US maintained close trade relations with Romania until the end (MFN status was only abolished in 1988), and even in 1989 was reluctant to impose economic sanctions or other repressive measures. The case of Romania illustrates that the US had no intention of directly interfering in the internal affairs of individual socialist countries, but expected regime change throughout the Eastern bloc to come about through the weakening of the Soviet Union. Standing up for human rights was only a means to weaken the adversary, which helped to win the Cold War and thus extend the US sphere of influence eastwards. This was the stakes of a geostrategic game from which the US ultimately emerged victorious.

For Romania, too, it was a game whose outcome was strongly influenced by geopolitical determination and the exposures and constraints that this entailed. After the Second World War, there was a significant Soviet influence, to which Romania yielded in order to regain Northern Transylvania. This proved to be a successful strategy to restore the country's territorial integrity in the Western part of the country. In the decade following the Soviet withdrawal, there was a drift away from the Soviet Union and a move towards the West, while the Romanian leadership was careful to ensure that Western influence remained limited and did not interfere with its domestic policy-making. Formally, therefore, the Soviet sphere of interest remained, but Moscow's direct influence was reduced, while Washington had no meaningful say in Ceausescu's policies. It was another successful period, with Romania manoeuvring effectively in the bipolar world and using it to further its nation-building goals. The next geopolitical shift took place in the mid-1980s, which led to a narrowing of the margin of manoeuvre for Romania: Western pressure on the regime increased, while the regime could no longer enjoy the support it needed to survive from the countries of the socialist bloc (and especially the Soviet Union).

The weakening of the Soviet Union and the gradual withdrawal of the states in its sphere of influence led Ceausescu to conclude that Romania needed to be strengthened and brought into the emerging new world order by a third way policy. This meant, on the one hand, turning towards developing countries, as illustrated by Ceausescu's visits to African and Asian countries in 1988. At the same time, Romania tried to become independent of foreign capital: Ceausescu announced on 12 April 1989 that Romania had repaid all its foreign debts by the end of March.[29] In foreign trade, similar trends prevailed: Romania's trade balance was negative for all but a few years after the Second World War, but the situation changed radically from 1981. For example, in 1987 the trade balance was USD 2.18 billion, in 1988 USD 3.75 billion and in 1989 USD 2.05 billion. [30]

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[29] Notification of the Romanian debt repayment, 84/RT/04472 (14 April 1989, Hungarian Embassy, Bucharest)

[30] Balasan, Andrei-Cristian: Romania foreign trade between 1945 and 1989. Centre for Economic Studies Working Papers, 2013/1.
https://ceswp.uaic.ro/articles/CESWP2013_V1_BAL.pdf (downloaded: 02. March 2023)

At the same time as moving towards economic autarchy, Ceausescu was also trying to strengthen his country in terms of population. Through a forced demographic policy, Ceausescu was able to present Romania's population at the end of 1988 at 23 million, a significant achievement for the party.[31] At least as important was the expansion of military capacity. Suffice it to recall here that at the meeting in Arad on 28 August 1988, Ceausescu hinted to Grósz: *„We have developed Romanian industry so that we are capable of producing everything, including nuclear devices and even nuclear weapons.”*[32] Indeed, in 1989, there were numerous reports that Romania, in addition to the probable acquisition of launch vehicle technology, was taking steps to produce nuclear weapons. [33]

Despite all these attempts, by 1989 the Romanian regime had reached a dead end, its downfall was caused ultimately due to Ceausescu's unwillingness and inability to accept the new geopolitical realities of the changed Soviet-American relationship and to deal with the resulting changes, which proved to be decisive for Romania. It was clear that the era that bore his name was over and that someone else would have to lead the country into a new political era.

The change of regime did not leave a power vacuum in Eastern Europe; with the retreat of the Soviet Union, Romania was brought into the sphere of US interests and after a few years of drifting, it assumed a leading role in the security structure of the region. Aside from the last years of Ceausescu, Romania is a good example of how a small country can gain an advantage in a new geopolitical arena, recognising when to give in to external pressures beyond its control and adapting optimally to the new situation.

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[33] HASZÁN, Zoltán: If there is no revolution, are we at war with Romania? https://index.hu/belfold/1989/2009/12/21/ha_nincs_a_forradalom_haboruzunk_romaniaval/ (downoaded: 02 March 2023)

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REGIONAL POLICY AND OPPOSITION IN INTERNATIONAL RELATION

Abstract

The relations between the states within the framework of regional geopolitics are filled with mutual oppositions and resistances. There is no doubt that these oppositions and resistances are the result of cross national interests that are in mutual conflict. The interests of the great powers in the region have an additional influence, but mostly the oppositions and resistance are the result of mutual neighborhood policies that burden the relations between the states.
Within this paper, we will make a theoretical review of the creation of opposition and resistance in regional politics according to the matrix of global-world politics, but to avoid an exclusively theoretical approach to this question, we will briefly refer to the mutual oppositions of the Balkan countries, that is, of the states in the environment of North-Macedonia, and through the case of mutual relations between North-Macedonia and Bulgaria. Through this one approach, the paper before you take on the character of a theoretical analysis of a case study, which has impact on regional relations and the policy of the European Union with strong security implications creating a source of threats and risks to European security.

The different national interests and the influence of national romanticism from the 19th and 20th century in the neighboring states of North-Macedonia, as well as the completely appropriate influence in North-Macedonia, the basis on which the national interests of the Balkan states are still defined. The spirit of the Balkan wars is not dead yet and lives on in national strategies, interests and ideologies of all Balkan states. This fact combined with weak and corrupt state institutions, weak economy and no offer to its citizens for a better future, increases its opposition and resistance in mutual neighborly relations. This behavior or opposition of states in mutual relations in practice elevates the theoretical approach of their sovereignty.

Undoubtedly, the situation in the states, their strategies, government and policies is crucial or decisive contribution has sovereignty or the role of sovereign, which is a key term for the behavior of states in regional politics and mutual opposition.
The sovereign is the one who decides on the exceptional situation, and in modern politics it is not only the state as an international legal subject, but it is the citizens from whom sovereignty is derived, a condition that is mostly determined as a constitutional category.

Keywords: sovereign, inter-neighborly relations, regional policy, opposition.

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Introduction

The opposition between the states, within the framework of regional politics or in inter-neighborly relations are part of the creation of the policy, that is, trivial. It is understood that the creation of politics in the Balkan framework means the creation of enemies. This is a basis for constituting a durable political attitude that is also used in inter-neighborly relations, but above all it has a great use „value" in the internal politics of the states.

We can carry this approach of Carl Schmidt into the 21st century and relate it to modern theories of security framing, we can notice its modernization in within the framework of the Copenhagen School and Ole Weaver through the existence of „Securitization" as a modern term that helps in the constitution of a durable - justified political attitude. If that we add the fact that states (small or large) are international legal subjects formally and legally equal on the international stage, as well as the fact that international security is only a synonym that does not exist in practice, but national security only exists in practice and it exclusively depends on the interests and goals of the state or its political elite, of course, that the political attitude which is sustained and justified in addition to its basic internal it has a political purpose as well as a foreign policy or, first of all, inter-neighborly use value.

In addition, the impact of geopolitical developments on regional relations, undoubtedly amplifies the use value of creating conflicts in the regional, inter-neighborly relations, that is oppositions. In this case of transgressive geopolitical developments, the role of geopolitical actors is crucial in relation to the behavior of the states in the region and their mutual opposition. From here, the position of opposition to the states in regional policies it represents nothing more than a simple „securitization" of a certain primarily political one a challenge through which a sustained political attitude is created, the public basis of which is some kind of certainty endangering the vital interests of the state.

Actually, this is a pragmatic everyday political approach in modern society characterized by fragmentation of the sub-political existence in the state, that is, it has internal political influences. Not assuming any ideological political responsibility is characteristic, rather transferring the policy to the individual and sub-individual level, which is expressed in practice through simple and down-to-earth PR exclusively intended for intra-party or intra-political survival of political actors in the state. Regardless of whether that political survival and the created securitization will cause the emergence of threats and thus risks to regional security, or will openly be influenced by individual geopolitical actors, these phenomena are constantly present in political relations, and at the same time they are not perceived as a real security challenge but as simply a political game on various levels with an extremely high level of significance, in which for unfortunately, especially in the Balkans, political leaderships of little importance who are oriented participate exclusively on intra-political and even intra-party personal survival.

It is not usual to present concluding views in the introduction, but on the basis of theoretical considerations, we will have to defend this „conclusion" and that based on the example and role of sovereignties, that is, the sovereign who decides on the political attitudes of his country, and thus about behavior in inter-neighborly relations, too.

Regarding the success of the resistance of the states in inter-neighborly relations and regional politics and its securitization (creating enemies in this context) as vital national interest, the sovereign has a key role, and hence sovereignty as well a modern phenomenon. Precisely the sovereign has to be able to show its key role in the creation of state policy in relation to the resistance within the regional policy which must often rely on the ideological basis of the state (the party in power). However, that does not mean that the opposition parties are not actors for the securitization and abuse of the sovereign, but for their own political interests.

Does it this exist only in countless historical examples, or is it the same in modern conditions?

This is not a conclusion, but a question that should lead us to a very important answer, which refers to the state ideology as a factor inciting the resistance or the sovereign's decision to protect real or imagined vital interests. After all, from that depends on the intensity and acceptance of the sovereign to provide resistance, beyond the established ideological matrix that permeated the entire twentieth century and where resistance and wars broke out in large numbers because of ideological clashes between states.

1. A modern view of the reasons for resistance
(Norht-Macedonian-Bulgarian relations)

Modernity in the 21st century is increasingly removed from political ideologies, because neither liberalism or conservatism in all their forms are strong enough either attractive for the citizens, which is why they would enter into regional political ones from ideological motives disputes or inter-neighborly relations of resistance. Simply put, states in the 21st century as international we no longer see legal entities as ideological creations, but only as communities of citizens (sovereigns) who are united around the idea of statehood, and where for their own common language, culture, history and tradition are the heritage of the most numerous people with admixtures and characteristics of all other nations.

In doing so, a nation is created based on the sovereign right of the citizens, and the name of the nation is taken according to the name of the most numerous people and its own cultural-historical heritage. Within those frameworks, human rights are extremely important freedoms, the economy and entrepreneurship, education and health or the corpus of personal and public security of citizens over that of state security. So the classical sources of threats are reduced and new risks and threats are asymmetric and refer to daily living with a reflection of long-term economic, political, environmental, social and human security.

When we talk about the historical or cultural heritage of the Balkans, it is necessary to keep in mind that it has a direct impact on modern views on inter-neighborly relations and resistance between the countries of the Balkans. This influence is so much expressed which may even be a direct cause of securitization of a certain issue in inter-neighborly relations to the extent of a vital national or state issue. The reason for this phenomenon is the deep historical traumas of the Balkan peoples that are reflected in modern relations to the extent of decisive resistance to the current regional and global processes, i.e., policy models.

The Balkans as a part of South-Eastern Europe is very characteristic in terms of inter-neighborly relations and providing resistance between states, even in modern conditions, must be looked through the lens of historical political legacy and trauma. In the Balkans, they historically touched the Habsburg Monarchy and the Ottoman Empire. Two completely opposite political social and cultural empires, which to a certain degree of social-historical, and thus and on the political, technological, economic and educational-scientific level they differed. From here, political elites especially from the 19th and 20th centuries in Slovenia, Croatia and Hungary have a lot of points of contact and on a larger scale they can follow the political events in Central Europe, and through that the processes of reform of the political thought and the behavior of the state. In contrast to this political-developmental tendency in the Habsburg monarchy, in the southern part of the Balkans where the Ottoman Empire rules and where the religious division is expressed, the only significant social institutions open to the population, especially to those who are not Muslims are the family and the connection with relatives, and the only depersonalized church is an institution.

Only at the end of the 19th century until almost the middle of the 20th century when certain Balkan states gradually become independent, institutions are created through mechanisms, regulations and access to resources and power[3].

However, that unbuilt system of institutions and awareness of political responsibility towards their own citizens, which as a historical legacy continues into the 21st century, complicates the modern perceptions of the Balkan states and peoples towards the resistance in inter-neighborly relations. Even the involvement of geopolitical actors in regional resistances in the Balkans are seen through the prism of mythologizing the historical role of these actors in modernity.

This situation implies that instead of creating loyalty and connection to the state in order to build a sustainable system-network for the functioning and rule of law in the state, in the Balkans there is a merciless struggle between the states for historical heritage. Also, that heritage is usually a myth that should prove historical continuity. This reality of modern times represents political suicide for the political elites, but still more political assassination on their own country in which they claim to have the power. The role of the European Union and NATO in contemporary relations in the Balkans is a difficult task which, according to the „carrot and stick" principle, they apply within the regional framework of politics.

Within those frameworks, neither the EU nor NATO can reliably determine modern reasons for resistance in inter-neighborly relations in the Balkans, because all the „arguments" of The Balkan states are exclusively historical. The basic reasons from a contemporary point of view can be sought in the constitutional regulations or more precisely restrictions in the constitutions of the states and again is in relation to human rights, freedom and their endangerment. For these reasons, the action of the institutions of the European Union as concrete measures and sanctions for the many violations of basic human rights, especially the rights of minorities politically limited, and this creates a concrete opportunity for the development of resistance in inter-

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[3] KASER, Karl: Freundschaft und Feindschaft auf dem Balkan. Euro-Balkanische Herausforderungen, Weiser Verlag, Klagenfurt/Celovec, 2001, p. 105.

neighborhoods relationships. For example, in the Constitution of Bulgaria[4] in article 11, paragraph 4 it is said: *"There shall be no political parties on ethnic, racial or religious lines, nor parties which seek the violent seizure of state power."*

Excluding the violent seizure of state power, a looking through the prism of human rights and freedoms and the right to ethnic and religious determination-self-awareness of each person, and especially the right to association, while in practice this constitutional provision in Bulgaria is applied to ban the political association of Macedonians, Roma and Pomaks (Turks), and this constitutional provision is a violation of the fundamentals human rights and freedoms and the right of association. Furthermore, in Article 12, paragraph 2, it also limits civil association through an explicit ban on setting political goals of citizens associations, where it is said: *"Associations, including trade unions, shall not pursue any political objectives, nor shall they engage in any political activity which is in the domain of the political parties."*

This leaves freedom of interpretation of the constitution (Constitutional Court) as to whether the cultural values and their support and nurturing represent political goals and political activity. This is exactly the case with the Macedonian cultural centers in Bulgaria, which are being banned, while on many occasions, Macedonian organizations have been denied registration and the right to peaceful assembly and action. Finally, Bulgaria even according to the Framework Convention on Protection of minority rights, and the groups to which the rights from the Framework Convention will be applied and defining the term "national minority", does not even treat the Macedonians at all as an "ethnic minority group"[5].

Here is the basic motivation for resistance in North Macedonia's inter-neighboring relations with Bulgaria, and furthermore that Bulgaria acts towards North Macedonia exclusively in historical terms, i.e. placing history and mythological perceptions as a basis for contemporary inter-neighborly relations with Macedonia. The lack of reciprocity in mutual relations creates mistrust on both sides, but in the political-pragmatic aspect, it leaves an opportunity for political elites to act throughout the process of "Securitization" of the relations between the two states. This is exactly the basis for replacement theses and turning the gaze from contemporary causes of resistance to historical issues. In addition, in the North-Macedonian-Bulgarian relations, the geopolitical reason is hidden influence of certain powers with the aim of weakening the cohesiveness of the EU and NATO and stopping the processes of integration. At the end of this section, we come again to the fact that the modern reasons for resistance in inter-neighborly relations are the historical traumas that are skillfully used by the political elites for preserving their positions and power.

A dilemma in relation to the contemporary views towards the resistance, and especially in North-Macedonian-Bulgarian relations from the aspect of a scientific-theoretical approach is whether it exists at all sufficient political substrate in the sovereign or political leadership to through politics manage the resistance, giving it a

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[4]   https://www.parliament.bg/bg/const (downloaded: 16 April 2023)
[5]   Report Submitted by Bulgaria – Pursuant to Article 25, Paragraph 1 of Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (downloaded: 9 April 2003), (Bulgarian version), ACFC/SR 2003, 001

conceptual framework or it is a spontaneous movement which represents exclusively political short-term activity of political actors from both sides.

Regarding this dilemma, we do not expect to give an answer in the paper itself, but we present exclusively as a sustained basis for thinking and analyzing the political pragma in the case of resistance in the inter-neighborly relations between North Macedonia and Bulgaria and the slowing down of the processes for integration in the European Union. At the same time we should keep in mind the regional and global consequences of this inter-neighborly resistance. In the continuation of the paper, we will explain the theoretical aspects and the challenge of resistance to regional policies, where we can focus on thinking about the impacts of geopolitical actors.

2. Politics as resistance and challenge to regional policies

In the theoretical approach to resistance some authors within the conceptualization of politics as a constant struggle for power between sovereign states and war as the ultimate and worst because of this struggle, they stick to the dichotomous explanation of resistance. Namely, politics as resistance and as management during its action should result in specific new or favorable conditions for the state. There are three vital ingredients in any political action: conflict, relationships, and power and some form of collective action.[6] At the same time, the collective action by the state or non-state actors has a decisive importance.

This is where the role of politics emerges civil relations or civil interaction according to Kenny or the so-called coexistence which we use it very often in North Macedonia. This very coexistence is a decision of the sovereign and its role in dictating (conscious or unconscious, known or felt) movement politics. At this point of thinking we have the beginning of the creation of the state politics and here we enter into several possible open theoretical debates about how they encourage the creation of state policy at the regional-international level, with which goals and interests and at what time. In order to design the policy, of course, at the international level of the state undoubtedly, it must rely on group interests and the power that the state has in the region, but it must be promoted through the values, ethics and political and cultural identity of the state (the sovereign).

Political and cultural identity are based on values and ethics, and they derive from tradition, history, level of education and contemporary development of the supporting people in the state and of the sovereign as an individual. The sovereign as an individual has the indisputable right and capacity to engage himself as human subject and substratum in action on behalf of interests, convictions, values and the feelings.

Of course, actions, intentions and consequences cannot be fully predicted similarly to the well-known attitude that there is no one hundred percent certainty of risk and threat, therefore politics manages resistance in its conceptualization and therefore all tendentious actions and specific motivations must be seen and analyzed the consequences of the same or in the context of the risks and the possible damage to the state.

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[6] ARMSTRONG David – FARELL, Theo – MAIGUASHCA, Bice: Governance and Resistance in World Politics. British International Studies Association, London 2003. p. 18.

Because of this approach to politics and its management the resistance represents a challenge in regional politics within which it is necessary to predict the consequences of the securitization of a certain political issue and its elevation into a question of vital interest for the state and the nation. In the context of this approach, an essential question could be raised, namely: *"Is politics primarily to preserve our interests as individuals or political groups, or is equivalent for the defense-promotion of our values, convictions, political identity, cultural identity, or different ways of being?"*[7]

This is very important question, which is not at all rhetorical, and introduces us to the essence of the resistance in regional policy, and especially in inter-neighborly relations and explicitly in the issue of the conflict between North Macedonia and Bulgaria. If the role of the power of politics and its influence on the shaping of a kind of dominant political logic in international relations of the state towards its neighbors is added to this then we have a very clear picture of the fundamental imperatives for the often irrational behavior of political leaderships and tendentious actions translated into conflicts, which ultimately cause damage to the sovereign and his rights and freedoms.

No matter how we try to explain this in practice, we will see that politics manages resistance, whether that resistance in regional politics and inter-neighborly relationship is logical or profitable for both parties. The problem with creating conflicts, the use of power and relationships, and even more so in managing resistance (this can be synonymous with conflict management) represent political actors (on purpose we use "politician", not political) because they do not manage the resistance, but on the contrary, they are participants in the resistance (participants in the conflict), and thus represent a problem, not a solution to the problem.

While the politicized actors who are the participants in the resistance under inadequate management of resistance, they become uncontrollably marginal, and themselves political actors because of their tendentious action which they are unable to manage become subject to the influence of other stronger centers of power over regional politics or of geopolitical actors. Thus, we come to the result that the conflict-of-interest approach created by political actors actually claims that interests can be negotiated or bargained for more or less profit or loss for one of the parties. Instead of having resistance management for values, cultural and political identity (sub political identity can also accommodate national identity, because the nation is political construction) as well as convictions, in the wrong foundation of resistance and political actors who are supposed to manage it we have abuse of the politicized actors and open space for the intervention of other centers of power with stronger relations and influences, and especially dominant goals in geopolitics.

The damage that will be caused at the regional level and in the relations between neighbors and long-term plan will be visible and long-lasting in terms of the still unresolved issue of values, beliefs and cultural and political identity, which is why they are basically what they are used securitization as a mobilizing tool in achieving political goals. The question of individualism, which in politics causes the appearance of the sub-political behavior is much more pronounced, especially through the

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[7]   Ibid. p. 19.

political actors who reduce politics to a sub-individual level, thereby making institutional political impossible management of resistance, but highlight personal perceptions that come to the fore interests, and the resources of the state and the sovereign are used. This is where the role of the sovereign begins, who will make it known in a specific way where the political-politician actors were wrong in terms of managing the dispute not protecting its values, beliefs and identities and engaging in bargaining for the interests which the sovereign does not recognize as his vital interests, but are political interests of political elites. What are the values, beliefs and interests of the sovereign we will talk about in the next chapter.

Although, we must mention that the role of securitization aims precisely to present the interests of political actors as vital interests of the sovereign, which will cause the sovereign to deviate from beliefs, values and identity or he will find an enemy that threatens exactly his values, convictions and identity. This is simply a political game of creating public support for political market with the interests in managing the resistance, and through the appearance of threat. In fact, the sovereign is not aware that by creating a perception of a threat to his values, beliefs and identity and their securitization, political actors try to survive on the political stage and to continue the resistance without the possibility of managing it towards a solution. In this way, the possibility of direct involvement of regional and geopolitical actors is opened which will take over the management of the resistance and lead to "de-securitization" and resolution. In such an outcome, the political actors, again to stay in the game, the blame for the „inflicted "damage" to the values, beliefs and identity of the sovereign will transfer it to the regional or geopolitical actors who took over the management of the resistance.

3.The values, beliefs, identity and role of the sovereign as politics

Values, beliefs and identity are related to interests, but they can be anything manipulates politically for various interests and it is usually very difficult to fully and clearly be expressed by the sovereign, while the political leaderships do not apply methods of determining and adapting to one's interests.

This is a distinct feature of the Balkans and has a direct impact on the politics and management of resistance, especially in the creation and the glorification before the sovereign of the politicized actors within the framework of the resistance. As characteristic we can also mention the influence of the configuration of the power, which does not always result from the political, military, economic or other power of the state, rather it is simply an abuse of the power gained through international institutions and membership of various alliances, especially as is the case with NATO and the EU. That diffusion of power through international organizations or alliances represents the expansion of a new form of real politics in international relations defined as a global policy that directly affects regional and interstate bilateral relations in all aspects.

Hence the role of the sovereign (in the sense of constitutional bearer of sovereignty – the citizens, the people) is called into question, because the influences of global power centers through international organizations and membership in various alliances highlights the role of the government i.e., political leaderships in relation to the sovereign. This is expressed in the creation and management of regional

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relations, especially those that also have geopolitical significance on the international stage. In that context, values, convictions and identity which are extremely significant for the sovereign are brought into a state of relativity in terms of political interests. Therefore, the possibility of trading with values, beliefs, culture and identity as with political issues that are easier for solving, rather than as identity, cultural or religious issues that are unequivocally impossible to trade. This change in the concept of approach in the management of resistance in the international politics, especially in interstate and regional relations, represents a relativization of the role of the sovereign and the question of sovereignty.

Therefore, knowledge, empiricism, historical memory are extremely important for the sovereign and his political survival as an internal political factor that transmits its political power, and through the social knowledge and cognition, that the state reflects in interstate relations.

A particularly large problem for the sovereign is the lost knowledge that was acquired and applied in the past, and in the present, it is replaced by mythologizing encouraged by politicians and actors for their own interests. From this point of view, it is simply extremely important the existence of a structured society that is framed, legally regulated and in which there are indigenous political structures capable to implement of domestic and international laws and the rule of law in its own state territory giving the security of the sovereign, and provide resistance in international relations and regional policies preserving the interests of the sovereign.

Of course, those political structures framed in the state arrangement under the threat of losing their political positions will have to disagree with trading values, beliefs and identity even under the pressure of a global center of power. This is possible to put into practice exclusively in regulated state structures with built political and legal systems. We can identify this because the structure is a component that extends throughout the entire system and allows the system to be considered as a whole.[8] This should be regulated and harmonized at the highest level, supporting the interests of the sovereign.

Precisely for this reason, in international relations the domestic political structure, including the institutional one, should be examined first, so that a distinction can be drawn between the expectations of possible behaviors, and thus the outcome in domestic and foreign policy.

This approach, when entering a conflict or providing resistance in interstate relations, must be observed by each state in any organized and solid state-political structure. It is the assessment of one's own inside political structure and its behavior as well as the assessment of the adversary inside the political structure is an introduction to certain possibilities for successful resistance. Especially for pre-defined weaker side this is crucial in policy making, above all, the internal policy of mobilization through the securitization of the sovereign. This policy must not be aimed at protecting the interests of political actors and their survival in the political structure of the state, but must exclusively be aimed at protection of the interests of the sovereign.

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8   WALTZ, Kenneth N.: Theory of International Politics. Magor, Skopje, 2009. p. 85.

Also, this policy should be structured and conceptualized throughout the state-political structure which must be flexible enough in finding alternative solutions in relation to the interests of geopolitical actors and their pressures. From that aspect, the approach to „concrete" positions is very problematic and most often leads to the loss of the values, interests and identity of the sovereign with long-lasting negative consequences on the sovereign himself and his trust in the state-political structure, but also to himself and his ability to govern his own country sovereignly. In fact, when it comes to an interstate dispute, especially to that is characterized by expressed resistance and it is still inter-neighborly, political actors are trying to impose their position at the sovereign as solely vaporized.

After all, that is why when securitization is used, later nobody wants to be the first to go out and start "de-securitization" so as not to lose political points in public. The main moment of communication with the public (the sovereign) should be based on "democratic relations with the public". Democratic public relations is a term used to describe pluralistic society and is mostly related to the concepts of political communication, but in relation to the communication with the public during the resistance in the relations between the neighbors. If the resistance has strong regional and geopolitical influences, communication is primarily political without a doubt. This term, "democratic public relations", describe the free media in a society where most of the communication that stems from the political system was created so that the public is convinced that the policy is correct.[9]

How correct the policy is does not depend on the created political communication, because, especially the political actors can create it outside the ethical norms, rather depends exclusively on the political-legal-state structure and the implementation of laws and the rule of law in order to protect the interests of the sovereign.

At the end of this paper, we return again to international political theory and international political ethics which is extremely important from the theoretical point of view on in this paper. Namely, when it comes to the role of the sovereign, one is set a fundamental antinomian choice in which we either have coercive duties and obligations to others in society (state), regardless of our nationality, or the borders of the nation-states essentially define our sense of political identity and justify the marked ethical partiality towards our compatriots. The opening of the debate in relation to this antinomy, and in the context of the key role of the sovereign within the framework of protection of values, interests and identity can lead us to debate about liberal's globalist theories which is not the aim of this paper at all.

Returning to the mentioned antinomy in political theory we want to show the importance of the role of citizens in relation to its rights and obligations, political identity and above all human rights and freedoms within the state whose constitutive element they are themselves, especially in a period when the state as an international legal subject provides resistance in inter-neighborly relations which in turn has an impact on regional relations.

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[9] LILLEKER, Darren G.: Key Concepts in Political Communication. SAGE Publication, New York, 2008. p. 189.

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However, the sovereign dictates the policy of resistance, even if we have that only as a theoretical foundation. In addition to this "traditional" role of the sovereign, and within the framework of the European Union there is a duality regarding the understanding of the sovereignty of states. Namely, nation-states have sovereignty over all matters which they are competent to decide, but the EU apparatus decides what those issues are. The nation states have no sovereignty at all if all their powers are delegated[10]. In addition to this interpretation of Scruton in relation to European speech, the use of the collective was discussed above in the text, power, i.e., the power of the alliances by the states during the inter-neighbor opposition or regional politics. This actually means that based on their political decisions how much they are not appropriate with the policies or more precisely with the values and interests of the European Union, member states can resist and oppose policies even of the very international union to which they belong.

If we reduce this to supporting the values, interests and identity of the sovereign, then we can conclude that states act from their own point of view correctly in terms of opposition and resistance in regional and inter-neighborly politics, protecting the interest of its citizens – the sovereign. This is completely logical, especially if one acts politically within an orderly framework of political-state system whereby the interest of the sovereign is determined.

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, opposition and resistance within regional politics will always be present, regardless of whether it is really about protecting the state and national interests or the interests of the sovereign or the reason is quite another.

However, the role of the sovereign and the protection of its values, interests and identity are key to the successful implementation of resistance in the inter-neighborhood policy. Within those frameworks or rather under the cover and pretext of protecting national interests or protecting the sovereign may be realizing the third motive for resistance in regional policies, especially in inter-neighborly relations, and it is the internal political survival of the political elites, which we called political groups. As we already said in the introduction of this paper, whatever the consequences of these three real motives for opposition and resistance, they will cause the appearance of threats and thus the risks to regional security, or will openly be influenced by individual's geopolitical actors.

Especially these securitizing phenomena are constantly present in political relations, and while they are not perceived as a real security challenge but as a simple political one plays on different levels with an extremely high level of meaning primarily and realistically for the political elites. Unfortunately, especially in the Balkans, small-scale political leaderships participate in them, meaning that they are oriented exclusively to the intra-political and even to the intra-party personal survival. These are the conclusions of this paper, visible not only from the theoretical approach, but specifically through the prism of relations between North Macedonia and

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[10]   SCRUTON, Roger: Political Philosophy. Continuum International Publishing Group, London, 2006. p. 175.

Bulgaria. The direct opposition of political elites from both countries to the regional processes that should strengthen-stabilize the southern wing of NATO, to stabilize the European security environment in Europe itself, thereby enabling the European Union as a global actor to conduct a successful policy, primarily a security policy towards its neighborhood, creates problems for the Union and NATO.

That problem is reflected in the involvement in the dispute between North Macedonia and Bulgaria of other geopolitical actors and strengthening of opposition and resistance in neighborly relations, with a strong reflection on the region.

The region continues to be unstable, with pronounced political crises in North Macedonia and Bulgaria supplemented by economic crises, creating a favorable situation for influences aimed at regional destabilization.

Undoubtedly, we must also include Serbia and its opposition to the policies of the European Union regarding the war in Ukraine, as well as the impacts on Bosnia and Herzegovina and the constantly escalating border conflict with Kosovo. That's how you get it a complete picture of the entire region in which conflicts are continuously maintained and securitization prevails to provide resistance in inter-neighborly relations.

As a basic motive for maintaining this opposition and strengthened national mobilization supported by securitization for a certain life important problem the excuse used is the protection of the national interests, and the direct protection of the sovereign. The dilemma of whether it is the sovereign who agrees to enter the game of resistance and opposition is impossible to answer, primarily because it is to be expected that it will not be able to get it adequate information about the real threat to his values, interests and identity, as well as the level of threat. In addition, it is interesting to note that the sovereign does not have the opportunity to realize the benefits for own values, interests and preservation and strengthening of identity if he accepts to participate in the processes without resistance and opposition, in particular those that have regional significance.

Hence, as a conclusion, the question of the need to create enemies is raised and the use of securitization as an instrument of political action, for the purpose of protection of values, interests and identity.

However, the opposition within the regional policies and especially the inter-neighborly relations represents a pragmatic creation of the policies by the political leaderships, not by the sovereign. The sovereign is only a justification for the creation of policies „in his own interest" by the political leaderships who in turn exclusively within the framework of such policy making as imperative they have their own interests, political, economic or other.

We can conclude that in regional policies, their implementation, and especially in the inter-neighborly relations within these regional policies and again especially in the Balkans the tendency of opposition and resistance will continue. That opposition and resistance, especially in inter-neighborly relations it will be presented in public discourses as a protection of the values, interests and identity of the sovereign - the citizens and that as a basic instrument it will be used for the mobilization of the

sovereign mostly on an ethno-political basis the securitization of a certain problem that will be elevated to the level of a vital issue for the nation-citizens. At the same time, the sovereign - the citizens are neither familiar nor aware of the real threat which is presented to them through the securitization process, nor they are aware of the consequences of the opposition-resistance, and even less perceive the processes that occur on regional level. The dilemma remains, for the successful management of the process of opposition and resistance by the internal political actors and thus the de-securitization of the position of the sovereign, which is a topic that could be written about further.

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BÁLINT PONGRÁCZ[1]

WHAT ARE THE REASONS FOR THE PRESENCE OF RUSSIAN PRIVATE MILITARY COMPANIES ON THE AFRICAN CONTINENT?

Abstract

Due to its widely publicised role in the 2022 Russian invasion of Ukraine, the Kremlin-linked private military company (PMC) *Wagner Group* (Группа Вагнера), has become a household name and a recurring feature in the mainstream media coverage of the conflict.

However, looking further than that, Wagner – as well as a number of other Russian PMCs – is suspected to be operating since at least 2014, in up to 30 countries, across 4 continents[2]. This particularly large operational environment in itself gives ample reason for the investigation of Russian private military companies, however, reported human rights violations[3] and shadowy business interests[4] further underline the necessity of such endeavour.

Keywords: Russia, private military company, Africa, PMCS, Yevgeni Prigozhin, Wagner Group, Группа Вагнера, military training, equipment, misinformation

This particular paper is intended to contribute to the academic literature by answering the question: What are the reasons for the presence of Russian PMCs in Africa? The scope of the research question is restricted to the African continent in order to present a coherent analysis of comparable case studies. Consequently, the text refrains from discussing the notable Russian PMC activity in Europe (Ukraine and Serbia), in Latin America (Venezuela) and in the Middle East and broader Asia (Syria, Sri Lanka, Indonesia, Azerbaijan, Tajikistan, Iraq and in more recent years Yemen and Afghanistan)[5]. This reduced scope subsequently means that the essay ought not to be considered an all-encompassing description of the reasons behind the deployment of Russian private military contractors and any further conclusions drawn from the grounds of this essay must be done with due caution. This is especially true and cannot be emphasised enough, for the case of the full-scale invasion of Ukraine,

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1   ORCID: 0009-0004-8643-9934

2   KATZ, B. – JONES, S. G. – DOXSEE, C. – HARRINGTON, N.: Moscow's Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies. Moscow's Mercenary Wars: The Expansion of Russian Private Military Companies, 2020. https://russianpmcs.csis.org/

3   OHCHR (2021b): CAR: Russian Wagner Group harassing and intimidating civilians – UN experts. OHCHR. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/11/car-russian-wagner-group-harassing-and-intimidating-civilians-un-experts (downloaded:13 March 2023)

4   GI-TOC: Russia's military, mercenary and criminal interests in West Africa grew in 2022 and look set to expand in 2023. 2022. https://riskbulletins.globalinitiative.net/wea-obs-006/04-russias-military-mercenary-and-criminal-interests-in-west-africa.html (downloaded:29 March 2023)

5   KATZ et. al. op. cit.

where the Wagner Group has shown an entirely different *modus operandi* compared to its previous deployments.[6]

The argument put forth by this essay emphasises the underlying duality of the *raison d'être* of Russian PMCs.

- On the one hand, it is argued, that private military companies, such as the Wagner Group, serve broader Russian interests either under the direct initiative of the Kremlin or in the employment of Russian elites such as Yevgeny Prigozhin, "Wagner's patron and financier"[7] and Sergei Shoigu, the defence minister of the Russian Federation.[8]
- On the other hand, it is shown that PMCs serve the interests of African authoritarian leaders, for example, Faustin-Archange Touadéra, the president of the Central African Republic.[9]

Although this distinction between Russian and local incentives aids the understanding of the reasons behind the presence of Russian private military companies in Africa, it is strictly a theoretical division. In practice, these two approaches do not separate so clearly and more often than not they coexist, as demonstrated by the case studies assessed in this essay.

In the hopes of complete transparency, *a priori* to the central part of the text is, first a short description of (1) the methodology of the research yielding this paper. That is followed by a (2) literature review, which is intended to describe the wider academic discussion on PMCs and their often-misunderstood legal status. The substantive analysis begins with the assessment of (3) Russian interests driving the deployment of PMCs in Africa and continues with the review of (4) local incentives for their employment. Due to the uneven distribution of available sources, the part discussing Russian interests is disproportionately larger. Naturally, the end of the essay is marked by its final section, the (5) conclusion.

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[6] CUMMINGS, B. – WILLIAMS, C. – CLARKE, P. – BROWN, W.: Wagner's war: A year in Ukraine and beyond. Tortoise, 2023. https://www.tortoisemedia.com/audio/wagners-war-a-year-in-ukraine-and-beyond/ (downloaded:13 March 2023)

[7] OCCRP: Yevgeny Prigozhin. OCCRP, 2022. https://www.occrp.org/en/poy/2022/ (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[8] LOZOVENKO, T.: Shoigu deploys his Private Military Company, which competes with Wagner Group, to war against Ukraine. 2022. https://www.pravda.com.ua/eng/news/2022/12/28/7382706/ (downloaded:17 March 2023)

[9] RAMANI, S.: France and the United States Are Making West Africa's Security Situation Worse. Foreign Policy, 2020. https://foreignpolicy.com/2020/09/12/france-united-states-sahel-making-west-africa-niger-mali-burkina-faso-security-situation-worse/ (downloaded:6 April 2023)

1. Methodology

The inherently secretive nature of private military companies significantly restricts the procurement of primary sources.[10] This is especially true in the case of Russian PMCs. Let us not forget the 2018 murder of three Russian journalists - Orkhan Dzhemal, Alexander Rastorguyev and Kirill Radchenko - who set out to film a documentary on Wagner's presence in the Central African Republic (CAR).[11] While such physical dangers are distant from most academics, the notable scarcity of primary sources could pose serious risks, undermining the reliability of the academic discourse, which could become disproportionally dependent on secondary sources. Unable to entirely avoid this pitfall, this essay recognises its considerable reliance on secondary sources. Consequently, this paper might unintentionally include some hidden biases and misjudgments inherited from its sources and their authors. In an effort to minimalize this distortion, the case studies and examples presented in this paper were chosen based on the amount of reliable information available to the general public, as disputed or underreported cases were dismissed and claims were thoroughly cross-checked.

Given these cautionary measures, the arguments introduced in this paper rest upon what can reasonably be considered sound evidence.

2. Literature review

Having discussed the difficulties regarding the immediate sources on the topic, it is particularly important to introduce the broader academic literature within which the research question is situated.

2.1. Defining private military companies

Private military companies can be best understood as a detachment from the larger private security industry.[12] Private security companies (PSCs), provide a wide array of services, such as intelligence gathering and analysis, VIP and site protection, supply deliveries for conventional military forces in combat zones as well as consultancy in all of these fields.[13] In contrast, PMCs have additional capabilities: they "kill or train others to kill".[14] On one end of the spectrum, this translates to the

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10 MARTEN, K.: Russia's use of semi-state security forces: the case of the Wagner Group. Post-Soviet Affairs, 2018/3, pp. 181-204. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/1060586x.2019.1591142.

11 MUDGE, L.: The Murder of Three Russian Journalists Should Not Go Unsolved. 2020. https://www.hrw.org/news/2020/08/10/murder-three-russian-journalists-should-not-go-unsolved (downloaded:14 March 2023)

12 MARTEN op. cit.

13 AVANT, D.D.: The Market for Force: The Consequences of Privatizing Security. Cambridge University Press, 2005. https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/market-for-force/introduction/4EB9ADABF37B05858DF90CAE8CE6676C (downloaded:15 March 2023)

14 MCFATE, S.: The Modern Mercenary: Private Armies and What They Mean for World Order. p. 1. https://web.s.ebscohost.com/ehost/detail/detail?vid=0&sid=7cae7f4b-1d55-4057-91a9-

professional training of local military and police forces,[15] while on the other, PMCs can provide special military capabilities – such as combat pilots, forward (artillery) observers and special operation troops – that are widely considered to be invaluable force multipliers.[16]

A common label attached to PMCs is 'mercenaries'. While the term is often used as a colloquial, pejorative synonym for a private military contractor, in academic discussions 'mercenary' denotes a non-state-aligned combatant who recognises no other oversight than that of their contract.[17] This *soldier-of-fortune* character of mercenary work is, however, significantly different from the 'Fortune 500 company-like' behaviour that describes the multi-billion private military industry.[18] McFate defines PMCs as "military enterprises" with a preference for "long-term, paying clients in perpetual need of armies".[19]

Some Russian companies, such as the Wagner Group, Sewa Security Services, PMC Patriot and the Slavonic Corps Ltd, are reportedly involved in VIP and site protection,[20] conduct training[21] and occasionally fight alongside conventional military forces.[22] By doing so, for an established client base, they match McFate's definition of private military companies and consequently, they are distinguishable from PSCs and mercenaries.

2.2. The legal status of PMCs

Contrary to popular belief, PMCs are legal in most countries and their use is not prohibited by international law, albeit heavily regulated. Their lawful operation is defined in the *International Convention Against the Recruitment, Use, Financing and*

c188996e3f37%40redis&bdata=JkF1dGhUeXBlPWlwLHNoaWImc2l0ZT1laG9zdC1saX ZlJnNjb3BlPXNpdGU%3d#AN=797683&db=nlebk (downloaded:15 March 2023)

[15] PATTISON, J.: The Morality of Private War: The Challenge of Private Military and Security Companies. Oxford University Press, 2014. https://academic.oup.com/book/1644/chapter/141179074 (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[16] KATZ et al. op. cit.; Singer, 2010).

[17] PERCY, S.: Mercenaries the history of a norm in international relations. Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2007. https://academic.oup.com/book/4622 (downloaded:15 March 2023)

[18] MCFATE op. cit.;
Transparency International UK: US Private Military and Security Companies Fuel Corruption and Conflict Risk. Transparency International UK, 2022. https://www.transparency.org.uk/us-private-military-and-security-companies-fuel-corruption-and-conflict-risk (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[19] MCFATE op. cit. p. 30.

[20] SERWAT, L.: Wagner Group Operations in Africa: Civilian Targeting Trends in the Central African Republic and Mali. ACLED, 2022. https://acleddata.com/2022/08/30/wagner-group-operations-in-africa-civilian-targeting-trends-in-the-central-african-republic-and-mali/ (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[21] RAU, C.: TRAC Incident Report. Terrorism Research and Analysis Consortium, 2023. https://trackingterrorism.org/chatter/wagner-group-training-soldiers-in-central-african-republic-car/ (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[22] OUN info: RCA: des experts inquiets de l'utilisation par le gouvernement de 'formateurs russes' et de contacts étroits avec les Casques bleus. ONU Info, 2021. https://news.un.org/fr/story/2021/03/1093112. (downloaded:13 March 2023)

Training of Mercenaries.[23] This United Nations document outlines two limitations on PMCs: participation in offensive military campaigns and operating outside states whose governments contracted them.[24] The best example to contextualize Russian PMCs in this legal framework is the Wagner Group's involvement in the Second Libyan Civil War. In 2019, Wagner deployed up to 1,200 troops in Libya, who reportedly contributed to the attack on the UN-recognised Government of National Accord (GNA) in Tripoli.[25] This is in clear violation of the first condition and – insofar one does not recognise the legitimacy of the Libya National Army (LNA) opposing the GNA – a violation of the second one as well. Therefore, it can be established that the conduct of Russian PMCs is *de facto* not restricted by international law.

Additionally, it is important to attend to the legal status of private military companies in Russia. PSCs – per the definition outlined previously – are legal in Russia, however, operating or working for a PMC is unlawful under *Article 359* of the Russian Criminal Code.[26] This was reassured in March 2018 when the Russian Cabinet of Ministers blocked a bill attempting to decriminalize PMCs in the country.[27] This domestic legal framework means that Russian PMCs are under the constant and credible threat of prosecution, which suggests a skewed power dynamic between PMCs and the Kremlin, favouring the latter.

3. The Russian rationales for the presence of Russian PMCs in Africa

In order to identify the reasons for the presence of Russian PMCs in Africa it is practical to discuss the Russian incentives separately from the local ones. This segment (3.) of the paper, identifies the Russian incentives by assessing the role PMCs play in the larger Russian interests on the continent.

There is no unanimous academic consensus on how to analyse Russian objectives in Africa. While some scholars distinguish up to seven different themes,[28] others recognise as little as four.[29] For the purposes of this essay, it is most suitable to

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23   UN: United Nations Treaty Collection. 1989.
     https://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XVIII-
     6&chapter=18&clang=_en (downloaded:29 March 2023)

24   PONGRACZ, B.: Mercenaries at the forefront of Russian international relations.
     Ludovika.hu, 2021. https://www.ludovika.hu/en/blogs/the-daily-
     european/2021/09/08/mercenaries-at-the-forefront-of-russian-international-relations/
     (downloaded:17 March 2023)

25   KATZ et al. op. cit.

26   ØSTENSEN, Å. G. – BUKKVOLL, T.: Russian Use of Private Military and Security
     Companies – the implications for European and Norwegian Security. Chr. Michelsen
     Institute, 2018. https://www.cmi.no/publications/6637-russian-use-of-private-military-
     and-security. (downloaded:13 March 2023);
     The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation. 1996.
     https://www.imolin.org/doc/amlid/Russian_Federation_Criminal_Code.pdf
     (downloaded:17 March 2023)

27   UAWire: Kremlin blocks the bill legalizing Russian private military companies. 2018.
     https://uawire.org/russia-will-not-legalize-mercenaries (downloaded:29 March 2023)

28   KATZ et al. op. cit.

29   BUGAYOVA, N. – REGIO, D.: Russia's Campaign in Africa, Overwatch Podcast
     (Transcript). Institute for the Study of War, 2019.
     https://www.understandingwar.org/sites/default/files/ISW%20Transcript%20-

merge these themes into three overarching categories: (3.1.) political aspirations, (3.2.) security objectives and (3.3.) economic interests.

3.1. Political aspirations

Starting with Grobachev's *New Thinking*, but at the latest following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, Moscow's foreign policy lost its previously all-encompassing communist ideology.[30] Furthermore, the appalling state of the early post-Soviet Russian economy and the turbulent domestic political environment of the 1990s developed crippling insecurity among Russian policymakers concerning the country's global status.[31] Vladimir Putin captured the atmosphere well when he warned his compatriots: *"[f]or the first time in the past 200 to 300 years, Russia faces the real danger that it could be relegated to the second, or even the third tier of global powers"* (1999). This urge to remain in the first tier of global powers is often described as Russia's pursuit of its Great Power posture, and it is the new driving ideology of Russian foreign policy.[32]

What it means to be a *Great Power* is disputed within academic circles, however, a good working definition was suggested by Joseph Siegle – coincidentally at his hearing on *Russia's Use of Private Military Contractors* at the National Security subcommittee of the U.S. House of Representatives. He argues that the Kremlin's self-perception as a Great Power derives from the claim that Russia's "interest must be considered in every region of the world".[33]

The importance of Africa within this overarching foreign policy framework stems from the sheer size of this continent. With its 54 votes in the United Nations General Assembly, scholars believe that Africa is an "attractive theatre" for Russia to win support for its desired Great Power posture.[34]

Samuel Ramani made the convincing case that it is through autocracy promotion that Russia attempts to actualise this support (2023). He argues that by helping African autocratic regimes, the Kremlin gains reliable long-term allies. This assessment is aligned with Burnell's claim that *"deliberate attempts to export autocracy, [...] in*

%2020190927%20Overwatch%20Russia%27s%20Campaign%20in%20Africa.pdf (downloaded:19 March 2023)

[30]   Zwick, P.: New Thinking and New Foreign Policy under Gorbachev. PS: Political Science and Politics, 1989/2, p. 215. doi: https://doi.org/10.2307/419599

[31]   Zhuangzhi, S.: Russia's Great Power Revival Strategy: Goals, Practices, and Challenges. CSIS, 2021. https://interpret.csis.org/translations/russias-great-power-revival-strategy-goals-practices-and-challenges/ (downloaded:20 March 2023)

[32]   Siegle, J.: Russia's Use of Private Military Contractors. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2022. https://africacenter.org/experts/russia-private-military-contractors/#_ednref2 (downloaded:20 March 2023)

[33]   Ibid.

[34]   Siegle, J.: Russia's Strategic Goals in Africa. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2021. https://africacenter.org/experts/joseph-siegle/russia-strategic-goals-africa/ (downloaded:29 March 2023);
Besenyő, J.: The Africa Policy of Russia. Terrorism and Political Violence, 2019/1, pp.132-153. doi: https://doi.org/10.1080/09546553.2018.1555976.

practice may be far more significant as a source of influence",[35] an opinion that is further emphasised by Kagan (2007).

Autocracy promotion, as defined by Antej Kästner, is the conscious effort to support autocratic regimes or slow down the democratization of countries by external political actors (2019). In practice, Russia utilises two techniques of autocracy promotion in Africa: (3.1.1.) support through the international community and (3.1.2.) disinformation campaigns.

Note that Russian PMCs play a significant role in the coup-proofing of African autocratic regimes, which could be considered a technique of autocracy promotion. However, coup-proofing is discussed as a local incentive for the deployment of Russian PMCs in the respectable (4.) section of the essay.

3.1.1. Support through the international community

Siegle argues, that the financially least demanding way in which Russia aids autocratic African regimes is within the framework of the United Nations (UN). If and when such regimes would face UN sanctions, Russia, a permanent member of the Security Council, acts as "the beleaguered regime's defender" and blocks the punitive measures.[36] This mutually beneficial tactic facilitates the survival of the African regime and the diplomatic support from the indebted country furthers Russia's claim on its desired *Global Power* status.

Since this technique of autocracy promotion happens exclusively in the international sphere of politics it can provide no explanation for the presence of Russian PMCs on the African continent.

3.1.2. Disinformation campaigns

The alternative technique of autocracy promotion deployed by the Kremlin in Africa is disinformation.

Disinformation, as defined by the European Commission, has two components: its content, which is false or misleading and its intention, which is to "deceive to secure economic or political gain" (2023). Disinformation is differentiable from misinformation, as the latter has no intent to deceive, albeit its content is misleading or false.[37]

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[35] BURNELL, P.: Is there a new autocracy promotion? 2010. p. 5, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/130597/WP96_Autocracy_ENG_mar10.pdf (downloaded:21 March 2023)

[36] SIEGLE, J.: Intervening to Undermine Democracy in Africa: Russia's Playbook for Influence. Africa Center for Strategic Studies, 2023. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/intervening-to-undermine-democracy-in-africa-russias-playbook-for-influence/ (downloaded:21 March 2023)

[37] Die Bundesregierung: What is disinformation? Webseite der Bundesregierung Startseite, 2022. https://www.bundesregierung.de/breg-de/themen/umgang-mit-desinformation/disinformation-definition-1911048 (downloaded:29 March 2023)

According to the Africa Defence Forum of the U.S. Africa Command, the aim of Russian disinformation in Africa is to promote pro-Russian and pro-autocratic sentiments by reshaping the domestic narrative in countries such as the CAR (ADF, 2022a). The primary means of such efforts are Moscow-funded local radio stations - such as the CAR's Radio Lango Songo[38] – and pro-Russian TV channels – for example Afrique Media in Cameroon.[39] But more conventional Russian media networks, such as Russia Today (RT) and Sputnik are also expanding on the continent in countries such as Eritrea and the Ivory Coast.[40]

While numerous African media outlets are linked to Yevgeny Prigozhin, there is no proof of Russian PMCs working with these entities directly.[41] Therefore, there is no evidence to suggest that PMCs are necessary for Russia's disinformation campaign in Africa.

To summarize, the Kremlin's political aspiration to remain a Global Power and its consequent autocracy promotion campaigns offer no explanation for the presence of Russian PMCs on the continent, insofar as coup-proofing efforts are regarded as a local incentive.

3.2. Security objectives

In the midst of Russia's total war on Ukraine, the Kremlin's security priorities are changing drastically, however, it is too early to assume any far-reaching consequences. That being said, the 21 cooperation treaties that Moscow has signed with various African states since 2014 can give an insight into what Russia's security objectives were for the continent between the annexation of Crimea and a full-scale invasion of Ukraine.[42] This timeframe is an ideal scope of analysis for this paper because Russian PMCs first appeared in Africa in 2014.[43]

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[38] SCHIPANI, A. – PILLING, D. – ADEOYE, A.: How Russia's propaganda machine is reshaping the African narrative. Financial Times, 9 Feb. 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/d427c855-c665-4732-9dd1-3ae314464d12 (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[39] EL-BADAWY, E. – MUNASINGHE, S. – BUKARTI, A. B. – BIANCHI, B.: Security, Soft Power and Regime Support: Spheres of Russian Influence in Africa. 2022. https://institute.global/policy/security-soft-power-and-regime-support-spheres-russian-influence-africa (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[40] ARBUNIÉS, P.: Russia's sharp power in Africa: the case of Madagascar, Central Africa Republic, Sudan and South Africa. 2020. https://www.unav.edu/web/global-affairs/detalle/-/blogs/russia-s-sharp-power-in-africa-the-case-of-madagascar-central-africa-republic-sudan-and-south-africa (downloaded:25 March 2023)

[41] GROSSMAN, S., – RAMALI, K. – DIRESTA, R.: Blurring the lines of media authenticity: Prigozhin-linked group funding. 2020. https://cyber.fsi.stanford.edu/io/news/libya-prigozhin (downloaded:25 March 2023).; Africa Center for Strategic Studies: Mapping Disinformation in Africa. 2022. https://africacenter.org/spotlight/mapping-disinformation-in-africa/ (downloaded:26 March 2023)

[42] HEDENSKOG, J.: Russia is Stepping Up its Military Cooperation in Africa. 2018. https://www.foi.se/rest-api/report/FOI%20MEMO%206604 (downloaded:1 April 2023)

[43] KATZ et. al. op. cit.

These military cooperation treaties are reminiscent of their Soviet predecessors. In essence, the Kremlin is offering (3.2.1.) military training and equipment at a subsidised price in return for (3.2.2.) basing rights and political support - elevating its Great Power status as discussed previously.[44] Notably, the African partners often finance these purchases by taking a Russian loan, which can later be written off by the Kremlin in an effort to further strengthen amicable ties between Russia and the continent.[45]

3.2.1. Military training and equipment

With regards to providing military training and hardware, it has to be emphasised that although the cooperation agreements are between state actors, according to UN documents, Russian training missions – often predominantly – feature civilian instructors. For example, in 2018 the Russian Federation supplied 175 training personnel to the CAR defence forces, 170 being civilian instructors.[46] Whether these civilian instructors were private military contractors remain unconfirmed, but certain scholars believe that they were in fact the first Wagner troops arriving in the country.[47]

Using PMCs instead of conventional military personnel in training missions is a rational decision of the Kremlin, which can hide the casualties suffered by PMCs much easier than that by the conventional armed forces.[48] The implications of arms exports are discussed as economic interests, in the (3.3.2.) segment on trade.

3.2.2. Russian military bases in Africa

According to the agreements, the planned military bases in CAR, Egypt, Eritrea, Madagascar, Mozambique and Sudan are intended to be used by the Russian armed forces, not PMCs. However, the Wagner Group has reportedly operated from Russian military bases before.[49] Furthermore, according to intelligence from the Swedish Defence Research Agency (FOI) a Russian private military company – PMC Patriot – "has been connected to the construction of a Russian air base in Burundi".[50]

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44   HEDENSKOG op. cit.
45   KLOMEGAH, K. K.: Russia's Politics Of Writing Off African Debts – OpEd. Eurasia Review, 2023. https://www.eurasiareview.com/21032023-russias-politics-of-writing-off-african-debts-oped/ (downloaded:2 April 2023)
46   UNSC: S/2018/729: Letter dated 23 Jul 2018 from the Panel of Experts on the Central African Republic extended pursuant to resolution 2399 (2018) addressed to the President of the Security Council. https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/s_2018_729.pdf (downloaded:5 January 2022)
47   PARENS, R.: The Wagner Group's Playbook in Africa: Mali. Foreign Policy Research Institute, 2022. https://www.fpri.org/article/2022/03/the-wagner-groups-playbook-in-africa-mali/ (downloaded:28 March 2023)
48   RACZ, A.: Band of Brothers: The Wagner Group and the Russian State. 2020. https://www.csis.org/blogs/post-soviet-post/band-brothers-wagner-group-and-russian-state (downloaded:5 April 2023)
49   BALESTRIERI, S.: Russian military expands in Africa by building bases in six countries. SOFREP, 2020. https://sofrep.com/news/russian-military-expands-in-africa-by-building-bases-in-six-countries/ (downloaded:29 March 2023);
     KATZ et. al. op. cit.
50   HEDENSKOG op. cit.

Be that as it may, the fact that PMCs use Russian military bases only proves the connection between the Kremlin and these companies, but it does not provide an explanation for the presence of Russian private military contractors in Africa.

In light of these two factors, it can be established that private military companies have a significant role in Russia's foreign security objectives as they can provide military training for allied nations without potentially exposing the Kremlin to public scrutiny over the casualties of Russian soldiers.

3.3. Economic interests

Following the 2014 annexation of Crimea, but more extensively, after the full-scale invasion of Ukraine began in February 2022, Russia became increasingly isolated from the Western World. Consequently, the importance of Russian cooperation with Africa grew exponentially.[51] Having discussed the political and security aspects of this relationship, this segment (3.3.) attends to Russia's economic interest in Africa and evaluates to what extent these can explain the presence of Russian PMCs on the continent.

Russian economic interests in Africa on a macro level can be analysed in three categories: in terms of (3.3.1.) foreign direct investment, as a (3.3.2.) trade-based relationship and with respect to major Russian companies' (3.3.3.) offshoring. Additionally, (3.3.4.) micro-enterprises are ought to be looked at.

3.3.1. Foreign direct investment

Russia's modest GDP - which was only near-equivalent to that of Spain, even prior to the Kremlin's war on Ukraine[52] – sets strict limitations for Moscow's economic engagement with Africa in terms of foreign direct investment (FDI). The fact that in 2019 Russia contributed less than 1% to the total FDI going to Africa means that this aspect of Russian economic interests is negligible in the context of this essay.[53]

3.3.2. Trade-based relationship

In light of the dispensable value of Russian FDI, scholars like Joseph Siegle argue that economic relations between Russia and Africa are predominantly 'trade-based' (2023). However, the scale, the balance and the distribution of this relationship are all suboptimal. Regarding its value, Russia trades a modest $14 billion annually

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[51] SIEGEL (2023) op. cit.;
WILSON, T.: Russia's growing trade in arms, oil and African politics. Financial Times, 14 Feb. 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/cb0f2fe7-5555-497d-806c-5c4c2be15e7f (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[52] World Bank: GDP (current US$) – Russian Federation, Spain. 2023. https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD?locations=RU-ES (downloaded:26 March 2023)

[53] Economist Intelligence: Russia-Ukraine war complicates Russian operations in Africa. 2022. https://country.eiu.com/article.aspx?articleid=1561950939&Country=Egypt&topic=Economy&subtopic=Ope_2 (downloaded:26 March 2023)

with the continent, in comparison to the $295 billion, $254 billion and $65 billion that the EU, China and the United States trade respectively.[54] In terms of its distribution, this relatively small sum has a 7:1 export-import ratio, meaning that Russian exports value almost seven times more than what the country imports, creating an approximately 10,5 billion annual trade deficit.[55] Additionally, Russian trade with Africa is narrowly diversified with 70% of it happening in four countries: Egypt, Algeria, Morocco and South Africa.[56] This extremely uneven distribution is especially important in the context of this paper, as Russian PMCs only operate in two of these countries - Egypt and South Africa - which drastically limits the possible causal link between trade interests and the presence of Russian PMCs in Africa.[57]

- The two major types of commodities exported by Russia to Africa are arms and grain. Russia is the largest exporter of arms to Africa, supplying almost half (44%) of all weapons that are arriving on the continent.[58] However, counterintuitively, this does not explain the presence of Russian PMCs, even though they train African troops on Russian – and often Soviet – military hardware. The reason for this is that the sole exporter of Russian arms is Rosoboronexport, a state-owned intermediary that deals with "national defence and law-enforcement agencies" exclusively.[59] Rosoboronexport does not engage in any other activity than the sale of weapons and while it sometimes relies on PSCs who "shepherd Russian arms sales", the delivery of weapons does not require a private military company, but only a private security company.[60] Similarly substantial is Africa's dependency on Russian grain, as imports from the country amount to almost one-third of African wheat consumption – with conflicting data regarding the exact percentage.[61] Nonetheless, there is no evidence to suggest that private military companies have any links to grain imports from Russia.

[54] SIEGEL (2023) op. cit.

[55] NOUROU, Moutiou A.: Africa imports seven times more goods from Russia than it exports to Vladimir Putin's country. Ecomnews Afrique, 2022. https://ecomnewsafrique.com/en/2022/03/10/africa-imports-seven-times-more-goods-from-russia-than-it-exports-to-vladimir-putins-country/ (downloaded:26 March 2023)

[56] Statista: Russia leading trade partners in Africa 2020. Statista, 2020. https://www.statista.com/statistics/1063407/russia-leading-trade-partners-in-africa-by-trade-volume/ (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[57] KATZ et al. op. cit.

[58] SIPRI: TRENDS IN INTERNATIONAL ARMS TRANSFERS, 2021. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2022. https://www.sipri.org/sites/default/files/2022-03/fs_2203_at_2021.pdf (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[59] Rosoboronexport: History and status of Rosoboronexport. 2023. http://roe.ru/eng/rosoboronexport/ (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[60] AFP: Private military contractors bolster Russian influence in Africa. France 24. 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/live-news/20220204-private-military-contractors-bolster-russian-influence-in-africa (downloaded:1 April 2023)

[61] SIEGEL (2023) op. cit.;
Statista Infographic: Africa's Major Reliance on Russian and Ukrainian Wheat. Statista Infographics, 2022. https://www.statista.com/chart/27009/import-sources-of-wheat-in-africa/ (downloaded:29 March 2023)

- Russian imports from Africa are mainly fruits and diamonds.[62] There is no evidence to suggest that private military companies are involved in the export of fruits from Africa. Diamond extraction is discussed in the following two sections as it is mainly done by (3.3.3.) major Russian firms operating in Africa – lacking a better word – by offshoring extraction and by (3.3.4.) micro-enterprises.

3.3.3. Offshoring

Alongside arms and grain, nuclear power and hydrocarbons are also traditional pillars of Russian economic relations. Russian energy and extraction giants, such as Rosatom, Gazprom, Rosneft and Alrosa set up mines and began the construction of various plants in Africa – it is this behaviour that this essay, in a somewhat unorthodox fashion, labels 'offshoring'.

The Russian State Nuclear Energy Corporation, better known as Rosatom, has cooperation agreements with 14 African states. It has already begun the construction of the El Dabaa nuclear power plant in Egypt – estimated to cost $30 billion[63] – and it is set to build a further three mini-stations in Ethiopia, Sudan and Zambia.[64] Additionally, through an elaborate system of subsidiaries – such as Atompredmetzoloto – Rosatom is involved in uranium mining and exploration in a number of African states – data on the exact number of countries is inconsistent.[65] The two Russian fossil fuel energy giants, Gazprom and Rosneft are also active on the continent extracting oil in Ghana, Nigeria, South Sudan and Senegal and conducting gas exploration in Libya and Algeria.[66] Accounting for more than one-fourth of global diamond extraction is a lesser-known Russian company, the state-controlled Alrosa.[67] Alrosa and its subsidiaries mine or explore diamonds in Angola, Zimbabwe and Botswana.[68]

Securing the extraction sites, energy plants and transmission networks of these state-owned energy and mining companies require serious manpower. However, the legal and social responsibility of deploying conventional military personnel in often

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[62] WILSON op. cit.

[63] Enerdata: Russia's Rosatom starts building Egypt's first nuclear power reactor. 2022. https://www.enerdata.net/publications/daily-energy-news/russias-rosatom-starts-building-egypts-first-nuclear-power-reactor.html (downloaded:27 March 2023)

[64] Rosatom: Rosatom Empowering Africa. 2021. www.rusatom-overseas.com. https://www.rusatom-overseas.com/media/mass-media-about-us/rosatom-empowering-africa.html (downloaded:27 March 2023);
PAPKO, A.: Oil, Diamonds, Bases: What Russia is After in African Countries. 2023. https://belsat.eu/en/news/oil-diamonds-bases-what-russia-is-after-in-african-countries-eng-video (downloaded:28 March 2023)

[65] LUZIN, P.: Russia's Atomic Strategy in Africa. 2020. https://ridl.io/russia-s-atomic-strategy-in-africa/ (downloaded:28 March 2023)

[66] PAPKO op. cit.

[67] U. S. Department of the Treasury: The United States Sanctions Major Russian State-Owned Enterprises. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2022. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/jy0707 (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[68] Alrosa: African projects. 2023. http://eng.alrosa.ru/operations/african-projects/ (downloaded:29 March 2023)

war-torn countries is relatively high.[69] In order to avoid the *body bag effect* - the domestic backlash after the death of a soldier abroad[70] – these firms hire private security companies to provide guard duties at dangerous sites.[71] Important to underline, that site protection services do not necessitate the use of private military companies, private security companies are well equipped to fulfil such duties as it is illustrated by the fact that many countries including China use PSCs in Africa in such roles.[72]

Therefore the presence of large Russian companies does not explain the deployment of Russian PMCs in Africa, albeit it provides a rationale for the use of PSCs which are similar entities.

3.3.4. Micro-enterprises

Behind the macro layer of large state-owned corporations hides a complex web of Russian micro-enterprises.[73] Since these firms are sheltered by an elaborate system of shell companies it is practically impossible to determine the exact number and net worth of such firms. Investigative journalists, however, discovered and reported extensively on one such network in the Central African Republic, which can be used as a case study to illustrate how these micro-enterprises create demand for Russian PMCs in Africa.

The 'Prigozhine galaxy' – as it was named by the European Investigative Collaboration (2022) – begins with an umbrella company called M Invest, owned by Yevgeny Prigozhin.[74] M Invest owns a number of security and mining companies, including Lobaye Investment and Diamville, which have been licensed to explore and mine gold and diamonds in the CAR since 2018.[75] Such endeavours – as discussed previously – necessitate site protection, which is provided by Sewa Security Services, another subsidiary of M Invest and a known cover for the Wagner Group.[76] On top of the regular jobs of a PSC attached to mining sites, Sewa/Wagner fulfils two additional

69   DYNER, A. M.: PISM. The Polish Institute of International Affairs, 2018.
     https://pism.pl/publications/The_Role_of_Private_Military_Contractors_in_Russian_Fore
     ign_Policy (downloaded:28 March 2023)
70   BAHADOR, B. – WALKER, S.: Did the Iraq war have a body bag effect? 2012.
     https://ir.canterbury.ac.nz/handle/10092/11606 (downloaded:28 March 2023)
71   DYNER op. cit.; RACZ op. cit.
72   NANTULYA, P.: Chinese Security Contractors in Africa. 2020.
     https://carnegieendowment.org/2020/10/08/chinese-security-contractors-in-africa-pub-
     82916 (downloaded:29 March 2023)
73   FABRICIUS, P.: Wagner's dubious operatics in CAR and beyond. 2022.
     https://issafrica.org/iss-today/wagners-dubious-operatics-in-car-and-beyond
     (downloaded:29 March 2023)
74   U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2020).
75   SPILLER, C. – METZGER, C. – CRITTENDEN, M.: SCOPE, 2021.
     https://www.scopedata.org/reports/2021-3-19_CAR.html (downloaded:29 March 2023);
     European Investigative Collaboration, 2022).
76   U.S. Department of State (2023) op. cit.;
     OHCHR (2021a): CAR: Experts alarmed by government's use of 'Russian trainers', close
     contacts with UN peacekeepers. United Nations Office of the High Commissioner Human
     Rights. https://www.ohchr.org/en/press-releases/2021/03/car-experts-alarmed-
     governments-use-russian-trainers-close-contacts-un (downloaded:29 March 2023)

roles. It increases the profits of M Invest by *"forcing local traders to sell directly to [...] Diamville, or [the treaders] risk violent reprisals"*[77] and *"providing military training [...] in exchange for favorable mining rights"*.[78] The fact that Wagner troops "kill [and] train others to kill"[79] in the CAR means that they ought not to be considered private security contractors, but military contractors.

The CAR is not an isolated case. Meroe Gold, another subsidiary of M Invest, received mining rights in Sudan in 2017 only months prior to the arrival of Russian PMCs who provided site security and military training to local troops[80] Similarly, in 2019, Wagner troops provided military assistance to the government of Mozambique in the Cabo Delgado province fighting the local Islamic Insurgency in return for natural gas extraction rights.[81]

The *Prigozhin Galaxy* is not an isolated case either. Another Russian private military company with suspected economic ties to micro-enterprises is PMC Patriot (ЧВК Патриот) which is linked to Russia's defence minister, Sergei Shoigu.[82] However, the complex web of shell companies surrounding PMC Patriot has not been investigated sufficiently yet, therefore reporting on the supposed 'Shoigu Galaxy' would compromise the academic integrity of this paper.

In conclusion, Russian economic interest on a macro-level - that is FDI, trade and large state-owned enterprises - cannot explain the presence of Russian PMCs in Africa, albeit the arms exports of Rosoboronexport, as well as the construction and exploration sites of Gazprom, Rosatom, Rosneft and Alrosa, provide reasons for the employment of PSCs.

Conversely, evidence suggests that Russian micro-enterprises, such as the Prigozhin-linked M Invest, rely heavily on PMCs in their operations, thus introducing a rationale for the presence of Russian private military companies on the African continent.

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[77] Caravanserai: Wagner Group extorting Africa's 'blood diamonds' to fund operations. Caravanserai, 2022. https://central.asia-news.com/en_GB/articles/cnmi_ca/features/2022/12/16/feature-01 (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[78] PEDONE, H.: Minerals, Militias and Mercenaries: Putin's Stake in the Central African Republic. The St Andrews Economist, 2021. https://standrewseconomist.com/2021/02/22/minerals-militias-and-mercenaries-putins-stake-in-the-central-african-republic/ (downloaded:29 March 2023); SPILLER – METZGER – CRITTENDEN op. cit.

[79] MCFATE op. cit. p. 1.

[80] U. S. Department of the Treasury: Treasury Targets Financier's Illicit Sanctions Evasion Activity. U.S. Department of the Treasury, 2020. https://home.treasury.gov/news/press-releases/sm1058 (downloaded:29 March 2023); KATZ et. al. op. cit.

[81] SUKHANKIN, S.: Russian PMCs and Irregulars: Past Battles and New Endeavors. Jamestown, 2020. https://jamestown.org/program/russian-pmcs-and-irregulars-past-battles-and-new-endeavors/ (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[82] LOZOVENKO op.cit.; DOXSEE, C.: Wagner: the Cornerstone of Russia's Strategy in Africa. ISPI, 2022. https://www.ispionline.it/en/publication/wagner-cornerstone-russias-strategy-africa-37141 (downloaded:29 March 2023)

4.   Local incentives for employing Russian PMCs

Having discussed the Russian incentives for the deployment of PMCs it logically follows to consider local agency and elaborate on the reasons why various African states employ Russian private military companies. Notable, that this approach is significantly more understudied in comparison to the Russian rationales. Consequently, it is a shorter segment and arguably even speculative in certain points - within the strict boundaries of academic conduct outlined in the (1.) methodology.

Following the same structure as the previous (3.) segment, local incentives are assessed with regard to (4.1) political aspirations, (4.2) security objectives and (4.3.) economic interests.

4.1.   Political aspirations

The political aims and goals of African governments are infinitely diverse, however, private military companies provide specialised services that have no practical use in most aspects of statecraft. Nonetheless, there is one broad political objective that PMCs can contribute to, regime survival.[83]

As discussed previously, Russia provides help for authoritarian regimes, in effect aiding and abetting their survival, both through the (3.1.1.) international community and locally, by deploying (3.1.2.) disinformation campaigns. Cumulatively, these efforts are called autocracy promotion. However, there is a third aspect of autocracy promotion that could also be perceived as a local effort, coup-proofing.

Quinlivan, who coined the term, describes coup-proofing as a set of deliberate efforts that increase the resilience of regimes against military coups (1999). In practice, there are five domestic strategies for coup-proofing: nepotism, military favouritism, 'counter-balance', surveillance and the promotion of professionalism within the armed forces.[84] Private military companies provide the third service, they can act as a parallel force to the conventional military in effect serving as a reliable counter-balance. The advantage of using PMCs in this role – which mainly entails providing personal security to high-ranking members of the regime[85] and occasionally participating in violence against rebels and civilians opposing the regime[86] – is warranted by the fact that foreign military contractors have no local political convictions, hence their loyalty lies with the "long-term, paying client",[87] that being the regime. Therefore, they are less likely to turn against a regime, no matter how oppressive it is.

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[83]   LUTTERBECK, D.: Coup-Proofing in the Middle Eastern and North African (MENA) Region. Oxford Research Encyclopedia of Politics, 2021. doi: https://doi.org/10.1093/acrefore/9780190228637.013.1869.

[84]   Ibid.

[85]   EDWARDS, N.: Coup-Proofing: Russia's Military Blueprint to Securing Resources in Africa. Council on Foreign Relations, 2021. https://www.cfr.org/blog/coup-proofing-russias-military-blueprint-securing-resources-africa (downloaded:5 April 2023)

[86]   ADF (2022b) op. cit.

[87]   MCFATE op. cit. p. 30.

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However, there is a considerable danger of overly relying on a foreign security detail. For example, Faustin-Archange Touadéra the president of the Central African Republic "owes his survival to Wagner mercenaries" and this almost exclusive reliance on the Russian PMC means that he is not necessarily the employer of Wagner anymore, but rather their hostage – according to an unnamed Western diplomat working in the region.[88]

Consequently, it can be established that the domestic political desire for coup-proofing provides a satisfactory explanation for the employment of private military contractors. However, this explanation is not specific to Russian PMCs, thus falling short of answering the research question in its entirety.

4.2. Security objectives

The roots of the contemporary security challenges of the continent can be traced back to the 1960s when most African countries gained their independence.[89] However, more recently, the spread of violent religious extremism has further deteriorated the security situation, especially in the Sahel region, ranging between Senegal and Eritrea.[90] Combined, the long history of instability and the growing ethnic and religious tensions created an almost continent-wide demand for counterinsurgency efforts in Africa.

International missions, directed by the United Nations, attempted to pacify Africa as early as 1960, starting with ONUC (1960-'64) – the United Nations Operations in the Congo.[91] Since then, the UN has deployed over 30 peacekeeping missions to the continent.[92] Additionally, state actors, most notably France, have made numerous bilateral attempts at peacekeeping and counterinsurgency in Africa, such as the now-terminated Operation Sangaris, which was the seventh French attempt to intervene in the Central African Republic since the country gained its independence in 1960.[93]

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[88] PILLING, D. – SCHIPANI, A.: How Moscow bought a new sphere of influence on the cheap. Financial Times, 7 Feb. 2023. https://www.ft.com/content/0c459575-5c72-4558-821e-b495c9db9b6f (downloaded:5 April 2023)

[89] STRONSKI, P.: Russia's Growing Footprint in Africa's Sahel Region. Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 2023. https://carnegieendowment.org/2023/02/28/russia-s-growing-footprint-in-africa-s-sahel-region-pub-89135?utm_source=carnegieemail&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=announcement&mkt_tok=ODEzLVhZVS00MjIAAAGKN56OzL6KJipFnB5LncLJIclTy19YED0VQGZBY0kg7P_QaazjehVt9_ATlj_2gwTm-oDCSW768a9kaPXr_WfNgUBIifA62UcqTgE0jRI (downloaded:6 April 2023)

[90] RAMANI (2020) op. cit.; UNOWAS: 'Unprecedented terrorist violence' in West Africa, Sahel region. UN News, 2020. https://news.un.org/en/story/2020/01/1054981 (downloaded:3 April 2023)

[91] UN: Peacekeeping: Our history. United Nations Peacekeeping, 2010. https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/our-history (downloaded:6 April 2023)

[92] UN: Africa. United Nations, 2021. https://www.un.org/en/global-issues/africa (downloaded:29 March 2023)

[93] France24: Last French troops leave Central African Republic amid closer Bangui-Moscow ties. 2022. https://www.france24.com/en/africa/20221215-last-french-troops-

Although these continuous efforts are far from futile, their results are often faint and consequently, some local actors feel that the interventions have failed them.[94] Supported by accusations of neo-colonial meddling – some of which were spread or reinforced by Russian disinformation campaigns[95] – the perceived failure of both European and international efforts steered African states towards alternative solutions.[96] One such alternative is the employment of private military companies, tasked with conducting counterinsurgency missions and training.[97] There is no reliable information regarding the number of African countries where PMCs are involved in counterinsurgency operations, but the confirmed cases involve Sudan, the CAR and Mozambique.[98]

Similarly to (4.1.) political aspirations, the African security objectives explain the demand for PMCs on the continent, but only in a general sense, not specific to Russian private military companies. A very good illustration of this is the example of Mozambique where after consecutive counterinsurgency failures, in 2019 the Wagner Group was ousted and replaced with a South African PMC the Dyck Advisory Group.[99]

4.3. Economic interests

Private military companies promise effectively no direct economic benefits for the host regimes. However, the mining companies that PMCs provide site security for are serious economic actors - revenues from legal diamond exports alone can account for up to 70% of some African countries' GDP.[100]

Russian PMCs have a competitive advantage in this regard. As discussed in (3.3.4.) the segment on micro-enterprises, Russian private military companies are integrated parts of larger entities, such as Prigozhin's M Invest. These conglomerates provide a bundle of services, from mineral exploration and extraction to military training and extortion – services exclusively describing private military contractors.[101]

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94 PILLING – SCHIPANI op.cit.
95 ADF (2022a) op. cit.
96 RAMANI (2020) op. cit.
97 FASANOTTI, F. S.: Russia's Wagner Group in Africa: Influence, commercial concessions, rights violations, and counterinsurgency failure. Brookings, 2022.
https://www.brookings.edu/blog/order-from-chaos/2022/02/08/russias-wagner-group-in-africa-influence-commercial-concessions-rights-violations-and-counterinsurgency-failure/ (downloaded:6 April 2023)
98 KATZ et. al. op. cit.
99 HANLON, J.: Mozambique: Mercenaries to the Fore as Dyck Contract Extended. 2020.
https://allafrica.com/stories/202007270611.html (downloaded:29 March 2023)
100 World Diamond Council: DIAMOND PRODUCING COUNTRIES IN AFRICA FACT SHEET. 2023.
https://www.diamondfacts.org/pdfs/media/media_resources/fact_sheets/Africa_Fact_Sheet.pdf (downloaded:7 April 2023)
101 CARAVANSERAI op. cit.; KATZ et. al. op. cit.

Therefore, the local economic incentive to employ Russian private military companies is indirect and stems from the profitable nature of interlinked Russian micro-enterprises involved in mining.

5. Conclusion

To summarize, this essay set out to answer the research question 'What are the reasons for the presence of Russian PMCs in Africa?' by assessing the larger Russian interests on the continent on one hand and the local demand for PMCs, on the other.

With regard to the Russian rationale, there are two explanations:
- Serving the interest of the Russian state, private military contractors are deployed in training missions to Africa, because casualties sustained by PMCs are significantly less detrimental to the Kremlin domestically than the loss of Russian military personnel;
- Russian private interests also fuel the demand for PMCs as micro-enterprises, predominantly centred around gold and diamond mining, heavily rely on the violent force provided by private military contractors.

Regarding the local incentives:
- Private military contractors are employed by certain African regimes because they are an effective coup-proofing measure;
- PMCs are also sought after because of their provide counterinsurgency and training capabilities;
- However, the demand for specifically Russian PMCs derives from the fact that Russian private military companies are parts of larger conglomerates, intertwined with mining companies that yield respectable revenue.

In light of that, it can be concluded that there are both Russian and local reasons for the deployment of Russian private military companies to the African continent.

Nonetheless, there are important limitations of this paper that have to be noted and highlighted.
- First and foremost, due to the research question being formulated in a specific way, this essay does not discuss the relationship between local populations and Russian PMCs. In light of the numerous human rights violations committed by Russian private military contractors in Africa, this aspect of the topic must be further researched by any reader to get a full picture of the situation.

- Similarly, the combination of the scope of the essay and its restricted length limits its ability to use elaborate case studies, leaving the reader with a general understanding of Russian PMCs in Africa, but very few developed examples.

- Finally, considering that the essay was written during Russia's full-scale invasion of Ukraine, but using research done even prior to that, a significant number of factors could be changing in the near future, consequently affecting the arguments and conclusions outlined in this essay.

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TAMÁS TÓTH[1]

ACTUALITIES OF CERTAIN SECURITY ASPECTS OF CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH REGARD TO INFORMATION SOCIETIES

Abstract

The everyday life of information societies is interwoven in cyberspace with advanced digital services based on internet technology, whose data and information security is subject to strict normative regulation in addition to user expectations. From the point of view of both machine-to-machine and person-to-person communication, it is essential to ensure the security and operation of networks free from external influences, one of the logical protection tools of which is cryptography, which renders protected knowledge unintelligible to unauthorized parties by encrypting it. The goal of the attackers, who are mostly motivated by financial gain, damage, and adversarial intelligence, is to acquire knowledge protected by cryptography and make it interpretable for use in their „illegal" activities. In addition to legitimate users, the cryptography of chat applications that provide encrypted online communication also benefits, for example, organized crime and terrorism, creating a challenge for law enforcement and national security agencies. On the basis of the above, the publication examines certain security aspects of cryptography.

Keywords: cryptography, data protection, information security, information gathering

Introduction

As a result of the continuous development of internet technology and digitization, the information society of our time is characterized by a continuous online presence in cyberspace and thus connectedness. The spread of chat applications that can be installed on smartphones and provide encrypted online communication can now be said to be common in advanced information-based societies. According to Meltawater's analysis,[2] in January 2023, WhatsApp had 2 billion monthly active users, while Facebook Messenger had more than 930 million. Telegram has increased its user base by 175% since 2018, or about 350 million in the last 3.5 years.[3] Based on the latest research results of Kovács, *„The 21st century is truly characterized by those info-communication devices, one of the best examples of which is the smartphone or mobile computers - tablets, laptops - and the revolutionary technologies that enable*

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their operation, such as 5G mobile communication."[4] Chat applications and applications based on Internet technology can be classified as PC/SaaS[5] cloud-based computing services,[6] since they can be downloaded by anyone with existing info communication devices, even with little IT knowledge.[7] Those performing the activity are subject to the Act CVIII of 2001 on Electronic Commerce Services and on Information Society Services Section 2, point m) of the Act.

A few years ago, more and more encrypted chat applications appeared, promising secure communication, among which E2EE[8] encryption became more and more common. According to co-authors Bányász, Tóth, Magyar and Koller, E2EE in practice means *"that the data transfer between the sender (one end point) and the receiver (other end point) is encrypted, the content of which is not even seen by the company operating the chat application. Due to Covid-19, most of the major companies offering video conferencing services have implemented end-to-end encryption – Zoom, for example, was affected by the attacks on it."*[9] In order to enforce the national security and public safety interests of the states, the information gathering activity carried out within the framework of democratic legislation also covers the above chat applications, since they can also be used during illegal activities. In August 2016, two terrorists of the Islamic State terrorist organization murdered the 86-year-old Jacques Hamel, the priest of the parish of Saint-Étienne-du-Rouvray in Northern France, during the preparation and execution of which they communicated on E2EE-protected Telegram.[10] According to Dobák: *"The spread of the Internet resulted in fundamental economic and social changes, many parts of our lives moved into the previously unknown virtual space. Following the idea that the task system and opportunities of the national security services are inseparable from the changes in information and communication technology, all this takes on special importance from the side of the national security sphere. On the one hand, the protection of systems (cyber security), and on the other hand, in the area of providing specific information gathering and legal control capabilities (e.g., wiretapping)."*[11]

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4   KOVÁCS, László: Warfare in the 21st century: cyber operations; Ludovika University Publishing House, 2023. ISBN: 978-963-5317-65-3. p. 25.
5   Public cloud/Software as a Service
6   Act CVIII of 2001 law. § 2 jc. point
7   KOVÁCS, Zoltán: National security challenges of infocommunication systems; PhD dissertation National Public Service University Military Technical Doctoral School 2015 p. 136. https://adoc.tips/az-infokommunikacios-rendszerek-nemzetbiztonsagi-kihivasai.html (downloaded:10 April 2023)
8   End-to-End Encryption
9   BÁNYÁSZ, P. – TÓTH, A. – MAGYAR, S. – KOLLER, M.: Security risks of videoconferencing applications; Acta Humana, 4/2022. p. 26. https://folyoirat.ludovika.hu/index.php/actahumana/article/view/6731/5286 (downloaded:06 April 2023)
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11 DOBÁK, Imre: The 21st century interpretation and characteristics of national security. In: DOBÁK, Imre (Ed.): National security at the beginning of the 21st century – Facing the challenges; Ludovika University Publishing House, 2022. p. 936. ISBN:978 963 5316 37 3

Therefore, the examination of cryptographic mechanisms from the security aspect is justified both from the point of view of cyber security and also from the point of view of national and public security. The publication will cover, among other things, general cryptographic knowledge, some of the main challenges of cryptography, with an outlook on post-quantum cryptography for the future, and the presentation of E2EE and C2SE[12] cryptographic procedures and mechanisms.

About cryptography in general

In addition to cryptography, cryptoanalysis is a branch of cryptology, i.e. the science of "secret communication". Based on Muha and Krasznay's definition: *"Cryptology is a branch of science dealing with the encryption (encoding ciphering) and deciphering (, decoding, deciphering) of data and messages, a subfield of the mathematical sciences."*[13] In essence, cryptography examines the algorithmic methods and cryptographic protocols containing a precise description of their use that must be followed, which ensure the confidentiality (secrecy) and integrity of transmitted messages or stored information, thus also their authenticity and non-repudiation.[14] Cryptography, or encryption in the common sense, is a process that allows an intact, authentic encrypted message to be transmitted and stored safely, without its unauthorized compromise. According to Buttyán and Vajda, *"The secrecy of a message means that the clear text can only be reconstructed for the desired partner. The authenticity of a decoded message means that the encoded message arrived at the decoder unmodified, in its original state, and its content reveals that it was sent by the partner."*[15] In essence, cryptanalysis is the comprehensive science of methods for deciphering chiper text.[16]

Cryptography is also one of the basic logical defense tools for preventing and preventing attacks aimed at unauthorized access to protected data transmitted over the online communication network. According to Muha's definition, *"Protection – in Hungarian language – is an activity or a series of activities aimed at creating, developing, or maintaining the state of."*[17] So protection is an activity, while security is a state. In an information communication network, during the encryption process, the open message is coded into an encrypted message with a encryption key, which can only be decrypted by the receiver in possession of the corresponding solving

[12] Client to Server encryption.
[13] MUHA, Lajos – KRASZNAY, Csaba: Managing the security of electronic information systems; National University of Public Service, 2018. p. 85. https://tudasportal.uni-nke.hu/xmlui/handle/20.500.12944/12932 (downloaded:14 April 2023)
[14] BOKHARI, Mohammad – SHALLAL, Qahtan: A Review on Symmetric Key Encryption Techniques in Cryptography; IJCA, 2016/10. p. 43. https://www.researchgate.net/publication/333118027_A_Review_on_ Symmetric_Key_Encryption_Techniques_in_Cryptography (downloaded:04 April 2023)
[15] BUTTYÁN, Levente – VAJDA, István: Cryptography and its applications; Typotex, 2005. pp. 17-18
[16] VAJDA, István: Introduction to Cryptography; BME, 1998. p. 87. http://www.hit.bme.hu/~buttyan/courses/BMEVIHI 4363/theory.pdf (downloaded:10 April 2023)
[17] MUHA, Lajos: Protection of the critical information infrastructures of the Republic of Hungary; PhD dissertation. Miklós Zrínyi National Defense University, 2007. p. 11. http://real-phd.mtak.hu/74/1/1228916.pdf (downloaded:14 April 2023)

encryption key. Cryptography uses different algorithmic methods, such as symmetric (e.g. AES[18] and asymmetric key e.g. RSA[19], ECC[20]) encryption. In symmetric encryption, the message is encrypted and decrypted with the same secret key, while in asymmetric encryption, two different keys are used: a public key for encryption and a different secret 'private' key for decryption.

Based on Takács' thoughts, *"Algorithms are functions that are used during encryption and decryption. Protocols include a series of steps, with the help of which two or more partners implement the set tasks. The two building blocks complement each other. Protocols build algorithms into themselves, and algorithms rely on the connection points established by protocols."*[21] The study is intended to analyze algorithm-based encryption in more detail, which is an important element of secure online communication. Encryption is intended to prevent an attacker from learning and interpreting the data in an interpretable form, so that the protected information can remain secure.

Some cryptographic challenges

With regard to encrypted communications, based on the authorized access to the content of the original message, it is necessary to distinguish between those entitled to access it (sender, receiver) and third parties, including authorized parties and unauthorized parties, i.e. the set of attackers (e.g. material profit-making, damage, information gathering and intelligence gathering, terrorism). The authorized party is none other than the law enforcement and national security organization authorized to collect information. Given an attacker who, according to the basic assumption, knows the cryptographic algorithm in detail, except for the encryption key needed to decipher the encrypted message. So, the protection provided by the cryptographic algorithm cannot exceed the level of protection of the encryption key. That is, the secret key is the highly protected information that can be changed periodically, while the other elements of the cryptographic system do not need to be changed for a longer period of time at greater expense. In other words, in relation to cryptographic algorithms, it is not their "secrecy" that is authoritative, but the protection of the keys. During an attack, the goal of the attackers is to learn and use the keys necessary for decryption, thus gaining access to the decrypted, original content of the encrypted communication.

A passive attack method is the so-called eavesdropping between the communicating parties by intervening on the server or network side, as well as monitoring and analyzing the communication flowing through the network, during which the attacker gains possession of the data stream flowing on the public channel. During a passive attack, the operation of the protocol is not interfered with, only the messages in the channel are known, they are not modified. In this case, the encryption

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[18] Advanced Encryption Standard (NIST Special Publication 800-38B (2005))
[19] RSA is an asymmetric cryptographic algorithm patented in the USA in 2000. It comes from the initials of the names of its inventors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir and Leonard Adleman.
[20] Elliptic Curve Cryptography - elliptic curve cryptography (Ex.: P-256, Curve25519.)
[21] TAKÁCS, Péter: Formal examination of cryptographic protocols by extending the CSN logic system; PhD dissertation, Doctoral School of Information Sciences, University of Debrecen, 2009. p. 6. https://dea.lib.unideb.hu/server/api/core/bitstreams/7eca2ade-7dfa-4d4f-9360-c12c8f592019/content (downloaded:13 April 2023)

of the protected information ensures the prevention of unauthorized access to the original content of the communication transmitted over the network. The purpose of encryption is basically to provide prevention against attacks.[22] In the case of an active attack, the main goal of the attacker is to modify, replace or delete the message or its parts without being noticed. The attacker actually interferes with the protocol. A known active form of attack is false identity creation, i.e. the impersonation of the authorized party, the creation of fictitious authorization, during which protected information is obtained by pretending to be the authorized party's identity. The attacker uses malware, such as malicious spyware, Trojan programs, and worms to gain access to protected information that can be interpreted by him.[23] Active attacks cannot be prevented with cryptographic algorithmic methods, but they can be detected and identified by using protocols. A classic form of active attack is the MitM[24] procedure, during which the attacker is able to check, change and manipulate the data transmission between the victim and the communication partner, as if the victim were communicating directly with the partner.[25]

In terms of the secrecy – i.e. efficiency – of cryptographic algorithms, practical and absolute secrecy must be distinguished from each other. The algorithm provides practical secrecy if it requires unrealistic computing capacity to crack, but is theoretically possible, for example during "exhaustive search". The algorithm provides unconditional secrecy, even if the information that can be obtained in order to crack it is not sufficient for successful decryption, no matter how much computing capacity the attacker has. The only algorithm known today that provides unconditional secrecy is On Time Pad, which, however, could not be widely used due to economic and organizational reasons.[26] According to Szádeczky, a general challenge is the continuous obsolescence of cryptographic algorithms and protocols due to technological development, but this does not mean a practical damage to secrecy. According to Szádeczky, *"All currently used fourth-generation encryption is imperfect [...], so it can be hacked, but in the best case, this is an impossible task in time. For example, we consider a suitable algorithm to be one that can be cracked in thousands to millions of years with the combined computing capacity of all the computers on Earth. These large numbers sound especially loud, but in fact - due to the growth of computing capacity according to Moore's law and the transfer of code-breaking tasks to graphics processors with thousands of cores - the result is that if the given algorithm provides adequate protection for our data for decades. Algorithms*

22 KAUR, Roop Kamal – KAUR, Kamaljit: A New Technique for Detection and Prevention of Passive Attacks in Web Usage Mining. I.; JWMT, 2015/6. p. 55. https://www.mecs-press.org/ijwmt/ijwmt-v5-n6/IJWMT-V5-N6-7.pdf (downloaded:14 April 2023)

23 KAHATE, Atul: Cryptography and Network Security; Tata McGraw Hill Education (India) Private Limited, 2013. pp. 15-16.
https://www.scribd.com/document/548057211/Cryptography-and-network-security-by-Atul-Kahate# (downloaded:13 April 2023)

24 Man-In-The-Middle

25 KAUFMAN, C. – PERLMAN, R. – SPECINER, M.: Network Security: Private Communication in a Public World; Pearson India Education Services Pvt., 2017. p. 9.
https://dokumen.pub/network-security-private-communication-in-a-public-world-2nd-ed-14th-printing-9780130460196-9789332578210-9789332586000-0076092018469-0130460192.html (downloaded:14 April 2023)

26 VAJDA, István: Introduction to Cryptography; BME, 1998. p. 91.
http://www.hit.bme.hu/~buttyan/courses/BMEVIHI 4363/theory.pdf (downloaded:10 April 2023)

that were considered safe in the past are thus continuously becoming obsolete. [...] The only solution to the problem is to replace the previous algorithms with a better algorithm that meets the standards of the time, and to recode the data."[27]

Looking into the not-so-distant future, the latest group of new-generation cryptographic procedures can be seen, i.e. post-quantum encryption, which uses quantum mechanical phenomena to increase the security of communication. Traditional cryptographic methods such as RSA rely on the difficulty of mathematical problems, while quantum encryption relies on quantum mechanical phenomena such as entanglement and measurement. In quantum encryption, the two communicating parties produce a key pair known only to them by entanglement. During encryption, one half of the key is used by the sending party, while the other half of the key is used by the receiving party for decryption. If someone tries to intercept or copy the encrypted data transmitted over the network, due to quantum mechanical phenomena, the entangled key will change and the communication will become confused, revealing the attack to the authorized party.[28] In Hungary, Act L. of 2013 on the electronic information security of state and local government bodies § 1 (1) para. Based on the amendment of point 49, which entered into force on July 1, 2022, post-quantum encryption is *"an encryption that provides a post-quantum application or a solution over and above the traditional cryptographic application against a mathematically verifiable attack carried out by a quantum computer, during which the connection between the two endpoints using communication, it creates a shared key between the two end-users with the data transfer, without the key being known by an unauthorized third party."*[29] Section 1 (1) of Act L of 2013. 50, it will be mandatory for those obliged to use government communication networks, banks under the Act on Credit Institutions and Financial Enterprises, as well as utility providers that are of paramount importance for the supply of the population, and organizations designated on the basis of the relevant decree of the Chairman of the Supervisory Authority of Regulated Activities to using quantum encryption to protect their data.

Post-quantum cryptography is currently a technology under development and standardization and has only limited practical applications. In 2022, as part of NIST's[30] standardization tender launched in 2016,[31] it presented the first four post-quantum cryptographic standard candidate algorithms (Dilithium, Falcon, Kyber, SPHINCS+) that can be resistant to quantum computers. Quantum computing would essentially make the use of RSA and ECC cryptography obsolete and breakable.[32]

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[27] SZÁDECZKY, Tamás: Compliance of cryptographic protocols; Military engineer, 4/2016. p. 179. http://real.mtak.hu/ 49982/1/164_15_szadeczky.pdf (downloaded:12 April 2023)

[28] CHEN, L. – JORDAN, S. – LIU, Y. – MOODY, D. – PERALTA, R. – PERLNER, R. – DANIEL, S.: Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography. NIST.IR 8105. 2016. pp. 1-2. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/2016/NIST.IR.8105.pdf (downloaded:12 April 2023)

[29] DR. GYÖMBÉR, Béla: Post-quantum encryption is introduced in Hungary; Jogalap, 2022. https://jogalappal.hu/poszt-kvantumtitkosistast-vezetnek-be-magyarorszagon/ (downloaded:04 April 2023)

[30] National Institute of Standards and Technology

[31] https://csrc.nist.gov/News/2016/Public-Key-Post-Quantum-Cryptographic-Algorithms (downloaded:11 April 2023)

[32] DR. SAARINEN, O.: Intro to Side-Channel Security of NIST PQC Standards; NIST PQC Seminar, 04 April 2023. pp. 2-3. https://csrc.nist.gov/csrc/media/Projects/post-quantum-cryptography/documents/pqc-seminars/

Symmetric key encryption can still remain safe against quantum computers, albeit with a larger key size and the hash function, albeit with a larger output value.[33] According to Pfeiffer, *"Any encrypted data recorded today that uses a cryptographic process that does not stand up to the challenges posed by quantum computers could be compromised in the not-too-distant future."*[34] Based on Asbóth's point of view, *"currently, it does not seem realistic that the one million qubit quantum computer that Google and IBM have promised in recent years will really arrive by 2030."*[35] Following Zentai's thoughts, *„the emergence of high-performance quantum computers - no matter how actively researched this field is - is still to come."*[36]

C2SE / E2EE encryption

C2SE is an encryption concept used to make communication between an endpoint source or target client and a server (such as a PC/SaaS cloud) more secure. Today, regulated SSL/TLS protocols[37] have become the general protocol used at the 4th transport layer according to the 7-layer OSI model.[38] It is mainly used in communication networks where the parties do not have full control between the network and the endpoint clients. A typical example of the application of C2SE is accessing Internet web pages or connecting to a video game server. The use of the technology is particularly prevalent in video conferencing applications such as Skype and Webex.[39]

In the case of platforms that use C2SE, by compromising the server, the entire range of protected data managed by the server can become accessible to the attacker in an unencrypted form, since he can carry out both passive and active attacks by using

presentations/2-side-channel-security-saarinen-04042023.pdf (downloaded: 08 April 2023)

[33] CHEN, L.– JORDAN, S. – LIU, Y.– MOODY, D. – PERALTA, R. – PERLNER, R.- DANIEL, S.: Report on Post-Quantum Cryptography. NIST.IR 8105. 2016. p. 2. https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/ir/ 2016/NIST.IR.8105.pdf (downloaded:12 April 2023)

[34] PFEIFFER, Szilárd: Can RSA encryption be broken even today?; HSWS, 2023. https://www.hwsw.hu/hirek/65635/rsa-titkositas-kvantumszamitogep-feltores-kod-algoritmus.html (downloaded:15 April 2023)

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[37] Secure Sockets Layer/ Transport Layer Security (TLS 1.3 standard: RFC-TLS13-28)

[38] Open Systems Interconnection (TANENBAUM, Andrew S. – WETHERALL, David J.: Computer networks; Panem Könyvek, 2013. pp. 60-61. http://gbb2.atw.hu/kieg/szte/tanenbaum_szamhalo.pdf (download 10 April 2023))

[39] HORMAN aka HORMS, Simon: SSL and TLS An Overview of A Secure Communications Protocol; Security Mini-Conf at Linux.Conf.Au, 2005. p. 1. https://projects.horms.net/projects/ssl_and_tls/stuff/ssl_and_tls.pdf (downloaded:12 April 2023)

the compromised server.[40] The risk of exposure to C2SE-protected communications infrastructure can also result from simple negligence. In 2019, more than 300 million private messages transmitted on WeChat and QQ chat applications were leaked due to a misconfigured server setting.[41] Among other things, the growing demand for the security of chat applications, as well as the tightening of data protection regulations, necessitated the general spread of E2EE cryptography, which is safer than the C2SE process. In addition to the enhanced security parameters of the optimally applied E2EE technology, it also offers a sustainable response to attacks. The first globally widespread cryptographic protocol published on the Internet in 1991 that can also be used in the E2EE concept was created by Philip R. Zimmermann under the name Pretty Good Privacy (PGP), which became the most widely used e-mail protocol in the world.[42] Since then, many other and much more advanced E2EE protocols have appeared, including the MT Proto used by Telegram, the Signal Protocol used by Signal, Facebook Messenger and WhatsApp, as well as the Viber Protocol.

During modern E2EE, data is encrypted and decrypted at the end points of two-way communication, for example in the software of the chat application installed on the smartphone itself. Its purpose is to provide protection during data transmission on intermediate networks so that the content of the communication is not extracted or processed in an unencrypted form on the host server. Only the source and the recipient have the encryption keys needed to decrypt the encrypted data.[43] In E2EE, data is encrypted with an encryption key before leaving the sending endpoint device, such as a smartphone, but can only be decrypted with the recipient's private key when it becomes accessible from the receiving endpoint device. Attackers cannot access the data on the server because they do not have the private keys needed to decrypt the data.[44] Nowadays, the use of E2EE is widespread in online communication, it is also used by default by, for example, Signal and Viber. The disadvantages of E2EE include, for example, exposure to the definition of endpoints, since decryption can only be ensured with a private key accessible to the defined endpoint, so their unique and clear definition is essential. If the endpoints are hacked, the attacker can gain access to the encryption key, thus becoming able to decrypt the data of the encrypted messages. Even though encrypted communications flow on the network, part of their accompanying or metadata is still not E2EE encrypted, which can provide useful information for attackers. E2EE is sufficiently secure in accordance with today's data and information protection requirements. Although E2EE is a highly secure cryptographic (cyber defense) technology, quantum computing may make it obsolete

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over time.[45] In the case of E2EE, the encrypted data is not accessible to attackers in an unencrypted form on the server side, for example, by the internet or application provider, unlike the C2SE concept.

Based on the above, from the point of view of data and information protection, the combination of C2SE used to protect the mobile internet network in chat applications with the cryptographic protocols used in the E2EE concept can be justified, since the traffic that can be extracted on the server side is a passive attack, thanks to E2EE, it cannot be deciphered during „checking" back by an unauthorized party without the appropriate private key. The application of the C2SE concept in the mobile network means additional security, since the metadata of online communication is not openly accessible outside of the server side. However, this activity of authorized third parties, i.e. the gathering of information for criminal and national security purposes, can cause challenges.

Conclusions

During the publication, it was confirmed that the spread of chat applications that can be installed on smartphones and provide encrypted communication based on internet technology is constantly expanding among users living in advanced information societies, and their use can be said to be general. In addition to the C2SE cryptographic mechanism, a large number of applications now integrate E2EE, the data and information protection benefits of which are enjoyed not only during legitimate use but also during illegal activities such as terrorism. Given that the E2EE concept does not passively enable the original recovery of the encrypted communication on the server or network side, for reasons of cryptography technology, without the possession of the corresponding encryption key, in addition to being an advantageous circumstance from the point of view of data and information security, the gathering of information for criminal and national security purposes can be identified as a challenge. However, algorithmic cryptographic procedures are not effective against active attacks. In the face of the development of encryption technology, the currently used cryptography protocols and encryption algorithms remained effective due to their practical secrecy, but the emergence of quantum computing and quantum computers poses a challenge to them. In preparation for the new challenges, NIST is already carrying out the standardization of future-proof post-quantum encryption and cryptography based on quantum mechanical phenomena, as well as in the framework of domestic legislation in critical sectors, such as organizations obliged to use government communications networks, the financial sector, and utility providers it is mandatory to use post-quantum encryption to protect their data. Here, too, the advantage/challenge duality can be identified from the point of view of cyber defense and the gathering of criminal and national security information. In summary, it can be concluded that it is expected that the "competition" between data protection (regulation) interpreted in the context of ensuring fundamental rights and the effective enforceability of legal information gathering interpreted in the context of guaranteeing security will continue to intensify in relation to the cryptographic procedures of the future.

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ANDRÁS JÓZSEF ÜVEGES[1]

INFORMATION AND CYBER OPERATIONS OF THE RUSSIAN-UKRAINIAN CONFLICT, AND THE POSSIBILITIES, AND RISKS OF USING THE PERSONAL DATA

Abstract

The alternation and interconnection of armed conflicts have increased the cyber security risks in many ways of life to a new, unprecedented extent. Information and - cyber operations had become frequently used tools of armed conflict. During these, personal data have a special value, as their use provides many opportunities for opponents with opposing interests to use them either for illegal purposes or later for identification during other violent acts.

Keywords: cybersecurity, information operations, armed conflict

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian government partially lost its position like a global superpower, which is still trying to regain present daies. To this end, it likes to use the advantages of digital space (cyberspace) to enforce its global geopolitical interests.

The Russian Federation was recieved a serious political, economic and social crisis in the 1990's, but it did not given up its global power aspirations. The process of decline was prevented by the favorable political and economic processes of the second half of the 2000's. At the same time as the economic recovery, the Russian global power strategic concept was revived. The effort to prevent NATO's expansion to the east led in part to the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict which that began on February 24, 2022.

In this article, I will present how the participating entities use information operations to influence international public opinion during this conflict, as well as briefly summarize the cyber operations carried out in parallel, in chronological order. I will also discuss the decisive role of social media (Like Twitter, Telegram, Facebook, etc.) during the operations carried out since the beginning of this conflict. In this study, I also show the possibility of using the personal data, as well as highlight the risks of negligent handling of personal data in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. The phenomenon in cyberspace that appeared parallel to military operations during the Ukrainian-Russian conflict is becoming visible. According to which, the place of classic media producers is gradually being taken over by society as a collective media production entity.

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Hypothesis

The dynamic and rapid alternation and interaction of various armed crises, traditional and new types of security challenges and threats have increased cyber security risks in many areas of life, indirectly and directly, to a new and unprecedented extent. According to hypothesis, personaldata leaked and used during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict has deepened the Russian-Ukrainian conflict in cyberspace. Because it is expected that the opposing participants will carry out targeted attacks against soldiers, government officials, politicians and refugees during the diplomatic settlement of the conflict or during the military conflict, using this type of data.

In addition, my opinion, during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, a change can be detected in the activities of the media using society. During the conflict, the importance of classic media-producing entities (television, on-line news agencies, etc.) declined significantly, and thanks to new digitalization, the population became the primary media creator.

My other hypothesis is that it is used by the population IoT[2] devices can be used as an effective intelligence system during a military conflict, if it is used in a coordinated manner, similar like a military reconnaissance systems. Where the IT device belonging to each person replaces the battlefield sensors, and the social network replaces the IT system for coordination.

Furthermore, I try to show through examples during the conflict, digital social media has now partly turned into the main channel of information operations. Filtering out authentic information from the media has become a complex nationalsecurity activity, as the news that appears can be part of a disinformation campaign, and in some cases completely contradictory news appears on the same topic.

Definition of personal data by several definitions

In the point of view of the interpretation of the article, I will be briefly clarify the concept (definition) of personal data in the European Union [3], according to the Russian and Hungarian point of view.

Present day, the concept of personal data is fundamental to the definition of the GDPR[4], according to which the personal data is any information relating to an identified or identifiable natural person („data subject"); a natural person can be identified directly or indirectly, in particular on the basis of an identifier such as name, number, location data, online identifier or one or more factors relating to the physical, physiological, genetic, mental, economic, cultural or social identity of the natural person can be identified.

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[2]   Internet of Things – refers to clearly identifiable electronic devices that are able to recognize some information and transmit it to another device on an Internet-based network (for example smart devices).
[3]   general data protection regulation, „GDPR"
[4]   GDPR 4. article 1. point

Based on EU law, personal data therefore interprets personal data quite broadly and uses a relative (context-dependent) approach, so for example the GDPR also states that when determining the identifiability of a natural person, all such methods must be taken into account - including, for example, marking, which can reasonably be assumed to be used by the data controller or another person to directly or indirectly identify the natural person.[5] The GDPR does not have to be applied to the data of deceased persons, the regulation of this issue is left to the law of the member states.[6]

In our country, the processing of personal data for the purposes of law enforcement, national security and national defense is governed by the Act on the right to informational self-determination and freedom of information 2011. year CXII. law (Infotv.) should be used, whose definition of personal data in July 2018 is GDPR and LED[7,8] was harmonized with its provisions. Accordingly[9] personal data is any information about the data subject; the person concerned is a natural person identified or identifiable on the basis of any information, and an identifiable natural person is a natural person who directly or indirectly, in particular, has an identifier, such as a name, identification number, location data, online identifier or the natural person's physical, physiological, genetic , it can be identified based on one or more factors related to its intellectual, economic, cultural or social identity. The EU and Hungarian definitions of personal data differ only minimally.

According to the Russian position, personal data is information directly or indirectly related to a specific or identifiable natural person (the subject of personal data) that can be provided to other persons as well. This is the Federal Law of the Russian Federation on Personal Data (2006.07.27-ei 152-es FZ law[10]) regulates.

Naturly, there are many differences between the GDPR and Act 152, such as the concept contained in Article 4 (1) of the GDPR, which makes it clear that the data subject is an „identified or identifiable natural person". The Russian Law on Personal Data does not specifically define this in Article 3 (1), but personal data is data that can be directly or indirectly linked to a natural person (the subject). Russian legislation does not define the concept of „data controller", but uses the term „operator", which is a state body, municipal authority, legal entity or private individual who, independently or in cooperation with other legal entities, organizes and/or processes personal data. If we follow this logic, it cannot be ruled out that the data controller could also be one of the Russian national security services.

Although the Personal Data Act does not specifically deal with it, the Federal Service for Supervision of Communications, Information Technology and Mass Media (RKN) according to Law on Personal Data shall apply to legal entities handling personal data of Russian data subjects, including offices of non-Russian companies, if these offices are physically located in Russia and process personal data in Russia.

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5   GDPR (26) recital
6   GDPR (27) recital, Hungary: Infotv. 25.§
7   Law enforcement privacy policy
8   Law Enforcement Directive
9   Infotv. 3.§ 1-2 point
10   Федеральный закон от 27.07.2006 N 152-ФЗ (ред. от 08.12.2020) "О персональных данных"

Operators must notify the RKN of the planned data management operations before start the mantioned operations. The notification is a detailed document. It can be filled out online and in printed form (only in Russian). Notifications are recorded in the Register of Operators. The operator must update his entry in the register of operators. Updates must be submitted to the RKN within 10 workdays from the date of expiry of the registration. This can happen, for example, if the operator performs new data management activities or deals with new data categories. That is, all planned data processing must be reported to the authority,[11] and the operator is a concept that does not distinguish between the data controller and data processor.

During the conflict, the Russian high leadership realized that the use of personal data can also be used as a weaponry. In light of this, Russian lawmakers have approved a bill that restricts the purchase of Russian citizens' personal data abroad. In the event that service providers wish to transfer the data of Russian citizens outside of Russia, it is considered a notifiable activity. The State Duma[12] passed the law in the second reading. According to the Russian foreign affairs statements, this activity hold a significant national security risk.

Companies wishing to transfer data abroad must notify the regulatory authority, RKN, for each country – this measure was eased after many internet companies protested.

The RKN considers that the countries that are parties to the GDPR offer adequate guarantees regarding the protection of the personal datas. According to the Russian authority, the EU data protection regulation provides adequate safeguards for the processing of personal data, but the United States of America does not meet of the minimum requirements of Russian authority.

In addition to the EU members, many African and Asian countries were also categorized as reliable countries, while many European members of the NATO defense alliance, as well as Australia, Canada, Japan and New Zealand, were classified as unfriendly countries.[13]

The GDPR also provides for international data transfer, pursuant to Article 45 personal data may be transferred to a third country if the Commission has established that the third country, an area of the third country, or one or more specific sectors provides an adequate level of protection. No separate authorization is required for such data transfer. Currently, neither Russia, nor Ukraine, nor the United States of America are among these countries, while, for example, Japan and New Zealand are.

According to the Russian position, according to the Federal Law on Personal Data, biometric data is any information that describes the physiological and biological characteristics of a person and on the basis of which the data subject can be identified.

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[11] A system similar to the Turkish data processing system.
[12] lower house of parliament
[13] iz.ru: ГД приняла во II чтении законопроект об усилении защиты персональных данных, 2022. július 5. https://iz.ru/1360069/2022-07-05/gd-priniala-vo-ii-chtenii-zakonoproekt-ob-usilenii-zashchity-personalnykh-dannykh (downloaded: 18 November 2022)

Biometric personal data can only be processed with the written consent of the data subject.

Although the current law already emphasizes that consent must be conscious, the amendments also specify that the data subject must be able to access a specific service even without providing their biometric personal data, i.e. the data controller cannot refuse consent. provides a specific service to the data subject on the basis that the data subject refuses to provide their biometric personal data.

The points of view have in common that when formulating personal data, they focus on whether a natural person can be identified from a given set of data, but from the point of view of government data management, it would be meaningless to compare the Russian-Hungarian-EU regulations, since the democratic/autocratic systems of the mentioned countries are different. However, it can also be seen that, according to the Russian point of view, the GDPR ensures the appropriate level of data management rules, while the American one does not.

In relation to the conflict, data belonging to the special categories of personal data also come to the fore. Based on the definition of the GDPR[14] these are personal data referring to racial or ethnic origin, political opinion, religious or worldview beliefs or trade union membership, as well as genetic data, biometric data for the unique identification of natural persons, health data and personal data relating to the sex life or sexual orientation of natural persons. In the case of this definition, the GDPR and Infotv.[15] definition is the same.[16]

- It is important to note that if personal data is not processed for national security, law enforcement or national defense purposes, it falls under the scope of the GDPR if the given data processing
- is carried out in connection with the activities of data controllers or data processors with a place of business in the Union, regardless of whether the data processing takes place in the territory of the Union or not
- it is carried out by a data controller or data processor that does not have a place of business in the Union, if the data management activities are related to the observation of the behavior of the data subjects, provided that it is about their behavior within the territory of the Union.

Based on the scope of the GDPR, it may therefore happen that, although the data management is carried out in the interest of national security, but it is not carried out by a person/organization falling under the scope of the law on national security, the data management will be governed by the rules of the GDPR, and for example, due to unlawful data management, the data manager may be punished according to this regulation Based on.

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[14] GDPR 9. article (1) paragraph
[15] Infotv. 3.§ 3. point
[16] It does not matter whether it is digital or paper-based data: if information is stored or processed that can be used to identify individuals directly or indirectly, data protection regulations must be applied.

Due to the provisions of the GDPR regarding data subjects, the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the Union and other legislation (such as the constitutions of the Member States) must also be taken into account, especially with regard to freedom of speech and freedom of expression as constitutional fundamental rights that may compete with the right to informational self-determination.

Among the victims of cyber warfare are a large number of civil entities belonging to the member states of the European Economic Area (EEA). These data controllers have to face the fact that they not only have to fend off attacks by hackers, but also have to investigate the attack and, if it affects personal data, the data protection incident. During the investigation of the incident, they must assess risks and damages and notify the competent data protection supervisory authority, unless the data protection incident is likely to pose no risk to the rights and freedoms of natural persons. If the incident poses a high risk to the rights and freedoms of the persons concerned, in that case they must also inform the persons concerned.

Based on the report, the authority will investigate the incident and, if it establishes the responsibility of the attacked organization (such as inadequate IT[17] protection etc.), can also impose a fine. This threat can also be inspiring for the attacker, because not only can he cause damage with the actual attack, but he can also expect to cause further financial damage and significant reputational damage to the target.

The publication of personal data can carry a significant dataprotection risk. Not only from the point of view of the affected entities, but also from the point of view of the leakers – because if the data controllers of these interfaces (e.g. blogs, news sites, Facebook posts, etc.) fall under the scope of the GDPR, they may face serious penalties for violating the data protection rules (e.g. they can expect an administrative fine, or even imprisonment in the case of a crime) and the payment of a compensation fee. This threat – if the entity used in the operation is not a „disposable" organization or a cost-sensitive organization – definitely sets limits for the planners of cyber operations.

Of course, this type of risk only occurs if entities that are established in the EEA and intend to operate in the longer term are involved in cyber operations - in other cases, even if the focus of the GDPR extends to the data controller, it is questionable whether whether any fines or damages awarded will ever be recovered from him. Regarding the crisis, we can state that in the current state of an armed conflict, the imposition of fines would not bring the results.

The political background of the Ukrainian-Russian conflict

After the breakup of the Soviet Union[18] both Ukraine and Russia tried to develop and strengthen their new political and economic system. In Ukraine, following the country's independence, society has always been divided in the political, social and

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[17]   Information Technologies
[18]   From 1991 to the early 2000s

cultural spheres by the dilemma of what orientation to represent, West[19] or East[20] orient itself towards.

The reason for this duality is that the country has different historical experiences and different cultural influences on Ukraine prevail. Western Ukraine represents more of a Western (European) value system, as the territory was first under Polish-Lithuanian, then Austrian and Hungarian control, while the central and eastern Ukrainian territories were first under Mongol and then Russian rule, therefore the Russian- Asian influences are authoritative. The southern and Crimean territories, which were under Ottoman control, were affected by a third type of impact.

These historical cultural influences on Ukraine result in a rift in the country. The several million Russian minority living in Ukraine preferred the Eastern (Russian) orientation, which resulted in tension. The Ukrainian leadership tried to maneuver between the two orientations.

Following its disconnection from the Soviet Union, Ukraine formulated its goal of distancing itself from Russia. If the separation took place in the political sense, the success of their separation in the economic and cultural sense has not yet been proven.

Since the beginning of the 2000s, the West countries and Russia have been fighting over which political block Ukraine should belong to. The stakes of the 2004 Ukrainian presidential election were also to decide the political direction of he country. Both the West and Russia supported their own presidential candidate. Mass demonstrations began after pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych[21] the pro-Russian presidential candidate won by fraud, the pro-Western Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko won in the repeated election round, (orange revolution[22]). Support for the new, pro-Western government has declined due to its indecisiveness and unfavorable economic decisions, as well as because it has not succeeded in delinking the Ukrainian economy from Russian energy. In the 2010 presidential elections, the alliance between Yushchenko and Tymoshenko broke up and the pro-Russian Viktor Yanukovych became the president of Ukraine.

Yanukovych wanted to achieve rapprochement with the EU through economic and political reforms. This was an unexpected decision by a Russian-oriented politician, especially since his supporters were pro-Russian oligarchs from eastern Ukraine (Donetsk) who rejected European integration. Yanukovych failed to break the government influence of the oligarchs, so they successfully blocked the country's European integration. The economic policy of the government, just like that of the previous government, was flawed.

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[19] Eurpean Union
[20] Federation of Russia
[21] Viktor Fedorovics Janukovics – ukr: Віктор Федорович Янукович. ukrán politikus, he is the leader of the Party of Regions, one of the most important parties in the country. He was the Prime Minister of Ukraine from August 4, 2006 to November 23, 2007, and the President of Ukraine from February 25, 2010 to February 22, 2014. In 2019, he was sentenced in absentia to 13 years in prison on charges of treason.
[22] Помаранчева революція – 2004. nov. 22.-2005. jan. 23.

The high dependence of the Ukrainian economy on Russian energy kept Ukraine away from the EU and NATO until 2014. Until the 2014 crisis, Ukraine was able to save billions of dollars annually with Russian gas price discounts. The Russian government also gained influence in the financial field in Ukraine, loans and grants with more favorable terms than in the West were always available to Ukraine sooner - the EU disburses too slowly, and the IMF imposes too strict conditions. In exchange for the aid provided to Ukraine, Russia imposed the condition that Ukraine should have a pro-Russian government.

By 2013, Ukraine was in a hopeless economic situation, the level of living was deteriorating, and due to the immeasurable corruption prevailing in the country, the public turned against the country's leadership. On November 21, the government announced that it would abandon the European direction and would not sign the association agreement with the EU. On November 30, mass protests broke out in Kyiv's Independence Square,[23] which was broken up on central orders, hundreds of thousands more took to the streets. The Ukrainian government failed, Yanukovych left the country at the beginning of 2014.[24]

The crisis in Ukraine began on November 21, 2013 with mass demonstrations. Ukrainians supporting European orientation distanced themselves from the aspirations of Russians in Ukraine, so they took up arms for secession from Ukraine.[25] The reasons leading up to and triggering the Russian-Ukrainian conflict on February 24, 2022, which the Russian leadership called a special operation in Ukraine, were as follows.

Russia has long opposed Ukraine's rapprochement with the Euro-Atlantic world and its institutions, NATO and the EU. The Russians[26] in fact, they opposed the expansion of the federal system from the beginning of the NATO expansion in the mid-90s, and the government also warned that in the event of the accession of Georgia and Ukraine, confrontation, and most likely war, should be expected – and this was emphasized again and again.

Taking advantage of the power vacuum following the departure of President Yanukovych - although Russia had been preparing for this step for a long time - Russia annexed Crimea in 2014. Relations between Russia and Ukraine have deteriorated. Nevertheless, in a speech given in 2021, Vladimir Putin called Russians and Ukrainians one nation, and in 2022 he already claimed that modern Ukraine was created entirely by communist Russia, and that the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991 was the disintegration of historical Russia.

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[23] Majdan Nezalezsnosztyi - Майдан Незалежності
[24] BAUNOV, Alexander – JARÁBIK, Balázs – GOBULOV, Alexander: A Year After Maidan: Why Did Viktor Yanukovych Flee After Signing the Agreement With the Opposition?, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace https://carnegiemoscow.org/commentary/59172 (downloaded: 31 December 2022)
[25] Formation of Donetsk and Luhansk Republics
[26] Then under the leadership of Boris Yeltsin

Russian President Vladimir Putin, who says that Ukraine was never a real state, demanded guarantees that Ukraine, which borders his country, would not join NATO, the 30-nation defense alliance, and also demanded that the territory be demilitarized. In January 2021, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy urged US President Joe Biden to allow Ukraine to join NATO as soon as possible. Enraged by this, Russia sent troops to military exercises near the Ukrainian border. Russia also called on NATO not to deploy strike weapons near Russia's borders, and to withdraw its troops and military infrastructure from the member states that joined the alliance after 1997, i.e., partly from the former Soviet Union and partly from the former Soviet Union's former sphere of influence. That means Central Europe, Eastern Europe and the Baltics, meaning Russia essentially wants NATO to return to its pre-1997 borders. The Russian government has long been concerned about the loss of influence over Ukraine and the reorganization of the security situation in the region.

As a direct precursor to these events, Russia's leadership officially recognized the breakaway states in eastern Ukraine, the self-proclaimed Donetsk[27] and Lugansk People's Republic.[28]

Situation in the Ukrainian-Russian conflict at the time of the investigation

In the second half of 2022, it can be said that, in addition to kinetic military operations, cyber and information operations became the most decisive during the conflict. An observable trend change is that from the first quarter of 2022, disinformation operations have reached such a scale that it is currently difficult even for professionals to decide what the purpose of the source spreading the disinformation is. 2022 IV. By the end of the quarter, the focus of the attacks was data breaches and data theft, as well as malicious software[29] attacks carried out. In terms of targets, the most popular are governmental networks and the IT infrastructure serving media entities.

Based on the 2022 IV year data, 81 active groups are involved in the conflict, from which 40 Russian and 36 Ukrainian groups can be identified from open sources. If you observe the changes in trends, you can see that the Twitter application is already used by fewer people than Telegram. It is expected that a continuous trend change will also be observed in the first quarter of 2023.[30]

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[27] Донецкая Народная Республика
[28] Луганская Народная Республика
[29] Malware – a malicious program where the creator's goal is clearly to cause harm.
[30] https://cyberknow.medium.com/update-20-2022-russia-ukraine-war-cyber-group-tracker-november-28-3400878e8cc5 (downloaded: 15 December 2022)

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Support	Name	Actions	Comms
Ukraine	Squad303 (Anon)	DDoS/SMS	Twitter
Ukraine	GhostSec (Anon)	Hack	Twitter
Ukraine	RedCult (Anon)	Hack/DDoS	Twitter
Ukraine	KelvinSecurity Hacking Team	Hack	Telegram
Ukraine	SecJuice	OSINT/Psyop	Twitter
Ukraine	Belarusian Cyber-Partisans	Ransomware	Twitter
Ukraine	BeeHive Cybersecurity	Hack/Sec	Twitter
Ukraine	Stand for Ukraine	Hack/ DDoS	UNK
Ukraine	HackenClub	DDoS/hack	Twitter
Ukraine	DumpForums	Hack	Telegram
Ukraine	studentcyberarmy	DDoS	Telegram
Ukraine	Onefist	Hack/OSINT	Twitter
Ukraine	CyWar	DDoS/Leaks	Telegram
Ukraine	KromSec	Hack/DDoS	Telegram
Ukraine	KiraSec	Hack/DDoS	Twitter
Ukraine	CyberSoldier	DDoS	Telegram
Ukraine	CyberPalyanitsa	DDoS	Telegram
Ukraine	Haydamaki	DDoS	Telegram
Ukraine	Ciberwars	DDoS	Telegram
Ukraine	DDoS_separ	DDoS	Telegram
Ukraine	2402Team	Hack	Telegram
Ukraine	DarkWolf	DDoS/Deface	Telegram
Ukraine	NAFO	Psyop/Meme	Twitter
Ukraine	Op Anonymous Italia Reborn	Hack	Twitter
Ukraine	Saint Javelin	Psyops	Twitter
Ukraine	National Republican Army - Cyber	Ransomware	N/A
Ukraine	SUDORM-RF	Hack	Twitter
Ukraine	Xxll	DDoS/Hack	Telegram
Ukraine	Ukrainian Cyber Alliance	DDoS/Hack	Telegram
Ukraine	TheGhostKamikaze (Anon)	DDoS/Hack	Twitter
Ukraine	X3cybersquad (Anon)	DDoS/Dox	Twitter
Ukraine	HmarsDDoS	DDoS	Telegram

Support	Name	Actions	Comms
Russia	RaHDit	Hack	Telegram
Russia	Xaknet	DDoS	Telegram
Russia	Killnet	DDoS	Telegram
Russia	DDoS Hacktivist Team	Dox/DDoS	Telegram
Russia	Zsecnet	DDoS	Telegram
Russia	Bear IT ARMY (RENAME)	Hack/Psyops	Telegram
Russia	ZOV cyber army	Psyop/Dox	Telegram
Russia	Cyber Front Z	Psyop/DDoS	Telegram
Russia	Info Front VoZzdie	DDoS/psyops	Telegram
Russia	Cyber Army of Russia	DDoS	Telegram
Russia	Legion	Psyop/Dox	Telegram
Russia	Beregini	DDoS/Hack	Telegram
Russia	NoName057(16)	Psyops/Dox	Telegram
Russia	ZSNOSINT	Hack/DDoS	Telegram
Russia	FRwLteam	Hack	Telegram
Russia	Zarya	DDoS	Telegram
Russia	RedHackersAlliance	Ransomware	UNK
Russia	Wizard Spider (Trickbot Crew)	DDoS	Telegram
Russia	Anonymous Russia	DDoS/Hack	Telegram
Russia	NBP Hackers	DDoS/Hack	Telegram
Russia	Phoenix	DDoS/Hack	Twitter
Russia	KIIIMIIk	Psyops/Dox	Telegram
Russia	ALtahreaTeam	DDoS/Deface	Telegram
Russia	JokerDPR	DDoS/Deface	Telegram
Russia	1877Team	DDoS/Botnet	Telegram
Russia	QBotDDoS (Mirai)	DDoS/Botnet	Telegram
Russia	9sminogbotnet	DDoS	Telegram
Russia	Russian Hackers Team	DDoS	Telegram
Russia	DDoSia Project	DDoS	Telegram
Russia	Xaknet DDoS Division	DDoS	Telegram

Support (State-Sponsored)	Name	Actions	Comms
Russia	GhostWriter	Hack	UNK
Russia	SandWorm	Hack/Wiper	UNK
Russia	Gamaredon	Hack/Wiper	UNK
Russia	DEV-0586	Hack/Wiper	UNK
Russia	DEV-0665	Hack/Wiper	UNK
Russia	Fancy Bear/APT28	Hack/Wiper	UNK
Ukraine	IT Army of Ukraine	DDoS	Telegram
Ukraine	Internet Forces of Ukraine	Psyops	UNK
Ukraine	US CyberCom	Hack	UNK
UNK	Curious George	Hack	UNK
Russia	Turla APT	Hack	UNK
Russia	SaintBear/TA471	Hack	UNK
UNK	TontoTeam	Hack	UNK
UNK	Space Pirates	Hack	UNK
UNK	Scarab	Hack	UNK
Ukraine	Calisto	Hack	UNK
Ukraine	UK NCSC	Defence	UNK

KEY:

Total Groups	81
Added	11
Removed	11
Is for New Groups	
Pro-Russian	40
Pro-Ukraine	36
UNK	5

Figure 1: Hacker groups
(Source: CyberKnow)

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In addition to the hacker groups (Appendix No. 1), there are also many lone criminals operating independently on both sides of the conflict. It is currently difficult to estimate their number. Because of the conflict, many independent hackers organized themselves into groups in a relatively short time, and in several cases these hackers came under the control of the government, where they were given specific tasks. Such as the IT Army, which is currently an active participant in the events. The picture shows the invitation from the Ukrainian side.


Figure 2: Mykhailo Federov Twitter account
(Source: Twitter)

Interpretation of information operations in the conflict

Before I present concrete examples and cases studies, we need to address what exactly is the defenition of information operation and how we define it.

In a conflict situation, the basic goal is to maintain organized order, controllability and controllability on one's side, and on the other side, the opposite, disorganization and an unmanageable, uncontrollable state, that is, to cause and temporarily create a specific chaos. This double goal can be achieved by means of a coordinated information influencing operation on the other party's side, negative and positive on one's side. Information operations are basically aimed at this.[31]

After the fast spread of the information society, the role played by information operations in armed conflicts increased, which run parallel to military activities on battlefields in the classical sense in almost all cases, with the exception, of course, of global surveillance campaigns or cybercriminal activity.

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[31] HAIG, Zsolt – VÁRHEGYI, István: Hadviselés az információs hadszíntéren, HM Zrínyi Kht., 2005. p. 172

The information battlefield includes the virtual space and partly the server IT infrastructure, which means the acquisition, production, processing, storage and transmission of information, as well as its protection. The information battlefield is a part of the digital ecosystem, besides the real battlefield, it includes the infocommunication systems of military and civilian organizations that support military operations. This was clearly demonstrated during the conflict, where operations are conducted in the entirety of cyberspace. (Appendix No. 2)

On the subject, Dr. Csaba Krasznay also drew attention to the appreciation of information operations. In his presentation entitled Cyber warfare in the shadow of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict, after the historical overview, Krasznay explained, among other things, the main characteristics of the so-called fourth generation warfare, which already includes the use of the information environment for military purposes. The author also discusses in detail the complex application of the information space and classic military equipment, as well as its development and potential. In his interview „The Ukrainians created the Uber of fire controll system", Dr. Krasznay shows that the digital space and the war fought there play a decisive role in today's armed conflicts.[32]

Martin C. Libicki's study published in 1995 was one of the first to summarize the theoretical connections of information warfare. From the point of view of information warfare, Libicki emphasized the importance of various technical and humanitarian information activities, the need for their coordination, and specified the scope of these activities and categorized them as follows:
- command and control warfare,
- intelligence-based warfare,
- electronic warfare,
- psychological warfare,

Information operations in the information space - such as data acquisition, data storage, processing, transmission, offensive cyber activity supporting the operations - are carried out in order to influence targets and their functionality without physical destruction. In the cognitive space, we basically target human emotions, such as perception, perception, interpretation, opinion, thinking or creating an independent opinion – with false or real information, which we deliver electronically.

From the point of view of the information space, the Ukrainian-Russian crisis affects not only the national defense (military) sector, but also the entire societal digital space as follows:
- the public administration;
- transportation, travel;
- law enforcement;
- national security;
- the military information environment of the national defense sector;
- the financial, economic and commercial sector;

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[32] SZEDLÁK, Ádám: Az ukránok létrehozták a tűzvezetés Uberjét – interjú, Forbes, 2022 szeptember 10. https://forbes.hu/uzlet/az-ukranok-letrehoztak-a-tuzvezetes-uberjet-interju/ (downloaded: 17 December 2022)

- social media, online messaging platforms, blogs, static and dynamic websites;
- critical information infrastructure; ITC environment.
- From the point of view of the information space and geographical location, the Ukrainian-Russian crisis also affects not only the national defense (military) sector, but also the global Internet, i.e. many geographical locations, by which I mean Ukraine or Russia directly, such as:
- Baltic region (cyber attacks against Baltic states);
- China (technological advance, covert continuation of cyber intelligence campaigns);
- EU member states (information operations against EU members);
- United State of America;
- and international organizations that have expressed negative criticism of the Russian or Ukrainian government.

Regarding the Ukrainian-Russian conflict, information operations and their impact should be examined from February 2022. The Ukrainian media illuminates Russian military operations from several parallel negative perspectives. The narratives compare current operations to World War II, and constantly emphasize that country A has attacked country B, where a single leader in country A determines military/political decisions.

Furthermore, the narratives also include the Russian Victory Day parade, which is compared to a similar military event in the Second World War. In addition, the image of the humanitarian crisis, which is used by Ukrainian media sources during numerous media campaigns, also appears here. During the conflict, both countries employ information operations in distinct ways as follows:

1. it uses information operations to portray its own military/political/economic activities and operations to the public in a positive way (Russian special military operations against a far-right organization, Ukrainian national defense war), as the public confirms this in posts and blogs, so this activity is currently operational;
2. discrediting the opposing entity, discrediting it in the political sphere, creating a negative or false image before international organizations (US Senate, European Parliament), disrupting the constitutional order of the opposing government, etc. Discrediting political leaders with opposing interests, possibly presenting their state of health, detailing their background;
3. non-governmental actors present some events partially different from reality, for this they use old media materials or videos produced with digital technology in order to increase the viewership of their own channels and blogs. In several cases, this also appears as an „off-topic" topic on blogs and channels with different themes.

According to Zsolt Haig's theory, *„The theory of information operations is based on the basic assumption that every organization and system which needs regulation in order to function and fulfill its intended tasks, can be achieved on the basis of relevant, accurate and timely, as well as objective information."*[33] In the Russian-Ukrainian information conflict, on the other hand, this is typically used by the Russian

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[33] HAIG, Zsolt: Információs műveletek a kibertérben. Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2018. 159. p.

side, while the Ukrainian information operations are a series of operations running parallel to each other in a decentralized manner, where the actors carry out their operations for the same purpose.

It is also important to emphasize that in several cases cyber operations and information operations are used synonymously, but the important thing is to see that cyberspace basically functions as a channel during the conflict. *„Information operations are new type of operational capability emerging with the development of information technology and the appreciation of the role played by information in military operations, prevailing in the information environment."*[34]

Social media, as well as news channels in the classical sense, are successfully used in information operations by opposing parties to spread propaganda materials or fake news. It is more typical of the conflict that these media materials are broadcast on social platforms. This is presumably because, similar to the global economy and trade, users prefer these interfaces for reading news.

It can also be observed that the staff belonging to the regular forces also likes to use Facebook Watch, as well as YouTube Short and TiKTok and Instagram short videos.

During the conflict, the uploaded materials are grouped around the following topics on Ukrainian social networks: the national defense struggle of the Ukrainian forces and its unquestionable legal basis:
- outstanding effectiveness of the Ukrainian armed forces and civil resistance;
- the brutality of the Russian military forces, the commission of war crimes;
- the helplessness and strategic mistakes of the Russian forces;
- the need for Western high-precision weapons.

In terms of operational activity, Ukrainian and Russian personnel and individuals, as well as other entities, upload the following materials:
- artillery strikes, attacks on destruction zones;
- fighting of Ukrainian subunits in open and rugged terrain;
- offensive and delaying combat of a Ukrainian tank squadron;
- an attack carried out by drones (commercial) against Russian units in defense or fighting a defensive battle,
- interception and raid against Russian sub-units;
- technical clearance of the area recaptured by Ukrainian forces, damage prevention;
- excavation of mass graves;
- successful self-airdefense activity;
- movement of a combat vehicle column;
- health care for own subunits, residents, and the injured;
- testimonies of prisoners of war;
- military equipment repair and technical service activities.

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[34] Ibid. p. 211

Figure 3: Press selection
(Source: Twitter)

Some of the pictures also show that the soldiers have a device suitable for recording media materials.

Which clearly shows that martial events are recorded from several perspectives, and the population, the media consuming environment itself, is also the producer of these materials.

With the help of these IoT devices or media recording materials, real data can be obtained on the battlefield almost immediately.

Figure 4: Twitter example
(Source: Twitter)

Regarding the channels, it can be seen that the Russian side prefers to use the RT news agency and YouTube channels. On the other hand, it can be said that the Ukrainian side prefers messaging services and related channel services in the information space. Of course, many Ukrainian YouTube channels broadcast the fight of Ukrainian forces in several counties.

Information operations (major events)

- The Ukrainian armed forces rely heavily on the opportunities offered by cyberspace when fighting a defensive battle. In addition to military operations, it effectively uses the information space according to the following grouping:

- Identify the commands of sub-units, units and higher units of the attacking Russian forces, against whom they will carry out targeted attacks;

- They operate a self-organizing reconnaissance system with the help of online messaging/file sharing applications. In this case, the battlefield sensors were replaced with IoT devices found in the population. These are able to transmit image, sound and geographic coordinates together, and they are also located in large numbers and geographically distributed. As a result, the Ukrainian battlefield leadership has immediate information

about the number, position and movement of enemy units, possibly also about the combat value, during the defensive battle.

- With the help of images and videos transmitted by the population (executions, the massacre in Bucha, the siege of Mariupol, the bombing of Kharkiv, the siege of Kiev) they are able to manipulate the Internet community;

- They publish personal data (war criminals) on their open internet interfaces in order to present to the audience the persons they believe to be war criminals;

- The opposing parties present their individual military operations in detail, from their own point of view, and publish this in the international media. Regarding the information operations, it can be established that the opposing parties blame each other for the situation and use the online media for this.

It is important to add that the Russian media is no longer owned by oligarchs with competing political interests. Vladimir Putin's presidential election in 2000 was followed by a tightening of control over all spheres of Russian political life and the media. Since the early 2000s, major Russian media organizations have either been directly controlled by the state or belonged to Putin loyalists.[35] Several major Russian media organizations serve as mouthpieces for the Russian government.[36]

In February 2022, before the outbreak of the war, TV channels and news portals associated with the Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvychuk, who has since been accused of treason, and the pro-Russian „For Life – Opposition Platform" were banned in Ukraine. The Language Act also severely restricted the publication of media products in the languages of national minorities (among others in Russian), since the law allows their publication, but stipulates that those published in the language of the minority must also be published in Ukrainian, which significantly raises the cost of producing press products in the language of the minorities cost.

As a result of the Zelenskyi administration's anti-oligarchic measures, the influence of the oligarchs decreased, their financial situation deteriorated, their political and economic power and influence decreased, while the environment of President Zelenskyi (the Office of the President) increased at the same time. The majority of Ukrainian oligarchs have supported Zelensky until now, the other oligarchs have left the country, their assets have been confiscated and locked up.

Thus, in February 2022, before the outbreak of the war, TV channels and news portals linked to the Ukrainian oligarch Viktor Medvychuk, who has since been accused of treason, and the pro-Russian „For Life – Opposition Platform" were banned in Ukraine.

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[35] KHVOSTUNOVA, Olga: A Brief History of the Russian Media. The Interpreter, December 6, 2013. http://www.interpretermag.com/a-brief-history-of-the-russian-media/ (downloaded 17 December 2022)

[36] Freedom ont he NET 2015: Russia, Freedom House, https://freedomhouse.org/sites/default/files/resources/FOTN%202015_Russia.pdf (downloaded 17 December 2022)

It is worth observing a number of significant events, which clearly show the differences in how the Russian and Ukrainian media present individual events. They clearly show how these events are used during information operations.

I have selected the events below because they generated a fairly large amount of media material both in the media and on social media.

Zaporizzsja[37]

On March 4, 2022, Russian forces entered the area of the Zaporizhia Nuclear Power Plant operating next to the city of Enerhodar in the Zaporizhia region of Ukraine (ЗAEC[38]). During the attack, the reactor blocks were not damaged, and the radiation level did not rise. After that, the fire was successfully extinguished and Russian forces took control of the object. At the time of the attack on March 4, reactor block 1 was shut down for maintenance. Block 2 continued to operate and covered the power plant's own needs. Block 3 was cooled and then shut down. Block 4 operated with an output of 825 mW. Blocks 5 and 6 provided cooling for the nuclear facilities. The US State Department warned the Russian ambassador in Washington that the Russian government should cease all military operations at the facility. Russian Ambassador Anatoly Antonov was invited to the State Department on August 18.[39]

Figure 5: Alarmky24 press
(Source: Alarmky24)

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[37] In Ukrainian - Запоріжжя, in Russian: Запорожье – Zaporozsje.
[38] oroszul: Запоро́жская атомная электростанция – ЗAEC
[39] Жанна Безп'ятчук: Ситуація близька до Фукусіми, допомоги світу немає". Інтерв'ю з інженером Запорізької АЕС., ВВС 13 серпня 2022
      https://www.bbc.com/ukrainian/features-62532425 (downloaded: 18 December 2022)

Figure 6: Extraordinary notice of the Ministry of Defense of the Russian Federation

Former Ukrainian Minister of Internal Affairs Denis Monastirskyi stated, that Russia is a terrorist state. All responsibility lies with the Russian Federation for what has happened in the nuclear power plant so far and will happen in the near future, and it is necessary to prepare for all possible scenarios in this regard. In January 2023, Denisz Monastirskyi died in a helicopter accident in Brovary, Kiev county.

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) according to his position of August 8, it can be concluded that the nuclear safety and protection situation in the nuclear power plant is stable and that there is no immediate threat to safety.

On August 24, the Russian side requested the establishment of an independent investigation committee from IAEA[40]. IAEA inspectors arrived at the nuclear power plant on September 1. On August 5, 2022, the Russian Ministry of Defense issued an emergency statement disclosing that three Ukrainian artillery strikes hit the Zaporizhia nuclear power plant and the area of the city of Enerhodar. As a result of the attack, electricity and water supply problems arose in Enerhodar, the 3rd block of

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[40] Zaporizhzhia nuclear power plant: the Russians negotiated with the International Atomic Energy Agency on the establishment of an investigation committee. https://mandiner.hu/cikk/20220824_zaporizzsjai_atomeromu_atom_energia_orosz_ukran _haboru (downloaded: 20 September 2022)

the nuclear power plant was disconnected from the grid, and the production of the 4th block was reduced. The attack did not affect the nearby oil and fuel storage facilities, thus preventing an extensive fire hazard and radiation disaster in Europe's largest nuclear power plant. The statement published in the Russian press called what happened a clear Ukrainian provocation.[41]


Figure 8: Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant
(Source: ceenergynews.com)

According to information published in the Ukrainian press on August 4, Russian forces occupied the area of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant and deployed 500 soldiers and numerous military equipment there. According to Ukrainian statements, on August 5, Russian forces carried out an operation on several occasions, when the area of the nuclear power plant was fired.[42,43]

The news published in the international press portrays the details of the attack at the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant in accordance with the Ukrainian position. On August 5, the BBC shared a statement from Ukraine's Atomic Energy Agency, which said a Russian missile attack had hit the plant but had not caused the coolant leak.[44]

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[41] Срочное заявление Министерства обороны Российской Федерации, https://z.mil.ru/spec_mil_oper/news/more.htm?id=12431834@egNews, (downloaded: 25 August 2022)

[42] росіяни стріляли в бік ЗАЕС - біля промислового майданчика три «прильоти», https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3544307-rosiani-strilali-v-bik-zaes-bila-promislovogo-majdancika-tri-priloti.html (downloaded: 20 September 2022)

[43] Загарбники вдруге за кілька годин обстріляли Запорізьку АЕС, https://www.ukrinform.ua/rubric-ato/3544429-zagarbniki-vdruge-za-kilka-godin-obstrilali-zaporizku-aes.html (downloaded: 20 September 2022)

[44] Zaporizhzhia: Russian rockets damaged part of nuclear plant, Ukraine says, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-62432873 (downloaded: 15 August 2022)

In summary, it can be said that the parties accused each other of attacking the territory of the Zaporizhzhya Nuclear Power Plant, and of carrying out military operations threatening the integrity and operation of the nuclear power plant. Regarding the events, the news published in the international and Ukrainian press agreed, basically setting the Russian side as the cause of the attacks on the nuclear power plant.

Bucha conflict[45]

In April 2022, the series of war crimes allegedly committed by Russian armed forces or unknown perpetrators in the city of Bucha, Ukraine, became known in the international press as the „Bucha massacre". According to Ukrainian authorities, more than 300 civilians lost their lives in the city during the operation of the Russian armed forces.[46] On April 2, Anatoly Fedoruk, the mayor of Bucha, stated that the Russian soldiers treated Ukrainian civilians inhumanely, many of them were raped, tortured and then killed. The Ukrainian leadership called what happened in Bucha a genocide. Both the Russian and Ukrainian governments have asked the International Criminal Court (ICC) to investigate the cases.

The Russian government denied that the massacre had taken place, classifying the pictures and videos taken of it as a provocation of Western interests or a prearranged event for the Western press. In a statement, the Russian Federation pointed out that the southern outskirts of Bucha, including the residential areas, were continuously fired by the Ukrainian forces with heavy artillery, tanks and rocket launchers during the period under review, while the city was under the control of the Russian armed forces. According to the information, the Russian armed forces evacuated Bucha on March 30, and on the 31st, the mayor of the city, Anatoly Fedoruk, made no mention of the residents who were shot to death by hand. According to the Russian position, the „evidence of crimes" appeared only on the fourth day, when the Security Service of Ukraine's (СБУ[47]) officers arrived in the city.[48,49,50,51,52]

The news published in the open media presented the event from several sides. Based on our investigation, it can be seen that the Russian and Ukrainian media share completely contradictory news, while the international media clearly form an opinion almost identical to the position of the Ukrainian side.

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[45] In Ukrainian: Буча, population in 2021 was 36 971 persons.

[46] https://www.themoscowtimes.com/2022/04/03/ukraine-says-killing-of-civilians-in-bucha-a-deliberate-massacre-a77187 (downloaded: 19 September 2022)

[47] СБУ – Служба безпеки України – Its main areas of operation are espionage, constitutional protection, anti-terrorist activities, the fight against organized crime and corruption, and the detection and eradication of other illegal activities.

[48] https://www.origo.hu/nagyvilag/20220405-mit-lehet-tudni-a-bucsai-meszarlasrol.html (downloaded: 01 September 2022)

[49] https://ria.ru/20220403/minoborony-1781557525.html (downloaded: 19 September 2022)

[50] https://www.dp.ru/a/2022/04/03/Minoboroni_RF_nazvalo_kad (downloaded: 01 September 2022)

[51] https://www.pravda.com.ua/news/2022/04/4/7336983/ (downloaded: 01 September 2022)

[52] https://www.bbc.com/news/60981238 (downloaded: 01 September 2022)

The New York Times also produced an investigative documentary film about the Bucha massacre. The staff of the newspaper identified (handled data) several people who were killed by the Russians on Jablunska Street in March. In its fact-finding report completed after eight months of research, the New York Times concluded that the perpetrators of the Yablunsk Street massacre were Russian paratroopers of the 234th Air Assault Regiment led by Lieutenant Colonel Artem Gorodhilov. The identities of several soldiers were also identified, and their photos were shown to the readers.[53]

The moral examination of data management is not the purpose of this article. The analysis basically identified the alleged criminals using personal data. Since the Russian soldiers used captured IT/telecommunication devices during the conflict, the journalists reached their family members with the data found on these devices and by analyzing the phone numbers dialed by the Russian soldiers. The identities of several paratroopers from the 234th regiment were identified with the help of the above-mentioned data and information found on social networking sites. The New York Times also identified Lieutenant Colonel Artem Gorodhilov, who occasionally appears in the recordings. The commander of the 234th regiment supervised the operations of the parachute unit in Bucha.

Figure 9: Statement of Russian Ministry of Defense

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[53] https://www.hrw.org/news/2022/04/21/ukraine-russian-forces-trail-death-bucha (downloaded: 01 September 2022)

According to the statement of the Russian Ministry of Defense, the photos and other news depicting what happened in the city of Bucha clearly depict scenes staged by the Ukrainians for the Western media. Russian information related to the events in Bucha is limited to combat events. The photos of the articles in the Russian press dealing with the events in Bucha show the military equipment involved.

The position published in the Ukrainian press subjectively portrays the actions committed by the designated staff of the Russian Federation in Bucha. In order to achieve a greater emotional (cognitive) impact, the footage that shocks the public predominantly shows the corpses of people on the street, presumably killed by Russian soldiers.

The news published in the international press basically portrays the events in Bucha in accordance with the Ukrainian position, and presents the Ukrainian people as victims.

Figure 10: Killings in Bucha „a deliberate massacre" says Ukraine[54]

In summary, it can be stated that the international and Ukrainian press portrays the events in Bucha from the same point of view, with the Russian party as responsible. The Russian media, on the other hand, limit themselves to factual announcements in which they objectively describe what happened and call the public to what they believe to be fake news created by Ukrainian propaganda. The reader of the news cannot find his way around the conflicting facts and data made public by the parties, so it is completely suitable for deceiving the readers. Language barriers further reinforce the fact that a part of the international media reading public does not speak Russian or Ukrainian. Thus, he basically acquires his knowledge from international media materials.

Regarding social media, it can also be said that many narratives have appeared on the Internet regarding the incident, which further worsens transparency. According

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[54] https://www.bbc.co.uk/programmes/w172yfbw7l24d6d (downloaded: 29 August 2023)

to some Twitter users, members of the Ukrainian national security services executed some of the Russian-collaborating residents in Bucha. Also, Ukrainian far-right individuals killed many residents, not Russian forces. Since the community on Twitter typically does not communicate in Russian, international media materials are more authoritative.

The Nord Stream natural gas pipeline incident

Figure 11: Peskov announced that they want to blame Russia for the explosion on the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines
(Source: RIA Novosti)

On September 26, a significant pressure drop occurred in the North Stream-1 and North Stream-2 natural gas pipelines[55] sections located in Danish and Swedish territorial waters[56]. The lines were out of service, but at the same time under pressure.

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[55] The Nord Stream-1 and Nord Stream-2 natural gas pipelines are owned by the Russian state energy company Gazprom, and were designed to transport Russian natural gas to Europe by bypassing Ukraine.

[56] Nord Stream 2 pipeline pressure collapses mysteriously overnight, https://www.theguardian.com/business/2022/sep/26/nord-stream-2-pipeline-pressure-collapses-mysteriously-overnight (downloaded: 24 October 2022)

Figure 12: Putin accused the United States of damaging the European energy network
(Source: RIA Novosti)

On September 28, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg and Danish Defense Minister Morten Bodskov called the leakage of the Nord Stream gas pipelines an act of sabotage. As a result of the sabotage, a gas leak occurred on one section of the Northern Stream-1 natural gas pipeline pair and on one section of the Northern Stream-2 natural gas pipeline pair.[57] According to Russian press information, the gas leak had already been stopped by October 3, but the time for the complete restoration of the pipelines could not be predicted at that time.[58] The Russian leadership accused the United States of America and its allies of committing the sabotage.[59] The statement published by the Danish police on October 18 clearly stated for the first time that there must have been an explosion on the Nord Stream pipelines, as a result of which a 50-meter section of the gas pipeline broke off.[60]

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[57] Sweden issues warning of two gas leaks on Nord Stream 1 pipeline, https://www.reuters.com/business/energy/sweden-issues-warning-two-gas-leaks-nord-stream-1-pipeline-2022-09-27/ (downloaded: 19 October 2022)

[58] Утечка газа из МГП Северный поток и Северный поток 2 прекратилась, https://neftegaz.ru/news/transport-and-storage/752948-utechka-gaza-iz-mgp-severnyy-potok-i-severnyy-potok-2-prekratilas/ (downloaded: 19 October 2022)

[59] Путин обвинил США в уничтожении европейской энергоструктуры, https://ria.ru/20220930/ssha-1820626655.html (downloaded: 19 October 2022)

[60] JACOBSEN, Stine: 'Powerful explosions' behind Nord Stream leaks, Danish police say, https://www.reuters.com/world/europe/danish-police-say-powerful-explosions-behind-nord-stream-leaks-2022-10-18/ (downloaded: 25 October 2022)

Figure 13: Russia's Purpoted Sabotage of The Nord Stream Pipeline marks a point of no return
(Source: Forbes)

Articles published in the Ukrainian press on September 27 clearly blamed the Russian leadership for the explosions on natural gas pipelines.[62]

On September 30, Russian President Vladimir Putin stated in connection with the explosions on the Nord Stream gas pipelines that the Western countries were apparently not satisfied with the effects of the sanctions, but had started sabotage against the European energy infrastructure. With this statement, Putin accused Western states, primarily the United States of America, of committing the bombings.[63]

In a statement on October 18, the Kremlin condemned the fact that the investigation into the explosions at the Nord Stream gas pipelines was conducted with the exclusion of Russian experts. According to Russian presidential spokesman Dmitry Peskov, this indicates that the Western countries conducting the investigation will accuse the Russian government of committing the bombings.[64]

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[61] https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2022/09/29/russian-sabotage-of-the-nord-stream-pipeline-mark-a-point-of-no-return/ (downloaded: 25 October 2022)
[62] Nord Stream: Ukraine accuses Russia of pipeline terror attack, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-63044747 (downloaded: 24 October 2022)
[63] Путин обвинил США в уничтожении европейской энергоструктуры, https://ria.ru/20220930/ssha-1820626655.html (downloaded: 19 October 2022)
[64] Вину за ЧП на "Северных потоках" хотят возложить на Россию, заявил Песков, https://ria.ru/20221018/gazoprovod-1824839288.html?in=t (downloaded: 19 October 2022)

On the other hand, on September 29, the international press clearly suspected Russia of committing the explosions on the Nord Stream natural gas pipelines.[65]

It can be concluded that the Ukrainian and international reports about the attack on the Nord Stream gas pipelines, as well as the opinions about the possible perpetrator, are the same, making Russia responsible for the sabotage. The central element of Russian press releases is the image of the Russian head of state making an announcement in the Kremlin after the bombings and accusing the United States of America and its allies.

In conclusion, it can be said that it is a serious dilemma for readers to find channels with relevant information. In addition, there is such an amount of information available (regardless of its reality) that it is currently advisable to take into account only the reliable Hungarian government information.

Cyber and informationoperations, events (chronology)

The Russian government – similarly to the Ukrainian government – defines cyberspace as a battlefield. As a result, it uses the opportunities provided by cyberspace to carry out cyber intelligence activities against opposing governments, and also carries out cyber attacks against Ukrainian targets. Its attacks are basically focused on carrying out overload attacks and targeting malicious software. The targets of Russian cyberattacks typically include vital system components, and in 2023, some attacks also targeted the personnel of the Ukrainian armed forces. It can also be said that one of the general characteristics of state-funded cyber attacks is that they follow the development of conflicts and conflict zones. This can also be seen in the case of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. It is advisable to review the cyber operations in chronological order, in this case starting from 2014.

On May 22, 2014, a cyber attack hit the Ukrainian election system[66] serving IT infrastructure. The attack had three phases. First, the attackers penetrated the IT infrastructure and deleted a number of data files necessary for the operation, as a result of which the system was paralyzed. The Russian-affiliated CyberBerkut[67] hacker group later leaked data in order to prove the result of the attack. Despite the fact that this is a cyber attack in the classical sense, it still has an informational operational dimension, as it could have resulted in the incorrect communication of the election result, which could have shaken the confidence of the population. In addition, the appearance of reliability of the electoral system has also been seriously damaged.[68]

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[65] Russia's Purported Sabotage Of The Nord Stream Pipeline Marks A Point Of No Return , https://www.forbes.com/sites/arielcohen/2022/09/29/russian-sabotage-of-the-nord-stream-pipeline-mark-a-point-of-no-return/?sh=19fe2e145dba, download : 2022.10.24.
[66] Ukrainian Central Election Commission System
[67] КиберБеркут
[68] The Christian Science monitor –
https://www.csmonitor.com/World/Passcode/2014/0617/Ukraine-election-narrowly-avoided-wanton-destruction-from-hackers (downloaded: 25 October 2022);
Gorchinskaya, Katya – Rudenko, Olga – Schreiber, William: Hackers foiled in bid to rig Ukraine presidential election results. Kyiev Post, 2014. május 25.

On May 25, 2014, the second wave of the attack continued. During the attack, the perpetrators introduced a malicious software into the election system, the purpose of which was to ostensibly change the result of the election.

On May 26, 2014, the voting system was hit by a Distributed Denial of Service (DDoS) attack, which caused a delay in the publication of the final results.

On December 23, 2015, a cyber attack hit the IT segment of the electricity distribution network in the western part of Ukraine (Ivano-Frankivsk). The attackers are the telephone network and malicious software[69] with the help of which they launched an overload attack against electricity providers. The TDoS[70] using an attack, even though the customers were cut off from the service provider, so they could not report the outage. As a result, 225,000 customers experienced service outages of 1-6 hours. The attack affected 16 substations that could not be reached during the attack (remote control access was damaged). The Sandworm APT group with Russian interests was responsible for the attack. The attack was later investigated by SANS ICS, on which it also prepared a detailed report.[71] Some experts describe this attack as the first successful cyberattack affecting the energy sector. Regardless, it is also worth considering that the population was also involved in the attack, which caused a serious cognitive impact, as one of the basic services necessary for everyday life was lost. On the other hand, it is important to highlight that the emails containing the malicious codes were purposefully sent to people (at different service providers) who had access data that were later used by the attackers. Presumably, these were selected in such a way that, based on their personal data found on the Internet, it was determined who could be responsible for the data required for entry at the companies.

On December 17, 2016, another attack hit the Ukrainian energy network. The attack affected Kyiv and its surroundings, where the attack caused a loss of service for approximately one hour. The Elektrum group, which is Win32/Industroyer, was named as the perpetrator of the attack[72] used malicious code.[73]

On July 27, 2017, an attack was carried out against Ukrainian networks with the NotPetya malicious software, which caused a great response in the world press. I will not elaborate on the case here, as many articles and studies have been written about it, but it is important to note that this attack is the best example of the fact that cyberspace has no geographical boundaries, as the individual actors involved include the system monitoring the status of the Chernobyl power plant (instead of which they switched to manual measurement), the production and refining control system of the Russian energy company Rosneft (the company has already switched to the backup

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[69] With the help of Balck Energy malware, which was delivered via email as a malicious attachment. Later, the KillDisk malware was used, which deleted certain elements of the system, causing them to restart.

[70] Telephony Denial of Service

[71] ASSANTE, Michael: Confirmation of a Coordinated attack of the Ukranian Power Grid 2016. januar 6. https://www.sans.org/blog/confirmation-of-a-coordinated-attack-on-the-ukrainian-power-grid/ (downloaded: 13 January 2023)

[72] https://www.welivesecurity.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/Win32_Industroyer.pdf (downloaded: 13 January 2023)

[73] CHEREPANOV A. – LIPOVSKY R.: Industroyer: Biggest threat to industrial control systems since Stuxnet. 12 07 June, https://www.welivesecurity.com/2017/06/12/industroyer-biggest-threat-industrial-control-systems-since-stuxnet/ (downloaded: 13 January 2023)

system), one of the largest shipping companies Maersk (whose entire internal IT has stopped), the London-based communications company WPP.[74]

In addition, it should also be mentioned here that 10 billion dollars of indirect damage was caused globally.[75]

On July 11, 2018, the Security Service of Ukraine prevented Russian national security services from carrying out a successful cyber attack on a vital piece of infrastructure that supplies the liquid chlorine needed to clean the country's entire drinking water and sewage system.[76] According to СБУ 's cyber security experts, the VPNFilter attack hit the company's systems that manage technological processes and recognize emergencies.[77] The aim of the attack was to permanently disable the operation of the liquefaction station that supplies liquid chlorine to water and sewer utilities throughout Ukraine.[78,79]

The American CISA AA22-011A 2022[80,81] alert was published on January 11, which has already drawn attention to the protection of vital infrastructures in the event of a possible Russian cyber attack. In our opinion, the warning was more of a summary, as it basically drew attention to already known protection methods and procedures, such as keeping our software security updates up to date, vulnerability testing, emergency plans up to date, etc. In addition, the recommendation also mentions a number of vulnerabilities that affect the mentioned systems[82]. The recommendation (CSA[83]) the american CISA[84], the FBI[85], and the NSA[86] made together. In addition, the recommendation also covers the method (TTP) in relation to a possible Russian attack.

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[74] ENISA: Supply Chain Attacks https://www.enisa.europa.eu/publications/info-notes/supply-chain-attacks (downloaded: 13 January 2023)

[75] UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA, Conspiracy to Commit an Offense Against the United States

[76] A chlorine distillation station located in Auli in Dnipropetrovsk County in the eastern half of the country.

[77] According to media reports, VPNFilter has infected network storage devices and routers in 54 countries. In order to spread the malware, it exploits public security gaps, it does not use zero-day vulnerabilities, but it also tries the manufacturer's login data on different devices to see if the user has changed them.

[78] BEDERNA, Zsolt – SZÁDECZKY, Tamás: Effects of botnets – a human-organisational approach. Security and Defence, 2021/3.

[79] StiNet, https://stinet.pl/en/ukraine-history-of-cyber-attacks-part-1/ (downloaded: 13 January 2023); Русские Блоги vhttps://russianblogs.com/article/7716457992/ (downloaded: 13 January 2023)

[80] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

[81] Understanding and Mitigating Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Threats to U.S. Critical Infrastructure

[82] FortiGate VPNs, Cisco routers, Oracle WebLogic szerver, Kibana, Zimbra software, Exim Simple Mail Transfer Protocol, Pulse Secure, Citrix, Microsoft Exchange server, VMWare, F5 Big-IP.

[83] Cybersecurity Advisory

[84] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency

[85] Federal Bureau of Investigation

[86] National Security Agency

On January 13, 2022, following the breakdown of diplomatic talks, Russian sympathizer hacker groups vandalized content (defacement[87]) attacks were launched against many Ukrainian government websites. The attackers posted a message on the websites stating that the personal data of the victims will be published and their electronically stored data will be deleted. This operation already foreshadows that the (unauthorized) use of personal data is part of information operations today. Some media attributed the attack not only to hackers linked to the Russian government, but also assumed Belarusian perpetrators were behind the attack.

On January 14, 2022, in line with the extent of the crisis, a large-scale cyber attack hit certain elements of the Ukrainian government IT infrastructure. During the attack, a national database of motor insurance policies was compromised in a distraction cyber attack, as well as content modification attacks were carried out against a number of institutions. Through cyber intelligence activities prior to kinetic military operations, Russian forces are believed to have obtained large amounts of personal data on the Ukrainian population. This information is expected to be used to identify and track down Ukrainian individuals likely to resist the occupation. In addition, it cannot be ruled out that many Ukrainian persons were deported from the country based on these data.

According to the Ukrainian point of view, the cyber attacks carried out in the first quarter of January were aimed at destroying the information systems of government organizations and vital infrastructure. Despite this, in addition to the primary goal of the attack, cyber-whistleblower activity also took place, and Russian forces presumably obtained a large amount of personal data during this activity. The purpose of this was presumably to have an extensive database before the attack so that the Ukrainian population could be monitored later.

According to the Ukrainian government, the car insurance hacker attack on January 14 resulted in the theft of up to eighty percent of the Ukrainian insurance policies registered with the Motor Transport Office - i.e., from the insurance data, they know who owns what type of vehicle, where they live and where they operate the vehicle, as well as their date of birth date and other data. This makes it relatively easy to identify, for example, a Ukrainian citizen at a checkpoint.

According to media reports, an entity linked to the Russian government carried out cyber intelligence activities against several Ukrainian government, military, judicial and law enforcement organizations, as well as nonprofit institutions, in February. The unnamed organizations sought information that was "critical to responding to emergencies and securing Ukrainian territory, as well as the distribution of humanitarian aid.

On January 15, 2022, Microsoft experts discovered a malicious program in Ukrainian IT systems. The malicious code primarily infected systems that are responsible for various operations during the emergency (special legal order) period. According to Microsoft Threat Intelligence Center (MSTIC) experts, once this software is activated, it deletes the data on the infected machine. The software was

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[87] The aim of the website defacement attack is for the attackers to gain access to the files in the Document-Root directory of the web server so that they can be deleted or modified.

basically disguised as a ransomware, however, unlike ransomware, victims have no way to get their data back even after paying the ransom.

On January 16, 2022, Ukraine's Ministry of Digital Transformation accused the Russian government of carrying out multiple content modification attacks against Ukrainian information infrastructure.[88]

On January 18, 2022, several Ukrainian government offices were hit by a cyber attack, during which some of the official databases were deleted by the attackers. At the same time as the deletion, a content modification attack hit the offices. According to the Ukrainian point of view, the institutions were presumably attacked by Russian perpetrators.

On January 23, 2022, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) issued a notice to operators of critical infrastructure. According to a DHS intelligence release, the Russian government would consider a cyberattack against the United States if the United States or NATO's response to a potential Russian invasion of Ukraine was deemed to „threaten Russia's long-term national security."

On February 15, 2022, according to Ukraine's State Service of Special Communications and Information Protection of Ukraine (SSSCIP), the Ministry of Defense, the Armed Forces and two banks were hit by a DDoS attack.[89] At the same time, according to declassified intelligence, entities with Russian interests have gained access to Ukrainian military, energy and other vital networks. The purpose of the intrusion was to obtain information about the affected systems, as well as to paralyze these systems in the event of a possible Russian attack.[90]

On February 16, 2022, CISA and the U.S. FBI and NSA jointly published a new recommendation "Russian State-Sponsored Cyber Actors Target Cleared Defense Contractor Networks to Obtain Sensitive U.S. Defense Information and Technology'[91].

On February 18, 2022, CISA issued guidance on the Russian-Ukrainian conflict. In "Cisa Releases New Insight To Help Critical Infrastructure Owners Prepare For And Mitigate Foreign Influence Operations"[92] document already identifies the

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[88] Announcement of the Ministry of Digital Transformation. 16 January 2022 https://thedigital.gov.ua/news/rosiya-mae-namir-zniziti-doviru-do-vladi-feykami-pro-vrazlivist-kritichnoi-informatsiynoi-infrastrukturi-ta-zliv-danikh-ukraintsiv (downloaded: 25 February 2023)

[89] LYNGAAS, Sean – LISTER, Tim: Cyberattack hits websites of Ukraine defense ministry and armed forces. 15. february 2022. https://edition.cnn.com/2022/02/15/world/ukraine-cyberattack-intl/index.html (downloaded: 13 March 2023)

[90] NAKASHIMA, Ellen – HORTON, Alex: Russian government hackers have likely penetrated critical Ukrainian computer systems, U.S. says. The Washington Post, 2022. february 15. https://www.washingtonpost.com/national-security/2022/02/15/russia-ukraine-cyber-attacks/ (downloaded: 13 March 2023)

[91] CISA   Alert   (AA22-047A).   https://www.cisa.gov/uscert/ncas/alerts/aa22-047a (downloaded: 13 March 2023)

[92] CISA Insight: https://www.cisa.gov/sites/default/files/publications/cisa_insight_mitigating_foreign_influence_508.pdf (downloaded: 13 March 2023)

leakage of personal data of employees working at certain companies as a risk factor. The recommendation specifically emphasizes that the protection of employees' social media clients (with their personal data) is of utmost importance, since after obtaining this data, it is easy to get into a given IT system.

On February 18, 2022, civil organizations call for solidarity with entities that are able to protect the human rights of the people of Ukraine in defense against cyber threats. The Center for Democracy and the Ukrainian Rule of Law and Digital Security Lab called on the international community to take swift action to support and assist Ukrainian civil society, as cyber attacks on critical infrastructure pose a direct threat to Ukrainian society.

On February 22, 2022, the Federal Bureau of Investigation warns US businesses of a possible ransomware attack.

On February 23, 2022, a data erasing malware (HermeticWiper[93]) a new form was discovered in Ukrainian IT networks. According to experts from ESET and Broadcom's Symantec, an attack of the same type as the one in January took place in February as well. The attack did not only affect Ukraine, some IT systems in Latvia and Lithuania were already infected. The attack affected the financial and government sectors, defense, industrial and aviation, as well as ITC service elements.[94] New Denial of Service (DDoS) attacks have been launched against banking and government networks.[95]

On February 24, 2022, US President Joe Biden warned US businesses and operators of critical infrastructure about the severity of cyber security risks[96]. At the same time, according to the information provided by the Russian government's National Computer Incident Response and Coordination Center, cyber-attacks hit Russia's vital information infrastructure as well as government internet portals.[97][98] The network of the international company ViaSat was also attacked, as a result of which service outages were experienced throughout Europe. According to the company, users' personal data was not downloaded, but this is a good example of how European digital infrastructure is affected by a third-party cyber war.

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[93] Symantec Threat Hunter Team: Ukraine: Disk-wiping Attacks Precede Russian Invasion. 2022. february 24.

[94] CIMPANU, Catalin: Second data wiper attack hits Ukraine computer networks. The Record. 2022. february 23. https://therecord.media/second-data-wiper-attack-hits-ukraine-computer-networks/ (downloaded: 13 March 2023)

[95] VOLZ, Dustin: Some Ukrainian Government, Banking Websites Disrupted Again. The Wall Street Journal, 2022. february 23. https://www.wsj.com/livecoverage/russia-ukraine-latest-news/card/some-ukrainian-government-banking-websites-disrupted-again-HnTGLkoVmpezDz8UBdPY (downloaded: 13 March 2023)

[96] The White House (East Room): Remarks by President Biden on Russia's Unprovoked and Unjustified Attack on Ukraine

[97] FRANCESHCI, Lorenzo: Russian Government Websites Are Currently Down. Motherboar – Tech by Vice. 2022. february 24. https://www.vice.com/en/article/bvnpnv/russian-government-websites-are-currently-down (downloaded: 13 March 2023)

[98] State Duma, Federal Assembly of Russia, Kremlin's site

In addition to the Ukrainian event management center, the Special Operations Center was established in coordination with the Internet security companies Meta and Cloudfare[99] too.

On February 26, 2022, Ukrainian officials are calling on civilians to join the Ukrainian IT Army. As a result, 184,000 people joined the organization already after the call [100]. One of the characteristics of the Russian-Ukrainian conflict is that IT professionals and hackers recruited from the population help to fight the defensive battle. [101].

On March 1, 2022, the European Parliament stated in a resolution that the EU will increase its contribution to strengthening Ukraine's defense capacity, including cyber security. Moreover, Parliament urged the EU, NATO and other like-minded partners to step up cyber security assistance to the Ukrainian authorities.[102]

On March 2, 2022, Microsoft continued to alert users that the HermeticWiper campaign is still active.[103] At the same time, Russia's National Computer Incident Management and Coordination Center released a list of more than 17,500 IP addresses and 174 Internet domains that it says are involved in cyberattacks against Russian domestic targets.

On March 3, 2022, the Ukrainian SSSCIP according to its information, many official websites of „regional authorities and local governments" were modified and used to spread „lies". In these messages, articles were posted about an agreement to end the fighting caused by the Russian invasion. According to Ukrainian authorities, the Russian government was responsible for the disinformation campaign.

On this day, hackers hacked the Russian Space Research Institute (IKI[104]) your website. Hackers defaced part of IKI's website where vulgar anti-Russian messages were posted.

On March 5, 2022, Ukrainian SSSCIP reported that Russian hackers continuously attacked the Ukrainian information infrastructure. According to the agency, sites belonging to the Presidency, Parliament, Cabinet, Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Interior were hit by distributed denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks.

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[99]   They help protect Ukrainian users by involving language experts.
[100] The 184,000 users were determined on the basis of data registered on the Telegram channel of the Ukrainian IT ARMY, as well as smaller Telegram channels.
[101] LUNDEN, Ingrid: Ukraine takes the resistance to cyberspace, assembling an 'IT army' to hack sites from Russia and its allies, calls on tech leaders to get involved. TechCrunch, 27 February 2022.
[102] European Parliament resolution of 1 March 2022 on the Russian aggression against Ukraine, 2022/2564(RSP) https://www.europarl.europa.eu/doceo/document/TA-9-2022-0052_EN.html downloaded: (31 July 2022)
[103] Microsoft Security Response Center: https://msrc-blog.microsoft.com/2022/02/28/analysis-resources-cyber-threat-activity-ukraine/#updated-malware-details (31 July 2022)
[104] It designs and manufactures scientific instruments for space experiments.

According to the posts of the hacker group Anonymous, it is the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB[105]) website has been disabled. The group also claimed to have taken down 2,500 websites in Russia and Belarus to support the Ukrainian government.

According to press information from March 6, 2022, subunits of the United States Cyber Command, so-called „cyber mission teams", are operating in Eastern Europe. Their mission is to disrupt cyber attacks by Russian forces. The US forces were assisted by Microsoft experts. Presumably, these forces could only counterbalance the activities of the Russian GU/GS.

On March 7, 2022, the group Anonymous hacked the IT system of Russian state television, as they believed the Russian state tax was distributing fake documents and propaganda material. The group claimed to have hacked Russian streaming services Wink and Ivi, as well as live TV channels Russia 24, Channel One and Moscow 24. According to the Google Threat Analysis Group, the Belarusian government has carried out widespread phishing attacks against members of the Polish military and Ukrainian officials. Google also warned hundreds of Ukrainian residents about government-sponsored hacking activity, much of it originating from Russian territory. At the same time, the Russian authorities introduced restrictions on the Russian IT infrastructure. According to the March 7th press release of the Open Observatory of Network Interference (OONI), the Russian government, seeking to hide the truth and control the narrative, blocks not only independent media websites, but also sources that collect data about captured and killed Russian soldiers. Russia's self-censorship is fueled by the nation's new „fake news" law, which punishes media outlets, bloggers and ordinary people with heavy fines and up to 15 years in prison for spreading information that contradicts the official government position.[106]

On March 8, 2022 the The International Legion Information Technology Battalion 300 (ILIT300) Members of the hacking group known as ILIT300 named their operation #OpPhoneKiss. The Russian Ministry of Economic Development's press service said on the same day that some websites of Russia's federal agencies were compromised in a supply chain attack. Hackers were able to post inappropriate content on websites.[107]

On March 9, 2022, according to Cisco Talos researchers, cybercriminals are trying to exploit Ukrainian sympathizers by offering malware primarily via Telegram channels in encrypted messages that can be used to launch attacks against Russian entities. One of the perpetrators offered a DDoS attack tool for use against Russian propaganda websites, but instead sent an information-stealing app that infected the victim with malware designed to steal credentials and cryptocurrency information.

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[105] Федеральная служба безопасности Российской Федерации ФСБ России
[106] SPENCER, David: OONI confirms Russia using internet censorship to shore up propaganda. VPNCompre, 9 March 2022. https://www.vpncompare.co.uk/ooni-russia-censorship-propaganda/ (downloaded: 22 September 2022)
[107] https://twitter.com/Battalion300 (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

On March 11, 2022, according to Rostelecom-Solar[108] the number of attacks to disrupt the operation of corporate websites in Russia increased in March. The targets of the increased attacks were Russian government agencies and state-owned companies, including the websites of the Kremlin, Aeroflot, and Sberbank. During the attacks, servers were diverted from their normal operation or users experienced temporary access problems.

On March 11, 2022 it is FBI[109] and the CISA[110] issued a joint Cybersecurity Advisory (CSA) warning organizations that Russian state-sponsored cyber entities could gain access to a target's network to run arbitrary code through default multi-factor authentication (MFA) protocols and a critical Windows Print Spooler vulnerability called PrintNightmare down with system privileges.[111]

On March 16, 2022, the Internet isolation of the Russian population will begin. International actors continue to isolate Russian actors. The Slack[112] is reportedly cutting off access to customers in Russia. The e-mail marketing tool, MailChimp and domain registrar, as well as the web host Namecheap have also begun disconnecting their services, taking Russian civil society offline in the process.

On March 18, 2022, RIAEvangelist, the maintainer of a popular open source software called node-ipc, came under fire for deliberately sabotaging his self-developed code to wipe data from computers running the program in Russia and Belarus. Modified versions of the software deleted all data and overwrote all files on the developer's IT device, creating new text files with „peace" messages.

On March 21, 2022, Sberbank warned its customers to avoid software updates due to the threat of „protest software". Basically, most of the protest programs broadcast anti-war messages, but one type contained malicious code to wipe out computers in Russia and Belarus.

On March 24, 2022, US analysts concluded that hackers linked to the Russian military were behind the cyber attack on Viasat's satellite broadband service that disrupted Ukraine's military communications at the start of the war. However, the US government has not officially or publicly attributed this attack to Russian forces. On March 25, 2022, the United States Department of Justice and the British Foreign Office indicted four Russian officials for carrying out cyberattacks against critical infrastructures under their control worldwide between 2012 and 2018. One of the indicted officials was an employee of a Russian military research institute. According to the British Foreign Office, the timing of the indictment is directly related to Russian President Vladimir Putin's „illegal war in Ukraine."

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[108] It is the cyber security arm of telecommunications company Rostelecom, Russia's largest digital service provider.
[109] Federal Bureau of Investigation
[110] Cybersecurity and Infrastructure Security Agency
[111] https://www.cisa.gov/news-events/alerts/2022/01/11/cisa-fbi-and-nsa-release-cybersecurity-advisory-russian-cyber-threats (downloaded: 10 October 2022)
[112] Corporate communication platform

On March 27, 2022, a large-scale cyber attack hit the leading Ukrainian Internet and telephone provider, Ukrtelecom. Service was down for hours, with the Russian government denying any involvement in the attack.

On March 29, 2022, the Russian Foreign Ministry accused the United States of America of conducting a large-scale offensive cyber operation against Russian IT infrastructure, and accused the Ukrainian government of the same.

On March 30, 2022, according to Viasat, a multifaceted cyber attack on KA-SAT's network resulted in a partial interruption of KA-SAT's consumer-oriented broadband satellite service, paralyzing tens of thousands of modems. According to Viasat, the attacks are ongoing and the attackers have repeatedly tried to test the new defense systems set up by the company.

In addition, Google's Threat Analysis Group stated that as part of its efforts to track malicious cyber activity related to Russia's invasion of Ukraine, it observed actors supported by the governments of China, Iran, North Korea, and Russia, as well as various unidentified groups using themes related to the war in Ukraine. they send out malicious mail. Financially motivated and criminal actors also use current events to deceive users.

On April 02, 2022, according to the Ukrainian Computer Incident Management Center[113] attacks were launched against Ukrainian government officials and persons through Telegram channels. Cybercriminals sent a message containing an embedded line of code that specializes in stealing sensitive data. Ukrainian intelligence has attributed the attacks to a hacker group called "UAC-0094" and is 100% sure that such acts must have originated in the Russian Federation and were launched by Kremlin-backed hackers.

On April 7, 2022, Attorney General Merrick Garland stated that the United States of America has been secretly removing malware from computer networks around the world in recent weeks to prevent Russian cyberattacks. Russia could attack the country's vital infrastructure, such as financial institutions and the power grid.[114]

On April 14, 2022, the Ukrainian Computer Emergency Response Team (CERT-UA[115]) has issued a new alert warning of an ongoing cyber attack using the infamous IcedID malware to compromise Ukrainian government agencies. The detected malware, also known as BankBot or BokBot, is a banking Trojan primarily designed to steal financial and banking credentials.[116]

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[113] Масове розповсюдження шкідливої програми MarsStealer серед громадян України та вітчизняних організацій (CERT-UA#4315) https://cert.gov.ua/article/38606 (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

[114] CONGER, Kate – SANGER, David E.: U.S. Says It Secretly Removed Malware Worldwide. Pre-empting Russian Cyberattacks, 2022. április 6. The New York Times https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/06/us/politics/us-russia-malware-cyberattacks.html (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

[115] https://cert.gov.ua/

[116] BEZVERKHYI, Andrii: Detecting IcedID: The Latest Campaign Against Ukrainian Government Bodies. https://socprime.com/blog/detecting-icedid-malware-the-latest-campaign-against-ukrainian-government-bodies/ (downloaded: 25 October 2022)

On April 22, 2022, hackers targeted the Ukrainian post office with a DDoS attack, just days after a new stamp honoring a Ukrainian border guard was issued. The release of the stamp caused a major response in the media, as the image also includes a ship. The media drew parallels between the ship in the picture and the previously sunk Russian flagship Moscow.

On August 31, 2022, critical infrastructure in Montenegro was hit by a cyber attack. At the same time, several Eastern European states were hit by cyber attacks that were classified as Russian interests. The targets were primarily in Moldova, Slovenia, Bulgaria, Estonia and Albania, and the networks were basically hit by DDoS attacks.

But the most devastating was the attack on Montenegro's digital infrastructure, which had multiple targets, including water systems, electricity systems, transport services and online government services.

On September 19, 2022 Sandworm impersonates Ukrainian telecommunications providers to install malware on victims' systems. The attacks were carried out by luring victims to websites they had already modified, usually with emails sent from domains that appeared to come from a Ukrainian telecommunications company. The operations target vital Ukrainian systems with malware such as Colibri Loader[117] and the Warzone RAT (remote control trojan).

On September 22, 2022, Russian interests develop software for vital industries to replace imports. Deputy Prime Minister, Minister of Industry and Trade Denis Manturov stated that they are developing modern software solutions, especially for the oil and gas industry, to replace the software of companies that left Russia due to sanctions. According to the minister, Russia needs to develop software alternatives to „satisfy the fundamental needs of Russian companies." He also noted that „leaders of the largest companies and various fields – engineering, electronics, metallurgy, oil and gas – are involved in this work."

On September 23, 2022, according to press information, Ukrainian hackers carried out a cyber attack against the Russian payment system MIR. The DDoS attack hit the MIR payment system and its operator, the National Payment Card System (NSPK). The attackers generated traffic to the systems using browsers and primitive DDoS attack tools to cause interruptions/outages in payments and terminal operations.

On October 3, 2022, SoundCloud was banned in Russia. The Germany-based online platform and music sharing website has been accused of distributing illegal content. Russia's telecommunications watchdog, Roskomnadzor, restricted access to SoundCloud at the request of the Russian Prosecutor General's Office on September 22. According to the indictment, he distributed prohibited information in Russia, which „incited mass riots and participation in unauthorized actions, extremism, and disseminated socially significant information under the guise of reliable messages."

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[117] https://www.malwarebytes.com/blog/threat-intelligence/2022/04/colibri-loader-combines-task-scheduler-and-powershell-in-clever-persistence-technique (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

Case studies

Personal data leaked from Sberbank

- The issue of large-scale collection of personal data appeared in several cases during the conflict. According to press information, personal data was also leaked from Sberbank in the period following the outbreak of the conflict. Based on information published in the press, Google allowed a sanctioned Russian advertising company to collect user data for months. Internet giant Google provided RuTarget, owned by Sberbank, with unique cell phone IDs, IP addresses, location data, and information about users' interests and online activity. On June 23, Google is believed to have shared potentially sensitive user data with a sanctioned Russian ad tech company owned by Russia's largest state-owned bank. The following can be identified as risk factors:
- Users' personal data (name, address, financial data, search history, interests, etc.) were leaked and transferred to unknown users;
- The advertising company forwarded the personal data to the Sberbank system, and from there the information, supplemented with bank data, may have entered the Russian government system.

The event occurred despite the fact that on April 6, the United States Department of the Treasury, Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) added a number of Russian entities to the list of Specially Designated Nationals (SDN). In particular, the US Department of the Treasury increased the sanctions against the Russian government due to the atrocities in Ukraine. Thus, the Ministry of Finance sanctioned the „web-based automated Russian advertising software developer", „Rutarget".[118]

A RuTarget 2022. from June 30, Google „Ad Manager Certified External Vendors" was also listed as a „demand-side platform".

Figure 14: Ad Manager Certified External Vendors

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[118] Also known as Segmento.

Figure 15: Third party services

Creating bad replutation

Unauthorized acces of personal data is excellent for negatively influencing the reputation of certain institutions during the conflict. Ukrainian hackers announced in a press release that they had stolen thousands of internal documents from the Central Bank of Russia. A 2.6 GB data package containing 27,000 files was obtained without authorization. In principle, this data also included the personal data of the bank's employees (former employees and active employees). The attack was carried out by an unknown member (group) of the ITArmy with Ukrainian interests. The attacker highlighted on the Telegram channel that if the Russian central bank can't even take care of its own data, how could it guarantee the stability of the ruble exchange rate.

The fact of the attack and the question of its success are significant because the central bank is one of the most important financial institutions in Russia, the developer of the state monetary policy and the regulator of the national currency. Russian media denied that its system had been hacked and stated in a press release that all the leaked documents were already on the open internet.[119]

Wagner group

Ukrainian hackers obtained the personal data of mercenaries with Russian interests from the Russian Wagner Private Military Company. Minister of Digital Transformation Mikhajlo Fedorov said this in a Telegram post.[120] According to the hackers, they had all the personal data of the mercenaries. Fedorov emphasized that all executioners, murderers and rapists must be severely punished and revenge is inevitable. As a result, this is a particularly good case study for monitoring the fact that the unauthorized use of personal data can cause further conflicts even after the conflict.

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[119] securitylab.ru: Банк России опроверг взлом систем украинскими хакерами , ноября, 2022. https://www.securitylab.ru/news/534653.php (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

[120] Ukrinform

War crimes

The management (documentation) of personal data and its importance have increased in terms of identifying war crimes that arose during the conflict.

Figure 16: IT Army hack Wagner Group
(Source: Fedorov)

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine employs a number of volunteers to analyze and evaluate media materials (video, images and audio) found on the Internet and typically in social media during OSINT and SOCINT activities. If possible, they look for signs of war crimes in these recordings, as well as additional related information, and their goal is to use the data found to uncover war crimes that have already been committed before international courts (penalty).

It is also important to emphasize that this is similar to how many hacker groups have joined the fight against Russian IT systems. Hundreds of volunteers and activists are working alongside Ukrainian government authorities and law enforcement organizations to gather evidence that can prove Ukraine's case before international organizations and prosecute the perpetrators. According to the national police, Ukrainian authorities are already investigating more than 11,000 possible Russian war crimes since the beginning of the invasion.

The handling of personal data and its security (confidentiality) issues also arose with regard to relatives of victims and victims of war crimes, as well as witnesses, as follows:

- In order to protect the witness, only minimal personal data is documented in order to prevent the identification of the witness;
- They use pseudo-anonymization to protect their doctrine;
- During the monitoring of Ukrainian or Russian residents who have fled military operations (possibly war crimes);
- During the identification of the victims, I document the data of the exhumed, which is no longer personal data within the meaning of the GDPR, however, countless personal data may be leaked in relation to deceased persons, for example the personal data of relatives and those conducting investigations.

The issue of refugees

The Portuguese Data Protection Authority imposed a fine of 170,000 euros and two reprimands on the Setúbal City Council. The case arose in the light of „violations committed during the handling of the data of Ukrainian refugees". This is the first time the CNPD has imposed a fine for failing to appoint a Data Protection Officer (DPO) in accordance with Article 37(1) of the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR). The CNP emphasizes that the single fine of 170,000 euros includes „*a breach of the principle of data integrity and confidentiality, as well as a breach of the obligation to appoint a data protection officer*".

The decision of the CNPD contains two reprimands for the municipality of Sadino, for „*violation of the obligation to inform the affected parties during data collection, as well as violation of the principle of limiting data retention*". The municipality of Setúbal was also the target of new house searches by the judicial police, as part of the DIAP (Department of Investigation and Prosecution) investigation into the reception of Ukrainian refugees in the Setúbal district. A source from the Judicial Police confirmed to Lusa that it was a search operation during which „documents were collected". In May, the Judicial Police had already searched the Setúbal City Council's Asylum Assistance Service and the Association of Eastern Emigrants (Edinstvo), as part of the investigation by the Setúbal District Criminal Investigation Department (DIAP).

The judicial investigation began after the Ukrainians were received at the Setúbal town hall by Russians sympathetic to the regime of Vladimir Putin, who photocopied the documents of those fleeing the war that began with the Russian military invasion of Ukraine on February 24. According to the newspaper, at least 160 Ukrainian refugees were received by the Russian Igor Hashin, a member of the Eastern Emigrants Association (Edintsvo), former president of the House of Russia and the Coordination Council of Russian Compatriots, and his wife, Yuliya Kashina, an official of the Sadino municipality.

Indirect cases – Public procurement problems

The Belgian Council of State suspended the decision by which a Belgian company (3M Belgium) was awarded a public procurement contract in the framework of the public procurement procedure, as the authority did not sufficiently examine whether the tenders met all the requirements of the GDPR. The VIVALIA,[121] The community platform of healthcare providers has issued a call for tenders for the processing of hospital patient data for statistical purposes. The public procurement contract was awarded to 3M Belgium, a Belgian company that, according to press reports, transmitted data to the United States of America and Russia without proper safeguards.[122]

Based on this, the subsidiary of UC Louvain (CIBES), which also participates in the public procurement procedure, challenged VIVALIA's decision before the Council of State. The Council of State considered that before awarding the public procurement contract, the authority must carry out the necessary checks in relation to the tenders submitted and must provide reasons on the basis of which it can judge that the selected tender offers „sufficient guarantee" so that the data and information entrusted to it are processed in accordance with the GDPR.

The decision to award the contract was suspended without the State Council examining whether the two bidders (CIBES and 3M) complied with the GDPR.
From the case above, it can be seen that the data currently managed by companies with Russian interests, or data processing companies with Russian interests, can also be considered an indirect risk factor.

Other cases

Since a lot of data about individual Russian state officials can be found on the Internet, it cannot be ruled out that the collection of this data helps attacks against Russian personnel, such as the attack against Russian government official Ivan Szusko. In response to Susko's murder, Rogov called Ukraine a terrorist organization and called for its destruction. This was not the only assassination, as the car of Igor Telegin, the Russian-appointed deputy head of internal affairs in occupied Kherson, was hit by a radio-controlled bomb.

Risk analysis in the view of personal data

The large amount of personal data released on the open Internet – regardless of the nationality of the person concerned – poses a significant risk to the rights and freedoms of the persons concerned. With regard to the GDPR, it can be established that this risk arises when, during the conflict, the two parties concerned leak, for example, the personal data of the persons concerned residing in the territory of the Union.

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[121] https://www.vivalia.be/ (downloaded: 10 October 2022)
[122] http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/Arrets/253000/600/253677.pdf#xml=http://www.raadvst-consetat.be/apps/dtsearch/getpdf.asp?DocId=40765&Index=c%253a%255csoftware%255cdtsearch%255cindex%255carrets_fr%255c&HitCount=2&hits=1e+1f+&065529202251 (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

There is not much hope for legal enforcement (application of sanctions) under the GDPR in the case of data controllers involved in armed conflict, however, for example, the Portuguese data protection supervisory authority has a decision related to the illegal handling of personal data of Ukrainian refugees or their suspected transfer to Russia.[123]

If risks are grouped, they must be differentiated:
- A risk factor within the conflict (damage to Russian or Ukrainian personal data);
- A risk factor partially linked to the conflict (personal data of foreign mercenaries from Chechnya, Georgia, Iran, etc.);
- Ss well as factors that can be evaluated in an international context.

In terms of the area of occurrence:
- Personal data posted on the open internet or published in an article;
- Personal data sold on the dark web.

Conclusion

The abuse of personal data, as well as the use of this data, is clearly visible during the Russian-Ukrainian cyber war. The article clearly shows that the aforementioned data can be easily misused both during the conflict and in the post-conflict period.
The personal data found are also of prime importance in the identification of persons accused of war crimes, as well as in the identification of victims affected during the war.

These data can also be found in the case of migration phenomena caused by the crisis, as well as in the course of related abuses.
In the article, I also tried to highlight the fact that during information operations, personal data appear simultaneously in cyberspace. Which took on unprecedented values in relation to the Russian-Ukrainian conflict.
It is expected that information operations and combat in cyberspace will not only last for the duration of the armed conflict, but will also be characteristic of the period of peaceful settlement that follows.

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[123] CNPD: Deliberação 2022/140.
https://www.cnpd.pt/umbraco/surface/cnpdDecision/download/122026, (downloaded: 21 December 2022)

Appendix 1: Hackergroups

Supporter of Ukraine		Supporter of Russia	
name	motivation/affiliated	name	motivation/affiliated
Anonymus Group	Anti-Russian activity on a voluntary basis[124]	Ghostwriter	State-sponsored Russian hacking group, government ties and control
IT Army of Ukraine	Volunteer hackers, probably coordinated by the Ukrainian government[125]	Cyber Army of Russia	Cyber army of Russia, targeted activity
Belarusian Cyber Partisans	A patriot, he protests Russia's military action against Ukraine[126]	UNC1151	Belarusian hacker group with Russia
Ghostsec	Hacker group sympathizing with Ukraine, independent anti-terrorist group[127]	APT28	Russian hacker group with government ties
DoomSec	Anti-Russian stance, independent hacker group[128]	Gamaredon	Russian hacker group, probable government background
NB65	Independent hacker group supporting Ukraine[129]	Sandworm	It is run by a Russian hacker group, believed to be run by the Russian military intelligence (GRU).[130]

[124] Tonács, Attila: A színfalak mögött ádáz kibercsata dúl az oroszok és az ukránok között. Portfolio, 2022. 06. 09., https://www.portfolio.hu/global/20220308/a-szinfalak-mogott-adaz-kibercsata-dul-az-oroszok-es-az-ukranok-kozott-531599 (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

[125] Fendorf, Kyle – Miller, Jessie: Tracking Cyber Operations and Actors in the Russia-Ukraine War. 24. March 2022, https://www.cfr.org/blog/tracking-cyber-operations-and-actors-russia-ukraine-war (downloaded: 09 June 2022)

[126] Szabad Európa: Ijesztő az Ukrajna elleni orosz kibertámadások célja: digitális dossziék létrehozása. https://www.szabadeuropa.hu/a/ijeszto-az-ukrajna-elleni-orosz-kibertamadasok-celja-digitalis-dossziek-letrehozasa/31834290.html (downloaded: 10 October 2022)

[127] Vail, Emma: Russia or Ukraine: Hacking groups take sides. 25 February 2022. https://therecord.media/russia-or-ukraine-hacking-groups-take-sides/ (downloaded: 16 June 2022)

[128] Chiki, Deeptendu: Anonymous collective DoomSec has hacked another Russian Government Website, 12 May 2022. https://www.thetechoutlook.com/news/anonymous-collective-doomsec-has-hacked-another-russian-government-website/ (downloaded: 16 June 2022)

[129] Todd, Drew: NB65 Hackers Attacking Russian Orgs in Ukraine Retaliation, 11 April 2022, https://www.secureworld.io/industry-news/nb65-hackers-russia-ukraine (downloaded: 16 June 2022)

[130] Haworth, Jessica: Microsoft report unmasks at least six Russian nation-state actors responsible for cyber-attacks against Ukraine, 28 April 2022, https://portswigger.net/daily-swig/microsoft-report-unmasks-at-least-six-russian-nation-state-actors-responsible-for-cyber-attacks-against-ukraine (downloaded: 10 June 2022)

AnkaRedTeam	Turkish hacker group sympathizing with Ukraine[131]	DEV-0586	It is run by a Russian hacker group, believed to be run by the Russian military intelligence (GRU).
Twisted Panda	Chinese hacker group supporting Ukraine[132]	NOBELIUM	It is controlled by a Russian hacker group, believed to be the Russian civilian intelligence service (SVR).
BlackHawks	Georgian hacker group supporting Ukraine[133]	EnergeticBear	A Russian hacker group, presumably the Russian security service (FSB) irányítja
SHDWSec	Independent hacker group supporting Ukraine[134]	Turla	It is controlled by a Russian hacker group, believed to be the Russian Security Service (FSB).
N3UR0515	Independent hacker group supporting Ukraine[135]	Armageddon	Probable Russian government-linked hacker group[136]
DeepNetAnon	Independent hacker group supporting Ukraine	Killnet	Russian government-backed hacker group[137]

[131] PuckArks: Russian goverment state council was hacked. 9 May 2022, https://twitter.com/PucksReturn/status/1526873279801311233 (downloaded: 16 June 2022)

[132] BARAN, Guru: Twisted Panda: Chinese APT Launch Spy Operation Against Russian Defence Institutes. 24 May 2022, https://gbhackers.com/twisted-panda-chinese-apt/ (downloaded: 16 June 2022)

[133] MURPHY, Hannah: Ukraine war sparks revival of hacktivism. 4 March 2022, https://www.ft.com/content/9ea0dccf-8983-4740-8e8d-82c0213512d4 (downloaded: 16 June 2022)

[134] LAPIENYTĖ, Jurgita: Wargames take out Russian websites, 17 March 2022, https://cybernews.com/cyber-war/wargames-take-out-russian-websites/ (downloaded: 16 June 2022)

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AnonGhost	An independent hacker group sympathetic to Ukraine[139]	UAC-0056	Russian hacker group, probable Russian government background and control.[140]
Anonymous Romania	Romanian hacker group sympathizing with Ukraine	APT29	It is controlled by a Russian hacker group, believed to be the Russian Security Service (FSB).[141]
PuckArks	Anti-Russian stance, independent hacker group[142]	The Red Bandits	A Russian hacker group, probably controlled by some security service
Squad303	Anti-Russian stance, Polish hacker group[143]	Stormous Ransomware	An independent hacker group sympathetic to Russia[144]
Distributed Denial of Secrets	An independent anti-Russian hacker group[145]	Cyber Front Z	Russian group supporting Russia[146]

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v0g3lsec	An independent anti-Russian hacker group[147]	Free Civilian	Hacker group supporting Russia[148]
Cyber Ninja Security Team	An independent anti-Russian hacker group[149]	Digital Cobra Gang	Hacker group supporting Russia[150]
KelvinSecurity	An independent hacker group sympathetic to Ukraine		
GNG	He sympathizes with Ukraine independent hacker group		
Hydra UG	Independent hacker group supporting Ukraine		
Secjuice	Hacker group supporting Ukraine[151]		
Monarch Turkish Hacktivists	Turkish hacker group sympathizing with Ukraine[152]		
Bandera Hackers	An independent hacker group sympathetic to Ukraine[153]		
Hacken Club	International hacker group sympathizing with Ukraine[154]		

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Anonymous Liberland	An independent hacker group sympathetic to Ukraine [155]		
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Appendix 2. Affected companies and institutions

Infrastructure (companies and institutions) in a cyber attack during the Russian-Ukrainian conflict

Cyber attacks supporting the Ukrainian interests	Cyber attacks supporting Russian interests
2022. 07. 04-10., Angarsk Electrolysis Chemical Complex, Russian company, network intrusion	2022. 06. 29., DTEK, Ukrainian energy company, cyber attack
2022. 07. 04-10., Network System Groups, Russian company, data theft	2022. 06. 29., Norwegian Digitalization Agency, Labor Inspection Authority, websites became unavailable
2022. 07. 04-10., Russian State Scientific Technical Library, Network System Groups, Russian institution, data theft	2022. 06. 29., US Federal Tax Payment System malfunction
2022. 07. 04-10., Russian Institute of Astronomy, Russian institution, data theft	2022. 06. 20-26., Exxonmobil and Shell Energy, online service, cyber attack
2022. 07. 04-10., Russian Space Science Institute, Russian institution, data theft	2022. 06. 08., American Freeport LNG liquefaction plant, explosion, cyber attack
2022. 07. 04-10., Russian Federal Research Center for Information and Computational Technologies, Russian institution, data theft	2022. 06. 13-19., Polish oil and gas company PGNIG, DDOS attack
2022. 07. 04-10., QTECH Russia, Russian company, network intrusion	2022. 06. 13-19., Polish oil refining and fuel trading company Orlen, online service outage
2022. 06. 20-26., Embassy of Moscow in Ecuador, mail system hacking and data leakage	2022. 06. 13-19., Prozorro Ukrainian electronic public procurement system, data theft
2022. 06. 23., iRz RZU industrial control system and transformer, Republic of Buryat, causing malfunction	2022. 05. 23-29., ukrinform.gov.ua, official site of Ukrainian government, data theft and data leakage
2022. 06. 13-19., Russian telecommunications companies Vostok, Telecom, Rostelecom, LeaderTelecom, Velnet Telecom, Orc Telecom, disruption and data theft in the context of a coordinated cyber attack	2022. 05. 16-22., Eurovision Song Festival, European-wide popular entertainment event, cyberattack
2022. 06. 16., Gazprom Urengoy gas pipeline, explosion and malfunction	2022. 05. 01-08., German and American government and state administration sites, minor malfunction
2022. 06. 12., looking.ru and vesti.ru Russian state broadcasting internet media platforms, data leak	2022. 05. 01-08., Ukrainian National Research and Information Center for Monitoring International Commodity Markets, database hack
2022. 05. 23-29., Techno Engineering Russian company, network intrusion	2022. 05. 01-08., Ukrainian pension insurance portal (pensia.ua), data theft, malfunction
2022. 05. 23-29., russianrailways.com, website of Russian railway company, DDOS attack	2022. 05. 01-08., attack on Romanian government and bank websites, DDOS attack
2022. 05. 16-22., infsys.ru and multi-sys.ru, sites of the Managed Service Provider, data theft	2022. 05. 01-08., Polish State Railways (PKP), cyber attack

2022. 05. 16-22., Russian State Duma website, network intrusion	2022. 04. 29. Romanian National Cyber Defense Directorate (DNDC), Police (PR), Social Democratic Party (PSD), overload attack
2022. 05. 09-15., Socar Energo Resource, Azerbaijani oil company, data breach	2022. 04. 19-20., DDOS attack against Czech government websites, Czech State Railways, Czech Cyber and Information Security Agency (NÚKIB), and Polish airports
2022. 05. 09-15., Administrative mail system of the Russian city of Achinks, intrusion into the mail system	2022. 04. 13-16., Wind turbine company Nordex, shutdown of turbine control
2022. 05. 09-15., Russian Federal Research Institute of Fisheries and Oceanography, network intrusion and data leakage	2022. 04. 13-16., UN and OSCE websites, cyber attack
2022. 05. 09-15., JSC UMMC Port and Railway Projects Service, a service providing Russian coal transportation	2022. 04. 13-16., Airports: Cologne-Bonn, Bremen, Hamburg, Gatwick; attack on passenger information systems
2022. 05. 09-15., McLanahan branch in Russia, distributor of equipment for the extraction of minerals, intrusion into the mail system	2022. 04. 13-16., US company Devon Energy, ransomware attack
2022. 05. 09-15., Georgian Altinfo TV, channel supporting Russian propaganda, network intrusion	2022. 04. 07-12., website of the Ukrainian Prosecutor General's Office, compromising the mail system
2022. 05. 09-15., Qiwi Bank, Russian financial institution, data breach	2022. 04. 01., European Parliament, phishing activity
2022. 05. 04., Shemeretyevo International Airport Zelenopark shopping center security system, network intrusion, malfunction	2022. 03. 28., Ukrtelekom, DDOS attack with loss of service
2022. 05. 01-08., Qiwi Bank, Russian financial institution, access to customer data, data leakage	2022. 03. 27-28., Polish State and Investment Agency, paih.gov.pl, data deletion, data leakage
2022. 05. 01-08., Russian LLCapital accounting office, mail system access	2022. 03. 27-28., State Post of Ukraine (ukrposhta.ua), access to mail system, phishing activity
2022. 04. 25., CorpMSP system specialized in supporting Russian companies, data theft, data leakage	2022. 03. 07., Ukrainian cyber police site, cyberpolic.gov.ua, DDOS attack
2022. 04. 24-30., Russian Federal Executive Service (FSSP), website became unavailable	2022. 03. 07., Ukrainian Unex bank, service outage due to cyber attack
2022. 04. 24-30., Russian electricity provider (Elektrocentromontazh), mail system access	2022. 03. 07., Ukrnapta, Ukrainian Vodafone, dialog.ua, websites became unavailable
2022. 04. 24-30., Russian Petersburg Social Commercial Bank (PSCB), for customer data való hozzáférés	2022. 03. 06., IRGiT, Polish financial and investment company, network access
2022. 04. 24-30., Russian ALET brokerage company, access to business secrets of fuel and energy companies	2022. 03. 02., Cyber attack against Ukrenergo Kyiv electricity grid, control system
2022. 04. 17-23., Russian tool maker Enerpad hacking mail system	2022. 02. 24., IT system of Kyiv Post, Ukrainian government institutions and Viasat KA-SAT satellite network, malfunctions and shutdowns in IT systems

2022. 04. 17-23., hacking of Russian Accent Capital commercial and real estate investment company, mail system	
2022. 04. 17-23., Russian financial and banking background operations company Tendertech, access to the mail system	
2022. 04. 17-23., Russian interest Neocom Geoservice, an oil and gas engineering company, access to the mail system	
2022. 04. 17-23., Russian Petersburg Social Commercial Bank (PSCB), access to customer database, temporary takeover of system administration	
2022. 04. 13-16., process control (SCADA) system of large Russian companies (RosTelecom, TekonAutomatika), malfunction	
2022. 04. 13-16., Petrol gas stations, website manipulation	
2022. 04. 13-16., RIA Novosti news agency, access to the database of users	
2022. 04. 13-16., Platon motorway toll collection system, DDOS attack	
2022. 04. 13-16., Russian RZD partner transport and logistics company, website conversion, data encryption, data leakage	
2022. 04. 13-16., Technotec, Rosneft, Gazprom Neft, Gazprom Linde Engineering, Continent Express, access to mail system	
2022. 04. 07-12., Russian Ministry of Culture, access to mail system, data leak	
2022. 04. 07-12., Blagoveshchensk city, Tver region administrative mail system, publication of electronic correspondence going back 3-6 years	
2022. 04. 07-12., SovComBank, access to database	
2022. 04. 07-12., Petrofort business center in Saint Petersburg, Aerogas engineering company, Forest logging company, large-scale email leak	
2022. 04. 06., Kremlin CCTV system, access to the control system	
2022. 04. 02-06., Gazprom website, modification of website content	
2022. 04. 02-06., Russian Continent Express tour operator, access to database	
2022. 04. 02-06., Belarusian ST Bank, Zepter Bank, Domovia real estate dealer, email and database access	
2022. 03. 30.-04. 01., Russian MashOil, Thozis Corp investor, Capital Legal Services, Mosekspertiza consulting company, publication of email contents	

2022. 03. 30.-04. 01., Russian MashOil, Thozis Corp investor, Capital Legal Services, Mosekspertiza consulting company, publication of email contents	
2022. 03. 27-28., Russian MashOil, construction company RostProek, email and database access	
2022. 03. 24-26., control system of the port of St. Petersburg, public lighting control system of the city of Rjazany, network intrusion, slight malfunction	
2022. 03. 21., Russian social media site VKontakte, access to personal data, distribution of fake messages	
2022. 03. 17-23., Russian Emergency Situation Ministry, website modification	
2022. 03. 17-23., Russian supplier company Almaz-Antey, Gazprom, Nuclear Research Institute of the Academy of Sciences, website hacking and network access	
2022. 03. 19., Nestlé's group operating in Russia, cyber attack	
2022. 03. 08., Russian Post (Pochta Rossii), database access, data leakage	
2022. 03. 08., Antonov Airlines emergency system, network intrusion, system data modification	
2022. 03. 08., Russian Applied Electrodynamics Science Center, database hacking	
2022. 03. 07., Russian Kosmo Lab LLD, DSTRAS (Development of Territories of the Russian Academy of Sciences) and CTM (Railway Logistics and Foreign Trade Company) network penetration	
2022. 03. 07., Beeline Russia and X5 trade and food supply group, data theft	
2022. 03. 06., Wink and Ivi streaming service provider, network system intrusion	
2022. 03. 06., Intrusion into the control system of the water supplier responsible for SCADA water supply	
2022. 03. 05., Russian Federal Security Service, website blocking	
2022. 03. 05., Russian postal service provider Delans, Altai State Pedagogical University, intrusion into the network system	
2022. 03. 01., Scanex.ru, Satellite Data Processing Company, database access, data leakage	
2022. 03. 01., passport application online service of the Russian Ministry of Internal Affairs, temporary takeover of system administrator rights	

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2022. 03. 01., Russian Ministry of Education, edu.ru websites, service outage due to cyber attack	
2022. 02. 28., Belarusian government websites (Ministry of Internal Affairs, Armed Forces), DDOS attack	
2022. 02. 26., shutdown of websites of Russian government institutions (Kremlin, Ministry of Defense, etc.), DDOS attack	

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EXAMINING THE RELATIONSHIPS AND LEGAL REGULATION OF INFORMATION SECURITY AND DATA PROTECTION, WITH PARTICULAR REGARD TO THE COMMUNICATION HABITS OF YOUNG PEOPLE

Abstract

In this scientific article, we would like to explore the legal tools and systems of tools that have been developed and are constantly being developed in response to the information security and data protection challenges of young people and which represent a response to the challenges of the present age.

We will examine what international information security-related events have taken place and, in parallel, what international and domestic legal instruments and instrument systems have been developed and are available to protect the data of primary school-aged youth.

Keywords: information security, data protection, development history of information security, legal regulation of information security, information security milestones, young people of elementary school age

Information protection and data protection

As defined by UNICEF, *"Millions of children around the world are spending more and more time online. While the digital environment greatly enables and improves children's access to high-quality and inclusive education, including distance and mobile learning, and access to information, children's increased exposure to the digital environment also poses risks and challenges. Harmful misinformation, child sexual exploitation and harassment, online bullying and violence, and mental health issues threaten the health, safety and rights of children."*[3]

A part of our future is always in the „hands" of the next generation. It does not matter what kind of environmental and socialization influences the younger generation has during its development. *„On the one hand, the protection of personal data is the right of every living person, regardless of age – as the dangers also reach –, on the other hand, the age limit for the use of digital devices is sliding down more and more."*[4] The digital environment surrounding the current young generation hides

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[3]   Protecting the rights of every child in the digital environment July 5, 2022. https://hlpf.un.org/2022/programme/protecting-the-rights-of-every-child-in-the-digital-environment-public -and-private (downloaded: 27 February 2023)
[4]   PÉTERFALVI, Attila Dr. President of the National Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority (NAIH): Key to the world of the net – NAIH's study on the safe and legal use of the Internet by children, 2018, p. 1, https://www.naih.hu/files/kulcsocska-a-net-vilagahoz-2018-01-29.pdf (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

countless challenges. This generation already grows up with the use of digital devices, but the use of technology does not necessarily go hand in hand with the conscious use of devices. The number of young people and the prevalence of digital devices means that the issue of information security and data protection must also be addressed at the institutional level, because every data protection incident is also an information security incident. However, it should be noted that some of the information security incidents – if they affect personal data – are classified as data protection incidents.

At the institutional level, cooperation can be observed in the context of the protection of information and the protection of personal data. The Data Protection Commissioner of the European Union reported in his information EDPS/2022/27 issued on November 30, 2022 that the European Union Cyber Security Agency (ENISA) and the European Union Data Protection Commissioner signed a strategic agreement in which the framework of cooperation, including cyber security, is summarized in 20 points , on the legal regulatory options for the main current technological innovations and future challenges related to the protection of privacy and data protection.[5]

Research methodology tools for writing this study

In the writing of this study, some research principles were particularly emphasized. Given that the „Investigation of information security among young people of primary school age" is one of today's current and relevant topics, during the writing of the study we tried to enforce the principle of objectivity, to examine the response system of the relevant legal instruments to the problem based on the available data. All this starting from a kind of historical approach.

The examination of the effective state was preceded by historical research, during which we examined the incidents[6] associated with the development of information technology, and in this study, we examine the legal regulatory environment and the reaction of some international organizations on the subject.

In the processing of the topic, great emphasis was placed on incorporating the methods of empirical research into the adaptation of the topic. Based on the request, two specialists - who can be regarded as experts in the field - were approached during an in-depth interview[7], and in the process of processing the topic, data appearing and available on numerous relevant institutional internet portals, such as questionnaire research, statistics and scientific articles, were analyzed. The use of secondary data was based on data from the Central Statistical Office and the National Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority. All of this contributed to the scientific foundation of the research on which this article is based.

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[5] Pairing up Cybersecurity and Data Protection efforts: EDPS and ENISA sign Memorandum of Understanding EDPS/2022/27 Brussels, 30 November 2022

[6] SZŰCS, Endre Dr. – ZÁHONYI, Lajos: Historical development of information security - Milestones, events and answers - Security Science Review 2021 II. year 3 numbers

[7] Interview subjects: Dr. Katalin Baracsi LL.M infocommunications lawyer and Dr. Attila Péterfalvi, president of the National Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority (NAIH)

Examining the situation of young people

Today's primary school age group will enter the labor market in approximately 10-15 years. When the most populous 40-50-year-old working age group living today will be in their 60s. Our future is closely related to the socialization of this age group. We owe them a responsibility, so that when the time comes, they will also owe us a responsibility. Part of our responsibility is to be able to convey to them appropriate answers to the challenges generated by digital technology. One way to do this is to try to bring today's information security and data protection challenges into the framework of legal regulations. Legal protection, the creation of an appropriate legal environment that responds to incidents, and the improvement of the security measures of the school infrastructure are also of paramount importance from the point of view of the personal data protection of young people and teachers and network security.

According to the latest education data available on the website of the Central Statistical Office (KSH), *„In Hungary, based on preliminary data for the 2022/2023 school year, 1 million 852 thousand people participate in various levels of public education, vocational training and higher education. 719,000 of them study in primary school."*[8,9] Also based on the data available on the KSH website, 91.4 percent of Hungarian households have internet access.[10] This means that this age group's encounter with the Internet and its information security challenges is practically inevitable. If, as the leading generation, we do not take care of the information security protection of young people and "let go" and let them go their own way in the absence of knowledge and protection, we expose them to enormous danger.

Today's 7–14-year-olds are already growing up with the daily presence of the Internet.[11,12] During everyday Internet use, this age group is more exposed to information security threats, among which we have identified the following challenges:

- Online bullying: Online bullying, i.e., cyberbullying, is one of the challenges that young people of primary school age often face. Due to the widespread use of social media and communication technologies, young people of elementary school age can easily become victims of online bullying.

- Data Protection: Elementary school-age youth share data during their online activities that can be used by online criminals or other malicious individuals. Lack of data protection makes them vulnerable to data breaches. Free online content, movies, games and applications, which often have limited data protection regulations, deserve special attention. Young people of primary school age are easily exposed to inappropriate content, data collection and manipulation, which can have a harmful effect on their lives.

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8   https://www.ksh.hu/s/kiadvanyok/oktatasi-adatok-2022-2023-elozetes-adatok/index.html (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

9   https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/oktat/oktatas2021e/index.html (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

10 https://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/haViewer.jsp (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

11 SZIKLAY, Júlia (Ed.): Key to the world of the net! – NAIH's study on the safe and legal use of the Internet by children, 2013 https://www.naih.hu/files/Kulcs_anv_v2.pdf (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

12 https://www.naih.hu/files/2013-projektfuzet-internet.pdf (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- Cybersecurity threats: young people of primary school age may face threats such as viruses, malware[13], phishing[14], which allow online attackers to infect or steal young people's personal data during the Internet and online activities.

The most-known youth-related events of recent years

The same information security problems and incidents appear not only in Hungary, but - through the use of the global application - at the international level at the same time. Perhaps the best-known information security incidents of recent years, which affected young people of primary school age:

- Facebook privacy scandal (2018): A company called Cambridge Analytica used Facebook data to target people to manipulate their consumer habits.[15]

- Hacking Fortnite Accounts (2019): Fortnite is one of the most popular games available online today, played by millions of kids. In 2019, hundreds of thousands of Fortnite accounts were hacked and used for advertising purposes. Many youth accounts were also affected during the incident. At the same time, it was also revealed that some 14-year-olds were themselves part of the hacker network;[16,17]

- YouTube child-friendly channels scandal (2019): During an investigation by the Federal Trade Commission (FTC, USA), it was found that YouTube does not adequately protect the personal data of children, and advertisements on child-friendly channels appeared. During the incident, the personal data of many primary school-age youths was compromised;[18,19]

- TikTok problems: One of the most popular applications among young people, TikTok has faced many privacy problems in recent years. One of the biggest issues was that the app collected personal data such as users' location, device ID and related internet activities. In 2020, an investigation into TikTok's privacy practices began in the United States. The investigation revealed that the application collects users' personal data, including the device ID, related Internet activities, and the user's location. However, data was not necessarily stored securely by the app, and users were not adequately informed about data collection and privacy practices.[20] Since then, the

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[13] Malware – malicious software, an abbreviation of the English term malicious software.

[14] According to some theories, the word phishing was formed from the combination of three English words: password, harvesting and fishing.

[15] https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/03/19/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-cambridge-analytica-facebook-debacle/ (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

[16] https://www.gamestar.hu/hir/epic-games-fortnite-adatlopas-per-266899.html (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

[17] https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46624136 (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

[18] https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/09/google-youtube-will-pay-record-170-million-alleged-violations-childrens-privacy-law (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

[19] https://edition.cnn.com/2020/07/09/tech/tiktok-security-threat/index.html (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

[20] https://www.nytimes.com/2019/11/01/technology/tiktok-national-security-review.html (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

application's data protection practices and potential violations have been investigated in several countries, including Hungary;

- Zoom video conferencing security issues (2020): The use of Zoom video conferencing application has increased significantly due to online education due to the coronavirus epidemic. During the use of the program, security problems appeared in many school video conferences, and the attackers disrupted classes.[21,22,23,24]

The cases listed above, as well as the selected examples, were perhaps the most international information security incidents that affected the scope of personal data. It is important to note that information security incidents affecting elementary school-aged youth can be numerous, and quite a few of them do not necessarily come to the attention of the media, so less information is available about them.

Reported data protection incidents in Hungary

Data protection incidents are also classified as information security incidents, however, some of the information security incidents – if they affect personal data – are classified as data protection incidents. We examined the data and reports of the National Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority.

Figure 1: Evolution of the number of NDPFIA incidents[25]
(Author's own edition)

21 FBI Warns of Teleconferencing and Online Classroom Hijacking During COVID-19 Pandemic. 30 March 2020
22 https://projects.iq.harvard.edu/user-services/faq/what-zoom-bombing (downloaded: 27 February 2023)
23 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/technology/zoom-security-privacy-issues (downloaded: 27 February 2023)
24 https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/business/zoom-video-privacy-security-coronavirus.html (downloaded: 27 February 2023)
25 Source of the data: Report of the National Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority on its activities in 2022 B/2589, Budapest, 2023. p. 88

Based on the data of the National Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority (NDPFIA), it can be established that in 2022 the Authority received a total of 627 data protection incident reports. This represents an increase of about 5% compared to the previous year's number of 594 units.


Figure 2: Types of incidents[26]
(Author's own edition)

In 2021, a significant number of incidents (77%) resulted in a breach of confidentiality. NDPFIA's statistics show that today's biggest information security challenge is the protection of data from unauthorized use, i.e., the lack of enforcement of the "confidentiality" principle. Confidentiality: *"the property of the electronic information system that the data and information stored in it can only be known, used and disposed of by those entitled to it and only according to their level of authorization."*[27]

Investigation of events affecting information security and legal regulations

One of the possible methods of strengthening data security and information security is to create laws, relevant regulations, as well as recommendations and guidelines under the legislative authority. The occurrence of information security

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[26] Source of the data: Report of the National Data Protection and Freedom of Information Authority on its activities in 2021 B/18074, Budapest, 2022 p. 88
[27] Act L of 2013 on the electronic information security of state and local government bodies § 1 CLV of 2009. act on the protection of classified data § 2

incidents can partly be attributed to the lack of legal regulations or their inadequate compliance.

These laws and regulations generally identify information security risks, prescribe preventive measures and recommend responses to incidents. Information security incidents can be very diverse, so legislation must also be broad in order to be able to respond effectively to various situations. In the following two tables, I summarize, in chronological order, the most important milestones that appeared in relation to the examined topic.

Information security events, marking the most important milestones affecting young people:

Year	IT information security events
1969	Advanced Research Projects Agency Network (ARPANET) is the founding of the predecessor of the Internet
1971	Sending the first email
1984-1991	TRW Data Theft - An investigation by the US Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) revealed that a US government company secretly collected data on millions of US citizens.
1989-1991	Emergence of the World Wide Web (www.)
1990	AT&T data breach - Bell Labs (AT&T's research arm) lost over 300,000 personal data when its systems were hacked.
1991	Appearance of first websites.
1993	Appearance of the first web browser (Mosaic) (April 22, 1993)
1993-1994	The appearance of the first search engines (Archie, Veronica, Excite).
1995	The appearance of the first online retailers (Amazon, Ebay).
1995	Citibank data theft - the bank lost more than 200,000 personal data when cybercriminals attacked its system.
1998	Founding of Google Search
1999	eBay data theft - the personal data of more than 4 million users of the online trading site fell into unauthorized hands.
2000	Emergence of Google AdWords - AdWords allowed advertisers to display targeted advertisements in Google search results.
2001	Starting Wikipedia
2004	Founding of Facebook
2005	Launch of YouTube

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2007	The appearance of the iPhone - the smartphone developed by Apple brought about a significant change in mobile technology and paved the way for applications and mobile payments.
2008	The rise of Cloud Computing - Amazon Web Services is the launch of the first major cloud-based service.
2009	The start of Bitcoin
2010	Spread of mobile internet – The spread of smartphones and tablets has significantly increased the use of mobile internet and the majority of internet users now access the internet via a mobile device.
2010	Launching Instagram
2011	Start Snapchat
2011	Launch Facebook Messenger
2016	Pokémon Go - The game connected to smartphones has gained huge popularity, and augmented reality (AR) technology has opened up a new dimension for online gaming.
2020	The impact of the Covid-19 pandemic has brought significant changes in all areas of life. The Internet and digital technology have made work, education, entertainment and communication even more important.
2020	The emergence of 5G networks will enable higher data transfer speeds and more reliable connections, which will have a significant impact on the use of the Internet.
2020-2021	The spread of blockchain technology - blockchain technology offers new opportunities in the field of data security and data protection and promotes the development of many new industries.
2022-2023	The emergence of ChatGPT and other artificial intelligences - the development and application of AI is becoming increasingly important in the field of digital technology and offers many new opportunities in Internet services.

Table 1: International milestones in the history of information technology that had an impact on the issue of information security and data protection regulation
(Author's own edition)

Legal regulatory milestones:

Year	Legal regulation of information security and data protection (international)
1980	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) Guidelines on Privacy and the Transboundary Flow of Personal Data (1980)
1981	Council of Europe Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to the Processing of Personal Data by Machine
1983	The German Constitutional Court's census judgment (Volkszahlungsurteil), which explicitly states that an information situation in which the citizen cannot know is incompatible with the protection of the individual's general right to privacy, including the right to self-determination of information and the democratic social order, as well as the legal order that serves it. who, when and for what purpose have information about it"
1992	Act No. LXIII of 1992 on the protection of personal data and the disclosure of data of public interest - Hungary
1995	DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and the freedom of such data about its flow
2005	Act No. XC of 2004. on Electronic Freedom of Information
2011	Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council on combating the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation and child pornography of children and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA
2011	Act No. CXII of 2010, law on information self-determination and freedom of information - Hungary
2016	REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 (GDPR) OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free flow of such data, and on the repeal of Regulation 95/46/EC (General Data Protection Regulation)
2016	DIRECTIVE (EU) 2016/680 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the protection of natural persons and the free flow of such data with regard to the processing of personal data by the competent authorities for the purpose of preventing, investigating, detecting, prosecuting or enforcing criminal sanctions, and on the repeal of Council Framework Decision 2008/977/IB

2018	GDPR comes into effect - The General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) introduced by the European Union has significantly strengthened data protection rights and has impacted businesses worldwide.
2021	European Commission - EU Children's Rights Strategy
2022	REGULATION OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL on the establishment of rules for the prevention of sexual abuse of children and the fight against it (Proposal)
2022-2023	On the cooperation between the European Union Cyber Security Agency (ENISA) and the Data Protection Commissioner of the European Union

Table 2: International and domestic milestones of the main legal regulation of information protection and data protection
(Author's own edition)

In the table, we have highlighted the years that specifically deal with the regulation of the situation of children and juveniles. It should be noted that the regulations issued by the European Union affect all EU citizens, including minors and children.[28,29,30] Legal regulatory frameworks that can answer the challenges of the current digital age are constantly being sought for information security incidents and effects generated by the development of IT.

Summary

"Everyone has the right to digital security. The law helps and protects us at the same time, even from ourselves,"[31] says internet lawyer Dr. Katalin Baracsi, who is herself a champion of the spread of conscious internet use and represents the safe internet awareness programs that, among other things, serve to get to know the legal framework as much as possible.

There are many laws and measures in place to protect the information security of primary school-aged youth. The information protection and data protection legal standards that regulate and protect the handling of personal data in the European Union and Hungary exist, are modified and are constantly being developed. These data protection laws try to provide the framework on the basis of which data can be secure and protected against unauthorized access and data breaches.

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28 https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/internet-telecoms/data-protection-online-privacy/index_hu.htm
29 Ibid.
30 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/ (downloaded: 27 February 2023)
31 Source: The interview conducted by the authors with internet lawyer Dr. Katalin Baracsi 19 May 2022

However, legal regulations alone are not sufficient to manage information security risks and prevent incidents. Measures and rules must be followed, and adaptation and innovation are constantly necessary to improve the effectiveness of legislation. In addition, it is necessary to start as many educational programs as possible, which help the conscious use of the Internet. Therefore, maintaining information security requires constant attention and commitment from all relevant actors, including legislators, service providers and end-users alike. Legislation and countermeasures that serve to protect the online safety of young people and children must be constantly changing and must periodically respond to the new challenges and dangers generated and dictated by the IT world. Of course, all of this does not necessarily mean the creation of new legislation, but it may be sufficient to raise awareness and possibly supplement and expand the application of the existing regulations.

In addition to legal regulations, there are educational and educational programs that help institutions and young people of primary school age prepare for information security challenges. Educational programs should teach young people about the importance of internet safety, their legal protection, and enlighten them about data protection and online security risks, so that they are protected against online harassment or cybercrime as conscious digital device users.

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Internet links:

- https://www.ksh.hu/docs/hun/xftp/idoszaki/oktat/oktatas2021e/index.html (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://www.ksh.hu/s/kiadvanyok/oktatasi-adatok-2022-2023-elozetes-adatok/index.html (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://statinfo.ksh.hu/Statinfo/haViewer.jsp (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://europa.eu/youreurope/citizens/consumers/internet-telecoms/data-protection-online-privacy/index_hu.htm (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://www.europarl.europa.eu/ftu/ (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/politics/wp/2018/03/19/everything-you-need-to-know-about-the-cambridge-analytica-facebook-debacle (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://www.gamestar.hu/hir/epic-games-fortnite-adatlopas-per-266899.html (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-46624136 (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://www.ftc.gov/news-events/news/press-releases/2019/09/google-youtube-will-pay-record-170-million-alleged-violations-childrens-privacy-law (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/02/technology/zoom-security-privacy-issues (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://www.nytimes.com/2020/04/08/business/zoom-video-privacy-security-coronavirus.html (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://www.naih.hu/files/2013-projektfuzet-internet.pdf (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://www.naih.hu/files/kulcsocska-a-net-vilagahoz-2018-01-29.pdf (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

- https://hlpf.un.org/2022/programme/protecting-the-rights-of-every-child-in-the-digital-environment-public-and-private (downloaded: 27 February 2023)

Legal regulations:

- Law No. CXI of 2011 on the Commissioner of Fundamental Rights

- Law No. XC of 2017 on criminal procedure

- GDPR, general data protection regulation: adopted by the European Parliament and the Council (EU) 2016/679 on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free flow of such data and on the repeal of Directive 95/46/EC

- Law No. CLV of 2009 on the protection of classified data

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- Act L of 2013 on the electronic information security of state and local government bodies § 1 CLV of 2009. act on the protection of classified data § 2

- DIRECTIVE 95/46/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL (24 October 1995) on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data

- DIRECTIVE 2000/31/EC OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL (June 8, 2000) on certain legal aspects of information society-related services, in particular electronic commerce, in the internal market („Electronic Commerce Directive")

- REGULATION (EU) 2016/679 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL (April 27, 2016) on the protection of natural persons with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free flow of such data, and on the repeal of Regulation 95/46/EC (general data protection regulation)

- Law No. LXIII of 1992 on the protection of personal data and the disclosure of data of public interest

- Act No. XC of 2005 on electronic freedom of information

- Law No. CXII of 2011 on the right to information self-determination and freedom of information

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- Directive 2011/93/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council (December 13, 2011) on combating the sexual abuse, sexual exploitation and child pornography of children and replacing Council Framework Decision 2004/68/JHA

- COMMUNICATION FROM THE COMMISSION TO THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, THE COUNCIL, THE EUROPEAN ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE AND THE COMMITTEE OF THE REGIONS - EU Children's Rights Strategy, Brussels 2021

- Regulation of the EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT and COUNCIL establishing rules for preventing and combating sexual abuse of children, Brussels 2022, proposal

- Guidance on security measures for the processing of personal data - Article 22 of Regulation (EC) No. 45/2001

- Information EDPS/2022/27 of the European Union Data Protection Commissioner issued on November 30, 2022

- Memorandum of Understanding on increasing cooperation between the European Data Protection Supervisor and the European Union Agency for Cybersecurity, Brussels, 30 November 2022

- Pairing up Cybersecurity and Data Protection efforts: EDPS and ENISA sign Memorandum of Understanding, Brussels, 30 November 2022

ANDONOV ALEKSANDAR MA

YUGOSLAV–TURKISH RELATIONS (1935-1938)

Abstract

The relations between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians (1918-1929) and later Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Turkey – as republic from 1923 – impersonated the Versailles system of international policy, established after the First World War. The challenges that were standing in front of Yugoslavia and Turkey were numerous. The two states were newly formed as a result of the changes that happened after the First World War. The newly formed states Kingdom of Yugoslavia and Turkey as Republic faced many challenges, and throughout their collaboration, they were trying to surpass the problems that they had. The main risk that Yugoslavia and Turkey faced in the thirties years of the 20th century was the positioning before the Second World War. The problems were mainly common, which induced Ankara and Belgrade to cooperate closer.

Keywords: Yugoslavia, Turkey, Versailles, First World War, Second World War

Introduction

In this research, we will observe the relations between Turkey and Yugoslavia in the thirties years of the 20th century. The relations between the two countries represent the new international system, established after the First World War at the Versailles conference. The Versailles system was predicted to maintain the peace in Europe, but since the peace treaty had been concluded, it was exposed to revisionism tendencies. Those tendencies were especially great burden for the existence of Yugoslavia, because the country was a product of the newly established system. Yugoslavia was surrounded with countries that doubted its existence and had territorial pretenses. This situation made even the interior political situation bad. Unlike Yugoslavia, Turkey faced with even a bigger challenge, its existence. As a country that lost the war, Ottoman Empire with the Treaty of Sèvres was predicted to be small country in Asia. Turkish nationalist forces led by Mustafa Kemal Pasha opposed the Treaty of Sevres and the Turkish people succeeded in changing the first decision of the winning countries in the war, and after a three-year war with Greece, Turks managed to get a much better Treaty signed in Lausanne.

The relations between Yugoslavia and Turkey were marginalized during the first years after the First World War. The main problem was the Sevres Treaty that Belgrade refused to sign, due to the clause in which Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenians were obliged as a country that succeeded territories from the Ottoman Empire to participate in the disbursement of the Ottoman foreign debt.[1] For Belgrade, after the First World War, this was unacceptable, due to the difficult economic

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[1] Yugoslavia was obliged to pay 5,25% from the debt or around 5 million Turk Liras.

situation. The situation started changing after Mussolini had taken over the power in Italy. Mussolini started to realize his plans for Italy, and Yugoslavia was exposed to a great pressure. Also the change of government in Bulgaria and the fall of Stambolijski in 1923, Yugoslavia faced new challenge in Macedonia, where the organization IMRO was organizing military actions in Macedonia. The interior situation and the clear dissatisfaction of the Croats, Slovenes and Macedonians in Yugoslavia, made King Alexander Karadjordjevic to seek for allies. In this purpose in 1925, Belgrade and Ankara signed a bilateral treaty in which normal diplomatic relations were established.[2] The treaty was signed in October 1925, and it was ratified in 1926. After it, the relations were intensive in many spheres. The main contract was followed by several agreements and conventions that related to the joint export of opium to the world market. This was followed by a treaty on friendship and non-aggression, a treaty on judicial discussion, arbitration and conciliation, a trade and clearing agreement, a convention on extradition, as well as an agreement on the regulation of mutual claims. During the signing of the agreement on the joint export of opium, a central opium bureau with headquarters in Istanbul was created, and this organization represented the main mechanism for the implementation of the agreement. The rapprochement of Yugoslavia and Turkey was also reflected in the official state visits that took place at the highest level. During his visit to Turkey, King Alexander I built a fairly confidential relationship with Mustafa Kemal, in 1931. Tthe second conference of the Balkan Pact was held in Istanbul and Ankara, and before signing the agreement in 1933, King Alexander visited Istanbul again.

On the other hand, Turkey was also facing interior and foreign problems. With the establishment of the republican system, the backward Ottoman society was changing rapidly, but those changes were hard for the Turks. The interior changes were accompanied with changes in the foreign policy as well. Mustafa Kemal needed much better relations with the countries that won the First World War, and without doubts Ankara was seeing Belgrade as an opportunity to get closer to France and Great Britain. Mustafa Kemal also intended to reduce the influence of Soviet Union that helped his movement, during the war with Greece. Using this as an opportunity to increase the geopolitical role of his country in the eyes of the winners, who were trying to stop the expansion of communism everywhere in the world. The main problems that Mustafa Kemal had to solve were the low level of industrialization, the demography problems and the obtaining of new credits for economic development. As Turkey was involved in wars from 1911 until 1923, many Turks died, also with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire a lot of Turks were living outside the new Turkish republic. The main goals[3] of the politics of Mustafa Kemal were to integrate the Turkish Republic into the Versailles system, established after the First World War. With the integration of Turkey into the new international system, Mustafa Kemal wanted to provide credits with the purpose of expanding industry, renewing the army and moving the Turks inside the borders of the Republic. Among those goals, the newly formed Turkish Republic wanted to establish stable ties with all western countries, to restore relations with the Arab and Islamic countries, to achieve stable and fair relations with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, to solve the problem with Italy that controlled the islands in the Aegean Sea, as well as to solve problems with

[2]   Службене новине Краљевине СХС, 1926, бр. 35 - X
[3]   FROMKIN, D.: A Peace to end all peace: Creating the Modern Middle East 1914-1922. Henry Holt & Co, 1989, pp. 555-561.

France, regarding its mandate in Syria and Southeastern Turkey, according to the Sykes-Picot treaty.[4]

1. Bilateral relations between Ankara and Belgrade

During the entire period between the two wars, Yugoslav embassies in Turkey were very active. This activity was manifested in several areas, such as economy, politics, military cooperation and cultural cooperation. There were three Yugoslav embassies in the Republic of Turkey: in Izmir, Istanbul and Ankara. The embassies were located in these cities because Ankara was the capital and where the entire official political life of Turkey took place; Istanbul was the city of trade, culture and its indisputable role and symbolism in international relations; and Izmir as the largest port in which great trade took place. After the assassination of King Alexander I Karadjordjevic, Yugoslavia found itself in a very difficult international position.[5] This difficult situation, among other things, arose as a result of the long-term instability of Yugoslavia's internal politics. After the assassination of the king, the national issues that the king had failed to resolve during his lifetime escalated. After the disappearance of his royal and personal authority, Croatian politicians had a more favorable position to act according to their convictions and goals. Former external partners and traditional allies, due to the weak reaction regarding the assassination, caused serious instability in relation to Yugoslavia's international position and Yugoslavia's trust in them. The Yugoslav consulate sent a report in which were described the reactions of the Turkish media and politicians about the assassination. The Turkish republic decidedly condemned the Marseilles assassination. Mustafa Kemal had a close relationship with King Alexander, and their friendship resulted in the creation of the Balkan Pact, which is precisely why pitiful reactions to the assassination were expected.[6] In 1935, the Turkish republic was occupied with the Syrian question and the question about Dardanelles and Bosporus. The Turkish government wanted to retake a part of the Syrian territory that was populated with Turks and to regain control over the straits. In order to achieve these goals, the cooperation with the Yugoslavian government was recommended.

The Ministry of Education of Turkey formed a commission, composed of local and foreign experts who were given the task of collecting archival material from all mosques and churches and storing it in the new library built near Suleymaniye in Istanbul, for the construction of which, the state took out a loan. The commission collected over 70,000 documents in Ottoman, Persian and Arabic languages, of which about 20,000 related to Balkan history.[7] In his report, the Yugoslav deputy suggested to Belgrade that they send a request to the Turkish government to accept Yugoslav experts who will examine this material. The Yugoslav Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, Milan Stojadinović, agreed with this proposal and a commission was formed, which received permission from the Turkish authorities to investigate the archives until 1878. This very important commission was composed of: Stanoje Stanojevic, member of the Serbian Royal Academy and professor at the University of

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4   AKŞIN, A.: Atatürk'ün Dış Politika İlkeleri ve Diplomasisi,. 1966, pp. 376-381.
5   CARR, E. H.: The twenty years' crisis 1919-1939: an introduction to the study of international relations. Macmillan & Co, London, 1958, pp. 198-206
6   AJ-370-7-302.
7   AJ- 370-3-68.

Belgrade, Fehmi Bajraktarević, founder of the Department of Oriental Studies at the Faculty of Philology in Belgrade, and Glisa Elezovic, who worked at the historical institute in Novi Sad. The members of the commission were doctors of historical sciences and connoisseurs of oriental languages, the last member of the commission was General Vojislav Vukotic, director of the military museum in Belgrade.[8] The archive materials examined in the following years were of great importance for the historiography on the Balkans.

In 1936, the Military Envoy of Turkey in Belgrade, Lt. Col. Muamer Hamdi, submitted a request for a commission composed of Turkish authorities to obtain permission from Yugoslavia to find and exhume the bodies of Turkish soldiers who died on the territory of Yugoslavia, in all past wars. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs allowed the Turkish commission to carry out its investigations, finds and excavations.[9]

During October, the President of the Council of Ministers, Milan Stojadinović, received an official invitation to visit Turkey, but he replied that – due to the complex situation with Italy – ,he had to be present in Belgrade.[10] During 1936, the Yugoslav government started to make the relations between the two countries closer. This action was in harmony with the new policy of Belgrade afterwards the assassination of Alexander I. The new policy proclaimed by Stojadinović was similar to Mustafa Kemal's concept; neutrality and equal relations with the powerful countries. As a sign of the actions of Yugoslavia to get closer to Turkey, Stojadinović ordered from the consulate a list of the leading politicians in Turkey and their biographies, which meant that Belgrade was interested to know the situation in Turkey better. Also the Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent and publicist to make pamphlets about Yugoslavia in order to introduce Yugoslavia to the Turkish people.[11]

Through cultural manifestations and cultural exchanges, cooperation and mutual connection intensified. As a part of cultural manifestations „40 nights in Istanbul", the Yugoslav cultural and artistic society was a guest, and Mustafa Kemal was also present at the manifestation, who expressed special respect to the Yugoslav society and played a dance with the dancers.[12]

Yugoslavia actively followed the Turkish foreign policy for a number of reasons, and the Yugoslav embassy in Ankara played an active role in that, which followed Turkey's activities on the international scene, and especially the creation of Turkish policy, according to major events in world politics and changes in the Versailles system. There is no doubt that Yugoslavia often harmonized its Regional-Balkan policy with the policy of Turkey, expecting Turkish support in return, especially within the framework of the Balkan Agreement and in relations with Italy. At the same time, Yugoslavia could make an assessment of the influence of France and England through analysis and information about Turkey's foreign policy, in relations with these countries. It is also interesting that Yugoslavia took an active interest in Turkey's foreign policy, regarding the straits and the Syrian issue, which is quite normal, because Yugoslavia had its own, above all, trade interests in the Dardanelles and the

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[8]   AJ- 370-3-91.
[9]   AJ- 370-7-319.
[10]   AJ- 370-7-327.
[11]   AJ- 370-3-257.
[12]   AJ- 370-3-214.

Bosporus, and regarding Syria, it assessed the rivalry and the relations between Great Britain and France in the Middle East, which would affect their policy towards Yugoslavia.[13]

The first official visit that took place between Turkish and Yugoslav politicians was in 1933, when King Aleksandar Karađorđević visited Turkey with Queen Maria and had a warm reception by Turkish President Mustafa Kemal. During this visit, there was also talks on the creation of the Balkan Agreement, which was concluded a year later. The visits realized between 1935 and 1938 had much greater significance, because each of them had a concrete goal, such as: economic cooperation, cooperation within the Balkan Agreement, or agreeing to sign the convention on the emigration of Muslims from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. During the visit of the Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Turkey, Numan Menemenoğlu to Belgrade on April 23, 1936, a meeting was held with the president of the royal Yugoslav government, Milan Stojadinović, which was also attended by the Turkish representative in Belgrade, Haider. After the meeting, Milan Stojadinović made a statement to the press, in which he emphasized that he was glad to receive a high-ranking official of the Turkish government and stressed Yugoslavia's support for Turkey regarding the Montreux Convention and the Straits.[14] During October 1936, the Prime Minister of Yugoslavia, Milan Stojadinović, visited Turkey. This visit was a central event between 1935 and 1938 in Yugoslav-Turkish relations, its importance lies in the very results of the visit and the direct talks that began on the conventions of the emigration of Muslims from Yugoslavia and the greatest rapprochement between Ankara and Belgrade. During this visit, Milan Stojadinović and Mustafa Kemal had a meeting, in which they were discussing the foreign policies of Belgrade and Ankara towards Balkan countries and the Western countries. The stances were very similar, due to the main fear of the both countries; a possible new war in which both leaders wanted neutrality for their countries. During his staying, Stojadinović attended a ceremony on which Soviet diplomats were present and they asked the Yugoslavian prime minister about his intention to recognize Soviet Union. The same advice was given by Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Turk minister of foreign affairs that insisted on establishing relations between Moscow and Belgrade. The entire visit to Turkey was an indication of healthy relations and the great similarity between Turkey and Yugoslavia in foreign policy. The principles of neutrality, economic prosperity and maintenance of internal peace were the goals of both Ankara and Belgrade.[15]

At the beginning of 1937, Aras visited Belgrade, and on February 5, he met with Stojadinović. They had a long and cordial conversation, Aras informed Stojadinović about the visit to Geneva and the meetings in Milan with the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs Count Ciano. The favorable relationship of both countries with Britain was established, and the treaty between Italy and England was welcomed, as well as the settlement of the relations of Yugoslavia and Turkey with Italy, and therefore, with all the Balkan countries. Stojadinović expressed satisfaction that an agreement was reached between Turkey and France regarding Syria. They agreed that at the next

[13] KASABA, R.: Turkey in Modern World. p. 432.
[14] AJ- 334-26-175.
[15] STOJADINOVIĆ, M.: Ni rat ni pakt, Jugoslavija izmedju dva rata. p. 392.

meeting of the Balkan Pact in Athens, they will confirm the common positions of all four countries.[16]

Afterwards in April 1937, Ismet Inonu visited Belgrade. New Turkish Prime minister Celâl Bayram made a visit to Belgrade in 1938, and the last bilateral visit happened in 1938, when Yugoslavian General Ljubomir Marić was an official guest of the Turkish military maneuvers.[17]

2. Convention for resettlement of the Muslim population

The key moment in Yugoslav-Turkish relations during the period 1935 to 1938 was the signing of the „Convention on the Resettlement of the Turkish Population from the Kingdom of Yugoslavia to Turkey". At the beginning of the 20th century, the entire Balkans were inhabited by different ethnic and religious groups. This diversity of the Balkans, and especially of Macedonia, was the result of the five-century Ottoman rule in that territory.

With the expulsion of the Ottomans from Macedonia in 1912, the Muslim element that had lived in these territories for centuries became undesirable for the rest of the Balkan Christian states. However, the Second Balkan War and then the First World War made it impossible to start the inevitable process of emigration of this population. After the First World War, conditions were created for the systematic and planned emigration of the Muslim population. It is estimated that there were about 170,000 Turks in the territory of South Serbia alone, and according to the first census from 1921 in the Kingdom of Croats, Serbs and Slovenes, where the population was enumerated according to their native tongue, about 150,000 Turks were enumerated in the territories of the entire SHS, and in the territories of the Vardar Banovina or until its formation of the Bitola, Skopje, Bregalnica and Kosovo regions, 119,000 Turks.[18] The Muslim population in the new state was not happy and could not bear the subordinate position in which they found themselves. After 1923 and the signing of the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey's new policy was to attract as many Muslim people as possible to settle in Turkey. There were several reasons for such a policy of Turkey. First of all, the new Turkish state saw itself as the smallest possible territory, and with that it insisted that all Turks should settle and thus an ethnically homogenous Republic of Turkey would be formed. The new Turkish state was severely underpopulated, which made it impossible to successfully implement large growth plans on a vast territory, and the population that was insufficient played a key role. The assimilationist policy towards the Kurds also played an important role. Ankara displaced them assimilative in the majority Turkish areas, and brought and settled the Turkish population from the former Ottoman territories in their place.[19] Turkey continued this policy and after that in 1925 a Turkish-Bulgarian agreement was signed on the voluntary emigration of Turks from Bulgaria and Bulgarians from Turkey. This contract was amended in 1937, and in 1934 Turkey signed a convention with Romania for the evacuation of the Turkish population from Dobrudja. Although emigration

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[16] AJ- 334-26-177.
[17] AJ- 370-4-24.
[18] Дефинитивни резултати пописа становништва 1921 године, Сарајево, 1932, 88-123.
[19] JOVANOVIC. V.: In Search of Homeland? Muslim Migration from Yugoslavia to Turkey, 1918-1941. Tokovi istorije, 2008/1-2, pp. 56-67.

from Yugoslavia started immediately after the end of the First World War, this process took on a completely different intensity in the second half of the 1930s. These changes are the result of the Law on Colonization passed by the Turkish Parliament on June 14, 1934[20] and the conventions signed with Romania and Bulgaria.

The Turkish authorities estimated that in 10 years from the adoption of this law, around 600,000 Turks will move from the Balkans to Turkey. Upon entry into force, the law provided a loan for the costs of this process. During the 1936 session of the Turkish Parliament, the Minister of the Interior, Şükrü Kaya, stated that from 1923 until now, around 600,000 Turks from different countries had settled in Turkey, of which around 200,000 voluntarily and 400,000 through various agreements.[21] The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia estimated that from 1918 to 1925, 21,500 Turks permanently emigrated from Yugoslavia. This information, the new law passed by the Turkish Parliament, the conventions with Bulgaria and Romania and Ankara's tendencies reported by the Yugoslav embassies encouraged Belgrade to take a more serious approach to this issue. According to the 1935 census, Turkey had 16,188,767 inhabitants, and the increase in 8 years was more than 2.5 million inhabitants. This increase, in addition to the high birth rate, was also the result of numerous migrations. However, Turkey was a large country and with this number of people it was sparsely populated. With an area of 783,356 square kilometers and according to the 1935 census, Turkey had a population density of 20 inhabitants per square kilometer. In addition, Istanbul alone had a population of 740,751[22] in 1935. The Yugoslav government, especially the Serbian element that dominated it, aimed to relocate the Muslim population. Their relocation to Albania was impossible for several reasons: first of all, Albania did not have the financial power to accept them, and even if it had, it would not accept them because Tirana would not be able to maintain its irredentist goals. The ambassador of Yugoslavia in Turkey thought that their relocation to Turkey was a much better and more realistic solution, because by doing so they would withdraw from that territory forever, and they would be completely assimilated in Turkey. Albania will always return them and they will demand their rights and property, while moving to Turkey would mean a definitive solution.[23] The report that the ambassador submitted to Belgrade[24] after the arrival of Milan Stojadinović at the head of the government was taken seriously, and thus the government's conclusion on the manner of treatment towards the Albanians was made. In order to encourage Albanians to emigrate, it was necessary to pass several legal solutions. The factual situation is that the Albanians are doing well in Yugoslavia and that if they want to leave it, they would only leave it to go to Albania. However, Tirana did not accept them and carried out constant propaganda that they should stay there, until those territories would be liberated and annexed to Albania. Proposals for legal measures were, the introduction of a large land tax, dividing the land by class and charging taxes on that basis, because Albanians and Turks had the best land inherited from the time of the Ottoman Empire, banning the cultivation of tobacco, which was the main item for smuggling for the Albanians and of which they received huge sums of illegal money, strict measures to ban forest cutting, so the Albanians who held this job for Pristina, Djakovica, Skopje, Podujevo, Peć and Prizren would be denied

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[20]   AJ- 370-9-630.
[21]   AJ- 370-9-629.
[22]   AJ- 370-3-81.
[23]   AJ- 411-2-37.
[24]   AJ- 37-22-365

another benefit and banned from bringing livestock into the cities, due to numerous livestock diseases. Other proposals were aimed at forced cultural assimilation, which the authorities assumed they would reject with disgust, such as the compulsory sending of female children to school.[25] Ministry of foreign affairs of Yugoslavia organized meeting in September 1935. On this meeting representatives of five ministries were called, Ministry of Interior, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of Traffic, Foreign Affairs and Ministry of Defense.[26] The reason for this session was the creation of a plan for the emigration of the Muslim population from the Vardar Banovina, consideration of the basic problems and distribution to the relevant departments of the future procedures that should be implemented, so that this plan would go smoothly both in the internal and external political field. The meeting also discussed questions of experience, that is, how the entire process unfolded in Romania, and several conclusions were reached:[27] not to allow property to be sold in Bosnia when moving, concentrate on the territories of Vardar Banovina, to provide a loan of 22 million dinars to cover the costs of the entire operation, ensure safe and cheap transport routes, that 3,000 Serbian colonists would settle on the 15,000 hectares that would be released, that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs initiates this resettlement issue with the Turkish government, those who apply to move to get rid of taxes and military obligations, to offer various compensations, such as handing over property for free transportation, partial payment of transportation, and issuing free immigration passports. At the session, the conclusion was reached that Turkey would have the possibility to receive at least 200,000 Muslims from Yugoslavia in two to three years. The next meeting of the group was scheduled for October 1, 1935, where the goal was for each relevant department to review all issues from its scope with the sectors in its ministry and present the problems likely to face and to propose solutions for them.[28]

In March 1938, Stojadinović proposed[29] that negotiations on the convention be held during the session of the Balkan Pact. Rüştü Aras agreed with this proposal, however, that the negotiations be after the official protocol. The negotiators were appointed from the Yugoslav side, Ivan Vukotic, the Yugoslav representative to Istanbul, and from the Turkish side, Hasan Saka, then a member of the Turkish parliament, and after the Second World War, prime minister of the Republic of Turkey.[30] The convention signed on July 11, 1938 included Muslims from Yugoslavia who speak the Turkish language and have Turkish culture, as the convention itself was called. The convention contained 21 articles in which all aspects of resettlement were contracted.

The signing of the convention in Yugoslavia did not receive much media attention, and there was a short article in the Belgrade „Politica"[31] about the fact that the convention had been signed. The Turkish press treated this convention as it did with the conventions it concluded with other countries, celebrating and presenting them as Turkey's recovery from the painful and long years of war and pressure, the

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[25] AJ- 37-22-365.
[26] AJ- 370-9-638.
[27] AJ- 370-9-640.
[28] AJ- 370-9-641.
[29] AJ- 370-9-774.
[30] AJ- 441-2-61.
[31] Потписана конвенција са Турском, Политика, 11. 07.1938.

general picture that the Kemalist regime placed in the public was that all Turks in the world now they have their own homeland where they are welcome.

This convention was satisfactory for both signatories, and mostly for those emigrants in Yugoslavia who, in accordance with its provisions, received the right to move away. However, the Albanian government tried with all its might to thwart this convention and present it in a negative context. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Yugoslavia stated that people appeared in the Vardar Banovina who agitated the Muslim population not to leave their homes and properties and not to accept the convention.[32]

After the convention was initialed, the parliaments of Yugoslavia and Turkey had to ratify it in order for it to enter into force. As Ataturk died shortly after the signing, Turkey entered a phase of internal problems that were quickly overcome, and soon Milan Stojadinović also retired from the post of Prime Minister. Everything was delayed in the matter of ratification and at the beginning of the Second World War the convention was never ratified and implemented. The emigration of the Turkish population continued in the fifties of the 20th century, with the convention between SFR Yugoslavia and Turkey.

Conclusion

The development of Yugoslav-Turkish relations in the period from 1935 to 1938, especially their bilateral relations within the framework of the Balkan Pact, the joint participation in international politics and mutual support indicated the importance of relations between the two countries on the eve of the Second World War and the turbulent years for several reasons. The importance of understanding these relationships, first of all, refers to the period that was researched, because in world history, it is the period when the change of the international system took place. Such a change was complex for the politics of each country, especially at international level. As a result of these changes, which took place on the world political scene, many countries suffered and failed to find their way in the new era and survive it. In those pre-war years, when very few politicians could foresee the coming war, and even less its scope at the world level and its consequences, it is important to determine what the two countries did to stay away from the major world conflict. The goals of Yugoslavia and Turkey after 1935 were very similar, they needed internal reformation, economic progress, improvements in the security system and environment, and changes in internal politics, especially resolving ethnic issues.

Due to the sudden complication of the political and security situation in Europe and the beginning of the Second World War, Yugoslavia's goals were not realized, and it did not persist on the path of neutrality, while Turkey managed not to participate in this world war and save itself from further destruction. The reason that Turkey was able to preserve its neutrality was its geographical positions, the constant political leadership it had, although Mustafa Kemal died in 1938, his policies were continued by his successors. Unlike Turkey, Yugoslavia did not withstand the pressure it was subjected to by Germany and England, although it lamented, but in the end it was

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[32] AJ- 441-2-43.

attacked by Germany, as a result of a combination of clumsy political decisions and the internal contdition of the country.

Yugoslav-Turkish cooperation continued after the Second World War, rounding off the process of the emigration of Turks from Macedonia and the Balkan Pact from 1953, in which Greece, Turkey and Yugoslavia participated, which was essentially the security protection of Yugoslavia under the auspices of NATO.

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LUKÁCS KRAJCSÍR[1]

WE DID NOT COME IN PEACE – CZECHOSLOVAKIA'S WAR WITH THE UKRAINIAN INSURGENT ARMY, 1945-1947

Abstract

After the outbreak of the Russian-Ukrainian war, the debate about the role of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) before, during and after the Second World War has been reignited – mostly because of their struggle against the Polish and Soviet authorities. However, there are only a few sources and publications dealing with Czechoslovakia: this despite the fact that the country waged a three-year armed conflict against the UPA. This paper presents this lesser-known part of the Ukrainian independence fight. Most of the chapters are devoted to describing the events „on the front" between 1945 and 1947. At the same time, the importance of propaganda and the war's impact on the society are not neglected either – especially the intensive 'fake news' campaign, which may even have influenced the Czechoslovakian election in 1946. As will be seen in the last chapter, not every stone is unturned, but there are still some uncertain claims, data and explanations about the war.

Keywords: Czechoslovakia, Soviet Union, Poland, UPA, OUN, StB, military actions and campaign, propaganda, election in 1946

"*We, the Ukrainian rebels, are acknowledging that we have come to your territory. We came not as enemies, but rather guests. We brought the truth to Your nation and the population of Your state about the oppression of peoples and humanity by the Moscow-Bolshevik imperialists. You, Mr. President have already been informed of our arrival, but this news was certainly disingenuous. You know: the Bolshevik emissaries and agents have always described us very negatively. This is an old and well-known method of the Bolshevik oppressors when they are speaking about liberation movements which were established by those people who were oppressed by them. The most democratic-revolutionary movements which are oppressed by Bolsheviks are called by them* [Bolsheviks – KL.] *fascist, reactionary, counter-revolutionary etc. A sober-minded person, however, can easily see where the roots of truth are lying. A sane person knows: the true essence of the movement's leadership is not in the name of the liberation movement itself, but rather lies in the ideological content for which it is fought. We, with our entire nation, are fighting nothing more than liberation from the Bolshevik yoke. Yet, we have no territory claims*" – an unknown member of the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) wrote down these words. More interesting is the fact that the letter, which the Czechoslovak authorities intercepted, was addressed to Edvard Beneš, the then President of Czechoslovakia.[2]

This was not the first nor the last time when the members of the Ukrainian resistance tried to directly communicate with the Czechoslovakian leadership and

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[1] ORCID: 0000-0003-1434-523X

[2] List UPA dr. Benešovi. In: Archiv bezpečnostních složek (ABS), Fond I. Hlavni sprava Vojenske kontrarozvědky (f. 302), sign. 302-142-6 – Undated.

convince them to support them. The Organisation of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which was established in 1929, struggled for decades for the creation of an independent state or at least for broad autonomy in the region. Although the Ukrainian nationalists fought mostly against the Soviets, Poles and, during the Second World War, against the German and Hungarian forces, sometimes they came to be confronted with the Czechs, too. Indeed, few days before Czechoslovakia fell apart in 1939, the Ukrainian nationalists staged a coup in Transcarpathia and clashed with the Czechoslovakian 12th Division in Khust. Despite the failure of their action, Prague accused them puppets of the Axis powers, who paved the way for Hungarian rule in the region. The armed clashes between Ukrainians and Czechs (who fought in the Red Army or in the Polish resistance) also had a very negative effect on the OUN's perception in society. There was no shortage of atrocities either: the massacres in the Volynyi area of western Ukraine claimed not just thousands of Polish and Ukrainian lives, but also 350 Czechs.[3]

According to the previous examples, it came as no surprise that after the end of Second World War in Europe, the Czechs remained distrustful to the UPA's cause. Are the 'Banderites' (*banderovci*) – named after their leader Stepan Bandera – posing a serious threat? Should we fight them and cooperate with our Polish and Soviet allies? How should the government and authorities respond to a possible attack from the Ukrainian insurgents? It did not take a long time to get answers to the questions.

Not so 'Passive Territory'

Despite the intensive fights in the region after 1945 between Ukrainians and Poles/Soviets, the returning Czech government members –Democratic and Communist alike – did not consider the Banderites a serious threat. In that time the leadership focussed on other urgent things, like the implementation of the Košice Programme (5 April 1945),[4] the reorganization of the public administration and services; the reestablishment of the Czechoslovakian Army; or repelling any possible attack of the still fighting Nazi forces in the Western part of the country. Moreover, the Czechoslovakian military armed command and the intelligence considered the UPA's threat so low that they declared the whole area of Eastern Slovakia a '*passive*

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[3] ROSSOLIŃSKI-LIEBE, Grzegorz: Stepan Bandera: The Life and Afterlife of a Ukrainian Nationalist Fascism, Genocide, and Cult. Ibidem Press, Stuttgart, 2014. p. 597. ISBN 978-3-8382-6684-8

[4] "*On 5 April 1945, the Košice Programme of the new "Czechoslovak Government of the National Front of Czechs and Slovaks", was proclaimed. This made clear that the immediate post-war period was not going to be a time of forgiveness and reconciliation, but rather one of retributive justice, and that it was going to seize the historic opportunity to rid the state of both Slavic nations' traditional competitors – the Germans and the Hungarians – and so make Czechoslovakia into a national state of the Czechs and Slovaks. Sections 8 and 9, which dealt with war criminals, collaborators, traitors and (in the same breath) the German and Hungarian minorities, were blunt: all ethnic Germans and Hungarians living on Czechoslovak territory before the signing of the Munich Agreement were to have their Czechoslovak citizenship revoked*" For more about the programme see: HEIMAN, Mary: Czechoslovakia, The State that Failed. Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 2009. pp. 204-207 ISBN: 978-0-300-17242-3

territory', where nothing happens and foreign attack is not expected. [5] It did not take a long time to see that this statement was based on an illusion. On 13 August, the first Ukrainian units of the armed resistance were registered in Spišská Stará Ves and Medzilaborce. These first groups avoided any type of confrontation with locals and authorities alike. They refrained to reconnaissance and did some propaganda work to improve their image among Slovaks.[6] However, the sluggish reaction of the Czech authorities encouraged other Ukrainian groups: ten days later a bigger UPA force – estimated at between 900 and 10.000 – entered Suché and Príkrou u Svidníka villages.[7] In order not to provoke unnecessary attention, they divided into smaller sotnyas[8] and took some villages in districts of Giraltovce, Prešov and Stropkov. The main forces of the Ukrainian fighters moved towards Humenné in eastern Slovakia – they goal was to capture the town and with it secure the routes to Transcarpathia, which for a short time it belonged *de jure* to Czechoslovakia, but *de facto* it was under Soviet occupation and administration.[9]

The Czechoslovakian 10th Infantry Division, stationed near Košice, seemed the only potential force which could stop the invaders. But the first attempts to slow down the UPA's advance ended poorly, because the 117-member Samo unit refused to fight. When they finally engaged with the enemy, the results were disappointing, so the whole unit seems to have been dissolved by mid-September. Beneš, fearing the loss of Košice (again), did not order the defence of the city, but rather a counter-attack. The Czechoslovak Defence Ministry withdrew two Moravian machine-gun companies from the western borders and sent them to heast. The National Security Board (*Sbor národní bezpečnosti/SNB*) – which had only been established a few months before –, sent armed contingency units into the conflict zone. The Czechoslovakian Army received artillery and air support from the Red Army. Even though the Czech-Russian forces were preparing for an intensive campaign, the Ukrainian insurgents learned about the upcoming attack. So, they withdrew they fighters from the Czechoslovakian territories. Before leaving the country, the sotnyas created a panic among the Slovaks to slow down the coming forces. They spread false rumours, like Lavrenty Beria, the Soviet Interior Minister, personally leads the Soviet troops (NKVD) in the retaliation and they show no mercy to civilians.[10]

Immediately following the UPA's departure, the region became much more tranquil. There were only sporadic gunfights at the border, but no major clashes between the UPA and the Czech authorities. Yet meanwhile the attacks against the

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[5] Banderovci jako téma Historického magazínu. 3 May 2007; https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/archiv/1462007-banderovci-jako-tema-historickeho-magazinu (downloaded: 22 September 2022)

[6] ŘEPA, Tomáš: Banderovci v Československu 1945–1947. Vybrané politické a vojenské aspekty. Securitas Imperii,-2019/1. p. 120

[7] ŠACH, Jan: Vpád banderovců na území Československa v letech 1945–1947. 24 June 2015; https://www.vhu.cz/vpad-banderovcu-na-uzemi-ceskoslovenska-v-letech-1945-1947/ (downloaded:22 September 2022)

[8] SOTNYA: originally it means a Cossack (cavalry) company, but in the 20th Century it was also used by the armed forces of the Russian, Ukrainian and some Balkan (e.g. Croatian) peoples to refer to a company-sized force.

[9] HEIMAN op. cit. pp. 220–222

[10] ŘEPA, Tomáš: Ukrajinští nacionalisté a komunistická propaganda. Zneužití tématu v Československu po roce 1945. Paměť a dějiny, 2014/2. p. 51

civilians increased. In the last weeks of 1945, another wave of 'Banderites' reached the towns and villages along the eastern part of the Czech-Polish borderline. However, as far as these Ukrainian groups are concerned, the methods and goals significantly deviated from the previous ones. The sotnyas did not want to convince the Slovaks and did not seek support among the locals; rather, they sought to create a stable 'hinterland' for the UPA. This meant that they saw the Czechoslovakian territories as a base of supply and recreation for the Ukrainian militants. Several atrocities were committed by them: the Czechoslovakian authorities registered at least thirty murder cases.[11] These Banderites' actions served not exclusively material objectives like acquiring food, clothing, or information. For example, in the village of Ulič, Alexander Stein, the forest ranger and member of the Communist Party of Slovakia (Komunistická strana Slovenska/KSS) was executed – together with his wife and two female relatives. An even larger massacre took place in Kolbasov. An unknown number of gunmen isolated a street where the Jews lived and stormed in the house where the locals were celebrating the end of Hanukkah. Only the 17-year-old Helena Jakubičová survived the brutal attack, thanks to hiding under her bed, which was covered with feather pillows.[12] The Czechoslovak leadership, however, was not yet able to retaliate. Instead, it concentrated on the reinforcement and reorganization of the border troops. The districts of Medzilaborce and Snina, just like the SNB contingency units, were placed under a military leadership. From the 4th Rapid Division and the 9th Division a joint border brigade was formed in Mid-December 1945: the 'Jánošík' codenamed unit was led by experienced World War veteran General Jan Stanek. They engaged only with those sotnyas who crossed the border. Also, they formed a joint Czechoslovak-Polish-Soviet military-security cooperation against Ukrainian insurgents.[13]

After the number of clashes had dropped significantly in 1946, Prague's attention and resources were concentrated on other important matters, such as the Peace Conference in Paris, speeding up the German expulsion, 'Reslovakizing' the Hungarian population, or providing help to Jewish refugees to reach the American occupied zones in Austria and Germany. Due to the relative calm on the Czechoslovak-Polish border, the numbers of the Jánošík group declined. In the end, the leadership replaced them with the Otto Group – named after its leader Colonel Otto Wagner. This unit consisted of three infantry battalions, one machine gun battalion and a company of armoured vehicles as a reserve. They task was 'simple': guarding an approximately 200-kilometre-long border line, preventing the infiltration of Ukrainian insurgents, and working with the Polish and Soviet authorities if needed.

The War of Words

Seeing the Czechoslovaks' passivity, the UPA immediately began to adopt a new kind of strategy. This meant they concentrated more on the spreading of pro-Ukraine propaganda among Slovaks and Rusyn minorities, mostly using leaflets and rumours. Their goal was to win te sympathy and support of the local population – or if this

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[11] Rossoliński-Liebe op. cit. p. 268
[12] Jancura, Vladimír: Armády troch štátov proti banderovcom. 12 April 2022; https://zurnal.pravda.sk/neznama-historia/clanok/623027-armady-troch-statov-proti-banderovcom/ (downloaded: 22 September 2022)
[13] Šach op. cit.

could not be achieved, then just increase the tension between Czechs and Slovaks. The pro-OUN/UPA propaganda often used anti-communist, anti-religious and sometimes anti-Semitic slogans. The latter proved to be a particularly serious problem in Slovakia, where between 1945 and 1948 several pogroms broke out; e.g. it happened in Bratislava, Topoľčany and Žilina.[14] Also, there were cases of Slovak agitators who had once been members of the far-right Hlinka Guard (the paramilitary armed organization of the fascist Slovak People's Party during WW II), but now they helped the UPA. Moreover, some of the Communist partisans, who were disappointed with the new leadership, did not receive their salaries, nor were employed in the new administration, also took part (directly or indirectly) in the spreading of the Ukrainian propaganda across Slovakia. Although the Communists later exaggerated the Czechoslovakian Greek Catholic church role, it is undoubtful that some priests agreed with OUN goals and sometimes they helped the insurgents to get false documents or money if they wanted to emigrate to the West.[15]

Of course, the Czech side also used the tools of the propaganda. The military leadership ordered political education for the soldiers and introduced the institution of political officers in the army. As a political officer's seminar on 11 June 1946 pointed out, their two – of ten – main objectives were: "*to educate for unity and brotherhood between Czechs and Slovaks*" and "*aim for moral and political education in the spirit of a brotherhood and alliance of Slavic peoples under the leadership of the Soviet Union*".[16] Even a dedicated newspaper was printed for the soldiers, border guards and interior forces who fought against the UPA: Fighter for Eastern Slovakia (*Bojovník za Východné Slovensko*). In parallel, the Communist agitators toured the eastern part of Czechoslovakia to describe the UPA/OUN the most serious threat to Czechoslovakia's sovereignty and security after the Second World War.[17] With the blessing of the CPC, they spread fake 'direct connections' between the Democratic Party (*Democratická strana/DS*) and the OUN, not to forget to mention the 'American threads' in the background. This proved to be very effective, because during 1946 the number of police reports and free volunteers significantly increased in Czechoslovakia. In Czech society, the image of the Banderites became very negative: their perception was equated with the SS and the Gestapo.[18]

The OUN propaganda also had quite remarkable consequences on the Czechoslovakian parliamentary elections in May 1946 – even though it is still an ongoing debate in Czech and Slovak historiography to what extent the war against the UPA affected the voting of the citizens. According to the statistics, the Communist Party of Slovakia achieved only 30% of votes in Slovakia (while the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia got more than 60% in Czech and Moravian lands), and the Democratic Party won over 61%. The Ukrainian propaganda seemed to be successful in the border districts – except in Medzilaborce, where the loclas had experienced the atrocities of the Banderites –, where the Rusyns and Greek Catholics lived in large

[14] More about the Slovakian pogroms, like in Topoľčany: WEIN, Martin: A History of Czechs and Jews: A Slavic Jerusalem. New York, 2015. pp. 127-130

[15] ŘEPA (2014) op. cit. p. 56

[16] FIALA, Jan: Zpráva o akci B. pp. 99-100

[17] ŘEPA (2014) op. cit. p. 52

[18] Zasobovani banderovců – prověřeni zpravy z 2. 5. 1946. In: ABS, Fond Sbirka pisemnosti utvarů SNB mapujici činnost organizace UPA na uzemi Československa v letech 1947–1948 (f. 307.), sign. 307-97-1

numbers. The reports of the State Security (*Státní bezpečnost/StB*) even suggested that even in the inner regions of Slovakia, the people viewed the military actions against the Ukrainian insurgents as inadequate, pointless, and unnecessary efforts.[19] It is not surprising that both, the CPC and CPS, later explained the Communist defeat in Slovakia with the 'active cooperation' between the Slovak Democratic Party and the OUN. With the help of the StB and the Soviet NKVD they even created false evidence to underpin the 'connecting links' between the 'Western imperialist powers' and Ukrainian nationalists, because the DP wanted to resurrect the Tiso-type 'independent' Slovakia. These manufactured 'facts' reported almost every type of assistance: from food supplying via arms smuggling to laundering the Ukrainian insurgents in the Slovak press. Moreover, after the Communist takeover in 1948, some of the democratic-liberal politicians were brought to justice because they helped the UPA's fight. For example, the court sentenced Ján Ursíny, the former Deputy Prime Minister and DP politician for years, on the not proven occasion that he had helped the "Banderites couriers".[20]

Operation Wide Garden Rake

Returning to the events on the 'front', in mid-Match an unprecedented military campaign started with three sotnyas (cca. 400 fighters) – two of them (Miron and Karmeluk groups) had already fought in Czechoslovakia in 1945, so they knew the opponent, the terrain and the locals very well. The Otto group took up the fight, but they could not hold back such an insurgent advance, only slow down their movement. So, by the end of the month, the UPA controlled 33 villages in the eastern part of Czechoslovakia. The intensive Ukrainian propaganda paid off because the locals received the UPA forces differently. For example, in some cases the reception was warm and friendly – they gave them dinner, accommodation or even openly agreed with their goals (*Down with Polish and Soviet Communism!*). At the same time, where the authorities did not flee from the villages, they showed resistance against the Banderites, who took hostages or looted and set buildings on fire.

In response, the Czechoslovakian Army's leadership organized and executed the largest offensive military operation in the post-1945 history of Czechoslovakia: the *Wide Garden Rake* (*Široké Hrábě*). 14 infantry and machine gun battalions, two artillery detachments, one tank battalion, an air force squadron took part in this action. This meant that from 21 April, 7000 soldiers and members of the SNB moved against the Ukranian sotnyas.[21] Despite the great preparations, the Czech counter-attack, led by General Jan Heřman, proved to be slow – there were days when they covered only ten kilometres. The reason behind this was not only the fierce resistance nor the

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[19] HONZÁK, Jaroslav: Banderovská apokalypsa. http://www.ceskenarodnilisty.cz/clanky/Banderovci12.htm (downloaded: 22 September 2022)

[20] ŠMIGEĽ, Michal: V boji s banderovci na Slovensku (1945-1947). Aktivity československých bezpečnostních složek proti UPA – spolupráce s Polskem a SSSR. In: VOLNÁ, Kateřina (Ed.): Aktivity NKVD/KGB a jejich spolupráce s tajnými službami střední a východní Evropy 1945–1989. Ústav pro studium totalitních režimů, Praha, 2009., pp. 217-226; ŘEPA (2019) op. cit. pp. 128-132

[21] ŠACH op. cit.

forested and mountainous terrain, but the rivalry between the Czechoslovak Army and the SNB. The latter's gunmen often engaged in combat without orders, but sometimes they had a very big lack of experience, ammunition, weapons, and equipment, like functioning radios. As Colonel Jaroslav Piskáček described in his interview: "*Initially, each machine gunner was allowed a total of 210 rounds of ammunition. Those with rifles had perhaps 60 rounds. […] I asked them how much ammunition they had left, when I'd used up the last of the drum magazine. That's when I found out that he had twenty rounds left and another one had fifteen. And those who had machine guns, they were also almost completely empty. So, I yelled: Cease fire! Boys, keep a bullet for yourselves, because they do only one thing to their prisoners. There was a corporal who was captured and nailed to the gate, his genitals cut off, stripped naked and crucified by his hands and feet, like Jesus Christ*".[22]

Despite all the difficulties, the Czechoslovak forces reached the border by the end of the month. After the situation had stabilised on the front and the number of clashes started to decrease, the leadership ordered reorganization and the extraction of the main forces. After the *Wide Garden Rake*, Prague considered the UPA a lesser threat, because most of the foreign fighters in the UPA, like Germans, Hungarians, Romanians and even Slovaks, had died or had been captured. They thought that the remaining Polish and Ukrainian militants will concentrate only on the Polish territories, not on Czechoslovak lands.[23] Also the Czech military command did not want to make any new, unilateral action against the UPA, so they decided to cooperate with the Polish and Soviet forces more than before. On 5 May 1946, a meeting was held in Český Těšín, where Colonel Jan Heřman, and the Polish Deputy Minister of Public Security, Colonel Gregorz Korczyński, agreed on many points. For example: the identification of the agreed recognition signs for Polish and Czechoslovak units; a hotline between the two countries' armed forces; the transfer of Polish 'Banderites' who had illegally crossed the border and got caught by the Czech guards; or the designation of the places where the prisoners and materials should be exchanged.[24] So, in the end, the Otto group (11 200 soldiers and policemen) was dissolved and a much smaller (4 000-member) Teplice was established – and during the second half of the year only a few hour-long small arms fire and light artillery shelling were registered, but with no casualties.

This situation slowly started to change in the spring of 1947. On 9-10 April 1947, light artillery shelled the Slovakian village of Ruská Voľa. In the next weeks dozens of 'Banderites' infiltrated the area, carrying out a series of terrorist attacks against local authorities, public administration employees or civilians. For example, on 21 April three members of the customs service disappeared after they had left the village of Kalinov. A few days later, enraged by the retaliation of SNB units (who sometimes executed the captives in the field), the UPA completely sacked the village of Vydraň – later the remnants of the settlement were incorporated into Medzilaborce.[25] Until mid-May, similar atrocities occurred almost on a daily basis, with no exact civilian

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[22] Interview with Jaroslav Piskáček. https://www.pametnaroda.cz/cs/piskacek-jaroslav-1926 (downloaded: 22 September 2022)
[23] Banderovci jako téma Historického magazínu. 3 May 2007; https://ct24.ceskatelevize.cz/archiv/1462007-banderovci-jako-tema-historickeho-magazinu (downloaded: 22 September 2022)
[24] ŘEPA (2019) op. cit. p. 128
[25] JANCURA op. cit.

casualties known to date. The reason behind the increasing 'Banderites' activism in Czechoslovakia was that in Poland the fighting also intensified. After the UPA successfully assassinated General Karol Świerczewski, the Deputy Minister of National Defence, Warsaw decided to put an end to the issue once and for all. In April 1947, Operation *Vistula* (Wisła) began, the objective of which was to wipe out every remaining sotnya and the deport those Ukrainians who lived in the operation zone. Until end of July, the Polish Army – with the help of Soviets – transported more than 140.000 civilians from the region to the western and northern parts of Poland. The Polish dismantled most of the fighting groups, more than two hundred UPA members were executed and most of the villages were burnt to the ground. Those sotnyas which suffered heavy losses or wanted to avoid the fighting with Polish-Soviet forces decided to leave the country. Their goal was to reach the American- and British-controlled zones of Austria and Germany as soon as possible. The only potential way to successfully reach these destinations lay through Czechoslovakia – very risky indeed, but perhaps they could rely on the locals' help, while the number of the Czech troops on the border was also reduced.

Action B – Countering the UPA 'invasion' in 1947

In the beginning of June, various, sometimes totally *ad hoc* established sotnyas (with altogether 1200 members) prepared for the crossing. However, thanks to Polish intelligence, Prague became aware of the impending 'invasion'. The Czech military command launched the Operation *Akce B* (B in this case means *Banderovci*) to counter the upcoming attack. On 13 June, the size of the Czechoslovakian forces reached 10,400 – 1,339 of them from the SNB Slovakia Regiment – and the leadership even redeployed 1,500 former partisans.[26]

The 'Ukrainian invasion' began on 14 June. Most of the sotnyas were successfully stopped, repelled, or annihilated. Nevertheless, three of them, cca. 500 insurgents, could pass the defence line and avoid the destruction. The first sotnya's leader was Michajlo Duda (alias Chromenko), while the second was commanded by Vladimír Szczygielski (alias Burlak). The third, so called Křemen sotnya, was the least observed one, because they had their own food storages, and avoided contact with the locals or clashes with the Czech authorities. Chromenko's gang moved to the southwest and reached the hills of the Nizké Tatry. The first fighting erupted only in the outskirts of Vernar, but the SNB could not catch them, so the sotnya headed to the north. As a result of the former intensive propaganda – even the local Slovak Socialist newspapers sympathised with the Ukrainian case – some local Slovaks gave food, clothing, and information to the Chromenko's units. On 23 July, the insurgents reached Liptovský Mikuláš, where they clashed with the police forces again. Despite the heavy losses, Chromenko and his men reached the Moravian region and then crossed the German or Austrian border in September. The leader later trained the UPA members and acted as a middleman between the CIA and the OUN – Chromenko lost his life during a paratrooper mission over the Ukrainian territories in the Soviet Union on 7 July 1950.[27]

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[26]   ŠACH op. cit.
[27]   ŘEPA (2019) op. cit. p.138

The sotnya led by Burlak did not have so much luck. From the first day of their arrival into Czechoslovakia, they had many (reportedly 15 combat) engagements. In the beginning, they moved to the south, but in Zlatá Baňa they suffered heavy losses. After the clash they changed their way and moved to the Nízké Tatry. Unlike Chromenko's group, Burlak's sotnya looted and opened fire on the locals. The Czechoslovak armed forces set up a trap around Partizánské Ľupči, which lies at an altitude of 1300 metres. However, the intelligence miscalculated the experience and number of 'Banderites', so the Czech high command sent in mere 'rookies' with insufficient ammo. The result: on 5 August, the Czechoslovaks suffered the biggest battlefield loss (9 fatal casualties, with dozens injured) after 1945. Although Burlak emerged victorious from the battle, the size of the sotnya was reduced to 68 fighters.[28] On 19 August 1947, they suffered another ambush near Strečna, and until they reached the city of Žilina, they clashed constantly with the Czech authorities. At last, the wounded Burlak – together with his girlfriend Ophelia – surrendered on 3 September. Although the sotnya lost their leader, 35-40 Ukrainian insurgents continued their way to the West and reached the American occupation zones.[29]

Burlak and the captured members of his group were interned in camps near Košice – initially promised that that if they cooperate, they would not be extradited to Poland. However, when the captives found out that Prague had reached an agreement with Warsaw, they broke out from the prison on 12 February 1948. The escaped prisoners covered 25 kilometres through an icy and snow-covered terrain before the Czech authorities could capture them again. In the end, Prague extradited 112 bandits to Poland, dozens of whom were executed – including Burlak himself. *Operation B* ended on 17 November 1947, but this did not mean the end of 'banderism' in Czechoslovakia. In the second half of 1948, the authorities still registered UPA movements, clashes, and the murder of Czech civilians. Indeed, as late as July 1949, three Ukrainian insurgents murdered a local resident named František Mandovec in the fortress near Kňovice in central Bohemia – the StB launched a manhunt against the killers and 'neutralised' the threat. [30]

Conclusion: Fog of War

Even though the war between Czechoslovakia and the UPA happened more than seven decades ago, there are still unanswered questions and uncertain claims. A much-debated point about the conflict is the exact number of casualties (on both sides), since not only the secondary but even primary sources differ on this point – the reason behind this could be the politically motivated 'cosmeticisation' of data, as well as the lack of reports about the 'individual' armed clashes (or even atrocities). If we take the 'average number' as a basis, then 49 Czechoslovak soldiers and SNB gunmen died 'heroic deaths' on the battlefield between 1945 and 1947 – while another 20 were killed by friendly fire or in traffic accidents.[31] On the other side, the Czechoslovaks 'neutralised' 350 'Banderites', while others surrendered or were taken as prisoners.[32]

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[28] Banderovci jako téma Historického magazínu
[29] JANCURA op. cit.
[30] Přehled o činnosti banderovců z dne 12.7.1949. In: ABS, fond Vnitřní odbor Hlavní správy VB (f.H 1–4), (číslo jednotky/čj.) 2576. tajné/49–II
[31] ŠACH op. cit.
[32] JANCURA op. cit.

The number of civilian casualties who died at the hands of Ukrainian insurgents or were 'collateral damage' during the actions of the Czechoslovak forces (mainly the SNB), is also extremely discrepant. There are numbers from three(!) to the deliberately exaggerated three thousand. In parallel, the fate of refugees also leaves many questions. The Polish government essentially declared the local Greek Catholics as an enemy; they were accused of being the 'fifth division' of the OUN. Therefore, thousands left the country to avoid persecution. In Medzilaborce alone, the Czechoslovak authorities registered nine thousand Greek Catholic refugees in May 1946. Although Prague deported them back under a military escort, a few hundred of the refugees remained in the Slovak regions. Some were even hidden by the Slovak Greek Catholic Church, who helped them to obtain false baptismal certificates or to escape to the West. On the other hand, the populations of Slovak villages which were attacked or threatened by the UPA were moved to Central Slovakia or to Hungarian-inhabited areas. There are also rough estimates about the material damage: the sotnya of Burlak alone made almost 4 million Czechoslovak koruna of damage, but the sum of all costs (from mobilisation to reparations) ran into few hundred million – which at that time affected the government's budget harshly, because Prague, on Stalin's direct orders, had renounced the Marshall Plan.[33] Moreover, in some municipalities the locals reported 'fictitious' UPA attacks (thus receiving state compensation), but in other cases they did not dare to go for compensation, because they feared of the investigation of the StB.

For all these reasons, since the fall of Socialism and the events in Ukraine in 2014, the UPA's activities in Czechoslovakia have once again become a popular research topic in Czechia and Slovakia. The topic is still not fully processed: only the Czech Archives of State Security Services (ABS) has collected the material on the Banderites in a separate subfund (f. 307), which is 13.8 flowmetres long.

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ISTVÁN BANDI

CONFRONTING THE PAST – THE FIRST STEPS IN EXPLORING THE LEGACY OF STATE SECURITY IN MOLDOVA

Alexandru Malacenco: Instituționalizarea puterii sovietice în RSS Moldovenească în anii 1944–1946: contribuția organelor NKGB-MGB[1] (The institutionalization of Soviet power in the Moldavian SSR in the years 1944–1946: the contribution of the NKGB-MGB bodies).

Bandi, István[2]

Bessarabia, which was part of the Kingdom of Romania between the two world wars, came to the Soviet Union as a result of the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact, and was recaptured by Romanian troops on June 22, 1941, with the start of Operation Barbarossa. However, the war situation turned around in a short time, and the Soviet troops entered the area between the Dniester and Prut rivers again, and in fact, their march continued towards the West. Alexandru Malacenco's volume begins with this Soviet military intervention.

The geographical and historical frameworks

The author determined the chronological starting point in March 1944, when the Red Army troops invaded the territory of Bessarabia and with it the party and the Soviet security services entered the state apparatus, signaling the restoration of the Soviet regime. The second half of 1946 marks the end of the time limit. During this period, the reform of state institutions took place in the Soviet Union, so, among other things, the People's Commissariat for State Security (NKGB) was transformed into the Ministry of State Security (MGB). And this meant not only the renaming of the institution, but also a serious reorganization, the transition from the war to the period of peace, that is, the adaptation of the Soviet state to the post-war reality. Through his research, the author examined these processes focusing on the territory of the Moldavian SSR.

Malacenco sought to clarify the role of the NKGB-MGB in the Moldavian SSR during Sovietization and the institutionalization of Soviet power.

It is extremely beneficial for the reader that Malacenco begins his work by clarifying the use of the term, since - as he states - most authors who discuss the re-

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establishment of Soviet power in the Moldavian SSR use the term „state security bodies", meaning in the Moldavian SSR the activities of the NKGB–MGB.

Thus, for the non-expert reader, he clearly clarified the confusing and inconsistent interpretation of when he uses the terms NKGB, MGB, KGB in the case of the Soviet Union, and when in the Moldavian SSR the names NKGB, MGB, KGB. With this conceptual clarification, he managed to accurately separate the Soviet and member states' state security agencies.

The novelty and scientific originality of the work

It is a pioneering work in Moldavian and Romanian-language historical literature, as it presents in detail the role of state security agencies in the consolidation of Soviet power in Moldova during the mentioned period. The originality of the work is given by its wealth of sources, as the author managed to provide information on the institutional changes that took place in the Moldavian territories based on new sources from the archives of the Republic of Moldova and Romania.

With the systematic archival processing work, in addition to the organizational history of the political police institutions of the time, by examining their activities, he modeled the characteristics of the Soviet security agencies, and presented the logic of how the secret police typically built the totalitarian system of the new member republic „from the shadows". The author's stated goal was to support with a thorough apparatus of notes and sources the specific use of tools and methods by the secret services, with which they contributed to the construction of Soviet power. The method of proof used by the author to demonstrate the direct connection between the consolidation of Soviet power and the intelligence agencies is unique in Moldavian literature. With this, he compared the sovietization that took place in the countries of the former socialist bloc and in a member republic within the Soviet Union.

About the structure of the volume

In three chapters, the author discusses the institutionalization of Soviet power in the Moldavian SSR between 1944-1946, and the contribution of the NKGB–MGB to this. In the first chapter, he examines the role of the NKGB–MGB in the light of historical sources. He elaborates the literature in chronological order, focusing on the extent to which the phenomenon he raises is reflected in works examining different eras.

The archival sources of the topic only became available after the disintegration of the Soviet Union, so the literature cannot be said to be rich. Moreover, the era and the aforementioned state security institutions have only been examined tangentially in the works published to date. The presented literature goes from Soviet historiographical and general works and manuals after the breakup of the Soviet Union to specialized works that discuss the organizational history of state security agencies and sub-issues of this topic.

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The author could not stand on the shoulders of giants since the literature on which his research hypothesis was based only indirectly affected the topic of the volume. From the general literature published after the collapse of the Soviet Union, he mainly used works presenting the historical background, with which he drew the various aspects of socio-economic, political, ideological oppression, anti-Sovietism, and national resistance in the discussed period. The literature dealing with the history of the Moldavian state security agencies is similarly limited, so Valeriu Pasat, comparing his works with specialized archive documents, clarified the role of the Soviet security agencies in the early period of the Sovietization of Moldova, and the specifics of the Soviet Union's cadre policy in the creation of the Moldavian NKGB-MGB.

The author also used the relevant Russian literature without language restrictions, so he compared, among other things, the works of Nikita V. Petrov, especially the historical data and terms relating to the states of Central and Eastern Europe, with the archival sources. With a similar aim, Malacenco turned to the works of Pavel Moraru, from which he took institutional history data, and with sufficient professional criticism, he supplemented in his own volume the organizational history deficiencies that still existed in the historian.

In addition to literary processing, he used rich archival material, primarily the organizational files from the Archives of the Intelligence and Security Service of the Republic of Moldova (Arhiva Serviciului de Informații și Securitate al Republicii Moldova – ASISRM). It should be emphasized that the downgrading of the documents made the research work difficult, but the author, to the great joy of the reading public, finally solved this successfully. As a result of the choice of topic, Malacenco was also forced to research in the archives of the National Council for Examining the Archives of the Securitate (Consiliul Național pentru Studierea Arhivelor Securității – CNSAS), since in mid-1944, due to the war situation, there was a new Soviet reorganization in Moldova, so the mood reports of the Romanian authorities on the behavior of the Soviet security agencies towards the locals, the mandatory seizures, violent measures they said. The author was able to supplement his processing work with additional details of public history and political history with the collections of documents discovered in the National Archives of the Republic of Moldova (Arhiva Națională a Republicii Moldova - ANRM). He supplemented the organizational history of the NKGB-MGB in Moldova based on documents identified in the Archives of Social Political Organizations (Arhiva Organizațiilor Social Politice a Republicii Moldova - AOSPRM) and revealed in detail the process of setting up the NKGB in Chișinău in September 1944.

Of special value is the comparative analysis in which the author compared the organization-building steps taken by the NKGB in Bessarabia in 1944 with its return in the Baltic states in the same period, and the way it was created, based on archival documents. He found surprising identities. During the fighting, the command of the NKGB was set up in a settlement close to the front, and an operations group with a few dozen officers was active in the operational area. The author establishes a similar schedule of organization building in the territory of Moldova and the Baltic states.

The thorough processing of the sources allowed Malacenco to reveal previously unknown peculiarities of organizational history, including the fact that the 3rd Directorate of Military Counter-Intelligence did not exist in the organizational chart of the Moldavian NKGB-MGB, while in the Soviet SSR it did in the NKGB-MGB .

The author paid off an old debt of the profession by analyzing in detail the multi-stage organizational transformation carried out in the spring of 1946, showing all the moments of how the NKGB, the People's Committee of State Security was transformed into the MGB, the Ministry of State Security - in accordance with Moscow's directives. Analyzing the cadre policy, Malacenco paints a very accurate picture of the composition of the professional staff after the war, concluding that a significant part of them - mainly Slavic-speaking - were sent to Moldova from various parts of the Soviet empire, and the number of people employed from the ranks of the local population was negligible, they were just that many to solve the language barriers and to help the operation of the institution with their local knowledge.

In the third part of the volume, the author describes the activities of the old and new Moldavian state security agencies, presenting in detail not only the repressive role, but also the methodology of transforming it into a Soviet-type society. Thus, he analyzes all possible means of operation, from the screening of returnees to the intimidation of the peasantry to the persuasion of children and young people, as well as intellectuals. Thus, it makes the operational principle by which the occupied territory was sovietized completely understandable to the reader.

Malacenco's work is truly a pioneering work, a guiding and promising initiative of scientific value both for Moldavian professional literature and for annexed states that have suffered a similar fate. Methodologically, the source apparatus is wide-ranging, the history of the organization is based on thorough archival research, and from this point of view, the originality of the work that sheds light on political history is beyond doubt. It is precisely this richness of sources that makes previously unknown persons known, and in the case of such a work, a name index would have greatly facilitated their retrieval.

Overall, it can be said that the credibility and originality of the volume *Instituţionalizarea puterii sovietice în RSS Moldovenească în anii 1944–1946: contribuţia organelor NKGB-MGB* also stems from the fact that there were no previous academic works that used thorough archival sources to examine the role of the state security agencies for analysis. Thus, in the period between 1944 and 1946, in the Moldavian SSR, he analyzed the specific methods and tools of the institutionalization of the Soviet communist power in a paradigmatic manner, thereby raising the processing of the era and this phenomenon to a higher academic level.

Alexandru MALACENCO

INSTITUȚIONALIZAREA PUTERII SOVIETICE ÎN RSS MOLDOVENEASCĂ ÎN ANII 1944 – 1946:

CONTRIBUȚIA ORGANELOR NKGB-MGB

Alexandru Malacenco, 1989. He started doctoral school in 2016. He received his doctorate in history in 2022 at the Doctoral School of History, Archeology and Philosophy of the State University of Moldova with a paper entitled Institutionalization of Soviet power in the Moldavian SSR in 1944-1946: the contribution if the NKGB-MGB. This work was launched as a book in 2022 and in March 2023 it was the LAUREATE OF THE MUNICIPAL AWARD for YOUTH in the field of SCIENCE, 2022 edition.

Teza de doctor în ştiinţe istorice a doctorandului Alexandru MALACENCO

„Instituţionalizarea puterii sovietice în RSS Moldovenească în anii 1944 – 1946: contribuţia organelor de securitate a statului”

Conducător de doctorat: Liliana ROTARU, dr. în ştiinţe istorice, conf. univ.
Specialitatea: 611.02 – Istoria românilor (pe perioade)

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Citations

If the author has citations within the text, he has to mark them with raised numbers (superscripts) in the order of their appearance, immediately following a passage of research information. At the foot of that same page, a note beginning with the corresponding number identifies the source of information.

First citations

If we have a list of citations (bibliography), the first citation has to comprise at least: the author's name, his full address, the page-numbers of the citation, in such a way to be easily identified in the list of biographical references.

Examples:

1. KOVÁCS, Jenő: Roots of the Hungarian Military Science, ideological problems of its development. p. 6.

2. ÁCS, Tibor: Military culture in the reform era. p. 34.

3. BEREK, Lajos: Basic elements of research work in Military Science. p. 33.

4. www.globalsecurity.org/army/iraq (downloaded: 19 April 2012)

List of biographical references (biography):

We have to fill the list by arranging the authors' name in alphabetical order.

Examples:

1. ÁCS, Tibor: Military culture in the reform era. Zrinyi Publishing House, Budapest, 2005, ISBN 963 9276 45 6

2. BEREK, Lajos: Basic elements of research work in Military Science. In: Tivadar SZILÁGYI (Ed.): Excerptions. Zrínyi Miklós Military Academy, Budapest, 1944. pp. 31-50.

3. KOVÁCS, Jenő: Roots of the Hungarian Military Science, ideological problems of its development. New Defense Review, 2005/3. pp. 1-7, ISSN 1216-7436

4. www.globalsecurity.org/army/iraq (downloaded: 19 April 2012)

Requirements for pictures, sketches, illustrations, diagrams and other appendixes:

−   title of the picture or illustration;

−   source of the picture or illustration (or its drafter);

−   serial number of the picture or illustration, (e.g. 1. picture);

−   if it is possible, a Hungarian legend should be provided when the caption of the picture or illustration is given in a foreign language.

Requirements for abbreviations and foreign terms:

−   foreignisms and abbreviations should be explained – at their first appearance – in the footnote, in Hungarian and in the original foreign language;

−   e. g. WFP – World Food Program – ENSZ Világélelmezési Programja.